FOOTNOTES:

"Inclosure1 in No. 9."Major Gordon, R.E., to Sir F. Bruce."Soo-chow, February 6, 1864."My dear Sir Frederick Bruce,—Par. 1.—"In consequence of the danger which will arise by my delaying inaction with the force any longer in a state of uncertainty, I have arranged with the Footaeto issue a proclamation (which he will send to you), clearing me of any participation in the late execution of the Wangs, and have determined to act immediately."Par. 2.—"The reasons which actuate me are as follows:—I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels; that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of no character; and that the Footae will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner put in, or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at times we should never feel certain."Par. 3.—"I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for the course I am about to pursue; but in the absence of advice,and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk. If I followed my own desire I should leave now, as I have escaped unscathed and been wonderfully successful.But the rabble, called the Quin-san force, is a dangerous body, and it will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government."Par. 4.—"I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave, and the Government does not support the Imperialists.I propose to cut through the heart of therebellion, and to divide it into two parts by the capture of Ye-sing and Liyang."Par. 5.—"If the course I am about to pursue meets your approbation, I shall be glad to hear; but, if not, shall expect to be well rebuked. However,I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most conducive to the interests of our Government."The Footae does not want the force to move against Nankin I imagine, as Tseng-kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself."Par. 6.—"The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some extenuating circumstances in his favour, for his action; and although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an European governor."This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I will answer shortly, I am, &c.,(Signed) "C. G. GORDON."Par. 7.—"P.S.If you would let the matter drop, and make me responsible for my action in the matter,I think it would be more conducive to our good relations with the Pekin Government than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae."C. G. G."

"Inclosure1 in No. 9."Major Gordon, R.E., to Sir F. Bruce.

"Soo-chow, February 6, 1864.

"My dear Sir Frederick Bruce,—

Par. 1.—"In consequence of the danger which will arise by my delaying inaction with the force any longer in a state of uncertainty, I have arranged with the Footaeto issue a proclamation (which he will send to you), clearing me of any participation in the late execution of the Wangs, and have determined to act immediately."

Par. 2.—"The reasons which actuate me are as follows:—I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels; that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of no character; and that the Footae will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner put in, or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at times we should never feel certain."

Par. 3.—"I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for the course I am about to pursue; but in the absence of advice,and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk. If I followed my own desire I should leave now, as I have escaped unscathed and been wonderfully successful.But the rabble, called the Quin-san force, is a dangerous body, and it will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government."

Par. 4.—"I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave, and the Government does not support the Imperialists.I propose to cut through the heart of therebellion, and to divide it into two parts by the capture of Ye-sing and Liyang."

Par. 5.—"If the course I am about to pursue meets your approbation, I shall be glad to hear; but, if not, shall expect to be well rebuked. However,I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most conducive to the interests of our Government.

"The Footae does not want the force to move against Nankin I imagine, as Tseng-kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself."

Par. 6.—"The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some extenuating circumstances in his favour, for his action; and although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an European governor.

"This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I will answer shortly, I am, &c.,

(Signed) "C. G. GORDON."

Par. 7.—"P.S.If you would let the matter drop, and make me responsible for my action in the matter,I think it would be more conducive to our good relations with the Pekin Government than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae.

"C. G. G."

Note.—The parts of the letter in italics are those subjected to review.

Analysis of Major Gordon's Letter.

Par. 1. Now, with regard to this first premise, what right had Major Gordon to make a prospect of danger to the Imperialists a pretext to resumefriendshipandalliancewith the faithless and barbarous wretches who had already implicated him in their revolting atrocities? Major Gordon's duty as a British officer, specially executing the policy of his Government, and leaving it responsible for his conduct, was simple and palpable. To avoid the deathless guilt of participation in the Soo-chow treachery and massacre, he should have repudiated both. What course did he pursue? He wrote and talked a great deal about disgust, indignation, horror, &c., but never took anyactionto fulfil his otherwise worthless protestations. By the only part we find he really performed and did not merely talk, it appears that he actually had theunparalleled audacity, folly, or knavishness, toarrangeterms with the Futai, although any intercourse, arrangement, or communication whatever, upon a friendly basis constituted a direct condonation and approval of the atrocities which would have made an unqualified separation fromallinterests and future connection imperative to any man of honour, humanity, or Christian principle.

Par. 2. The assertion that Gordonknew for a certaintythat Burgevine intended to rejoin the Ti-pings, is best controverted by the following extract from theFriend of China, Shanghae newspaper (issue of September 29, 1864), which, being one of the principal organs among a population of Europeans and Americans, scarcely numbering 2,000 souls, may be credited for being well informed upon affairs in their midst; moreover, the editor was personally acquainted with Burgevine, and was aware, equally with myself, that he entertained no enthusiasm for the Ti-ping cause.

The article referred to states:—

"As for Gordon's assertion to Sir F. Bruce that he knew for a certainty Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels, and that upwards of 300 Europeans—[This estimate is supremely absurd. During the whole time Burgevine was with the Ti-pings, and when everything seemed to favour his enterprise, he could never obtain more than one-third of 300 Europeans]—of no character, intended to join him. This being written in February last, we know for a greater certainty that, at that time, neither did Burgevine meditate anything of the kind, nor were there thirty—the tenth of 300—Europeans in this quarter available for any such game. And though Gordon may have been under an impression that he was writing truth when he made this assertion, his common sense might have told him the thing was as improbable as it has eventually proved incorrect. We say hemayhave been under an impression that he was writing truth. We may not refrain, however, from saying we doubt it. Why, Gordon knew as well as we did that the rebels never sought the assistance of foreigners, did not care to see them in their ranks, and were always jealous of them. Gordon knew right well, moreover, that when Burgevine left Soo-chow he left the rebel service for ever; that he was sick and disgusted with it; and if ever he meditated anything afterwards, it was operation rather as an independent buccaneer than as a Ti-pinggeneral. The assertion—yarn, wilful lie, or whatever it shall be called—did very well, however, in the place it was intended for, viz. Pekin, a place so far away from the scene of action, that there was no possibility of contravening it at the time."

Besides the facts—incontrovertible to those acquainted with the case—in the above refutation of Gordon's "reasons" for his fresh blood-alliance with that cold-blooded murderer, the Futai, another strong argument may be proved against his veracity:—

1. We may be quite sure that the Ti-pings would never have accepted a second time the services of the man who had once betrayed them. From my own knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Chung-wang, I am quite assured on this point. 2. Then with respect to the probable action of Burgevine himself. Having deserted the Ti-ping cause before Soo-chow had fallen, and while its prospects were in vastly more favourable condition than at the period of Gordon's statement, he would, consequently, never be disposed to join when its circumstances had become desperate. 3. As for the "300 of no character," mercenaries would certainly not espouse a failing movement, which, in fact, had become still more "unprofitable" than when the Burgevine-Ti-ping legionaries ran away because, even at that time, they found no sufficient inducement to remain. These propositions cannot fail to damage the "reasons" given by Gordon, because they show that all common sense and reason points to an exactly opposite conclusion. Thus we find that logic reverses Gordon's "reasons," while facts entirely prove the falseness of his statements. The principal argument is the fact that Burgevinedid notjoin the Ti-ping, and the mythical "300" were never more heard about.

Par. 3. This paragraph of Gordon's letter seems to contain about the most severe condemnation of his "reasons" that it would be possible to imagine. He states that "he is open to very grave censure for thecourse he was about to pursue," and that, "knowing the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done," he had made up his mind to "run the risk;" that is to say, he knew that the Manchoo Government would approve the treachery and massacre in which the Futai had involved him; yet such was his obliquity of principle that he actually used as a reason to resume the sanguinary alliance the very fact which should have made his separation from the Manchoo still more imperative.

With regard to the ungenerous, if not treacherous, manner in which Gordon, behind their backs, termed his comrades "the rabble," it is well noticed in the quotation from theHong-Kong Daily Press, at the end of this analysis.

Par. 4. This section of the letter exhibits a very pretty ebullition of overweening self-conceit. If the writer takes the field again, the rebellion cannot last "six months;" without that mighty warrior's hostility, it would last "six years." Well, Bombastes did take the field, but the "rebellion" still flourishes. It will be seen that the blower of his own trumpet modestly puffs his value at only twelve times that of any other officer who might conduct the operations against the Ti-ping.

Par. 5. Concerning this protestation of disinterested motives—"I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations"—I beg to refer my readers to the concluding paragraph of the analysis, when they will find that this statement is no less questionable than others by the same author. With regard to Gordon's excessive care of the "interests of our Government," and his declaration (in paragraph 2 of the letter), "that the Futai will not accept another British officer if I leave the service," the article in theFriend of China, already quoted, continues from where we left off:—"And just as likely to be true was the statement that the Futai would not accept anotherBritishofficer if he, Gordon, left the Chinese service. How did Gordon learn that fact, orthat story? What can there be inBritishofficers that they should be so repugnant to the Deputy Viceroy? What Gordon really meant was:—If I leave, 'the Government' will not find such a faithful tool in any one else as they have found in me."

Par. 6. In this part of the precious letter it is shamelessly declared that "the Futai has extenuating circumstances in his favour" for breaking faith and cruelly butchering the defenceless prisoners at Soo-chow, who solely surrendered upon the terms guaranteed by Gordon himself.

Par. 7. This postscript makes a fitting conclusion to the bad principle and illogical reasoning of the letter we have reviewed. Gordon has the audacity to request that the "matter"—affecting not only his own character, for that is immaterial, but the honour of the British army and the fair fame of England herself—may be "let drop," and to opine that "good relations" should be maintained with the Pekin Government, by no longer expressing any indignation at the immeasurable disgrace reflected upon England by the revolting barbarities perpetrated by her very good Manchoo allies, through the aid, and in the actual presence, of British officers.

Before concluding the analysis of Gordon's apology for resuming active operations with the Futai, it is necessary to make a few further observations. In the first place, it is quite impossible to deduce a sufficient cause from the three "reasons" by which he declares himself to have been actuated (paragraph No. 2). Even suppose we admit the allegations that Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels; that 300 Europeans were ready to join him; and that the Futai would not have accepted anotherBritishofficer, to what conclusion do they lead us? Simply, thatifthese suppositions became realized, the event might prove disastrous to the Manchoo. Now, as Gordon chose to make this his excuse for comfortably passing over the Soo-chow affair, andresuming active service, it is perfectly clear that (whether he intends to convey this meaning or not) he pursued such conduct in the interest of his Imperialist friends; and this reduces the three "reasons" into a plea of duty to the Manchoo. Moreover, from the independent action claimed throughout the letter, the writer does not attempt to justify himself by any pretence of duty to his own Government. British officers, and, indeed, all their countrymen, may well feel astonished and disgusted at the extraordinary reasoning of Gordon, who, though merely the hired mercenary of alocalMandarin (Le Futai), and being totally withoutstatusin the Imperialist service,[72]made his duty to the Manchoo, forsooth, a reason for condoning the atrocities in which they had already involved him, and justifying his future participation in deeds equally abhorrent to every civilized and Christian sentiment.

We now come to the question as to the worth of this plea of duty. Either Gordon was the servant of the Manchoo Government or the British Government. When the English Commons compelled ministers to revoke the Order in Council authorizing the employment of British officers by the Manchoo, and to recall all so employed,in consequence of the Soo-chow massacre, Gordon, eventually, was withdrawn from service with the Futai. Now this proves that he wasbonâ fidethe servant of the British Government, and not only destroys his implied plea of duty to the Government of China, but virtually disclaims any countenance or indorsement of his act in joining the Futai and resuming active operations subsequent to the Soo-chow tragedy. Thus it is palpable beyond any manner of doubtthat the course Gordon pursued wasentirelyaccording to "personal considerations;" was at his own responsibility; and was neither in consonance with duty to his own Government nor that of the Manchoo.

There are but three other motives which might be held to account for Gordon's conduct. The first would be, duty to his God—but this never has been attributed to him, and it would be gross blasphemy to do so; the second, philanthropy, has been professed both by himself and friends; the third, which is pecuniary, has been more frequently ascribed to him. The philanthropical motive will be controverted shortly when we come to a case in which it is attributed to him. With one exception (theChina Mail), the whole European press of China lamented Gordon's connection with the Futai at Soo-chow; still more indignant were the channels of public opinion when they found that he quietly ignored the treacherous massacre by remaining at his post; and then rumours were not wanting with regard to the mercenary motives believed by many people to be the real cause of his return to active service. Major Gordon has not only brought himself into evil repute, but also the service of which he is so questionable a specimen. Take, for instance, the following extract from theFriend of China(issue February 20, 1864):—"If it be true that Major Gordon has again coalesced with Le Futai, he must not blame us if we judge of his motives according to the old maxim, 'actions speak louder than words.' It would seem that his late rejection of rewards from the hand of Kung was simply because of its having been too little for his acceptance, not too vile. His retirement to Quin-san was a safe dodge to quiet public opinion in regard to the Soo-chow massacre.... We hope that he has stipulated for tens of lacs of rupees. Why should a soldier of fortune not make a fortune? When the major returns to Scotland, will any of his 'canny' countrymen ask impertinent questions as to the source of the 'siller'? To be sure,military men who wear Queen Victoria's uniform may hem and haw, cough and look doubtful; but we assure the major that if one British officer can sell his sword, the others have no right to complain about the price.... Dollars cover every defect, and a wealthy soldier can afford to buy the respect which he cannot exact. Let the trade of murder flourish, as it always has done, and may Major Gordon fully enjoy all the wealth that the Manchoos can give, and that mental satisfaction which faithful servitude never fails to bring to those of integrity! Is not faithfulness bought and sold in 'Vanity Fair,' and should that not be looked for in the conduct of a—British soldier?"

If this article were to be literally intended, it would probably indicate the principles of Gordon. It appears very unfair to judge him by the code of honour, civilized morality, and Christian doctrine, when he does not seem either to appreciate such restraints or conform to them; therefore it is possible that the press has been too severe when condemning acts that, in this case, may, perhaps, be rather virtuous than otherwise.

We now bring the analysis of Gordon's "reasons" to a close by the following extract from theHong-kong Daily Press(October, 1864), which refers to paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the letter, and finishes by making a direct accusation of mercenary motives for his coalescence with the Futai:—

"We believe it is well known that had Gordon left, Macartney would have succeeded. Certain it is that Macartney was an applicant for the post when Gordon was nominated, and as he had subsequently completely won the Futai's confidence, there can be little doubt about the matter."It will be seen, therefore, that Gordon's pretexts are shallow subterfuges, which will not stand the test of truth for one moment. He admits he is open to grave censure, but he says, 'knowing as I do that the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk.' That is a nice process of reasoning, certainly!"He then turns round on his comrades—calls them a dangerous rabble, 'which he will make it his duty to see dissolved as quietly as possible, andthat while in course of dissolution it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government.'"Apart from Gordon's unprincipled conduct with respect to the perfidy of the Futai, and to the murder of the Wangs—conduct which must heap disgrace on his name, and for ever prevent him from looking an honest man in the face again—we doubt whether, in the whole page of history, a parallel is to be found of a victorious fortunate commander turning on his comrades in the disgraceful, and we will add treacherous, manner in which Gordon turns on the Quin-san force in the letter before us. Let the reader remember the number of times Gordon had led the Quin-san force to victory—how splendidly they behaved in the campaign which Gordon was about to lead them through when he thus treacherously denounced them! Whatever they were, they had made him what he was; and bad as they might have been, we doubt whether any one of them ever departed more directly from the code of honour laid down by himself than Gordon did in rejoining the Futai, or even whether any one of them so far betrayed his comrades as Gordon does in the letter before us."A letter from Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell, dated Pekin, 21st March, encloses a letter from Mr. Hart, the Inspector of Customs, to Sir Frederic, communicating the important fact that, at the interview which Colonel Gordon had had with the Futai at Soo-chow, about the beginning of February, he, Mr. Hart, acted as interpreter between the two. The ostensible reason for Mr. Hart thus acting was to enable the Futai to exculpate himself, which, according to Mr. Hart, he most completely did. Why did not Gordon mention this important circumstance in his letter to Sir Frederic advising His Excellency that he had again taken the field?[73]How came it that Mr. Acting-Consul Markham in his letter to Sir Frederic announcing the reconciliation, was silent on the point? How came it that General Brown was either ignorant of, or suppressed the fact? How did the fact come to be kept so secret from the public? Not a whisper nor a hint of Mr. Hart's presence is to be detected in the despatches of these officers, let alone the complete vindication of the Futai which that gentleman avers was effected at the interview?"The answer is plain. Mr. Hart is a man of good repute, of high standing, and is a true and faithful servant. The Mandarins have great faith in him, and his word goes a long way. If they sent him to Gordon with an offer of 50,000taels, the colonel might be assured not only that the money would be placed to his credit in any bank in London he might name, but that the transaction would be kept an inviolable secret."There, reader, you have the clue to Gordon's sacrifice of principle, and Mr. Hart's visit to Soo-chow."

"It will be seen, therefore, that Gordon's pretexts are shallow subterfuges, which will not stand the test of truth for one moment. He admits he is open to grave censure, but he says, 'knowing as I do that the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk.' That is a nice process of reasoning, certainly!

"He then turns round on his comrades—calls them a dangerous rabble, 'which he will make it his duty to see dissolved as quietly as possible, andthat while in course of dissolution it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government.'

"Apart from Gordon's unprincipled conduct with respect to the perfidy of the Futai, and to the murder of the Wangs—conduct which must heap disgrace on his name, and for ever prevent him from looking an honest man in the face again—we doubt whether, in the whole page of history, a parallel is to be found of a victorious fortunate commander turning on his comrades in the disgraceful, and we will add treacherous, manner in which Gordon turns on the Quin-san force in the letter before us. Let the reader remember the number of times Gordon had led the Quin-san force to victory—how splendidly they behaved in the campaign which Gordon was about to lead them through when he thus treacherously denounced them! Whatever they were, they had made him what he was; and bad as they might have been, we doubt whether any one of them ever departed more directly from the code of honour laid down by himself than Gordon did in rejoining the Futai, or even whether any one of them so far betrayed his comrades as Gordon does in the letter before us.

"A letter from Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell, dated Pekin, 21st March, encloses a letter from Mr. Hart, the Inspector of Customs, to Sir Frederic, communicating the important fact that, at the interview which Colonel Gordon had had with the Futai at Soo-chow, about the beginning of February, he, Mr. Hart, acted as interpreter between the two. The ostensible reason for Mr. Hart thus acting was to enable the Futai to exculpate himself, which, according to Mr. Hart, he most completely did. Why did not Gordon mention this important circumstance in his letter to Sir Frederic advising His Excellency that he had again taken the field?[73]How came it that Mr. Acting-Consul Markham in his letter to Sir Frederic announcing the reconciliation, was silent on the point? How came it that General Brown was either ignorant of, or suppressed the fact? How did the fact come to be kept so secret from the public? Not a whisper nor a hint of Mr. Hart's presence is to be detected in the despatches of these officers, let alone the complete vindication of the Futai which that gentleman avers was effected at the interview?

"The answer is plain. Mr. Hart is a man of good repute, of high standing, and is a true and faithful servant. The Mandarins have great faith in him, and his word goes a long way. If they sent him to Gordon with an offer of 50,000taels, the colonel might be assured not only that the money would be placed to his credit in any bank in London he might name, but that the transaction would be kept an inviolable secret.

"There, reader, you have the clue to Gordon's sacrifice of principle, and Mr. Hart's visit to Soo-chow."

Beforenarrating the events subsequent to Gordon's return to active operations, and bringing the history of the Ti-ping revolution down to a close, it is necessary to review a despatch written by Sir F. Bruce, the British Minister in China. The document constitutes the only authority, or rather the only official approval, Gordon ever received for rejoining the Futai. It is necessary to notice the same, because, as it was an entirely conditional approval, and the conditions wereneverobserved, it naturally became null and void. It is, therefore, our duty to prove these facts, and thereby elucidate what might otherwise be held to remove the responsibility from Gordon, and, in fact, justify his conduct. The following despatch is the one in question, and it will be seen that it is the reply to Gordon's letter:—

"Pekin, March 12, 1864."Sir,—I have received your letter of the 6th of February, stating the reasons that have led to your continuing operations in concert with the Governor of Kiang-soo. I informed the Chinese Government that I did not feel called upon to interfere with the course you have taken,but that my acquiescence was founded on the passage in their despatch to me, which states, that in any future operations in which a foreign officer is concerned the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations are to be observed, and that I should enclose you the extract of that despatch for your guidance, and as containing the arrangements agreed upon for the future. [1.]"I have received the strongest assurance that it will be strictly adhered to, and that the Governor Le is to be instructed to that effect. I need not impress upon you how essential it is that there should be no repetition of the occurrence at Soo-chow."I fully appreciate the motives that led you, after the correspondence that has taken place, to resume operations at once, and to expose yourself thereby to hostile criticism. You might have limited yourself to a statement of the reasons which rendered the step expedient, and have thrown upon others the onus of decision before committing yourself to any action."But you appear to have felt, as commander of a Chinese force, and as the only person thoroughly acquainted with its composition and with the dangers to which this force, if indiscreetly handled, might give risethat the decision must be based on your representations, and you therefore assumed its responsibility."This honourable and manly conduct on your part entitles you to a frank expression of my opinion on the subject."I think it due to you to state that my concurrence in the step you have taken is founded in no small measure on my knowledge of the high motives that have guided you while in command of the Chinese force,of the disinterested conduct you have observed in pecuniary questions, and ofthe influence in favour of humanity you exercised in rescuing Burgevine and his misguided associates from Soo-chow. [2.]"I am aware of the perseverance with which, in the face of serious obstacles and much discouragement, you have steadily pursued thepacification of the province of Kiang-soo.In relieving itfrom being the battle-field of the insurrection, and in restoring to its suffering inhabitants the enjoyment of their homes and the uninterrupted exercise of their industry, you may console yourself with the assurance that you are rendering a service to true humanity as well as to great material interest. [3.]"It would be a serious calamity and addition to our embarrassments in China were you compelled to leave your work incomplete, and were a sudden dissolution or dispersion of the Chinese force to lead to the recurrence of that state of danger and anxiety from which, during the last two years, Shanghae has suffered."Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to garrison Shanghae indefinitely, and tranquillity cannot be relied on until a civil administration suited to Chinese ideas and habits is firmly established in the province, and until the disorderly and brigand elements which form the force of the Taeping insurrection are either put down or so thoroughly repelled from its frontiers as to leave that unfortunate province in peace."To the force under your command we must look for that result, and to its efficiency and discipline your presence is indispensable. In a body so composed a state of inactivity is full of danger, and I approve your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai's proceedings at Soo-chow,provided you take care that your efforts in favour of humanity are not in future defeated by the Chinese authorities.[74][4.]"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,"Frederic W. A. Bruce."Major Gordon, R.E., &c."

"Pekin, March 12, 1864.

"Sir,—I have received your letter of the 6th of February, stating the reasons that have led to your continuing operations in concert with the Governor of Kiang-soo. I informed the Chinese Government that I did not feel called upon to interfere with the course you have taken,but that my acquiescence was founded on the passage in their despatch to me, which states, that in any future operations in which a foreign officer is concerned the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations are to be observed, and that I should enclose you the extract of that despatch for your guidance, and as containing the arrangements agreed upon for the future. [1.]

"I have received the strongest assurance that it will be strictly adhered to, and that the Governor Le is to be instructed to that effect. I need not impress upon you how essential it is that there should be no repetition of the occurrence at Soo-chow.

"I fully appreciate the motives that led you, after the correspondence that has taken place, to resume operations at once, and to expose yourself thereby to hostile criticism. You might have limited yourself to a statement of the reasons which rendered the step expedient, and have thrown upon others the onus of decision before committing yourself to any action.

"But you appear to have felt, as commander of a Chinese force, and as the only person thoroughly acquainted with its composition and with the dangers to which this force, if indiscreetly handled, might give risethat the decision must be based on your representations, and you therefore assumed its responsibility.

"This honourable and manly conduct on your part entitles you to a frank expression of my opinion on the subject.

"I think it due to you to state that my concurrence in the step you have taken is founded in no small measure on my knowledge of the high motives that have guided you while in command of the Chinese force,of the disinterested conduct you have observed in pecuniary questions, and ofthe influence in favour of humanity you exercised in rescuing Burgevine and his misguided associates from Soo-chow. [2.]

"I am aware of the perseverance with which, in the face of serious obstacles and much discouragement, you have steadily pursued thepacification of the province of Kiang-soo.In relieving itfrom being the battle-field of the insurrection, and in restoring to its suffering inhabitants the enjoyment of their homes and the uninterrupted exercise of their industry, you may console yourself with the assurance that you are rendering a service to true humanity as well as to great material interest. [3.]

"It would be a serious calamity and addition to our embarrassments in China were you compelled to leave your work incomplete, and were a sudden dissolution or dispersion of the Chinese force to lead to the recurrence of that state of danger and anxiety from which, during the last two years, Shanghae has suffered.

"Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to garrison Shanghae indefinitely, and tranquillity cannot be relied on until a civil administration suited to Chinese ideas and habits is firmly established in the province, and until the disorderly and brigand elements which form the force of the Taeping insurrection are either put down or so thoroughly repelled from its frontiers as to leave that unfortunate province in peace.

"To the force under your command we must look for that result, and to its efficiency and discipline your presence is indispensable. In a body so composed a state of inactivity is full of danger, and I approve your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai's proceedings at Soo-chow,provided you take care that your efforts in favour of humanity are not in future defeated by the Chinese authorities.[74][4.]

"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,"Frederic W. A. Bruce.

"Major Gordon, R.E., &c."

[1.] Now, here we have theconditionupon which Sir F. Bruce agreed to Gordon's action. Let us see how the condition has been observed. If my readers will take the troubleto turn back to the preceding chapter, they will find that the capture of Hwa-soo and Wu-see (as corroborated by the letter dated "April 28, 1864," from one of Gordon's own officers) was followed with a complete violation of Sir F. Bruce's conditional "acquiescence" by the wholesale massacre of the unfortunate Ti-pings. Furthermore, the following chapter will prove that at every city captured by Gordon and the Imperialists "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations" werenotobserved, nor even pretended to be fulfilled according to the terms of the condition upon which Gordon's action was approved: the principal cases referred to will be found to be the capture of Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, Chang-chow-foo, and Nankin.

[2.] The preceding quotation from theHong-kong Daily Press, and the description of Burgevine's hegira in Chapter XXII., sadly differ from Sir F. Bruce's "pecuniary" and "influence in favour of humanity" theories formed at Pekin upon evidence supplied by Gordon himself. Burgevine had actuallyleftSoo-chow before Gordon interfered.

[3.] Readers of this history will at once perceive the falseness of these statements, Major Gordon having, in fact, not onlypreventedthe "pacification of the province of Kiang-soo" by the Ti-pings, butmadeit "the battle-field of insurrection" by his "steadily pursued"invasionsof the otherwise peaceful and settled Ti-ping territories. As for the hypocritical cant about "a service to true humanity," &c., I need only refer to the narrative of the journey to Soo-chow by the sub-editor of theFriend of China; the travels of the silk-merchant through thepacifiedcountry; the letters from two of Gordon's own officers, &c.

[4 and 1.] Combining the first and last paragraphs selected from the precious letter for review, we will briefly notice the facts proving in what manner Gordon fulfilled the proviso of Sir F. Bruce—"I approve yournot awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai's proceedings at Soo-chow,PROVIDEDyou take care thatyour efforts in favour of humanityare not in future defeated by the Chinese authorities." In Chapter XXIII., the letter from one of Gordon's officers contains the following statement relative to the capture of the village of Hwa-soo, subsequent to the reconciliation between the official Manchoo murderer and the British bravo, and also subsequent to the establishment of the conditions by Sir F. Bruce's despatch:—"The slaughter among the rebelsafterthe capture of Hwa-soo was terrible. Upwards of 9,000 weretaken prisoners, and oftheseit was estimated 6,000 were killed or drowned, principally by the Imperialists." Now, Gordon himself commanded on this occasion, but he did not "take care" that "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations should be observed." This distinct violation of the British Minister's conditional sanction is alone sufficient to illustrate the fact that hisprotégé'sconduct was contrary to his wish or intention, and, also, to withdraw his stipulated justification. Moreover, we shall find that, at every succeeding capture of a Ti-ping city the same barbarities were perpetrated, and the same indifference to his superior's instructions exhibited by Gordon, who stuck to his dear Imperialist friends with extraordinary devotion and tenacity, considering their sanguinary deeds and treacherous nature.

TheShanghae Recorder(a paper supporting the policy of the British Government in China, and their very good Manchoo allies), in its issue of March 31, 1864, thus narrates the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the Imperialist General Ching and Major Baily, one of Gordon's subordinates:—"As we expected, the usual horrible and revolting cruelty was exercised, after thesurrenderof Kar-sing-foo, by Ching's troops. On entering the city they encountered no resistance, when the unfortunates (all non-combatants) found remaining were laden with loot, obliged to carry it out to the Imperial lines, and forthwithbeheaded, as payment in full! Truly it is the cold-blooded butcheries which disgrace the Imperialist cause, and deaden every feeling except unmitigated disgust at their mode of warfare." The city had been evacuated by the troops.

TheChina Mail(describing the capture of the city of Chang-chow-foo) by Gordon's Anglo-Manchoo force and an army of his Imperial friends, in its issue of May 30, 1864, states:—"The two breaches were carried in a rush, and quarter was givento only a few hundred menwho had offered to surrender some weeks before." The families of the garrison and the other inhabitants of this large city numbered many thousand; but all, excepting the "few hundred men," were cruelly butchered in cold blood during several days.

TheTimes, in its issue of September 28, 1864, in a leading article upon the fall of Nankin, states:—"What the cost of human life has been on this occasion we cannot yet calculate. It is plain that no mercy was extended, and although the treacherous deeds at Soo-chow must have acted as a warning to the European officers, the account of the European eye-witnesses makes it evident that the carnage was very great." According to my own private advices, theFriend of Chinaand other journals, the Ti-ping capital was evacuated; therefore, the unfortunates butchered by the Imperialists were, probably, the sick, wounded, and poor inhabitants who were unable to fly, or had not sufficient inducement to do so.

With regard to Gordon's "influence in favour of humanity," can any man of ordinary mind understand these results as philanthropical: viz., the slaughter of thousands in the field; the cold-blooded massacre of thousands of helpless prisoners; and the death of even hundreds of thousands by starvation; the destruction of Christianity and free circulation of the Bible, as practised among the Ti-pings; and the re-establishment of Buddhism? Those who ascribe philanthropical motives toGordon must entertain curious ideas as to the love of mankind, when they illustrate it by ravaging Ti-pingdom with fire and sword!

Having now terminated the narrative of Gordon's reconciliation with the Futai, the next chapter will describe the subsequent events.

FOOTNOTES:[60]This Order in Council was passed on the 9th July, 1864. See "Copy of all Ordinances relating to Neutrality in China," issued in return to an address of the House of Commons, dated May 30, 1864. (Colonel Sykes' motion.)[61]Tien-chwangs, colonels of regiments.[62]Italics are by the Author.[63]This the Chung-wang proposed, if the Tien-wang would authorise such policy. As for his having even thought of "giving up the cause," the assertion is equally false and absurd, which subsequent events have proved.[64]Here we have Gordon's reasons for approving the treachery.[65]It was a follower of the Nar-wang who first attacked the Mo-wang.[66]It will be seen that Gordon here admits he was not an Imperialist officer, but alocalMandarin's.[67]This sinister statement, when combined with the fact that Gordon soon afterwards returned to companionship and active co-operation with General Ching and the Futai, regardless of his responsibility for the Soo-chow treachery and massacre, certainly affords some ground for the belief that the whole tragedy was previously arranged; that Gordon retired only while compelled to do so by the unanimous expression of indignation among all Europeans (General Brown and other authorities included); and that his future course he originally intended to follow whenever the universal excitement became somewhat abated, and public attention less directed towards himself. Whether this conclusion be correct or otherwise, Major Gordon and his Manchoo friends alone can say; but in either case the Englishman fully deserves the imputation. His first conduct occasioned and made himparticepsin the treachery; his last act condoned the atrocities at which he had pretended to be disgusted.[68]This statement is quite sufficient to make Gordon entirely responsible for every circumstance connected with the surrender of Soo-chow. He made all the assurances and guarantees, it appears, but never troubled himself to insure their observance, although he had complete power to do so.[69]Here is another extraordinary admission; for, though Gordon's honour was pledged to preserve the lives and property of the deceived traitors, he very coolly took himself off to Quin-san, without making the slightest exertion to save the unfortunate people who had trusted to his word as a British officer. Subsequent to this event hundreds and thousands of the betrayed garrison were cruelly put to death. Who is responsible for the massacre—the Manchoos, who followed their natural instincts and barbarous laws, or the British officer, who obtained the surrender, guaranteed the terms, and then quietly permitted the violation of his pledges?[70]This concluding paragraph is simply a tissue of mendacity and absurdity. Does the dishonoured officer intend to qualify the treacherous destruction ofhisprisoners, by introducing the totally irrelevant opinion that they have no Government, or "real ideas" of Christianity?[71]See Inclosure 1 in No. 9, "Return to an Address of the Honourable House of Commons," dated July 1, 1864:—for "Copies of Communications which have passed between Sir F. Bruce and Colonel Gordon."[72]See "Our Interests in China," by H. Lay, C.B., late Inspector-General of Chinese Customs, pp. 37-41. Thisexposéof British policy in China fully proves, together with Blue Book information, that Gordon never held any commission from the Emperor of China; that neither did he hold any commission from the local authorities, but, by serving without, was in reality a "filibuster."[73]It will be seen that Gordon's letter is dated from Soo-chow.[74]Italics by the Author.

[60]This Order in Council was passed on the 9th July, 1864. See "Copy of all Ordinances relating to Neutrality in China," issued in return to an address of the House of Commons, dated May 30, 1864. (Colonel Sykes' motion.)

[61]Tien-chwangs, colonels of regiments.

[62]Italics are by the Author.

[63]This the Chung-wang proposed, if the Tien-wang would authorise such policy. As for his having even thought of "giving up the cause," the assertion is equally false and absurd, which subsequent events have proved.

[64]Here we have Gordon's reasons for approving the treachery.

[65]It was a follower of the Nar-wang who first attacked the Mo-wang.

[66]It will be seen that Gordon here admits he was not an Imperialist officer, but alocalMandarin's.

[67]This sinister statement, when combined with the fact that Gordon soon afterwards returned to companionship and active co-operation with General Ching and the Futai, regardless of his responsibility for the Soo-chow treachery and massacre, certainly affords some ground for the belief that the whole tragedy was previously arranged; that Gordon retired only while compelled to do so by the unanimous expression of indignation among all Europeans (General Brown and other authorities included); and that his future course he originally intended to follow whenever the universal excitement became somewhat abated, and public attention less directed towards himself. Whether this conclusion be correct or otherwise, Major Gordon and his Manchoo friends alone can say; but in either case the Englishman fully deserves the imputation. His first conduct occasioned and made himparticepsin the treachery; his last act condoned the atrocities at which he had pretended to be disgusted.

[68]This statement is quite sufficient to make Gordon entirely responsible for every circumstance connected with the surrender of Soo-chow. He made all the assurances and guarantees, it appears, but never troubled himself to insure their observance, although he had complete power to do so.

[69]Here is another extraordinary admission; for, though Gordon's honour was pledged to preserve the lives and property of the deceived traitors, he very coolly took himself off to Quin-san, without making the slightest exertion to save the unfortunate people who had trusted to his word as a British officer. Subsequent to this event hundreds and thousands of the betrayed garrison were cruelly put to death. Who is responsible for the massacre—the Manchoos, who followed their natural instincts and barbarous laws, or the British officer, who obtained the surrender, guaranteed the terms, and then quietly permitted the violation of his pledges?

[70]This concluding paragraph is simply a tissue of mendacity and absurdity. Does the dishonoured officer intend to qualify the treacherous destruction ofhisprisoners, by introducing the totally irrelevant opinion that they have no Government, or "real ideas" of Christianity?

[71]See Inclosure 1 in No. 9, "Return to an Address of the Honourable House of Commons," dated July 1, 1864:—for "Copies of Communications which have passed between Sir F. Bruce and Colonel Gordon."

[72]See "Our Interests in China," by H. Lay, C.B., late Inspector-General of Chinese Customs, pp. 37-41. Thisexposéof British policy in China fully proves, together with Blue Book information, that Gordon never held any commission from the Emperor of China; that neither did he hold any commission from the local authorities, but, by serving without, was in reality a "filibuster."

[73]It will be seen that Gordon's letter is dated from Soo-chow.

[74]Italics by the Author.

Operations Resumed.—Attack on Kin-tang.—The Battle of the Brickbats.—Ti-ping Success.—Active Operations.—Manœuvring.—Hang-chow Invested.—Fall of Kar-sing-foo.—Gordon's Proceedings.—Chang-chow-foo.—Narrative of the Siege.—Fall of Chang-chow.—The Foo-wang.—Manchoo Cruelty.—Debate on the Chinese War.—Lord Palmerston's Policy.—Its Errors.—Mr. Cobden's Policy.—Mr. Layard.—His Inaccuracy.—Extracts from the Debate.—Result of Lord Palmerston's Policy.—Fall of Nankin.—"Imperialist" Account.—The Chung-wang's Capture.—Other Reports.—Digest of Events.—The Chung-wang.—His Position in Nankin.—Events in the City.—Newspaper Reports.—Doubts as to the Chung-wang's Fate.—The Retreat from Nankin.—Newspaper Extracts.—The Shi-wang's Proclamations.—Lee-Shai-Yin's Address.

Late in the month of February, 1864, the Futai'sGeneral, Gordon, resumed operations against the Ti-pings. Upon this occasion it appears that he acted entirely on his own responsibility, neither under the orders of his hitherto controller, General Brown (commanding H.B. Majesty's forces at Shanghae), nor the Futai. Consequently, the campaign to be noticed partook more strongly of filibustering than any of the preceding raids already described.

The first movement the Anglo-Manchoo force made was directed against the walled city of Yih-sing, on the western shore of the Ta-hoo Lake, and about forty miles south-west of Wu-see. After a short engagement, the usual result of such operations occurred. The garrison, unable to resist the overwhelming artillery employed by Gordon, an arm newly replenished from the British arsenal at Shanghae before taking the field, was drivenfrom the city with much loss; those who managed to escape retreating to Li-yang, the nearest walled town. Soon, however, they were followed up to this place, but the commandant having received orders to retire to another city, it was evacuated upon the appearance of the disciplined troops and their irresistible guns.

The appearance of the country lately wrested from the Ti-pings is given as follows by one of Gordon's own officers (who was present during all operations) in his notes, "How the Taepings were driven out of the provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang." Describing the march to Yih-sing, he states:—

"Some commissariat boats also went astray, causing the infantry a few days' hunger, as scarcely any food could be obtained, the country being all deserted and devastated. Seemingly it had not been cultivated easilyafter the Taepings lost possession. Hundreds of dead bodies were strewn along the roads, people who died from starvation; and even the few who were yet alive, watched one of their comrades dying, so as to obtain some food off his dead body."[75]

Sleep calmly and sweetly, ye China-rebel-subduing English politicians, and speak authoritatively as to the benefit of your intervention in the Chinese civil war, after reading this testimony from the hand of one of your mercenary tools! Is there a man so ill-"liberal" as to consider Lord Palmerston and colleagues are responsible for the results of their policy of interference towards the outlandish Chinamen? What do the starving Chinamen above mentioned say?

Their easy successes seem to have made the victorious enemy too confident in their own prowess, and less cautious than heretofore. Leaving a garrison at Li-yang, and also a considerable portion of his artillery, Gordon next advanced upon Kin-tang, a small city to the north-west. Elated by his former triumphs, and believing that his appearance alone would cause the submission of all Ti-ping cities in the district,and place their long-haired people under the barber's razor, Gordon expected no resistance at Kin-tang, and was induced to think that the place would open its gates to receive him as a sort of "conquering hero" whenever he might choose to enter. It will be seen that he became the victim of misplaced confidence.

Although, since my departure from China, and since the Ti-pings have been driven far inland, all information has been received from Chinese sources—false, exaggerated, and figurative—it seems pretty certain that the Chung-wang, after parting with me at Wu-see, placed the Shi and Foo Wangs in charge of the military position, while he proceeded to Nankin in order to confer with his king, the Tien-wang. Chang-chow-foo became the head-quarters of the Foo-wang, and it so happened that Kin-tang was similarly occupied by the Shi-wang (a general second only to the Commander-in-Chief in talent and capability), when Gordon arrived before its walls. Both cities were situated on the southern road from Nankin, and their retention was absolutely necessary to maintain either the communications of the capital, or insure the retreat of the garrison, should they be obliged to abandon their charge. In consequence of this the Chung-wang divided about 10,000 of the best Ti-ping troops between his two lieutenants for the express purpose of holding Kin-tang and Chang-chow, while another force was organized to co-operate in the field.

The two Wangs had concentrated all their strength at Chang-chow when intelligence of Gordon's advance upon Kin-tang reached them. The Shi-wang, with a division of several thousand men, by forced marches, managed to throw himself into the city just before the enemy appeared.

When the Anglo-Manchoo contingent arrived under the walls on the 20th of March, they summoned the place to surrender, but no reply was made, for the battlementswere silent and deserted, neither soldier nor spear, nor sign of living occupation being visible. The gates were all fast closed, and although Gordon had been looking forward to enter peaceably, and when he had arrived could see neither trace of man nor prospect of opposition, something there must have been ominous and suspicious in the stillness reigning over the city, for he preferred battering the walls down to knocking at the gates and demanding admission. The heavy guns were moved up to within a few hundred yards; the boats, containing supplies, followed them by the creeks; and batteries were soon thrown up, still amidst the same profound and mysterious silence upon the part of the garrison. During the bombardment all the noise was on one side; nor flag, nor face, nor living thing could be observed about the encompassed battlements. After several hours' constant firing, a large and practicable breach was effected, and the 1st regiment of Anglo-Chinese ordered to storm the silent ramparts. The enemy came forward with a loud cheer, bearing with them bamboo bridges to throw across the moat, while the stormers were closely supported by portions of the 2nd and 5th regiments, who were allowed to enter the city ditch in their boats and cross unopposed. The short space between the moat and the foot of the breach was soon passed, and the storming column began to ascend. At this moment the hitherto invisible garrison appeared and broke their previous silence in a manner fatal to the assailants. Manning every available position, they threw such incessant showers of brickbats that the Imperialists, despite the gallant behaviour of their foreign officers, were unable to advance. The Ti-pings then rushed into the breach, and charging with their spears, drove them back in confusion. Three times the enemy turned to renew the struggle, but on each occasion were hurled back with loss, being quite unable to cope with the Ti-ping soldiers in a hand-to-hand combat. The breach was now played upon by the artillery, and thedefenders driven back with great loss of life from the canister, grape, and shell. Gordon then ordered his Adjutant-General, Kirkham, to bring up fresh companies of the 2nd and 5th regiments, and himself to lead them forward to a second assault. Scarcely, however, had he given the order, when a jingall ball reached him at his almost secure distance and wounded him in the leg.ColonelKirkham, with great bravery, led his men into the deadly breach, but when half-way up, fell severely wounded. Still, with courage worthy of a better cause, his men followed their officers only to be again charged by the valiant garrison and completely routed after a desperate conflict at close quarters. Again the murderous artillery swept away the defenders of the breach, andMajorBrown, Gordon'saide-de-camp, leading forward fresh columns, made a last desperate attempt to storm the yawning chasm. Again the disciplined Chinese and their foreign officers rushed upon the blood-stained ruins; but with dauntless and undiminished courage the Ti-pings again met them—spear to bayonet and firelock, and man to man. After a terrible struggle the assailants were finally driven off, and retreated upon Li-yang, withMajorBrown and all their commanding officershors-de-combat. This action has been called "the Battle of the Brickbats," such missiles being the principal means of defence used by the garrison.

The attack upon Kin-tang was the most severely contested action that the Anglo-Manchoo troops had ever fought. Their defeat is to be attributed to the fact that they were not assisted by an overwhelming park of artillery, which usually did all the fighting. If the Imperialists had not been supplied with British guns, men, and munitions of war,ad libitum, the Ti-pings would have been quite able to manage the disciplined legions. Gordon, in this assault, lost fourteen European officers and nearly one-seventh of the men engaged. The destruction amongst the defenders of Kin-tang musthave been equally severe, not less than 600 having fallen.

At this period the Ti-pings seem to have made a desperate effort to defeat the overwhelming numbers of the enemy encircling them on every quarter. At Nankin, Chang-chow-foo, and Kin-tang they managed to defeat the Imperialist forces almost on the same day at each place. The garrison of the capital having sallied forth in strength, defeated a portion of the great beleaguering army under Tseng-kwo-fan (Imperialist Commissioner and Governor-General of the two Kiang provinces) with much slaughter. Upon reaching Li-yang, after narrowly escaping being surrounded by the troops pursuing from Kin-tang, Gordon received intelligence the same evening that the garrison of Chang-chow had sallied out, completely routing the large investing force commanded by the Futai's brother, and following up the success by moving between Soo-chow and Shanghae, thereby threatening not only to recapture all the country lately wrested from Ti-ping rule, but isolate his division and more than counteract its operations by a powerful diversion upon Shanghae or Soo-chow.

Leaving a strong detachment to garrison Li-yang, Gordon at once proceeded with the remainder of his force, and all the artillery, to operate against the Ti-pings from Chang-chow. On the 29th of March he came upon them at Hwa-soo, in the neighbourhood of the city of Chang-zu, about 35 miles north-east of Soo-chow. On the morning of the 30th, finding that the Ti-pings did not number more than 3,000, he ordered about 1,500 infantry to attack them, while he followed in the boats with the artillery, to give assistance if required. Again, as at Kin-tang, the Royal Engineer was completely out-generalled. The Foo and Shi Wangs were both consummate strategists, and at irregular warfare, when artillery was not employed against them, would easily have foiled Major Gordon.

The Ti-pingscontinually gave way as the disciplined troops advanced; but they were manœuvred so as to draw their pursuers into a position from which for a time they were themselves invisible, while a masked breast-work, ingeniously stretched across the end of the slight hollow, helped to conceal them. Barely had the retreating forces disappeared behind their slight intrenchment and the inequalities of the ground, when they were doubled back upon each flank so as to almost completely envelop the enemy. The Ti-pings were allowed to execute their manœuvre thus easily through the incautious advance of their antagonists, for the latter halted in the very hollow to which they had been enticed, directly they lost sight of those whom they were pursuing. When next the Imperialists saw their opponents, it was in the form of a serried line, surrounding them upon every side except a small space in their rear, and charging them on front and both flanks. After a feeble resistance, during which they lost seven English officers and more than 200 men, the ranks of Gordon's force were broken, and the whole mercenary contingent fled from the field with precipitation.

According to the published accounts of this engagement, the Ti-pings were commanded by the Foo-wang, "numbered about 3,000," and were "badly armed." It will thus be seen that, without artillery being brought to bear against them, they were quite able to cope hand to hand with the disciplined troops, officered by foreigners and well armed with musket and bayonet as the latter were, although poorly equipped with a small supply of jingalls, a few bad European firearms, and a majority of bamboo spears.

During the spring of the year 1864, the Ti-pings struggled with desperate bravery against the odds opposed to them; and for some time it seemed very doubtful whether they would succeed or not. While Gordon and the Imperialist troops were being defeated in the northern districts of the Ti-ping territory, the Franco-Manchoo contingentand co-operating forces were meeting a similar fate in the south. Late in February the Imperialists besieging Hang-chow, the provincial capital of Che-kiang, were totally defeated by a sortie of the whole garrison. About the same time another large army was routed by a Ti-ping force in the neighbourhood of Fo-yang, a city not far from Hang-chow. Having recovered from their former repulse and obtained fresh supplies of British mercenaries and munitions of war, the Mandarins again proceeded to invest the provincial capital. On the 2nd of March the Franco-Chinese, commanded byGeneralsD'Aiguebelle and Schodelana, attacked the above city, and after several hours' hard fighting, succeeded in capturing three forts on the south side; only, however, to be driven out by a desperate charge the Ti-pings made during the afternoon, with a loss of fourteen Europeans and more than a hundred men. On the 29th of the same month, the besiegers recommenced active operations. Supported by a strong body of Imperialists, the Franco-Chinese attacked and carried the outworks of the city a second time, the garrisons retiring within the walls after some hard fighting. The next day fire was opened upon the city from numerous siege artillery, and a practicable breach was soon effected. Again the Franco-Chinese, or more correctly speaking, Manchoos, led the assault, but met with such gallant resistance that they were driven back to their supports in confusion. Twice they bravely rallied, and twice they endeavoured to storm the breach, rendered impregnable by the brave hearts and ready hands defending it, and each time they were repulsed with great slaughter. At the close of the day the assault was given up, after a heavy loss of life, and a vast expenditure of British shot and shell without other result.

Although Hang-chow could not be wrested from the Ti-pings by force of arms, a few days later it fell from external influences, having been rendered untenable through the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the enemy,whereby its supplies and lines of communication were cut off.

About the same time that Gordon commenced his raid upon Yih-sing, Li-yang, and Kin-tang, Manchoo General Ching proceeded with a large army and an auxiliary force composed of detachments from the English contingent, to beleaguer the city of Kar-sing-foo, situated about midway between Soo-chow and Hang-chow, on the Grand Canal. Ching was the bravest native general engaged against the Ti-pings; he was a renegade from their cause, and we all know that such people make the most bitter enemies. He had already been defeated before the city, shortly after I had left it on my last return to Shanghae. Gordon's subordinate,ColonelBailey, had charge of the large siege train accompanying the army, and in a few hours after establishing his batteries, managed to effectively breach the walls of the doomed city. On rushed Ching's men and their allies, but their efforts were useless, for every assault failed; and Ching himself received a wound which, more than a month later, proved mortal. Some few days subsequent to this repulse, large reinforcements were received by the enemy, fresh breaches were made, and the small but devoted garrison was compelled to evacuate the place at night, having lost their gallant commander, Yoong-wang, and nearly two-thirds of their number. When the Imperialists at last entered, they put to the sword all the unfortunate non-combatants who had not fled the city,[76]sparing neither man, woman, nor child, during their cruel butchery of the unoffending inhabitants. Does Colonel Gordon, R.E., call this "observing the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations," according to the proviso of Sir F. Bruce? Does Sir F. Bruce, after the massacres at Wu-see, Kar-sing, &c., still term Gordon's conduct "a service in favour of humanity"?

Afterthe loss of Kar-sing, Hang-chow was also evacuated, and the two garrisons retreated to the large city of Hoo-chow-foo. The fortune of war now set strongly against the Christian patriots. With a few memorable exceptions, they were everywhere defeated, through the British influence so cruelly brought to bear against them, for which they were always unprepared, and equally unable to resist.

Having retired to Quin-san (the head-quarters of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent), after his defeat at Hwa-soo, Gordon was shortly joined by an Imperialist army of 15,000 men. A body of troops, commanded by officers of H.B. Majesty's 67th regiment, was also moved from Shanghae to support them. The Imperialists and the whole disciplined force, together with the latter's large park of artillery, now took the field again and moved upon the Foo-wang's position. The Ti-pings were still lightly intrenched at the village of Hwa-soo; they had been strongly reinforced by the Shi-wang, but were considerably hampered by a large number of country people who had fled from the enemy.

On the 11th of April the Imperialists commenced their attack, but, warned by former defeats, they entirely depended upon their artillery, to which the Ti-pings had not a single gun to reply with. The over-matched defenders were at last shelled out of their open breast-works with great slaughter, and being outflanked by the disciplined and undisciplined enemy, were much cut up during their retreat, while a great number were made prisoners and savagely put to death, as described in Chapter XXIII. by the letter of an officer present, under the eyes ofGeneralGordon. The loss of the Ti-pings on this occasion was very heavy. Although the Shi and Foo Wangs succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy with their best troops, at least 8,000 unfortunates, principally country people, were killed.

Following up his success, Gordon pursued the retreatingforce to Chang-chow-foo. Meanwhile troops were being concentrated upon the same point from every quarter, so that within a few days the city was surrounded by an immense Imperialist army, which was estimated to exceed 100,000 men. The Shi-wang having proceeded to Kin-tang, the garrison commanded by the Foo-wang cannot have consisted of more than 7,000 to 8,000 effective soldiers, but at least 10,000 civilians, including all persons of any standing in the Chang-chow district, and who were Ti-ping subjects, or held civil office under the Tien-wang's Government, had sought refuge within the city walls, carrying with them their movable property and their families, whereby the number of non-combatants was more than doubled.

Three times already had the Imperialists been completely routed before the city, and the siege raised by the gallant resistance of the garrison, although on two occasions the enemy were assisted by detachments of foreign artillery and disciplined troops. After much hard fighting the defenders were driven from all their outworks and strictly confined to the city walls, when the besiegers at once proceeded to effect several breaches. The following account of the subsequent efforts of Gordon and the Futai to storm the place is partly transcribed from the narrative of an officer engaged, and which was published in theShanghae Recorderof May 2, 1864.

The Ti-pings having been driven from all their stockades and intrenchments to the west of the city, and these being occupied by a strong force of Imperial troops, Gordon moved round opposite the south-east angle, and commenced forming his siege batteries, while the Imperialists placed their guns on his left, facing the south of the city. A combined attack was arranged for the 27th of April, but as the Imperialist batteries were ready on the 24th, and the troops who had so often been defeated were eager to storm, and averse to relinquish their hope of taking the city, the Futai gave orders to open fire, andby three o'clock in the afternoon a capital breach was effected. The advance was sounded and the stormers pushed on steadily to the city ditch, but were there thrown into confusion by some defect in the bridges. At last, however, they scrambled across, and advancing through the stakes got to the foot of the breach, where they maintained themselves for a considerable time; but the defenders, notwithstanding a most destructive covering fire from the Imperialist guns and from a battery of Gordon's enfilading theterre plein, manned the breach and wall with great courage, regardless of life, and compelled the assailants to fall back with heavy loss. This ended the first day's assault.

Gordon's guns having been put in position during the night, and a pontoon bridge laid down over the city ditch (the garrison was too weak to prevent the same by a sortie, and had not a single cannon to oppose its construction), at daybreak he opened fire, while the Imperialists' batteries did the same to knock away the barricades thrown up in their breach. Bang, bang, went the heavy guns, as quickly followed by the boom of bursting shell tearing up ponderous masses of the wall, and burying beneath them many of the defenders, while the smaller guns laid along the parapet right and left operated with deadly effect wherever the garrison appeared, or opened fire with their jingalls or musketry. By half-past twelve o'clock the new breach was rendered practicable, and the signal was given to the Imperialists to storm at the old one. On rushed the 4th Regiment of Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries, bravely led byColonelHoward, and forward came the Ti-pings to the breach, determined and daring, to be mowed down in heaps by the terrible covering fire of the artillery; but no sooner down than their place was filled by their followers rushing with unabated courage to the defence. In the words of the officer whose narrative we are making contribute to this history:—The edge of the city ditch was gained, and over went the 4th Regiment's colours, accompaniedby Colonel Howard, Captain Cane (R.A.), and Lieutenant Stackpole, and up the breach through a shower of missiles and fire-balls. Then came that deadly pause, the colours waving on the breach, defended by a few brave men. The defenders and assailants hesitated. They stood at bay for a moment. The "celestial" nature shrank from the dread conflict hand to hand. The officers attempted to break the spell: they pushed their men, they pulled them, they beat them with their swords, but in vain. The Ti-pings, fighting for life, sooner recovered their presence of mind, and every man discharged his missile on the heads of the assailants. The colours and their defenders were pushed off the wall down the breach, and had to retire over the bridge on their column. A murderous fire was poured from every loop-hole, men were falling fast, yet the attacking force stood its ground, but hesitated to advance to where it would have been comparatively safe, being too low for the aim of the besieged. The retire was now sounded, and the stormers fell back to cover.

The Ti-pings suffered terribly from the superior arms of their assailants, and now that they had succeeded in repulsing them a second time, they were swept from the shattered walls by the artillery, which still continued to fire on them. At half-past two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy were ready at both points of attack for a simultaneous movement. Up went their signal rockets, a yell burst from the ranks of Gordon's force, which was taken up and carried along the Imperialist lines, and on came both storming parties at a rapid pace. The 3rd Regiment of the English contingent now made the assault, and their colours were borne up the breach by Captain Winstanley (H.M.'s 67th Regiment), and other officers rallying around them and fighting hand to hand with the defenders. The Imperialists crossed their bridges, crowded at the foot of the other breach, and waved their flags about, but hesitated to mount it. With their bamboo spears, and undiminished courage, the brave garrisonrushed to meet their well-armed enemy, while all who possessed firearms plied them diligently from the walls, and others kept up an incessant volley of brickbats from the heaps piled ready for use around the rampart, and which formed a principal means of defence. Still Gordon's troops maintained their position on the walls, and, if possible, began to increase the extent of their lodgment, whilst the Ti-pings were falling fast from the musketry of the enemy, which they had but small means to answer. At this critical moment the Foo-wang headed a last desperate charge in person. Leading forward all his unwounded men, this gallant chief inspired them with fresh ardour, while the efforts of the assailants began to flag. As one present stated: The contest every moment became more close, and was prolonged for at least twenty minutes. At length the stormers were driven from the ground they had gained, and hurled to the bottom of the breach. Several times they struggled to mount again, but every attempt was futile. The rear ranks of the enemy being under the fire from the wall, lost heavily in killed and wounded, while the front ranks, so desperately opposed, could not advance. The order to retire was now given, and the assaulting forces were withdrawn to cover, while their artillery again swept the breach with canister, shell, and grape, inflicting fearful havoc among the dauntless garrison of Chang-chow. During all this time the Imperialists had hurried on column after column to assault by their own breach, but none were able to effect a lodgment within the well-defended walls of the city. Every attack was repulsed with great slaughter upon both sides, and at last the bravest of the late General Ching's—he had died from the effects of a wound in the head received at Kar-sing—Mandarins advanced with his men, but though he passed the sticking point and got his colours partly into the breach, yet he too was brought to a stand and obliged to retire. The assault was now abandoned, and the besiegers carried off their killed andwounded, including 27 European officers, 400 of the English contingent, and about 1,500 Imperialists.

Although the Ti-pings were victorious, and had succeeded in defeating every attack upon the city, their triumph was only purchased by an awful sacrifice of life. When the stormers mounted the wall a fearful sight was before them. "Far as the eye could see, heaps upon heaps lay dead and mangled." During the different assaults at least one half the garrison were placedhors-de-combat, principally by the murderous fire of the enemy's artillery, which they were totally unable to countervail, having none to reply with. Chang-chow being completely surrounded by the vast Imperialist army, its fall, either by famine or the sword, was certain.

Having established fresh batteries at a different part of the city, on the 11th of May the enemy succeeded in capturing it. Upon this occasion two immense breaches were made, while the incessant artillery fire, and the overwhelming rush of the enormously superior assailing force over the wide-spread ruins of the wall, quickly overpowered the last gallant resistance offered by the remnant of the garrison. A comparison of the casualties of the English contingent at each attack affords the best proof that the terrible results of the first had almost exterminated the defenders. At the first attack the contingent lost 27 officers and 400 men; at the second, only 2 killed and 5 wounded! When the Imperialists poured through the two fresh breaches, the best and bravest of the remaining Ti-ping soldiers sacrificed themselves in the futile effort to repulse them, while their comrades, although fighting desperately to the last, were driven from the walls, and then through the streets of the city, still disputing the ground step by step. At last the few survivors were brought to bay in the commandant's palace. Throughout all the fighting the brave Foo-wang had been foremost in leading and encouraging his troops, and now, still unwounded, with several officers and a score or twoof men, he made a last desperate stand in his own house. One by one his few followers—unable to conquer, but determined to die with their faces to the foe and their hands raised to the last in defence of their noble cause—fell around him, and then for a moment he fought alone against a host of assailants. Still he was not killed, for a price was fixed upon his capture alive. At length this dauntless chief, whose acquaintance I have valued, and whose elegist I am proud though grieved to have become, was overpowered by numbers and beaten to the ground, though not until many an enemy had fallen under his heavy sword. Even when disarmed and helpless in the grasp of the foe, he still struggled against a fate that would never have befallen him but for the unexpected, irresistible, and unrighteous military interference of England. One report of the capture of Chang-chow (China Mail, May 30) states:—"The chief (Foo-wang) of those who were in command of the city, fought in his palace to the last, and required ten men to bind his hands and secure him; and, when brought into the presence of the Futai, refused submission or to pay any respect to him, saying, 'Ah! were it not for the aid of the disciplined troops (under Gordon) he defied all the Futai's hosts to take the city from him.'" If the British army, arsenals, and navy had been thrown open to supply the young and vigorous revolution, instead ofwastingtheir help upon the corrupt and hopeless Manchoo, how great would the success and future results have been! With all the British assistance the Imperialists have barely been able to drive the Ti-pings from their cities and possessions in the provinces of Che-kiang and Kiang-nan, much less to suppress the great Christian and patriotic movement, or insure its final extinguishment.

The Foo-wang was cruelly put to death by his merciless captors. "The two breaches were carried in a rush, and quarter was givento only a few hundred men;" so says the report above quoted from. How many days thetriumphant Mandarins were engaged butchering the unfortunate inhabitants does not transpire; but, with the exception of the small number mentioned, the whole 12,000, besides the garrison, with their families, were massacred. Two years' provisions were found in the city, and this being stored in the Ti-ping granaries, was the entire produce of the district, and was the sole means destined to support the people during the ensuing season. The whole supply was seized by the Imperialists; and though previous to their success much misery had been caused by the general effect of the war, after their capture of the departmental city the entire department was starved; such being the usual result of Manchoo re-establishment in any locality, and particularly so at Chang-chow-foo, as proved by the letter of the first English-contingent officer in Chapter XXIII.

We have now noticed four authenticated instances (the captures of Wu-see, Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, and Chang-chow-foo), subsequent to Gordon's return to service, when the conditions upon which Sir F. Bruce gave his approval to that officer's action were violated by the wholesale massacre of the vanquished and prisoners. We may, therefore, while expressing boundless disgust at Colonel Gordon's persistent continuance in the Futai's service after each and every one of these atrocities, fairly presume that the astounding assertion as to his influence in favour of humanity—in spite of the eulogy by Mr. Montgomery Martin at a late "China dinner" in London, wherein he stated that the officer in question had done moreforthe "civil cause" in China than all the bishops, merchants, and military put together—is not only negatived, but quite reversed.

Soon after the capture of Chang-chow-foo, Colonel Gordon was compelled to withdraw from active military operations by the Order in Council, prohibiting further aid to the Manchoo. He managed, however, to continue acting contrary to the ordinance, by organizing camps ofinstruction and proceeding to Nankin in person, there to advise the besieging forces commanded by Tseng-kwo-fan.

About the time the events noticed in this chapter were taking place in China, in England the energetic opposition of such men as Lord Naas, Colonel Sykes, Hon. Mr. Liddell, Mr. White, Messrs. Bright, Cobden, &c., from their places in the House of Commons, drew attention to the subject, and will ever stand as a memorable protest against the criminal policy of the Government.

During the second debate of the session on "British relations with China" (May 20, 1864), Mr. Baxter, M.P., very happily termed the policy of the Government "not a comedy of errors, but a tragedy of errors." Lord Palmerston, in this case, defended his policy by a very extraordinary argument, which it is singular that his opponents did not use to his confusion. Coming out as the advocate of intervention in foreign affairs, he stated, as a justification of his war against the Ti-pings:—

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