Chapter 2

[E]As each boat with a Torpedo, and armed complete, costs four hundred and eighty-six dollars, this economy would pay for seven hundred and eighty-nine boats; hence, eight hundred and thirty-nine Torpedo boats, with Torpedoes and arms, could be fitted out for the sum which one 80 gun ship would cost.

[F]A deduction may be made from this time; after harpooning, if the ship were anchored in a current which ran one mile and a half an hour, that would be two feet three lines a second; hence, if the distance from the harpoon to the Torpedo were sixty feet, thirty seconds would be sufficient for the tide to push it under the keel; its clockwork might be set to explode in one minute from the time the Torpedo fell out of the boat. If a vessel were under sail, running more than two miles an hour, one minute would be sufficient time for the clockwork to act before explosion. After explosion there would, of course, be no resistance, and the probability is, that all hands would be too much occupied in attempting to save themselves, to keep them under any discipline. Thus each Torpedo boat would not be more than three minutes within the line of the enemy's fire.

[G]It is very easy to make the boats so that they cannot be sunk.

I now beg of my reader to meditate on this kind of attack, and make up his mind on which are in the greatest danger, the six hundred men in the ship or the six hundred men in the boats? Are not the chances fifty to one against the ship, that she would be blown up before she could kill two hundred men in the boats? Should this appear evident, or be proved by future practice, no commander would be rash enough to expose his ship to such an attack.

To give a fair comparative view of the two modes of fighting, I have, in these calculations, made the number of men on each side equal; by the same rule, if twenty ships of 80 guns were to come into one of our ports, we should be necessitated to have one thousand boats and twelve thousand men; but such a preparation would not be necessary. It can never be necessary for us to have more boats than are sufficient to meet the boats which the enemy could put out to oppose us; an 80 gun ship, which is to work her guns, cannot be encumbered with many boats; they usually have:

They may, in some cases, have two more boats, total number, six; therefore, twelve boats on our part would be sufficient to attack an 80 gun ship[H]; particularly as all our boats would be built expressly for running, and our business is to run to harpoon and not to fight; for this purpose our six oarsmen, in each boat, never quit their oars, while our four marines keep up a running fire. The six or eight boats, if the enemy could put out so many, could not prevent our twelve boats closing on the ship. If our boats came into contact with the boats of the enemy, the contest would be reduced to boat fighting; the ship could not use her cannon or small arms against us without firing on her own boats. If we succeeded to drive the boats under the guns of the ship, we should follow so close, that her guns and small arms could not be used, for in the night and amidst a number of boats in confusion, they could not discriminate between friends and enemies. On this theory, if twenty ships of 80 guns, or a force to that amount, were to enter one of our ports, two hundred and forty boats, with two thousand, eight hundred and eighty men would be sufficient, and perhaps more than sufficient, for the attack; and the following view ofchances exhibits a strong probability, that such a force of Torpedo boats and men would destroy the twenty ships of the line within one hour.

[H]While organizing a system of Torpedo attack against the Boulogne flotilla, during the administration of Mr. Pitt, it was determined that men should be taken from Lord Keath's blockading fleet to man the boats; but a difficulty occurred how to carry a sufficient number of good active boats. Finding that the ships of war could not take on board more than their usual number, without being encumbered, four ordnance vessels were to be prepared, with large hatchways, to receive a number of boats in the hole, and to carry Torpedoes. Lord Melville was impeached, Mr. Pitt died, and my system was opposed by Lords Grenville and Howic, and the new administration. I mention this, my experience, to shew that ships of war cannot carry a sufficient number of boats to contend with the boats which we could bring into action; they may, indeed, bring with them ordnance ships to carry boats; but, if they unman the ships to man the boats, the ship will be less formidable in her fire; and I believe it is self-evident, that they who have to cross three thousand miles of sea, cannot be so well furnished with boats as we who command the land.

Let the attack be in the night. The enemy must be at anchor; twenty vessels could not keep under way in narrow waters which could not be well known to their pilots. If they put out their boats, they could not bring into action more than six good boats from each ship, total, one hundred and twenty boats. Each ship would be a point from which their boats could depart, or to which they could retreat, total, twenty positions; in these twenty positions, twelve thousand men would be exposed to Torpedo explosion, which is the same, in effect, as a mine under a fortification. We, with two hundred and forty boats, exposing only two thousand, eight hundred and eighty men, would have the whole of our shores to depart from or retreat to; being the assailants, and having it in our power to approach in every direction, the enemy could not know a feint from a real attack, nor could they tell which ship we would attack first; they, consequently, could not concentrate their boats; each vessel would be necessitated to keep her own boats on the look-out, and to aid in protecting her; while we should have the power to divide our force, or concentre one hundred boats on one vessel, as circumstances might require; hence, every thing is in favour of the success of the Torpedo attack, while the greatest danger is to be apprehended for the ships.

Having given my experience and theory on anchored and harpoon Torpedoes: a system, which I hope will, by every friend to America and humanity, be considered of some interest to the United States. I am aware of the doubts which may arise, as to the success of harpooning, in the minds of men in general, and particularly of those who have no experience, who are so impressed with the imaginary tremendous fire of an 80 gun ship, or a ship of war, that the question has often been put to me, where will you find men who have courage to approach in boats within twentyfeet of an 80 gun ship, to harpoon her? I answer, that the men in the boats, who are not more than three minutes within the line of the enemy's fire, are not so much in danger, nor does it require so much courage, as to lie yard-arm and yard-arm, as is usual in naval engagements, and receive broadsides, together with grape-shot and volleys of small arms, for forty or sixty minutes. It is not so great a risque, nor does it require so much courage, as to approach a vessel in boats, climb her sides, and take her by boarding, yet this has frequently been done. This risque is not so great, nor does it require so much courage, as to enter a breach which is defended by interior works and close ranges of cannon, flanked by howitzers or carronades loaded with cannister or grape-shot, and the parapet crowded with infantry; yet such breaches have been forced, and cities taken by assault, with numerous examples of this kind. I hope there can be no doubt of sufficient courage to make a Torpedo attack. In the instances of captain Siccombe and lieutenant Payne, before mentioned, they considered the risque of so little importance, that they went to the attack without any apparent concern; and the sailors, who were offered a few guineas for each gun of a vessel which they should destroy, used all their influence with the officers to be permitted to be of the party. But I will not propose a project so novel, and look to others to execute it. If Torpedoes be adopted as a part of our means of defence, with a reasonable number of men organized and practised to the use of them, if it be thought proper to put such men under my command, and an enemy should then enter our ports, I will be responsible to my fellow-citizens for the courage which should secure success. While I propose this, I wish it to be understood, that I do not desire any command or public employment. My private pursuits are the guarantee of an independence and freedom of action, which is always grateful to my feelings; they are useful and honourable amusements, and the most rational source of my happiness.

Estimate for an anchored Torpedo

Inpage 22, I have given an estimate for a clockwork and harpooning Torpedo.

Estimate for an Establishment in our most important and vulnerable Ports.

Having mentioned the ports in which it is most probable the enemy would attempt to make an impression, calculations can be made for a like mode of defending other situations—aminutiae, which I am not prepared to enter into, nor is it necessary in the present state of this disquisition. I have shewn a strong power, in boats and Torpedoes, to defend six of our principal ports. Gentlemen will please to look to the numbers allotted to each port, and reflect, whether an enemy would not be inclined to respect a force so active and tremendous in its consequences; a force, which under the cover of the night, could follow them into every position within our waters, and pursue them for some leagues from our shores into the open sea; yet those establishments would not require an expenditure of four hundred thousand dollars; for the cutlasses and fire-arms to arm the boats, and the powder for the Torpedoes, are already in our arsenals and magazines. And what is four hundred thousand dollars in a national point of view? A sum, which would little more than build and fit out for sea two ships of 30 guns. After reflecting on these experiments and demonstrations, I hope no one will, for a moment, hesitate in deciding, that the two thousand, seven hundred Torpedoes and six hundred and fifty boats, before estimated, will be a better protection for six of our sea-ports, than two ships of thirty or any other number of guns. To man the boats in the different ports, nothing more will be necessary than a marine militia; they can be as numerous as any possible necessity could require; and should be exercised to row and use the Torpedoes until the practice became familiar; after which practice, once a month would be sufficient. Corps thus formed, would be no expence to the national government; Torpedoes would require no repairs, and the boats, carefully laid up in houses built for the purpose, would last many years.

To compare Torpedoes with the usual marine establishments, and the superior protection which they give, for any specific sum expended, I have stated this prospect of economy; but I do not consider economy, in the commencement of such a system, as anobject of primary importance. Let our fellow-citizens be convinced. Convince the people of Europe of the power and simple practice of these engines, and it will open to us a sublime view of immense economy in blood and treasure. As we are not in actual hostility, and have no opportunity to try experiments on an enemy, my opinion is, that we should immediately prepare for such an event; and to satisfy the public, we should, without loss of time, make the following experiment:

Purchase a strong ship; make six Torpedoes; build two good row-boats, and prepare them as for action, with twelve men each. Let the ship be anchored, and the men practised in harpooning, throwing the Torpedoes, and observing the action of the tide in driving them under her bottom. After practising on her while at anchor, the ship to be got under way in moderate and stiff breezes, and while under way, the men to row at and harpoon her, letting the Torpedoes fall into the water, and observing the action of the current in driving them under her bottom. When the men have been so exercised as to be certain of harpooning the ship, the Torpedoes to be charged, a committee appointed, or the whole of congress witness the effect, the ship to be put under way, the helm lashed, her men take to the boat, the Torpedo boats advance, harpoon her, and blow her up. The success of such an experiment will shew the value of the system; to which courage must be added in case of an actual engagement.

Probable expence of such an experiment

Twenty-four men can be chosen from the sailors in government employ.

THOUGHTS

On the probable effect of this invention

At the time a new discovery is made in physics or mathematical science, the whole of its consequences cannot be foreseen. In the year 1330, Bartholomew Schwartz is said to have invented gun-powder; twenty-five years after, a very imperfect kind of cannon was constructed of welded bars of iron, others of sheet-iron, rolled in the form of a cylinder and hooped with iron rings; in some cases, they were made of leather, strengthened with plates of iron or copper; balls of stone were used; and it was not until the beginning of the fifteenth century, that is, one hundred and seventy years after the invention of powder, that iron balls were introduced into practice. Muskets were not used until the year 1521, or one hundred and ninety-one years after the invention of gun-powder. The Spaniards were the first who armed their foot-soldiers in this manner—they had matchlocks; but firelocks, that is, locks with flints, were not used until the beginning of the eighteenth century, one hundred and eighty years after the invention of muskets, and three hundred and eighty years after the invention of powder. When firelocks were first invented, Marshal Sax had so little confidence in a flint, that he ordered a match to be added to the lock with a flint, lest the flint should miss fire[I]: such is the force of habit and want of faith in new inventions.

[I]I have seen one of these firelocks in the collection of ancient arms, Rue de Bacq. Paris.

Although cannon, fire-arms, and the whole detail of ammunition, now appear extremely simple, yet we here see the very slow advances to their present state of perfection; and they are still improving: hence I conclude, that it is now impossible to foresee to what degree Torpedoes may be improved and rendered useful. When Schwartz invented powder, it may be presumed that his mind did not embrace all its consequences, or perceive that hisdiscovery would supercede the use of catapultas, armour, bows and arrows, and totally change the whole art of war. He certainly could have no conception of such a combination of art as we now see in ships of the line; those movable fortifications, armed with thirty-two pounders, and furnished with wings, to spread oppression over every part of the ocean, and carry destruction to every harbour of the earth. In consequence of the invention of gun-powder, ships of war have been contrived, and increased to their present enormous size and number[J]; then may not science, in her progress, point out a means by which the application of the violent explosive force of gun-powder shall destroy ships of war, and give to the seas the liberty which shall secure perpetual peace between nations that are separated by the ocean? My conviction is, that the means are here developed, and require only to be organized and practised, to produce that liberty so dear to every rational and reflecting man; and there is a grandeur in persevering to success in so immense an enterprise—so well calculated to excite the most vigorous exertions of the highest order of intellect, that I hope to interest the patriotic feelings of every friend to America, to justice, and to humanity, in so good a cause.

[J]Compared with existing military marines, I consider all galleys and vessels of war, which were in use previous to the invention of powder, as very insignificant. It is probable that four 74 gun ships in open sea would destroy all that ever existed at any one time.

I have shewn that a ship of 80 guns and six hundred men, could have little chance of resisting fifty Torpedo boats of twelve men each, equal six hundred men. If it can be admitted possible that an 80 gun ship will be necessitated to retreat before fifty boats, she must run so far that the boats cannot follow her, that is, more than eight or ten leagues; therefore, boats could follow a ship over the narrow parts of the Baltic or British channel; but I will confine my remarks to the British channel, between Boulogne and Romney, from Calais to Dover, and from Ostend to the mouth of the Thames. If I can shew that in those waters the British fleets would be compelled to retreat before Torpedo boats or perish, itfollows, that they must yield to a like system of attack in every other sea; and the like combination of power which can force them to yield, will act on all ships of war to their total annihilation.

Let the coast of Boulogne be the scene for action; suppose the British to have one hundred ships of 80 guns, or a force to that amount, equal eight thousand guns and sixty thousand men; this is a greater power than ever has been engaged in one action. I have mentioned large ships, because the strength of a fleet depends more on the size of the ships and weight of metal, than on their number; in such case, the line will not be so much extended as if the vessels were smaller and more numerous; the signals can be seen and answered from the extremities of the line with more certainty, and the order of battle can be better kept. The length of a ship, from the point of the bowsprit to the stern, may be estimated at forty fathoms, and the distance between two ships one hundred fathoms, consequently, the one hundred ships would form one line of fourteen thousand fathoms, or twenty-eight thousand yards, equal to near sixteen miles. Such a line could not see and answer signals from the van and rear to the centre. It could, however, be formed into four divisions of twenty-five ships each, and they again could be subdivided; but the tactics which must be adhered to when two fleets of near equal force engage, will be of little utility when the attack is made by a sufficient number of Torpedo boats.

ESTIMATE OF THE FORCE TO ATTACK SO FORMIDABLE A BLOCKADING FLEET

Men, sixty thousand, a number equal to the British; they cannot all be sailors, nor is it necessary they should, but men, who with six weeks exercise can learn to row well, for to row with tolerable dexterity, is all the nautical knowledge required. To divide the sixty thousand men, twelve in a boat, will require five thousand boats, each of which will be so light, that its twelve men can drawit on the beach above high water mark, or on the sands or plane, in a few minutes, or launch it into the water with equal facility.

MANNER OF ARRANGING THE BOATS UNTIL WANTED

A boat being six feet wide and twenty-seven feet long, if a space of twelve feet wide and thirty-nine feet long be allowed for each boat, four hundred and forty of them would range side by side in the distance of one mile, then leaving twelve feet from the stems of the first row to the sterns of the second, and a like space between each line, the five thousand boats could be laid up on a beach or plane one mile long, one hundred and fifty yards wide, and give sufficient room for the men to get at the boats without confusion; this plan would not require the expence of forming a bason or harbour. Thus arranged, each boat with its Torpedo, harpoon-guns, arms, and oars, in their places, and the twelve men in their stations, six on each side of the boat, the whole could be run into the water and manned in an hour, which facility of embarking is of the first importance for rapid movements, and to take advantage of the weather.[K]

[K]When the British fleet is becalmed before Boulogne, the French flotilla is becalmed also, and cannot make any advantageous movements. The calms which lay the British fleet under great disadvantage, will give every possible advantage to the Torpedo boats, and will be the most favourable time for the attack.

ESTIMATE FOR THE PREPARATIONS

This is equal to 315,000l.sterling or about the value of three ships of 80 guns; it is equal to 7,560,000 livres, a sum of little importance to France, it being not equal to the expences of her governmentfor one day; the men she has, and three times the number if required; the powder for the Torpedoes and arms for the men, are in her magazines.

Suppose the boats and Torpedoes prepared, the harpooners exercised, and the men practised to the oars. The intrepidity of the French, in an assault, has been so often proved, that there can be no question as to their courage to rush on to the attack in any case where there is a reasonable hope of success. It is obvious, that the British ships could not put out a sufficient number of boats to oppose five thousand Torpedo boats; consequently, they have not other means of resistance than to manoeuvre and defend themselves from their ports and decks, in the best manner they can devise.

It is now necessary, in calculating the chances of success, to examine various modes of attack and defence; I therefore beg of the reader, never to lose sight of the facility with which the whole of the French boats can be run into the water, manned, and ready for action, or again drawn up on the shore, and with how much ease every advantage may be taken of calms and favourable circumstances; he must also separate from his mind the idea of boats attempting to fight ships; such an attempt would be absurd; it is Torpedoes, those instruments of instantaneous destruction, which are to decide the contest; the boats are but the means of harpooning and attaching the Torpedoes to the ships: this is the whole object of the attack.

In defence, it is to be considered by what means a ship or ships could prevent the boats approaching so near as to harpoon them in the larboard and starboard bow, and make good their retreat? I will name the calm months of June, July, and August, as most favourable for the enterprise. Let it be recollected, that in all attacks of this kind, the boats row at the rate of five miles an hour, or one hundred and forty-six yards a minute; at the distance of four hundredand thirty-eight yards or three minutes from the ship, they will risk random round shot[L]; at two hundred and nineteen yards or one and a half minutes from the ship, they risk one discharge of grape; at one hundred yards or forty seconds from the ship, they risk one volley of small arms, before they harpoon. After harpooning, it is probable the ship's crew would be more occupied about their own safety, than in standing deliberately to fire at the boats. And thus, each boat will not be more than four minutes within the line of the ship's random shot: such rapidity and decision in attack, gives incalculable advantages to the boats.

[L]All shot from cannon, carronades, or howitzers, against boats, must be random: a boat is too small and moves too quick to admit of taking aim; and in the night, musket shot will be random also.

FIRST MODE OF ATTACK

In a calm and usually dark night, the ships at anchor, either in one line or parallel lines, or promiscuously. The Torpedo boats to be formed into divisions, each division to consist of fifty boats, and to attack one ship. Suppose the ships first attacked to be those nearest the land; in a calm they could not get under way, nor could they change their positions; a ship, by having a spring on her cable, might possibly bring her broadside to bear on the boats; but as the fire of the broadside could do little injury until the boats were within four hundred and thirty-eight yards, or three minutes, of her bow, and, as three minutes after coming within the line of fire is to decide the contest, I conceive that her broadside could not protect her; if the boats, at six hundred yards distance, run for her bow, it would be impossible for her to change her position so quick by a spring on her cable, as the boats could change their direction to keep under her bow. If the ships were in one line, and the headmost first attacked, she could receive no assistance from the vessel astern, for she would lie between the stern ship and the boats, and receive the fire which might be directed for them. If the ships lay in several parallel lines, or promiscuously, and the next line wereon her larboard, the larboard ship would be distant at least one hundred fathoms, and while the boats were bearing down, might fire broadsides on them when they were at the distance of two hundred yards; but the moment they closed in with the ship she must cease her fire, otherwise she would do more injury to the ship than to the boats; the larboard ship would, therefore, only have an opportunity to fire two minutes at the boats, in which time, she might possibly discharge two broadsides; but as the boats could keep in a line with the bow of the vessel attacked, and there is more danger from the larboard or starboard ship than the one attacked, a better mode would be to attack the headmost ship of each line at the same time; in such case, each ship would be necessitated to reserve her whole fire for her own defence; she could not assist the next ship, and thus each vessel would be as much exposed and left to her own resources, as though there were not another ship within three leagues of her. The succeeding ships of the line, or lines, could be attacked in like manner: hence, this mode of attacking any number of vessels with an equal number of divisions of boats, amounts to nothing more than a repetition of an attack with fifty boats on one ship, and it does not appear to me possible, that her fire could repel fifty boats, or prevent them lodging ten, fifteen, or twenty harpoons, if necessary, in her larboard and starboard bow. I leave to nautical men and experienced commanders, to shew to the public how a ship or ships of war, anchored in a calm as before stated, could resist such an attack, and their total destruction in a few hours.

But commanders, seeing the danger of being becalmed while at anchor, may keep the fleet under way.

SECOND MODE OF ATTACK

In the night, the ships under way, calm, or light breezes of not more than four knots an hour. Ships of the line, that are under way, seldom approach nearer each other than a cable'slength; this precaution, is to prevent their running foul and causing confusion; when expecting an enemy of equal force, the custom is to form one line; admitting, that to oppose the Torpedo boats, they preserved this usual order of battle, close hauled and under easy sail, to let the boats come up, here, as in the case of being at anchor, each ship must apply her whole fire against the division of boats which attack her; she cannot aid the ship next to her. As the boats, advancing under cover of the night, each division will, in three minutes from the time they arrive within danger of cannon shot, be in with the bow of the destined ship, and fire their harpoons into her. Therefore it appears, that her chance while under way is very little better than when at anchor. If, as the boats advance, a ship turns her bow to meet them, she facilitates their harpooning her. Will any other order of battle than one right line, give more security? Would two, three, or four parallel lines, give better protection? In such case, the line nearest the boats would be attacked first, and the other lines taken in succession. Were the ships to form a crescent, the headmost vessels would be first attacked, in this form, they might surround a number of boats and get them between two fires; but whatever situation the boats may be in, after they arrive within the range of grape-shot they can, in a few minutes, be under the bow of the ship, where they will be safe from all fire except small arms; but to arrive under her bow, amounts to a moral certainty of effecting her destruction. Therefore, with the immense advantage which Torpedoes give to an attack with boats, it is of little consequence whether it be made in the night or day, in a calm or a breeze of from four to six knots. If the ships engage with the boats, their case will be desperate. In all my reflections on this kind of war, I see no chance for their escape other than by retreat; and the moment English ships of war retreat before Torpedo boats, that moment the power of the British marine is for ever lost, and with it the political influence of the nation.

In this view of chances, I have calculated the number of men in the boats equal to the number in the ships, and estimated five thousand boats to be brought into action; but in all cases when there are sufficient Torpedo boats to drive in the boats of the ships, there will be sufficient to attack the fleet; the one hundred ships could not put six hundred good boats in motion, therefore, one thousand Torpedo boats would suffice for the attack; they could be formed into fifty divisions of twenty boats each; they would have every advantage, in a calm, of directing fifty or one hundred boats against one vessel, while the ships would not have the power to concentrate their fire on the boats; the ships could not be defended, unless there were transports or ordinance vessels expressly for carrying good row-boats, the number of which should be sufficient to repel the Torpedo boats; but if ships can only be protected by boats, it follows, that they will cease to be of use, and the contest for the command of the channel must be decided by boat fighting. In such case, the nation which could put in action the greatest number of boats, and was least dependent on commerce, would have a decided advantage. England is more dependent on commerce than France; her merchant vessels could be attacked, destroyed, and her trade ruined; yet the commerce of France could not be more, nor so much, injured as it is at present. In such an event, England, who has usurped the dominion of the ocean and laid all nations under contribution, would be the most humble supplicant for the liberty of the seas. And then the Emperor of France would have a noble opportunity to display a magnanimity of soul, a goodness of heart, which would add lustre to his great actions, and secure to him the admiration of the civilized world, by granting to so ingenious, industrious, enterprising, and estimable a people, a perfect liberty of commerce.[M]

[M]A government, and particularly a monarchy or aristocracy, may be in the habitual practice of vice, while the people are in the habitual practice of virtue. In an aristocracy, where the army, navy, places, and pensions, are in the power of the few, the voice of the people has little or no influence. The genius, industry, and enterprise of the English, have converted a barren island into the most fruitful and beautiful spot on earth; their improvements in the useful arts, have made them the greatest and most useful manufacturing people that ever existed. In proportion as the people, by their industry, increased the riches of the nation, the government found a facility in raising revenue, and have loaded the virtuous people with taxes to the amount of twenty-five or more millions a year, to pay for ruinous wars, the conquest of America, the establishment of the Bourbons, and the balance of Europe.

I have now run this subject to a conclusion, in which I do not hesitate to say, that two thousand Torpedo boats and twenty-four thousand men, would take the command of the British channel from Boulogne to Romney, from Calais, Gravelines, Dunkirk and Ostend, to the mouth of the Thames, and that the command of the commerce of those narrow seas, would command the British nation; but there the power of Torpedo boats must cease—a nation cannot send such boats to sea to depredate on commerce, nor to foreign countries on expeditions of conquest, and therefore the seas must be free.

the imaginary inhumanity of Torpedo war

In numerous discussions which I have had on this subject and its consequences, it has been stated, that instead of giving liberty to the seas, its tendency would be to encourage piracy and buccaneering, by enabling a few men in a boat to intimidate and plunder merchant vessels, thereby producing greater evil than the existing military marines. This idea, is similar to one which might have arisen on the invention of muskets, which, giving to an individual the power of certain death at the distance of fifty or a hundred yards, robbers might infest the highways, and from an ambush, shoot the traveller and take his property; yet there is not so much robbery now as before the invention of gun-powder; society is more civilized; it is not so much divided into feuds, or clans, to secrete and protect villainy; and all civilized society will, in their own defence, combine against the robber, who has little chance to escape. In like manner, as an individual, instigated by revenge, might with an air-gun shoot his neighbour, or by means of gun-powder blow up his barn or buildings; but society combine against such atrocious acts, and he who would commit them, could have little other prospect before him than the gibbet. In the case of pirates or buccaneers, they could not make a Torpedo without some intelligent workmen, who would be a means of discovery. Were they to take a prize, they must have some port to carry it to, or it could be of no use to them; were they to plunder a ship, they could not carry much in a Torpedo boat, and the boat must have a port to go to, where neighbours or spectators, observing her suspicious character, would lead to investigation; added to which, pirates are seldom constant in their attachment to each other, and each would suspect the other turning informer. It would be difficult for a Torpedo boat to depart from any port of America, andreturn without being detected. It is certainly much more easy and secure for an individual to go on the highway and rob, yet how seldom is that done. When nations combine against pirates, there is no reason to fear that individuals can make a bad use of this invention.

But men, without reflecting, or from attachment to established and familiar tyranny, exclaim, that it is barbarous to blow up a ship with all her crew. This I admit, and lament that it should be necessary; but all wars are barbarous, and particularly wars of offence. It is barbarous for a ship of war to fire into a peaceable merchant vessel, kill part of her people, take her and the property, and reduce the proprietor with his family from affluence to penury. It was barbarous to bombard Copenhagen, set fire to the city, and destroy innocent women and children. It would be barbarous for ships of war to enter the harbour of New-York, fire on the city, destroy property, and murder many of the peaceable inhabitants; yet we have great reason to expect such a scene of barbarism and distress, unless means are taken to prevent it; therefore, if Torpedoes should prevent such acts of violence, the invention must be humane.

When a fortress is besieged, and a mine driven under the citadel, the powder laid, and the train ready to light, it is the custom for the besiegers to send to the commander of the besieged, to inform him of the preparations, and leave it to his judgment to surrender or risque the explosion; if he will not surrender after such warning, and he, with his men, should be blown up, he is to be charged with the inhumanity, and not the besiegers. Should government adopt Torpedoes as a part of our means of defence, the Europeans will be informed of it, after which, should they send hostile ships into our ports among anchored Torpedoes or Torpedo boats, and such ships should be blown up, the inhumanity must be charged to them, and not to the American government or to this invention.

Having, in the preceding chapter, given details for a system of French Torpedo boats, which could command the narrow parts of the British channel, I may be accused of enmity to England and partiality to France; yet I have neither hatred nor particular attachment to any foreign country. I admire the ingenuity, industry, and good faith of the English people; I respect the arts, sciences, and amiable manners of the people of France. There is much in each of those countries which we may copy to great advantage. But my feelings are wholly attached to my country, and while I labour for her interest in this enterprise, I am happy that the liberty of the seas, which I believe can be effected, will not only benefit America; it will be an immense advantage to England, to France, and to every other nation. Convinced of this, I have viewed military marines as remains of ancient warlike habits, and an existing political disease, for which there has hitherto been no specific remedy. Satisfied in my own mind, that the Torpedoes now discovered, will be an effectual cure for so great an evil. To introduce them into practice, and prove their utility, I am of opinion, that blowing up English ships of war, or French, or American, were there no other, and the men on shore, would be humane experiments of the first importance to the United States and to mankind.

A VIEW

of the political economy of this invention

At the death of Queen Elizabeth, in 1602, the royal navy consisted of the following vessels.

When equipped for sea, it carried 8376 men.

At the death of King James I. in 1665, the royal navy amounted to sixty-two sail; the money expended per annum was fifty thousand pounds sterling, equal to 222,222 dollars, 20 cents.

At the death of King William, in 1701-2, the navy consisted of

The whole navy mounting about 9300 guns, and to completely man the ships, it would take 52,000 men; the sum allowed per annumfor the navy, was 1,046,397 pounds sterling, equal to 4,650,653 dollars, 30 cents. Thus in one century, it increased in vessels and men six fold, and in expence twenty fold.

Annual expence, 13,654,013 pounds sterling, equal 60,684,502 dollars, 40 cents; at present, I have not time to ascertain the exact number of men, which however amount to more than one hundred thousand.

From 1701 to 1801, the number of vessels have been increased four fold, and the expence twelve fold; the expence is now two hundred and seventy times greater than at the death of King James I, one hundred and eighty-five years ago.

STATE OF THE MARITIME POWER OF NATIONS ABOUT THE YEAR 1790

Taken from Arnauld

Taking the whole of these fleets, and estimating their expence by that of the British marine, it must amount to about twenty-six millions of pounds sterling per annum, equal to 115,555,555 dollars, 50 cents. Can we reflect on this table and not feel, in the most sensible manner, the folly of the eleven European nations, who support such establishments for their mutual oppression? Is there an American who, after viewing these horrid consequences of divided Europe and her barbarous policy, that can for a moment harbour a wish, that these happy States should be divided, and each petty government, in proportion to its resources, augment its fleets and armies either for defence or to gratify a mad ambition, by depredating on its neighbours? If there be such men, they are in a state of political insanity, and the worst enemies to the American people. The humane and excellent Dean Tucker, in his work on political economy, published during the American revolution, has observed, "That the wars of Europe, for the last two hundred years, have, by the confession of all parties, really ended in the advantage of none, but to the manifest detriment of all. Suffice it to remark,that had each of the contending powers employed their subjects in cultivating and improving such lands as were clear of all disputed titles, instead of aiming at more extended possessions, they had consulted both their own and their people's greatness much more efficaciously, than all the victories of a Cesar or an Alexander." This important truth should be deeply impressed on the mind of every American.

But I will return to the fleets of Europe, and endeavour to point out the principal causes of the great increase of those engines of oppression, and from whence the wealth has arisen to support such expences. I will also shew the increasing resources which will, if science does not check it, enable England hereafter to support a marine of fifteen hundred armed ships, with as much ease as she now does seven hundred and sixty.

In 1602, the British nation could not possibly have paid for the expence of such a navy as it possessed in 1701, and in 1701, the resources of the nation were not equal to the expence of the navy of 1801. The reason is, that since 1602, the sciences have developed immense resources. Chemistry and mechanics have multiplied the produce of productive labour, and increased the riches of every nation in Europe; the commerce of China and the East-Indies has been opened; Russia and Sweden have become civilized and commercial; South America, the West India islands, and North America, have, from a few hundred persons, grown to a population of at least twenty-five millions; who have created a vast and productive commerce, of which there was no conception two centuries ago. Agriculture has every where been improved; the earth produces more for a given labour; manufactures are carried on, in various degrees of perfection, in every country and district of country, which, creating surplus wealth to pay for luxuries, returns millions of riches on so enterprising and commercial a people as the English, which, added to their own improvements in mechanism, manufactures, and agriculture, enables the government, at this day, toexpend thirteen millions of pounds sterling, annually, on their marine. Yet the people in general live better, have more enjoyments, and because they have more enjoyments, they are in reality not more oppressed than the people of 1625, who paid only fifty thousand pounds to the marine. Such is the natural consequence of a general cultivation of the useful arts; but a just government and a wise people, should take care that the wealth which the useful arts give to them, should not be uselessly expended.

As imports and exports are the consequence of increased population and industry, the following will shew how the expences of the British marine have not only kept pace, but gained on her sources of wealth.

Table of British Imports, Exports, and Expence of the Marine, in pounds sterling.

In 1701

Expence of the Marine

1,046,397l.or one thirteenth of the whole imports and exports.

In 1798

Expence of the Navy

13,654,013l.or about one seventh of the total imports and exports.

In 1800, the population of the United States was estimated at 5,214,801; with this population, we import from England to the amount of seven millions sterling per annum, for which we pay, in direct and circuitous trade, equal seven millions, making our imports from England, and exports to pay for them fourteen millions, or equal to one seventh of the imports and exports of England. Therefore, as it is the profits of trade which support the British marine, we pay one seventh of its whole expence, or about two millions sterling, and, in fact, support one seventh of seven hundred and sixty armed ships, equal 108. Thus we cherish an evil of which we complain, and unless we can destroy it, we must continue to nourish it.

In 1700, the population of England and Wales amounted to 5,475,544; in 1800, to 9,343,578; it did not double in the last century notwithstanding the great increase of trade. As her population is now equal to one person for every six acres, there is a powerful check on its increase, and the rational calculation is, that it will not double, or rise to eighteen millions in the next two centuries. But the United States is doubling its population in about twenty-five years, or, for probable correctness, say in thirty years; consequently, in

Even then, the acres of the United States will be more than ten to an individual. As our habits and customs are English, it is a reasonable calculation, that

This is more than they now send to all the world, which wealth resulting from American labour, being turned into England, will increase her resources equal to the maintenance of her present marine: for, as I before stated, if of seven millions which we now import, we furnish funds for the seventh part of her naval expences, or say two millions. Seven is into fifty-six, the imports of ninety years hence, eight times; the United States will, therefore, furnish sixteen millions sterling per annum, to support the British marine, and enable England to double her present naval establishment. Thus we are continually aiding and supporting, the only tyranny which can oppress us, or disturb our tranquility.

I am aware that, opposed to this statement, it will be said that we shall become manufacturers, and hereafter import, in proportion to our population, less from England; but, in a vast country like the United States, where lands are cheap, and men can easy be provided for in agricultural pursuits; it will be difficult for the manufactures to keep pace with the population. We are now much greater manufacturers than we were twenty-five years ago; yet our imports increase; the manufactures of England have augmented ten fold in the last century. Although her population has not doubled, yet her exports and imports have kept near even pace with each other. The consequence of manufactures, is to create abundance and give the means of purchasing luxuries; therefore, more persons enjoy the luxuries of fine articles. England has her manufactures established and her people taught; she has the start of all the world, which she will keep for very many years; nor can such superiority be an injury to America, or to France, or any other nation, provided the profits are not expended on a military marine to oppress them.[N]Then what is to be done to arrest thisenormous evil, this organizing system of oppression? One of three things must be done: we must have a marine of a force to be respected, or we must suffer our commerce to be as limited as the British government may think proper, and be laid under contribution; or, military marines must be destroyed, and liberty given to the seas.

Back to Index Next