THE DEFENDANT ROTHENBERGER

“The above considerations warrant the general conclusion that the cases of lynching ought to be stressed in the course ofthis action. If the action is carried out to such an extent * * * the deterring of enemy airmen is actually achieved.”

In furtherance of this plan, Goebbel’s speech of 27 May 1944 is cited and the letter from the Chief of the Party Chancellery, Fuehrer Headquarters, 30 May 1944, marked “Secret—not for publication,” and bearing the initials of Thierack, concerning “the people’s judgment of Anglo-American murders,” signed by Bormann, is significant, particularly the following paragraph:

“No police or criminal proceedings have been taken against the citizens who have taken part herein.”

The distribution of this circular was as follows: “Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Verbaendefuehrer, Kreisleiter,”[669]and contains the following note to all Gauleiter and Kreisleiter, initialed by Thierack and signed by Friedrichs:

“The Chief of the Party Chancellery requests that the Kreisleiter inform the Ortsgruppenleiter only verbally of the contents of this circular.”

Exhibit 109 [635-PS, Pros. Ex. 109] is of even greater significance. This is a letter from the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery, dated 4 June 1944, to the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack, headed, “Regards people’s justice against Anglo-American murders”. This letter is quoted in its entirety:

“The Chief of the Party Chancellery informed me about the enclosed transcript of a secret circular letter and requested me likewise to inform you.“I herewith comply with this and beg you to consider how far you want to instruct the courts and district attorneys with it.“The Reich Leader and Chief of the German Police has, as I was further told by executive leader Bormann, so instructed his police leaders.”

“The Chief of the Party Chancellery informed me about the enclosed transcript of a secret circular letter and requested me likewise to inform you.

“I herewith comply with this and beg you to consider how far you want to instruct the courts and district attorneys with it.

“The Reich Leader and Chief of the German Police has, as I was further told by executive leader Bormann, so instructed his police leaders.”

It contains a handwritten note, initialed by Thierack as a signature and also initialed by Klemm, which reads as follows:

“Return note with the addition that such cases are to be submitted to me for the purpose of their examination for quashing in case proceedings are pending.”

In this adroit plan to encourage the murder of Allied airmen and escape the responsibility, therefore, under the recognized rules of warfare, the procedures adopted by the Ministry of Justice were unique and worthy of the legal minds of those who dealt with the matter. As shown in the affidavit of Pejlovec, a secretdirective was sent out by the Ministry of Justice calling for reports in cases of the lynching of Allied airmen. This directive was interpreted by Pejlovec to the effect that no prosecutions were contemplated.

The witness Dr. Gustav Mitzschke, Referent in the legislative department, testified that he was instructed to call upon the State Secretary, which he did, and received the following instructions:

“When you talk to General Public Prosecutor Helm at Munich, please tell him that in cases where Allied fliers have been killed or ill-treated, the police and any other agencies concerned are to pass on the files to the prosecution office, and that the prosecution as quickly as possible must make a report to the minister and also forward the files.”

Helm issued a directive to the prosecutors under him. This directive called for reports and files in such cases and stated that they were necessary because sometimes other factors, such as robbery or the use of Allied uniforms to cover the murder of Germans, had to be considered.

Klemm stated that Mitzschke was directed to inform Helm that reports were to be given in all cases.

The witness Helm stated that the note in conformity with Mitzschke’s instructions as to the reports to be made was written and sent out, he thinks, on the same day of Mitzschke’s visit and, in his cross-examination he states that he is sure it was not later than the day after Mitzschke’s visit.

The witness Hans Hagemann, general public prosecutor at Duesseldorf, testified that he was directed that in such cases a report had to be made to the Ministry of Justice. He also verified the secret decree sent out by the Minister of Justice.

The nature of the reports called for, in itself, is not considered by this Tribunal of particular importance. Thierack had directed Klemm, as shown above, to submit to him reports as to cases pending “for quashing.” The procedure followed by the Ministry went beyond this in that it required reports and the transmittal of files of cases where no indictment had as yet been issued. The Ministry of Justice thus took over, in substance, the disposition of these cases and the prosecution throughout Germany was thereby restricted in its normal duty of filing indictments against those who had murdered Allied airmen and were criminals under German law. From the evidence in this case and from sources of judicial information, this Tribunal knows of many instances of the lynching of Allied airmen by the German population. No case has been brought to the attention of this Tribunal where an indictment was actually filed for such offenses. What reports andfiles were submitted to the Ministry of Justice we do not know, but it is obvious that such reports as were made were allowed to die in the archives of the Ministry.

There is evidence as to one case pertaining to this matter. The defendant Klemm in his testimony refers to it. Around the turn of the year 1944–45 in Kranenburg, in the district of the court of appeals, Duesseldorf, an SA leader had shot two captured paratroopers in cold blood. Regarding this, Klemm stated:

“We prosecuted that case and even though the police, as well as the Party offices, offered considerable resistance, these discussions were advanced energetically. I do not know of the final outcome.”

The evidence in this case, as shown by the testimony of Hagemann, indicates that during September of 1944, at the time of the Allied parachute attack on Arnhem two captured Canadian paratroopers were shot by one Kluetgen while a Kreisleiter stood by and either permitted or encouraged the shooting.

The witness Hagemann undertook to investigate the matter but was unable to do so fully because a Kreisleiter could not be so examined if he refused to testify. It was necessary if the Kreisleiter was to be examined to have the approval of the Party Chancellery. An application was made for such consent but it was never given. Hagemann stated that he made a report over the telephone to the Ministry about the case. He believed he spoke with the defendant Mettgenberg. Afterwards he made a written report to the Ministry of Justice. He told the Ministry that he needed their support to obtain permission for the Kreisleiter to testify. He received written instructions to clear up the case completely, but since no approval was received to interrogate the Kreisleiter, he could not continue the proceedings. He stated, that again and again he requested the Ministry to obtain permission for him to examine the Kreisleiter. When asked whether he heard from the Ministry regarding this authority, he stated that he had not.

Permission to examine the Kreisleiter not having been obtained, he was never examined. Up to the time of the capitulation of Germany, no indictment had been filed against Kluetgen. This apparently was the prosecution and energetic action on the part of the Ministry of Justice to which Klemm referred in his testimony. In many cases discussed before this Tribunal, indictment, trial, and final execution were certainly more expeditiously handled.

In this plan to incite the population to murder Allied airmen, the part of the Ministry of Justice was, to some extent, a negative one. However, neither its action in calling for a report on pendingcases for quashing, nor its action in calling for reports and files pertaining to all such incidents, was negative. Certainly the net effect of the procedure followed by the Ministry of Justice resulted in the suppression of effective action in such cases, as was contemplated in the letter from the Reich Ministry and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to the Ministry of Justice.

The defendant Klemm was familiar with the entire correspondence on this matter. He specifically directed the witness Mitzschke to obtain reports. His own testimony shows that he knew of the failure to take effective action in the case cited, and it is the judgment of this Tribunal that he knowingly was connected with the part of the Ministry of Justice in the suppression of the punishment of those persons who participated in the murder of Allied airmen.

The second transaction of particular importance with regard to the defendant Klemm is connected with the penitentiary at Sonnenburg. The record in this case shows that in the latter part of January 1945 this great penal institution under the Ministry of Justice was evacuated and that prior thereto, between seven and eight hundred political prisoners therein were shot by the Gestapo.

Klemm denies knowledge of this matter and states:

“From the documents in this case only, particularly from the affidavit of Leppin, I found out that over 800 persons were shot at Sonnenburg.”

He testified further that about the middle of January, Thierack had told him that Himmler had subordinated the prisoners at Sonnenburg to his own command and that as Minister of Justice of the Reich he, Thierack, could no longer do anything in regard to this institution. He testified further:

“It is not only my opinion but it was absolutely clear that at that time that penal institution was exclusively under the order of Himmler.”

He stated that he spoke to Hansen about the subject of Sonnenburg after this conversation with Thierack as to the change in authority, and that Hansen knew about such change. He testified further “that the prisoners were turned over to the Gestapo, I only found out here in this courtroom.”

As to what occurred in the Ministry of Justice with regard to the evacuation of Sonnenburg, the testimony of Robert Hecker is important. Hecker was the Referent in the department of justice in Department V of Berlin. Hecker testified in substance as follows: that in discussions with Hansen, the general public prosecutor for the Kammergericht in Berlin and the official under the Ministry of Justice responsible for certain matters in penal institutions,Hansen told him it might be necessary to evacuate Sonnenburg and that preliminary discussions had been carried on; that he, Hansen, had discussed the matter with the State Secretary with regard to the measures to be taken, and he had misgivings and suggested to Hecker that Hecker discuss the matter with the State Secretary. Hecker further stated that when he was the official on duty one night for the Minister of Justice, he received a telephone call from the director at Sonnenburg to the effect that a Russian break-through had taken place and asking for instructions; that he thereupon called Thierack at his home and asked for instructions and Thierack stated that the institution would be defended, and that the authorities at the institution were so informed. As the break-through did not then threaten the penitentiary, this order was not carried out. Hecker testified that later the director of the prison asked what measures he should take if the occasion should arise and that thereupon he called the general public prosecutor at the Kammergericht as to what instructions had been issued. The general public prosecutor was away at that time but the Referent who was present informed him that according to the instructions issued, the police were supposed to be informed in the case of evacuations. He testified further that Eggensperger, a Referent in Department V of the Ministry of Justice, who was on duty the night of the evacuation of Sonnenburg, had informed him the next morning that the prison had been evacuated; that Eggensperger told him that Hansen had called the night before, stating that the action of turning the prisoners not to be evacuated over to the Gestapo was under way and, when questioned as to whether it had been authorized by the Ministry of Justice, Hansen had named Klemm as the person in the Ministry who knew of and approved the transaction. He stated further that Eggensperger had made a typewritten note reporting his telephone conversation with Hansen and that he had received a copy of the note.

On cross-examination the witness Hecker testified in substance that he was himself in charge of the problem of the evacuation of prisons. When asked if he had heard that Himmler, in the middle of January, had issued an order concerning Sonnenburg, he answered that he had not and repeatedly denied any knowledge to the effect that Himmler had taken charge at Sonnenburg, and stated that he had not heard any rumor in the Ministry of Justice to the effect that Thierack had given up authority to issue orders concerning Sonnenburg. He stated that the conversation with Thierack over the telephone was at night and that Thierack had merely answered briefly his inquiry, stating that the institution would be defended. He testified that during the course of thatnight he repeatedly spoke to the authorities in Sonnenburg penitentiary and that he tried to contact the competent person in the Kammergericht, namely Hansen, in regard to the matter. Hecker stated that the director of the penitentiary knew that some kind of an agreement with the Gestapo existed and what he should do in the case of an evacuation, and that there were secret directives for evacuating penitentiaries and prisons. As to the note made by Eggensperger, he stated that it included a statement to the effect that the matter had been discussed between the General Public Prosecutor and the State Secretary Klemm. When asked about what happened to prisoners not evacuated, he replied that “as far as I was informed, the prisoners were shot by the Gestapo.”

The testimony of Eggensperger in connection with the evacuation of Sonnenburg is also significant. Eggensperger testified that he was an official in the penal execution department of the Ministry of Justice; that he was the official on duty for the entire Ministry of Justice to whom telephone calls were channeled on the night that Hansen reported the evacuation of Sonnenburg. Hansen called him during the night and informed him that during that night the prisoners of Sonnenburg penitentiary would be handed over to the Gestapo; that a detachment of the Gestapo had already arrived at Sonnenburg; and that the action was under way. “Hansen told me that this evacuation, or rather this transfer of the prisoners being carried out, was because the enemy constituted an immediate danger to the prison.” When asked whether this directive had been approved by anyone in the Ministry of Justice, Hansen answered, “Yes. This matter has been discussed with the State Secretary Klemm.” He testified as to the note which he made reporting the transaction, and that Hecker received a copy of this note. He stated that he had been deeply impressed by the information which he had received and asked Hecker if it was true that the State Secretary knew anything about the matter and approved it, and when asked what Hecker said, he answered:

“Hecker shrugged his shoulders. He looked at me and said, ‘Well, Hansen has—’ Well, I can only give you the sense of what he says, that Hansen has fooled this Under Secretary of State and he has got around him, or he impressed him. I think he said, ‘Hansen has convinced the Under Secretary of State to approve it.’”

He further stated that when he asked Hansen whether the minister or the Ministry were familiar with the matter, he answered in the affirmative and told him that the State Secretary knew about it and that he had put this down in his file note.

On cross-examination when asked if, as a liaison officer in Berlin in Department V, he reported repeatedly to the defendant Klemm in his capacity as State Secretary, he answered, “Yes.” When asked with what matters he was concerned, he answered, “Again and again there were current matters which had to be discussed with the State Secretary who wanted some information and some information I gave him myself. In some complicated cases I asked the officials in charge to come in.” The witness also testified that because of Klemm’s personality he, Eggensperger, was quite surprised at the action of Klemm and that was why he discussed the matter with Hecker in the morning. He testified further that it was his duty to make the file note as to the telephone conversation which he had received; that that file note was, he would say, about a half of a typewritten page. When asked if the file note included the name Klemm in connection with the fact that Hansen had referred to him, he answered, “Yes.” When asked whether Hansen spoke about an agreement, whether he used the word “agreement,” the witness answered that while he could not state the exact word used, that Hansen informed him that the matter had been discussed and approved, and stated that Hansen “reported to me the execution of a directive which had been issued.” He further stated:

“If you ask me concerning the execution, it was the report of a general public prosecutor concerning an important occurrence in a penitentiary. I would formulate it like that. It was his duty to report this matter.”

When asked if the name Klemm was mentioned by Hansen because Hansen had noticed that the witness had some doubts, the witness answered:

“I certainly didn’t ask him whether the State Secretary had a report on that matter. I certainly asked him that the minister knew about it, and therefore, it was striking that he did not refer to the minister himself but rather to Klemm.”

He further testified:

“I was the only official, apart from Hecker, in Department V, who had remained in Berlin, and in that capacity I maintained contact between the Ministry—that is the RMJ—and the evacuated divisions. If Hansen was given any instructions, then it was I who passed them on to him. That brought about the fact that I had frequent contact with him, particularly over the telephone.”

He stated further that he never heard of anybody being called to account for the action taken in connection with the massacre at Sonnenburg.

Pertaining to the question as to who had the authority to determine what prisoners were to be evacuated in case of evacuation and what prisoners were to be turned over to the Gestapo for liquidation, [NG-030, Pros. Exhibit 290] is important.

This exhibit includes the directive from the Reich Ministry of Justice, dated 5 February 1945, which is designated “Secret,” to the public prosecutor in Linz, re: preparation for an evacuation of the penal institution within the district of Oberlandesgericht Graz. This letter shows enclosures. It states as follows:

“In view of the proximity of the front line I have advised the public prosecutor in Graz to make the necessary preparations for possible evacuation of the penal institutions within his jurisdiction, and I have decided that your district shall be the reception center for these institutions. You are requested to take any steps which may be necessary for their reception, as it might [become urgent at any moment. You will also get in touch] with the public prosecution in Graz and exchange all necessary particulars with him for the settlement of questions concerning you both. For details I refer to the enclosed directives. You are requested to keep me informed of whatever steps you take.”

It also includes a directive from the Reich Ministry of Justice with the file mark “IV a 56/45 g,” dated Berlin, 12 February 1945, marked “Secret,” and also contains the stamp of the Oberlandesgericht president at Linz, “Received 9 March 1945.” It is designated, “Relieving of the Penitentiaries.” It shows enclosures as follows: “Additional copies for the public prosecutor and all independent penal institutions.” This directive states, among other things:

“Foreigners can only be set free in full agreement with the police authorities; otherwise they must be transferred to the police.”

This directive is signed “Thierack.”

The exhibit contains further a directive to the public prosecutors, Linz, and is in part as follows:

“To the: Public Prosecutors, Linz. The authorities in charge of the independent administrative offices. Judges in charge of the juvenile prisons in Ottenheim [and Mattighofen].“For their knowledge and consideration. The circulars given in the Reich ordinance of the Reich Ministers of Justice, dated 12 February, have been communicated as follows: * * *.”

“To the: Public Prosecutors, Linz. The authorities in charge of the independent administrative offices. Judges in charge of the juvenile prisons in Ottenheim [and Mattighofen].

“For their knowledge and consideration. The circulars given in the Reich ordinance of the Reich Ministers of Justice, dated 12 February, have been communicated as follows: * * *.”

This directive also contains a form to be used in connection with the discharge of prisoners, designated: “Supplement to: Reich Ordinance of Reich Ministers of Justice, dated 12 February 1945,” with the file mark “IV a 56/45 g,” and has the seal of Linz showing receipt.

The exhibit also includes a directive of “Evacuation of the Judicial Executive Institutions Within the General Plan for the Evacuation of Threatened Territories in the Reich.” This is marked “Secret” and has no heading, no date, and no signature (NG-030, Pros. Ex. 290).

This states, in paragraph 1:

“The evacuation of penal institutions lying within territories threatened by enemy attack is a matter of concern for the public prosecutors of the territories to be evacuated as well as for those within the territories appointed for reception in transit. This does not apply if the evacuation can be confined to a change of locality within the Landesgericht itself. The carrying out without friction of all measures of evacuation therefore depends upon the close cooperation of the public prosecutors concerned who must get in touch with each other on all the particulars which are necessary for those measures. The individual measures for evacuation must be left as far as possible to the personal initiative of the public prosecutors concerned, as only they possess the necessary knowledge of local conditions and are able to bring about the required cooperation with local administrative and Party offices. These directives can only give an indication of what is to be done.”

From the import, a fair inference is that it was an enclosure to the original letter of Thierack.

Further along, the document states:

“NN prisoners are not to be released under any circumstances. They are to be rapidly transferred to territories which are not in danger of enemy attack according to special orders.“Foreigners are to be released only if they had their residence in the Reich for many years, if they are especially reliable and fulfill all the requirements under (h).“Jews, Jewish persons of mixed race of the first degree, and gypsies are not to be released.“For Polish subjects, who are protected personnel, a release may be considered only if the requirements made under (h) apply to them after the strictest investigation. The same applies to people living in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Poles who have been sentenced to at least 1 year internment in a disciplinary camp, may also be turned over to the police, withan interruption, if necessary, in the execution of their sentence. This can only be done if an agreement is reached with the commander of the Security Police and the SD.”

“NN prisoners are not to be released under any circumstances. They are to be rapidly transferred to territories which are not in danger of enemy attack according to special orders.

“Foreigners are to be released only if they had their residence in the Reich for many years, if they are especially reliable and fulfill all the requirements under (h).

“Jews, Jewish persons of mixed race of the first degree, and gypsies are not to be released.

“For Polish subjects, who are protected personnel, a release may be considered only if the requirements made under (h) apply to them after the strictest investigation. The same applies to people living in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Poles who have been sentenced to at least 1 year internment in a disciplinary camp, may also be turned over to the police, withan interruption, if necessary, in the execution of their sentence. This can only be done if an agreement is reached with the commander of the Security Police and the SD.”

Under the heading of “Carrying-out the evacuation” is stated (NG-030, Pros. Ex. 290):

“As soon as orders for evacuation are issued, the evacuation has to be carried out in full accordance with the plans agreed upon. In many cases, it is true, prevailing conditions will necessitate deviations and improvisations. Should it become impossible, for any reasons, to bring the prisoners back to the extent agreed upon, those prisoners who are not outspokenly asocial or hostile to the State, are to be released in good time so that they will not fall into the hands of the enemy. The elements mentioned before, however, must be turned over to the police for their removal, and if this is not possible they must be rendered harmless by shooting. All traces of the extermination are to be carefully removed.”

Further documents in this exhibit, issued at Linz, show that by agreement and orders of the defense commissioner, orders were issued by the prosecutor at Linz which appear to implement the preceding document. On 14 April 1945 the chief public prosecutor at Linz made an official report to the Reich Ministry of Justice showing steps which he had taken.

The significant directives of the Minister of Justice above quoted were issued shortly after the incident at Sonnenburg and concerned the disposition of prisoners in the penitentiaries of the Reich in areas threatened by the Allied advance. It is also significant that the defendant Klemm who denies all connection with or authority over the penitentiary at Sonnenburg in late January 1945 subsequently on 11 February 1945 ordered the evacuation of the prison at Bautzen, including the discharge of certain prisoners and the transfer of those not so discharged to Waldheim; and that around Easter of 1945 he ordered the evacuation of the prison at Rothenfeld and instructed the matron as to the disposition of the prisoners.

It is the contention of the defendant that Hansen was an unreliable person who falsely used the name of the State Secretary. It is to be noted, however, that the testimony does not show that Hansen was undertaking to obtain from Eggensperger authority for some contemplated action under alleged authority from the State Secretary. Hansen called Eggensperger who was the official on duty at the Ministry of Justice to make an official report of an action which was already under way and when questioned as to his authority, he cited the approval of the State Secretary. His report was embodied in an official note as he could assume it wouldbe. This note stated that the action taken was based upon the approval of the State Secretary. Surely Hansen, an official under the Minister of Justice, whatever his character might have been, would never have dared to use falsely an alleged authority by the State Secretary to account for the liquidation of some 800 people and then make an official report that, according to all normal procedure, would come directly into the hands of the State Secretary.

This Tribunal is asked to believe that in the middle of January, Himmler took over the operations of the penitentiary at Sonnenburg and that the first time that the State Secretary, the defendant Klemm, heard of the liquidation of those who were not evacuated was in this trial. That Himmler controlled evacuations within the area of his command was shown by evidence in this case and can be assumed from the nature of the evacuation. An evacuation is a matter of military concern since it involves interference on the roads with military operations and transport. The operational control of a penal institution is an entirely different matter. In the middle of January, Himmler was in command of an army which was having considerable difficulty and he was scarcely in a position to assume the functions and responsibilities in the Ministry of Justice as regards the operations of a penal institution. Certainly if he did so it is strange that Eggensperger, a Referent in Department V dealing with penal institutions, or Hecker, also in Department V and in charge of evacuations of penal institutions, or the director of the institution at Sonnenburg, knew nothing about this transfer of authority some two weeks after it is alleged to have been made. It was also strange that Hansen, who is alleged to have known of this transfer of authority, would call the Ministry of Justice and make an official report as to the transaction on the night when it was under way and cite as his authority for his connection therewith the State Secretary. That the defendant Klemm knew nothing about the liquidation of some 800 people in this institution until he learned it in this trial, overtaxes the credulity of this Tribunal. Even in Nazi Germany the evacuation of a penal institution and the liquidation of 800 people could hardly have escaped the attention of the Minister of Justice himself or his State Secretary charged with supervision of Department V which was competent for penal institutions. Exhibit 290, herein extensively quoted, shows that the operations of penal institutions and the disposition of the inmates remained a function of the Ministry of Justice, and it is the opinion of this Tribunal that the Ministry of Justice was, at the time of the evacuation of Sonnenburg, responsible for the turning over of theinmates to the Gestapo for liquidation, and that the defendant, Klemm, approved in substance, if not in detail, this transaction.

When Rothenberger was ousted as State Secretary because he was not brutal enough, it was Klemm who was chosen to carry on the Thierack program in closest cooperation with the heads of the Nazi conspiracy. Klemm was in the inner circle of the Nazi war criminals. He must share with his dead friend, Thierack, (with whom he had lived), and his missing friend, Bormann, the responsibility, at a high policy level, for the crimes committed in the name of justice which fill the pages of this record. We find no evidence warranting mitigation of his punishment.

Upon the evidence in this case it is the judgment of this Tribunal that the defendant, Klemm, is guilty under counts two and three of the indictment.

From his own sworn statements we derive the following information concerning the defendant Rothenberger. He joined the NSDAP on 1 May 1933 “for reasons of full conviction.” From 1937 until 1942 he held the position of Gau Rechtsamtleiter. He states: “As such I also belonged to the Leadership Corps.” Parenthetically, it should be stated that the organization within the Leadership Corps to which he belonged has been declared criminal by the judgment of the first International Military Tribunal, and that membership therein with knowledge of its illegal activities is a punishable crime under C. C. Law 10. We consider the interesting fact of his membership in the Leadership Corps no further, solely because defendant Rothenberger was not charged in the indictment with membership in a criminal organization. He was a Dienstleiter in the NSDAP during 1942 and 1943. From 1934 to 1942 he was Gaufuehrer in the National Socialist Jurists’ League. In 1931 he became Landgerichtsdirektor, and in 1933 Justiz-Senator in Hamburg. From 1935 to 1942 he was president of the district court of appeals in Hamburg. In 1942 he was appointed Under Secretary in the Ministry of Justice under Thierack. He remained in that office until he left the Ministry in December 1943, after which he served as a notary in Hamburg. Thus, it is established by his own evidence that while serving as president of the district court of appeals he was also actively engaged as a Party official. Other evidence discloses the wide extent to which the interests and demands of the Ministry of Justice, the Party, the Gau Leadership, the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo affected his conduct in matters pertaining to the administration of justice. Rothenberger took over the Gau Leadership of the National Socialist Lawyers’ League at the request of Gauleiter Kauffmann,who was the representative of German sovereignty in the Gau and who was, for all intents and purposes, a local dictator. As Gaufuehrer during the period following the seizure of power, Rothenberger had ample opportunity to learn of the corruption which permeated the administration of justice. He testified:

“It has been emphasized here time and again how during the first period, after the revolution of 1933, every Kreisleiter attempted to interfere in court proceedings; the Gestapo tried to revise sentences, and it is known how the NSRB, the National Socialist Jurists’ League, tried to gain influence with the Gauleiter or the Reichsstatthalter in order to act against the administration of justice.”

Concerning the dual capacity in which he served, he said:

“On account of the identity, of course, between president of the district court of appeals and Gaufuehrer, I was envied by all other district courts of appeal because they continually had to struggle against the Party while I was saved this struggle.”

In August 1939, on the eve of war, Rothenberger was in conference with officials of the SS and expressed to them the wish to be able to fall back on the information apparatus of the SD, and offered to furnish to the SD copies of “such sentences as are significant on account of their importance for the carrying-out of the National Socialist ideas in the field of the administration of justice.” Rothenberger testified that during the first few years after the seizure of power, there was the usual system of SD informers in Hamburg. The unsatisfactory personnel in the SD was removed by Reichsstatthalter Kauffmann, and the defendant Rothenberger nominated in their place individuals who, he said, “were judges and who I knew would never submit reports which were against the administration of justice.” He states also:

“In the meantime, the directive had been sent down from the Reich Ministry of Justice to the effect that the SD should be considered and used as a source of information of the State by agencies of the administration of justice.”

While he was president of the district court of appeals at Hamburg, and during the war, this ardent advocate of judicial independence was not adverse to acting as the agent of Gauleiter Kauffmann. On 19 September 1939 Kauffmann, as Reichsstatthalter and defense commissioner, issued an order as follows:

“The president of the Hanseatic Court of Appeals, Senator Dr. Rothenberger, is acting on my order and is entitled to demand information in matters concerning the special courts and to inspect documents of every kind. All administrativeoffices as well as the offices of the NSDAP are requested to assist him in his work.”

On 26 September 1939 Rothenberger, as president of the Hanseatic Court of Appeals, notified the Prosecutor General of Kauffmann’s order and requested that a copy of the indictment “in all politically important cases or cases which are of special interest to the public should be sent to him.” In a report to Schlegelberger of 11 May 1942 he spoke of the “crushing effect” of the Fuehrer’s speech of 26 April 1942 and of the feeling of consequent insecurity on the part of the judges, and said:

“I have therefore assumed responsibility for each verdict which the judges discuss with me before passing it.”

In the same report he states that on 6 May 1942 he made arrangements with all senior police officers, senior SS, senior officers of the criminal police, of the Secret State Police, and of the SD “to the effect that every complaint about juridical measures taken by judges was to be referred to me before the police would take action (especially regarding execution of sentence).”

In June 1942 Rothenberger reported to the defendant Schlegelberger that he had made similar arrangements in Bremen with the Kreisleiter, president of the police, leader of the Secret State Police (Gestapo), and the leader of the SD. He reported to Schlegelberger:

“In view of the present situation, I am intensifying the internal direction and control of jurisdiction which I have considered to be my main task since 1933.”

On 7 May 1942 Rothenberger issued an order in which he stated his intention to inform himself prior to the proceedings on cases which are of political significance “or which involve the possibility of a certain conflict between formal law and the instinctive reactions of the people or National Socialist ideology.” He directed that reports be submitted to him which must be in sufficient detail in order, as he said, “to enable my deputy to judge the necessity of my intervention.”

By reference to his own words we have already set forth Rothenberger’s expressed convictions as to the duty of a judge as the “vassal” of the Fuehrer to decide cases as the Fuehrer would decide. The conclusion which we are compelled to draw from a great mass of evidence is not that Rothenberger objected to the exertion of influence upon the courts by Hitler, the Party leaders, or the Gestapo, but that he wished that influence to be channeled through him personally rather than directed in a more public way at each individual judge. On the one hand he establishedliaison with the Party officials and the police, and on the other he organized the system of guidance of the judges who were his subordinates in the Hamburg area. He testifies that he considered the system of conferences between judges and prosecutors before trial, during trial and sometimes after trial, but before the consultation of the judges, to be wrong, and states that he considered it more correct, in view of the situation, that such a discussion should take place a long time before the trial and not between individual judges and the prosecutor, “but on a higher level, namely, between the chiefs of the offices, so that there would be no possibility to exert an influence on the individual judge in any way.” Concerning his dictatorial attitude toward the other judges, Rothenberger testified: “Of course, guidance is guidance, and absolute and complete independence of the judge is possible only in normal conditions of peace, and we did not have these conditions after the Hitler speech.”

The guidance system instituted by the defendant Rothenberger was not limited to conferences concerning pending cases of political importance before trial. We are convinced from the evidence that he used his influence with the subordinate judges in his district to protect Party members who had been charged or convicted of crime, that on occasions he severely criticized judges for decisions rendered against Party officials, and on at least one occasion was instrumental in having a judge removed from his position because he had insisted upon proceeding with a criminal case against a Party official.

As further illustration of the character of control which was exercised by Rothenberger over the other judges in his district, reference is made to his letter of 7 May 1942 addressed to the judges in Hamburg and Bremen in which he announced that a conference would be held for the discussion of cases fixed for the following week. We quote (NG-389, Pros. Ex. 76):

“A few cues to matters which will come up will be given, file numbers quoted, and comments made in a few key words.”

He especially required of the judges that they report to him concerning penal cases against Poles, Jews, and other foreigners, and “penal and civil cases in which persons are involved who are State or Party officials, or NSDAP functionaries, or who hold some other eminent position in public life.”

One will seek in vain for any simple, frank, or direct statement by Rothenberger relative to any of the abuses of the Nazi system. His real attitude can only be extracted from the ambiguities of his evasive language. We quote from the record of the reportmade by Rothenberger to the judges on 27 January 1942 (NG-1106, Pros. Ex. 462):

“With regard to the matter it had to be considered whether or not any material claims made by the Jews could still be answered in the affirmative. Concerning this question, it might, however, be practical to maintain a certain reserve.”

In an early report to the Hamburg judges, Rothenberger discussed the opinion of the Ministry concerning the legal treatment of Jews. He stated that the fact that a debtor in a civil case is a Jew should as a rule be a reason for arresting him; that Jews may be heard as witnesses but extreme caution is to be exercised in weighing their testimony. He requested that no verdict should be passed in Hamburg when a condemnation was exclusively based on the testimony of a Jew, and that the judges be advised accordingly.

On 21 April 1943, as the result of a long period of inter-departmental discussions, a conference of the state secretaries was held. Rothenberger was at the time State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice and participated in the conference concerning the limitation of legal rights of Jews. Kaltenbrunner also participated. At this meeting consideration was given to drafts of a decree which had long been under discussion. Modifications were agreed upon and the result was the promulgation of the infamous 13th regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law which provided that criminal actions committed by Jews shall be punished by the police and that after the death of a Jew his property shall be confiscated.

We next consider Rothenberger’s activity concerning the deprivation of the rights of Jews in civil litigation. In the report of 5 January 1942 the defendant wrote:

“The lower courts do not grant to Jews the right to participate in court proceedings informa pauperis. The district court suspended such a decision in one case. The refusal to grant this right of participation in court proceedings informa pauperisis in accordance with today’s legal thinking. But since a direct legal basis is missing, the refusal is unsuitable. We therefore think it urgently necessary that a legal regulation or order is given on the basis of which the rights of a pauper can be denied to a Jew.” (Pros. Ex. 373, NG-392, document book 5-D, p. 331.)

Notwithstanding his statement of 5 January to the effect that it would be unsuitable to deprive Jews of this right without a legal regulation, we find that on 27 January 1942 the report of a conference shows the following (NG-1106, Pros. Ex. 462):

“The senator reported that the question of the poor law concerning Jews has gained significance again. With the district court there were two cases pending. He requested that contacts with the district court and with the local court judges be made at once so that a uniform line is followed to the effect that the Jews be denied the benefits of the poor law. It would be entirely out of the question that Jews be granted the benefits of the poor law subsequent to the present development. This would apply especially to Jews who had been evacuated, but in his opinion also to those who had not been evacuated.”

About this time a report concerning the claim of the Jewish plaintiff, Israel Prenzlau, came to the attention of the defendant Rothenberger. The Jew sought the right to proceed informa pauperis. The report on the case contains the following statement by a Gau economic advisor, which is couched in the usual Nazi language of sinister ambiguity (NG-589, Pros. Ex. 372):

“In reply to your inquiry I state my point of view in detail.“In a lawsuit between a German national and a Jew, I consider the settling of a dispute by compromise settlement in court inadmissible for political reasons. The German national, as party in the lawsuit, pursuant to his clearly defined conceptions of justice derived from his political schooling since 1933, can expect that the court will decide the case by a verdict, i.e., take a conclusive attitude toward the dispute in hand. What is expected is a decision which was arrived at not from purely legal points of view, as result of a legal train of thought, but which is an expression to the way in which National Socialist demands concerning the Jewish question are realized by German administrators of justice. Evading this decision by a compromise might mean encroaching upon the rights of a fellow citizen in favor of a Jew. This kind of settlement would be in contradiction to the sound sentiments of the people. I therefore consider it inadmissible.”

“In reply to your inquiry I state my point of view in detail.

“In a lawsuit between a German national and a Jew, I consider the settling of a dispute by compromise settlement in court inadmissible for political reasons. The German national, as party in the lawsuit, pursuant to his clearly defined conceptions of justice derived from his political schooling since 1933, can expect that the court will decide the case by a verdict, i.e., take a conclusive attitude toward the dispute in hand. What is expected is a decision which was arrived at not from purely legal points of view, as result of a legal train of thought, but which is an expression to the way in which National Socialist demands concerning the Jewish question are realized by German administrators of justice. Evading this decision by a compromise might mean encroaching upon the rights of a fellow citizen in favor of a Jew. This kind of settlement would be in contradiction to the sound sentiments of the people. I therefore consider it inadmissible.”

The report shows that upon receipt of the opinion of the Gau economic advisor, “the defendants thereupon refused settlement with the plaintiff and now deny that they owe him anything.” The court which had jurisdiction of the Prenzlau case granted to the plaintiff the right to proceed informa pauperis. On 13 February 1942 having before him the report of the Gau economic advisor, the defendant Rothenberger wrote to the president of the district court, Hamburg, as follows:

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