CHAPTER IIIToC

It has been pointed out that the proportion at present received by the various grades of workers in an industry, from the man who manages the whole industry to those who do the least skilled work, will at first be maintained. It may be that the salaries paid to managers at present rates may seem so exorbitant[185]—so out of all proportion to those paid to others—that there will be an outcry against it, leading to a diminution of these salaries. For present high salaries to managers are due to the extraordinary difficulty of handling industry under competitive conditions—difficulties that will in great part disappear when coöperative conditions are substituted for competitive conditions. With the exception of these highest salaries, probably the wisest rule will be to maintain at first the proportion that exists at the time when the industry is taken over. Taking over these industries will at once raise the salaries of all because they will receive the share of the profits which now comes to the capitalist, after the deduction of sums paid to annuitants. Nevertheless, it cannot be expected that the proportion now existing will be indefinitely maintained.

The cost of management under competitive conditions is far higher than it would be under coöperative. A railroad man once pointed out to me that the coöperativesystem is impossible because it would be impossible for the government to find men capable of handling railroads at the price habitually paid by the government for such services. He pointed out that genius is necessary to handle railroads,—the genius of such men as J.J. Hill and the late E.H. Harriman. When, however, it was explained to him that the reason why it was necessary to have such men as Harriman and Hill run our railroads was the competition between them, and when he was asked whether it would be necessary to have such men if our railroads were run as our postoffice is run, he admitted that under such conditions nine-tenths of the difficulty of management would be eliminated.

Obviously, therefore, the enormous salaries paid to men at the head of trusts, life insurance companies, and railroad systems, would no longer be earned, and of course they would no longer be paid.

What is true regarding the heads of these industries is true throughout a large part of the administration. It would need less of the faculty which characterizes the larger carnivora and more of the faculties which characterize the beaver and the ant. For these humbler services lower wages would be paid. This does not mean, however, that there will not be in the state room for men of the constructive ability of Harriman and Hill; but these men will not be the servants of our industries, they will be the servants of our state; and the genius that is now absorbed by business, will, in a coöperative commonwealth, be more usefully employed in the larger fields of politics.

After this slight digression, let us return to the question how far the remuneration will be subject to revision.

It may be that the lower grades will not be subject to revision at all; that all the iron ore we need can beproduced by working four hours a day during eight months of the year, and that the rate of wages earned upon the old scale increased by the profits to which workers will be entitled will, without changing the proportion, furnish a standard of comfort such as to-day it is difficult to foresee. It is probable, however, that workingmen who are to-day members of the Socialist party will not agree with this prognosis, but will insist that in a coöperative commonwealth the whole scheme of remuneration will have to be revised. If this be so, it is useless to deny that the revision of this rate of wages will be a matter of difficulty and that the difficulties arising will tend to be perpetual.

Obviously, there must be some plan devised under which these matters will be better adjusted than by a government board, as has been suggested by certain Socialists. Mr. Hillquit[186]quotes with approval the words of Kautsky that government in a coöperative commonwealth will change in character, and that the state will no longer govern, but administer, and this is to a large degree true. But if the administration is to determine what every man is to receive as compensation for the work he does, it is clear that matters of such vital importance cannot be referred to the arbitrary action of a board of administrators.

It seems to me that it will be indispensable to submit these matters to an industrial parliament in which every industry will be represented. And as the determination of these questions will be a matter of the greatest importance to every individual, it is probable that these parliaments will have to be bicameral for the same reason that our government is bicameral; for the same difficulty will present itself. New York insists uponhaving its large population represented in Congress. Rhode Island, on the other hand, in spite of its small size, insists upon having its state sovereignty represented; so New York is given a representation in proportion to its population in the Lower House and Rhode Island is given equal representation in the Upper House. Exactly the same situation will present itself it regard to industries: Certain industries will be enormous and will want to be represented in proportion to their size; for example, the steel industry. Others will be much smaller but perhaps of much greater importance; for example, the engineers. They will want to be fairly represented in spite of their small size and I see no way of adjusting this other than by adopting an industrial parliament of two chambers, in one of which representation will be according to numbers, while in the other every industry will be equally represented irrespective of size. This may seem a cumbersome system, but it will take no more time than the administration of the trade union takes to-day, and will not be half as costly; for the trade union of to-day has to accumulate funds to provide for unemployment, old age, sickness, and strikes. Strikes and unemployment it will not be necessary to provide against and the others will be provided for by every guild for their own members. The question, therefore, of the adjustment of price and wages will occupy far less time than is now occupied by federations of trade unions.

It is probable that the conclusions to which the industrial parliament will come will not be final. It will be deemed wise to refer them for execution to the general government. This matter, however, belongs to the chapter on the political aspect of Socialism.

It may not be clear at first sight why it is proposed to substitute store checks for greenbacks or gold. Early Socialist writers—particularly Rodbertus—attached much importance to the elimination of gold and the substitution therefor of what they called "labor checks"; a currency representing time spent in labor. Modern Socialist writers have been disposed to cast aside all efforts to substitute this kind of currency for gold. Mr. Hillquit quotes Kautsky[187]with approval on this subject:

"'Money,' says Kautsky, 'is the simplest means known up to the present time which makes it possible in as complicated a mechanism as that of the modern productive process, with its tremendous far-reaching division of labor, to secure the circulation of products and their distribution to the individual members of society. It is the means which makes it possible for each one to satisfy his necessities according to his individual inclination (to be sure within the bounds of his economic power). As a means to such circulation, money will be found indispensable until something better is discovered.'"[188]

Upon this point I find myself at variance with modern Socialists. In Book II, Chapter VI, on Money, I have endeavored to show how the use of gold for currency puts those who own and handle gold in a position practically to control the entire country. If I have failed in proving this, there will be no occasion for substituting anything for gold. But if I have failed, it is, I think, my fault; or perhaps Socialist writers on this subject have not had, and do not possess, the intimate knowledge of financialaffairs indispensable to an understanding of this subject. If Mr. Kautsky had practiced law in America, and had had American financiers for his clients, he would not, I think, have failed to understand that money is still more to-day what it always has been since the beginning of the civilized world—the "root of all evil." By money, I mean not currency, which is indispensable, but the use of precious metals as the sole fundamental medium of exchange; because the amount of such precious metals being limited, the few, who under competitive conditions contrive to get control of these metals, become by virtue of this control masters not only of our economic, but of our political conditions.

Mr. Hillquit says[189]that the principal economic classes and interest groups are represented by separate and well-defined political parties; and that the "only exception seems to be presented by the money-lending group of capitalists, who, as a rule, do not form parties of their own. This, however, may perhaps be accounted for by the function of money capital, which can become operative only in connection with the other forms of capitalistic ownership, but has no independent productive existence."

It is misleading to endeavor to draw conclusions from political groups which characterize politics in Germany and France, and there is, I think, a better reason why the great "money-lending group of capitalists" or financiers do not form parties of their own.

Mr. Hillquit is doubtless right in saying that the "Republican party is substantially the party of the modern capitalists," "while the Democratic party is largely the party of the middle class"; nevertheless, in America, as in Europe, the so-called interests and capitalists belong to no one party, because they must and do control both.And it is because Socialist writers do not seem to be aware of the extent to which they do control politics, that comparatively little interest is taken by these writers in questions of currency.

No one who lived in Europe during the Boer war is ignorant of the immense desire of both France and Germany to intervene on behalf of the Boers, and they certainly would have intervened not only because it afforded them a good opportunity to crush England, which one of them openly and the other less openly desired to do, but because such a war would have been popular with the masses in both countries. One thing alone prevented this: Financiers in France and Germany were heavily interested in African gold mines and it was their influence that turned the scale against the crushing of England at that time.

In America, the revelations of the life insurance investigation told all the world what Wall Street previously knew: that big corporations contribute to both Republican and Democratic parties and practically control the action of the Democratic side of our legislatures as well as the Republican. Nothing could have been more transparent than the influence of financiers in the decision whether Cannon and the rules that make Cannon supreme in Congress were to be maintained. The Wall Street Group, which had a lobby in Washington, appealed to the Republican majority not to disorganize their party by fighting against Cannon personally, promising that the Republican party would alter the rules that gave him his present autocratic power; and when in compliance with this promise, Cannon was reëlected and the rules came up, the same lobby secured enough Democratic votes to maintain the rules in spite of the adverse votes of the insurgent Republicans, the argument then usedbeing that the tariff bill could not be passed unless the rules were maintained.

Again, after Taft had, on three separate occasions, solemnly promised the people, if he were elected, a revision downward of the tariff, the same lobby secured a revision of the tariff upwards. We are assured by Messrs. Aldrich and Payne that the revision is a revision downward. How, then, will they explain the extraordinary haste with which ships sought to reach this port before the new tariff came into effect?[190]Were these ships hurrying to port in order to escape the payment of a low tariff? It may be answered that although the tariff was raised as regards certain articles, it was lowered as regards others. To this I have but to quote theReviews of Reviewsfor September, 1909, and the articles entitled, "The Payne-Aldrich Tariff," which follow in subsequent numbers. TheReview of Reviewsis quoted rather than other periodicals because it is recognized as a supporter of the so-called Roosevelt policies and, therefore, cannot be accused of Socialistic tendencies. It is seldom that the Interests have gone so far as to elect a presidential candidate on a definite promise and deliberately, as soon as the candidate was elected, to violate their promise. But the Interests have at this moment such control over our politics that they can even do this; and it seems very doubtful whether this treachery will ever be materially punished.

If, as I believe, it is important that the competitive system be allowed to survive in the coöperative commonwealth, it is obvious that it can only be tolerated on the condition that the community be safe from such politicalcontrol as this. And for this reason it seems to me essential that the use of gold as currency be limited; and that as regards the exchange of all the necessaries of our existence, we should have a currency that entirely escapes the control of the financier. This is the reason why I have insisted on the use of store checks which are just as convenient and secure as our present greenbacks.

There seems to be no other way of eliminating the undemocratic autocracy of the financier than by some such system as the one above described; that is to say, the issue by the state of orders on the public stores to the extent of the goods in the public stores, which may in their general appearance differ but little from the greenback of to-day: Instead of reading "Good for $1.00 gold currency," they will read "Good for $1.00 at the public stores." This public store currency will eliminate the use of gold and silver throughout the socialized industries and as regards all agricultural products except a very small portion. Every socialized industry and every farmer will furnish to the state the bulk of his produce—that is, the minimum exacted by the state—in exchange for this kind of currency.[191]It is only the surplus—the amount produced by the farmer and factory above the minimum established by the state—that the farmer and the factory will be at liberty to sell for gold instead of exchanging for public store notes; and of this surplus the farmer and factory will be free to sell as much as they choose for public store notes, so that gold and silver will constitute a small part of the medium of exchange. This system will have the following advantages:

It will practically eliminate the present control of political and economic conditions by financiers. So long as the currency used in exchanging necessaries and comforts is rescued from the control of financiers, it is a matter of comparative indifference whether the financiers control the currency used in the manufacture and distribution of luxuries, for such control will have practically no effect upon the things necessary to human existence.

It will give to the state the use of the gold coin which is now accumulated in its treasury for the redemption of its notes; and the state will use this large gold fund for the purchase of the products of other nations.[192]

Let us see how this proposed system of store notes will work in a given manufacture:

The state will order the steel guild to manufacture thirty million tons of pig iron (the amount produced in 1907 was a little over twenty-six millions); and will allot to the steel guild for the supply of steel six hundred and sixty million dollars in store notes, this being calculated at the rate of $20 a ton. (The price in 1907 was a little over $22.) These $660,000,000 will be paid to the steel guild in the following manner:

Every week a number of store orders will be issued to the amount of the wages of the week and of the fixed charges. At stipulated periods the steel guild will furnish the state pig iron so that the state will never have advanced to the guild store orders amounting to more than the value of the pig iron in the store, an exception of course being made for the first few weeks that the industry proceeds upon this basis. Upon the delivery of pig iron at these stated periods, the state will deliver the difference between the weekly amounts already paid and the price of the pig iron delivered. If deliveries of pigiron can be made once a month, this will enable a repartition of a part of the profits so that the workers will not have to wait until the end of the year before they receive their profits, the final dividend being paid at the expiration of each year.

Such an order as the above will serve the following purposes and have the following consequences: the steel guild will have a definite order for a definite amount of pig iron to manufacture. It will know exactly how many men it will need to manufacture this pig iron. It will employ a few more men than those employed in 1910. The state will issue to the steel guild weekly the amount of store notes necessary to pay the wages upon the same scale as in 1910. Men engaged in the Steel Trust at the moment of transference will continue to work and receive the same rate of wages; but they will be entitled to their share of the profits after the amounts due annuitants and the amounts necessary to create a fund for old age and sickness have been deducted. Obviously, this first order of thirty million tons is far larger than the country uses, because a large part of the product of 1907 was exported. The amount thus exported will be at the disposal of the state either to export, or exchange for foreign products, or to set aside as a reserve upon which the state can draw in case of deficit.

Let us now consider the purposes we have in view in this proposed economic organization of the coöperative commonwealth and how far we attain these purposes:

The main object of a coöperative commonwealth is to give to all workers as nearly as possible the exact product of their work. It may be interesting to note that this isthe ideal that Mr. Roosevelt himself proposes, and he objects to Socialism because he thinks Socialism will on the contrary allow the "thriftless and the vicious" to profit. These words describe not a coöperative commonwealth, but existing conditions. For example, such a degenerate as Harry Thaw, who would, I suppose, according to Mr. Roosevelt be classified as one of the "thriftless and vicious," obtains his income from the profit created by others who work for it; whereas those who work, instead of getting the full product of their work, are obliged to see that nearly if not altogether one-half of it goes to the support of the idle, among them this young man. These are the exact conditions to which Socialism proposes to put an end, and, therefore, I point out that the principal object that Socialism has in view is to do exactly the thing that Mr. Roosevelt wants to see done—to undo the very things to which Mr. Roosevelt objects.

Another principal object of this proposed organization is to prevent overwork and unemployment, that necessarily lead to drunkenness, pauperism, prostitution, and crime.

A third thing which this system of organization proposes to do is to preserve the resources of the country; and here again we find ourselves realizing the ideal of Mr. Roosevelt. The single idea of a lumberman is to sell lumber—not to preserve it; the idea of a coal miner is to sell coal—not to preserve it; the idea of an iron miner is to sell ore—not to preserve it. In a coöperative commonwealth there is no desire to make profit out of these things. The one object in view is to use our lumber, coal, and ore to the best advantage and with the least waste.

Another object we have in view is to produce with the greatest economy, with the greatest efficiency. We donot want forty refiners engaged in refining sugar where seven will suffice.[193]We want all our factories while they are working, to be working at their best efficiency, not on half time or with only one-half the engines going. We also want the things we need to be produced in such a way as to take advantage of every waste product—a thing that can only be done when industry is concentrated in the hands of a single guild instead of being distributed as it tended to be (before the organization of trusts) in the hands of many competing manufacturers.

This system of production and distribution would maintain the present check upon overpopulation which Mr. Huxley regarded as the principal objection to Socialism;[194]for under this plan, although every member of the community would be assured a comfortable income, his comforts would be limited by the number of children he brought into the world. Experience shows that the prudence of the middle class to-day constitutes a check upon overpopulation; that, in other words, overpopulation is to be feared, not in the middle class, but in those, such as the extremely poor, who are under no prudential check.[195]

The imprudent in such a coöperative commonwealth as is above described, have always before them the prospect of the state farm with its different degrees of unattractiveness. If, therefore, to-day workingmen look upon the almshouse with abhorrence, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the workers in a coöperative commonwealth, accustomed to a far higher standard of living than the workingman of to-day, would be deterredas much by the prospect of committal to a farm colony as a self-respecting worker to-day is deterred by the prospect of the almshouse.

But there is another point of view from which the question of overpopulation must be considered: The increasing independence of women in America has already served to diminish the increase of population to the extent which our sociologists regard as alarming. The population of the United States is increasing chiefly through immigration and the increase of immigrants. Here, as elsewhere, it is the extremely poor that propagate. Indeed, as women become more and more independent economically, as they certainly would in a coöperative commonwealth, there seems to be more danger of underpopulation than overpopulation. But here the state can no doubt exert a very important influence; for if there seems danger of underpopulation it might increase its tax upon the industries of the state and apply the tax to the support of children so as to relieve parents at the expense of the entire state, of the cost of educating children, thereby removing all economic motive for underpopulation.

I think, moreover, that since Mr. Huxley's day the whole opinion as to overpopulation has changed. There is not a shadow left of the fears of Malthus; for the extraordinary results published in the 13th Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor show that productivity is likely to increase rather than diminish in a coöperative commonwealth, in view of the fact that all those now engaged in pure competition and therefore a burden on the community, will be put to the work of production, thereby increasing the productivity of the nation relatively to its numbers.

[152]See Northern Securities Case, 193 U.S.

[153]Kautsky, "The Social Revolution."

[154]Upon every breadwinner there are on an average four persons dependent—the aged, women, and children; 200,000 unemployed is therefore equivalent to 1,000,000 in want.

[155]See Book II, Chapter I, Unemployment.

[156]See Appendix, p. 412.

[157]"Socialism." By John Spargo, p. 217."Socialism in Theory and Practice." By Morris Hillquit, Chapters V and VI.

[157]"Socialism." By John Spargo, p. 217.

"Socialism in Theory and Practice." By Morris Hillquit, Chapters V and VI.

[158]By "pure capitalism" is meant the ownership of industry entitling the owner to dividends although the owner contributes nothing to the industry in the way of personal service.

[159]See Appendix, p. 428.

[160]Saturday Evening Post, May 8, 1909.

[161]Outlook, March 20, 1909, p. 622.

[162]Ibid., p. 619.

[163]Ibid., p. 623.

[164]On the very day of writing of the above, the N.Y.Timesof June 25, 1909, states that the United States Postoffice Department has installed a complete ice-making plant which has made such economy that the Government is considering the building of an ice-plant for all its departments. Private dealers charge at the rate of $7.65 a ton for ice, whereas the Postoffice Department now furnishes ice at a cost of 65 cents a ton.

[165]"The Elimination of the Tramp," by Edmond Kelly. (G.P. Putnam's Sons.)

[166]See Appendix, p. 429.

[167]Charities and the Commons, p. 342, June, 1907.

[168]Eugène Simon, "La cité chinoise" (translated into English); Toubeau, "La répartition métrique des impôts," 2 vols., Paris (Guillaumin), 1880, quoted by Kropotkin in "Fields, Factories and Workshops," p. 239. See Evolution and Effort, p. 168.

[169]Dr. M. Fesca, "Beiträge zur Kenntniss der japanesischen Landwirthschaft," Part II, p. 33 (Berlin, 1893). The economy in seeds is also considerable. While in Italy 250 kilogrammes to the hectare are sown, and 160 kilogrammes in South Carolina the Japanese use only sixty kilogrammes for the same area. Semler, "Tropische Agrikultur," Bd. III, pp. 20-28. Quoted by Prince Kropotkin in "Fields, Factories and Workshops," p. 239.

[170]L. Grandeau, "Etudes Agronomiques," 3d series, 1887-8, p. 43. Quoted by Kropotkin, Ibid., 101.

[171]See Ponce, "La Culture maraiche," 1869. Barrel's "Dictionnaire d'Agriculture." Quoted by Kropotkin, Ibid., p. 64.

[172]Very little land in New York State produces more than from two to three tons an acre, and most of it does not produce so much.

[173]It is impossible in this book to give to the question of soil fertility the scope which it needs in order to convince a layman of the almost unlimited extent to which good soil can be manufactured and made fertile. Those who are anxious to satisfy themselves on this subject are urged to read the books above quoted.

[174]"The Elimination of the Tramp," p. 51.

[175]Published by G.P. Putnam's Sons.

[176]See "Elimination of the Tramp," p. 45.

[177]SeeHampton's Magazinefor May and June, 1909.

[178]See p. 58.

[179]The occupation that furnishes most inmates to our asylums is farming.

[180]This limitation on property has already been enacted in the State of New York (Chap. 463, Laws of 1909), and bills of similar import have been introduced into the legislatures of California, Maine, and Pennsylvania. In Maine a hypothetical question as to the constitutionality of such legislation was submitted to the supreme court, which reported favorably (19 Lawyers' Reports annotated [U.S.] 422).

[181]Farmers' Bulletin, No. 242.

[182]Something has been done in connection with the milk supply. Thus the milk producers of Boston have organized a union and have agreed to a price with the Milk Contractors' Association. But although this effort at combination has cheapened milk for large consumers such as hotels, large restaurants, and even small stores, pint customers pay just as much in Boston as elsewhere; that is, 8 cents a quart. (Industrial Commission Report, Vol. VI, p. 409.)

[183]See 13th Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor of U.S., p. 25, where the cost of producing wheat under the best conditions is approximately 30 cents per bushel.

[184]Book II, Chapter II.

[185]For example, it is generally believed that the President of the Steel Trust gets over $100,000 a year. Before the insurance investigation presidents of life insurance companies got similar salaries. Railroad presidents are also paid at similar rates.

[186]"Socialism in Theory and Practice," p. 133.

[187]"Socialism in Theory and Practice," p. 119.

[188]Karl Kautsky, "The Social Revolution," p. 129.

[189]"Socialism in Theory and Practice," p. 164.

[190]See any daily newspaper between March 16, 1909, when the bill was introduced in the House, and Aug. 6, 1909, when the law went into effect.

[191]Obviously, until all the industries are socialized, a part of this minimum will have to be paid in gold. When, however, all the industries are socialized, the whole of the minimum will be paid in store checks.

[192]See Appendix, p. 431.

[193]Book II, Chapter I.

[194]I am not aware that Mr. Huxley has ever suggested any other objection to Socialism than this; but I may be mistaken.

[195]"Government," Vol. I, p. 339.

The importance of the political aspect of Socialism depends upon the kind of Socialism selected for study. In Fourier's system, the social side altogether predominates—the political side is relatively unimportant. In state Socialism, on the other hand, the political side is the most important and the social side is subsidiary. In modern Socialism, the government takes an intermediary position; the functions of the state under modern Socialism would be in some respects less extended than in such a government as that of Prussia; while in other respects it would be more extended; but in no department would it assume the excessive power and interference generally associated with Socialism in the public mind.

It cannot be too emphatically repeated that modern Socialism discards the idea of a common home or even of a common table except to the extent that a common table is sometimes found convenient in our own day. To just the same extent the coöperative commonwealth discards the idea of state ownership of industry and state ownership of land except within the limits set forth in the previous chapter.

The two great political objections to Socialism are: that it would give to the government a power destructive of individual liberty; and that the corruption in ourexisting government demonstrates the unwisdom of increasing the scope of its operations.

On the first of these objections it is not necessary to dwell; for it is obvious that the moment state Socialism is abandoned, this objection falls to the ground. The state no longer has the onerous and probably impossible function of assigning tasks; the state no longer controls the hours of labor; the state no longer interferes in the private life of the individual any more than to-day. The relations of the government are not so much with the individual as with conglomerations of individuals in the respective industries; and even here, the government does no more than indicate the amount of a given thing that must be produced and the rate at which the thing so produced is to exchange with the other necessaries of life. It has been suggested that just as in France where commercial cases are brought before purely commercial courts and thus separated from civil and criminal cases, so all things pertaining to production and distribution might be determined by an industrial parliament that would determine such matters as the amount of a given thing to be produced and the rate at which this thing is to exchange with other necessaries, subject to the approval of Congress.

Such a system would have the great advantage of referring business matters to business men who would bring no other than business considerations to the solution of them. It would relieve Congress of the necessity of discussing commercial details with which its members are generally unfamiliar, and it would above all prevent that sacrifice of business interests to purely political considerations which often occurs to-day.

There will be an important rôle to be played in determining the amount of the various necessaries of lifewhich the socialized industries will be called upon to produce, in distributing these products, exchanging surplus products with foreign markets, and distributing the proceeds of these exchanges. All this work is of a purely business character and should be confided to business men, who have shown themselves by their practical success in business fields most fitted therefor. It would seem wiser to refer these matters to a parliament composed of the representatives of associated industries, of agricultural producers, and of distributing bodies. It would be the duty of such a parliament to appoint its own executive and cabinet, and it may be advisable to associate with the representatives of agriculture and industry in such a parliament, representatives selected by the citizens at large, so as to minimize the possibility of combinations between powerful groups of industries for the purpose of determining questions of public interest to their particular advantage.

No attempt will be made here to work out the details of such a system, the object of this book being rather to indicate the possibility of doing these things than to point out the particular method by which they should be done.

The objection that the corruption in our existing government demonstrates the unwisdom of increasing the scope of its operations seems at first sight a formidable one. If our government is as corrupt as our "yellow journals" make it out to be, it seems folly to extend its functions and give it larger opportunities for the exercise of this corruption and for the demoralization of the community which this corruption tends to produce. There are, however, many reasons for believing that the less government has to do, the more corrupt it is; and the more it has to do, the less corrupt it is.

For example, the Board of Aldermen in the city of New York was once the governing body of the city. It was a body to which men of importance belonged because its functions were important. When corruption crept into the Board of Aldermen the legislature was persuaded more and more to abridge its powers, and Tweed availed himself of this disposition to take practically all the powers of government out of the hands of the board and concentrate it in a small body of men called "supervisors," to which he took care that he and the members of his ring should belong. Some time after the Tweed ring was broken up the Board of Aldermen retained the right of confirming the appointments of the mayor; but this power too was taken from it by ex-President—then Assemblyman—Roosevelt in 1884, and from that year the Board of Aldermen became little more than a franchise-bestowing corporation. The board has consequently become so corrupt that the title of Alderman, which used to be a title of honor, is in New York a title of disgrace. If we compare the Board of Aldermen to the board which corresponds to it in London, we shall find a totally different state of things. In London it is the County Council that governs the municipality, and accordingly we find on it men who stand first in the ranks of the business world.

But there is another consideration of vastly more importance than this. New York citizens continue to complain year after year of the low order of men selected by its citizens, not only to the Board of Aldermen, but to all elective offices, including the State Assembly and the Senate. Yet they do not stop to inquire the reason for this, though it is obvious. What stake have the majority of New York citizens in the government of the city? The vast majority are not interested in the tax rates,for they do not pay taxes, or do not think they do. The majority are not interested in an efficient fire department, because they do not own property likely to be destroyed by fire and, indeed, it is said that it is members of this very majority that start most of the fires in New York. They are not interested in clean streets, for foul though our streets be, they are not as foul as the unwholesome tenements. They are not interested in an efficient police. They are not interested in a board of education, because all they want to get out of school for their children is reading, writing, and arithmetic—enough to get a job. It is difficult to see in what respect the large majority of our citizens are interested in good government at all.

What then are they interested in? They are interested in bad government. They want to get a brother or a cousin on the police force; and they want the police to be complaisant to a brother or a cousin in a liquor saloon. The retailer does not want to be disturbed in his encroachments on the sidewalk. The building trade does not want to be annoyed by a too conscientious building department. The German wants his beer on Sunday and barrooms want to do business on Sunday. The peddler wants to violate street ordinances and stand his cart in the already too crowded streets. Churches want to receive per capita contributions to their asylums and have long made efforts to secure per capita contributions to their schools. The gambler wants to keep open his gambling den; and the people want the gambler to be undisturbed. The business man, the corporation, and the criminal want to be "let alone"; and those dregs of the population too low to be able to use the vote, want to sell it for a pittance on election day. These are the conditions under which distinguished citizens and committees of one hundred expect to secure goodgovernment! And we go on ineffectually organizing municipal leagues, good government clubs, and citizens' unions to this hopeless end. It is not reasonable to suppose that in a government determined by the majority we can expect the government to be good when the majority does not want the government good, but wants it bad.

Occasionally the government in New York gets so bad that it outrages even our outrageous majority, and the overthrow of bad government is regarded as a triumph for reform. But no reform movement has ever lasted more than one administration. The public has emphatically assured us, over and over again, that it does not want reform administration, and indeed it may be said that some of these reform administrations have been just as bad as those they were intended to reform.

Municipal politicians want good laws, if at all, in order to use them for the purpose of levying blackmail, and the community is willing to pay the blackmail so long as it is not too extortionate. Business men find it cheaper to pay blackmail and be allowed to do what they want. And the same is true all the way down the line until we get to the criminal class, which has the biggest stake in bad government of all.

Yet the strange anomaly of existing conditions is that while the majority of the citizens of New York have shown year after year for a century that they want bad government and mean to have it, these citizens are not bad men, but want to be good. It is the folly of our economic conditions that makes them want bad government, and no more pitiable sight was ever presented to gods and men than this city of New York, or indeed any other of our great cities, full of citizens animated with the best intentions, forced by economic conditions to be bad. It has not yet seemed to dawn upon the reformersof the present day that, if they want to have good government, the majority of the citizens must be interested in the government being good; and not, on the contrary, interested in its being bad as at this present time.

There are two ways of accomplishing this. One way has been pointed out; to put an end to the competitive system that sets every man at the throat or pocket of his neighbor. The other is to enlarge the functions of the government sufficiently to make it important to every citizen that the government be good; then only will public spirit become stronger than private interest.

This conflict between public spirit and private interest is not a matter about which there can be any longer any doubt. When a group was engaged in organizing the City Club, we were told not once but a dozen times by a dozen different men of high standing in the community, that the whole question of good government to them resolved itself into this: "Can I by contributing money or time to reform sufficiently reduce taxes to make it worth my while to give my time and my money to this thing; or is it not better for me to use my money in purchasing protection from the organization that now controls the city and devote my time to my own private affairs?" To these men the question of good government was simply a question of tax rate, and these citizens are the ones least touched by political conditions. When we come to citizens whose business puts them continually in contact with political conditions, we find the contrast between public spirit and private interest still more marked; in the corporations that want franchises, in the builders who want their plans approved, and in the citizens already described who have an interest in keeping on good terms with the powers that be.

If now we remove the temptation on the one hand andgive a motive for good government on the other, is it not reasonable to suppose that we are more likely to obtain good government than now?

Temptation can be removed in many ways. Altogether the greatest motive for corruption is that furnished by the eagerness of corporations to secure franchises. Indeed the city was at one time governed by the owners of our city transportation system. The temptation to violate building laws would be removed if it were the city who built and not the private individual. The temptation to vote for a corrupt police force would be removed if the city instead of private barrooms sold alcoholic drinks. The temptation to vote for corruptible milk inspectors would be removed if the city instead of private dealers supplied milk. In a word, if the city were to undertake the tasks heretofore suggested, practically all temptation for graft would be eliminated.

The same process would not only eliminate temptation for graft, but would give the citizens a stake in good government. If the city distributed milk the citizen would be interested in having pure milk at a low price; if the city owned tramways, the citizen would be interested in having transportation effective and cheap; if the city manufactured gas and electric light, the citizen would be interested in having good heat and light at proper prices; and so at last the dream of the reformer that all citizens of the same city regard themselves as stockholders in the same corporation, would cease to be a dream and would be realized. They would have the same interest in the gas plant, electric plant, ice plant, milk plant, transportation plant of their city as a stockholder to-day has in the dividends which these respective industries accord him, though the dividends would not be paid in gold, but in wholesome service at cheap prices. Then only wouldthe conflict between public spirit and private interest come to an end, for a man would find it more to his interest that the government be carried on honestly and efficiently than he does now to secure a government that is dishonest and inefficient. In a word, as Mr. Mill said that the cure for the abuse of liberty is more liberty, so the cure for the abuse of government is more government. This must not be understood as a relapse in favor of state Socialism. It cannot be too often repeated that it would be as great an error to confide too much to the state as, at present, it is an error to confide too little to it. The solution is to be found in taking the middle course:medio tutissimus ibis. Give to the government the work it is fitted to do and no more. What work it is fitted to do and what work it is not fitted to do has already been explained.[196]

Amongst the tasks for which it is fitted is the work of Education:

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