Two months before issuing the Proclamation Mr. Lincoln had urgently requested the senators and representatives of the Border States to give their effective co-operation in aid of compensated emancipation. In his letter of July 12 he said "Before leaving the Capitol, consider and discuss this subject among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as such I pray you to consider this proposition and at least commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government, I beseech you that you do in no wise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, its happy future assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you more than to any others the privilege is given to assure that happiness, to swell that grandeur, to link your own names therewith forever."
The majority of the senators and representatives from the Border States did not concur with Mr. Lincoln's views and did not respond favorably to his earnest appeal. The Maryland delegation in Congress, the Kentucky delegation with one exception, and the Missouri delegation with one exception, entered into a long argument dissenting from the conclusions of the President. The West Virginia men (with the exception of Mr. Carlile), Mr. Casey of Kentucky, Mr. John W. Noell of Missouri, Mr. George P. Fisher of Delaware, together with Mr. Horace Maynard and Mr. A. J. Clements from Tennessee (not a Border State), expressed their readiness to co- operate with Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Maynard wrote a separate letter distinguished by breadth of view and strength of expression. It is impossible to comprehend the determination of the Border State men at that crisis. Having resisted in vain the aggressive legislation of Congress already accomplished, they could hardly fail to see that the institution of slavery was threatened with utter destruction. It seems absolutely incredible that, standing on the edge of the crater, they made no effort to escape from the upheaval of the volcano, already visible to those who stood afar off.
The Monitory Proclamation of Emancipation was issued on the 22d of September. It gave public notice that on the first day of January, 1863—just one hundred days distant—"all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then thenceforward and forever free." It was a final tribute to those engaged in rebellion that every agency, every instrumentality would be employed by the government in its struggle for self-preservation. It brought—as Mr. Lincoln intended it should bring—the seriousness of the contest to the hearts and consciences of the people in the Loyal States. He plainly warned them that every thing was at stake and that if they were unwilling to meet the trial with the courage and the sacrifice demanded, they were foredoomed to disaster, to defeat, to dishonor. He knew that the policy would at first encounter the disapproval of many who had supported him for the Presidency, and that it would be violently opposed by the great mass of the Democratic party. But his faith was strong. He believed that the destruction of slavery was essential to the safety of the Union, and he trusted with composure to the discerning judgment and ultimate decision of the people. If the Administration was to be defeated, he was determined that defeat should come upon an issue which involved the whole controversy. If the purse of the Nation was to be handed over to the control of those who were not ready to use the last dollar in the war for the preservation of the Union, the President was resolved that every voter in the Loyal States should be made to comprehend the deadly significance of such a decision.
The effect of the policy was for a time apparently disastrous to the Administration. The most sagacious among political leaders trembled for the result. Only the radical anti-slavery men of the type of Sumner and Stevens and Lovejoy were strong and unyielding in faith. They could not doubt, they would not doubt the result. For many weeks the elections in the North promised nothing but adversity. Maine voted a few days before the Proclamation was issued. Ever since the repeal of the Missouri Compromise the majorities against the Democrats in that State had varied from ten to nineteen thousand. Under the pressure of military reverses and the cry of an abolition war, the majority for Abner Coburn, the Republican candidate for governor, was a little over four thousand; and for the first time in ten years one of the districts returned a Democratic representative to Congress in the person of L. D. M. Sweat. Vermont, contrary to the tide of opinion elsewhere, increased her majority for the Administration—an event due in large part to the loyal position taken by Paul Dillingham who had been the leader of the Democratic party in the State.
The October elections were utterly discouraging. In Ohio the Democrats prevailed in fourteen of the Congressional districts, leaving the Republicans but five,—registering at the same time a popular majority of some seven thousand against the Administration. The extent of this reverse may be measured by the fact that in the preceding Congressional election Republican representatives had been chosen in thirteen districts. In Indiana the result was overwhelming against the President. The Republicans had held their convention early in the summer and had re-affirmed the Crittenden Resolution as embodying their platform of principles. They were not in position therefore to withstand the furious onslaught made by the Democrats on the Slavery question. Of the eleven Congressional districts the Republicans secured but three, and the Democrats had a large majority on the popular vote.—In Pennsylvania whose election was usually accepted as the index to the average public opinion of the country, the Democrats secured a majority of four thousand, and elected one-half the delegation to Congress. In November, 1860, Mr. Lincoln had received a majority of sixty thousand in Pennsylvania, and this change marked the ebb of popular favor created by the anti-slavery policy of the Administration.
Against the candidacy of Mr. Seymour for the governorship of New York, the Republicans nominated James S. Wadsworth, formerly a partisan of Mr. Van Buren and Silas Wright. He was a gentleman of the highest character, of large landed estate which he had inherited, and of wide personal popularity. He had volunteered for the war and was then in the service, with the rank of Brigadier-General. The convention which nominated him assembled after Mr. Lincoln's decisive action. They hailed "with the profoundest satisfaction the recent proclamation of the President declaring his intention to emancipate the slaves of all rebels who did not return to their allegiance by the 1st of January, 1863," and they urged upon the National Government "to use all the means that the God of battles had placed in its power against a revolt so malignant and so pernicious." Lyman Tremaine, a distinguished citizen who had been theretofore connected with the Democratic party, was nominated for Lieutenant-Governor.
The contest was extremely animated, enlisting the interest of the entire country. The result was a victory for Mr. Seymour. His majority over General Wadsworth was nearly ten thousand. His vote almost equaled the total of all the Democratic factions in the Presidential election of 1860, while Mr. Wadsworth fell nearly seventy thousand behind the vote given to Mr. Lincoln. The discrepancy could be well accounted for by the greater number of Republicans who had gone to the war, and for whose voting outside the State no provision had been made. No result could have been more distasteful to the Administration than the triumph of Mr. Seymour, and the experience of after years did not diminish the regret with which they had seen him elevated to a position of power at a time when the utmost harmony was needed between the National and State Governments.
To the President the most mortifying event of the year was the overwhelming defeat in Illinois. Great efforts were made by the Republican party to save the State. Personal pride entered into the contest almost as much as political principle, but against all that could be done the Democrats secured a popular majority of seventeen thousand, and out of the fourteen representatives in Congress they left but three to the Republicans. They chose a Democratic Legislature, which returned William A. Richardson to the Senate for the unexpired term of Mr. Douglas,—filled since his death by O. H. Browning who had been appointed by the Governor. The crushing defeat of Mr. Lincoln in his own State had a depressing effect upon the party elsewhere, and but for the assurance in which the Administration found comfort and cheer, that the Democrats were at home to vote while the Republicans were in the field to fight, the result would have proved seriously discouraging to the country and utterly destructive of the policy of emancipation as proclaimed by the President.
In the five leading free States, the Administration had thus met with a decisive defeat. The Democratic representatives chosen to Congress numbered in the aggregate fifty-nine, while those favorable to the Administration were only forty. In some other States the results were nearly as depressing. New Jersey, which had given half its electoral vote to Mr. Lincoln two years before, now elected a Democratic governor by nearly fifteen thousand majority, and of her five representatives in Congress only one was friendly to the policy of the Administration. Michigan, which had been Republican by twenty thousand in 1860, now gave the Administration but six thousand majority, though Senator Chandler made almost superhuman efforts to bring out the full vote of the party. Wisconsin, which had given Mr. Lincoln a large popular majority, now gave a majority of two thousand for the Democrats, dividing the Congressional delegation equally between the two parties.
If this ratio had been maintained in all the States, the defeat of the war party and of the anti-slavery policy would have been complete. But relief came and the Administration was saved. The New-England States which voted in November stood firmly by their principles, though with diminished majorities. The contest in Massachusetts resulted in the decisive victory of Governor Andrew over General Charles Devens, who ran as a Coalition candidate of the Democrats and Independents against the emancipation policy of the Administration. New Hampshire which voted the ensuing spring had the benefit of a Loyal re-action and sustained the Administration. In the West, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota cheered the Administration with unanimous Republican delegations to Congress, and on the Pacific coast California and Oregon stood firmly by the President.
The result in the Border slave States amply vindicated the sagacity and wisdom of the President in so constantly and carefully nurturing their loyalty and defending them against the inroads of the Confederates. They responded nobly, and in great part repaired the injury inflicted by States which were presumptively more loyal to the Administration, and which had a far larger stake in the struggle for the Union. Delaware's one representative was Republican, Missouri elected a decisive majority of friends to the Administration, and in the ensuing year Kentucky, West Virginia, and Maryland materially increased the strength of the government. The Administration was finally assured that it would be able to command a majority of about twenty in the House. But for the aid of the Border slave States the anti-slavery position of Mr. Lincoln might have been overthrown by a hostile House of Representatives. It is true therefore in a very striking sense that the five slave States which Mr. Lincoln's policy had held to their loyalty, were most effectively used by him in overpowering the eleven slave States which had revolted against the Union.
The third and last session of the Thirty-seventh Congress assembled four weeks after the close of the exciting contest for the control of the next House of Representatives. The message of Mr. Lincoln made no reference whatever to the political contest in the country, and unlike his previous communications to Congress gave no special summary of the achievements by our forces either upon the land or the sea. He contended himself with stating that he transmitted the reports of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and referred Congress to them for full information. He dwelt a length upon the total inadequacy of Disunion as a remedy for the differences between the people of the two sections, and quoted with evident satisfaction the declarations he had made in his Inaugural address upon that point. In his judgment "there is no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a National boundary upon which to divide. Trace it through from east to west upon the line between the free and the slave country, and we shall find a little more than one-third of its length are rivers easy to be crossed; and populated, or soon to be populated, thickly on both sides, while nearly all its remaining length are merely surveyor's lines over which people may walk back and forth without any consciousness of their presence. No part of this line can be made any more difficult to pass by writing it down on paper or parchment as a National boundary." In the President's view "a nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its laws. The territory is the only part which is of certain durability. That portion of the earth's surface which is inhabited by the people of the United States is well adapted for the home of one National family, but it is not well adapted for two or more."
Mr. Lincoln was still anxious that the Loyal slave States should secure the advantage of compensated emancipation which he had already urged, and he recommended an amendment to the Constitution whereby a certain amount should be paid by the United States to each State that would abolish slavery before the first day of January, A. D. 1900. The amount was to be paid in bonds of the United States on which interest was to begin from the time of actual delivery to the States. The amendment was further to declare, that "all slaves who enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war at any time before the end of the rebellion shall be forever free," but the individual owners, if loyal, shall be compensated at the same rate that may be paid to those in States abolishing slavery. The amendment also proposed to give to "Congress the right to appropriate money for the colonization of the emancipated slaves, with their own consent, at any place outside of the United States."
Congress had scarcely time to consider this grave proposition when the President issued on the first day of the new year (1863) his formal Proclamation abolishing slavery in all the States in rebellion against the Government, with the exception of Tennessee, and of certain parishes in Louisiana and certain counties in Virginia whose population was considered loyal to the Government. Tennessee was excepted from the operation of the Proclamation at the urgent request of Andrew Johnson who, after the fall of Nashville in the preceding spring, had resigned from the Senate to accept the appointment of military governor of his State. His service in the Senate, with his State in flagrant rebellion, was felt to be somewhat anomalous and he was glad to accept a position in which he could be more directly helpful to the loyal cause. He possessed the unbounded confidence of Mr. Lincoln who yielded to his views respecting the best mode of restoring Tennessee to the Union, and her inhabitants to their duty to the National Government. There is good reason for believing that both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Johnson afterwards regarded the omission of Tennessee from the Proclamation of Emancipation as a mistake, honestly made in the first place by Governor Johnson and too readily acceded to by the President.
The recommendation of Mr. Lincoln for a system of compensated emancipation was taken up promptly and cordially by the Republican members of both branches of Congress. The House appointed a special committee on the subject. With but little delay a bill was passed appropriating to Missouri, the first State considered, ten millions of dollars with the restriction that the money should be paid only to the loyal slave-holders. The Senate increased the amount to fifteen millions of dollars and returned it to the House for concurrence in the amendment. The measure had been thus passed in both branches but with stubborn opposition on the part of some prominent Democratic leaders from Missouri. John B. Henderson in the Senate and John W. Noell in the House labored earnestly to secure the compensation for their State, but the bill was finally defeated in the House. By factious resistance, by dilatory motions and hostile points of order, the Democratic members from Missouri were able to force the bill from its position of parliamentary advantage, and to prevent its consideration within the period in which a majority of the House could control its fate. The just responsibility for depriving Missouri of the fifteen millions of dollars must be charged in an especial degree to Thomas L. Price, Elijah H. Norton, and William A. Hall, representatives from that State, who on the 25th of February, 1863, by the use of objectionable tactics deprived the House of the opportunity even to consider a bill of such value and consequence to their constituents. A large majority stood ready to pass it, but the determined hostility of the Democratic members from Missouri defeated the kindly and generous intentions of Congress towards their own State. At a later period in the session the attempt was made to pass the bill by a suspension of the Rules, but this motion though it received the support of a majority was defeated for the lack of two-thirds of the votes as required. The Democratic members of Missouri were again active in resisting the boon which was offered to their State and so earnestly pressed by the Republicans of the House.
The course of the Missouri representatives was sustained by the solid vote of the Democratic members from the free States, and received the co-operation of a majority of representatives from the Border slave States. If the bill for Missouri had passed, a similar relief would have been offered to Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland and Delaware. Mr. Crittenden whose influence with the representatives from these States was deservedly great could not be persuaded to adopt the President's policy. The consideration which influenced him and other Border State men to the course which subsequent events proved to be unwise, was their distrust of the success of the Union arms. The prospect had grown steadily discouraging ever since the adjournment of Congress in the preceding July, and with the exception of General McClellan's success at Antietam there had been nothing to lighten the gloom which deeply beclouded the military situation. The daily expenditures of the nation were enormous, and the Secretary of the Treasury had at the opening of the season estimated that the National debt at the close of the current fiscal year would exceed seventeen hundred millions of dollars. The Border State men chose therefore to maintain possession of their four hundred thousand slaves, even with the title somewhat shaken by war, rather than to part with them for the bonds of a Government whose ability to pay they considered extremely doubtful.
They could readily have secured, indeed they were urged to accept, fifty millions of dollars, the equivalent of gold coin, in securities which became in a few years the favorite investment of the wisest capitalists in the world. Such opportunities are never repeated. The magnanimous policy of the President and the wise liberality of the Republican party were precisely adapted, if the Border State men could have seen it, to the critical situation of the hour. Subsequent events prevented the repetition of the offer, and the slave-holders were left to thank themselves and their representatives for the loss of the munificent compensation proffered by the Government. They could not believe Mr. Lincoln when at the pressing moment he pleaded with them so earnestly to accept the terms, and flavored his appeal with the humorous remark to Mr. Crittenden: "You Southern men will soon reach the point where bonds will be a more valuable possession than bondsmen. Nothing is more uncertain now than two-legged property."
After the unfortunate issue of the Peninsular campaign and in the fear that Lee might turn directly upon Washington, a new army was organized on the 27th of June, 1862, and placed under the command of Major-General John Pope. It included the forces which had been serving under Frémont, Banks and McDowell, and was divided into three corps with these officers respectively in command. General Frémont considering the designation below his rank asked to be relieved from the service, and his corps was assigned to General Rufus King, and soon after to General Sigel. General Pope took the field on the 14th of July with a formidable force. General McClellan was still within twenty-five miles of Richmond, and with Pope in front of Washington, the Confederate authorities were at a standstill and could not tell which way to advance with hope of success or even with safety.
If the army of Lee should move towards Washington he might be compelled to fight General Pope protected by the extensive fortifications on the south side of the Potomac, leaving Richmond at the same time uncovered, with the possibility that McClellan, re-enforced by Burnside's corps which lay at Fortress Monroe, would renew his attack with an army of ninety thousand men. But as soon as the Confederates ascertained that McClellan was ordered back to the Potomac, they saw their opportunity and made haste to attack Pope. Fault was found with the slowness of McClellan's movements. His judgment as a military man was decidedly against the transfer of his army from the point it occupied near Richmond, and it cannot be said that he obeyed the distasteful order with the alacrity with which he would have responded to one that agreed with his own judgment.
No reason can be assigned why if the Army of the Potomac was to be brought back in front of Washington it should not have been transferred in season to re-enforce General Pope and give a crushing blow to Lee. General McClellan was directed on the third day of August to withdraw his whole army to Acquia Creek, and as General Halleck declares, "in order to make the movement as rapidly as possible General McClellan was authorized to assume control of all the vessels in the James River and Chesapeake Bay, of which there was then a vast fleet." General McClellan did not begin the evacuation of Harrison's Landing until the 14th of August—eleven days after it was ordered. General Burnside's corps was ordered on the 1st of August to move from Newport News to Acquia Creek, and an estimate of the transportation facilities at command of General McClellan, may be formed from the fact that Burnside's whole corps reached their destination in forty-eight hours. General Lee knew at once by this movement that it was not the design to attack Richmond, and he made haste to throw his army on Pope before the slow moving army from Harrison's Landing could re-enforce him. General McClellan did not himself reach Acquia Creek until the 24th of August. The disasters sustained by General Pope in the month of August could not have occurred if the forces of the Union, readily at command, had been brought seasonably to his aid. It was at this crisis that the unfortunate movements were made, the full responsibility for which, perhaps the exact character of which, may never be determined, but the sorrowful result of which was that the Union forces, much larger in the aggregate than Lee's, were divided and continually outnumbered on the field of battle.
Flushed with success the Confederate authorities pushed their fortunes with great boldness. General Bragg invaded Kentucky with a large army and General Lee prepared to invade Pennsylvania. The cruel defeat of General Pope disabled him for the time as a commander, and the Administration, fearing for the safety of Washington, and yielding somewhat to the obvious wishes of the soldiers, ordered General McClellan on September 2 to assume command of all troops for the defense of the Capital. General Lee avoiding the fortifications of Washington, passed over to Maryland, and prepared to invade Pennsylvania with a force formidable in numbers and with the added strength of a supreme confidence in its invincibility. General McClellan moved promptly westward to cut off Lee's progress northward. After preliminary engagements the main battle of Antietam was fought on the 17th of September, resulting in a Union victory. Lee was severely repulsed and retreated across the Potomac.
General McClellan fought the battle of Antietam under extraordinary embarrassment caused by the surrender of Harper's Ferry to the Confederates on the 13th, with a loss to the Union army of more than twelve thousand men. Could he have had the advantage of this force on the battle-field, under a competent commander, at the critical moment, his victory over Lee might have been still more decisive. His success however was of overwhelming importance to the National Government and put a stop to an invasion of Pennsylvania which might have been disastrous in the extreme. He was blamed severely, perhaps unjustly, for not following Lee on his retreat and reaping the fruits of his victory. He had the misfortune to fall into a controversy once more with the authorities at Washington. After a correspondence with the War Department he was peremptorily ordered by the General-in-Chief Halleck on the 6th of October in these words: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. . . . I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions." The order was not promptly obeyed. The Army of the Potomac—as those who spoke for General McClellan maintained—had been for six months engaged in a laborious campaign in which they had fought many battles and experienced much hardship. They needed rest, recruitment, clothes, shoes, and a general supply of war material before setting out on what would prove a winter march. The authorities at Washington asserted, and apparently proved on the testimony of Quartermaster-General Meigs, a most accomplished, able, and honorable officer, that the Army of the Potomac, when it received its first orders to move in October, was thoroughly and completely equipped. General McClellan thought however that if intrusted with the command of the army he should be allowed to direct its movements. He crossed the Potomac near Harper's Ferry in the last week of October, and began an advance through Virginia which effectually covered Washington. He had reached Warrenton, and, before the plan of his campaign was developed, received at midnight, on the 7th of November, a direct order from President Lincoln to "surrender the command of the army to General Burnside, and to report himself immediately at Trenton, the capital of New Jersey."
GENERAL McCLELLAN'S MILITARY CAREER.
The reasons for this sudden and peremptory order were not given, and if expressed would probably have been only an assertion of the utter impossibility that the War Department and General McClellan should harmoniously co-operate in the great military movements which devolved upon the Army of the Potomac. But the time of removal was not opportunely selected by the Administration. After General McClellan's failure on the Peninsula, a large proportion of the Northern people clamored for his deposition from command, and it would have been quietly acquiesced in by all. At the end of those disastrous days when he was falling back on the line of the James River, General McClellan had telegraphed the Secretary of War "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." Perhaps no such dispatch was ever before sent by a military officer to the Commander-in-Chief of the army—to the ruler of the nation. In any other country it would have been followed with instant cashiering. Mr. Lincoln, with his great magnanimity, had however condoned the offense, and after the defeat of Pope the Administration had enlarged the command of McClellan and trusted the fortunes of the country to his generalship. The trust had not been in vain. He had rolled back the tide of invasion by a great battle in which for the first time the army of Lee had been beaten. He was now marching forward with his army strengthened for another conflict, and without explanation to the country or to himself was deprived of his command. A large part of the people and of the public press and an overwhelming majority in the army were dissatisfied with the act, and believed that it would entail evil consequences.
This ended the military career of General McClellan which throughout its whole period had been a subject of constant discussion—a discussion which has not yet closed. The opinion of a majority of intelligent observers, both civil and military, is that he was a man of high professional training, admirably skilled in the science of war, capable of commanding a large army with success, but at the same time not original in plan, not fertile in resource, and lacking the energy, the alertness, the daring, the readiness to take great risks for great ends, which distinguish the military leaders of the world. For a commander of armies, in an offensive campaign, his caution was too largely developed. He possessed in too great a degree what the French term thedefensive instinct of the engineer, and was apparently incapable of doing from his own volition what he did so well on the bloody field of Antietam, when under the pressure of an overwhelming necessity.
General Burnside assumed the command with diffidence. After a consultation with General Halleck he moved down the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg where he confronted General Lee's army on the 13th of December, and made an attack upon it under great disadvantages and with the legitimate result of a great defeat. The total loss of killed and wounded of the Union army exceeded ten thousand men. The public mind was deeply affected throughout the North by this untoward event. All the prestige which Lee had lost at Antietam had been regained, all the advantage we had secured on that field was sacrificed by the disaster on the still bloodier field of Fredericksburg. It added immeasurably to the gloom of a gloomy winter, and in the rank and file of the army it caused a dissatisfaction somewhat akin to mutiny. So pronounced did this feeling become and so plainly was it manifested that the subject attracted the attention of Congress and led to some results which, despite the seriousness of the situation, were irresistibly amusing.
On the 23d of January Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts offered a somewhat extraordinary resolution,—instructing the Committee on the Conduct of the War to "inquire whether Major-General Burnside has since the battle of Fredericksburg formed any plans for the movement of the Army of the Potomac or any portion of the same, and if so whether any subordinate generals of said army have written to or visited Washington, to oppose or interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether such proposed movements have been arrested or interfered with, and if so by what authority." The consideration of the resolution was postponed under the rule, and three days later it was called up by Mr. Anthony of Rhode Island and its adoption urged "with the view of finding out whether officers were coming up here from the Army of the Potomac to interfere with the plans of General Burnside." There was indeed no doubt that some of the general officers connected with the army had been in Washington, and confidentially informed the President of the dispirited and depressed condition of the whole force.
General Burnside's character was one of great frankness, truth, and fidelity. He was full of courage and of manliness, and he conceived from circumstances within his knowledge, that certain officers in his command were gradually undermining and destroying him in the confidence of the army and of the public. He had not desired the position to which the President called him as the successor of General McClellan. He did not feel himself indeed quite competent to the task of commanding an army of one hundred thousand men. But there as in every other position in life he would try to do his best. He failed and failed decisively. It would probably have been wise for him to resign his command immediately after the defeat at Fredericksburg. On January 23, the Friday before the Senate resolution was adopted, General Burnside, highly incensed by the injury which he thought had been done him, wrote an order peremptorily "dismissing, subject to the approval of the President, Major-General Joseph E. Hooker from the Army of the United States, for having been guilty of unjust and unnecessary criticism of his superior officers, and for having by the general tone of his conversation endeavored to create distrust in the minds of officers who have associated with him, and for having habitually spoken in disparaging terms of other officers." The order declared that General Hooker was dismissed "as a man unfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like the present when so much patience, charity, confidence, consideration, and patriotism is due from every person in the field." The same order dismissed Brigadier-General John Newton and Brigadier-General John Cochrane for going to the President with criticisms on the plans of the commanding officer, and relieved Major-General William B. Franklin, Major-General W. F. Smith, Brigadier-General Sturgis and several others from further service in the Army of the Potomac.
The outcome of this extraordinary proceeding was very singular. General Burnside took the order, before its publication, to the President who instead of approving it, very good-naturedly found a command for the General in the West, and on the very day that the Senate passed the resolution of inquiry, two orders were read at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac,—one from General Burnside announcing that Major-General Joseph E. Hooker was assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac and asking the army to "give to the brave and skillful General, who is now to command you, your full and cordial support and co-operation;" the other from General Hooker assuming command of the Army of the Potomac by direction of the President and conveying to the late commander, General Burnside, "the most cordial good wishes of the whole army."
In the South-West where General Grant, General Sherman, and General Rosecrans were stubbornly contesting the ground, no decisive results were attained. The army went into winter quarters, with a general feeling of discouragement pervading the country. A substantial advantage was gained by General Buell's army in driving Bragg out of Kentucky, and a very signal and helpful encouragement came to the Government from the fact that the public manifestations in Kentucky were decisively adverse to the Confederates, and that Lee's army in Maryland met no welcome from any portion of the population. General McClellan's army was cheered everywhere in Maryland as it marched to the field of Antietam; and as Bragg retreated through the mountain sections of Kentucky his stragglers were fired upon by the people, and the women along the route upbraided the officers with bitter maledictions. Perhaps the feature of the two invasions most discouraging to the Confederates was the condition of the popular mind which they found in the Border States. They had expected to arouse fresh revolt, but they met a people tired of conflict and longing for repose under the flag of the Nation.
Congress felt that the situation was one of uncertainty if not of positive adversity. They did not however abate one jot or tittle of earnest effort in providing for a renewal of the contest in the ensuing spring. They appropriated some seven hundred and forty millions of dollars for the army and some seventy-five millions for the navy, and they took the very decisive step of authorizing "the President to enroll, arm, equip, and receive into the land and naval service of the United States such number of volunteers of African descent as he may deem useful to suppress the present Rebellion for such term of service as he may prescribe, not exceeding five years." The enactment of this bill was angrily resisted by the Democratic party and by the Union men of the Border States. But the Republicans were able to consolidate their ranks in support of it. In the popular opinion it was a radical measure, and therein lay its chief merit. Aside from the substantial strength which the accession of these colored men to the ranks would give to the Union army, was the moral effect which would be produced on the minds of Southern men by the open demonstration that the President did not regard the Proclamation of Emancipation asbrutum fulmen, but intended to enforce it by turning the strong arm of the slave against the person of the master. It was a policy that required great moral courage, and it was abundantly rewarded by successful results. It signalized to the whole world the depth of the earnestness with which the Administration was defending the Union, and the desperate extent to which the contest would be carried before American nationality should be surrendered. The measure had long been demanded by the aggressive sentiment of the North, and its enactment was hailed by the mass of people in the Loyal States as a great step forward.
A subject of striking interest at this session of Congress was the passage of the "Act relating tohabeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases." The President had ordered for the public safety, and as an act necessary to the successful prosecution of the war, the arrest and confinement of certain persons charged with disloyal practices. No punishment was attempted or designed except that of confinement in a military fortress of the United States. It became a matter of argument not only in Congress but throughout the country, whether the President was authorized by the Constitution to suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus. In order to set the question at rest it was now proposed to pass an Act of indemnity for past acts to all officers engaged in making arrests, and also to confirm to the President by law the right which he had of his own power been exercising. The bill declared that "during the present Rebellion the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpusin any case throughout the United States or any part thereof; and wherever the said writ shall be suspended no military or other officer shall be compelled, in answer to any writ ofhabeas corpus, to return the body of any person or persons detained by him by authority of the President."
The bill was stubbornly resisted by the Democratic party, and after its passage by the House thirty-six Democratic representatives asked leave to enter upon the Journal a solemn protest against its enactment. They recited at length their grounds of objection, the principal of which was "the giving to the President the right to suspend the writ ofhabeas corpusthroughout the limits of the United States, whereas by the Constitution the power to suspend the privilege of that writ is confided to the discretion of Congress alone and is limited to the place threatened by the dangers of invasion or insurrection," and also because "the bill purports to confirm and make valid by act of Congress arrests and imprisonments which were not only not warranted by the Constitution of the United States but were in palpable violation of its express prohibitions." Mr. Thaddeus Stevens peremptorily moved to lay the request on the table, and on a call of the ayes and noes the motion prevailed by a vote of 75 to 41. The division in the House by this time amounted to a strict line, on one side of which was the war party and on the other side the anti-war party.
The crowning achievement of the session in aid of the Union was the passage of an "Act for enrolling and calling out the National forces and for other purposes." By its terms all able-bodied citizens of the United States between the ages of twenty and forty- five years, with a few exemptions which were explicitly stated, were declared to "constitute the National forces and shall be employed to perform military duty in the service of the United States when called on by the President for that purpose." Volunteering was not to be relied upon as the sole means of recruiting the army, but the entire population within the arms-bearing age was now to be devoted to the contest. Taken in connection with other legislation already adverted to—the enormous appropriations for the forthcoming campaign, the organization of African regiments, the suspension of the writ ofhabeas corpusat the President's discretion—this last measure was the conclusive proof of the serious determination with which Congress and the people would continue the contest. The spirit with which the President and Congress proceeded in that depressing and depressed period proved invaluable to the country. The situation had so many elements of a discouraging character that the slightest hesitation or faltering among those controlling the administration of the Government would have been followed by distrust and dismay among the people.
The President's Border-State Policy.—Loyal Government erected inVirginia.—Recognized by Congress and Senators admitted.—Desirefor a New State.—The Long Dissatisfaction of the People of WesternVirginia.—The Character of the People and of their Section.—TheirOpportunity had come.—Organization of the Pierpont Government.—State Convention and Constitution.—Application to Congress forAdmission.—Anti-slavery Amendment.—Senate Debate: Sumner, Wade,Powell, Willey, and Others.—House Debate: Stevens, Conway, Bingham,Segar.—Passage of Bill in Both Branches.—Heavy Blow to the OldState.—Her Claims deserve Consideration.—Should be treated asgenerously at least as Mexico.
The great importance attached by Mr. Lincoln to the preservation of Loyalty in the line of slave States which bordered upon the free States was everywhere recognized. As Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri had been promptly placed under the control of governments friendly to the Union, there remained of the States in rebellion only Virginia with territory adjacent to the Loyal States. Virginia bordered on the Ohio River for two hundred and fifty miles; she was adjacent to Pennsylvania for a distance of one hundred and twenty miles, half on the southern, half on the western line of that State. Her extreme point stretched to the northward of Pittsburg, and was within twenty-five miles of the parallel of latitude that marks the southern boundary of New England. The continued exercise of even a nominal jurisdiction so far North, by the State which contained the capital of the Rebel Confederacy, would be a serious impeachment of the power of the National Government, and would detract from its respect at home and its prestige abroad. But the National Government was of itself capable only of enforcing military occupation and proclaiming the jurisdiction of the sword. What the President desired was the establishment of civil government by a loyal people, with the reign of law and order everywhere recognized. Happily the disposition of the inhabitants was in harmony with the wishes of the Administration and the necessities of the Union.
After the adoption of the Secession Ordinance by the Virginia Convention on the 17th of April, the loyal people of the Western section of the State were prompt to act. As early as the 13th of May—a fortnight before the day appointed for the popular vote on the Secession Ordinance in Virginia—five hundred staunch Union men came together in a Convention at Wheeling, denounced the Ordinance of Secession and pledged their loyalty to the National Government and their obedience to its laws. If the Ordinance should be approved by the popular vote of Virginia, this preliminary conference requested the people in all the counties represented, to appoint delegates on the fourth day of June to a General Convention to assemble in Wheeling on the 11th of the same month. These Union- loving men were energetic and zealous. They realized that with the secession of Virginia, completed and proclaimed, they must do one of two things—either proceed at once to organize a State government which would be faithful to the National Constitution, or drift helplessly into anarchy and thus contribute to the success of the rebellion. Their prompt and intelligent action is a remarkable illustration of the trained and disciplined ability of Americans for the duties of self-government.
The members of the Convention which was organized on the 11th of June were even more determined than those who had assembled the preceding month. Without delay they declared the State offices of Virginia vacant because of the treason and disloyalty of those who had been elected to hold them, and they proceeded to fill them and form a regular State organization of which Francis H. Pierpont was appointed the executive head. They did not assume to represent a mere section of the State, but in the belief that the loyal people were entitled to speak for the whole State they declared that their government was the Government of Virginia. This Western movement was subsequently strengthened by the accession of delegates from Alexandria and Fairfax Counties in Middle Virginia and from Accomac and Northampton Counties on the Eastern Shore. Thus organized, the Government of the State was acknowledged by Congress as the Government of Virginia and her senators and representatives were admitted to seats.
Notwithstanding the compliance with all the outward forms and requirements, notwithstanding the recognition by Congress of the new government, it was seen to be essentially and really the Government of West Virginia. It was only nominally and by construction the Government of the State of Virginia. It did not represent the political power or the majority of the people of the entire State. That power was wielded in aid of the rebellion. The senators and representatives of Virginia were in the Confederate Congress. The strength of her people was in the Confederate Army, of which a distinguished Virginian was the commander. The situation was anomalous, though the friends of the Union justified the irregularity of recognizing the framework of government in the hands of loyal men as the actual civil administration of the State of Virginia.
The people of the Western section of Virginia realized that the position was unnatural,—one which they could not sustain by popular power within the limits of the State they assumed to govern, except for the protection afforded by the military power of the National Government. Between the two sections of the State there had long been serious antagonisms. Indeed from the very origin of the settlement of West Virginia, which had made but little progress when the Federal Constitution was adopted, its citizens were in large degree alienated from the Eastern and older section of the State. The men of the West were hardy frontiersmen, a majority of them soldiers of the Revolution and their immediate descendants, without estates, with little but the honorable record of patriotic service and their own strong arms, for their fortunes. They had few slaves. They had their land patents, which were certificates of patriotic service in the Revolutionary war, and they depended upon their own labor for a new home in the wilderness. A population thus originating, a community thus founded, were naturally uncongenial to the aristocratic element of the Old Dominion. They had no trade relations, no social intercourse, with the tide-water section of the State. Formidable mountain ranges separated the two sections, and the inhabitants saw little of each other. The business interests of the Western region led the people to the Valley of the Ohio and not to the shores of the Chesapeake. The waters of the Monongahela connected them with Pennsylvania and carried them to Pittsburg. All the rivers of the western slope flowed into the Ohio and gave to the people the markets of Cincinnati and Louisville. Their commercial intercourse depended on the navigation of Western waters, and a far larger number had visited St. Louis and New Orleans than had ever seen Richmond or Norfolk. The West-Virginians were aware of the splendid resources of their section and were constantly irritated by the neglect of the parent State to aid in their development. They enjoyed a climate as genial as that of the Italians who dwell on the slopes of the Apennines; they had forests more valuable than those that skirt the upper Rhine; they had mineral wealth as great as that which has given England her precedence in the manufacturing progress of the world. They were anxious for self-government. Their trustworthy senator, Waitman T. Willey, declared that the people west of the Alleghany range had for sixty years "desired separation." The two sections, he said, had been time and again on the eve of an outbreak and the Western people could with difficulty be held back from insurrection. Criminations and recriminations had been exchanged at every session of the Legislature for forty years and threats of violence had been hurled by one section at the other.
The opportunity for a new State had now come. Its organization and admission to the Union would complete the chain of loyal Commonwealths on the south side of Mason and Dixon's line, and would drive back the jurisdiction of rebellious Virginia beyond the chain of mountains and interpose that barrier to the progress of the insurrectionary forces Westward and Northward. The provision in the Federal Constitution that no new State shall be formed within the jurisdiction of any other State without the consent of the Legislature of the State as well as of Congress, had always been the stumbling-block in the way of West Virginia's independence. Despite the hostilities and antagonisms of the two populations, Virginia would insist on retaining this valuable section of country within her own jurisdiction. But now, by the chances of war, the same men who desired to create the new State were wielding the entire political power of Virginia, and they would naturally grant permission to themselves to erect a State that would be entirely free from the objectionable jurisdiction which for the time they represented. They were not slow to avail themselves of their opportunity.
The Pierpont Government, as it was now popularly termed, adopted an Ordinance on the 20th of August, 1861, providing "for the formation of a new State out of a portion of the territory of this State." The Ordinance was approved by a vote of the people on the fourth Thursday of October, and on the 26th of November the Convention assembled in Wheeling to frame a constitution for the new government. The work was satisfactorily performed, and on the first Thursday of April, 1862, the people approved the constitution by a vote fo 18,862 in favor of it with only 514 against it. The work of the representatives of the projected new State being thus ratified, the Governor called the Legislature of Virginia together on the sixth day of May, and on the 13th of the same moth that body gave its consent, with due regularity, to "the formation of a new State within the jurisdiction of the said State of Virginia." A fortnight later, on the 28th of May, Senator Willey introduced the subject in Congress by presenting a memorial from the Legislature of Virginia together with a certified copy of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and the vote of the people.
The constitution was referred to the Committee on Territories and a bill favorable to admission was promptly reported by Senator Wade of Ohio. The measure was discussed at different periods, largely with reference to the effect it would have upon the institution of slavery, and Congress insisted upon inserting a provision that "the children of slaves, born in the State after the fourth day of July, 1863, shall be free; all slaves within the said State who shall at that time be under the age of ten years shall be free when they arrive at the age of twenty-one years; all slaves over ten and under twenty-one shall be free at the age of twenty-five years; and no slave shall be permitted to come into the State for permanent residence therein." This condition was to be ratified by the Convention which framed the constitution, and by the people at an election held for the purpose, and, upon due certification of the approval of the condition to the President of the United States, he was authorized to issue his proclamation declaring West Virginia to be a State of the Union.
Mr. Sumner was not satisfied with a condition which left West Virginia with any form of slavery whatever. He said there were "twelve thousand human beings now held in bondage in that State, and all who are over a certain age are to be kept so for their natural lives." He desired to strike out the provision which permitted this and to insert on in lieu thereof, declaring that "within the limits of the said State there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude otherwise than in the punishment of crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." Mr. Sumner's amendment was opposed by some of the most radical anti-slavery men in the Senate, notably by Collamer and Foot of Vermont, by Wade of Ohio, and by Howe of Wisconsin. They believed that the convictions of the people of West Virginia had developed to the point embodied in the bill, and that to attempt the immediate extirpation of slavery might lead to re-action and possibly to the rejection of the constitution. Mr. Sumner's amendment was therefore defeated by 24 votes against 11. Of the 24 votes 17 were given by Republican senators.
Mr. Powell of Kentucky vigorously opposed the bill in all its parts. He contended that "if the cities of New York and Brooklyn, with the counties in which they are located, were to get up a little bogus Legislature and say they were the State of New York, and ask to be admitted and cut off from the rest of the State, I would just as soon vote for their admission as to vote for the pending bill." No senator, he said, could pretend to claim that "even a third part of the people of Virginia have ever had any thing to do with rendering their assent to the making of this new State within the territorial limits of that ancient Commonwealth." He declared this to be "a dangerous precedent which overthrows the Constitution and may be fraught with direful consequences." "Out of the one hundred and sixty counties that compose the State of Virginia," he continued, "less than one-fourth have assumed to act for the entire State; and even within the boundaries of the new State more than half the voters have declined to take part in the elections."
Mr. Willey argued that the Legislature represented the almost unanimous will of all the loyal people of West Virginia. He said that "besides the 19,000 votes cast, there were 10,100 men absent in the Union army, and that, the conclusion being foregone, the people had not been careful to come out to vote, knowing that the constitution would be overwhelmingly adopted." On the 14th of July, three days before Congress adjourned, the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 23 to 17. Mr. Rice of Minnesota was the only Democrat who favored the admission of the new State. The other Democratic senators voted against it. Mr. Chandler and Mr. Howard of Michigan voted in the negative because the State had voluntarily done nothing towards providing for the emancipation of slaves; Mr. Sumner and Mr. Wilson, because the State had rejected the anti- slavery amendment; Mr. Trumbull and Mr. Cowan, because of the irregularity of the whole proceeding.
The bill was not considered in the House until the next session. It was taken up on the 9th of December and was vigorously attacked by Mr. Conway of Kansas. He questioned the validity of the Pierpont Government and asked whether the law which gave him his warrant of authority had come from "a mob or from a mass-meeting." He said he had "serious reason to believe that it is the intention of the President to encourage the formation of State organizations in all the seceded States, and that a few individuals are to assume State powers wherever a military encampment can be effected in any of the rebellious districts." Mr. Conway denounced this scheme as "utterly and flagrantly unconstitutional, as radically revolutionary in character and deserving the reprobation of every loyal citizen." It aimed, he said, at "an utter subversion of our constitutional system and will consolidate all power in the hands of the Executive." He was answered with spirit by Mr. Colfax of Indiana, who reviewed the successive steps by which the legality of the Virginia government had been recognized by the President and by all the departments of the executive government. He argued that West Virginia had taken every step regularly and complied with every requirement of the Constitution.
Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky said the Wheeling government could be regarded as the government of the whole State of Virginia "only by a mere fiction. Weknowthe fact to be otherwise." He said it was the party applying for admission that consented to the admission, and that was the whole of it. When the war should cease and the National authority should be re-established he wanted the Union as it was. This would be "a new-made Union—the old majestic body cut and slashed by passion, by war, coming to form another government, another Union. The Constitution gives us no power to do what we are asked to do." Mr. Maynard said there were "two governors and two Legislatures assuming authority over Virginia simultaneously. The question here is which shall the Government of the United States recognize as the true and lawful Legislature of Virginia?" He contended that it had already been settled, by the admission of members of both branches of Congress under the Pierpont Government. Mr. Dawes affirmed that "nobody has given his consent to the division of the State of Virginia and the erection of a new State who does not reside within the new State itself." He contended therefore that "this bill does not comply with the spirit of the Constitution. If the remaining portions of Virginia are under duress while this consent is given, it is a mere mockery of the Constitution." Mr. Brown of Virginia, from that part which was to be included in the new State, corrected Mr. Dawes, but the latter maintained that while a member of the Legislature "was picked up in Fairfax and two or three gentlemen in other parts of the State, they protested themselves that they did not pretend to represent the counties from which they hailed."
Mr. Thaddeus Stevens said he did not desire to be understood as "sharing the delusion that we are admitting West Virginia in pursuance of any provision of the Constitution." He could "find no provision justifying it, and the argument in favor of it originates with those who either honestly entertain an erroneous opinion, or who desire to justify by a forced construction an act which they have predetermined to do." He maintained that it was "but mockery to say that the Legislature of Virginia has ever consented to the division. Only two hundred thousand out of a million and a quarter of people have participated in the proceedings." He contended that "the State of Virginia has a regular organization, and by a large majority of the people it has changed its relations to the Federal Government." He knew that this was treason in the individuals who participated in it; but so far as the State was concerned, it was a valid act. Our government, he argued, "does not act upon a State. The State, as a separate distinct body, is the State of a majority of the people of Virginia, whether rebel or loyal, whether convict or free men. The majority of the people of Virginia is the State of Virginia, although individuals have committed treason." "Governor Pierpont," continued Mr. Stevens, "is an excellent man, and I wish he were the Governor elected by the people of Virginia. But according to my principles operating at the present time I can vote for the admission of West Virginia without any compunctions of conscience—only with some doubt about the policy of it. None of the States now in rebellion are entitled to the protection of the Constitution. These proceedings are in virtue of the laws of war. We may admit West Virginia as a new State, not by virtue of any provision of the Constitution but under our absolute power which the laws of war give us in the circumstances in which we are placed. I shall vote for this bill upon that theory, and upon that alone. I will not stultify myself by supposing that we have any warrant in the Constitution for this proceeding."
Mr. Bingham of Ohio made an able argument principally devoted to rebutting the somewhat mischievous ground assumed by Mr. Stevens. He affirmed that "the minority of the people of the State cannot be deprived of their rights because the majority have committed treason." He argued that, the majority of the people of Virginia having become rebels, the State was in the hands of the loyal minority, who in that event had a right to administer the laws, maintain the authority of the State government, and elect a State Legislature and a Governor, through whom they might call upon the Federal Government for protection against domestic violence, according to the express guaranty of the Constitution. "To deny this proposition," continued Mr. Bingham, "is to say that when the majority in any State revolt against the laws, the State government can never be re-organized nor the rights of the minority protected so long as the majority are in revolt." He contended that the doctrine he advocated was not a new one, that it was as old as the Constitution, and he called attention to the remarkable letter of "The Federalist," addressed by Mr. Madison to the American people in which "he who is called the author of the Constitution" asked: "Why may not illicit combinations for purposes of violence be formed as well by a majority of a State as by a majority of a county or district of the same State? And if the authority of the State ought in the latter case to protect the local magistrate, ought not the Federal authority in the former case to support the State authority?"
Mr. Segar, who represented the district including Fortress Monroe, pleaded very earnestly against the dismemberment of his State and he argued, as Mr. Powell had argued in the Senate, that there was no evidence that a majority of the people within the counties which were to compose the new State had ever given their assent to its formation. The ordinary vote of those counties he said was 48,000 while on the new State question the entire vote cast was only 19,000. He named ten counties included in the new State organization in which not a single vote had been cast on either side of the question at the special election. Though loyal to the Union and grieving over the rebellious course of Virginia he begged that this humiliation might be spared her. "Let there not be two Virginias; let us remain one and united. Do not break up the rich cluster of glorious memories and associations which gather over the name and the history of this ancient and once glorious Commonwealth."
On the passage of the bill the ayes were 96 and the noes were 55. The ayes were wholly from the Republican party, though several prominent Republicans opposed the measure. Almost the entire Massachusetts delegation voted in the negative, as did also Mr. Roscoe Conkling, Mr. Conway of Kansas and Mr. Francis Thomas of Maryland. The wide difference of opinion concerning this act was not unnatural. But the cause of the Union was aided by the addition of another loyal commonwealth, and substantial justice was done to the brave people of the new State who by their loyalty had earned the right to be freed from the domination which had fretted them and from the association which was uncongenial to them.
To the old State of Virginia the blow was a heavy one. In the years following the war it added seriously to her financial embarrassment, and it has in many ways obstructed her prosperity. As a punitive measure, for the chastening of Virginia, it cannot be defended. Assuredly there was no ground for distressing Virginia by penal enactments that did not apply equally to every other State of the Confederacy. Common justice revolts at the selection of one man for punishment from eleven who have all been guilty of the same offense. If punishment had been designed there was equal reason for stripping Texas of her vast domain and for withdrawing the numerous land grants which had been generously made by the National Government to many of the States in rebellion. But Texas was allowed to emerge from the contest without the forfeiture of an acre, and Congress, so far from withdrawing the land grants by which other Southern States were to be enriched, took pains to renew them in the years succeeding the war. The autonomy of Virginia alone was disturbed. Upon Virginia alone fell the penalty, which if due to any was due to all.
Another consideration is of great weight. An innocent third party was involved. Virginia owed a large debt, held in great part by loyal citizens of the North and by subjects of foreign countries. The burden was already as heavy as she could bear in her entirety, and dismemberment so crippled her that she could not meet her obligations. The United States might well have relieved Virginia and have done justice to her creditors by making some allowance for the division of her territory. Regarding her only as entitled to the rights of a public enemy so long as she warred upon the Union, we may confidently maintain that she is entitled at least to as just and magnanimous treatment as the National Government extends to a foreign foe. In our war with Mexico it became our interest to acquire a large part of the territory owned by that republic. We had conquered her armies and were in possession of her capital. She was helpless in our hands. But the high sense of justice which has always distinguished the United States in her public policies would not permit the despoilment of Mexico. We negotiated therefore for the territory needed, and paid for it a larger price than would have been given by any other nation in the world. The American Government went still farther. Many of our citizens held large claims against Mexico, and the failure to pay them had been one of the causes that precipitated hostilities. Our government in addition to the money consideration of fifteen millions of dollars which we paid for territory, agreed to exonerate Mexico from all demands of our citizens, and to pay them from our own Treasury. This supplementary agreement cost the National Treasury nearly four million dollars.
If the United State were willing to place Virginia on the basis on which they magnanimously placed Mexico after the conquest of that Republic, a sufficient allowance would be made to her to compensate at least for that part of her public debt which might presumptively be represented by the territory taken from her. If it be said in answer to such a suggestion that it would be fairer for West Virginia to assume the proportional obligation thus indicated, the prompt rejoinder is that in equity her people are not held to such obligation. The public improvements for which the debt was in large part incurred had not been so far completed as to benefit West Virginia when the civil war began,—their advantages being mainly confined to the Tide-water and Piedmont sections of the State. There is indeed neither moral nor legal responsibility resting upon West Virginia for any part of the debt of the old State.
In determining the relative obligations of the National Government and of the government of West Virginia, concerning the debt, it is of the first importance to remember that the new State was not primarily organized and admitted to the Union for the benefit of her own people, but in far larger degree for the benefit of the people of the whole Union. The organic law would not have been strained, legal fictions would not have been invented, contradictory theories would not have been indulged, if a great national interest had not demanded the creation of West Virginia. If it had not been apparent that the organization of West Virginia was an advantage to the loyal cause; if the border-State policy of Mr. Lincoln, so rigidly adhered to throughout the contest, had not required this link for the completion of its chain,—the wishes of the people most directly involved would never have had the slightest attention from the Congress of the United States. Strong and equitable as was the case of West Virginia, irritating and undesirable as her relations to the older State might be, advantageous to the people as the new government might prove, these considerations would not of themselves have offered sufficient inducement to engage the attention of Congress for an hour at that critical period. They would have been brushed aside and disregarded with that cool indifference by which all great legislative bodies prove how easy it is to endure the misery of other people. West Virginia indeed got only what was equitably due, and what she was entitled to claim by the natural right of self-government. The war brought good fortune to her as conspicuously as it brought ill fortune to the older State from which she was wrenched. West Virginia is to be congratulated, and her creditable career and untiring enterprise since she assumed the responsibilities of self-government show how well she deserved the boon. But the wounds inflicted on the mother State by her separation will never be healed until Virginia is relieved from the odium of having been specially selected from the eleven seceding States for the punishment that struck at once against her prosperity and against her pride of empire.
Nor should it be forgotten that the State of Virginia before the war might well be regarded as the creditor and not the debtor of the National Government. One of her earliest acts of patriotism as an independent State was the cession to the General Government of her superb domain on the north side of the Ohio River, from the sale of which more than one hundred millions of dollars have been paid into the National Treasury. A suggestive contrast is presented to-day between the condition of Virginia and the condition of Texas and Florida. It was the aggressive disunionism of the two latter States which aided powerfully in dragging Virginia into rebellion. But for the urgency of the seven original Confederate States, in which Texas and Florida were numbered, Virginia Loyalists would have been able to hold their State firm in her National allegiance. Since the war Texas has traveled the highway to wealth and power, founded on the ownership of her public lands, of which the National Government could have deprived her with as little difficulty as was found in dividing Virginia. Florida has likewise enjoyed general prosperity, and secured rapid development from the resources of land which the National Government had generously given her before the war and of which she was not deprived for her acts of rebellion. True-hearted Americans rejoice in the prosperity of these States which adorn the southern border of the Republic; but they cannot help seeing, and seeing with regret, how differently the ancient Commonwealth of Virginia has fared at the hands of the National Government.
If the hurt to Virginia were of a general character, which could not be specified or defined, her case might be passed over with the plea ofdamnum absque injurid. But, unfortunately,—or it may be fortunately,—the detriment to her public credit can be stated with substantial precision, and can be traced directly to her despoilment. That took from her the power to pay her debt. If the harm resulting therefrom were confined to the State and to the holders of her securities, the National Government might the more easily disregard the equities of the case. But Virginia's embarrassment is of wide-spread concern, and injuriously affects the public credit of other States. Nor can it be said that the precedent of aiding Virginia could be quoted for aid to every State that might get into financial trouble. It could be quoted only for the case—which will perhaps never again occur—where the National Government shall strip the State of a large and valuable part of her territory, and thus take from her the ability to meet her obligations. The precedent might then be quoted, and should be unhesitatingly followed.
In the formal and necessarily austere administration of public affairs there is little room for the interposition of sentiment. Yet sentiment has its place. We stimulate the ardor of patriotism by the mere display of a flag which has no material force, but which is emblematic of all material force, and typifies the glory of the Nation. We stir the ambition of the living by rearing costly monuments to the heroic dead. It may surely be pardoned if Americans shall feel a deep personal interest in the good name and good fortune of a State so closely identified with the early renown of the Republic,—a State with whose soil is mingled the dust of those to whom all States and all generations are debtors,—the Father of his Country, the author of the Declaration of Independence, the chief projector of the National Constitution.
National Currency and State Bank Currency.—In Competition.—Legal-tender Bill tended to expand State Bank Circulation.—SecretaryChase's Recommendation.—Favorably received.—State Bank Circulation,$150,000,000.—Preliminary Bill to establish National Banks.—Fessenden.—Sherman.—Hooper.—National Bank System in 1862.—Discussed among the People.—Recommended by the President.—Mr.Chase urges it.—Bill introduced and discussed in Senate.—Discussionin the House.—Bill passed.—Hugh McCulloch of Indiana appointedComptroller of the Currency.—Amended Bank Act.—To remedy Defects,Circulation limited to $500,000,000.—National Power.—State Rights.—Taxation.—Renewed Debate in Senate and House.—Bill passed.—Merits of the System.—Former Systems.—First Bank of the UnitedStates.—Charters of United-States banks, 1791-1816.—NationalBanks compared with United-States Banks.—One Defective Element.—Founded on National Debt.