With this condition of affairs, permitted and encouraged by England and France, our distinguished minister at Paris was justified in saying to the Government of Louis Napoleon on the reception of the Confederate steamerGeorgiaat Brest, in language which though but the bare recital of fact was of itself the keenest reproach to the French Government:—
"TheGeorgia, like theFlorida, theAlabama, and other scourges of peaceful commerce, was born of that unhappy decree which gave the rebels who did not own a ship-of-war or command a single port the right of an ocean belligerent. Thus encouraged by foreign powers they began to build and fit out in neutral ports a class of vessels constructed mainly for speed, and whose acknowledged mission is not to fight, but to rob, to burn, and to fly. Although the smoke of burning ships has everywhere marked the track of theGeorgiaand theFloridaupon the ocean, they have never sought a foe or fired a gun against an armed enemy. To dignify such vessels with the name of ships-of-war seems to me, with deference, a misnomer. Whatever flag may fly from their mast-head, or whatever power may claim to own them, their conduct stamps them as piratical. If vessels of war even, they would by this conduct have justly forfeited all courtesies in ports of neutral nations. Manned by foreign seamen, armed by foreign guns, entering no home port, and waiting no judicial condemnation of prizes, they have already devastated and destroyed our commerce to an extent, as compared with their number, beyond any thing known in the records of privateering."
It would seem impossible that such a state of things could be the result of the impartial administration of an honest neutrality. It must be attributed to one of two causes;—either the municipal law of foreign countries was not sufficient to enable the governments to control the selfishness or the sentiment of their people,—to which the reply is obvious that the weakness and incompetence of municipal law cannot diminish or excuse international obligations: or it must have been due to a misconception of the obligations which international law imposes. How far there may have been a motive for this misconception, how far the wish was father to the thought of such misconstruction, it is perhaps needless now to inquire. The theory of international law maintained by the foreign Powers may be fairly stated in two propositions:—
1. That foreign Powers had the right, and in due regard to their own interests were bound, to recognize belligerency as a fact.
2. That belligerents once recognized, were equals and must be treated with the same perfect neutrality.
It is not necessary to deny these propositions, but simply to ascertain their real meaning. In its primary and simple application, the law of belligerency referred to two or more belligerents, equally independent. Its application to the case of insurgents against an established and recognized government is later, involves other and in some respects different considerations, and cannot even now be regarded as settled. To recognize an insurgent as a belligerent is not to recognize him as fully the equal of the government from which he secedes. This would be simply to recognize his independence. The limitation which international law places upon this recognition is stated in the English phrase, "the right to recognize belligerency as a fact;"—that is, to recognize the belligerent to the extent of his war capacity but no farther. The neutral cannot on this principle recognize in the belligerent the possession of any power which he does not actually possess, although in the progress of the contest such power may be developed.
The Southern Confederacy had an organized government and great armies. To that extent its power was a fact. But when foreign governments recognized in the insurgents the rights of ocean belligerency, they went beyond the fact. They were actually giving to the Confederacy a character which it did not possess and which it never acquired. For the Confederacy had not a ship or an open port. Whenever an insurgent power claims such right, it must be in condition to assume and discharge the obligation which such rights impose. When any power, insurgent or recognized, claims such right,—the right to fly its flag, to deal in hostility with the commerce of the world, to exercise dangerous privileges which may affect the interests and complicate the relations of other nations,—it must give to the world a guaranty that it is both able and willing to administer the system of maritime law under which it claims such rights and powers, by submitting its action to the regular and formal jurisdiction of Prize Courts. Strike the Prize Court out of modern maritime law and the whole system falls, and capture on the sea becomes pure barbarism,—distinguished from piracy only by the astuteness of a legal technicality. The Southern Confederacy could give no guaranty. Just as it undertook to naturalize foreign seamen upon the quarter-deck of its roving cruisers, so it undertook to administer a system of maritime law which precluded the most solemn and important of its provisions— a judicial decision—and converted the humane and legal right of capture into an absolute and a ruthless decree of destruction. No neutral has the right to make or accept such an interpolation into the recognized and essential principles of the law of maritime warfare.
The application of this so-called neutrality to both the so-called belligerents was not designed nor was it practicable. In referring to the obligation of the neutral to furnish no assistance to either of the belligerents, one of the oldest and most authoritative of international law writers says: "I do not say to give assistance equally but to give no assistance, for it would be absurd that a state should assist at the same time two enemies. And besides it would be impossible to do it with equality: the same things, the like number of troops, the like quantity of arms and munitions furnished under different circumstances are no longer equivalent succors." Assistance is not a theoretical idea; it is a plain, practical, unmistakable fact. When the United States had, at vast cost and by incredible effort, shut the Southern Confederacy from the sea and blockaded its ports against the entry of supplies, when that government had no resources within its territory by which it could put a ship upon the ocean, or break the blockade from within, then it was that England allowed Confederate officers to camp upon her soil, organize her labor, employ her machinery, use her ports, occupy her colonial stations, almost within sight of the blockaded coast, and to do this continuously, systematically, defiantly.
By these acts the British government gave the most valuable assistance to the South and actually engaged in defeating the military operations of the United States. There was no equivalent assistance which Great Britain could or did render to the United States. They might have rendered other assistance, but none which would compensate for this. Let it be supposed for one moment that Mexico had practiced, on the other side of the Rio Grande, the same sort of neutrality,—that she had lined the bank of the river with depots of military supplies; that she had allowed officers of the Confederate army to establish themselves and organize a complete system for the receipt of cotton and the delivery of merchandise on her territory; that her people had served as factors, intermediaries, and carriers,—would any reasonable interpretation of international law consider such conduct to be impartial neutrality? But illustration does not strengthen the argument. The naked statement of England's position is its worst condemnation. Her course, while ingeniously avoiding public responsibility, gave unceasing help to the Confederacy —as effective as if the intention had been proclaimed. The whole procedure was in disregard of international obligation and was the outgrowth of what M. Prévost-Paradol aptly charaterized as a "malignant neutrality."
It cannot be said in reply that the Governments of England and France were unable to restrain this demonstration of the sympathy, this exercise of the commercial enterprise of their people. For the time came when they did restrain it. As soon as it became evident that the Confederacy was growing weaker, that with all its marvelous display of courage and endurance it could not prevent the final success of the Union, there was no longer difficulty in arresting the building of the iron-clads on the Mersey; then the watchfulness of home and colonial authorities was quickened; then supplies were meted out scantily; then the dangers of a great slave empire began to impress Ministerial consciences, and the same Powers prepared to greet the triumph of the Union with well-feigned satisfaction. But even if this change had not occurred the condition of repressed hostility could not have lasted. It was war in disguise —not declared, only because the United-States Government could not afford to multiply its enemies, and England felt that there was still uncertainty enough in the result to caution her against assuming so great a risk. But the tension of the relation was aptly described by Mr. Seward in July, 1863, when he said,—
"If the law of Great Britain must be left without amendment and be construed by the government in conformity with the rulings of the chief Baron of the Exchequer [theAlexandracase] then there will be left for the United States no alternative but to protect themselves and their commerce against armed cruisers proceeding from British ports as against the naval forces of a public enemy. . . . British ports, domestic as well as colonial, are now open under certain restrictions to the visits of piratical vessels, and not only furnish them coals, provisions, and repairs, but even receive their prisoners when the enemies of the United States come in to obtain such relief from voyages in which they have either burned ships they have captured, or have even manned and armed them as pirates and sent them abroad as auxiliaries in the work of destruction. Can it be an occasion for either surprise or complaint that if this condition of things is to remain and receive the deliberate sanction of the British Government, the navy of the United States will receive instructions to pursue these enemies into the ports which thus in violation of the law of nations and the obligations of neutrality become harbors for the pirates? The President very distinctly perceives the risks and hazards which a naval conflict thus maintained will bring to the commerce and even to the peace of the two countries. But he is obliged to consider that in the case supposed, the destruction of our commerce will probably amount to a naval war, waged by a portion at least of the British nation against the government and people of the United States—a war tolerated although not declared or avowed by the British Government. If through the necessary employment of all our means of national defense such a partial war shall become a general one between the two nations, the President thinks that the responsibility for that painful result will not fall upon the United States."
The truth is that the so-called neutral policy of foreign Powers was the vicious application of obsolete analogies to the conditions of modern life. Because of the doctrine of belligerent recognition had in its origin referred to nations of well established, independent existence, the doctrine was now pushed forward to the extent of giving ocean belligerency to an insurgent which had in reality no maritime power whatever. It was an old and recognized principle that the commercial relations of the neutral should not be interfered with unless they worked positive injury to the belligerent. The new application made the interests of neutral commerce the supreme factor in determining how far belligerent rights should be respected. The ship-building and carrying-trade of England were to be maintained and encouraged at any cost to the belligerent. Under the old law, a belligerent had the right to purchase a ship and a cargo, or a neutral might run a blockade, taking all the risk of capture. By the new construction, power was to be given to a belligerent to transfer the entire administration of its naval service to foreign soil, and to create and equip a navy which issued from foreign waters, ready not for a dangerous journey to their own ports of delivery, but for the immediate demonstration of hostile purpose. No such absurd system can be found in the principles or precedents of international law; no such system would be permitted by the great powers of Europe if to-morrow they should engage in war.
The principle of this policy was essentially mercenary. It professed no moral sense. It might be perfectly indifferent to the high or the low issues which the contest between the belligerents involved; it was deaf to any thing which might be urged by justice of humanity or friendship; it was the cynical recognition of the truth of the old proverb that "It is an ill wind which blows good to no one." It was the same principle upon which England declares with audacious selfishness that she cannot sacrifice that portion of her Indian revenue which comes from the opium trade or the capital which is invested in its growth and manufacture, and that China must therefore take the poison which diseases and degrades her population. But selfish as is this market-policy, it is a policy of circumstance. It may be resisted with success or it may be abandoned because it cannot succeed. It creates bitterness; it leads to war; it may in its selfishness cause the destruction of a nation, but it does not necessarily imply a desire for that destruction. But there was in the foreign policy of Europe towards the United States during the civil war the manifestation of a spirit more intense in its hostility, more dangerous in its consequences. It was the spirit of enmity to the Union itself, and the emphatic demonstration of this feeling was the invasion of Mexico for the purpose of converting the republic by force into an empire. Louis Napoleon's enterprise was distinctly based on the utter destruction of the American Union.
The Declaration of Independence by the British Colonies in America was something more than the creation of a new sovereignty. It was the foundation of a new system both of internal government and foreign relation, a system not entirely isolated from the affairs of the Old World but independent of the dynastic complications and the territorial interests which controlled the political conflicts of Europe. At first, with its material resources undeveloped, its territorial extension limited and surrounded by the colonies of the great Powers, this principle although maintained as a conviction, could not manifest itself in action. But it showed itself in that abstinence from entangling alliances which would avoid the dangers of even a too friendly connection. In time our territory expanded. The colonies of foreign nations following our example became independent republics whose people had the same aspirations, whose governments were framed upon the same basis of popular right. The rapidity of communication, supplied by the railroad and the telegraph, facilitated and concentrated this political cohesion, and there had been formed from the borders of Canada to the Straits of Magellan a complete system of republics (to which Brazil can scarcely be considered an exception) professing the same political creed, having great commercial interests in common, and which with the extinction of some few jealousies, were justified in the anticipation of a prosperous and peaceful future. There was not an interest or an ambition of a single one of these republics which threatened an interest or an ambition of a single European power.
It needs no argument to show that the central element of the stability of this system of American republics was the strength of the Federal Union, its growth into a harmonious nationality, and its ability to prevent anywhere on the two continents the armed intervention of foreign Powers for the purpose of political domination. This strength was known and this resolution publicly declared, and it is safe to affirm that before 1861 or after 1865 not one nor all of the European Powers would have willingly challenged this policy. But the moment the strength of the Union seemed weakened, the moment that the leading Republic of this system found itself hampered and embarrassed by internal dissensions, all Europe —that Europe which upon the threatening of a Belgian fortress, or the invasion of a Swiss canton, or the loss of the key to a church in Jerusalem, would have written protocols, summoned conferences, and mustered armies—quietly acquiesced in as wanton, wicked, and foolish an aggression as ever Imperial folly devised. The same monarch who appealed with confidence to Heaven when he declared war to prevent a Hohenzollern from ascending the throne of Spain, appealed to the same Heaven with equal confidence and equal success when he declared war to force a Hapsburg upon the throne of Mexico.
The success of the establishment of a Foreign Empire in Mexico would have been fatal to all that the United States cherished, to all that it hoped peacefully to achieve. The scheme of invasion rested on the assumption of the dissolution of the Union and its division into two hostile governments; but aside from that possibility, it threatened the United States upon the most vital questions. It was at war with all our institutions and our habits of political life, for it would have introduced into a great country on this continent, capable of unlimited development, that curious and mischievous form of government, that perplexing mixture of absolutism and democracy,—imperial power supported by universal suffrage,— which seems certain to produce aggression abroad and corruption at home, and which must have injuriously influenced the political growth of the Spanish-American Republics. Firmly seated in Mexico, it would have spread through Central America to the Isthmus, controlling all canal communications between the two oceans which were the boundaries of the Union, while its growth upon the Pacific Coast would have been in direct rivalry with the natural and increasing power of the United States. Commanding the Gulf of Mexico it would have controlled the whole commerce of the West- Indian islands and radically changed their future. Bound by dynastic connection, checked and directed by European influence, it could not have developed a national policy in harmony with neighboring States, but its existence and its necessary efforts at expansion would have made it not only a constant menace to American Republics but a source of endless war and confusion between the great Powers of the world. The policy signally failed. But surely European statesmen, without miraculous foresight, might have anticipated that its success would have been more dangerous than its defeat, and that the conservative strength of the Union might be even to them an influence of good and not of evil.
In 1859 Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell: "It is plain that France aims through Spain at getting fortified points on each side of the Gut of Gibraltar which in the event of war between Spain and France on the one hand and England on the other would by a cross fire render that strait very difficult and dangerous to pass and thus virtually shut us out of the Mediterranean. . . . The French Minister of War or of marine said the other day that Algeria never would be safe till France possessed a port on the Atlantic coast of Africa. Against whom would such a port make Algeria safe? Evidently only against England, and how could such a port help France against England? Only by tending to shut us out of the Mediterranean." Later in the same year writing to the same colleague, he says, "Till lately I had strong confidence in the fair intentions of Napoleon towards England, but of late I have begun to feel great distrust and to suspect that his formerly declared intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain dormant and has not died away. He seems to have thought that he ought to lay his foundation by beating with our aid or with our concurrence or our neutrality, first Russia, then Austria, and by dealing with them generously to make them his friends in any subsequent quarrel with us. . . . Next he has been assiduously laboring to increase his naval means, evidently for offensive as well as for defensive purposes, and latterly great pains have been taken to raise throughout France and especially among the army and navy, hatred of England and a disparaging feeling of our military and naval means."
Is it not strange that, even with such apprehensions, the destruction of the Union was so welcome in England that it blinded the eyes of her statesmen and her people? They should surely have seen that the establishment of a Latin empire under the protection of France, in the heart of the Spanish-American Republics, would open a field far more dangerous to British interests than a combination for a French port in Africa, and that in pursuing his policy the wily Emperor was providing a throne for an Austrian archduke as a compensation for the loss of Lombardy. There was a time when Lord Palmerston himself held broader and juster views of what ought to be the relations between England and the United States. In 1848 he suggested to Lord John Russell a policy which looked to a complete unification of the interests of the two countries: "If as I hope," said His Lordship, "we shall succeed in altering our Navigation Laws, and if as a consequence Great Britain and the United States shall place their commercial marines upon a footing of mutual equality with the exception of the coasting-trade and some other special matters, might not such an arrangement afford us a good opportunity for endeavoring to carry in some degree into execution the wish which Mr. Fox entertained in 1783, when he wished to substitute close alliance in the place of sovereignty and dependence as the connecting link between the United States and Great Britain? A treaty for mutual defense would no longer be applicable to the condition of the two countries as independent Powers, but might they not with mutual advantage conclude a treaty containing something like the following conditions:—
"1. That in all cases of difference which may hereafter unfortunately arise between the contracting parties, they will in the first place have recourse to the mediation of some friendly Power, and that hostilities shall not begin between them until every endeavor to settle their difference by such means shall have proved fruitless.
"2. That if either of the two should at any time be at war with any other Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to take out letters of marque from such Power under pain of being treated and dealt with as a pirate.
"3. That in such case of war between either of the two parties and a third Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to enter into the service naval or military of such third Power.
"4. That in such case of war as aforesaid, neither of the contracting parties shall afford assistance to the enemies of the other by sea or by land, unless war should break out between the two contracting parties themselves after the failure of all endeavors to settle their differences in the manner specified in Article 1."
At the time Lord Palmerston expressed these opinions, we had just closed the Mexican war, with vast acquisition of territory and with a display of military power on distant fields of conquest which surprised European statesmen. Our maritime interests were almost equal to those of the United Kingdom, our prosperity was great, the prestige of the Nation was growing. In the thirteen intervening years between that date and the outbreak of the Southern Rebellion we had grown enormously in wealth, our Pacific possessions had shown an extraordinary production of precious metals, our population had increased more than ten millions. If an alliance with the United States was desirable for England in 1848, it was far more desirable in 1861, and Lord Palmerston being Prime Minister in the latter year, his power to propose and promote it was far greater. Is there any reason that will satisfactorily account for His Lordship's abandonment of this ideal relation of friendship between the two countries except that he saw a speedier way of adding to the power of England by conniving at the destruction of the Union? His change from the policy which he painted in 1848 to that which he acted in 1861 cannot be satisfactorily explained upon any other hypothesis than that he could not resist the temptation to cripple and humiliate the Great Republic.
This brief history of the spirit rather than the events which characterized the foreign relations of the United States during the civil war, has been undertaken with no desire to revive the feelings of burning indignation which they provoked, or to prolong the discussion of the angry questions to which they gave rise. The relations of nations are not and should not be governed by sentiment. The interest and ambition of states, like those of men, will disturb the moral sense and incline to one side or the other the strict balance of impartial justice. New days bring new issues and old passions are unsafe counselors. Twenty years have gone by. England has paid the cost of her mistakes. The Republic of Mexico has seen the fame and the fortunes of the Emperors who sought her conquest sink suddenly—as into the pits which they themselves had digged for their victims—and the Republic of the United States has come out of her long and bitter struggle, so strong that never again will she afford the temptation or the opportunity for unfriendly governments to strike at her National life. Let the past be the past, but let it be the past with all the instruction and the warning of its experience.
The future safety of these continents rests upon the strength and the maintenance of the Union, for had dissolution been possible, events have shown with what small regard the interests or the honor of either of the belligerents would have been treated. It has been taught to the smaller republics that if this strength be shattered they will be the spoil of foreign arms and the dependent provinces again of foreign monarchs. When this contest was over, the day of immaturity had passed and the United States stood before the world a great and permanent Power. That Power can afford to bury all resentments. Tranquil at home, developing its inexhaustible resources with a rapidity and success unknown in history, bound in sincere friendship, and beyond the possibility of a hostile rivalry, with the other republics of the continents, standing midway between Asia and Europe, a Power on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic, with no temptation to intermeddle in the questions which disturb the Old World, the Republic of the United States desires to live in amicable relation with all peoples, demanding only the abstinence of foreign intervention in the development of that policy which her political creed, her territorial extent, and the close and cordial neighborhood of kindred governments have made the essential rule of her National life.
[NOTE.—In the foregoing chapter the term "piratical" is used without qualification in referring to the Southern cruisers, because it is the word used in the quotations made. It undoubtedly represented the feeling of the country at that time, but in an impartial discussion of the events of the war the word cannot be used with propriety. Our own Courts have found themselves unable to sustain such a conclusion. Looking to the future it is better to rest our objections to the mode of maritime warfare adopted by the Confederacy upon a sound and enduring principle; viz., that the recognition of ocean belligerency, when the belligerent cannot give to his lawful exercise of maritime warfare the guaranty of a prize jurisdiction, is a violation of any just or reasonable system of international law. The Confederacy had the plea of necessity for its course, but the jurisdiction of England for aiding and abetting the practice has not yet been presented.]
[NOTE.—Her Britannic Majesty's principal ministers of State in 1861-2,—at the time of the correspondence touching theTrentaffair, referred to in the preceding chapter,—were as follows:—
Premier—Lord Palmerston.Lord High Chancellor—Lord Westbury.Lord President of the Council—Earl Granville.Lord Privy Seal—The Duke of Argyll.Secretary for Foreign Affairs—Lord John Russell.Secretary for the Colonies—The Duke of Newcastle.Secretary for the Home Department—Sir George Gray.Secretary of State for War—Sir G. C. Lewis.Secretary of State for India—Sir Charles Wood.Chancellor of the Exchequer—Rt. Honorable W. E. Gladstone.Secretary for Ireland—Rt. Honorable Edward Cardwell.Postmaster-General—Lord Stanley of Alderney.President Board of Trade—Rt. Honorable Charles Pelham Villiers.
The same Ministry, with unimportant changes, continued in power throughout the whole period of the Rebellion in the United States.]
The Tenth chapter of this volume having been given to the press in advance of formal publication, many inquiries have been received in regard to the text of Judge Black's opinion of November 20, 1860, referred to on pp. 231, 232. The opinion was submitted to the President by Judge Black as Attorney-General. So much of the opinion as includes the points which are specially controverted and criticized is here given—about one-half of the entire document. It is as follows:—
. . . "I come now to the point in your letter which is probably of the greatest practical importance. By the Act of 1807 you may employ such parts of the land and naval forces as you may judge necessary for the purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed, in all cases where it is lawful to use the militia for the same purpose. By the Act of 1795 the militia may be called forth 'whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any State by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of Judicial proceedings, or by the power vested in the marshals.' This imposes upon the President the sole responsibility of deciding whether the exigency has arisen which requires the use of military force, and in proportion to the magnitude of that responsibility will be the care not to overstep the limits of his legal and just authority.
"The laws referred to in the Act of 1795 are manifestly those which are administered by the judges, and executed by the ministerial officers of the courts for the punishment of crime against the United States, for the protection of rights claimed under the Federal Constitution and laws, and for the enforcement of such obligations as come within the cognizance of the Federal Judiciary. To compel obedience to these laws, the courts have authority to punish all who obstruct their regular administration, and the marshals and their deputies have the same powers as sheriffs and their deputies in the several States in executing the laws of the States. These are the ordinary means provided for the execution of the laws; and the whole spirit of our system is opposed to the employment of any other, except in cases of extreme necessity arising out of great and unusual combinations against them. Their agency must continue to be used until their incapacity to cope with the power opposed to them shall be plainly demonstrated. It is only upon clear evidence to that effect that a military force can be called into the field. Even then its operations must be purely defensive. It can suppress only such combinations as are found directly opposing the laws and obstructing the execution thereof. It can do no more than what might and ought to be done by a civil posse, if a civil posse could be raised large enough to meet the same opposition. On such occasions, especially, the military power must be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority, since it is only in aid of the latter that the former can act at all.
"But what if the feeling in any State against the United States should become so universal that the Federal officers themselves (including judges, district attorneys, and marshals) would be reached by the same influences, and resign their places? Of course, the first step would be to appoint others in their stead, if others could be got to serve. But in such an event, it is more than probable that great difficulty would be found in filling the offices. We can easily conceive how it might become altogether impossible. We are therefore obliged to consider what can be done in case we have no courts to issue judicial process, and no ministerial officers to execute it. In that event troops would certainly be out of place, and their use wholly illegal. If they are sent to aid the courts and marshals, there must be courts and marshals to be aided. Without the exercise of those functions which belong exclusively to the civil service, the laws cannot be executed in any event, no matter what may be the physical strength which the Government has at its command. Under such circumstances, to send a military force into any State, with orders to act against the people, would be simply making war upon them.
"The existing laws put and keep the Federal Government strictly on the defensive. You can use force only to repel an assault on the public property and aid the Courts in the performance of their duty. If the means given you to collect the revenue and execute the other laws be insufficient for that purpose, Congress may extend and make them more effectual to those ends.
"If one of the States should declare her independence, your action cannot depend upon the righteousness of the cause upon which such declaration is based. Whether the retirement of the State from the Union be the exercise of a right reserved in the Constitution, or a revolutionary movement, it is certain that you have not in either case the authority to recognize her independence or to absolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or the other States in Convention assembled, must take such measures as may be necessary and proper. In such an event, I see no course for you but to go straight onward in the path you have hitherto trodden— that is, execute the laws to the extent of the defensive means placed in your hands, and act generally upon the assumption that the present constitutional relations between the States and the Federal Government continue to exist, until a new code of things shall be established either by law or force.
"Whether Congress has the constitutional right to make war against one or more States, and require the Executive of the Federal Government to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from the other States, is a question for Congress itself to consider. It must be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor are there any words in the Constitution which imply it. Among the powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, is that 'to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water.' This certainly means nothing more than the power to commence and carry on hostilities against the foreign enemies of the nation. Another clause in the same section gives Congress the power 'to provide for calling forth the militia,' and to use them within the limits of the State. But this power is so restricted by the words which immediately follow that it can be exercised only for one of the following purposes: 1. To execute the laws of the Union; that is, to aid the Federal officers in the performance of their regular duties. 2. To suppress insurrection against the State; but this is confined by Article 4, Section 4, to cases in which the State herself shall apply for assistance against her own people. 3. To repel the invasion of a State by enemies who come from abroad to assail her in her own territory. All these provisions are made to protect the States, not to authorize an attack by one part of the country upon another; to preserve the peace, and not to plunge them into civil war. Our forefathers do not seem to have thought that war was calculated 'to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.' There was undoubtedly a strong and universal conviction among the men who framed and ratified the Constitution, that military force would not only be useless, but pernicious, as a means of holding the States together.
"If it be true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of general hostilities carried on by the Central Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would beipso factoan expulsion of such State from the Union. Being treated as an alien and an enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly. And if Congress shall break up the present Union by unconstitutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility between different sections of the country, instead of the domestic tranquility which the Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry on a contest like that?
"The right of the General Government to preserve itself in its whole constitutional vigor by repelling a direct and positive aggression upon its property or its officers cannot be denied. But this is a totally different thing from an offensive war to punish the people for the political misdeeds of their State Government, or to enforce an acknowledgment that the Government of the United States is supreme. The States are colleagues of one another, and if some of them shall conquer the rest, and hold them as subjugated provinces, it would totally destroy the whole theory upon which they are now connected.
"If this view of the subject be correct, as I think it is, then the Union must utterly perish at the moment when Congress shall arm one part of the people against another for any purpose beyond that of merely protecting the General Government in the exercise of its proper constitutional functions.
"I am, very respectfully, yours, etc.,
In Chapter VIII., there is some inaccuracy in regard to the number of killed in the John Brown raid at Harper's Ferry. According to the official report of Colonel Robert E. Lee, U.S.A., who commanded the military force that relieved Harper's Ferry, the insurgents numbered in all nineteen men,—fourteen white, five colored. Of the white men, ten were killed; two, John Brown and Aaron C. Stevens, were badly wounded; Edwin Coppee, unhurt, was taken prisoner; John E. Cooke escaped. Of the colored men, two were killed, two taken prisoner, one unaccounted for.
The progress of the country, referred to so frequently in the text, is strikingly illustrated and verified by the facts contained in the several appendices which follow.
The appendices include a variety of subjects, and they have all been selected with the view of showing the progress and development of the Nation in the different fields of enterprise and human labor.
The tabular statements as to the population and wealth of the country will be found especially accurate and valuable. The statistics relating to Education and the Public Schools, to Agriculture, to Railways, to Immigration, to the Army, to Shipping, to the Coal and Iron Product, to National and State Banks, to the Circulation of Paper Money, to the price of Gold, and to the Public Debt, will be found full of interest.
Thanks are due and are cordially given to Mr. Joseph Nimmo, Jr.,Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, and Mr. Charles W. Seaton,Superintendent of the Census, for valuable aid rendered in thepreparation of the appendices.
For courtesies constantly extended, and for most intelligent and discriminating aid of various kinds, the sincerest acknowledgments are made to Mr. Ainsworth R. Spofford, the accomplished Librarian of Congress.
APPENDIX A.POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT EACH CENSUS, FROM 1790 TO 1880 INCLUSIVE.[From the Reports of the Superintendents of the Census.]
Alabama . . . . . . 1,262,505 996,992 964,201 771,623 590,756 309,527 127,901 . . . . . . . . . . Alabama. Arkansas . . . . . . 802,525 484,471 435,450 209,897 97,574 30,388 { *18} . . . . . . . . . . Arkansas. { 14,255} California . . . . . 864,694 560,247 379,994 92,597 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . California. Colorado . . . . . . 194,327 39,864 34,277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colorado. Connecticut . . . . 622,700 537,454 460,147 370,792 309,978 297,675 { *100} 261,942 251,002 237,946 . Connecticut. { 275,148} Delaware . . . . . . 146,608 125,015 112,216 91,532 78,085 76,748 72,749 72,674 64,273 59,006 . Delaware. Florida . . . . . . 269,493 187,748 140,424 87,445 54,477 34,730 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Florida. Georgia . . . . . . 1,542,180 1,184,109 1,057,286 906,185 691,392 516,823 340,985 252,433 162,686 82,548 . Georgia. Illinois . . . . . . 3,077,871 2,539,891 1,711,951 851,470 476,183 157,445 55,162 12,282 . . . . . . . Illinois. Indiana . . . . . . 1,978,301 1,680,637 1,350,428 988,416 685,866 343,031 147,178 24,520 5,641 . . . . Indiana. Iowa . . . . . . . . 1,624,615 1,194,020 674,913 192,214 43,112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iowa. Kansas . . . . . . . 996,096 364,399 107,206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kansas. Kentucky . . . . . . 1,648,690 1,321,011 1,155,684 982,405 779,828 687,917 { *182} 406,511 220.955 73,677 . Kentucky. { 564,135} Louisiana . . . . . 939,946 726,915 708,002 517,762 352,411 215,739 { *484} 76,556 . . . . . . . Louisiana. { 152,923} Maine . . . . . . . 648,936 626,915 628,279 583,169 501,793 399,455 { *66} 228,705 151,719 96,540 . Maine. { 298,269} Maryland . . . . . . 934,943 780.894 687,049 583,034 470,019 447,040 407,350 380,546 341,548 319,728 . Maryland. Massachusetts . . . 1,783,085 1,457,351 1,231,066 994,514 737,699 610,408 { *128} 472,040 422,845 378,787 . Massachusetts. { 523,159} Michigan . . . . . . 1,636,937 1,184,059 749,113 397,654 212,267 31,639 { *131} 4,762 . . . . . . . Michigan. { 8,765} Minnesota . . . . . 780,773 439,706 172,023 6,077 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minnesota. Mississippi . . . . 1,131,597 827,922 791,305 606,526 375,651 136,621 75,448 40,352 8,850 . . . . Mississippi. Missouri . . . . . . 2,168,380 1,721,295 1,182,012 682,044 383,702 140,455 { *29} 20,845 . . . . . . . Missouri. { 66,557} Nebraska . . . . . . 452,402 122,993 28,841 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nebraska. Nevada . . . . . . . 62,266 42,491 6,857 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nevada. New Hampshire . . . 346,991 318,300 326,073 317,976 284,574 269,328 { *139} 214,460 183,858 141,885 . New Hampshire. { 244,022} New Jersey . . . . . 1,131,116 906,096 672,035 489,555 373,306 320,823 { *149} 245,562 211,149 184,139 . New Jersey. { 277,426} New York . . . . . . 5,082,871 4,382,759 3,880,735 3,097,394 2,428,921 1,918,008 { *701} 949,059 589,051 340,120 . New York. {1,372,111} North Carolina . . . 1,399,750 1,071,361 922,622 869,039 753,419 737,987 638,829 555,500 478,103 393,751 . North Carolina. Ohio . . . . . . . . 3,198,062 2,665,260 2,339,511 1,980,329 1,519,467 937,903 { *139} 230,760 45,365 . . . . Ohio. { 581,295} Oregon . . . . . . . 174,768 90,923 52,465 13,294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oregon. Pennsylvania . . . . 4,282,891 3,521,951 2,906,215 2,311,786 1,724,033 1,348,233 { *1,951} 810,001 602,365 434,373 . Pennsylvania. {1,047,507} Rhode Island . . . . 276,531 217,353 174,620 147,545 108,830 97,129 { *44} 76,931 69,122 68,825 . Rhode Island. { 83,105} South Carolina . . . 995,577 705,606 703,708 688,507 594,398 581,185 502,741 415,115 345,591 249,073 . South Carolina. Tennessee . . . . . 1,542,359 1,258,520 1,109,801 1,002,717 829,210 681,904 { *52} 261,727 105,602 35,691 . Tennessee. { 422,771} Texas . . . . . . . 1,591,749 818,579 604,215 212,592 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Texas. Vermont . . . . . . 332,286 330,551 315,098 314,120 291,948 280,652 { *15} 217,895 154,465 85,425 . Vermont. { 235,966} Virginia . . . . . . 1,512,565 1,225,163 1,956,318 1,421,661 1,239,797 1,211,405 { *250} 974,600 880,200 747,610 . Virginia. {1,065,116} West Virginia . . . 618,457 442,014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West Virginia. Wisconsin . . . . . 1,315,497 1,054,670 755,881 305,391 30,945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wisconsin.
Total, States . . 49,371,340 38,115,641 31,183,744 23,067,262 17,019,641 12,820,868 { *4,631} 7,215,858 5,294,390 . . . . . Total, States.{9,600,783}
Arizona . . . . . . 40,440 9,658 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arizona.Dakota . . . . . . . 135,177 14,181 4,837 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dakota.District of Columbia 117,624 131,700 75,080 51,687 43,712 39,834 33,039 24,023 14,003 . . . . District of Columbia.Idaho . . . . . . . 32,610 14,999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Idaho.Montana . . . . . . 39,159 20,595 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Montana.New Mexico . . . . . 119,565 91,874 93,516 61,547 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Mexico.Utah . . . . . . . . 143,963 86,786 40,273 11,380 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utah.Washington . . . . . 75,116 23,955 11,594 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Washington.Wyoming . . . . . . 20,789 9,118 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wyoming.
Total, Territories 784,443 443,730 259,577 124,614 43,712 39,834 33,039 24,023 14,093 . . . . . Total, Territories.
On the public ships . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,100 5,318 . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the public ships.In U. S. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *4,631 . . . . . . . . . . In U. S. Service.
Total, U. S. . . . 50,155,783 38,558,371 31,443,321 23,191,876 17,069,453 12,866,020 9,633,832 7,239,881 5,308,483 3,929,214 . . Total, U. S.
* All other persons, except Indians, not taxed.
Admitted By Cons- By 1st By 2nd By 3d By 4th By 5th By 6th By 7th By 8th By 9th By 10thSTATES. to the titution, Census, Census Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census,Union. 1789. 1790. 1800. 1810. 1820. 1830. 1840. 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880.RATIO OF REPRESENTATION . . . . 30,000. 33,000. 33,000. 35,000. 40,000. 47,700. 70,680. 93,423. 127,381. 131,425. 154,325.
Alabama . . . . . . . . 1819 . . . . . . . . 3 5 7 7 6 8 8Arkansas . . . . . . . . 1836 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5California . . . . . . . 1850 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 4 6Colorado . . . . . . . . 1876 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1Connecticut . . . . . . . —— 5 7 7 7 6 6 4 4 4 4 4Delaware . . . . . . . . —— 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Florida . . . . . . . . 1845 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2 2Georgia . . . . . . . . —— 3 2 4 6 7 9 8 8 7 9 10Illinois . . . . . . . . 1818 . . . . . . . . 1 3 7 9 14 19 20Indiana . . . . . . . . 1816 . . . . . . . . 3 7 10 11 11 13 13Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 1846 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 9 11Kansas . . . . . . . . . 1861 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 7Kentucky . . . . . . . . 1792 . . 2 6 10 12 13 10 10 9 10 11Louisiana . . . . . . . 1812 . . . . . . . . 3 3 4 4 5 6 6Maine . . . . . . . . . 1820 . . . . . . . . 7 8 7 6 5 5 4Maryland . . . . . . . . —— 6 8 9 9 9 8 6 6 5 6 6Massachusetts . . . . . . —— 8 14 17 20 13 12 10 11 10 11 12Michigan . . . . . . . . 1837 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 6 9 11Minnesota . . . . . . . . 1858 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 3 5Mississippi . . . . . . . 1817 . . . . . . . . 1 2 4 5 5 6 7Missouri . . . . . . . . 1821 . . . . . . . . 1 2 5 7 9 13 14Nebraska . . . . . . . . 1867 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3Nevada . . . . . . . . . 1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1New Hampshire . . . . . . —— 3 4 5 6 6 5 4 3 3 3 2New Jersey . . . . . . . —— 4 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 7 7New York . . . . . . . . —— 6 10 17 27 34 40 34 33 31 33 34North Carolina . . . . . —— 5 10 12 13 13 13 9 8 7 8 9Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 1802 . . . . . . 6 14 19 21 21 19 20 21Oregon . . . . . . . . . 1859 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1Pennsylvania . . . . . . —— 8 13 18 23 26 28 24 25 24 27 28Rhode Island . . . . . . —— 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2South Carolina . . . . . —— 5 6 8 9 9 9 7 6 4 5 7Tennessee . . . . . . . 1796 . . . . 3 6 9 13 11 10 8 10 10Texas . . . . . . . . . 1845 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 6 11Vermont . . . . . . . . 1791 . . 2 4 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 2Virgina . . . . . . . . —— 10 19 23 23 22 21 15 13 11 9 10West Virginia . . . . . 1863 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4Wisconsin . . . . . . . 1848 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 8 9
65 105 141 181 213 240 223 237 293 293 325
Statement of the Outstanding Principal of the Public Debt of the United States on the 1st of January of each Year from 1791 to 1842 inclusive; and on the 1st of July of each Year from 1843 to 1883 inclusive.
The amount given for the year 1791 represents the debt of the Revolution under the Funding Bill of Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury. The debt had decreased to a considerable extent by the year 1812. In consequence of the war with Great Britain, which began that year, there was a rapid increase, the maximum being reached in 1816. Thenceforward, with the exception of the years 1822, 1823, and 1824,—a period of extreme financial depression,—the debt was steadily decreased, until in the year 1835, under the Presidency of General Jackson, it was extinguished,—the total amount outstanding being only $37,000 in bonds which were not presented for payment. The creation of a new debt, however, began at once, and was increased in the years 1847, 1848, and 1849 by the Mexican war. This, in turn, was quite steadily reduced until the financial panic of 1857, when, during the administration of Mr. Buchanan, there was another incease. The debt was about eighty millions of dollars in amount when the civil war began.
Year. Amount. Year. Amount. Year. Amount. Year. Amount. 1791 $75,463,476.52 1815 $ 99,833,660.15 1839 $ 3,573,343.82 1863 $1,119,772,138.63 1792 77,227,924.66 1816 127,334,933.74 1840 5,270,875.54 1864 1,815,784,370.57 1793 80,352,634,04 1817 123,491,965.16 1841 13,594,480.73 1865 2,680,647,869.74 1794 78,427,404.77 1818 103,466,633.83 1842 20,601,226.28 1866 2,773,236,173.69 1795 80,747,587,39 1819 95,529,648.28 1843 32,742,922.00 1867 2,678,126,103.87 1796 83,762,172.07 1820 91,015,566.15 1844 23,461,652.50 1868 2,611,687,851.19 1797 82,064,479.33 1821 89,987,427.66 1845 15,925,303.01 1869 2,588,452,213.94 1798 79,228,529.12 1822 93,546,676.98 1846 15,550,202.97 1870 2,480,672,427.81 1799 78,408,669.77 1823 90,875,877.28 1847 38,826,534.77 1871 2,353,211,332,32 1800 82,976,294.35 1824 90,269,777.77 1848 47,044,862.23 1872 2,253,251,328.78 1801 83,038,050,80 1825 83,788,432.71 1849 63,061,858.69 1873 2,234,482,993.20 1802 86,712,632.25 1826 81,054,059.99 1850 63,452,773.55 1874 2,251,690,468.43 1803 77,054,686.30 1827 73,987,357.20 1851 68,304,796.02 1875 2,232,284,531.95 1804 86,427,120.88 1828 67,475,043.87 1852 66,199,341.71 1876 2,180,395,067.15 1805 82,312,150.50 1829 58,421,413.67 1853 59,803,117.70 1877 2,205,301,392.10 1806 75,723,270.66 1830 48,565,406.50 1854 42,242,222.42 1878 2,256,205,892.53 1807 69,218.398.64 1831 39,123,191.68 1855 35,586,858.56 1879 2,245,495,072.04 1808 65,196,317.97 1832 24,322,235,18 1856 31,972,537.90 1880 2,120,415,370.63 1809 57,023,192.09 1833 7,001,698.83 1857 28,699,831.85 1881 2,069,013,569.58 1810 53,173,217.52 1834 4,760,082.08 1858 44,911,881.03 1882 1,918,312,994.03 1811 48,005,587.76 1835 37,513.05 1859 58,496,837.88 1883 1,884,171,728.07 1812 45,209,737.90 1836 336,957.83 1860 64,842,287.88 1813 55,962,827.57 1837 3,308,124.07 1861 90,580,873.72 1814 81,487,846.24 1838 10,434,221.14 1862 524,176,412.13
Showing the Highest and Lowest Price of Gold in the New-York Market everyMonth, from the Suspension of Specie Payment by the Government inJanuary, 1862, until Resumption in January, 1879, a Period of SeventeenYears.1862. 1863. 1864. 1865. 1866. 1867.MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest LowestJanuary . . . 103-5/8 100 160-3/4 133-5/8 159-3/8 151-1/2 233-3/4 198-1/8 144-5/8 129 137-7/8 132February . . . 104-3/4 102-1/8 172-1/2 152-1/2 161 157-1/4 216-1/2 196-5/8 140-5/8 135-7/8 140-1/2 135-1/4March . . . . 102-3/8 101-1/4 171-3/4 139 169-3/4 159 201 148-1/4 136-1/2 125 140-3/8 133-3/8April . . . . 102-1/4 101 157-7/8 145-1/2 184-3/4 166-1/4 153-5/8 144 129-5/8 125-1/2 142 132-3/8May . . . . . 104-1/8 102-1/8 154-3/4 143-1/2 190 168 145-3/8 128-5/8 141-1/2 125-1/8 138-7/8 134-7/8June . . . . . 109-1/2 103-3/8 148-3/8 140-1/2 250 193 147-3/8 135-7/8 167-3/4 137-5/8 138-3/4 136-1/2July . . . . . 120-1/8 108-3/4 145 123-1/4 285 222 146 138-3/4 155-3/4 147 140-5/8 138August . . . . 116-1/4 112-1/2 129-3/4 122-1/8 259-1/2 231-1/2 145-3/8 140-1/4 152-1/4 146-1/2 142-3/8 139-7/8September . . 124 116-1/2 143-1/8 126-7/8 254-1/2 191 145 142-5/8 147-1/8 143-1/4 146-3/8 141October . . . 133-1/2 122 156-3/4 140-3/8 227-3/4 189 149 144-1/8 154-3/8 145-1/2 145-5/8 140-1/4November . . . 133-1/4 129 154 143 260 210 148-3/4 145-7/8 148-5/8 137-1/2 141-1/2 138-1/8December . . . 134 128-1/2 152-3/4 148-1/2 243 212-3/4 148-1/2 144-5/8 141-3/4 131-1/4 137-7/8 133
1868. 1869. 1870. 1871. 1872. 1873.MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest LowestJanuary . . . 141-7/8 133-1/4 136-5/8 134-5/8 123-1/4 119-3/8 111-1/4 110-1/2 110-1/8 108-1/2 114-1/4 111-5/8February . . . 144 139-5/8 136-1/4 130-7/8 121-1/2 115 112-1/2 110-3/4 111 109-1/2 115-7/8 112-7/8March . . . . 141-3/8 137-7/8 132-1/4 130-7/8 116-3/8 110-1/4 112 110-1/8 110-5/8 109-3/4 118-1/2 114-5/8April . . . . 140-3/8 137-3/4 134-3/8 131-1/4 115-5/8 111-1/2 111-1/4 110-1/8 110-5/8 109-3/4 118-1/2 114-5/8May . . . . . 140-1/2 139-1/8 144-7/8 134-5/8 115-1/2 113-3/4 112-1/4 111 114-3/4 112-1/8 118-5/8 116-5/8June . . . . . 141-1/2 139-1/8 139-5/8 136-1/2 114-3/4 110-7/8 113-1/8 111-3/4 114-3/4 113 118-1/4 115July . . . . . 145-1/4 140-1/8 137-7/8 134 122-3/4 111-1/8 113-1/4 111-3/4 115-1/4 113-1/2 116-3/8 115August . . . . 150 143-1/2 136-5/8 131-1/4 122 114-3/4 113-1/8 111-5/8 115-5/8 112-1/8 116-1/4 114-3/8September . . 145-1/8 141-1/8 162-1/2 130-5/8 116-3/4 113 115-1/8 112-1/4 115-1/8 112-5/8 116-1/8 110-7/8October . . . 140-3/8 133-3/4 132 128-1/8 114-1/4 111-1/8 115 111-1/2 115-1/4 112-1/4 111-1/4 107-5/8November . . . 137 132-1/8 128-5/8 121-1/2 113-1/4 110 112-5/8 110-1/2 114-1/4 111-3/8 110-1/2 106-1/8December . . . 136-3/4 134-1/2 124 119-1/2 111-1/4 110-1/2 110-3/8 108-1/2 113-3/8 111-1/8 112-5/8 108-3/8
1874. 1875. 1876. 1877. 1878.MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest LowestJanuary . . . 112-1/8 110-1/8 113-3/8 111-3/4 113-1/4 112-1/2 107-1/8 105-1/4 102-7/8 101-1/4February . . . 113 111-3/8 115-3/8 113-1/4 114-1/8 112/3-4 106-1/8 104-5/8 102-3/8 101-5/8March . . . . 113-5/8 111-1/4 117 114 115 113-3/4 105-3/8 104-1/4 102 100-3/4April . . . . 114-3/8 111-3/4 115-1/2 114 113-7/8 112-1/2 107-7/8 104-3/4 101-1/4 100-1/8May . . . . . 113-1/8 111-7/8 116-3/8 115 113-1/4 112-1/4 107-3/8 106-1/4 101-1/4 100-3/8June . . . . . 112-1/4 110-1/2 117-1/2 116-1/4 113 111-7/8 106-3/8 104-3/4 101 100-5/8July . . . . . 110-7/8 109 117-1/4 111-3/4 112-1/2 111-3/8 106-1/8 105-1/8 101-1/2 100-3/8August . . . . 110-1/4 109-1/4 114-3/4 112-5/8 112-1/8 109-3/8 105-1/2 103-7/8 100-3/4 100-1/2September . . 110-1/4 109-3/8 117-3/8 113-3/4 110-3/8 109-1/4 104 102-7/8 100-1/2 100-1/8October . . . 110-3/8 109-3/4 117-5/8 114-1/2 113-1/4 108-7/8 103-3/8 102-1/2 101-3/8 100-1/4November . . . 112-3/8 110 116-3/8 114-1/8 110-1/8 108-1/8 103-3/8 102-1/2 100-1/2 100-1/8December . . . 112-3/8 110-1/2 115-1/4 112-1/8 109 107 103-3/8 102-1/2 100-1/2 100
Table showing the Total Amount of Gold and Silver Coin issued from theMints of the United States in each Decennial Period since 1790.
Period. Gold. Silver. Period. Gold. Silver. 1793-1800 . . $ 1,014,290.00 $ 1,440,454.75 1851-1860 . . $330,237,085.50 $ 46,582,183.00 1801-1810 . . 3,250,742.50 3,569,165.25 1861-1870 . . 292,409,545.50 13,188,601.90 1811-1820 . . 3,166,510.00 5,970,810.95 1871-1880 . . 393,125,751.00 155,123,087.10 1821-1830 . . 1,903,092.50 16,781,046.95 1881-1883 . . 204,076,239.00 84,268,825.65 1831-1840 . . 18,756,487.50 27,309,957.00 1841-1850 . . 89,239,817.50 22,368,130.00 Total . . .$1,337,179,561.00 $376,602,262.55
The following statement exhibits the total valuation of real and personal estate in the United States, according to the Census Returns of 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880.
Both the "true" and the "assessed" valuation are given, except in 1850, which gives only the "true." The dispartiy between the actual propery and that which is assessed for taxation is very striking.
The effect of the war and the consequent abolition of slavery on the valuation of property in the Southern States is clearly shown by the figures.
In all comparisons of value between the different periods, it must be borne in mind, that, in 1870, gold was at an average premium of 25.3 per cent. To equate the valuation with those of other years, there must be a reduction of one-fifth on the reported valuation of 1870, both "true" and "assessed."
The four periods exhibit a more rapid accumulation of wealth in theUnited States than was ever known before in the history of the world.
STATES 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880. STATESAND Assessed Assessed Assessed ANDTERRITORIES. True Value. Value. True Value. Value. True Value. Value. True Value. TERRITORIES.
Alabama . . . . . . . . . $228,204,332 $432,198,762 $495,237,078 $155,582,595 $201,835,841 $122,867,228 $428,000,000 . . Alabama.Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,410,295 3,440,791 9,270,214 41,000,000 . . Arizona.Arkansas . . . . . . . . 39,841,025 180,211,330 219,256,473 94,528,843 156,394,691 86,409,364 286,000,000 . . Arkansas.California . . . . . . . 22,161,872 139,654,667 207,874,613 269,644,068 638,767,017 584,578,036 1,343,000,000 . . California.Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,338,101 20,243,303 74,471,693 240,000,000 . . Colorado.Connecticut . . . . . . . 155,707,980 341,256,976 444,274,114 425,433,237 774,631,524 327,177,385 799,000,000 . . Connecticut.Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,924,489 5,599,752 20,321,530 118,000,000 . . Dakota.Delaware . . . . . . . . 21,062,556 39,767,233 46,242,181 64,787,223 97,180,833 59,951,643 130,000,000 . . Delaware.District of Columbia . . 14,018,874 41,084,945 41,084,945 74,271,693 126,873,618 99,401,787 220,000,000 . . District of Columbia.Florida . . . . . . . . . 22,862,270 68,929,685 73,101,500 32,480,843 44,163,655 30,938,309 120,000,000 . . Florida.Georgia . . . . . . . . . 335,425,714 618,232,387 645,895,237 227,219,519 268,169,207 239,472,599 606,000,000 . . Georgia.Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,292,205 6,552,081 6,440,876 29,000,000 . . Idaho.Illinois . . . . . . . . 156,265,006 389,207,372 871,860,282 482,899,575 2,121,680,579 786,616,394 3,210,000,000 . . Illinois.Indiana . . . . . . . . . 202,650,264 411,042,424 528,835,371 663,455,044 1,268,180,543 727,815,131 1,681,000,000 . . Indiana.Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 23,714,638 205,168,983 247,338,265 302,515,418 717,644,750 398,671,251 1,721,000,000 . . Iowa.Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,518,232 31,327,895 92,125,861 188,892,014 160,891,689 700,000,000 . . Kansas.Kentucky . . . . . . . . 301,628,456 528,212,693 666,043,112 409,544,294 604,318,552 350,563,971 902,000,000 . . Kentucky.Louisiana . . . . . . . . 233,998,764 435,787,265 602,118,568 253,371,890 323,125,666 160,162,439 382,000,000 . . Louisiana.Maine . . . . . . . . . . 122,777,571 154,380,388 190,211,600 204,253,780 348,155,671 235,978,716 511,000,000 . . Maine.Maryland . . . . . . . . 219,217,364 297,135,238 376,919,944 423,834,918 643,748,976 497,307,675 837,000,000 . . Maryland.Massachusetts . . . . . . 573,342,286 777,157,816 815,237,433 1,591,983,112 2,132,148,741 1,584,756,802 2,623,000,000 . . Masschusetts.Michigan . . . . . . . . 59,787,255 163,533,005 257,163,983 272,242,917 719,208,118 517,666,359 1,580,000,000 . . Michigan.Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . 32,018,773 52,294,413 84,135,322 228,909,590 258,028,687 792,000,000 . . Minnesota.Mississippi . . . . . . . 228,951,130 509,472,912 607,324,911 177,278,800 209,197,345 110,628,129 354,000,000 . . Mississippi.Missouri . . . . . . . . 137,247,707 266,935,851 501,214,398 556,129,969 1,284,922,897 532,795,801 1,562,000,000 . . Missouri.Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,943,411 15,184,522 18,609,802 40,000,000 . . Montana.Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . 7,426,949 9,131,056 54,584,616 69,277,483 90,585,782 385,000,000 . . Nebraska.Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,740,973 31,134,012 29,291,459 156,000,000 . . Nevada.New Hampshire . . . . . . 103,652,835 123,810,809 156,310,860 149,065.290 252,624,112 164,755,181 363,000,000 . . New Hampshire.New Jersey . . . . . . . 200,000,000 296,682,492 467,918,324 624,868,971 940,976,064 572,518,361 1,305,000,000 . . New Jersey.New Mexico . . . . . . . 5,174,471 20,838,780 20,813,768 17,784,014 31,349,793 11,363,406 49,000,000 . . New Mexico.New York . . . . . . . . 1,080,309,216 1,390,464,638 1,843,338,517 1,967,001,185 6,500,841,264 2,651,940,006 6,308,000,000 . . New York.North Carolina . . . . . 226,800,472 292,297,602 358,739,399 130,378,622 260,757,244 156,100,202 461,000,000 . . North Carolina.Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 504,726,120 959,867,101 1,193,898,422 1,167,731,697 2,235,430,300 1,534,360,508 3,238,000,000 . . Ohio.Oregon . . . . . . . . . 5,063,474 19,024,915 28,930,637 31,798,510 51,558,932 52,522,084 154,000,000 . . Oregon.Pennsylvania . . . . . . 722,486,120 719,253,335 1,416,501,818 1,313,236,042 3,808,340,112 1,683,459,016 4,942,000,000 . . Pennsylvania.Rhode Island . . . . . . 80,508,794 125,104,305 135,337,588 244,278,854 295,965,646 252,538,673 400,000,000 . . Rhode Island.South Carolina . . . . . 288,257,694 489,319,128 548,138,754 183,913,337 208,146,989 133,560,135 322,000,000 . . South Carolina.Tennessee . . . . . . . . 201,246,686 382,495,200 493,903,892 253,782,161 498,237,724 211,778,538 705,000,000 . . Tennessee.Texas . . . . . . . . . . 52,740,473 267,792,335 365,200,614 149,732,929 159,052,542 340,364,515 825,000,000 . . Texas.Utah . . . . . . . . . . 986,083 4,158,020 5,596,118 12,565,842 16,159,995 24,775,279 114,000,000 . . Utah.Vermont . . . . . . . . . 92,205,049 84,758,619 122,477,170 102,548,528 235,349,553 86,806,775 302,000,000 . . Vermont.Virginia . . . . . . . . 430,701,082 657,021,336 793,249,681 365,439,917 409,588,133 308,455,135 707,000,000 . . Virginia.Washington . . . . . . . . . . 4,394,735 5,601,466 10,642,863 13,562,164 23,810,693 62,000,000 . . Washington.West Virginia . . . . . . included in Virginia 140,538,273 190,651,491 139,622,705 350,000,000 . . West Virginia.Wisconsin . . . . . . . . 42,056,595 185,945,489 273,671,668 333,209,838 702,307,329 438,971,751 1,139,000,000 . . Wisconsin.Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,516,748 7,016,748 13,621,829 54,000,000 . . Wyoming.
Total for U. S. . . . . $7,135,780,228 $12,084,560,005 $16,159,616,068 $14,178,986,732 $30,068,518,507 $16,902,993,543 $43,642,000,000 . . Total for U. S.