On this particular occasion (I don't know when it occurred or what troops of ours had been engaged), the ground on the slope of, and below the eastern side of the kopje, was covered, over a large area, with shrapnel bullets and bits of shell; and the large prominent boulders, some of them as big as haystacks, bore marks where shells had struck in numbers;but, away up on a corner of the kopje, fifty yards off, were at least 500 cartridge cases, showing where some three or four men had lain in perfect security and had kept up a harassing fire in spite of our shrieking shell, and the whistling but inoffensive bullets from our bursting shrapnel.
They had played the Boer game, which the introduction of smokeless cordite had rendered so easy; they had studiously avoided all the prominent objects behind which one would naturally expect to find an enemy, and had selected other places on the flanks, from which to pour in, unobserved, their annoying and ceaseless fire, whilst our advancing troops blazed away, and continued to blaze away, at the top of the hills, at green bushes, and at anystone walls in the neighbourhood, instead of impartially searching with their fire the slopes of all the hills in their front, or watching the spirts of dust thrown up by the Boer bullets and trying to discover from these indications the direction whence the fire was coming and the probable location of the marksman.
These are all points which, unfortunately, can only be learned when bullets are flying around, but a very little instruction in this goes a tremendously long way; and when skirmishing is again introduced, as it must inevitably be, into the curriculum of instruction we give our infantry soldiers in peace time, no doubt more attention will be paid to the question of adapting your system of warfare to meet that of your enemy. The invading force which enters an enemy's country is, to my mind, entirely at the mercy of and eventually forced to adopt, any system of warfare which may be thrust upon it by the owners of the country; thus, a widely scattered enemy must be met by our thin clouds of skirmishers: changes of position rapidly carried out by an enemy entirely mounted must be checkmated by our strong bodies of mounted infantry: the withdrawal, when pressed by us, of the enemy to a previously selected position must be met by our timely flanking movements: the invitation by the enemy to a frontal attack over a suspiciously open piece of country must be met by an attack delivered somewhere else.
In fact, whatever the enemy obviously wishes us to do, must not be done, lest we be drawn into a trap; and above all nothing must ever be taken for granted. I am fully aware that these axioms are as old as the hills, and that every soldier is supposed to absorb them with his military milk in his infancy as a recruit; but I am afraid that he does not assimilate enough of this particular kind of diet.
Many are the instances, some of themmicroscopic, some of them serious, which I have seen of the neglect of the golden rule—take nothing for granted; and I might also add to this rule another, namely—never despise your enemy—to which the attention of all amateur soldiers might be drawn when they next race off in the direction of any campaign which may be threatening.
This queer Meyer's Kop made an excellent helio station from which signalling communication was easily maintained to the north and south; and it was also a first-rate observation post, from which the surrounding country for miles round could be seen. One of the officers was usually on watch up there from daylight to dark, and it was really a very pleasant way of spending three or four hours on a fine day. Sometimes we could see what we thought were Boers riding about on the sky line, and we used to especially watch the entrance to Slabbert's Nek, in the hopes of seeing some of the enemy moving about. Once or twice we went out with a few men and some wagons to procure forage from the farm of an Englishman named Passmore, a horsebreeder and trainer, and a jockey well known at Johannesburg, who had a run near us, but who had had to bolt when the Boers arrived in the neighbourhood. This man had opened a small store on his property, but when we arrived we found that it had been carefully looted. I never saw such confusion as there was; nearly everything had been torn down or off the shelves and thrown promiscuously on to the floor; things looked as though a whole troop of monkeys had been allowed a free hand for half an hour or so. Only once have I seen anything approaching such a state of matters, and that was years ago, when Captain Farrell's pet monkey was accidentally shut up in his master's quarters for a couple of hours; and the havoc that monkey, who was of an enquiring turn of mind, played with writing table, dressing table,chest of drawers, and tin uniform cases may be better imagined than described.
Passmore's store however had been visited, it was suspected, by Kaffirs and not by Boers. It was a curious circumstance, noticed by one of our officers with a Sherlock Holmes disposition, that all the tins, of which there were a number containing mustard, medicines, pepper, linseed, ginger and other things, had a small opening, roughly made, evidently to enable the contents to be examined. Now, no white man would have gone to the trouble of doing this, even if he couldn't have read the label, which was plain enough in every case.
G and H Companies were sent in with wagons, on the 20th of July, to Bethlehem, to draw another supply of rations and to get the mails, sixty-three bags of which were waiting for us. They returned the next day in the afternoon, together with the Bedfordshire regiment, who camped alongside of us, but left the next evening to join Paget's Brigade, which was only a few miles away.
The Bedfords, who had been equipped earlier in the campaign than we had, when things were more plentiful, were very well provided as regards transport. They had plenty of wagons, Scotch carts, ammunition carts and water carts, while we were still limited to the one water cart with which we originally started, and the two old Scotch carts, procured at a farm, which we utilised to carry some of our reserve ammunition. The four ammunition and other carts we had brought from home had been left at Glen for want of mules to draw them.
A bad night—Start for Relief's Nek—Description of ground—Orders to attack—Leading companies take wrong direction—Remaining companies advance against Nek—They close up to the Boer position—Further advance impossible—Death of Sir Walter Barttelot—Orders to retire at dusk—Difficulty of bringing in wounded—A good Samaritan.
A bad night—Start for Relief's Nek—Description of ground—Orders to attack—Leading companies take wrong direction—Remaining companies advance against Nek—They close up to the Boer position—Further advance impossible—Death of Sir Walter Barttelot—Orders to retire at dusk—Difficulty of bringing in wounded—A good Samaritan.
It was dark on Sunday evening, the 22nd of July, when the Bedfords started from Meyer's Kop; and directly they had gone the wind rose and the rain came down in torrents, splashing up the black soil, turning the camp into a morass, and penetrating through everything—blankets, waterproof sheets, canvas sheeting. The wind blew our blankets about and the rain drenched everything for many hours without ceasing, all fires were quenched by the downpour, and we sat and cursed and were wretched. One or two of us were fortunate enough to get hold of some corrugated iron, and I remember getting an hour or two's broken sleep by crawling, all wet and muddy, under a long sheet of this iron, which I had stretched over my blankets.
To add to our troubles, one of the companies on picket fired a few shots in the middle of all our discomfort, but, as the firing did not continue, no further steps were taken: however, about half-past two, the Volunteer company burst out into heavy firing which they continued for some time. As they were on picket quite close to us, the Adjutant ran up to see what was the matter, and found that they were firing at some lights some distance in front of them: so the firing soon stopped, and we huddled under our dripping blankets until three o'clock, when we were routed out and told to pack our kits and load the wagons. Overnight the Colonel had had confidential orders to move before daybreak towards Retief's Nek, where we were to meet General Hunter and receive further orders; so by four o'clock we were on the move. The nightwas pitch dark, but luckily the rain had stopped: the whole camp and the ground round it was a sea of mud, and it was with the greatest difficulty that we could start the wagons, already fully loaded with rations and mails, to which had been added the men's blankets, now trebled in weight owing to the absorption of rain: in consequence of the compression, the water was soon running out of the bottoms of the wagons, which will give an idea how wet the blankets had been when loaded.
As it was, after squelching and slipping along in slimy mud, we had to wait at the top of the hill for the wagons to be hauled up to drier ground; by that time it was dawn, and we were able to proceed at a better pace across country towards Retief's Nek.
There was one nasty drift on the way, muddy and slippery, which caused considerable delay to our small column; but after this we trekked along for some hours over grassy veldt, until we came in sight of Retief's Nek, when the Colonel rode on to communicate with General Hunter, and the battalion halted under the lee of a huge mass of rock, rising sheer out of the plain. This was about eleven o'clock, so we seized the opportunity to eat some biscuit and what cooked food we happened to have in our haversacks, and to rest; for after our dreadful night and long tramp, we were fairly well tired.
After some little while, the Colonel came back, summoned the officers, and told us the orders he had received from General Hector Macdonald, who was in charge of the operations; we then went some little distance aside, and the position was shown to us and the orders explained.
In front, the ground, level and grassy, stretched away for about a mile and a half to a low conical hill, which appeared to be of slaty rock, and the top of which shone and glistened inthe sun like white marble; a little to the rear of this, and seemingly connected with it by a narrow nek, rose another hill, very similar in appearance, but dark and lowering. Separated from these hills on our right by a gap, perhaps 600 or 700 yards wide, rose a spur with a knoll half way up, a little less in height than the kopje (which we had now named Marble Kop), and from this knoll the spur rose abruptly to a great height, broken and jagged, the slopes covered with huge black rocks: this cliff bore round to our right for perhaps a mile or more, very steep and precipitous, until it was abreast of where we were standing, when the range of mountains swung away to our right and was lost in the distance. Still to the front, but a little to our right, rose a narrow grassy kopje, with a couple of houses at its foot. This kopje was separated from the great range of hills by a narrow, funnel shaped passage which seemed to be about 600 yards wide at the entrance; but whether this narrow kopje, which ran straight back, eventually joined the broken and jagged cliffs in the distance, or whether it was an isolated hill and the passage ran round behind it, could not be decided from the spot upon which we were then.
Marble Kop was the position the battalion were to attack, and it was to be supported in its advance by the battery, which would take up a position on a hill which we could not then see, but which was immediately in front of Marble Kop, and some considerable distance away from it: no nearer position could be found for the guns.
On the left of Marble Kop rose abruptly to a point a lofty range of hills, looking quite inaccessible, and bearing round to our left in a great sweep. Between this point and Marble Kop was another gap of some considerable width, which was the pass of Retief's Nek; and down at the bottom of this pass and hidden in a fold of ground, the roadran from where guns were posted straight into and beyond the pass.
Our orders from General Macdonald were to attack Marble Kop, and on arrival there to open an enfilading fire on a trench which the enemy was reported to have dug across the pass: there were to be no supports for us, and there was no information as to the position of the enemy, or his strength, or whether Marble Kop was occupied by him: a deadly stillness was in the air, and the strongest telescope did not reveal the presence of the enemy at any point which was visible.
The companies now proceeded to move off in the following order:—G company under Captain Mackenzie, then H under Captain Wisden; after them A under Major O'Grady, followed by B with Major Panton in command, and C under Captain Wroughton; E under Captain Aldridge bringing up the rear. The remaining companies were on various duties; D under Lieut. Ashworth was escorting the guns and took no part in the action, F under Captain Gilbert, and the Volunteer company under Sir Walter Barttelot, were baggage and rear guard respectively: they came up shortly after we had advanced, when the wagons had been parked by Major Scaife, who was baggage master—these two companies then proceeding to join in the attack.
The leading company, G, was directed to advance towards Marble Kop, proceeding in a circuitous direction, and skirting the base of the narrow kopje, then in front and lying at our feet. This kopje G should have left on the right. The companies were to advance in column of sections, each extended to ten paces, and with large intervals between each line; all officers and supernumeraries were to be in among the men in line, so as not to render themselves too conspicuous. The companieswere soon fairly launched and moving off across the grassy veldt in great parallel lines, about a hundred or more yards apart, and stretching well away to the right and left, so as not to afford to the enemy a more extensive objective than was necessary. The leading company was a long way off, and the men were appearing smaller and smaller as they got further away to the front, when it was noticed that the column, instead of skirting the narrow kopje in front and leaving it on theirright, had misunderstood these instructions and were entering the funnel shaped passage, thus leaving the narrow kopje on theirleft.
There was then no time or means of recalling them without considerable delay, owing to the distance, fully a mile, which they had already traversed, so it was considered advisable to allow them to continue their advance in the direction which they had chosen; the point of attack had been distinctly pointed out to every one concerned, and if, as often happens in these widely extended movements, certain contingencies had arisen which necessitated the direction of the attack being changed, yet no further instruction could be given by the commanding officer, and the execution of the attack must, perforce, be left to the discretion of each company commander.
Under the extended order system as carried out during this war, the company commander becomes a far more important personage than he has been during the last twenty years, with an immensely free hand, within certain limits, directly active operations commence.
The machine guns under Captain Green had gone along with H company, and had by this time, with the three leading companies, gone quite out of sight into the funnel shaped passage; C company, which was the fifth in order of succession, was just inside the entrance, and E was following in rear:the ammunition cart and water cart and the rest of the first line were coming on behind. This was the situation about one o'clock, and I was walking up the narrow kopje, intending to watch the progress of events from its summit, when suddenly from inside the passage on the right, into which the companies had gone, came, like a clap of thunder, a most fearful outburst of firing, which continued for some time without intermission, and which echoed and re-echoed among the ravines and rocky hills, until one could hardly hear one's own voice.
From the top of the kopje nothing could be seen, either of our men or the enemy, and the infernal pandemonium still continued in the valley below; but to the incessant ping-boom, ping-boom of the Mauser, unmistakeable from its propinquity, was now added the ping, ping, ping of the Lee Metford, and the continuous stutter of the Maxim, as this highly strung machine, shaking and quivering with nervous energy, stammered out whole belts full of ammunition without ceasing. Undoubtedly, Captain Green had got hold of a soft thing and was taking the utmost advantage of it, and squeezing the last ounce out of the Maxim, which fired as it had never fired before and probably never will again. The water in the casing fizzed and spluttered, but more was handy; the empty belts littered the ground, but the ammunition cart was not far off, and so the vastly important work of spattering with bullets the hillside opposite, which a moment before had been as still as the grave, was continued without intermission. The companies in front had dropped into cover behind some huge rocks which fringed both sides of the valley, immediately on the first shots being fired; and they had ever since continued to fire at their invisible foe, who were lining the hillside and the jagged crest line not 800 yards away.
Captain Mackenzie had, at the outset, exposed himself somewhat recklessly, and had been knocked over in the open with a bullet in his ankle; his subaltern, Lieut. Hopkins, seeing this, shouted to a couple of men to accompany him, and dashed out without a moment's thought towards his captain, in the face of a murderous fire which covered the ground around them with a cloud of dust spirts. Together with the two men, who turned out to be Corporal Hoad and Lance-Corporal Neville, Lieut. Hopkins raised Captain Mackenzie and bore him, groaning and sweating with agony from his broken ankle, to safety.
For this gallant act these three, the young officer and the two Corporals (both young soldiers), were recommended for the Victoria Cross, the highest distinction to which a soldier can aspire. However, in lieu of this, Lieut. Hopkins was offered a company in the Manchester regiment, and the two Corporals were each awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Nothing could be done to withdraw the companies in front, and the Maxim had also to remain; but orders were sent to B, C, and E companies to move to their left to the other side of the kopje. This they soon did, and the attack was launched again at Marble Kop, but on this occasion from the direction in which it had been originally intended to advance. As matters turned out, however, it was perhaps as well that the mistake had been made and the advance commenced in the wrong direction, as our three companies, although useless to the battalion in continuing the advance, were still of inestimable value where they were lying, as they held a good number of the enemy in check and prevented them from leaving their cover and proceeding to other positions, from which they could, perhaps, have done more damage. While our three companies kept up a dropping fire andwhile the Maxim rattled out its scattered shots at intervals, no Boer would dare to leave his cover; and so matters remainedin statu quoin this valley until dusk.
Meanwhile, our battery had commenced shelling vigorously the slopes of the hills on the right of Marble Kop, and B and C companies, with E following, were moving over to the open ground directly in front of it; from here they advanced in succession by half-companies and stretched away out into the veldt, E company being meanwhile held in reserve.
We sat and watched the companies diminishing in the distance, and, when the leading half-company was about a thousand yards from us and about the same distance from the foot of Marble Kop, we saw rifle fire opened on them from their right front. They continued their advance like a parade ground movement, halting, lying down to fire and then rising and going on again, the lines in rear conforming to the movements of those in front, and the men on the right of all the lines delivering their fire against their hidden enemy among the hills on the right front. Gradually the lines in rear decreased their distances, closing up to the front and reinforcing and thickening the firing line: this manœuvre adds more rifles to the firing line and enables more fire to be brought to bear on the enemy, but at the same time it increases the vulnerability of the foremost line, rendering more men liable to be hit owing to their proximity to each other, so, possibly, the advantages may or may not outweigh the disadvantages. In this particular case, however, where the enemy were behind perfect cover, the disadvantages of thickening the firing line predominated, and the enemy's bullets fell pretty thickly amongst our men.
It appeared at this stage of the proceedings, that Marble Kop was unoccupied, and that the bulkof the firing was coming from a concealed party of sharpshooters at long range, stationed somewhere on the right front, upon whom the shrapnel of our guns seemed to have little or no effect: however our men, although hampered by having to fire half right, continued to pour in a constant fire at ranges of from 600 to 800 yards, and perhaps longer.
About this time, also, F company and the Volunteer Company appeared, coming up from the rear in similar formation (half company columns) to that adopted by us: seeing that the firing line wanted a wider front instead of a thicker formation, F company was directed by signal to continue moving to the front, but to gradually edge off to the left, so as eventually to come up on the left of the present firing line, composed of B company.
So F company trudged off and carried out this manœuvre beautifully, coming up into line with B company and lying down and opening fire about half an hour later: meantime the Volunteer company had received similar orders to move further off and to prolong the line to the left of F company; this movement had used up all the companies at our disposal, except E, who were now moved off to the left also, but were still to remain as a reserve in rear of the centre, in view of possible contingencies which might arise. There were one or two wounded being brought in, so a dressing station was established under some cover, formed by a few large rocks and a tree or two; and the doctor, who had remained in the valley on the right attending to one or two men of G company who had been hit, was sent for. The first line transport with the ammunition carts, water cart and the medical officer's cart had, for some inexplicable reason, remained in this valley, although the majority of the battalion had been moved in another direction; they did not come near us all the afternoon, men having to besent over to get ammunition, which, at a later stage of the fight, was running short rapidly.
For the second time that day I sat down and searched the hills thoroughly with a telescope; not a sign of an enemy did I see, and yet the jets and puffs of dust thrown up amongst the men spread all over the veldt up to a thousand yards in front distinctly showed that the firing was from the right front. Away on our right, the spur, which has been alluded to as being separated from Marble Kop by a gap about six hundred yards wide, was being steadily shelled by our battery all along its length, and on its face where it joined the big jagged cliffs and trended off to the right; but it was now seen that this spur continued round to the left also, and forked out into another lofty range of hills, which swung round with a semi-circular sweep, enclosing a valley into which various underfeatures and knolls led out from the spur and from the lofty range itself. The conclusion I came to at the time was that the Boers were in position on these knolls and underfeatures, rising in tiers, one above another, and that the majority of the firing was directed on our men through and over the gap between the spur and Marble Kop; this supposition was supported by information given by the stretcher bearers, who were now coming in pretty frequently with wounded men from the firing line, so I signalled information to this effect to the officer commanding the battery; the distance, however, was too great, and the enemy were too well posted for shrapnel to do any harm: moreover, the gunners, from their long distance in the rear and because of the intervening end of the spur, could not see any of the underfeatures, behind which the enemy were situated.
The advance was continued until the right of the firing line, B company, was about 600 yards from the foot of Marble Kop; they could go nofurther with any advantage, and were fully occupied, as was C company, in keeping down the fire from their right front. Beyond them F company was pushing forwards towards the left of Marble Kop where the pass opened out, and were moving down into a fold of the ground, which hid them from my sight; slightly behind them and on their left was the Volunteer company, slowly pushing on, firing and advancing, and lying down to fire again, and continuing this with the greatest coolness and steadiness.
I was watching them through my telescope for some little time, noticing Sir Walter Barttelot running forward and the half-company following him, and I thought how unmistakeable a leader he looked, with no equipment and no rifle, standing and pointing with his stick to places which men should occupy. Sir Walter did not know the meaning of fear or nervousness, and the pluck and marvellous endurance he displayed during the campaign was a constant wonder to all of us, and put to shame many a soldier of half his age.
Soon the Volunteer company disappeared, like F company, in the fold of the ground, and I hoped that they would succeed in pushing on into the pass and round by the left of Marble Kop, and so create a diversion in the state of affairs. One or two wounded men being brought in from these companies proved what I suspected—that the huge, black, conical hill, rising on the left of the pass, was also occupied by the enemy's marksmen, who were behind the rocks and ledges of the steep slopes. This being so, things looked bad for our chance of being able to push round the left side of Marble Kop, which was, like its front, a slippery mass of smooth volcanic rock rising to a sharp pinnacle, and without an atom of cover. Nothing was to be gained by rushing this rock and swarming up its slippery sides (which we could easily have done),because, once there and necessarily crowded, we should have been exposed without the least protection to an overwhelming fire from the hills on the right and left of the Kop, while we could have done little good by our rifle fire, which would, of course, have to be directed up hill.
However, half of E company, waiting patiently in reserve, was sent out in support of F and the Volunteers, in case they should succeed in gaining a footing, and I went out myself a little way to find out if I could see what was beyond the fold in the ground into which these two companies had disappeared. Soon I met a stretcher borne along with difficulty by two men of F company, Privates Stewart and Biles, and upon it I was shocked to see Sir Walter Barttelot; he was unconscious and breathing heavily, and had been shot through the body by a bullet fired from the lofty hill on our left front. Sadly the men continued on their way to the dressing station, where Dr. Edwards immediately attended to him; but the case was hopeless from the first, and he breathed his last, still unconscious, soon after arrival.
From the men I learned that Captain Gilbert with most of his Company had brilliantly dashed into a Kaffir kraal under a severe fire from the left, and were there doing their best to subdue the enemy's scathing fire; several men had been wounded, Lieut. Anderson had been dangerously shot in the neck, and more stretchers were wanted. On the way back, therefore, volunteers were called for from E company to go out with stretchers, and right gallantly they came forward, plenty of them; they went out under the steady shower of bullets, right up to the firing line, and brought back most of the wounded who could not walk.
About four o'clock, a message was received from the Colonel that, if it was impossible, withoutsupports as we were, to carry the Nek, a retirement should be made, and a reply was sent that the Nek could certainly be carried, as the men were only waiting for the order to rush Marble Kop; but that the advantage thus gained would be valueless, as no troops could remain on the smooth pinnacle, with no cover and commanded on both sides.
Orders were therefore sent to each company commander to retire as quickly as possible as soon as it was dusk. All this time the firing in the valley on the right had been going on, and at intervals the Maxim spluttered out a handful of rounds and kept the enemy from quitting, and, possibly, from taking up other positions from which they could have added their quota of fire to that already being showered on us.
The stretchers were still coming in, and some of the men of E company had once more volunteered to make another journey, although this work was much more dangerous than lying behind an ant heap in the firing line, and the men deserve all the credit that it is possible to give them for their pluck and coolness. Four volunteers, when asked for, were also easily forthcoming to carry to the four Company commanders the orders to retire; one of these men, Hurrell, of E, had only just returned with a stretcher, but off he went again, and, I am thankful to say, safely returned.
There were now a number of poor fellows lying on the grass, and the doctor and Corporal Knapp and Private Gill were busy doing the best for them that circumstances would allow; several others, who were only slightly wounded and were able to walk, were sent off to camp, and the stretchers were sent back to the firing line in anticipation of the retirement at dusk.
Although we had been in action since mid-day and it was now nearly five o'clock, not an ambulance had arrived; but at last ours was seen slowlyapproaching from the valley on our right where it had remained: the labour of removing the groaning, wounded men—one of whom had been shot in the body, another in the thigh, another in the chest—in the clumsy old ambulance, which carried only two at a time, was commenced by the doctor.
It was now getting dusk, and a desultory fire was still being kept up by the enemy, when suddenly this increased in intensity and became a continuous clatter of musketry. The whole veldt between us and Marble Kop became spattered with puffs of dust thrown up by the Mauser bullets, some of the shots even reaching to the dressing station, which, unfortunately, had no Red Cross flag raised, although the Boers must have seen the ambulance wagon standing by with its white tilt and large flag flying.
The reason of this sudden outburst of musketry was the retirement of our men, who were running back smartly to be clear of the heavy fire: several little clumps of men were lagging somewhat in rear, carrying their wounded with them, and the Boers kept up a furious fire directed on these small parties. Several men were hit in this way, and the remainder were furious at the conduct of the Boers; but their firing was perhaps excusable, as, in the dusk, I doubt whether they could distinguish the stretcher parties at that long distance.
In contravention of the old-fashioned idea that all retirements should be conducted slowly, and that it is a disgrace to move out of a slow walk, is the common-sense feeling that, if troops are to withdraw under a heavy fire, the quicker they carry out the movement the earlier they will be beyond range, and the fewer casualties will occur: troops who have served in India on any of the numerous hill expeditions which take place in that country soon learn to act upon this plan.
It was almost dark when the companies began to arrive at the dressing station, and, as the bulletswere still flying about, we formed up in a hollow a little further back and waited for the remainder to come in: a good many men, and almost all the officers, were still in rear bringing along their wounded. Some of the companies, notably F and the Volunteers, had a long way to come, and the former had to wait till quite dark before they could rush out of the cover afforded by the kraal and successfully carry in those who had been badly hit. Lieut. Anderson had been very dangerously wounded in the throat, and the men had some difficulty in moving him: his wound had been bound up under a dreadful storm of bullets by a young soldier called Say of F company. Several other men were especially noted in their care for wounded comrades and their total disregard of danger: a large number of others showed the possession of bravery in a marked degree by securing and issuing ammunition, carrying orders, and assisting in other ways, under a heavy and continuous fire.
[9]Our casualties were severe, there being oneofficer killed and four wounded, whilst three men were killed and thirty-two wounded.
The three companies in the valley on our right retired about the same time as we did, and we proceeded to camp, which lay behind the position occupied by the battery and by D company, their escort: it must have been nearly seven o'clock when we reached our bivouacs and the wagons were brought up and unloaded of their wet and sopping blankets. However, we were too dead tired (having worn our blankets and heavy equipment for fifteen hours) and exhausted for want of sleep and food to think much of discomfort; and first we had to look after our wounded. Volunteers were soon forthcoming, and we managed to procure some tents, without any pegs, which we at last succeeded in pitching: the wounded arrived, the majority being able to walk, but some being brought in on stretchers, and a few, two at a time, on the single wretched ambulance which was all we had; and they were stowed away and made as comfortable as we could manage in the tents.
A real genuine Good Samaritan of a modern type appeared in the shape of an acting Chaplain, Mr. Leary, a Colonial born and bred, who did right good service in looking after our men—whom he had never seen before. He went to and fro with the ambulance, and, after one or two trips, got the men taken on a couple of miles further and put in the Field Hospital, which was at Boshop Farm. He is a right good man, just the one for a soldiers' padré, and he ought to be a Bishop: I hope he will be one before long.
We managed to rake up some Bovril, and gave the wounded that and some tea: the padré took out a bucketful of soup to give to the men still waiting at the dressing station to be removed. Our doctor, a civilian named Edwards, and also aColonial, from New South Wales, worked like a horse: his labour and the padré's that night only began when ours was finished.
The following orders relating to the action were published a day or two afterwards:—
Extract from Battalion Orders, 24th July, 1900.
"It is with the deepest regret that Lieut.-Col. Donne records the death in action yesterday of Sir Walter Barttelot, Bart., Commanding the Volunteer Company. Sir Walter Barttelot served throughout the long and arduous marches of the battalion, showing an example of fortitude and devotion to duty unsurpassed in the annals of the regiment, and which had deservedly won him the love of his comrades of all ranks. Sir Walter Barttelot passed unharmed through the actions of Welkom, Zand River, Doornkop, the Capture of Pretoria and the battle of Diamond Hill, in all of which he led his volunteers to the attack. In the desperate assault yesterday on the Boer position at Retief's Nek, he fell gallantly at the head of his company, to be mourned both by the regiment and the county of Sussex as one of the bravest soldiers and truest of men that have given their lives for Queen and country."
Extract from Battalion Orders, 26th July, 1900.
"Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Hunter, K.C.B., referred as follows to the conduct of the battalion in the action of Retiefs Nek on 23rd July.
"'Your men worked splendidly in the attack. They could not have done more. I wish you to convey to them, please, my high admiration of the dauntless way in which they advanced under such a fire.
"'Nothing could have been finer, and I deeply deplore the heavy losses incurred.'
"Lieut.-Col. Donne feels proud to publish these remarks from such a distinguished General asSir A. Hunter, with whom he has often had the honour of serving before.
"Although the attack could not be pressed home, owing to darkness and the cross-fire of the enemy, yet the losses of the battalion were not in vain, and the boldness of the attack on the right justly contributed to the success next morning of the turning movement on the left, which resulted in the rout of the Boers.
"The names of those who have fallen in this, as well as in all other actions, will be recorded at no distant date on a monument to be probably erected in the County Cathedral at home, or in such conspicuous place as may be deemed worthy to commemorate their deeds of valour on these South African battlefields."[10]
Sir Walter Barttelot was buried the next day under a huge eucalyptus growing by itself in a field to the east of Boshop Farm: two of the men who had been killed were buried there, too; their names were Bennett and Buck.
A slab of timber was erected over Sir Walter's grave, upon which an inscription had been cut by one of the Volunteer company.
FOOTNOTES:[9]Our casualties during the day were as follows:KILLED.Capt.Sir W. G. Barttelot,Volunteer CompanyPrivateE. Bennett,G CompanyPrivateC. Buck,B CompanyPrivateJ. Mills,B CompanyWOUNDED.Capt.E. L. Mackenzie2nd Lieut.J. C. W. Anderson2nd Lieut.H. G. Montgomerie2nd Lieut.G. E. LeachmanClr.-Sergt.A. Nye,F CompanyLce.-Corp.J. Butt,H CompanyLce.-Corp.A. King,F Company dLce.-Corp.F. Manser,C CompanyPrivateA. Clarke,B CompanyPrivateA. Perry,B CompanyPrivateE. Brown,B CompanyPrivateJ. Leadbetter,B CompanyPrivateL. Paddon,B CompanyPrivateJ. Hall,B CompanyPrivateJ. Nicholls,B CompanyPrivateJ. Hyde,B CompanyPrivateA. Baker,F CompanyPrivateG. Parsons,F CompanyPrivateE. Coldwell,F CompanyPrivateW. Croft,F CompanyPrivateH. Smith,F CompanyPrivateA. Holder,F Company dPrivateH. Weeks,F CompanyPrivateA. Thomas,C CompanyPrivateF. Baker,C CompanyPrivateM. Jeal,C CompanyPrivateW. Brown,C CompanyPrivateA. Winchester,C CompanyPrivateG. Duke,C CompanyPrivateP. Griffiths,H CompanyPrivateW. Boniface,G CompanyPrivateJ. Hiscock,Vol. Company dPrivateM. Weller,Vol. CompanyPrivateP. Pilcher,Vol. CompanyPrivateE. Gouldsmith,Vol. CompanyPrivateR. Burtenshaw,E Companyd Died of wounds.[10]They are inscribed upon the Memorial at Brighton.—Ed.
[9]Our casualties during the day were as follows:KILLED.Capt.Sir W. G. Barttelot,Volunteer CompanyPrivateE. Bennett,G CompanyPrivateC. Buck,B CompanyPrivateJ. Mills,B CompanyWOUNDED.Capt.E. L. Mackenzie2nd Lieut.J. C. W. Anderson2nd Lieut.H. G. Montgomerie2nd Lieut.G. E. LeachmanClr.-Sergt.A. Nye,F CompanyLce.-Corp.J. Butt,H CompanyLce.-Corp.A. King,F Company dLce.-Corp.F. Manser,C CompanyPrivateA. Clarke,B CompanyPrivateA. Perry,B CompanyPrivateE. Brown,B CompanyPrivateJ. Leadbetter,B CompanyPrivateL. Paddon,B CompanyPrivateJ. Hall,B CompanyPrivateJ. Nicholls,B CompanyPrivateJ. Hyde,B CompanyPrivateA. Baker,F CompanyPrivateG. Parsons,F CompanyPrivateE. Coldwell,F CompanyPrivateW. Croft,F CompanyPrivateH. Smith,F CompanyPrivateA. Holder,F Company dPrivateH. Weeks,F CompanyPrivateA. Thomas,C CompanyPrivateF. Baker,C CompanyPrivateM. Jeal,C CompanyPrivateW. Brown,C CompanyPrivateA. Winchester,C CompanyPrivateG. Duke,C CompanyPrivateP. Griffiths,H CompanyPrivateW. Boniface,G CompanyPrivateJ. Hiscock,Vol. Company dPrivateM. Weller,Vol. CompanyPrivateP. Pilcher,Vol. CompanyPrivateE. Gouldsmith,Vol. CompanyPrivateR. Burtenshaw,E Companyd Died of wounds.
[9]Our casualties during the day were as follows:
[10]They are inscribed upon the Memorial at Brighton.—Ed.
[10]They are inscribed upon the Memorial at Brighton.—Ed.
Bearer Companies—Retief's Nek—Artillery driving—Naauwpoort Nek—White flags—Golden Gate—Orders to take over surrender of five commandos—To Raats' Farm—The Boer laager—Surrender of arms and horses—Organisation of prisoners—The Commandants—Basuto visitors—Destruction of ammunition.
Bearer Companies—Retief's Nek—Artillery driving—Naauwpoort Nek—White flags—Golden Gate—Orders to take over surrender of five commandos—To Raats' Farm—The Boer laager—Surrender of arms and horses—Organisation of prisoners—The Commandants—Basuto visitors—Destruction of ammunition.
During all the time we were between Bethlehem and Retief's Nek we had been away from the Bearer Company and the Field Hospital, and had only one ambulance with us to perform the necessary duties of both of these units. When leaving Bethlehem, our doctor, who was then a civilian of the New South Wales Hospital, tried to get an ambulance to accompany the regiment and the battery, thenen routeto Meyers Kop; but he met with considerable opposition to his request from the Bearer Company authorities, who apparently did not mind a whole battalion and a battery going off without transport for the sick or possible wounded, but hated having to give up one of their ambulances. The doctor had, eventually, to go to General Hunter and get an order from him before he could secure the wagon which was required.
The idea of separating or breaking up the unit was so distasteful that the request for a wagon was, at the time, compared to that of a battery commander being asked to break up the organization of his battery by sending one gun away with troops.
The comparison between a battery of the Royal Field Artillery and the miserable collection of half-a-dozen old ambulance wagons was too delicious for words, and will, no doubt, be appreciated by our gallant gunners! There is no branch of the army in which such a sacred regard for the everlasting red tape is evidenced in the field as in the Hospitals and Bearer Companies: "At all costskeep your wagons empty," should be their motto, which will be supported by many a footsore soldier, with ragged clothes and worn-out boots, who has been refused even a temporary ride in these vehicles.
At the time when we were in such trouble with our boots, and had to wear miners' highlows and anything that could be picked up in the shops, many a man might have been saved days and days in hospital by a lift in a wagon at the critical time: of course, the Bearer Company say at once, "We are not here to carry men with bad boots, our duty is to take wounded men from the scene of action to the Field Hospital," and decline to receive him: the Field Hospital say "We cannot take you unless you are handed over by the Bearer Company": the baggage master shouts at once, "Come off that blank wagon, don't you know you musn't ride on transport wagons?" and so the wretched man gets left behind by all.
There are two sides to every question, however, and all soldiers know that once a schemer obtains the slightest privilege from the hospital or the doctor, his example is immediately followed by crowds of imitators.
The practical advantages of the Bearer Company in the field are not very apparent, and the general who ordered the Field Hospital and the Bearer Company in his brigade to be amalgamated was a sensible man.
On the 25th of July at five o'clock in the morning we moved across to join the Highland Brigade camp, which was at Boshop Farm, a couple of miles away. Most of the Highlanders were out on the hills on the left of the pass, and only the Seaforth Highlanders were in camp: they also left about eight o'clock as there was an action going on. It seems that the Highland Light Infantry had attacked the hills on the left of Retief's Nek theday before, while we were making our attack on the pass; but the enemy were in great force, and resisted to the utmost the advance of the regiment, who, however, succeeded in getting a footing on the end of a ridge. In the early morning the pickets pushed on and occupied a prominent knoll, from which, as soon as it was light, a further advance was made along the ridge, which eventually led on to the range of hills on the left of the pass; once this was reached, all opposition ceased, and the Boers fled.
In the afternoon we moved to a new camp at the Nek itself: there was an enormous convoy to go before us, so we did not get into camp until dark: the Highland Brigade and ourselves, not to mention the convoy, were all jumbled together in the jaws of the pass. However in the morning the Highlanders and the convoy and most of the other troops went back again, and moved round by Boshop Farm towards Naauwport Nek, whilst we were ordered to remain with a battery and some Yeomanry and guard the pass. After the usual pickets had been posted, we moved to a new camp, somewhat better sheltered from the bitter cold winds; and here we remained in peace a couple of days.
A very fine example of what our artillery can do in the way of driving was seen during our short march from Boshop Farm to Retief's Nek, the day after the battle. Two guns of Major Simpson's battery, the 81st, were with the rear guard, and had moved to the summit of a hill, which they vacated at dusk, then proceeding to camp; the guns were under a young subaltern, and took a bee line from the hill to the camp in the distance. The hill was very steep, and near the foot of the slope, which they went down with all breaks on, was an outcrop of smooth rock, about fifteen or eighteen feet wide, running round the hill like a belt, and assteep as the roof of a house. Perfectly unconcerned, the young officer rode at this slippery place, and, without an instant's hesitation, shoved his horse across it, the intelligent animal sinking on his haunches and sliding to the other end on his iron-shod hoofs.
Steadily, the drivers followed in succession, the horses repeating the example of their leader and sliding down with taut traces, the gunners clutching on to the drag ropes in rear, slipping and cursing and falling in a heap at the foot of the slope, the heavy weight of the limber driving it forward and tearing the ropes out of their hands. And so they all got down without mishap and continued on their way to camp.
The ground behind the pass was very open for a considerable distance, the hills enclosing a grassy fertile valley, with a farm at the upper end and a spruit running across to the south: the farm was deserted, although all the furniture and a good deal of wheat and oats had been left.
On the left of the pass and sheltered in several ravines, which ran deep into the hills, the horses of the Boers had been kept waiting, apparently about a day, while the owners were busy with their Mausers amongst the hills; from the marks there must have been several hundred men employed in defending Retief's Nek alone. On the second day of our halt, a lame Boer with his rifle and bandolier crept up openly to a picket at the farm and surrendered himself; it seems that he had been fighting against us on the Nek, but had slipped among the rocks when retiring and had sprained his ankle.
Orders were received to move off towards Naauwpoort Nek, so we left on the 27th of July and marched round past Boshop Farm, which was still used as a hospital (there being one or two cases which could not be moved to Bethlehem as theothers had been), and along a very bad road for some twelve miles to a place called Hebron. The Bedfords, who had been at Slabbert's Nek, followed us up the same day and told us about the fight at Slabbert's Nek, where they had had to storm the position, meeting with some opposition, but eventually carrying the hill without much loss to themselves. They had then remained to secure the pass, as we did at Retief's Nek, and had camped on a hill, making with great labour a road up the heights for the guns and the wagons. This had just been finished when orders were received to join us and proceed to Naauwpoort Nek; so the unfortunate Bedfords had to drag their wagons and guns down again late in the evening, and march most of the night, so as to arrive at Retief's Nek before we started; altogether, they had an uncomfortable time for a few days.
Continuing our march next day, we passed on the left Little Spitz Kop, which we afterwards heard had been cleared in gallant style by the Camerons who had passed that way some days previously, and were now busy watching Naauwpoort Nek. We also passed the spot where the Highland Brigade had bivouacked the day before, opposite the Nek; but our little column still pushed on, over several bad drifts, until dusk, when we camped at Groendraai, having trekked fully 15 miles.
On the road we passed a desertedwinkel, full of mealies and sheepskins, which had been broken into by some of those who had preceded us. Awinkelis a small roadside store, with a stock, mostly suitable for Kaffirs, of clothes, cheap jewellery and rubbish generally, which the owner of thewinkeldisposes of in exchange for wool, sheepskins, mealies and other things: we met the manager of this place the next day coming back to look after his property.
Next day, the 27th of July, we trekked off again, and about mid-day joined General Bruce Hamilton, with whom were the Camerons; the Highlanders had been clearing the hills with which we were surrounded, and even then we could hear firing occasionally. After a while our battalion was sent out to clear and occupy a large, flat-topped kopje, which rose straight out of an extensive valley. This kopje turned out to be unoccupied, and, leaving B company on picket there, the battalion moved on to camp.
The next day was a peaceful one; there was, however, a good deal of excitement about, which we could not fathom: several flags of truce were sent out by the General in various directions, and every one was wondering what it all meant. The battalion went out also, and C company, under Captain Wroughton, was despatched to climb to the top of, and picket, a perfectly awful hill, a long distance away, and a fearful climb.
It took them a long time even to reach the foot of the hill, and longer still to climb up the steep slope; we watched them through our glasses, tiny specks moving slowly, very slowly, up and up, and then disappearing over the sky line. As soon as they had reached the summit, A and D companies, under Major O'Grady and Lieut. Ashworth, Major Scaife being again baggage master, proceeded along the valley, protected on the right by Captain Wroughton's presence up the hill, and on the left by B company, still on picket on the kopje we had occupied the previous night. A and D moved straight out about two-and-a-half miles to their front, where there was an isolated, conical-shaped kopje with a flat, straight spur running off to its right and joining it to the hills further on. To this flat spur the two companies were directed to proceed, and to remain there until ordered to withdraw.
From their high elevation, both of our partiescould see, in the valley beyond, but at a very great distance, numbers of Boer wagons trekking in all directions, evidently in a disorganised kind of way: they were, of course, quite out of range, even of our cow gun, which had accompanied the Camerons from Bethlehem, and was now in camp.
In the afternoon, we withdrew our pickets and proceeded to camp, which we did not reach until the late afternoon, the pickets having taken a long time to withdraw. We found the camp had been moved about a mile to a new site on the far side of the drift; the wagons and the convoy had amused themselves during the day by crossing this drift, which was fairly good but terribly steep on the ascending side, necessitating double teams of oxen. Earlier in the day, before we started, we had sent our empty wagons across the drift to a place opposite our camp, and just on the other side of the spruit: we had carried our bundles of blankets and other baggage across by hand, and loaded them on the wagons, so our wretchedly weak and overworked mules had a rest that day.
The next morning, the 31st of July, we marched off again towards Golden Gate: the Mounted Infantry, who were in front, carried white flags, which were also borne by those on our flanks, and it seemed as though an armistice had been declared. However, no information was given to us, so we trekked on steadily until the afternoon, when the General, who had ridden on in front some miles, sent back word to the Colonel to say that he wanted to see Major du Moulin.
So I rode off, followed by the usual chaffing remarks about canteen jam and other things, and found the General about 4 miles ahead at Klerksvlei, with his staff and escort. There, he gave me orders to ride on to Raats' Farm, about 4 miles further on, and to receive the surrender of five commandos. This was news indeed, soaccompanied by Lieut. Bellamy, who was then assistant to the Provost Marshall, with a few of his mounted Police, an orderly with a white flag, and one or two other officers, I hurried off at once, as the sun was beginning to drop towards the horizon, and there was an immense amount of work to be done, and very little time to do it in.
The General had told me some of the particulars of the surrender, which was entirely unconditional, with the reservation, granted by General Hunter, that private property should be respected, and that each burgher should be allowed a horse to ride to his destination, wherever that might be; and he instructed me to take over the arms and ammunition at once and to remove the horses for the night.
We rode on for some three or four miles over grassy veldt, huge ranges of hills on the right and left closing in on us as we advanced further; they appeared to meet in front of us, and, in fact, did close together to within 600 or 800 yards, forming the redoubtable Golden Gate. Across the mouth of this pass ran a deep spruit with steep banks; this was Klerks Spruit, and it was crossed by a terribly steep and bad drift, almost impassable for ox wagons, and entirely so for mule wagons, which would have had to be unloaded.
After almost meeting, the ranges of hills bore away again from each other, enclosing broken and hilly ground, which formed the outskirts of the mountains shutting in the famous Caledon Valley, at the northern entrance to which we now found ourselves; just beyond the drift was a farm, a substantial, well-to-do farm of considerable area, with a large orchard and several outhouses. This was Klerksvlei, owned by Mr. Solomon Raats, and it was around this farm in all directions, as far as one could see in the fast fading light, that the Boers were encamped: the whole neighbourhoodwas covered with men, horses, wagons and bullocks.
It was with a distinctly weird feeling that I rode into the heart of the enemy's laager and drew up on a slight rise of ground, just outside the farm: a small party of Mounted Infantry had followed us, and these now closed up behind and dismounted.
I sent for the five commandants, who soon appeared, each surrounded by a small crowd of retainers; and to them I gave instructions that each commando was to be formed up immediately, in order that the arms and bandoliers might be collected and that the horses might be counted.
There were several officers present, who had accompanied me, either on duty or as spectators with the General's permission, so that I was enabled to provide an officer to attend to the surrender of the arms and other matters of each commando. This was a business which took some considerable time, as each commando mustered about 300 to 350 men, and the rifles and bandoliers had to be brought up one by one and stacked in wagons. After all had been given in, the horses and ponies, a wretched lot of crocks, were handed over to men of the Mounted Infantry and led to the other side of the drift, where Major Lean's corps of Mount Infantry, the well-known 5th M.I., took over charge and formed a cordon round them.
Nearly the whole of the rifles with which the Boers were armed were Mausers: there was an occasional Lee-Metford, captured from our troops in Natal, usually, and perhaps a Martini or two. The ammunition was carried in bandoliers of every imaginable shape and pattern, mostly home made; but some of the burghers preferred cartridge bags of leather or canvas. Many revolvers had been surrendered, but these were mostly weapons taken from prisoners, such as R.A. drivers or A.S.C. men, and were as a rule out of order.
It was considerably after dark that evening before the horses had been got away, and there remained several wagons piled up with rifles; there were bullocks in plenty, so these wagons were soon on the move across the drift and into the Mounted Infantry camp under a guard. The commandants informed us that there were many Boers out in the hills to whom information had been sent of the surrender, and who would come in the following morning and give up their rifles. Meantime, there was nothing further to be done that night, so a guard was mounted on the farm, where Lieut. Bellamy and myself were remaining; and the other officers and the Mounted Infantry went back to camp, taking to the General a brief report from me of what had been done.
Old Mr. Raats was very civil, providing a room and preparing supper for us and looking after our horses; there were quite a number of Boers staying at the farm also, among them being six or seven of the biggest men that I had ever seen; they were very tall, enormously broad shouldered and stout in proportion, and quite filled the dining room at the farm when they all came in at once.
The Boer laager was not all composed of fighting men by any means; there were large numbers of non-combatants—women, children and Kaffirs, hangers-on who attended to the feeding of the commandos or drove sheep and cattle, and other nondescripts who did not belong to any commando, but who accompanied the Boers, all the same. Then there were a number of what they called "trek Boers;" these were Boers with their families, cattle, wagons, horses and all their belongings, who had quitted their farms and were moving or trekking with the commandos; these men had some splendid wagons and teams of magnificent oxen with them.
There were many Boers who spoke perfectEnglish, and among them in particular two wearing the Red Cross badge; these two stated that they belonged to the Identity Department of the Red Cross Society, and produced papers in proof of this. One of them, Mr. Nelson, informed me that their duties were to remain with the commando to which they were attached, and to keep a list of any men killed or wounded, forwarding a copy to Pretoria when an occasion offered.
This system appears to have been the only means by which any record was kept of the casualties among the Boers, but the killed and wounded were so few that no doubt it worked well enough.
There was a parson, or predikant, also accompanying the commandos. He was, of course, not a fighting man, but was very loyal to his own folk, and, when we asked him what he would have done if any fighting had taken place, he replied that under ordinary circumstances he helped to look after the commissariat arrangements, but that if we had attacked the camp he would have taken a rifle at once and assisted as well as he could to defend his country. We assured him that his sentiments did him credit.
For several hours that night the Boers collected in groups round their camp fires, singing hymns, and it was late before everything was quiet, and we were able to sleep. Mr. Raats had provided us with the guest chamber of his house, and this room was fully furnished in the most elaborate style, including even a bath. Our first step had been to throw up the narrow window and ventilate the room as much as possible; we should have preferred to sleep in the open, but as we had no kit except what we stood up in, this was not advisable.
Soon after daybreak the next morning the collecting of rifles was proceeded with: numbers of Boers came crowding in from the hills around,eager to surrender their arms and ammunition, and in a few hours we had accumulated a large heap on the ground. The ammunition we filled into bags and loaded on wagons, but the rifles were placed in a great pile and burned, as we had no means of carrying such a large number: they were rendered quite useless, as the barrels were made soft by the heat, and all the foresights, backsights and other attachments were melted off.
The Boers told us that they had left nine or ten wagons, mostly loaded with rifle ammunition, on the road about 3 miles off; the bullocks had been taken away by the Harrismith commando, and the wagons were left there with a few Boers in charge; they also said the road was terrible, and that it would take a long time to bring in the wagons, even if bullocks were sent out for this purpose.
A report to this effect being made to the General, the Engineer officer, Lieut. Evans, was sent out to destroy the wagons. This was done during the day by blowing them up; unfortunately, owing to some Kaffir putting a bag of powder in close proximity to the fuse, a premature explosion took place, and the old sergeant of the R.E. section, Sergeant Munn, was somewhat seriously injured, while Lieut. Evans himself was cut about a good deal.
During the morning the officers whom the General had detailed to assist me reported their arrival: they were, Captain Wroughton of our battalion; and Captain Tufnell, Lieut. Lambton and Lieut. Key, all from the Mounted Infantry; these, with Lieut. Bellamy, gave us one British officer to each of the five commandos: but, as Lieut. Bellamy had to return to his proper duty as assistant Provost Marshal, Lieut. Bond was applied for in relief of him.
As soon as the officers arrived we were able to get the Boers into some sort of organization. Eachcommando had its Boer commandant, who had under him his adjutant and secretary, both of whom usually spoke English; and the remainder of the Boers were distributed under the orders of a certain number of Field Cornets, corresponding to our section commanders, who knew all about the men, and had rolls of them and other information.
The commandants themselves knew nothing about their men, their names or other details, but left all that to the Field Cornets.
The five officers were posted to the commandos as follows:—
Having thus a certain nucleus of organization to go upon, the officers went off, each to his own commando, to make themselves acquainted with their commandants and to ascertain the quantity of rations available, besides obtaining other information, such as the numbers of men, horses, wagons, Cape carts and bullocks, in each commando.
Of these commandos, that of Potgieter was the most important and the strongest in numbers, and the best looked after by the commandant and his Field Cornets; nearly all the burghers came from the Smithfield District, while those in the other commandos came from the districts of Bethulie, Thaba N'Chu and Winburg.
Jonker was not really a commandant, but, being the oldest Field Cornet, he was selected by us to organise and look after the burghers of the Harrismith commando, composed of those who hadelected to surrender instead of going off with Olivier.
Commandant Du Plooy was the most respectable and reliable, as far as one could observe in the fortnight the Boers were under our charge; but all the commandants were men of standing and position, accustomed to be treated, as could be seen, with a good deal of deference by the burghers; they appeared to be all honourable men, and were most courteous in their address and manner of speaking on all occasions.
Commandant Joubert was a truculent old gentleman, who apparently failed to thoroughly grasp his position, and, while not exactly objecting to any orders which were given him, he showed his disapproval in other ways, and usually had a good deal to say on any matter that came forward.
General Bruce Hamilton rode over that morning and had an interview with the five commandants, and ascertained that they thoroughly understood the conditions upon which their surrender was accepted; these were, that each burgher was to be allowed a horse to ride to his destination, and that all private property was to be respected. The Boers had a great fear of being compelled to walk, and would have done anything sooner than go on foot, a thing to which they have never been accustomed. They were amazed at our infantry marching as they did every mile of the road, and frankly admitted that the Boers could have done nothing of the sort.
Lieut. Bellamy was busy all that day enquiring into the cases of the trek Boers and such other non-combatants as were willing to take the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty, or of neutrality, and to go quietly back to their farms: to these passes were issued and the people allowed to go off at once. This reduced the crowd of wagons veryconsiderably, as nearly all of these burghers had one, if not more, wagons, and usually one or two vans or covered carts in which the womenfolk travelled, if they were well-to-do people.
Several of them had droves of cattle and flocks of sheep also. The remainder of the wagons, which were almost entirely those that had been captured from our convoys on different occasions, were loaded with the burghers' kits and with their rations of meal and some coffee. They said they had been out of tea and sugar for a long time, that the coffee was merely roasted beans and mealies, and that tobacco was almost unknown. However they had plenty of cattle, which largely made up for the absence of other food; as the Boer is a great meat eater, and, unlike other civilised people, can exist on meat alone for a considerable period.
There was one field gun amongst the wagons: this had belonged to U Battery, R.H.A., and had been captured by the Boers at Sanna's Post; several artillery ammunition wagons were also found, which, with some of the wagons which were loaded with gun and rifle ammunition, were all sent away to the General's camp.
The hills and ravines around Raats' farm were full of cattle and mules grazing, so we sent a number of the Boers to bring them in and to inspan them into the wagons and Cape carts, as it was now necessary to shift our camp to a better site where the commandos could be separated somewhat. There was plenty of space about a couple of miles outside the Golden Gate, and in the afternoon each officer moved his commando and encamped it in a new spot.
Here the wagons, carts and horses were drawn up with some regularity, and the officers were enabled to check the numbers previously given in by the commandants, which were found to be substantially correct in every case.
Another important matter was the equalising of such rations as were in the possession of the Boers: stock was therefore taken by each officer, and Captain Wroughton arranged about the sharing of what flour and other stuff there was, and saw that the fat oxen were collected and put into a drove in charge of some of the burghers, until they were required for slaughtering.
During this day the battalion had been moved to the same spot upon which the laager was encamped: several pickets were furnished round the prisoners, and sentries placed on the roads leading in and out of the pass.
All the burghers paraded with their horses the next morning, so that those which were fit for use by the mounted troops might be taken, and others given in their place. An Artillery officer came down to select these horses, and from the way he went about the business, carefully examining each animal all round and passing his critical hand over fetlocks and back sinews, it was plain that he did not realise that he had about 1,200 horses to look through that morning. However, our time was precious, and we had plenty to do without meddling in other people's affairs, so the Artillery major was left to run his own show; it came to a climax a few hours afterwards, as we received orders to move before he had selected more than a few horses.
From that time on we were beset with people who either wanted another horse, or thought they saw their way to getting a better one. None of us had any peace; there was always someone who wished to exchange his horse for a better one, and on going down to the lines we were pretty certain to see several strangers "looking round," as they called it—but we soon knew what that meant. The Boer laager seemed to be considered a fair field for anyone to exploit, one officer going so faras to send his men down to take some of the Boers' blankets away from them!