The Project Gutenberg eBook ofVerdun, Argonne-Metz, 1914-1918

The Project Gutenberg eBook ofVerdun, Argonne-Metz, 1914-1918This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online atwww.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.Title: Verdun, Argonne-Metz, 1914-1918Publisher: Pneu MichelinRelease date: February 7, 2015 [eBook #48185]Most recently updated: October 24, 2024Language: EnglishCredits: E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Christine P. Travers, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net)*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK VERDUN, ARGONNE-METZ, 1914-1918 ***

This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online atwww.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Verdun, Argonne-Metz, 1914-1918Publisher: Pneu MichelinRelease date: February 7, 2015 [eBook #48185]Most recently updated: October 24, 2024Language: EnglishCredits: E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Christine P. Travers, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net)

Title: Verdun, Argonne-Metz, 1914-1918

Publisher: Pneu Michelin

Release date: February 7, 2015 [eBook #48185]Most recently updated: October 24, 2024

Language: English

Credits: E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Christine P. Travers, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK VERDUN, ARGONNE-METZ, 1914-1918 ***

The Project Gutenberg eBook, Verdun Argonne-Metz 1914-1918, by Anonymous

MICHELIN'S ILLUSTRATED GUIDESTO THE BATTLE-FIELDS (1914-1918)

VERDUNArgonne-Metz1914-1918

MICHELIN & Cie—CLERMONT-FERRANDMICHELIN TYRE CoLtd—LONDONMICHELIN TIRE Co—MILLTOWN, N.J., U.S.A.

Diploma byGeorges SCOTT,given to Subscribers, by the Committee of theMemorial Fund of the Mortuary of Douaumont.

MEMORIAL FUNDTO THEDEFENDERS OF VERDUNMORTUARY OF DOUAUMONT(A War Fund authorised by Ministerial decree dated 3/12/19)On the battlefield of Verdun, millions of men engaged in a battle of giants; 400,000 French soldiers fell there on a front of 20 kilometres.A fund has been established with the object of erecting a Mortuary in the centre of the battlefield, at a point whence the whole field may be viewed.The site chosen is situated between the Fort of Douaumont and the Thiaumont redoubt (Seepages 96-99of this Guide).The Patrons are MarshalFoch, M. RaymondPoincaré, and His Excellency, the cardinalDubois.The executive Committee, under the honorary presidency of MarshalPétain, is presided over by S. G. MgrGinisty, Bishop of Verdun, GeneralBoichut, commanding the 12th Infantry Division, the Commandant of Verdun, GeneralValantin, formerly commanding the town and forts of Verdun and the Hauts-de-Meuse.The names of all subscribers will be registered in a golden Book to be kept in the basilica. At the top of the list will be the names of the Founder members who have subscribed 500 francs or more. On the inside walls of the monument will be carved inscriptions which families may wish to place in memory of their dead.An artistic diploma by GeorgesScottis sent to every subscriber of 20 francs, on which there is a reproduction of MarshalPétain'sautograph and an acknowledgement of the subscriber's interest in the memorial (Photo. herewith).Subscriptions may be sent: to Verdun, to S. G. MgrGinisty, Bishop of Verdun, and to MeSchleiter, solicitor; to Paris, to Princess Henride Polignac, 26, avenue Montaigne.

MEMORIAL FUNDTO THEDEFENDERS OF VERDUN

MORTUARY OF DOUAUMONT

(A War Fund authorised by Ministerial decree dated 3/12/19)

On the battlefield of Verdun, millions of men engaged in a battle of giants; 400,000 French soldiers fell there on a front of 20 kilometres.

A fund has been established with the object of erecting a Mortuary in the centre of the battlefield, at a point whence the whole field may be viewed.

The site chosen is situated between the Fort of Douaumont and the Thiaumont redoubt (Seepages 96-99of this Guide).

The Patrons are MarshalFoch, M. RaymondPoincaré, and His Excellency, the cardinalDubois.

The executive Committee, under the honorary presidency of MarshalPétain, is presided over by S. G. MgrGinisty, Bishop of Verdun, GeneralBoichut, commanding the 12th Infantry Division, the Commandant of Verdun, GeneralValantin, formerly commanding the town and forts of Verdun and the Hauts-de-Meuse.

The names of all subscribers will be registered in a golden Book to be kept in the basilica. At the top of the list will be the names of the Founder members who have subscribed 500 francs or more. On the inside walls of the monument will be carved inscriptions which families may wish to place in memory of their dead.

An artistic diploma by GeorgesScottis sent to every subscriber of 20 francs, on which there is a reproduction of MarshalPétain'sautograph and an acknowledgement of the subscriber's interest in the memorial (Photo. herewith).

Subscriptions may be sent: to Verdun, to S. G. MgrGinisty, Bishop of Verdun, and to MeSchleiter, solicitor; to Paris, to Princess Henride Polignac, 26, avenue Montaigne.

Advertisement for the Guide Michelin2 inseparablesTheMichelinRoad Mapand Guide.The Guide, for the town.The Map, for the country.They complete one another, without overlapping.Use them together.

Advertisement for the Guide Michelin2 inseparables

2 inseparables

TheMichelinRoad Mapand Guide.

They complete one another, without overlapping.

Use them together.

IN MEMORYOF THE MICHELIN EMPLOYEESAND WORKMEN WHO DIED GLORIOUSLYFOR THEIR COUNTRY

All rights of translation, adaptation or reproduction (in part or whole) reserved in all countries.

View of Verdun from the air.

Verdun, one of France's most ancient cities, was first a Gallic, then under the name ofVirodunum Castrum, a Roman fortress. In 843 the celebrated treaty which divided the Carolingian Empire and annexed Verdun to the Kingdom of Lorraine was signed there. From 870 to 879 Verdun became part of France, but in 923 it was incorporated in the German Empire. As a county, it was governed under the feudal system by the hereditary counts, the last of whom was Godefroy de Bouillon, and later by the episcopal counts and bishops.

In the 10th century, Bishop Haimont, of Verdun, persuaded the Count of Verdun to transfer his rights to him. The arrangement was confirmed by Emperor Othon III, but the count's heirs disputed the bishops' title to the town. Later, the burgesses revolted against the authority of the bishops, and after a sanguinary struggle succeeded in throwing off their yoke about the middle of the 13th century. After a long occupation by the Germans, Henri II, King of France, retook Verdun in 1552 and granted it privileges which were confirmed by François II in 1559. During the Religious Wars, the town was for the Leaguers, and only agreed to receive Henry IV's envoy, after that prince's conversion to the Roman Faith. The burgesses did not take the oath of allegiance to the King of France until 1601.

Both in respect of its geographical position and history, Verdun is a typical fortified town. From time immemorial it has played an important part in resisting invasion, as witness its fortified camp and citadel. Since 1870 it has been the centre of a stronghold formed by a rough semi-circle of hills and slopes bristling with defensive works and batteries.

Since the year 450, when Attila left it "like a field ravaged by wild beasts", it has been besieged at least ten times.

Charles the Fifth besieged and took it in 1544, but after a seven years occupation it was retaken by Henry II of France in 1552. The Huguenots tried to take it by surprise in 1589, but were unable to overcome the resistance of the citizens.

Siege of 1792.—In 1792, the Prussians attacked and bombarded the town, defended by Beaurepaire with only thirty-two guns and forty-four artillerymen. The Council of Defence, urged thereto by the Anti-Republican section of the population, decided to capitulate, in spite of opposition on the part of Beaurepaire, who died soon afterwards at the Town Hall by his own hand, according to some, others holding that he was assassinated. The Prussians occupied the town for six weeks, after the garrison had left. Although it is true that a few women went to the Camp of Bras with an offering of sweetmeats for the King of Prussia, it has not been established that the latter gave a ball at Regret, at which the women of Verdun danced. The victory of Valmy forced the Prussians to leave Verdun. On October 13th, Kellermann took possession of the Citadel, and on the 14th the troops of the Republic entered the town. Several of the visitors to the Camp of Bras expiated their regrettable act on the scaffold.

Siege of 1870.—In 1870, Verdun offered a more stubborn resistance. When the Saxon troops, about 10,000 in number, appeared to the east of the town, the garrison of the latter comprised only 1,500 regular troops, including fifty artillerymen, 2,000 untrained men and 1,400 men of the National Sedentary Guard, while its armament consisted of twenty mortars, twenty-one howitzers and ninety-six guns, of which the barrels of only forty-six were rifled. Under the command of General Guérin de Waldersbach, seconded by General Marmier, this small garrison repulsed a violent attack on August 24th, and refused to surrender. After being reinforced by 2,600 men who had escaped from Sedan, several sallies were made. By September 23rd the enemy had completely encircled the town, and were forcing the inhabitants of the surrounding villages to help with the siege-works. On the night of October 19th, thirty sappers, twenty-five artillerymen and 100 foot soldiers surprised the two German batteries on Heyvaux Hill, between Thierville and Regret, on the left bank, and after hand-to-hand fighting, spiked all the guns.

After the fall of Metz, Verdun, besieged by 15,000 men with 140 heavy guns, in addition to field artillery, surrendered on November 8th with the honours of war.

The town had been bombarded three times. On August 24th it received about 2,000 shells; on September 26th the Citadel received 1,000 to 1,200 shells in five hours; on October 13th, 14th and 15th 20,000 to 25,000 shells fell in the town, severely damaging the upper part and the Citadel.

The name of the German Prefect who governed Verdun and the Meuse province was Von Bethmann Hollweg.

September 9th 1914.—The Battle of the Marne.After the attack of the German right wing by Maunoury's army, the English army and Franchet d'Esperey's army threatened to break the communication between the first and second German armies and cause their hasty retreat which was reflected gradually all along the front.

September 9th 1914.—The Battle of the Marne.

After the attack of the German right wing by Maunoury's army, the English army and Franchet d'Esperey's army threatened to break the communication between the first and second German armies and cause their hasty retreat which was reflected gradually all along the front.

After the French manœuvre at the frontiers was checked and with the threat of a German envelopment in the West, General Joffre steadfastly withdrew from the battle and ordered a general retreat until the moment when the French troops were reunited. As soon as a favourable moment offered, it would be possible to take up a position and then to drive back the enemy.

The plan was as follows: to carry out on the left a mass movement (6th Army under Maunoury) to outflank, at the propitious moment, the German right, while a general attack or at any rate a desperate resistance should take place on all the rest of the front, from Paris to the Vosges.

The enemy's objective was first of all to wipe out the allied forces, the right having instructions to pursue the French left and the English army, before turning upon Paris which was to be seized like a plum ready to be picked! In the centre, the Crown Prince was in command of the pursuit: he saw his fourth cavalry corps pushing out their scouts towards the line, Dijon-Besançon-Belfort.

Here were dreams of triumph destined to give place to surprise, then doubt and finally the bitterness of defeat.

On September 5th, Gallieni reported the Germans creeping towards the South-East. The moment for the French manœuvre had arrived and Joffre launched the general offensive.

On September 6th-7th, the Sixth Army attacked the German right wing. To guard himself against this flank menace, Von Kluck brought up three army corps in succession from his frontal attack.

September 7th-8th. This diminution of strength allowed the English Army and the second French Army under Franchet d'Esperey to advance.

September 9th-10th. The Second Army threatened to cut off the contact between the First and Second German Armies and to take them in rear. Under this threat they determined upon a hasty retreat the effect of which made itself gradually felt along the whole of the German front (September 10th-13th).

After the battle of the Frontiers, the Third Army likewise beat a retreat. Having reached the left bank of the Meuse, the army pivoted on its right which rested on the fortress of Verdun, stopping frequently to delay the pursuit of the Crown Prince's army.

September 6th, 7th and 8th.While the Duke of Wurtemburg pressed heavily upon the right of the Fourth Army (under Langle de Cary), the Crown Prince vigorously set upon the left of Sarrail in an attempt to break completely through the pivot by Trouée de Revigny, valleys of Ornain and Saulx. He hoped to cut off Sarrail who, when attacked at the same time in rear on the Heights of the Meuse, would find himself surrounded and forced to surrender. But these ambitious plans were thwarted by the vigorous action of the left of the Fifth Corps and the Fifteenth which was withdrawn en masse from the Army of Lorraine (under Castelnau).

The Battle of the Marne.—The Third Army in front of Verdun.

September 9th.On its left the Third Army continued to engage the Germans on the flank, while the right wing, though vigorously holdingits ground before frontal attacks, remained in a precarious position owing to the standing menace of the German forces in rear on the Hauts-de-Meuse. Sarrail received permission from the General-in-Chief to withdraw his right, if need be, and to leave the permanent garrison of Verdun to secure the defence of the Fortress. But the General of the Third Army held fast with heroic determination and would not give up his entrenched position as long as the Meuse was not liberated and while a ray of hope appeared.

September 10th.The forts of Troyon and Genicourt, on the Hauts-de-Meuse, continued to hold out against heavy artillery bombardment. The barrier of the Meuse was not cleared but, to guard against any eventuality, Sarrail transferred two divisions to the West of Saint-Mihiel.

September 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th.Coming from the German right, the advancing wave gradually overtook the armies of the Prince of Wurtemburg and the Crown Prince. The two latter, mad with rage, were forced to withdraw their forces in echelon, while Sarrail's army pivoting round Verdun harassed the enemy as far as Argonne. Thus the battle of the Marne was won by the same troops who had just undergone the repulse of the battle of the Frontiers and, when overwrought with fatigue, had successfully accomplished a retreat unprecedented in history. The undaunted spirit of Commander-in-Chief Joffre, the well-defined and masterful strategy which he planned and carried out in strict collaboration with his highly courageous army commanders, above all the superhuman bravery of the rank and file, to these factors is due what to-day we call "The Miracle of the Marne".

"The fate of the War was settled at its commencement, in 1914, on the Marne, where the French General indeed saved France against the fierce onslaught of a whole nation."

So wrote theBerliner Tageblattafter the War.

AFTER THE MARNE, THE BATTLE FOR VERDUN

October 1914-August 1915.—The enemy strove to cut off Verdun. On the East, the Salient of Saint-Mihiel. On the West, the battle of Argonne.

February 1916-August 1916.—In a terrific and desperate encounter the enemy threw themselves at Verdun. They were hurled back by a magnificent defence.October 1916-August 1917.—Three French attacks drove the enemy back to their original attacking positions.

February 1916-August 1916.—In a terrific and desperate encounter the enemy threw themselves at Verdun. They were hurled back by a magnificent defence.

October 1916-August 1917.—Three French attacks drove the enemy back to their original attacking positions.

September-November 1918.The Salient of Saint-Mihiel was straightened during the great final offensive when Verdun was completely liberated by the French-American forces.

The line in front of Verdun, as it was in February 1916.

After the battle of the Marne, the Crown Prince established his lines of resistance north of the fortress, on the line Avocourt-Melancourt-Brabant-Ornes.

The formation of the Saint-Mihiel Salient (September 1914).

On September 20th, the third Bavarian Corps attacked the 75th reserve division, advanced rapidly on the 22nd as far as the line Combres-Vigneulles-Thiaucourtand bombarded the forts of the Hauts-de-Meuse. This line was defended by mobile troops outnumbered by two to one.

On the 25th, the Germans succeeded in getting a footing on the Hauts-de-Meuse in the region of Vigneulles. From there they pushed on to Saint-Mihiel and entered the town, without however being able to cross the Meuse. But on the following day, the river which was only defended at this point by a battalion of territorials was cleared, and the Germans started to climb again towards the valley of Aire, in the direction of Verdun. At this dangerous moment, the sixteenth corps which had left Nancy met the German forces, harassing them and forcing them to fall back on the suburbs of Saint-Mihiel. It did not, however, succeed in forcing them to withdraw on the right bank of the Meuse. On September 29th the line ran through Combres, Chauvoncourt, Apremont, Flirey, Le Bois le Prêtre.

The salient was made.

The enemy were attacked without cessation during the months of October, November and December. Towards Saint-Mihiel the enemy held their position on the left bank of the stream.

The crest of Les Éparges, after being held firmly by the enemy from September 1914, was strongly attacked on April 6th by the twelfth Infantry Division who struggled obstinately for over a month before they wrested from the Germans the observation posts which from this crest, gave near views towards the North. This brilliant action was followed by counter-attacks by the Fifth German Corps, which were particularly violent during the day-time of April 24th and May 5th. Starting from this moment, the struggle assumed a less stubborn character, but none the less keen and murderous. (Seepage 129.)

The extremity of the Saint-Mihiel Salient seen from the Fort des Paroches.

The village of Forges in 1915.A footbridge of wagons crossing the stream of Forges.

The village of Forges in 1915.

A footbridge of wagons crossing the stream of Forges.

Les Éparges in 1915.During a period of quiet, a plant for making rings has been installed at the entrance of a dug-out.

Les Éparges in 1915.

During a period of quiet, a plant for making rings has been installed at the entrance of a dug-out.

In April 1915, a 75 gun firing on the crest of Les Éparges.

Machine gun in position in a front line trench. Sector of Les Éparges, February 1915.

A ravine in the luxuriant forest of Argonne.In the middle a company in Indian file is going up to the line.

A ravine in the luxuriant forest of Argonne.

In the middle a company in Indian file is going up to the line.

The stationary warfare assumed a special character in the Argonne. Lanes and footpaths formed the only breaks in the impenetrable thickets. There were no gentle slopes, no convenient firing positions for the infantry, no observation posts for the artillery—everything was concealed by the thick foliage.

Springs rose everywhere and rivulets ran over the clayey soil. Mud made the paths impassable, and filled up the trenches as soon as they were made. French and German trenches intersected. Firing was continuous, snipers perched here and there in trees taking careful aim, while at night rifle and machine gun fire at random continued uninterruptedly, sweeping the forest in order to prevent surprise and to make movement dangerous. But the rifle was merely an auxiliary weapon, as each army rained showers of grenades and bombs upon the other all day long.

Apart from actual battles, there were hundreds of casualties, killed and wounded, every day. In the attack or defence of a trench, the fighting immediately became a hand-to-hand struggle, with knives and revolvers.Underground there was a continuous digging of saps and mines; it was a contest of speed and skill between the opposing sappers. It was a case of blowing up the enemy first or being blown up by him. Over the wrecked trenches, destroyed by mines, through smoke and under a rain of earth thrown up by the explosions, the soldiers dashed forward to occupy the crater or to fight for it if the enemy had reached it first.

A fight with bombs.French foot-soldiers throwing back at the enemy bombs which they have captured from them.

A fight with bombs.

French foot-soldiers throwing back at the enemy bombs which they have captured from them.

During the first three months of 1915, between Four-de-Paris and the valley of the Aire, the French sappers excavated over 3,000 metres of mine galleries and fired 52 mine chambers, using nearly 16,000 lbs of explosives.

Later on, the mine warfare developed considerably in other directions, and mine-chambers charged with more than 130,000 lbs of explosives were fired.

The enemy wanted to reach the valley of the Biesme across the wood of Grurie and Bolante.

In October, advancing to the sap, the Germans of von Mudra's armycorps took Bagatelle and Saint-Hubert. At the end of November the Four-de-Paris—Varennes road was abandoned by the French.

The German pushes towards Four-de-Paris (October 1914-May 1915).

At the end of December, the Second French Corps cleared Four-de-Paris.

In January, the Garibaldians (Italian volunteers) attacked in the direction of Bolante.

On January 8th, the Germans hurled themselves upon the outskirts of Bolante. For three whole days the foot soldiers of the 31st, 46th, 76th and 89th regiments as well as the Garibaldians were at close grips with the Silesian and Hessian chasseurs, fierce struggles taking place.

In spite of all their furious attacks, the enemy could not get to the Biesme, but they succeeded in driving a deep and narrow wedge in the French lines in the direction of Four-de-Paris.

While these obstinate encounters were going on in the forest of Argonne, the 9th and 10th French Divisions (5th Corps) attacked in the valley of the Aire and set out to storm Vauquois, a village perched on a mound commanding all the valley, which the enemy had constituted a defensive centre and a first class observation post.

From December to February, on ground that was transformed into a sea of mud, attacks on Boureuilles carried the French lines to 250 metres from the village.

From October 28th 1914 to March 1st 1915, four attacks were launched against Vauquois, the summit of which was reached by the French troops of the 10th Division. The struggle extended around the mine craters until 1916. (Seepage 144.)

In June and July 1915, the German commander gave up local attacks and had recourse to massed attacks of men and material on fronts of 3 to 4 kilometres.

The first attack (on June 20th) was on the North side and then (July 2nd) on the East side of the salient of Fontaine-Madame.

On June 20thin the morning, after a violent bombardment of gas shells, two Prussian and Wurtemburg divisions attacked in the wood of Grurie. The foot-soldiers of the 32nd Corps, though gassed and almost buried in their trenches, put up a fierce resistance. Their positions were subjected to a veritable siege. The enemy, however, captured Fontaine-aux-Charmes.

The big German Attacks (May-July 1915).

Up to June 28th, French counter-attacks succeeded in recapturing part of the lost ground.

On June 30th, the Germans extended their attack up to the north of Four-de-Paris. The enemy advanced to within 8 kilometres of their objective, the railway station of Les Islettes. The fire of the 75's, however, barred the road and the French reserves counter-attacked.

On July 2nd, there was an artillery bombardment of even greater violence.

The famous 42nd Division of Fère-Champenoise and the Yser withstood the attack with a heroism that won admiration even from the enemy.

The Germans could not capture the valley of the Biesme, in spite of their terrific efforts and heavy sacrifices.

In July 1915, the French front in the sectors of Bolante and Fille-Morte, followed the ridge which dominates the ravine of the Meurrissons, and passed over perpendicularly the Haute-Chevauchée road, comprising the dominating hills 285 and further to the East 263.

From this line which was provided with good observation posts, a French attack could take in rear the German lines that were established in front of Four-de-Paris.

The French Attacks in the valley of the Aire (October 1914-April 1915).

This attack after being fixed for July 11th was postponed to July 14th.The enemy, however, forestalled it by himself attacking onJuly 13th.

Sappers excavating a mine gallery.

After a bombardment of exceptional ferocity (nearly 50,000 shells) and the blowing up of several mines, 5 regiments of the Metz army attacked. They came out from saps which had been run up to within a short distance of shell-shattered French trenches.

The enemy crept in by small columns and surrounded the front lines. Under an avalanche of heavy shells, which annihilated a large number of men in their dug-outs, the French gave ground, to avoid being overwhelmed or outflanked. The enemy patrols then crossed the second French line.

The reserves of the 5th Corps, 131st, 82nd, 89th Infantry Regiments and the 66th battalion of chasseurs were brought up along ravines infested with gas, to the counter-attack. Without artillery preparation, they deployed under heavy rifle fire and then proceeded to clear the forest at the point of the bayonet and retook part of the first position.

In October the Argonne front suddenly became as calm as it had previously been active. The Germans were content with a defensive policy. The struggle for the saps was renewed, trenches were blown up by mines and the mine craters were disputed by short bombing engagements.

In 1916, during the battle of Verdun, the Argonne was especially the scene of artillery duels and of mine warfare on the plateau of Bolante, at Hill 285 and at Vauquois.

The Mound of Vauquois hollowed out by mine craters.(View from the air, May 1917).E.Site of the church.—L. F.French lines.—L. A.German lines.The German mine opposite the church had been charged with 60 tons of explosives. Notice on the German side, the entrances to the galleries excavated under the mound.

The Mound of Vauquois hollowed out by mine craters.

(View from the air, May 1917).

E.Site of the church.—L. F.French lines.—L. A.German lines.

The German mine opposite the church had been charged with 60 tons of explosives. Notice on the German side, the entrances to the galleries excavated under the mound.

The fortress of Verdun, the basin of Briey, the fortress of Metz.

During 1915, Germany was particularly on the defensive, in Artois (May-June) and in Champagne (September-October). Her successes in Serbia and Russia had not brought the final victory which could only be won on the Western front.

Germany feared an allied offensive and was anxious over the continual increase of their forces in men and material. To forestall this offensive would cause it to miscarry and keep the initiative in her own hands.

The Germans wanted too, to make an impression on the world at large which began to have doubts about her ultimate victory. Finally they were influenced by political considerations at home. The rationing of the population had lowered the general morale, and the prestige of the Crown Prince had slumped heavily on account of his failure in Argonne. A grand victory was necessary to strengthen the German morale, to appease dissension and to rehabilitate the prestige of the Imperial family. The German High Command chose Verdun. Was this choice of ground as paradoxical as it has been said?

"Verdun in all the war is the hinge of the door which swings open sometimes on France, sometimes on Germany". (L. Gillet.)

The only communication between Verdun and the rear was by the Meusian railway and the "Sacred Way". The Verdun-Commercy railway was cut by the Saint-Mihiel salient and the Verdun-Sainte-Menehould railway would be cut by shell fire at the very outset of the battle.

To capture Verdun was to threaten the whole French right wing, to gain an important stake, a stronghold fronting the rich basin of Briey, and to get the benefit of a great moral effect.

The Verdun salient lent itself to converging enemy attacks and concentrated fire. On the right bank the defenders of Verdun would be fighting with their backs to the Meuse. The neighbourhood of Verdun with its valleys and woods, facilitated the moving of troops and the concentration of artillery screened from view.

The enemy too had fourteen railways at his disposal and Metz close at hand from which to bring up troops and supplies.

On the French side, there was only one broad gauge railway connecting Verdun, via Saint-Menehould, with the rest of France. This railway, too, was always liable to be cut off by shell-fire. (See illustration opposite).

The table-lands of Verdun where the battle was to be fought are the last of the series of heights which form the top of the basin in which Paris lies. The Meuse which often overflows in winter divides them from North to South.

The terrace of the table-lands of the right bank, for some ten kilometres in width, separates the valley of the Meuse from the marshy plain of the Woëvre.

Numerous streams flow at a depth of more than a hundred metres for a very short distance, thus hollowing out deep ravines which give to the hills of the Meuse a contour "jagged, cut in festoons, as though it was hand-modelled in a clay substance". The summit line, where not indented, contains the highest points (388 m.), keys to the battle field.

"All this country with its partitions and compartments seemed built like a natural fortress. The sheltered ways and ravines provided covered approaches and first-rate artillery positions. Every wood and copse could be converted into a redoubt.

"If the branching off of the valleys and their innumerable ramifications added to the dangers of movement or manœuvre or facilitated surprise attacks, the ridges, on the other hand, made marvellous observation posts. On all sides were the very slopes, banks and flank protection which engineers could desire." (L. Gillet:La Bataille de Verdun).

Following the lesson of the offensives in Artois (May 1915) and Champagne (September 1915), the German commander intended to put into practice the French offensive methods but to add, by means of artillery fire, an unparalleled ferocity. To concentrate masses of artillery, to cut by shell fire the only broad-gauge railway that connected Verdun with France (see plan p. 18), to flatten out the French defences, to isolate the occupants by barrages of heavy shells, then to rush headlong on the town and crush the last resistance, at the same time sending forward overwhelming masses of troops, without regard to losses: such was the plan which the Germans carried out on February 21st, 1916.

Troops in position on February 21st, 1916.The enemy concentration round the fortress of Verdun.

Troops in position on February 21st, 1916.

The enemy concentration round the fortress of Verdun.

The battered fort of Douaumont (August 1916).

The battle of Verdun was a battle of annihilation, mutual annihilation. The method was to concentrate the fire of all the guns, not over a line but on a zone, and not only on the position to be captured but also as far as possible in rear on everything that could support the position. The simile that best expresses it is no longer that of a battering ram striking against a wall, but that of a rammer falling perpendicularly and hammering an encircled zone. The encircled zone was the part where the old territorials who were screening from observation a road behind the lines, ran almost as great a danger as men in other battles did in an attacking wave. Here, while the shells continued to fall, no fatigue party of men or munitions could go three hundred metres without being wiped out entirely. Here the wounded in deep-dug aid-posts went mad from lack of air. Here often a mug of water meant life or death to a man. This encircled zone was bounded by a narrow stretch of ground which the opposing artilleries tried to spare because the infantry were fighting there hand to hand, with bombs, machine guns, and flame-throwers; every square yard of ground being hotly disputed.

"In front of Verdun, one day, the O. C. of a new force asks the officer of the chasseurs whom he has just relieved: "Where does our line run here?—I'll show you. There where you will find on the ground my dead chasseurs, lying side by side, that is where our line runs".

"In front of Verdun, one day, a battalion commander being completely cut off sends twenty runners one after another, to the Colonel's headquarters. These runners are bound to follow a certain track to go and another to return. Not one comes back and on the next day he finds the bodies of all twenty, ten lying on the path there and ten on the path back.

"In front of Verdun, one day, at nightfall, a battalion commander goes up towards the front line to see his men and cheer them on. The front line is a string of shell holes and in these holes, one by one, the men are crouched. He leans over one of these pits of darkness, for the night waspitch black, and in a low voice so that the enemy may not hear asks: "How goes it?". There is no movement but a voice replies in muffled tones as though telling a secret: "All well, Colonel, they shall not pass". He goes on his way continuing his rounds "How goes it?" and from each dark shell-hole rises the same secret whisper.

At the aid post of the fort or Tavannes, two wounded men and a runner leaving the "furnace".Their privations and sufferings are written on their wan faces.

At the aid post of the fort or Tavannes, two wounded men and a runner leaving the "furnace".

Their privations and sufferings are written on their wan faces.

"Where was that? At Mort-Homme or Froideterre? At Haudromont farm or Chapelle Sainte-Fine? It makes no difference! It was "in front of Verdun, one day" any day you like in this battle, in which so many days were alike, and these innumerable stories, so magnificent that no poet could have had the genius to invent one of them, these stories—each one so immortal—are all as alike in their essentials as were the countless actions in this "battle of annihilation" (Joseph Bédier:L'Effort français).

In the wood of Les Fosses. A runner on a track.

February 21st-25th 1916.—The central attack.

March-April 1916.—The attack on the flanks.

May-September 1916.—The battle of attrition.

The central attack (February 21st-25th) endangered the position of Verdun but the arrival of the first French reinforcements saved the place.

The enemy widened his attacking front, but his effort to outflank the position was a failure.

The defence was reorganised, road and rail taking their part in the battle. The enemy's attempts at attrition on the spot were a failure.

On July 1st the allied offensive was launched on the Somme.

October 24th 1916.—The Battle of Douaumont-Vaux.

December 15th 1916.—The Battle of Louvemont-Bezonvaux.

August 20th 1917.—The Battle of Hill 304 and Mort-Homme.

As soon as this new engagement allowed him, the French Commander intended to turn the enemy's failure before Verdun into defeat.

Three operations were prepared with the greatest skill and most energetically carried out, by which the enemy were driven out of the positions they had captured. These were the three victories of October 24th 1916 (Douaumont-Vaux), December 15th 1916 (Louvemont-Bezonvaux) and finally August 20th, 1917 (Samogneux-Mort-Homme, Hill 304).

The central attack (February 21st-26th 1916).This attack was carried on from February 21st to 26th on the right bank of the Meuse and narrowed its front as it advanced, finally stopping on the sixth day at Poivre Hill and Douaumont.

The central attack (February 21st-26th 1916).

This attack was carried on from February 21st to 26th on the right bank of the Meuse and narrowed its front as it advanced, finally stopping on the sixth day at Poivre Hill and Douaumont.

On February 21st 1916, at 7.15 a.m., the enemy opened fire on the two banks of the Meuse, over a front of 40 kilometres. Simultaneously Verdun was systematically bombarded, the last residents being evacuated by the military authority at midday on the 25th.

For nine hours, all the enemy guns and trench mortars kept up a running fire without intermission. In all the woods adjoining the front it was a regular fire-work display. A feature of this overwhelming bombardment was the enormous proportion of heavy calibre shells, 150's and 210's coming over like hailstones.

Under this deluge of projectiles all trenches were levelled, the woods became a twisted mass of trunks and branches, and villages collapsed and were blotted out.

The infantry attack was launched at 4.15 p.m. just before dusk, from the Haumont-Ornes wood.

Three army corps, the 7th, 18th and 3rd advanced. They thought that they had only to march, with their rifles slung, over ground like a ploughed field.

The 51st (Boulengé) and 72nd Divisions (Bapst) of the 30th Corps (Chrétien) sustained the first shock and for three days covered the arrival of French reinforcements.

A heroic combat followed the most formidable artillery preparation hitherto known. The chasseurs of Colonel Driant resisted the attack, inch by inch, in the wood of Caures. By nightfall the advance of the enemy was insignificant compared with their losses. They succeeded, however, in capturing the wood of Haumont.

On the 22nd, with snow falling, the bombardment was resumed with, if possible, greater intensity. Colonel Driant in the wood of Caures was outflanked on both sides and died fighting, after first evacuating his chasseurs to Beaumont.

Meanwhile the sectors of Woëvre and the left bank of the Meuse were subjected to violent bombardment.

The fightingon the 23rdwas even more furious. Brabant fell into the hands of the enemy after a fierce resistance by the 351st Infantry Regiment, which clung desperately to the ruins of Samogneux until nightfall. Further east the battle raged fiercely. The French counter-attacked unsuccessfully at Caures Wood and were attacked at Herbebois. The 51st Infantry Division, fell back, making the enemy pay dearly for his progress towards Fosses Wood. In the evening, the front extended along the Samogneux-Beaumont-Ornes line. Samogneux was captured by the enemy during the night. The situation was very critical.

On the 24th, the enemy brought up fresh storm troops and, although harassed by the French artillery on the left bank of the Meuse, they succeeded in taking Hill 344 to the East of Samogneux, Fosses Wood and the village of Ornes. But on the same day French reinforcements arrived, namely the 37th Infantry Division of the 7th Corps, the 31st and 306th Brigades of the 20th Corps under General Balfourier who provisionally took charge from the Meuse to the Woëvre. At the same time also General Pétain took over the command of the army of Verdun from General de Castelnau.

On the 25th, the 37th Infantry Division, with orders to defend Talou Hill and Louvemont village, resisted for a long time against incredibly furious attacks, but on their right the enemy succeeded in capturing Vauche Wood and, advancing towards Douaumont, carried the fort by surprise (seepage 88). However, their efforts to take the village failed before the heroic tenacity of the 31st Brigade, while the 94th Infantry Division, covered itself with glory. The enemy advance from this side had the effect of compelling the 31st Infantry Division to abandon Talou Hill.

During this time, in Woëvre, the front which was a dangerous salient and only very lightly held, was withdrawn to the foot of the Meuse Hills. This falling back was carefully cloaked and under cover of a rearguard action a new front was organised.

Taking over the command on the night of the 25th, General Pétain at once divided the battle-line into four sectors, officered as follows: General Bazelaire, on the left bank, from Avocourt to the river; General Guillaumat, from the Meuse to Douaumont; General Balfourier, from this point to the Woëvre; General Duchesne, on the Meuse Heights.

There were no trenches, but he ordered that the forts should at least be connected by a continuous line of entrenchments to be made while the battle was at its height and which the "poilus", in their disdain for the shovel and pick, called the "Panic Line". The entire 59th Division was told off to build the earthworks on the second and third lines. Thirteen battalions kept in repair the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, via Souilly (theSacred Way), which became the main artery for re-victualling the place in men and munitions, and along which 1,700 motor lorries passed each way daily. Lastly, General Pétain managed to imbue all ranks with his energy and faith, and the enemy's drive was stopped.

Indeed, duringthe day of the 26th, the 39th Division (Nourisson), which had relieved the 37th, repulsed all attacks on Poivre Hill, while the 31st Brigade continued to hold Douaumont until relieved in the evening by the 2nd Division (Guignabaudet).

On the following days the fighting continued about and in the streets of Douaumont, which the enemy finally captured on March 4th. The Germans now began to show signs of weakening. Their effort on the right bank had failed. Checked at Douaumont, they were taken in the rear by the French positions on the left bank, and were obliged to modify their plans. From that time they operated simultaneously or successively on both banks.

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