The Project Gutenberg eBook ofVicksburg National Military Park, Mississippi

The Project Gutenberg eBook ofVicksburg National Military Park, MississippiThis ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online atwww.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.Title: Vicksburg National Military Park, MississippiAuthor: William C. EverhartRelease date: September 19, 2018 [eBook #57935]Language: EnglishCredits: Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online DistributedProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK VICKSBURG NATIONAL MILITARY PARK, MISSISSIPPI ***

This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online atwww.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Vicksburg National Military Park, MississippiAuthor: William C. EverhartRelease date: September 19, 2018 [eBook #57935]Language: EnglishCredits: Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online DistributedProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net

Title: Vicksburg National Military Park, Mississippi

Author: William C. Everhart

Release date: September 19, 2018 [eBook #57935]

Language: English

Credits: Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online DistributedProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK VICKSBURG NATIONAL MILITARY PARK, MISSISSIPPI ***

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR · March 3, 1849

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIORStewart L. Udall,Secretary

NATIONAL PARK SERVICEConrad L. Wirth,Director

HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER TWENTY-ONE

This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the historical and archeological areas in the National Park System administered by the National Park Service of the United States Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. Price 25 cents.

VICKSBURGNational Military Park, Mississippiby William C. EverhartSiege cannon.NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES No. 21Washington, D. C., 1954(Reprint 1961)

by William C. Everhart

Siege cannon.

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES No. 21Washington, D. C., 1954(Reprint 1961)

The National Park System, of which Vicksburg National Military Park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic, scientific, and historic heritage of the United States for the benefit and inspiration of its people.

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE · DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Merchant steamers unloading supplies at Vicksburg after the surrender.Courtesy Library of Congress.

Cannon overlooking the river.

Across the imperishable canvas of the American Civil War are vividly recorded feats of arms and armies, and acts of courage and steadfast devotion which have since become a treasured heritage for all Americans. Among the military campaigns, few, if any, present action over so vast an area, of such singular diversity, and so consequential to the outcome of the war, as the great struggle for control of the Mississippi River. Seagoing men-of-war and ironclad gunboats engaged shore defenses and escorted troops along river and bayou; cavalry raids struck far behind enemy lines as the armies of the West marched and countermarched in a gigantic operation which culminated in the campaign and siege of Vicksburg. Protected by heavy artillery batteries on the riverfront and with land approaches to the north and south guarded by densely wooded swamplands, Vicksburg defied large-scale land and river expeditions for over a year. Finally the tenacious Grant, in a campaign since accepted as a model of bold strategy and skillful execution, forced the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, splitting the Confederacy in two and securing for the North its great objective in the Western Theater.

Control of the Mississippi River, whose course meandered over 1,000 miles from Cairo, Ill., to the Gulf of Mexico and divided the Confederacy into almost equal parts, was of inestimable importance to the Union from the outbreak of hostilities. The agricultural and industrial products of the Northwest, denied their natural outlet to markets down the great commercial artery to New Orleans, would be afforded uninterrupted passage. It would provide a safe avenue for the transportation of troops and their supplies through a tremendous area ill-provided with roads and railroads; the numerous navigable streams tributary to the Mississippi would offer ready routes of invasion into the heart of the South. Union control would cut off and isolate the section of the Confederacy lying west ofthe river—Texas, Arkansas, and most of Louisiana—comprising almost half of the land area of the Confederacy and an important source of food, military supplies, and recruits for the Southern armies. Forcefully emphasizing the strategic value of the Mississippi was the dispatch of the General in Chief of the Union armies to Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant on March 20, 1863, as Grant prepared to launch his Vicksburg campaign:

“Johnny Reb.” A volunteer soldier of the Confederacy.Courtesy Confederate Museum, Richmond.

The great objective on your line now is the opening of the Mississippi River, and everything else must tend to that purpose. The eyes and hopes of the whole country are now directed to your army. In my opinion, the opening of the Mississippi River will be to us of more advantage than the capture of forty Richmonds.

To protect this vital lifeline, the Confederacy had erected a series of fortifications at readily defensible locations along the river from which the Union advance could be checked. Pushing southward from Illinoisby land and water, and northward from the Gulf of Mexico by river, Union army and naval units attacked the Confederate strongpoints from both ends of the line. They captured post by post and city by city until, after the first year of the war, Vicksburg alone barred complete Union possession of the Mississippi River. From the city ran the only railroad west of the river between Memphis and New Orleans. Through the city most of the supplies from the trans-Mississippi were shipped to Confederate armies in the East. The city’s batteries on the bluffs, commanding a 5-mile stretch of the river, effectively prevented Union control of the Mississippi. Vicksburg was indeed the key, declared Lincoln, and the war could not be brought to a successful conclusion “until that key is in our pocket.”

“Billy Yank.” A volunteer soldier of the Union.Courtesy Library of Congress.

David Farragut, first admiral of the United States Navy, early in May 1862, headed his Western Gulf Squadron of oceangoing vessels up the Mississippi. In a spectacularengagement he passed the forts protecting New Orleans and captured the South’s largest port city. Proceeding 400 miles up river, Farragut received the surrenders of Baton Rouge, capital of Louisiana, and Natchez, Miss., arriving before Vicksburg on May 18, just 1 year before Grant’s army invested the city from the rear. At the same time, Flag Officer C. H. Davis was moving down the Mississippi River from the north, commanding a flotilla whose striking power was largely provided by a ram fleet under Col. Charles Ellet, Jr., and the seven “Pook Turtles”—ironclad gunboats, built on the Northern rivers, which mounted 13 guns in an armored casemate resting on a flat-bottomed hull.

After capturing Memphis in June 1862 and completely destroying the Confederate fleet of converted river steamboats, Davis pushed southward and on July 1 dropped anchor beside Farragut’s fleet just north of Vicksburg. All of the Mississippi River was now in Union possession, except for a section at and below Vicksburg.

The batteries of Vicksburg had been passed for the first time on June 28. On that day Farragut blasted the city and its defenses with broadsides from his ships and a devastating fire from Comdr. David Dixon Porter’s mortar boats in an unsuccessful attempt to reduce the city by naval attack. It was clearly evident from this experience that a powerful land force would be required to capture fortress Vicksburg. Only 3,000 troops under Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams had accompanied the expedition, and they were put to work with pick and shovel to dig a cut off which might permit river traffic to bypass the Vicksburg batteries. As the fleets idled above Vicksburg, the sweltering monotony was spectacularly interrupted by the short but battle-filled career of the Confederate ironclad ramArkansas, which performed at Vicksburg one of the great feats of arms on the Western waters.

The energy and skill of Lt. Isaac N. Brown, who commanded theArkansas, had enabled the ram to be readied for action despite almost impossible handicaps in securing materials. Routing the Union vessels sent to apprehend her, the venturesome man-of-war stood for the two Federal fleets lying at anchor just above Vicksburg and, with guns blazing, passed entirely through the massed flotillas to safety under the Vicksburg batteries. Here theArkansaswithstood all attempts to destroy her and presented a formidable threat to Farragut’s wooden ships.

By the end of July, conditions indicated to Farragut that a withdrawal from Vicksburg was necessary. In the hot, fetid atmosphere of the river the disease rate had so increased that only 800 of Williams’ 3,000 men were fit for duty. At the same time, the steadily falling waters threatened to maroon his deep-draught vessels. Farragut, with Williams’ troops aboard, moved down river to New Orleans, while Davis steamed up river, leaving Vicksburg unopposed. The initial expedition against Vicksburg had failed.

THE STRATEGIC SITUATIONJULY 1862

Scene of Sherman’s assault against the Bluffs at Chickasaw Bayou.FromBattles and Leaders of the Civil War.

With the Union withdrawal, communications between the sections of the Confederacy east and west of the Mississippi, which had been temporarily curtailed, were resumed. From Vicksburg to Port Hudson, a distance of 250 miles by river, the Mississippi was now in Confederate hands. Into the Mississippi, just above Port Hudson, emptied the Red River which drained much of the trans-Mississippi South, and down which great stores of food were being floated to supply the armies of the Confederacy. It was imperative for the North to close off this important supply route.

In October 1862, Grant, who had won the sobriquet of “Unconditional Surrender” at Fort Donelson and had rallied his army from near defeat at bloody Shiloh, was placed in command of the Department of the Tennessee with headquarters at Memphis; his objective—to clear the Mississippi River. The same month, Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton, a West Pointer, born and raised in Pennsylvania, who had served with Grant in the Mexican War, was placed in command of the Confederate troops defending the Mississippi; his objective—to keep the Southern supply line open and prevent loss of the river. Vicksburg would be the focus of military operations for both commanders.

The first full-scale expedition against Vicksburg was initiated in December 1862, with Grant pushing southward through the State of Mississippi to strike Vicksburg from the rear as Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, with an army of 32,000 men aboard 60 transports, proceeded down river from Memphis. Grant anticipated that his advance would pull Pemberton’s army away from Vicksburg, permitting Sherman to make a lodgment on the bluffs immediately north of the city against a greatly reduced garrison. On December 20, Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn, with a striking force of 3,500 Confederate cavalry, swung in behind the Union line of march, capturing and burning $1,500,000 of military goods at Grant’s supply base in Holly Springs. Unwilling to wage a campaign without a base of supply, Grant abandoned his campaign and returned to Memphis.

Sherman made his assault on December 29 at Chickasaw Bayou, 5 miles north of Vicksburg. The land here was a low, swampy shelf lying between the Yazoo River and the bluffs. The few dry causeways over which the Federal infantry could advance were completely covered by Confederate rifle and artillery fire from the bluffs 200 feet above. The Union Army lost nearly 2,000 men against Confederate casualties of less than 200. Tersely, Sherman reported his defeat: “I reached Vicksburg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted and failed.”

GRANT’S FIRST MOVE AGAINSTVICKSBURGDECEMBER 1862

Grant’s advance was halted and turned back when Van Dorn’s cavalry raid destroyed the huge Union supply base at Holly Springs.

Sherman assaulted the bluffs at Chickasaw Bayou, 5 miles north of Vicksburg and was repulsed.

The Confederate ironclad ramArkansasengaging the combined Union fleets at Vicksburg.FromBattles and Leaders of the Civil War.

By the end of January, Grant had arrived at the Union encampment at Milliken’s Bend, 30 miles north of Vicksburg, and assumed leadership of the operations against Vicksburg. His army, numbering about 45,000, was divided into three corps under General Sherman, Maj. Gen. John McClernand, and Maj. Gen. James Birdseye McPherson. Cooperating with the army, and providing aid without which the bayou expeditions would not have been possible, was the Western Flotilla under Porter. This fleet consisted of 11 ironclads, 38 wooden gunboats, rams, and sundry auxiliary craft mounting over 300 guns and carrying a complement of 5,500. The war in the West now hinged upon the effectiveness of this combined land and naval force. Under Grant’s direction it maneuvered over hundreds of miles of river and bayou seeking to outflank Vicksburg. The capture of the city would result not from great battles but from a war of movement.

The capture of Vicksburg proved difficult partly because of the topography of the area, which so favored defense of the city as to render the fortress almost impregnableto attack. To move against the city it was necessary to reach the bluffs which extended north and south and on which Vicksburg had been built. Behind the bluffs, to the east, lay dry ground on which an army might maneuver; below the bluffs, on both sides of the river, flooded swamplands prevented ground movements. With his army behind the bluffs, either above or below, Grant might come to grips with Pemberton’s Army of Vicksburg. Unless he reached the bluffs, capture of the city would be impossible; it could not be assaulted from the river.

The line of bluffs which marks the eastern boundary of the Mississippi Valley leaves the river at Memphis, curves in a great 250-mile arc away from the river, and then swings back to reach the river again at Vicksburg. Enclosed between the bluffs and the river is the “Delta”—a strip of land averaging some 60 miles in width, which is now a fertile, well-drained, cotton-growing region. In 1863, it was a swampy bottom land containing numerous rivers and bayous, subject to incessant floods. It was covered with thick forests and dense undergrowth, a condition, which, according to Grant’s engineer officer, “renders the country almost impassable in summer, and entirely so, except by boats, in winter.” This impenetrable swampland, lying before the bluffs, effectively guarded Vicksburg’s right flank. Unless the waterways of the Delta might provide a passage to the bluffs, operations against Vicksburg to the north were hopeless.

Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding the Union Army of the Tennessee.Courtesy National Archives.

Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton, commanding the Confederate Army of Vicksburg.Courtesy Flohr Studio, Vicksburg.

South of Vicksburg the prospect for the Union Army was equally dismal. After meeting the river at Vicksburg, the bluffs follow the river course closely to the south and were accessible, therefore, to troops from the Mississippi River. But the river batteries of the city prevented passage of transports to the river below; for troops to get below the city it was necessary to move through the Louisiana lowlands west of the river. This region was like the Delta north of Vicksburg—flooded bottom lands interspersed with bayous, rivers, and lakes. It would prove equally obstinate to land movements.

To increase Grant’s difficulties, his campaign against Vicksburg was begun during the wet season when streams were overflowing and lowlands impassable. The winter of 1862-63 was a period of unusually high water, the Mississippi cresting higher than its natural banks from December until April. Had Grant reached Vicksburg during the dry season, his problem would have been less formidable.

Until the bottoms were dry enough to permit land movements, the Union commander felt himself compelled to keep the army active. Even if success along the water routes seemed unlikely, he reasoned that prolonged idleness would be injurious to the health and morale of his troops. Grant had come to believe that military success was won by the aggressive. To Grant’s critics, who demanded that he open the Mississippi without delay or be replaced by someone who could, Lincoln replied, “I can’t spare this man; he fights.”

As Pemberton prepared to defend Vicksburg he was beset by difficulties rivaling those of his opponent, despite the topography which was friendly to his defensive purpose. Vicksburg would be secure only so long as the Confederate Army could prevent Grant from achieving a foothold on the high ground above or below the city. Yet, to prevent such a lodgment, it was necessary for Pemberton to defend a wide front extending 200 miles above and below Vicksburg, at any point along which Grant might strike. To cover this large area the Confederate commander would have to disperse his limited garrison dangerously and at the same time retain sufficient troops to protect the city—his primary responsibility. Under such conditions it was essential for Pemberton to receive information of Federal movements in order to concentrate his troops rapidly to meet the advance. Yet Pemberton was almost wholly lacking in cavalry and had no navy to interfere with and report Union progress through the rivers and bayous. Both Pemberton and Grant faced exacting problems in command during the Vicksburg operations.

Vicksburg’s location on the horseshoe bend of the river had suggested a solution to the Vicksburg problem the previous summer. By digging a canal across the peninsula below Vicksburg and diverting the river through it, unarmored transports could bypass the city batteries and deliver troops safely to the bluffs below. In January, Sherman’s Corps, assisted by dredging machines, began excavation of the mile-long canal. This project continued until March when a sudden rise in the river flooded the peninsula, driving the troops to the levees, and destroying much of their work.

Pivot-gun and crew of the Union warshipWissahickon, which fought the Vicksburg batteries.FromPhotographic History of the Civil War.

GRANT’S CANALFEBRUARY-MARCH 1863

By digging a canal across the mile-wide peninsula, Grant hoped to by-pass the Vicksburg batteries, move the army on transports below the city, and attack from the south.

Union soldiers at work on Grant’s canal opposite Vicksburg.From a wartime sketch.

A similar effort to turn Vicksburg’s left flank was essayed by cutting a canal at Duckport, between Milliken’s Bend and Vicksburg. By this avenue it was hoped vessels might leave the Mississippi above Vicksburg, pass through a series of circuitous bayous and emerge again on the Mississippi 20 miles below the city. The route was laboriously opened for navigation and one small steamer safely passed to the river below. Then the level of the river fell and blocked the Duckport attempt.

While the canal work was in progress, McPherson’s Corps was assigned the opening of the Lake Providence route. The objective of this activity was the turning of Vicksburg’s left flank by passing southward through the Louisiana waterways to reach the bluffs below the city. A canal was cut to provide entrance from the Mississippi into Lake Providence, 75 miles above Vicksburg. From Lake Providence a route was surveyed through the labyrinth of bayous, lakes, and rivers by which a fleet might emerge again on the Mississippi 200 miles below the city and move on Vicksburg from the south. While presenting great difficulties to navigation, the entire 400 miles would be safe from enemy action. By the end of March 1863, McPherson’s men had almost cleared the route for navigation. The dredging of shoals and the sawing off of trees far enough below the water to permit passage of the transports proved the most severe obstacles. Before this long and extremely difficult route could be completed, however, other, more likely, plans were formulated, and the Lake Providence expedition was recalled.

THE BAYOU EXPEDITIONSFEBRUARY-APRIL 1863

Four unsuccessful attempts by Grant to strike Vicksburg from the rear by moving his army on transports through the rivers and bayous to the bluffs north or south of the city.

Yazoo Pass Expedition blocked by the guns of Fort Pemberton.

Lake Providence Route abandoned; unable to clear route for navigation.

Steele’s Bayou Expedition cut off in Rolling Fork.

Duckport Canal Expedition abandoned because of low water in the bayous.

The Yazoo Pass project, which sought to turn the right flank of Vicksburg by sending an expedition through the Delta waterways to the bluffs north of the city, was for a time the most promising of the bayou attempts. By exploding a mine in the Yazoo Pass, 325 river miles north of Vicksburg, access from the Mississippi into the rivers of the Delta was secured. With paddle wheels reversed against the roaring current which surged through the crevasse, and suffering extensive damage in collisions with trees and floating debris, the gunboats and transports carrying a division of infantry began the hazardous journey. Almost a month was required to reach the calmer waters of the Coldwater River.

Notified of the threat, Pemberton dispatched Maj. Gen. W. W. Loring’s Division to halt the Union advance. Fort Pemberton, overlooking the Yalabusha River 90 miles north of Vicksburg, was quickly constructed of earth and cotton bales. The land surrounding the fort was completely flooded, permitting approach by water only. On March 11, the Union gunboats began an artillery bombardment and were promptly greeted by a heavy return fire as “Old Blizzards” Loring gained his nickname by pacing the parapet and urging his gunners to, “Give them blizzards, boys! Give them blizzards!” Grant had planned to send 30,000 men through the Yazoo Pass; but Loring’s gunners blasted back every attempt to pass the fort, forcing the fleet to withdraw. The Yazoo Pass expedition was one of the great flanking attempts of the war—the route from Milliken’s Bend to the rear of Vicksburg through the pass was over 700 miles, yet it was only 30 miles direct from Milliken’s Bend to Vicksburg.

The last and most extraordinary of Grant’s unsuccessful attempts to reach Vicksburg was the Steele’s Bayou expedition through 200 miles of narrow, twisting bayous north of Vicksburg. Like the Yazoo Pass operation, it was an effort to turn the city’s right flank. This shorter route had been originally scouted in order to send aid to the Yazoo Pass expedition when that column seemed in great danger of being cut off and captured. Further explorationsuggested the route to the bluffs by way of Steele’s Bayou might prove the best of all possible approaches to Vicksburg, and Porter himself commanded the squadron of 11 vessels which entered Steele’s Bayou from the Yazoo River on March 16.

The route was heavily obstructed by natural hazards, but Porter, warned by apprehensive officers who feared that superstructures would be carried away in crashing through the closely overhung waterways, answered with the declaration, “All I need is an engine, guns, and a hull to float them.” Progress was slow through winding streams barely wide enough to admit passage of the gunboats. This time alert Confederates, aided by treacherous obstructions in the mouth of the Rolling Fork, nearly succeeded in shutting up and capturing the entire fleet by felling huge trees across the bayou to block Porter’s retreat.

Skirmishing in the heavily wooded and flooded bottom lands during the bayou expeditions.From a wartime sketch.

Sherman, following behind the fleet with infantry, received word of Porter’s danger, and an eerie night march ensued. By the flaring light of candles held in the muzzles of their rifles, the Federal soldiers splashed through the canebrake hip deep in water and arrived in time to drive off the Confederates who had moved in behind the Union fleet. Three days were required to back the fleet to safety on the Mississippi, which was reached late in March. Grant had now testedall possible approaches to Vicksburg as he attempted to swing wide around its flanks to the north and south. Every effort had failed. In April, the Union Army was no closer to Vicksburg than it had been in December. The Southern bastion on the Mississippi had successfully withstood Union land and naval attacks for almost a year.

In the eyes of many in the North, Grant’s Army had floundered in the swamps for months with nothing to show for it except a steadily mounting death list from disease. Criticism of the Union commander mounted. “I don’t know what to make of Grant, he’s such a quiet little fellow,” said Lincoln, thinking of the more flamboyant leaders who had led his Eastern armies, “The only way I know he’s around is by the way he makes thingsgit.” Lincoln had grown increasingly fond of Grant, whose army, while ineffective, had never been inactive. Now he declared to Grant’s critics, “I think we’ll try him a little longer.”

Although Grant had made every effort to navigate the bayous and reach Vicksburg, he was later to record that little hope had been entertained that success would greet these ventures. While waiting for the dry season which would permit land operations, however, he had determined to exhaust every possibility and to retain the fighting edge of his army by keeping it constantly on the move. As April arrived and the roads began to emerge from the slowly receding waters, Grant prepared to execute the movement which he had believed from the first to be the logical approach against Vicksburg—marching down the west bank of the Mississippi through Louisiana, crossing the river south of the city, and laying siege to it from the rear.

Grant’s Vicksburg campaign officially began on March 29, 1863, when he ordered McClernand’s Corps to open a road for the army from Milliken’s Bend to the river below the city. Considerable work had been done previously when it was contemplated that a canal from Duckport to the river below Vicksburg might offer passage to the fleet. Falling waters had finally defeated this plan and, during April, McClernand’s engineers labored to bridge streams, corduroy roads, and build flatboats to cross areas still covered by flood waters. During that month also, elements of the Army of the Tennessee accomplished the 70-mile march and assembled at a small hamlet appropriately named, Hard Times, in view of Grant’s unpleasant bayou experiences. Here they were across the river from the Confederate stronghold of Grand Gulf, 25 miles below Vicksburg.

Adm. David Dixon Porter, commanding the Union naval operations on the inland waters.Courtesy National Archives.

Porter’s gunboats running the Vicksburg batteries on the night of April 16, 1863.From a wartime sketch.

This remarkable wartime photograph, taken by a Confederate Secret Service agent, shows Grierson’s cavalrymen near the end of their 600-mile raid behind the Confederate lines.FromPhotographic History of the Civil War.

To ferry the Union Army across the Mississippi, it was necessary for Porter’s fleet, in anchorage north of Vicksburg, to run the batteries and rendezvous with Grant below. While naval craft singly and in groups had, on occasion, passed these batteries successfully before, it was still a formidable undertaking for which careful preparation was required. As protection against shellfire, each vessel had its port side, which would face the Vicksburg guns in passage, piled high with bales of cotton, hay, and grain. Coal barges were lashed alongside as an additional defense.

Shortly before midnight, April 16, Confederate pickets in skiffs at the bend of the river above Vicksburg saw the muffled fleet bearing down upon them and quickly gave the alarm. Tar barrels along the bank were ignited and buildings in the small village of De Soto across the river were set afire. The blinding light of a great flare helped illuminate the river and outline the fleet for the Confederate gunners. Tier upon tier of the river batteries thundered down on the Union vessels. In return, these boats delivered their broadsides into the city as they passed so close that the clatter of bricks from falling buildings could be heard on board.

Through this “magnificent, but terrible” spectacle—one of the most fearful pageants of the war—steamed the fleet in single file. “Their heavy shot walked right through us,” related Porter. Every one of the 12 boats was hit repeatedly. Many went out of control and revolved slowly with the current. Despite the furious bombardment, only one craft was sunk; within a few days damages were repaired and the fleet joined the army at the village of Hard Times. Because of the difficulty of supplying the army by wagon train over the wretched road from Milliken’s Bend, 6 transports and 12 barges loaded with supplies ran the batteries a few nights later with the loss of 1 transport and 6 barges.

Grant’s plan was to make an assault landing at Grand Gulf, a fortified road junction on the bluffs at the mouth of the Big Black River. On April 29, the Union gunboats pounded the Grand Gulf fortifications for 6 hours, seeking to neutralize the defenses and clear the landing for 10,000 Federal infantry aboard transports just beyond range of the Confederate cannon. The naval attack failed to reduce the Confederate works, and that night Grant marched southward along the Louisiana shore to a landing opposite Bruinsburg. There he was met by the fleet which then slipped downstream under cover of darkness. By noon of the following day, April 30, Grant was across the Mississippi, experiencing

a degree of relief scarcely ever equaled since.... I was now in the enemy’s country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships, and exposures, from the month of December previous to this time, that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.

Grant’s landing was unopposed, partly because of two diversionary movements and partly because of Pemberton’s decision to hold his army close to Vicksburg and fight a defensive campaign. Both diversions were completely successful. On April 17, the day after Porter’s running of the batteries had indicated Grant’s strategy of striking from the south, Col. B. H. Grierson with 1,000 cavalrymen moved out from southwestern Tennessee on one of the celebrated cavalry raids of the war. They rode entirely through the State of Mississippi behind Pemberton’s army to a junction with Union forces at Baton Rouge, La. In 16 days Grierson covered 600 miles, interfering with Confederate telegraph and railroad communications and forcing Pemberton to detach a division of infantry to protect his supply and communication lines. Sherman, whose corps had not yet made the march from Milliken’s Bend, made an elaborate feint above Vicksburg. Loading his men aboard every available gunboat, transport, and tug, he landed atHaynes’ Bluff, north of Vicksburg, leading Pemberton to expect the real attack from that direction. Both moves helped screen Grant’s true objective.

The events immediately following Grant’s landing revealed a basic difference in tactical concepts between Pemberton, commanding the Army of Vicksburg, and Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, his superior, who was in charge of Confederate operations in the West. Johnston believed that to defeat Grant it would be necessary for Pemberton to unite his whole force in order to smash the Union Army, preferably before Grant could consolidate his position on the east bank. Accordingly, he wired Pemberton on May 2 “If Grant’s army crosses, unite all your troops to beat him; success will give you back what was abandoned to win it.”

It was Pemberton’s concept that holding Vicksburg was vital to the Confederacy and that he must primarily protect the city and its approaches. To have marched his army to meet Grant “would have stripped Vicksburg and its essential flank defenses of their garrisons, and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager hands of the enemy.” This inability of Pemberton and Johnston to reach agreement upon the tactics that might thwart Grant’s invasion seriously affected subsequent Confederate operations and prevented effective cooperation between the two commanders in the Vicksburg campaign.

Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding the Union XV Corps.Courtesy National Archives.

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commanding Confederate military operations in the West.Courtesy National Archives.

McClernand’s Corps, immediately upon debarking on April 30, headed for the bluffs 3 miles inland. By nightfall the Federal soldiers had reached the high ground and pushed on toward Port Gibson, 30 miles south of Vicksburg. From this point, roads led to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, and Jackson. Maj. Gen. John S. Bowen moved his Grand Gulf command toward Port Gibson to intercept the threat, and, at daylight on May 1, leading elements of the Union advance clashed with Bowen’s troops, barring the two roads which led to Port Gibson.

The battle of Port Gibson was a series of furious day-long engagements over thickly wooded ridges cut by deep, precipitous gullies and covered with dense undergrowth. While greatly outnumbering Bowen, McClernand was prevented by the rugged terrain from bringing his whole force into action. Slowly forced backward, Bowen conducted an orderly retreat through the town, which he evacuated. The holding action had cost Bowen 800 casualties from his command of 8,000; Union losses were about the same from a force at hand of about 23,000. Pemberton determined not to contest Grand Gulf lest he risk being cut off from Vicksburg and withdrew across the Big Black River. Thus he permitted Grant to occupy Grand Gulf and gave him a strong foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi.

Grant’s overall strategy, up to the capture of Grand Gulf, had been first to secure a base on the river below Vicksburg and then to cooperate with Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks in capturing Port Hudson. After this he planned to move the combined force against Vicksburg. Port Hudson, a strong point on the Mississippi near Baton Rouge, was garrisoned by Confederate troops after Farragut’s withdrawal the previous summer. At Grand Gulf, Grant learned that Bank’s investment of Port Hudson would be delayed for some time. To follow his original plan would force postponement of the Vicksburg campaign for at least a month, giving Pemberton invaluable time to organize his defense and receive reinforcements. From this delay the Union Army could expect the addition of no more than 12,000 men. Grant now came to one of the most remarkable decisions of his military career.

Information had been received that a new Confederate force was being raised at Jackson, 45 miles east of Vicksburg. Against the advice of his senior officers, and contrary to orders from Washington, Grant resolved to cut himself off from his base of supply on the river, march quickly in between the two Confederate forces, and defeat each separately before they could join against him. Meanwhile, he would subsist his army from the land through which he marched. The plan was well conceived, for in marching to the northeast toward Edwards Station, on the railroad midway between Jackson and Vicksburg,Grant’s vulnerable left flank would be protected by the Big Black River. Moreover, his real objective—Vicksburg or Jackson—would not be revealed immediately and could be changed to meet events. Upon reaching the railroad, he could also sever Pemberton’s communications with Jackson and the East. It was Grant’s belief that, although the Confederate forces would be greater than his own, this advantage would be offset by their wide dispersal and by the speed and design of his march.

But this calculated risk was accompanied by grave dangers, of which Grant’s lieutenants were acutely aware. It meant placing the Union Army deep in alien country behind the Confederate Army where the line of retreat could be broken and where the alternative to victory would not only be defeat but complete destruction. The situation was summed up in Sherman’s protest, recorded by Grant, “that I was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to maneuver a year—or a long time—to get me.”

The action into which Pemberton was drawn by the Union threat indicated the keenness of Grant’s planning. The Confederate general believed that the farther Grant campaigned from the river the weaker his position would become and the more exposed his rear and flanks. Accordingly, Pemberton elected to remain on the defensive, keeping his army as a protective shield between Vicksburg and the Union Army and awaiting an opportunity to strike a decisive blow—a policy which permitted Grant to march inland unopposed.

With the arrival of Sherman’s Corps from Milliken’s Bend, Grant’s preparations were complete and, on May 7, the Union Army marched out from Grand Gulf to the northeast. His widely separated columns moved out on a broad front concealing their objective. When assembled, Grant’s Army numbered about 45,000 during the campaign. To oppose him, Pemberton had available about 50,000 troops, but these were scattered widely to protect important points. On the day of Grant’s departure from Grand Gulf, Pemberton’s defensive position was further complicated by orders from President Jefferson Davis that both Vicksburg and Port Hudson must be held at all cost. The Union Army, however, was already between Vicksburg and Port Hudson and would soon be between Vicksburg and Jackson.

In comparison with campaigns in the more thickly populated Eastern Theater, where a more extensive system of roads and railroads was utilized to provide the tremendous quantities of food and supplies necessary to sustain an army, the campaign of Grant’s Western veterans (“reg’lar great big hellsnorters, same breed as ourselves,” said a charitable “Johnny Reb”) was a new type of warfare. The Union supply train largely consisted of a curious collection of stylish carriages, buggies, and lumbering farm wagons stacked high with ammunition boxes and drawn by whatever mules or horses could be found. (Grantbegan his Wilderness campaign in Virginia the following year requiring over 56,000 horses and mules for his 5,000 wagons and ambulances, artillery caissons, and cavalry.) Lacking transportation, food supplies were carried in the soldier’s knapsack. Beef, poultry, and pork “requisitioned” from barn and smokehouse enabled the army which had cut loose from its base to live for 3 weeks on 5 days’ rations.

Back to Index Next