Let me give you the background, so there is no misunderstanding. We have what we call an orientation program. The men we recruit from the colleges, and the type of men that we want, we cannot always get off the civil service roster. Therefore, we have an understanding with Civil Service that we can take men under schedule A. Within a period of 2 years, they will have to be assigned to the White House or dropped from the Service.
Now, in order to determine their ability and fitness for assignment, since some people are better criminal investigators than they are in protection work, we have an orientation program which includes duty on the White House detail. Mr. Bolden was one of the men selected to come in the summer of 1961. He was also a replacement for some regular agent on the detail who was on leave. It was a 30-day assignment. This afforded us an opportunity to observe him, determine whether he was equipped and so forth.
And he was on the White House detail for this short period of time. The time that he describes was a 5-day weekend up in Hyannis Port.
Mr.Rankin. I don't think that quiteanswers——
Mr.Rowley. I am giving the background.
Mr.Rankin. I think the question is as to when you got the complaint.
Mr.Rowley. Well—excuse me. [Continuing.] Before he left his detail assignment, you see, he alleges that he told me about the condition that was going on up in Hyannis.
RepresentativeFord. Before he left on this 30-day assignment?
Mr.Rowley. When he left to return to his office in Chicago.
Mr.Rankin. And what is the fact in that regard?
Mr.Rowley. The fact is he never informed me. He never informed any of his supervisors or anyone on the detail.
Mr.Rankin. I think the record should show, Mr. Chairman, that we were never advised that he wanted to testify, nor had we any inquiry or anything about the matter, until after we learned about it in the newspapers. And, even then, he didn't ask to testify. And we asked the FBI to check into it, and he had counsel, and they refused to tell anything about the matter at that time.
Mr.Dulles. Could I ask a question?
Did I understand you to say that the Civil Service prescribes that certain men must be assigned to the White House for a certain detail?
Mr.Rowley. No, Mr. Dulles; we have an arrangement with the Civil Service that they will permit us to recruit these men, not from the register, but under what they call schedule A. They give us an opportunity, 2 years, to train these men, with the understanding that within 2 years' time they will have to be assigned to the White House detail or we will not be able to retain them in the Service.
However, during that 2 years, we urge them to take the civil service examination, so that they get on the register. And then when they do—quite frequently this occurs—they are selected from the register, and once they become permanent, if they are not interested in the White House detail, then they continue their work as a criminal investigator in the field.
Mr.Dulles. But if they do not take that special examination, then—and become a part of the civil service, then they have to be assigned to the White House, to stay on?
Mr.Rowley. Yes.
Mr.Dulles. I was a little worried when you said certain people had to be assigned to the White House, that you were under compulsion to assign certain people to the White House in order to retain them.
Mr.Rowley. No; anyone who works in the White House, whether he is an electrician, a painter, or anything, for a period of 2 years, he automatically becomes eligible for permanent civil service status.
RepresentativeFord. Is that by law or by regulation?
Mr.Rowley. That I cannot say. I would always interpret it as under law. I may be wrong on that, Mr. Ford, but this is what happens. When our men spend 2 years on the detail at the White House, they come within that classification.
Mr.Rankin. Chief, can you clarify Commissioner Dulles' inquiry? The Civil Service does not direct that you put certain people in the White House?
Mr.Rowley. Oh, no; we do that in order to—I see your point, sir. We do that in order to give them the permanency that they should have to continue their employment with the Secret Service.
Mr.Rankin. But that is the choice of the Secret Service rather than anybody else?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Dulles. I gather the Civil Service prescribed if they did not do this, they could not be retained. Is that correct?
Mr.Rowley. That is right. In otherwords——
Mr.Dulles. There is some pressure, I should think.
Mr.Rowley. There is no pressure, because we voluntarily entered into an agreement with them, sir, for this arrangement, explaining that we frequently don't get from the register the type of men that we want, and that, therefore, we want the opportunity to recruit the men from the universities or colleges. Once they have served on the White House detail for a period of 2 years, then they would get this permanent status. However, during the 2 years, they have an opportunity and they are encouraged to take the civil service examination, so they get career status. But there is no pressure from the Civil Service. It is a convenience or agreement that they have arranged with us.
Mr.Rankin. Maybe I can help, Chief. Schedule A is an exemption from the regular civil service roster, is it not?
Mr.Rowley. That is correct.
Mr.Rankin. And the register is a list of employees from which you have to otherwise select Government employees if they are not exempt by reason of their positions, is that correct?
Mr.Rowley. That is right.
RepresentativeFord. In other words, Civil Service Commission has set up for the White House detail allinclusive——
Mr.Rowley. Not necessarily for the White House detail, Mr. Ford. For the Secret Service—to allow us to get the type of individuals that we want for both criminal investigation and protective work. Because if you say exclusively for the White House detail, the fellow might not be equipped for the White House detail.
RepresentativeFord. In other words, every person recruited by Secret Service for any capacity is recruited in the first instance under schedule A.
Mr.Rowley. Yes; if he hasn't—if he is not on the register for civil service. We first go to the Civil Service, when we want to select somebody, to see if there is anyone on there that meets our qualifications. And then, if not, then we hire them under schedule A, which is sort of a blanket exemption.
RepresentativeFord. But I gather from what you have said, or I think you are intimating that most of your recruiting actually is from colleges, and they are under schedule A.
Mr.Rowley. That is right; yes, sir. Most of them from your State, sir—Michigan State University.
RepresentativeFord. It is a fine school.
Mr.Rowley. That is where it started, actually. They were the first ones. Now we also recruit on the west coast, in California, they have terrific schools out there.
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, I don't think you covered the Bolden matter as to whether you had an investigation made. Did you?
Mr.Rowley. Yes; I did, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Did you find out anything about the conduct of your agents?
Mr.Rowley. I found out there was no truth to the charges of misconduct. There were 11 charges lodged against us.
One charge, the ninth charge, a part of it was true. The boys did contribute for food. In other words, up there in Hyannis, when they are up there for a week, or a weekend, they would be assigned to a house, which economically was beneficial to them. One shift, and some of the drivers would be in this house. This house was in a remote area from the shopping area and so forth. So they agreed when they arrived there to contribute, to buy food for breakfast, it being an 8 to 4 shift. Eight to four meant they would have breakfast there and dinner.
Mr.Rankin. What do you mean by that, Chief? Did they get a certain house and were able to live together there to reduce their expenses?
Mr.Rowley. That is correct.
Mr.Rankin. And then they each contributed to that common expense?
Mr.Rowley. That is correct.
Mr.Rankin. And did someone cook for them?
Mr.Rowley. One of the agents who enjoyed it as a hobby cooked the meals for them, while the others took care of the dishes.
Mr.Rankin. They did contribute to supporting that?
Mr.Rowley. They contributed to supporting that, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Was there criticism of that action?
Mr.Rowley. There was criticism of the action to this extent: That when they went shopping they bought two or three cases of beer which they had available in the icebox when the men came off duty in the evening.
Mr.Rankin. Now, were they on a travel status or subjectto——
Mr.Rowley. Not on travel status under our regulations. They could be there a week, and they would be working their 8 hours. They were not working any longer than their 8 hours. It was comparable to their assignment here in Washington.
Mr.Rankin. So it was really a summer White House position?
Mr.Rowley. Summer White House is what we called it.
Mr.Rankin. And did you investigate the charges to see whether they were valid?
Mr.Rowley. I investigated. This portion was correct. There was some substance to that portion.
He also said he was left on post for a period of 2 hours and wasn't relieved. That an agent had used this time to take care of his private car. We established there was no agent up there who had a private car.
Further, we established that he was left on post because according to our arrangements it was routine that whenever the President went out for a cruise, the agents on the outer perimeter at the time would remain on duty, and the agents in the inner perimeter would accompany the President on the cruise in the followup boat. Naturally, when they were out on the boat, there was no one available to start what we call the push, to rotate the men from one post to another. In other words, in the White House or any place where we establish posts, every half hour one man starts from the office and starts making the push. The first man is relieved and he relieves the next one, so there is no monotony on their jobs. They each have a different area. They are conversant or acquainted with each and every phase of the physical area. But because he was on one post, and not relieved, he complained.
So the next day, to bend over backwards, and show there was not any prejudice, the agent in charge took him on the cruise, so he would not feel he was being ignored.
Mr.Rankin. Now, from your investigation, did you find any violation at Hyannis of the regulations of the Secret Service?
Mr.Rowley. No, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Have you been informed of any other claims that Secret Service agents had been violating the regulations while on duty?
Mr.Rowley. No, sir; I haven't been informed of any others. And it seems in the last few days or few weeks we have been getting complaints that we haven't had in many years. And I think, as I mentioned earlier, because of the fact that we are very careful with the type of men we screen, their record has been above reproach over the years. They have conducted themselves in an exemplary manner. My files are replete with commendations on behalf of the agents wherever they have traveled and worked with committees and individuals in connection with Presidential travels, both here and abroad, which testifies to the impression that they have made.
Mr.Rankin. Have you ever had a Secret Service agent indicted or a complaint filed against him, a criminal complaint, prior to this time?
Mr.Rowley. This is the first time I remember anything like this happening since I have been with the Secret Service.
RepresentativeFord. Mr. Rankin, I don't recall Chief Rowley saying precisely what the reprimands were specifically for these violations of the regulations in this one instance.
You spoke highly of their background, and you spoke very high in their praise. But I did not hear what reprimand, if any, had actually been lodged against them.
Mr.Rowley. There was no reprimand. You are talking about the current thing?
RepresentativeFord. I am talking about the Dallas trip.
Mr.Rowley. I stated in considering what would be an appropriate punishment at the time, I felt that these men, by their conduct, had no bearing on the assassination of the President in Dallas. That to institute formal punishment or disciplinary action would inevitably lead the public to conclude that they were responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy. I did not think in the light of history that they should be stigmatized with something like that, or their families or children. And, for that reason, I took the position that I did.
RepresentativeFord. So there was no official reprimand or disciplinary action?
Mr.Rowley. No, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Did you talk to the agents, to indicate and make it plain to them that this was a violation of the regulations?
Mr.Rowley. I talked to some of the agents, as did my inspector at the time, who interviewed each and every one of them.
Mr.Rankin. And I think the Commission would be interested in whether you can be assured, or assure them that the action you took was sufficient so that this would not happen again.
Mr.Rowley. Well, I am confident that it would not happen again, Mr. Rankin.
Mr.Rankin. Can you tell us why you think so?
Mr.Rowley. Because they realize the seriousness of their action.
Initially I can understand the situation—they thought they were going for a dinner, buffet, and they got into the place and it wasn't there.
I talked personally with the agents there, and they just thought while they were there they would have a drink. It was one of those situations.
The important thing was that it was pointed out to them this was wrong, this was a violation. These men are young men with futures, they realize the true situation, innocent as they may have seemed to think it was.
But I am quite confident that we will not have a repetition of that.
And in talking to Mr. Behn—I am confident, too, in him—I know that he will see to it that they are well supervised.
Mr.Rankin. When they are out on a trip of this kind, Chief Rowley, as I understand your regulations, it is understood by the regulations and by the Secret Service that they are on duty all the time—that is, subject to call?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. And even though it is late in the evening or they had gone to bed in the early hours of the morning, they could be called to go on duty and perform their responsibility of taking care of the President or the Vice President, or whoever they are charged with; is that right?
Mr.Rowley. That is right.
Mr.Rankin. So that do they understand that when they are out on that kind of duty, they are subject to call at all times, and anything they do contrary toregulations is a violation, because they are subject to the call and must be ready at any moment to perform their duties.
Mr.Rowley. They certainly do, because there have been situations, whether or not they have had it with the Kennedy administration I don't know—but I know there have been situations where we have moved fast, all hours of the night. I remember one instance, that has never been disclosed—as Mr. Dulles knows, you never advertise your successes, you just get the other things—that I would like to give you as an example off the record, to answer your question, if I may.
TheChairman. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
TheChairman. Back on the record.
Chief, it seems to me that on an assignment of that kind, to be alert at all times is one of the necessities of the situation. And I just wonder if you believe that men who did what these men did, being out until early morning hours, doing a little—even a small amount of drinking—would be as alert the next day as men should be when they are charged with the tremendous responsibility of protecting the President.
Mr.Rowley. Well, we checked on that, Mr. Chief Justice, and the agent in charge reported that they were in good physical condition. I don't condone these late hours; no. This is not a rule. This case is an exception. However, because of the activities of any travel such as the Presidents today make from one place to another, to maybe seven States in a weekend, there is constant going.
I don't condone this at all. But these men are young. They are of such age that I think that they responded in this instance adequately and sufficiently as anyone could under the circumstances.
TheChairman. Well, I am thinking of this. As you go along in the motorcade, you have men who are scanning the buildings along the way, don't you?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
TheChairman. And they have submachineguns in one of the cars.
Mr.Rowley. No; for security reasons, I would like to—we don't have machine-guns now, sir.
TheChairman. I just thought I heard that from the record here, that they had some kind of guns.
Mr.Rowley. They had a weapon, a new weapon; yes, sir.
Mr.Chairman. Well, whatever it is.
Now, other people, as they went along there, even some people in the crowds, saw a man with a rifle up in this building from which the President was shot. Now, don't you think that if a man went to bed reasonably early, and hadn't been drinking the night before, would be more alert to see those things as a Secret Service agent, than if they stayed up until 3, 4, or 5 o'clock in the morning, going to beatnik joints and doing some drinking along the way?
Mr.Rowley. If I remember that witness' testimony—and that was one of the first statements that he made—that witness was with his wife, and he happened to look up there, and I think he said, "There is a man with a rifle, it is a Secret Service man," and let it go at that. He didn't inform any of the authorities.
TheChairman. No; nobody did. But I say wouldn't an alert Secret Service man in this motorcade, who is supposed to observe such things, be more likely to observe something of that kind if he was free from any of the results of liquor or lack of sleep than he would otherwise?
Mr.Rowley. Well, yes; he would be. But then, on the other hand, Mr. Chief Justice, in some instances the men come in from a trip at 1:30 in the morning, which there have been cases on travels that I have made, and have to be up at 3:30 or 4 o'clock, and out in time for a 5 o'clock departure. Then you go all that day until 1 or 2 o'clock the next morning. This is what has happened in the past.
TheChairman. I am not talking about the past. We are talking about nine men here who were out until rather unusual hours of the morning.
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
TheChairman. They were to be on duty the next day.
The next day—or if not sooner.
The next day they were supposed to be alert to anything that might occuralong the line of march. Don't you think that they would have been much more alert, sharper, had they not been doing these things?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir; but I don't believe they could have prevented the assassination.
TheChairman. Isn't it a substantial violation of these rules to do a thing of that kind?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir—on the basis of this section here.
TheChairman. Yes.
Now, Chief I noticed, also, in reading some of the reports that three of these men whom you speak of, were actually on night duty, protecting the life of the President. And around 4 o'clock in the morning, when they were protecting him at the Texas Hotel, they said that they had a coffee break, and they went from the hotel over to the beatnik joint. Now, is that consistent with your regulations?
Mr.Rowley. In this case, I talked to these three agents. They were relieved at different times—because their posts are in the corridor of a stuffyhotel——
TheChairman. Of the what?
Mr.Rowley. The corridor that they were on post outside the President's suite was a stuffy one, and they went downstairs to get a breath of fresh air. And they walked—it was a block—and out of curiosity they went into this place. One fellow looked in and left, he didn't buy any coffee. Another fellow went in and felt, I suppose, when he went in that he would buy a cup of coffee. But they were on what we call reliefs, the same as we relieve them around the White House. There are only so many posts, but you have a group of men in one of the rooms of the hotel where they are available, like an alert squad, and they relieve everyone on post every half hour. It is a part of the rotation of positions we have.
TheChairman. Do you have any regulations concerning where they shall remain when they are relieved for this short period of time?
Mr.Rowley. No, sir.
TheChairman. They can go any place they want?
Mr.Rowley. No; not any place. They usually stay within the immediate confines. That is understood. The hotel or the residence.
TheChairman. Well, they didn't do that here, did they?
Mr.Rowley. No, sir.
TheChairman. They went to the beatnik joint.
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
TheChairman. Now, is that consistent with their duty?
Mr.Rowley. No; it is not consistent or inconsistent with their duty. But as they explained to me, they wanted to get a breath of fresh air. If they are at a residence in a remote place, and they want to walk around the area, they might walk maybe a city block or so, which is what they do on a lot of these assignments—particularly in hotels. This was not an air-conditioned hotel.
TheChairman. It would seem to me that a beatnik joint is a place where queer people of all kinds gather anyway, and that the mere fact that these men did leave their post of duty might be an indication to someone that the President was not being protected, and might leave an opening for them to go there and try to do something.
Mr.Rowley. They were relieved, Mr. Chief Justice. They didn't leave their post of duty. They would not leave their post of duty until they were relieved by someone.
TheChairman. As I understood the report, they said they left for a coffee break.
Mr.Rowley. Well, it is an expression. They left to have coffee, sir.
TheChairman. Was there any place for coffee in the hotel?
Mr.Rowley. I think there was a coffee shop in the hotel; yes, sir.
TheChairman. That was the only place in town, as I understood, from the reports, outside of the beatnik place they could. But they went down to the beatnik place. Did they do that by prearrangement with the other agents?
Mr.Rowley. No, sir; it was curiosity on their part. They hadn't seen the other agents. There was no arrangement of any nature at all, sir.
TheChairman. But they did there meet other agents?
Mr.Rowley. They saw other agents—those that were in the place at the time they looked in. I think they came in after most had left, though.
Mr.Dulles. Were these men off duty for the night or were they going back on duty immediately after this break?
Mr.Rowley. No; they were on duty. They were the midnight shift, Mr. Dulles, from 12 to 8 a.m.
Mr.Dulles. They were going back on duty?
Mr.Rowley. They were going back on duty; yes, sir; in 10 minutes, 15 minutes.
Mr.Dulles. I see.
RepresentativeFord. And they did go back on duty and relieve somebody subsequent to this?
Mr.Rowley. That is right; yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you give the Commission a letter as of May 5 of this year in regard to this Dallas matter concerning the Press Club and the Cellar?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. And is that letter correct in regard to what happened as far as you know?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. And did you make available to the Commission the statements of each agent signed by the agent?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Dulles. I think you said Dallas. Did you not mean Fort Worth?
Mr.Rankin. Yes—it should be Fort Worth, I am sorry. Thank you.
I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1019 and ask you if that is your letter of May 5 that we have just referred to.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1019 for identification.)
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1019.
TheChairman. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1019, was received in evidence.)
TheChairman. Chief, I notice in the report that was made that while your inspector found that no one—no member of the Secret Service was intoxicated at the club—but that there was someone connected with the group who was intoxicated.
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
TheChairman. I wonder if that also wasn't a violation of that portion of the rule which says, "In interpreting the words 'excessive' and 'improper' slight evidence tending to indicate unusual or questionable conduct will be considered proof that the use of liquor has been improper or excessive. Association with others who drink to excess will be considered as an indication of using more than a moderate amount of liquor."
Did you call that to the attention of your people?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir. They ran into that individual as they were entering—two agents ran into this individual as they were entering the Fort Worth Club.
TheChairman. Go ahead.
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1020, and ask you if that is a document that you had prepared for the Commission.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1020 for identification.)
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. And that includes, under capital letter A, the transmittal from Inspector McCann; B, the report of the investigation by Inspector McCann; C, the Drew Pearson article?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. D, the statements of the supervisors; and, E, the statements of the special agents; F, the statements of witnesses; and, G, the memorandum of May 19, 1964, by Agent Sorrels, is that right?
Mr.Rowley. That is right.
Mr.Rankin. And are those various documents a part of the official report by the Secret Service to the Commission of this matter?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1020.
TheChairman. It may be so admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1020, was received in evidence.)
Mr.Dulles. Off the record, may I ask a question?
TheChairman. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
TheChairman. Back on the record.
Chief, I notice—I have read this report. At any place in here, did any of your investigators, Inspector McCann, or your special agents, or anybody else, indicate that there had been any violation of any kind on the part of your people, or particularly any violation of this section 10, chapter 1, page 7 of the Secret Service manual?
Mr.Rowley. I think what happened in this instance, we responded to the broadcast of Mr. Pearson and his charge that the men were inebriated. We were primarily concerned with that at that time. And to get the statements from the men. But I do know that in the course of his interviewing of these individuals at the time, and taking their statements, he impressed upon them the fact that there was a violation.
TheChairman. Has there been any report made to the Commission to the effect that there was any violationof——
Mr.Rowley. No, sir; unless it is contained in this document here, sir.
TheChairman. I have not seen anything in there. It seems to me they were all given a complete bill of health. And I just wonder if that is quite consistent with the facts that the Commission should have.
Mr.Rowley. No, sir; as I said earlier, we don't condone their actions, nor do we try to belittle the violation. But in the circumstances, I took the decision that I thought right in view of the tragedy and so forth. In any other circumstance it would have been entirely different. But as I said earlier, I don't think that these people should be blamed for the tragedy that happened at that time, and that any attempt to assess formal punishment would in the light of history stigmatize them for the rest of their life, as well as their families.
Mr.Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I plan to leave that subject now—unless there is some further question.
TheChairman. Any further questions?
Very well.
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, will you tell us whether you learned anything about the preparations in Dallas for the visit of the President on November 22?
Mr.Rowley. Yes; I read the report of Special Agent Lawson, who was designated as the advance agent for that visit.
Mr.Rankin. And do you know that that report has been furnished to us?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. A copy of it.
And have you examined it to determine whether it is accurate, as far as you can determine?
Mr.Rowley. It is accurate; yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Do you have any additions or corrections?
Mr.Rowley. No; I have no corrections to make, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Were you—are you satisfied, now examining that report, with the manner in which the advance preparations for the trip of the President were handled?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
The report follows the standard procedure that we have exercised over the years, and in many of the trips we had taken with the late President. He covered everything with the police and all that we have normally covered on such visits.
Mr.Rankin. Did you have enough agents at that time to perform the required duties in connection with this trip for both Dallas and the other cities in Texas to be visited?
Mr.Rowley. Well, we never have enough agents for the activities that the President today is engaged in. We draw from the field to supplement or augment the agents from the White House detail. We move the agents from one point to another where we can—particularly in the area of the advance men.
But in Dallas we had sufficient agents with prior experience in Presidential protection who assisted Mr. Lawson in the advance preparations.
Mr.Rankin. Did you furnish to the Commission a statement of the preparations that were made for the trip?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. And that included the various protective activities, did it?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1021, and ask you if that is the report you made in regard to the trip.
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1021 for identification.)
Mr.Rankin. Do you have any corrections or additions that you care to make to it?
Mr.Rowley. No, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1021.
TheChairman. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1021, was received in evidence.)
TheChairman. Chief, I have wondered about this question. Some months before Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had been handled very roughly in Dallas. Did you make—did your people make any investigation as to that group that caused that disturbance for him, to see if there might be some possibility of the same thing happening to the President?
Mr.Rowley. Not immediately at the time of the incident that occurred to Mr. Stevenson, but when the advance man came down, that was one of the things that we assigned a local agent to inquire into, to ascertain the hard core of that group, if you will, that were responsible for stimulating that activity. And he contacted an informant, and with the local police, who are members of a special squad that are involved in this kind of activity, they went and identified through pictures, which they saw in the newsreel, the principal members. They had photographs made, and they issued them to the agents on their visit there, to be on the lookout for these men as potential troublemakers.
(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)
TheChairman. Did they do the same thing concerning the incident that Vice President Johnson had a year or so before that?
Mr.Rowley. No, sir; not at that time. That was more or less in the heat of a political campaign. I don't think that was a similar type of activity.
TheChairman. I see.
But you did do it with the Stevenson matter?
Mr.Rowley. That is right.
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you make a report to the Commission with regard to the publicity concerning the trip of the President?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. And is Commission Exhibit No. 1022 that report?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1022 for identification.)
Mr.Rankin. Do you wish to make any additions or corrections of that letter?
Mr.Rowley. Of that letter? No.
Mr.Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1022.
TheChairman. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1022, was received in evidence.)
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, could you inform the Commission about the advance publicity concerning trips of the President to various parts of the country? There has been the question raised as to whether that is a threat to the President,and might make the work of the Secret Service and others who are doing protective work more difficult.
Mr.Rowley. Well, we have found that it is. And we always consider it as a potential threat in that it might give someone the opportunity who had any plans, whether it be an individual as in this case, or a group, to select an area, if they knew what the route was, or conduct a reconnaissance, if you will. I have always been opposed to it, and I have always tried to prevail upon the staff of the various Presidents who might be responsible for the release, not to release it too far in advance.
Mr.Rankin. Could you tell the Commission what the problem is in that regard?
Mr.Rowley. Well, in this regard, it is a political thing, and the President cannot be contained in a vacuum. If he wants to go out and meet the people under our form of government, he will in his own way. Each and every President has his own thoughts and methods as it pertains to these visits, and the need for publicity. This trip in Dallas was an opportunity for the people to see the President, as are the trips of any President. I remember well when President Truman started his trip across the country in June 1948, the purpose being to get the feel of the people and let the people see him at the time.
And it was then, as a result of that trip, that he determined he would run for reelection. That I know of my own personal knowledge.
But these are the things that are hard in security, as far as developing a close screen on the President.
Mr.Rankin. Is the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service under your direction, too?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir; that is part of the White House area, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Are you familiar with the testimony of Robert Bouck concerning that Section?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Do you know whether that accurately describes the conduct of that Section?
Mr.Rowley. Well, at that time. The Section was established by us some 20 years ago, and primarily to process threats, obscene letters and suicide notes. Over the years, and particularly during the last 9 years, the work has evolved to a point where we find that it requires further expansion.
It had a broad and general concept in the criteria of what it needed for Presidential protection in knowing what risks were about the country.
Mr.Rankin. Did the Secret Service have a written communication to other intelligence agencies as to the criteria for information that they sought?
Mr.Rowley. At that time?
Mr.Rankin. Yes; at that time.
Mr.Rowley. No; it was more or less of an informal arrangement that we had with the agencies, as we developed the Section.
Mr.Rankin. Will you tell the Commission what the standard was that you told the agencies you would like to have information concerning?
Mr.Rowley. Well, if there were any threats to the President, we were interested in being informed about it. We were in touch with the FBI, the CIA and others.
In the basic schools of the Treasury, and through coordination, our agents in charge of the areas, in coordination meetings, would inform representatives of other agencies of the type that we were interested in, the nature of the threats that we asked that they refer to us.
Mr.Rankin. Did you know that this standard only developed about 400 names from all over the country?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. And that it produced none in the immediate Dallas vicinity?
Mr.Rowley. That is right.
Mr.Rankin. Now, have you done anything about that standard since the assassination?
Mr.Rowley. Well, we have had a complete reexamination of the Protective Research Section.
Mr.Rankin. Can youdescribe——
Mr.Rowley. We infused new blood. We have asked the Rand Corp., the Research Analysis Corp., the President's Scientific Advisor, and the medical people for a study of this, and we are in constant consultation. We have brought in experienced agents who now are processing, evaluating, and analyzing all reports we receive, and indexing the information as we receive it from the various agencies. We have more recently issued and forwarded to the intelligence community in Washington our criteria at the present time regarding what we would ask them in a more formal manner. This is the beginning of what we hope to be a more thorough and practical approach to this problem.
Mr.Rankin. Chief, I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1023, dated June 17, 1964, and ask you if that is a communication from you to the Commission describing the new criteria.
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1023 for identification.)
Mr.Rankin. Does it accurately state that criteria?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir; it does.
Mr.Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1023.
TheChairman. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1023, was received in evidence.)
Mr.Rowley. If I mayread——
Mr.Rankin. Would you tell us the gist of the new criteria, and what the difference is as you conceive it from the old standard?
Mr.Rowley. Well, if I may do this. We have sent this criteria to the intelligence agencies that we think would be of help to us, with a covering letter in which we say that studies are now underway, "by which we hope to develop more detailed criteria. Our experience with the attached guidelines will also be carefully evaluated with a view towards amendments if required. We will appreciate your cooperation and suggestions concerning these guidelines, so that the person of the President will be protected to the best of our combined abilities and resources."
Another thing today now that we have to concern ourselves with, is that we get an expanding file of information.
Mr.Rankin. Has that happened since the assassination?
Mr.Rowley. Well yes; we have gotten some 9,000 reports on the members of the Communist Party from the FBI. At this time we have read and evaluated and catalogued them and indexed them. There has been a small percentage that have been to date of interest to us. But this is the beginning. And except for the indexes, we are more or less current as a result of that. This is through the long hours and hard work by the new group that I brought in to develop this department.
Mr.Rankin. Now, how is the standard described in Exhibit No. 1023 different from the prior standard?
Mr.Rowley. Well, we have always had the basic standard. The other standard was the threat to harm or embarrass the President, however, this time we added three factors.
Mr.Rankin. And these are in addition to the threat of harm to the President?
Mr.Rowley. That is correct.
Mr.Rankin. All right, proceed.
Mr.Rowley. The interest of the individual or the organization, capabilities of the individual or the organization, and the activities of the individual or organization. The interests of the individual or organization is the prime factor to be considered in the criteria, but must be coupled with the capability and activity of the individual or organization in any determination for referral to the Secret Service.
"The interest must be towards the President, or others named, or other high Government official in the nature of a complaint, coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined. After the interest phase of the criteria is met, then the activity which encompass previous history, that is, mental instability, history of violence and the capability of the individual or organization forfurthering this interest will dictate whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service. In making referrals to the Secret Service, it is requested that the agency furnish all pertinent background information relating to each of the three factor criteria."
Mr.Rankin. Now, is the Secret Service operating under the standard or criteria described in Exhibit No. 1023 at the present time?
Mr.Rowley. At the present time, it is, sir.
Mr.Rankin. And when did that become effective?
Mr.Rowley. That became effective in the last 3 weeks as we developed and explored and examined the many reports that we were receiving.
Mr.Rankin. Now, the language that you read into the record, where you invited comment and suggestions from the various other agencies to whom you sent communication, what did you mean by that? Is that asking them for their ideas so that you may further change the criteria?
Mr.Rowley. Where we may get in a position later on to break it down into categories. In other words, if every agency forwards and inundates us with many reports—say we expand to 3 million, obviously, the whole intelligence family could not cope with that. You have to get it down to a workable number. On the other hand, if you try to restrict the categories too much, then you find yourself in a position that you may miss another Oswald, and then the utilities of your file are of no consequence. So you have to try to reach the level in between there where it is going to be practical for us to react or develop the type of risks that we think should be covered by our organization in the protection of the President of the United States.
Mr.Rankin. Are you doing anything about the use of equipment that might help you to secure information about any particular locality the President was going to travel to more readily?
Mr.Rowley. In connection with the PRS?
Mr.Rankin. Yes.
Mr.Rowley. Well, we have conferred with the IBM. Can I go off the record on this?
TheChairman. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
TheChairman. Back on the record.
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, you have described off the record certain matters that involve the security of the country and cannot be made public. But can you tell us whether you have done anything in the past to try to improve your methods in testimony that can be made public?
Mr.Rowley. Well, I have tried to secure in the appropriations funds to enable us to procure the equipment and personnel that we thought would be necessary.
With the approval of the Congress, we were able 2 years ago to secure funds to enable us, in our check forgeries program, to try to adapt the characteristics of handwriting to an ADP processing program. We are hopeful this will work out. And we have used the Bureau of Standards to assist us in this program. We have prints out and have programmed part of the operation.
Now, it was my thought that if we succeeded in that area, we could also apply it to PRS. So we are working quite hard on this other area. And I knew the need would be eventually for us to get into the PRS stage on the electronic machine situation.
Mr.Rankin. Now, did you know that we had asked Mr. Bouck when he testified if he could inform us at a later date about people who were in institutions or otherwise might be dangerous, and with regard to whom you asked that the Secret Service be notified, so that they could make adequate protection for the President?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. Do you know how many such cases you now have?
Mr.Rowley. Approximately a thousand.
Mr.Rankin. Would you tell the Commission what your practice was for the Secret Service concerning the route of the motorcade at the time of the assassination—that is, whether you made inspection of adjacent buildings?
Mr.Rowley. At that time, and prior to that time, except for the inaugurationsin Washington, and other parades, involving the visit of foreign dignitaries in Washington, in which the President would ride in the motorcade with the head of state, where we had ample time to make these surveys, we had never conducted on trips out of Washington surveys of this nature. I have here a statement of the conditions that prevailed in Dallas as well as other areas—if I may read this.
Mr.Rankin. Yes.
Mr.Rowley. "Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade. For the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington where the traditional route is known to the public long in advance of the event, buildings along the route can be checked by teams of law enforcement officers, and armed guards are posted along the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few days in advance, buildings are not checked either by Secret Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the request of the Secret Service. With the number of men available to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical.
"In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing through the principal downtown section between tall buildings. While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be avoided and other choices made, it was not practical to select a route where the President could not be seen from roofs or windows of buildings. At the two places in Dallas where the President would remain for a period of time, Love Field and the Trade Mart, arrangements were made for building and roof security by posting police officers where appropriate. Similar arrangements for a motorcade of 10 miles, including many blocks of tall commercial buildings, is not practical. Nor is it practical to prevent people from entering such buildings or to limit access in every building to those employed or having business there. Even if it were possible with a vastly larger force of security officers to do so, many observers have felt that such a procedure would not be consistent with the nature and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their President and to welcome him to their city.
"In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other check was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law enforcement agency at its request, of the Texas School Book Depository Building or those employed there prior to the time the President was shot."
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, I will ask you not to describe any procedure, because of security considerations, but I would like to have you tell on the record, as I think it is proper, whether there has been a change in this regard in the procedures of the Secret Service?
Mr.Rowley. There has been a change in this regard.
Mr.Rankin. I will not make an inquiry about that, unless the Commission wishes to go into it off the record.
RepresentativeFord. Is it my understanding that the Commission has such documents that we could analyze ourselves as to these changes?
Mr.Rankin. I don't think we have any report of this.
RepresentativeBoggs. Why can't we get it off the record?
TheChairman. All right.
(Discussion off the record.)
TheChairman. Back on the record.
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you giveus——
Mr.Dulles. Could I ask one question with regard to Exhibit No. 1023?
This, as I understand it, is the new specifications with regard to persons with respect to whom you wish to have alert information.
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Dulles. It is called, "U.S. Secret Service Protective Information Guidelines." The top of page 2 of this exhibit is a paragraph that reads, "The interest"—and that is the interest of the suspect, Iassume——
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Dulles. "The interest must be towards the President, or others named,or other high Government officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance real or imagined."
I wonder if you could explain that a little more? I ask this question because I have been studying the previous assassinations a good deal. And in many of these cases, it seems to me this definition would not have covered the assassin. That is, there has been in some cases opposition to government, opposition to people in authority, but there has been no expressed hatred toward or animus against a particular President. And I was wondering whether this went too far on a definition to meet your purposes.
Mr.Rowley. This is a beginning, as I indicated to you here. We hope to improve it. But this is one of the things where we want to include the Oswald-type individual.
Now, Oswald wrote to the Governor intimating that he would use whatever means was necessary to obtain the change of his undesirable, or as he called it, dishonorable discharge. All legal means had been used in his case, where the Navy Review Board had examined it and came to a decision.
And this is an example of what we were trying to include in the area of this type of individual. Now, the otherpeople——
Mr.Dulles. But that was not a threat directed against the President. That was directed against the Secretary of the Navy.
Mr.Rowley. That is right; but then, on the other hand, they transfer the threats. I am quite sure that the Congressmen here get many threats, and that sometimes they may not come off. But these people are obsessed.
You take the individual that attempted the assassination of the late President Roosevelt in Miami that time. His original purpose was to shoot President Hoover. But then when he heard Roosevelt was there, he transferred.
Now, I remember a situation involving a member of Truman's staff, where a fellow stalked this man at his home. And finally we got into the case on his request. We satisfied ourselves that he wasn't a real threat to him—but we picked up the paper a year later and found out he shot at an assemblyman in Staten Island. So if they make a threat or something like this, even though it is against the Government as a group, or have some grievance, they transfer it—particularly, to the President. They use that father complex, as indicated in the research work that these different agencies have submitted to us.
RepresentativeFord. Under these criteria, which you are now following, Oswald would have been designated? Is that your judgment?
Mr.Rowley. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr.Dulles. I had some questions about that in reading it. That did not occur to me, because Oswald had never expressed any antagonism toward the President, as far as I know, up to this time—the President personally, or even afterward.
Mr.Rowley. That is right; but under this criteria he would. Namely, he had the interest because of the letter he wrote to Governor Connally. The activity, because he was a defector, and he demonstrated for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. The capability, because he traveled, and he had knowledge of firearms.
Mr.Dulles. Yes; but those do not come, it seems to me, within this definition. Maybe I interpret it differently than you. The last interest Oswald showed was directed toward General Walker. It wasn't against—of course, that wasn't known.
Mr.Rowley. No; it wasn't known but the first interest of this type was the letter to Governor Connally as Secretary of the Navy, in which he said he would use whatever means he could to correct that discharge, inferring, of course, that he would apply illegal means if he could.
RepresentativeFord. If we only had the letter that he wrote to Governor Connally, and no other information, how would that threat, or that course of action, become known to the Secret Service?
Mr.Rowley. It would not, unless it was furnished by the Navy Department or Secretary of the Navy's office.
Just like you gentlemen get letters that never come to our attention. Butyou might pick up a paper some day and read that this fellow hit somebody, and he was in to see you or wrote you letters.
RepresentativeFord. Would this criteria be circulated among the 50 Governors, for example, or their staffs, so that if threats are received against a Governor, then the Governor's staff in that particular State would so notify the Secret Service?
Mr.Rowley. It could. In this case it would be a help. But they refer all their complaints to the FBI. Threats of this kind.
RepresentativeFord. The State?
Mr.Rowley. The Governors do in most cases. So that the FBI under this system would bring it to our attention.
Mr.Dulles. I would think, Mr. Rowley, this might be subject to misinterpretation as being rather narrower than you suggest.
Mr.Rowley. Well, this is something—actually, we have to develop something, and we have to, if you will, have a crash program; we are working constantly to develop the categories and breakdowns as I indicated earlier.
(At this point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, did you supply to us the statements of the Secret Service agents who were informed about the assassination in Dallas? You gave us written statements, did you?
Mr.Rowley. Yes.
Mr.Rankin. I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1024, and ask you if that is the letter of transmittal, together with the attached statements that you have just described from the various agents about the events at Dallas.
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1024 for identification.)
(At this point, Mr. Dulles withdrew from the hearing room.)
Mr.Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1024.
TheChairman. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1024, was received in evidence.)
Mr.Rankin. I would like to inform the Commission that these are copies of the statements you already have in connection with the Secret Service report, but we wanted to make it part of the record.
TheChairman. Very well.
Mr.Rankin. Chief, did you write me a letter for the Commission on April 22, in which you enclosed the statements of five of your agents in regard to President Kennedy's views about agents riding on the back of the car?
Mr.Rowley. Yes, sir.
Mr.Rankin. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1025, and ask you if that is your transmittal letter with the statements attached.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1025 for identification.)
Mr.Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1025.
TheChairman. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1025, was received in evidence.)
Mr.Rankin. Chief Rowley, I should like to have you state for the record, for the Commission, whether the action of President Kennedy in making these statements was understood by you or properly could have been understood by the agents as relieving them of any responsibility about the protection of the President.