FOOTNOTES:

“I am this moment returned from a long conference with Lord Grenville. Our prospects become more and more promising as we advance in the business. The compensation cases (as described in the answer) and the amount of damages will, I have reason to hope, be referred to the decision of commissioners, mutually to be appointed by the two governments, and the money paid without delay on their certificates, and the business closed as speedily as may be possible. The question of admitting our vessels into the islands under certain limitations is under consideration, and will soon be decided. A treaty of commerce is on the carpet. All things beingagreed, the posts will be included. They contend that the article about thenegroesdoes not extend to those who came in on their proclamations, to whom (being vested with the property in them by the right of war) they gave freedom, but only to those who were,bona fide, the property of Americans when the war ceased. They will, I think, insist that British debts, so far asinjuredby lawful impediments, should be repaired by the United States by decision of mutual commissioners. These things have passed in conversation, but no commitments on either side, and not to have any official weight or use whatever.“The king observed to me, the other day, 'Well, sir, I imagine you begin to see that your mission will probably be successful.'—'I am happy, may it please your majesty, to find that you entertain that idea.'—'Well, but don't you perceive that it is like to be so?'—'There are some recent circumstances (the answer to my representation, etc.) which induce me to flatter myself that it will be so.' He nodded with a smile, signifying that it was to those circumstances that he alluded. The conversation then turned to indifferent topics. This was at the drawing-room.“I have never been more unceasingly employed than I have been for some time past and still am; I hope for good, but God only knows. TheWilliam Pennsails in the morning. I write these few lines in haste, to let you see that the business is going on as fast as can reasonably be expected, and that it is veryimportantthat peace and quiet should be preserved for the present. On hearing last night that one of our Indiamen had been carried into Halifax, I mentioned it to Lord Grenville. He will write immediately by the packet on the subject. Indeed, I believe they are endeavoring to restore a proper conduct toward useverywhere; but it will take some time before the effects will be visible. I write all this to you inconfidence, and for your ownprivatesatisfaction. I have not time to explain my reasons, but they arecogent. I could fill some sheets with interesting communications if I had leisure, but other matters press, and must not be postponed; for 'there is a tide in the affairs of men,' of which every moment is precious.Whatever may be the issue, nothing in my power to insure success shall be neglected or delayed.”[77]

“The king observed to me, the other day, 'Well, sir, I imagine you begin to see that your mission will probably be successful.'—'I am happy, may it please your majesty, to find that you entertain that idea.'—'Well, but don't you perceive that it is like to be so?'—'There are some recent circumstances (the answer to my representation, etc.) which induce me to flatter myself that it will be so.' He nodded with a smile, signifying that it was to those circumstances that he alluded. The conversation then turned to indifferent topics. This was at the drawing-room.

“I have never been more unceasingly employed than I have been for some time past and still am; I hope for good, but God only knows. TheWilliam Pennsails in the morning. I write these few lines in haste, to let you see that the business is going on as fast as can reasonably be expected, and that it is veryimportantthat peace and quiet should be preserved for the present. On hearing last night that one of our Indiamen had been carried into Halifax, I mentioned it to Lord Grenville. He will write immediately by the packet on the subject. Indeed, I believe they are endeavoring to restore a proper conduct toward useverywhere; but it will take some time before the effects will be visible. I write all this to you inconfidence, and for your ownprivatesatisfaction. I have not time to explain my reasons, but they arecogent. I could fill some sheets with interesting communications if I had leisure, but other matters press, and must not be postponed; for 'there is a tide in the affairs of men,' of which every moment is precious.Whatever may be the issue, nothing in my power to insure success shall be neglected or delayed.”[77]

To Mr. Randolph he wrote: “I shall persevere in my endeavors to acquire the confidence and esteem of this government—not by improper compliances, but by that sincerity, candor, truth, and prudence, which, in my opinion, will always prove to be more wise and more effectual than finesse and chicane. Formal discussions of disputed points should, in my judgment, be postponed until the case becomes desperate; my present object is to accommodate, rather than to convert or convince. Men who sign their names to arguments seldom retract. If, however, my present plan should fail, I shall then prepare and present such formal, and at the same time such temperate andfirm, representations as may be necessary to place the claims and conduct of the two governments in their proper point of view.”

A treaty was finally signed at London, on the nineteenth of November, 1794, by Mr. Jay and Lord Grenville, and submitted to their respective governments for ratification. It was defective in some parts and objectionable in others; but, as it was the best that could be obtained, Mr. Jay was induced to sign it.

In a private letter to Washington, written on the same day that he signed the treaty, Mr. Jay said, “To do more was impossible. I ought not to conceal from you,” he added, “that the confidence reposed in your personal character was visible and useful throughout the negotiation.” To the secretary of state he wrote:—

“The long-expected treaty accompanies this letter. The difficulties which retarded its accomplishment frequently had the appearance of being insurmountable. They have at last yielded to modifications of the articles in which they existed, and to that mutual disposition to agreement which reconciled Lord Grenville and myself to an unusual degree of trouble and application. They who have levelled uneven ground know how little of the work afterward appears.“Since the building is finished, it can not be very important todescribe the scaffolding, nor to go into all the details which respected the business. My opinion of the treaty is apparent from my having signed it. I have no reason to believe or conjecture that one more favorable to us is attainable.”

“Since the building is finished, it can not be very important todescribe the scaffolding, nor to go into all the details which respected the business. My opinion of the treaty is apparent from my having signed it. I have no reason to believe or conjecture that one more favorable to us is attainable.”

This treaty provided for the establishment of three boards of commissioners; one to determine the eastern boundary of the United States, by deciding which was the river St. Croix named in the treaty of peace in 1783; another to ascertain the amount of losses which British subjects had experienced in consequence of legal impediments to the recovery of debts due them by citizens of the United States, contracted before the Revolution—such amount, on their report being made, to be paid by the government of the United States; and a third to estimate the losses sustained by American citizens in consequence of irregular and illegal captures by British cruisers, for which the sufferers had no adequate remedy in suits of law—such losses to be paid by the British government.

It was provided that the western posts should be given up to the United States on the first of June, 1796, in consideration of the adjustment of the ante-revolutionary debts, the then residents in their respective neighborhoods having the option of remaining, or of becoming American citizens. The important Indian traffic in the interior was left open to both nations, by a mutual reciprocity of inland trade and free intercourse between the North American territories of the two nations, including the navigation of the Mississippi. The British were to be allowed to enter all American harbors, with the right to ascend all rivers to the highest port of entry. This reciprocity did not extend to the possessions of the Hudson's Bay company, nor to the admission of American vessels into the harbors of the British North American colonies, nor to the navigation of the rivers of those colonies below the highest port of entry.

It was stipulated that the subjects or citizens of one government, holding lands in the dominions of the other government, should continue to hold them without alienage; nor, in the event of war or other national differences, should there be any confiscation byeither party of debts, or of public or private stocks, due to or held by the citizens or subjects of the other. In a word, there should be no disturbance of existing conditions of property; and merchants and traders on each side should enjoy the most complete protection and security for their property.

The foregoing is the material substance of the first ten articles of the treaty, which it was declared should be perpetual; the remaining eighteen, having reference chiefly to the regulation of commerce and navigation between the two countries, were limited in their operations to two years after the termination of the war in which Great Britain was then engaged.

The commercial portion of the treaty provided for the admission of American vessels into British ports in Europe and the East Indies, on terms of equality with British vessels. But participation in the East Indian coasting trade, and the trade between European and British East Indian ports, was left to rest on the contingency of British permission. The right was also reserved to the British to meet the existing discrimination in the American tonnage and import duties by countervailing measures. American vessels, not exceeding seventy tons burden, were to be allowed to trade to the British West Indies, but only on condition of a renunciation, during the continuance of the treaty, of the right to transport from America to Europe any of the principal colonial products. British vessels were to be admitted into American ports without any further addition to the existing discriminating duties, and on terms equal to the most favored nations.

It was also stipulated that privateers should give bonds, with security, to make equivalent restitution for any injury they might inflict upon neutrals, in the event of the condemnation of any prize. Other provisions, favorable to neutral property captured by privateers, were made; and it was determined that the list of contraband articles should include, besides ammunition and warlike implements, all articles serving directly for the equipment of vessels, except unwrought iron and fir-plank.

It was also provided that no vessel attempting to enter a blockadedport should be captured, unless previously notified of the blockade; that neither nation should allow enlistments within its territory by any third nation at war with the other; nor should the citizens or subjects of either be allowed to accept commissions from such third nation, or to enlist in its service—citizens or subjects acting contrary to this stipulation to be treated as pirates. Provision was also made for the exercise of hospitality and courtesy between ships-of-war and privateers of the two countries; also for prohibiting the arming of privateers of any nation at war with either of the contracting parties, or fitting them out in the ports of the other; and for excluding the privateers of a third nation from the ports of the contracting parties, which had made prizes of vessels belonging to citizens or subjects of either country. It was also agreed that neither nation should allow vessels or goods of the other to be captured in any of its bays or other waters, or within cannon-shot of its coast.

It was further stipulated, that in the event of war between the two nations, the citizens or subjects of each, residing within the limits of the other, should be allowed to continue peaceably in their respective employments, so long as they should behave themselves properly. It was also provided that fugitives from justice, charged with murder or forgery, should be mutually given up.

Such was the substance of the famous treaty, the ratification of which caused a tempest in the political atmosphere, whose fury shook the Union to its foundation, and proved to the utmost test the stability of the character and popularity of Washington.

Rumors of the conclusion of a treaty reached the Congress before its adjournment in March, 1795; but the treaty itself did not arrive until two days afterward. The president received it on the fifth of March, but its contents were kept a profound secret for several months. Washington studied it carefully, fully digested every article, and resolved to ratify it, should it be approved by the senate. Parts of it he approved, parts he disapproved; but he saw in it the basis for a satisfactory adjustment of the relations of the two governments, and a guaranty of peace.

The president issued a circular calling the senate together in June, for the purpose of considering the treaty. He resolved to keep its provisions a secret until that time, because there was a predisposition in the public mind to condemn it. Already, as we have seen, the appointment of a special envoy to negotiate with Great Britain had been denounced as a cowardly overture, and degrading to the United States; and it was declared that the mission of a special envoy, if one was to be sent, should be to make a formal and unequivocal demand of reparation for wrongs inflicted on our commerce, the payment of damages to owners of slaves carried away, and the immediate surrender of the western posts.

A large party in the United States had resolved that the treaty, whatever it might be, especially if it should remove all pretexts for a war with Great Britain, should be rejected; and, even before its arrival, preparations for opposition were made. In the course of a few days after Washington received it, and had submitted it, under the seal of strict privacy, to Mr. Randolph, the secretary of state, sufficient information concerning it leaked out to awaken public distrust, and yet not enough was known for the formation of any definite opinion concerning it. But instantly the opposition press commenced a crusade against it.

“Americans, awake!” cried a writer in one of these. “Remember what you suffered during a seven-years' war with the satellites of George the Third (and I hope the last). Recollect the services rendered by your allies, now contending for liberty. Blush to think that America should degrade herself so much as to enter intoany kind of treatywith a power, now tottering on the brink of ruin, whose principles are directly contrary to the spirit of republicanism.

“The United States are a republic. Is it advantageous to a republic to have a connection with a monarch? Treaties lead to war, and war is the bane of a republican government. If the influence of a treaty is added to the influence which Great Britain has already in our government, we shall be colonized anew.

“Commercial treaties are an artificial means to obtain a naturalend—they are the swathing bands of commerce that impede the free operations of nature. Treaties are like partnerships; they establish intimacies which sometimes end in profligacy, and sometimes in ruin and bankruptcy, distrust, strife, and quarrel.

“No treatyought to have been made with Great Britain, for she is famed for perfidy and double dealing; her polar star is interest; artifice, with her, is a substitute for nature. To make a treaty with Great Britain is forming a connection with a monarch; and the introduction of the fashions, forms, and precedents of monarchical governments has ever accelerated the destruction of republics.

“If foreign connections are to be formed, they ought to be made with nations whose influence would not poison the fountain of liberty, and circulate the deleterious streams to the destruction of the rich harvest of our Revolution.Franceis our natural ally; she has a government congenial with our own. There can be no hazard of introducing from her, principles and practices repugnant to freedom. That gallant nation, whose proffers we have neglected, is the sheet-anchor that sustains our hopes; and should her glorious exertions be incompetent to the great object she has in view, we have little to flatter ourselves with from the faith, honor, or justice of Great Britain. The nation on whomour political existence depends, we have treated with indifference bordering on contempt.Citizens, your only security depends onFrance; and, by the conduct of your government, that security has become precarious.

“To enter into a treaty with Great Britain at the moment when we have evaded a treaty with France; to treat with an enemy against whom France feels an implacable hatred, an enemy who has neglected no means to desolate that country and crimson it with blood, is certainly insult. Citizens of America, sovereigns of a free country, your hostility to the French republic has been spoken of in the National Convention, and a motion for an inquiry into it has been only suspended from prudential motives—the book of account may soon be opened against you. What then, alas, will be your prospects! To have your friendship questioned by that nation is indeed alarming!”

Such was the logic—or rather the mad, seditious cry of faction—employed to forestall public opinion, and defeat the noble and humane intentions of the government. The Democratic Societies, though infirm and tottering, joined in the clamor. One of these in Virginia exclaimed, “Shall we Americans, who have kindled the spark of liberty, stand aloof and see it extinguished when burning a bright flame in France, which hath caught it from us? If all tyrants unite against a free people, should not all free people unite against tyrants? Yes, let us unite with France, and stand or fall together.”

The Massachusetts Society, in an address to all sister societies of the Union, put forth similar sentiments, and declared that the political interests of the United States and France were “one and indivisible.” The Pennsylvania Society exhorted that of New York to be ready and oppose the treaty if its provisions should be found dishonorable to the country; and newspapers and pamphleteers joined in the general cry of factious opposition.

The senate, pursuant to proclamation, assembled at Philadelphia on the eighth of June. Some changes had taken place in the material of that body, favorable to the government. Mr. Jay's treaty, with accompanying documents, was laid before it on the first day of the session. That gentleman had arrived from England a fortnight previously, and found himself elected governor of the state of New York by a large majority; and when he landed, he was greeted by thousands of his fellow-citizens, who gathered to welcome their new chief magistrate, and to testify their respect to the envoy who had so faithfully, as they believed, executed a mission of peace. A great crowd attended him to his dwelling, and the firing of cannon and ringing of bells attested the public joy. He immediately resigned his seat as chief justice of the United States, and three days after his arrival home he took the oath of office as governor of the state of New York.

The senate held secret sessions when considering the treaty, and for a fortnight it was discussed in that body with the greatest freedom and candor. Finally, on the twenty-fourth of June, the senateby a vote of twenty to ten—precisely a constitutional majority—advised the ratification of the treaty, that article excepted which related to the West India trade.

“An insuperable objection,” says Marshall, “existed to an article regulating the intercourse with the British West Indies, founded on a fact which is understood to have been unknown to Mr. Jay. The intention of the contracting parties was to admit the direct intercourse between the United States and those islands, but not to permit the productions of the latter to be carried to Europe in the vessels of the former. To give effect to this intention, the exportation from the United States of those articles which were the principal productions of the islands was to be relinquished. Among these was cotton. This article, which a few years before was scarcely raised in sufficient quantity for domestic consumption, was becoming one of the richest staples of the southern states. The senate, being informed of this fact, advised and consented that the treaty should be ratified on condition that an article be added thereto, suspending that part of the twelfth article which related to the intercourse with the West Indies.

“Although, in the mind of the president, several objections to the treaty had occurred, they were overbalanced by its advantages; and, before transmitting it to the senate, he had resolved to ratify it, if approved by that body. The resolution of the senate presented difficulties which required consideration. Whether they could advise and consent to an article which had not been laid before them, and whether their resolution was to be considered as the final exercise of their power, were questions not entirely free from difficulty. Nor was it absolutely clear that the executive could ratify the treaty, under the advice of the senate, until the suspending article should be introduced into it. A few days were employed in the removal of these doubts; at the expiration of which, intelligence was received from Europe which suspended the resolution which the president had formed.

“The English papers contained an account, which, though not official, was deemed worthy of credit, that the order of the eighthof June, 1793, for the seizure of provisions going to French ports, was renewed. In the apprehension that this order might be construed and intended as a practical construction of that article in the treaty which seemed to favor the idea that provisions, though not generally contraband, might occasionally become so, a construction in which he had determined not to acquiesce, the president thought it wise to reconsider his decision. Of the result of this reconsideration there is no conclusive testimony. A strong memorial against this objectionable order was directed; and the propositions to withhold the ratification of the treaty until the order should be repealed; to make the exchange of ratifications dependent upon that event; and to adhere to his original purpose of pursuing the advice of the senate, connecting with that measure the memorial which had been mentioned, as an act explanatory of the sense in which his ratification was made, were severally reviewed by him. In conformity with his practice of withholding his opinion on controverted points until it should become necessary to decide them, he suspended his determination on these propositions until the memorial should be prepared and laid before him.”[78]

The senate, on voting to recommend the ratification of the treaty, removed the seal of secrecy, but forbade any publication of the treaty itself. Regardless alike of the rules of the senate, and of official decorum, Senator Mason, of Virginia, sent to Bache, the editor of theAurora(the democratic newspaper) a full abstract of the treaty, which was published on the second of July. In this, Mason had only anticipated Washington, who, to counteract statements concerning the contents of the treaty, and malignant comments which began to appear, had resolved to have the whole document published.

FOOTNOTES:[75]Life of Washington, ii, 360.[76]His son, William Jay.[77]Life and Writings of John Jay, by his Son, William Jay, i, 323.[78]Life of Washington, ii, 361.

[75]Life of Washington, ii, 360.

[76]His son, William Jay.

[77]Life and Writings of John Jay, by his Son, William Jay, i, 323.

[78]Life of Washington, ii, 361.

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termination of jay's treaty—washington withholds his signature to the ratification—efforts to intimidate him—violent proceedings in philadelphia and new york—proceedings of the selectmen of boston—riotous proceedings in new york—hamilton and others stoned—opposition to the treaty—chamber of commerce in favor of the treaty—movements in philadelphia—denunciations of jay and the treaty in the southern states—disunion threatened—washington's letter to the selectmen of boston—washington at mount vernon—his hasty return to the seat of government—fauchet's letter intercepted—confidence withdrawn from randolph—the ratification of the treaty signed—randolph and fauchet—randolph's vindication of his conduct—his repentance.

The publication of the contents of the treaty produced a blaze of excitement throughout the country. The author of the treaty, the senators who approved of its ratification, and the president, were all vehemently denounced. Great indignation had already been expressed because the entire negotiation had been involved in mysterious secrecy; because the document had not been immediately made public on its reception by the president; and because the senate deliberated upon it with closed doors. The partisans of France had used every effort, during the spring and summer, to excite the people against Great Britain; and it was evident, from the tone of opposition writers and declaimers, that no possible adjustment of difficulties with that country, which might promise a future friendly intercourse between the two nations, would be satisfactory.[79]

It was asserted that any treaty of amity and commerce with Great Britain under the circumstances, whatever might be its principles, was a degrading insult to the American people, a pusillanimous surrender of their honor, and a covert injury to France. They affected to regard the compact as an alliance; an abandonment of an ancient ally of the United States, whose friendship had given them independence, and whose current victories, at that moment challenging the admiration of the world, still protected them, for an alliance with the natural enemy of that friend, and with an enemy of human liberty. They spoke of the court of GreatBritain as the most faithless and corrupt in the world, and denounced the result of Jay's mission as a surrender of every just claim upon a rapacious enemy for restitution on account of great wrongs.

These denunciations had great immediate effect. All acknowledged that the treaty was not as favorable to the United States as the latter had a right to expect; and “public opinion did receive a considerable shock,” says Marshall. Men unaffected by the spirit of faction felt some disappointment on its first appearance; therefore, when exposed to the public view, continues Marshall, “it found one party prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, but the other not ready in its defence. An appeal to the passions, prejudices, and feelings of the nation might confidently be made by those whose only object was its condemnation; while reflection, information, and consequently time, were required by men whose first impressions were not in its favor, but who were not inclined to yield absolutely to those impressions.”

As we have observed, Washington, for a specific purpose, withheld his signature in ratification of the treaty. The vote of the senate recommending its ratification, with the stipulation that one article should be added, suspending so much of another as seemed requisite, and requesting the president to open without delay further negotiation on that head, presented serious questions to his mind. He had no precedent for his guide. Could the senate be considered to have ratified the treaty before the insertion of the new article? Was the act complete and final, so as to make it unnecessary to refer it back to that body? Could the president affix his official seal to an act before it should be complete? These were important questions, and demanded serious reflection.

The opponents of the treaty, aware of the cause of the delay in its ratification, resolved to endeavor to intimidate the president and prevent his signing it. The most violent demonstrations, by word and deed, were made against it. On the fourth of July, a great mob assembled in Philadelphia, and paraded the streets with effigies of Jay and the ratifying senators. That of Jay bore a pair of scales: one was labelled “American Liberty and Independence;” and the other,which greatly preponderated, “British Gold.” From the mouth of the figure proceeded the words, “Come up to my price, and I will sell you my country.” The effigies were committed to the flames amid the most frightful yells and groans.

Public meetings were assembled all over the country to make formal protests against the treaty. They were called ostensibly to “deliberate upon it,” but they were frequently tumultuous, and always declamatory. A large meeting was held in Boston on the tenth of July. The chief actors there denounced the treaty as not containing one single article honorable or beneficial to the United States. It was disapproved of by unanimous vote, and a committee of fifteen, appointed to state objections, in an address to the president, reported no less than twenty. They were adopted by the meeting without debate, and were sent to the president accompanied by a letter from the selectmen of Boston. Only a few of the stable inhabitants of Boston appear to have been concerned in this matter, and the wealthy merchants and some other rich men who attended the meeting, and whose fears were excited by the leaders of the opposition, were made mere tools of on the occasion.

A meeting for a similar purpose was held in front of the city-hall, in Wall street, New York, on the eighteenth of July, pursuant to a call of an anonymous handbill. There the opposition gathered in great numbers, and there also was a large number of the friends of the treaty, who succeeded at first in electing a chairman. They were then about to adjourn to some more convenient place, when Brockholst Livingston, Mr. Jay's brother-in-law, and a leader of the opposition, urged the meeting to proceed instantly, as the president might ratify the treaty at any moment. Indeed, the whole Livingston family, with the eminent chancellor at their head, were now in the ranks of the opposition, and exerted a powerful influence. “With more than thoughtless effrontery,” says Doctor Francis, “they fanned the embers of discontent.”

Hamilton, Rufus King, and other speakers, occupied the balcony of the city-hall. The former, with sweet and persuasive tones, had uttered conciliatory words, and spoken in favor of adjournment, whenthe meeting became a good deal disturbed by conflicting sentiments and stormy passions. Just then an excited party of the opposition, who had held a meeting at the Bowling Green, with William L. Smith, a son-in-law of Vice-President Adams, as chairman, and who had burned a copy of the treaty in front of the government house, marched up Broadway, with the American and French flags unfurled, and joined the meeting. The turbulence of the assembly was greatly increased by this addition; and while Hamilton and King “were addressing the people in accents of friendship, peace, and reconciliation, they were treated in return with a shower of stones, levelled at their persons, by the exasperated mob gathered in front of the city-hall.”[80]

“These are hard arguments,” said Hamilton, who was hit a glancing blow upon the forehead by one of the stones. A question was finally taken on a motion to leave the decision on the treaty to the president and senate, when both sides claimed a majority. Then some person, utterly ignoring the presence of a chairman, moved the appointment of a committee of fifteen, to report to another meeting (to be held two days afterward) objections to the treaty. He read a list of names of gentlemen that should form that committee, and, at the close of clamorous shouts, he declared them duly appointed by the vote. The meeting finally broke up in great confusion. The adjourned meeting was attended by only the opponents of the treaty; and Brockholst Livingston, chairman of the committee of fifteen, reported twenty-eight condemnatory resolutions, which were adopted by unanimous vote.

“These resolutions,” says Hildreth, “while expressing great confidence in the president's wisdom, patriotism, and independence, were equally confident that his 'own good sense' must induce him to reject the treaty, as 'invading the constitution and legislative authority of the country; as abandoning important and well-founded claims against the British government; as imposing unjust andimpolitic restraints on commerce; as injurious to agriculture; as conceding, without an equivalent, important advantages to Great Britain; as hostile and ungrateful to France; as committing our peace with that great republic; as unequal toward America in every respect; as hazarding her internal peace and prosperity; and as derogatory from her sovereignty and independence.”[81]

On the very next day (July 22), the New York Chamber of Commerce, representing the commercial interests of that city, adopted resolutions diametrically opposed to those offered by Livingston. These set forth that the treaty contained as many features of reciprocity as, under the circumstances, might be expected; that the arrangements respecting British debts were honest and expedient; and that the agreement concerning the surrender of the western posts and for compensation for spoliations, and their prevention in future, were wise and beneficial. If the treaty had been rejected, they said, war with all its attendant calamities would have ensued, and they were satisfied with what had been done.

On the twenty-fourth of July a similar meeting was held in Philadelphia. Among the leaders who denounced the treaty by speech and acts were Chief-Justice M'Kean, Alexander J. Dallas (the secretary of the commonwealth), General Muhlenburg (late speaker of the house of representatives), and John Swanwick (representative elect in Congress). A committee of fifteen was appointed by the meeting to convey the sentiments of the assemblage to the president, who was then at Mount Vernon, in the form of a memorial. That instrument was read twice and agreed to without debate. The treaty was then thrown to the populace—consisting chiefly, as Wolcott said in a letter to the president, of “the ignorant and violent classes”—who placed it upon a pole, and, proceeding to the house of the British minister, burned it in the street in front of it. They performed a like ceremony in front of the dwelling of the British consul, and also of Mr. Bingham, an influential federalist, with loud huzzas, yells, and groans.

At the South, equally hostile feelings toward the treaty and its friendswere manifested. John Rutledge, then chief justice of South Carolina, denounced the treaty in violent language at a public meeting. He said it was destitute of a single article that could be approved, and reproached Jay with being either a knave or a fool—with corruption or stupidity—in having signed it. The stanch old patriot, Christopher Gadsden, denounced it in terms equally decisive; and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, at the close of a violent harangue, moved to request the president to take steps to have Jay impeached. “If he had not made this public exposure of his conduct and principles,” said Pinckney, “he might one day have been brought forward, among others, as a candidate for our highest office: but the general and deserved contempt which his negotiations have brought both his talents and principles into, would for ever, he trusted, secure his fellow-citizens from the dangerous and unwise use which such a man would have made of the powers vested in a president.”

The meeting appointed a committee of fifteen to report their sentiments at another gathering. It was done on the twenty-second of July. The report contained severe criticisms upon the several articles of the treaty, and recommended a memorial to the president, asking him not to ratify it. Meanwhile the populace trailed a British flag through the streets, and then burned it at the door of the British consul.

While these meetings were occurring in the principal cities, the opposition press all over the country was alive with the subject, and its denunciations were sometimes so violent that it was difficult to find words strong enough to express them. The Democratic Societies, vivified by the excitement, were also active with a sort of galvanic life. One of these in South Carolina resolved, “That we pledge ourselves to our brethren of the republican societies throughout the Union, as far as the ability and individual influence of a numerous society can be made to extend, that we will promote every constitutional mode to bring John Jay to trial and to justice. He shall not escape, if guilty, that punishment which will at once wipe off the temporary stain laid upon us, and be a warning totraitors hereafter how they sport with the interests and feelings of their fellow-citizens. He was instructed, or he was not: if he was, we will drop the curtain; if not, and he acted of and from himself, we shall lament the want of aguillotine.”

The Pendleton Society of the same state declared their “abhorrence and detestation of a treaty which gives the English government more power over us as states than it claimed over us as colonists—a treaty, involving in it pusillanimity, stupidity, ingratitude, and treachery.”

In Virginia, the grand panacea for all political evils of the federal government,disunion, was again presented. The following specimen of the prescription, taken from a Virginia newspaper, will suffice as an example:—

“Notice is hereby given, that in case the treaty entered into by that damned arch-traitor, John Jay, with the British tyrant should be ratified, a petition will be presented to the next general assembly of Virginia at their next session, praying that the said state may recede from the Union, and be under the government of one hundred thousand free and independent Virginians.“P. S. As it is the wish of the people of the said state to enter into a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, with any other state or states of the present Union who are averse to returning again under the galling yoke of Great Britain, the printers of the (at present) United States are requested to publish the above notification.—Richmond, July 31, 1795.”

“P. S. As it is the wish of the people of the said state to enter into a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, with any other state or states of the present Union who are averse to returning again under the galling yoke of Great Britain, the printers of the (at present) United States are requested to publish the above notification.—Richmond, July 31, 1795.”

Even at that early period of the republic, neither newspaper editors, nor political combinations, nor gatherings of clamorous assemblies, could make any sensible impression on the real strength of the Union.

Nor did these individual or public demonstrations move Washington from his steady march in the line of duty, or in his allegiance to what he discerned to be truth and justice. On his way to his home on the Potomac, he was overtaken at Baltimore, on the eighteenth of July, by the committee from Boston, bearing to him the proceedings of the great public meeting there on the subject ofthe treaty. He immediately sent the papers back to Mr. Randolph, the secretary of state, with a request that he would confer upon the subject with the other two secretaries and the attorney-general, and transmit the opinion of the cabinet to him as early as possible. The whole affair, he had no doubt, was intended to place him “in an embarrassed situation.” The cabinet members, after consultation, wrote out replies to the Boston authorities in accordance with their views, and sent them to the president. He weighed them carefully, and on the twenty-eighth of July he addressed the following letter to the selectmen of Boston:—[82]

“In every act of my administration I have sought the happiness of my fellow-citizens. My system for the attainment of this object has uniformly been to overlook all personal, local, and partial considerations; to contemplate the United States as one great whole; to consider that sudden impressions, when erroneous, would yield to candid reflection; and to consult only the substantial and permanent interests of our country.“Nor have I departed from this line of conduct, on the occasion which has produced the resolutions contained in your letter of the thirteenth instant.“With a predilection for my own judgment, I have weighed with attention every argument which has at any time been brought into view. But the constitution is the guide, which I never can abandon. It has assigned to the president the power of making treaties, with the advice and consent of the senate. It was doubtless supposed that these two branches of government would combine, without passion, and with the best means of information, those facts and principles upon which the success of our foreign relations will always depend; that they ought not to substitute for their own conviction the opinions of others, or to seek truth through any channel but that of a temperate and well-informed investigation.“Under this persuasion, I have resolved on the manner of executing the duty before me. To the high responsibility attached to it I freely submit; and you, gentlemen, are at liberty to make these sentiments known as the grounds of my procedure. While I feel the most lively gratitude for the many instances of approbation from my country, I can no otherwise deserve it than by obeying the dictates of my conscience.”

“Nor have I departed from this line of conduct, on the occasion which has produced the resolutions contained in your letter of the thirteenth instant.

“With a predilection for my own judgment, I have weighed with attention every argument which has at any time been brought into view. But the constitution is the guide, which I never can abandon. It has assigned to the president the power of making treaties, with the advice and consent of the senate. It was doubtless supposed that these two branches of government would combine, without passion, and with the best means of information, those facts and principles upon which the success of our foreign relations will always depend; that they ought not to substitute for their own conviction the opinions of others, or to seek truth through any channel but that of a temperate and well-informed investigation.

“Under this persuasion, I have resolved on the manner of executing the duty before me. To the high responsibility attached to it I freely submit; and you, gentlemen, are at liberty to make these sentiments known as the grounds of my procedure. While I feel the most lively gratitude for the many instances of approbation from my country, I can no otherwise deserve it than by obeying the dictates of my conscience.”

To these noble sentiments Washington firmly adhered, and they were the basis of his replies to all similar communications. Before this letter was sent, Washington received many private and public letters on the subject, as well as newspaper accounts of meetings all over the country. He perceived that a crisis had arrived, when he must act promptly and energetically, in accordance with his convictions of right. He saw that the excitement throughout the Union was becoming formidable, and he resolved to return to Philadelphia immediately, summon his cabinet, and propose to ratify the treaty without delay—notwithstanding such return would be to him a great personal sacrifice. “Whilst I am in office,” he said to Randolph in his letter announcing his determination to return, “I shall never suffer private convenience to interfere with what I conceive to be my official duty.” This was one of the great maxims of his life.

“I view the opposition,” he said, “which the treaty is receiving from the meetings in different parts of the Union, in a very serious light; not because there is more weight in any of the objections which are made to it than was foreseen at first, for there is none in some of them, and gross misrepresentations in others; nor as it respects myself personally, for this shall have no influence on my conduct, plainly perceiving, and I am accordingly preparing my mind for it, the obloquy which disappointment and malice are collecting to heap upon me. But I am alarmed at the effect it may have on, and the advantage the French government may be disposed to make of, the spirit which is at work to cherish a belief in them that the treaty is calculated to favor Great Britain at their expense. Whether they believe or disbelieve these tales, the effect it will have upon the nation will be nearly the same; for, whilstthey are at war with that power, or so long as the animosity between the two nations exists, it will, no matter at whose expense, be their policy, and it is to be feared will be their conduct, to prevent us from being on good terms with Great Britain, or her from deriving any advantages from our trade, which they can hinder, however much we may be benefitted thereby ourselves. To what length this policy and interest may carry them is problematical; but when they see the people of this country divided, and such a violent opposition given to the measures of their own government pretendedly in their favor, it may be extremely embarrassing, to say no more of it.

“To sum the whole up in a few words, I have never, since I have been in the administration of the government, seen a crisis, which in my judgment has been so pregnant with interesting events, nor one from which more is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one side or the other. From New York there is, and I am told will further be, a counter current; but how formidable it may appear I know not. If the same does not take place at Boston and other towns, it will afford but too strong evidence that the opposition is in a manner universal, and would make the ratification a very serious business indeed. But, as it respects the French, even counter resolutions would, for the reasons I have already mentioned, do little more than weaken in a small degree the effect the other side would have.”

Two days afterward (the thirty-first of July) he wrote to Mr. Randolph, informing him that he should not set out for Philadelphia until he should receive answers to some letters, and then said:—

“To be wise and temperate, as well as firm, the present crisis most eminently calls for. There is too much reason to believe, from the pains which have been taken, before, at, and since the advice of the senate respecting the treaty, that the prejudices against it are more extensive than is generally imagined. This I have lately understood to be the case in this quarter, from men who are of no party, but well disposed to the present administration. How should it be otherwise, when no stone has been left unturnedthat could impress on the minds of the people the most arrant misrepresentation of facts; that their rights have not only beenneglected, but absolutelysold; that there are no reciprocal advantages in the treaty; that the benefits are all on the side of Great Britain; and, what seems to have had more weight with them than all the rest and to have been most pressed, that the treaty is made with the design to oppress the French, in open violation of our treaty with that nation, and contrary, too, to every principle of gratitude and sound policy? In time, when passion shall have yielded to sober reason, the current may possibly turn; but, in the meanwhile, this government, in relation to France and England, may be compared to a ship between the rocks of Scylla and Charybdis. If the treaty is ratified, the partisans of the French, or rather of war and confusion, will excite them to hostile measures, or at least to unfriendly sentiments; if it is not, there is no foreseeing all the consequences which may follow as it respects Great Britain.“It is not to be inferred from hence that I am disposed to quit the ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than have yet come to my knowledge should compel it; for there is but one straight course, and that is, to seek truth and pursue it steadily.“But these things are mentioned to show that a close investigation of the subject is more than ever necessary, and that they are strong evidences of the necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying the determination of government into effect, with prudence as it respects our own people, and with every exertion to produce a change for the better from Great Britain.”

“It is not to be inferred from hence that I am disposed to quit the ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than have yet come to my knowledge should compel it; for there is but one straight course, and that is, to seek truth and pursue it steadily.

“But these things are mentioned to show that a close investigation of the subject is more than ever necessary, and that they are strong evidences of the necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying the determination of government into effect, with prudence as it respects our own people, and with every exertion to produce a change for the better from Great Britain.”

Randolph, at Washington's request, had made a rough draft of a memorial, intended to meet all objections to the treaty. This had been sent to Mount Vernon, and in reference to it the president said:—

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