FOOTNOTES:

“The doctrine has been avowed, that the treaty, though formally ratified by the executive power of both nations, though published as a law for our own by the president's proclamation, is still a mere proposition submitted to this assembly, no way distinguishable, in point of authority or obligation, from a motion for leave to bring in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so dear to many precisely for the reason, that in the contention for power, victory is always dear, is obviously repugnant to the very terms, as well as the fair interpretation of our own resolution (Mr. Blount's). We declare, that the treaty-making power is exclusively vested in the president and senate, and not in the house. Need I say that we fly in the face of that resolution, when we pretend that the acts of that powerare not valid until we have concurred in them. It would be nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the most glaring contradiction, and to claim a share in a power which we at the same time disclaim, as exclusively vested in other departments. What can be more strange than to say, that the compacts of the president and senate with foreign nations are treaties without our agency, and yet, that those compacts want all power and obligation until they are sanctioned by our concurrence. It is not my design, in this place, if at all, to go into a discussion of this part of the subject. I will, at least for the present, take it for granted that this monstrous opinion stands in little need of remark, and, if it does, lies almost out of the reach of refutation.”

After discussing the subject of bad faith on the part of the United States, in refusing to execute the treaty, with a clear and comprehensive view of the obligations of nations, Mr. Ames continued:—

“I shall be asked, why a treaty so good in some articles, and so harmless in others, has met with such unrelenting opposition? and how the clamors against it, from New Hampshire to Georgia, can be accounted for? The apprehensions so extensively diffused on its first publication, will be vouched as proof that the treaty is bad, and that the people held it in abhorrence.“I am not embarrassed to find an answer to this insinuation. Certainly a foresight of its pernicious operation could not have created all the fears that were felt or effected: the alarm spread faster than the publication of the treaty; there were more critics than readers. Besides, as the subject was examined, those fears have subsided. The movements of passion are quicker than those of the understanding: we are to search for the causes of first impressions, not in the articles of this obnoxious and misrepresented instrument, but in the state of the public feeling.“The fervor of the Revolutionary war had not entirely cooled, nor its controversies ceased, before the sensibility of our citizens was quickened with a tenfold vivacity, by a new and extraordinary subject of irritation. One of the two great nations of Europeunderwent a change which has attracted all our wonder, and interested all our sympathy. Whatever they did, the zeal of many went with them, and often went to excess. These impression met with much to inflame, and nothing to restrain them. In our newspapers, in our feasts, and some of our elections, enthusiasm was admitted a merit, a test of patriotism; and that made it contagious. In the opinion of party, we could not love or hate enough. I dare say, in spite of all the obloquy it may provoke, we were extravagant in both. It is my right to avow, that passions so impetuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist without disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting at risk the peace and precious interests of our country. They were hazarded. It will not exhaust the little breath I have left, to say how much, nor by whom, or by what means they were rescued from the sacrifice. Shall I be called upon to offer my proofs? They are here. They are everywhere. No one has forgotten the proceedings of 1794. No one has forgotten the capture of our vessels, and the imminent danger of war. The nation thirsted, not only for reparation, but vengeance. Suffering such wrongs, and agitated by such resentments, was it in the power of any words of compact, or could any parchment, with its seals, prevail at once to tranquillize the people? It was impossible. Treaties in England are seldom popular, and least of all, when the stipulations of amity succeed to the bitterness of hatred. Even the best treaty, though nothing be refused, will choke resentment, but not satisfy it. Every treaty is as sure to disappoint extravagant expectations, as to disarm extravagant passions; of the latter, hatred is one that takes no bribes; they who are animated by a spirit of revenge, will not be quieted by the possibility of profit.“Why do they complain that the West Indies are not laid open? Why do they lament that any restriction is stipulated on the commerce of the East Indies? Why do they pretend, that if they reject this, and insist upon more, more will be accomplished? Let us be explicit—more would not satisfy. If all was granted, would not a treaty of amity with Great Britain still be obnoxious? Have we not this instant heard it urged against our envoy, that he wasnot ardent enough in his hatred of Great Britain? A treaty of amity is condemned because it was not made by a foe, and in the spirit of one. The same gentleman, at the same instant, repeats a very prevailing objection, that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France. 'No treaty,' exclaim others, 'should be made with a monarch or a despot; there will be no naval security while those sea-robbers prevail on the ocean; their den must be destroyed; that nation must be extirpated.'“I like this, sir, because it is sincerity. With feelings such as these we do not pant for treaties. Such passions seek nothing, and will be content with nothing, but the destruction of their object. If a treaty left King George his island it would not answer, not if he stipulated to pay rent for it. It has been said, the world ought to rejoice if Great Britain was sunk in the sea; if, where there are now men, and wealth, and laws, and liberty, there were no more than a sandbank, for the sea-monsters to fatten on—a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict.“I object nothing to the good sense or humanity of all this. I yield the point that this is a proof that the age of reason is in progress. Let it be philanthropy, let it be patriotism, if you will; but it is no indication that any treaty would be approved. The difficulty is not to overcome the objections to the terms; it is to restrain the repugnance to any stipulations of amity with the party.“Having alluded to the rival of Great Britain, I am not unwilling to explain myself. I effect no concealment, and I have practised none. While those two great nations agitate all Europe with their quarrels, they will both equally endeavor to create an influence in America; each will exert all its arts to range its strength on its own side. How is this to be effected? Our government is a democratical republic; it will not be disposed to pursue a system of politics, in submission to either France or England, in opposition to the general wishes of the citizens; and if Congress should adopt such measures, they would not be pursued long, nor with much success. From the nature of our government, popularity is theinstrument of foreign influence. Without it, all is labor and disappointment. With that auxiliary, foreign intrigue finds agents, not only volunteers, but competitors for employment, and anything like reluctance is understood to be a crime. Has Britain this means of influence? Certainly not. If her gold could buy adherents, their becoming such would deprive them of all political power and importance. They would not wield popularity as a weapon, but would fall under it. Britain has no influence, and, for reasons just given, can have none. She has enough; and God forbid she ever should have more. France, possessed of popular enthusiasm, of party attachments, has had, and still has, too much influence on our politics. Any foreign influence is too much, and ought to be destroyed. I detest the man, and disdain the spirit, that can bend to a mean subserviency to the views of any nation. It is enough to be American; that character comprehends our duties, and ought to engross our attachments.“But I would not be misunderstood. I would not break the alliance with France. I would not have the connection between the two countries even a cold one. It should be cordial and sincere; but I would banish that influence, which, by acting on the passions of the citizens, may acquire a power over the government.”

“I am not embarrassed to find an answer to this insinuation. Certainly a foresight of its pernicious operation could not have created all the fears that were felt or effected: the alarm spread faster than the publication of the treaty; there were more critics than readers. Besides, as the subject was examined, those fears have subsided. The movements of passion are quicker than those of the understanding: we are to search for the causes of first impressions, not in the articles of this obnoxious and misrepresented instrument, but in the state of the public feeling.

“The fervor of the Revolutionary war had not entirely cooled, nor its controversies ceased, before the sensibility of our citizens was quickened with a tenfold vivacity, by a new and extraordinary subject of irritation. One of the two great nations of Europeunderwent a change which has attracted all our wonder, and interested all our sympathy. Whatever they did, the zeal of many went with them, and often went to excess. These impression met with much to inflame, and nothing to restrain them. In our newspapers, in our feasts, and some of our elections, enthusiasm was admitted a merit, a test of patriotism; and that made it contagious. In the opinion of party, we could not love or hate enough. I dare say, in spite of all the obloquy it may provoke, we were extravagant in both. It is my right to avow, that passions so impetuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist without disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting at risk the peace and precious interests of our country. They were hazarded. It will not exhaust the little breath I have left, to say how much, nor by whom, or by what means they were rescued from the sacrifice. Shall I be called upon to offer my proofs? They are here. They are everywhere. No one has forgotten the proceedings of 1794. No one has forgotten the capture of our vessels, and the imminent danger of war. The nation thirsted, not only for reparation, but vengeance. Suffering such wrongs, and agitated by such resentments, was it in the power of any words of compact, or could any parchment, with its seals, prevail at once to tranquillize the people? It was impossible. Treaties in England are seldom popular, and least of all, when the stipulations of amity succeed to the bitterness of hatred. Even the best treaty, though nothing be refused, will choke resentment, but not satisfy it. Every treaty is as sure to disappoint extravagant expectations, as to disarm extravagant passions; of the latter, hatred is one that takes no bribes; they who are animated by a spirit of revenge, will not be quieted by the possibility of profit.

“Why do they complain that the West Indies are not laid open? Why do they lament that any restriction is stipulated on the commerce of the East Indies? Why do they pretend, that if they reject this, and insist upon more, more will be accomplished? Let us be explicit—more would not satisfy. If all was granted, would not a treaty of amity with Great Britain still be obnoxious? Have we not this instant heard it urged against our envoy, that he wasnot ardent enough in his hatred of Great Britain? A treaty of amity is condemned because it was not made by a foe, and in the spirit of one. The same gentleman, at the same instant, repeats a very prevailing objection, that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France. 'No treaty,' exclaim others, 'should be made with a monarch or a despot; there will be no naval security while those sea-robbers prevail on the ocean; their den must be destroyed; that nation must be extirpated.'

“I like this, sir, because it is sincerity. With feelings such as these we do not pant for treaties. Such passions seek nothing, and will be content with nothing, but the destruction of their object. If a treaty left King George his island it would not answer, not if he stipulated to pay rent for it. It has been said, the world ought to rejoice if Great Britain was sunk in the sea; if, where there are now men, and wealth, and laws, and liberty, there were no more than a sandbank, for the sea-monsters to fatten on—a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict.

“I object nothing to the good sense or humanity of all this. I yield the point that this is a proof that the age of reason is in progress. Let it be philanthropy, let it be patriotism, if you will; but it is no indication that any treaty would be approved. The difficulty is not to overcome the objections to the terms; it is to restrain the repugnance to any stipulations of amity with the party.

“Having alluded to the rival of Great Britain, I am not unwilling to explain myself. I effect no concealment, and I have practised none. While those two great nations agitate all Europe with their quarrels, they will both equally endeavor to create an influence in America; each will exert all its arts to range its strength on its own side. How is this to be effected? Our government is a democratical republic; it will not be disposed to pursue a system of politics, in submission to either France or England, in opposition to the general wishes of the citizens; and if Congress should adopt such measures, they would not be pursued long, nor with much success. From the nature of our government, popularity is theinstrument of foreign influence. Without it, all is labor and disappointment. With that auxiliary, foreign intrigue finds agents, not only volunteers, but competitors for employment, and anything like reluctance is understood to be a crime. Has Britain this means of influence? Certainly not. If her gold could buy adherents, their becoming such would deprive them of all political power and importance. They would not wield popularity as a weapon, but would fall under it. Britain has no influence, and, for reasons just given, can have none. She has enough; and God forbid she ever should have more. France, possessed of popular enthusiasm, of party attachments, has had, and still has, too much influence on our politics. Any foreign influence is too much, and ought to be destroyed. I detest the man, and disdain the spirit, that can bend to a mean subserviency to the views of any nation. It is enough to be American; that character comprehends our duties, and ought to engross our attachments.

“But I would not be misunderstood. I would not break the alliance with France. I would not have the connection between the two countries even a cold one. It should be cordial and sincere; but I would banish that influence, which, by acting on the passions of the citizens, may acquire a power over the government.”

The speaker then drew a picture of the national disgrace, in the eyes of the world, that would be caused by a breach of national faith; and he appealed with inexpressible power to the hearts and understandings of the members, on this all-important consideration. He probed, with keen and searching precision, the Jesuitical position assumed by the house, in disclaiming any participation in the treaty-making power, and yet claiming the right to decide upon the merits of a treaty, and to defeat its execution. He then dwelt upon the evils that would accrue, in the form of a loss to the mercantile community, of five millions of dollars promised in payment for spoliations; and the renewal of Indian wars on the frontier, if the western posts should not be given up.

“On this theme,” he said, “my emotions are unutterable. If Icould find words for them, if my powers bore any proportion to my zeal, I would swell my voice to such a note of remonstrance, it should reach every log-house beyond the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, wake from your false security— your cruel dangers; your more cruel apprehensions are soon to be torn open again. In the daytime your path through the woods will be ambushed; the darkness of midnight will glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You are a father—the blood of your sons shall fatten your cornfields. You are a mother—the war-whoop shall waken the sleep of the cradle.

“On this subject you need not expect any deception on your feelings. It is a spectacle of horror which can not be overdrawn. If you have nature in your hearts, they will speak a language, compared with which, all I have said, or can say, will be poor and frigid.... By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires—we bind the victims. This day we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans our decision will make—to the wretches that will be roasted at the stake—to our country—and I do not deem it too serious to say, to conscience and to God. We are answerable; and if duty be anything more than a word of imposture, if conscience be not a bugbear, we are preparing to make ourselves as wretched as our country....

“The idea of war has been treated as a bugbear. This levity is, at least, unseasonable, and, most of all, unbecoming some who resort to it. Who has forgotten the philippics of 1794? The cry then was, reparation—no envoy—no treaty—no tedious delays. Now, it seems, the passion subsides, or, at least, the hurry to satisfy it. Great Britain, they say, will not wage war upon us.

“In 1794, it was urged by those who now say, no war, that if we built frigates, or resisted the piracies of Algiers, we could not expect peace. Now they give excellent comfort truly. Great Britain has seized our vessels and cargoes to the amount of millions; she holds the posts; she interrupts our trade, say they, as a neutral nation; and these gentlemen, formerly so fierce for redress, assure us, in terms of the sweetest consolation, Great Britain willbear all this patiently. But let me ask the late champions of our rights, will our nation bear it? Let others exult because the aggressor will let our wrongs sleep for ever. Will it add, it is my duty to ask, to the patience and quiet of our citizens, to see their rights abandoned? Will not the disappointment of their hopes, so long patronized by the government, now in the crisis of their being realized, convert all their passions into fury and despair?...

“Look again at this state of things. On the seacoast, vast losses uncompensated; on the frontier, Indian war and actual encroachment on our territory; everywhere discontent; resentments tenfold more fierce because they will be more impotent and humbled; national discord and abasement. The disputes of the old treaty of 1783, being left to rankle, will revive the almost extinguished animosities of that period. Wars in all countries, and most of all in such as are free, arise from the impetuosity of the public feelings. The despotism of Turkey is often obliged by clamor to unsheathe the sword. War might, perhaps, be delayed, but could not be prevented. The causes of it would remain, would be aggravated, would be multiplied, and soon become intolerable. More captures, more impressments would swell the list of our wrongs, and the current of our rage. I make no calculation of the arts of those whose employment it has been, on former occasions, to fan the fire; I say nothing of the foreign money and emissaries that might foment the spirit of hostility, because this state of things will naturally run to violence. With less than their former exertion they would be successful.

“Will our government be able to temper and restrain the turbulence of such a crisis? The government, alas! will be in no capacity to govern. A divided people, and divided councils! Shall we cherish the spirit of peace, or show the energies of war? Shall we make our adversary afraid of our strength, or dispose him, by the measures of resentment and broken faith, to respect our rights? Do gentlemen rely on the state of peace because both nations will be more disposed to keep it? because injuries and insults still harder to endure, will be mutually offered?...

“Is there anything in the prospect of the interior state ofthe country, to encourage us to aggravate the dangers of a war? Would not the shock of that evil produce another, and shake down the feeble and then unbraced structure of our government? Is this a chimera? Is it going off the ground of matter of fact to say, the rejection of the appropriation proceeds upon the doctrine of a civil war of the departments? Two branches have ratified a treaty, and we are going to set it aside. How is this disorder in the machine to be rectified? While it exists its movements must stop; and when we talk of a remedy, is that any other than the formidable one of a revolutionary interposition of the people? And is this, in the judgment even of my opposers, to execute, to preserve the constitution, and the public order? Is this the state of hazard, if not of convulsion, which they can have the courage to contemplate and to praise; or beyond which their penetration can reach and see the issue? They seem to believe, and they act as if they believed, that our union, our peace, our liberty, are invulnerable and immortal; as if our happy state was not to be disturbed by our dissentions, and that we are not capable of falling from it by our unworthiness. Some of them have, no doubt, better nerves and better discernment than mine. They can see the bright aspects and happy consequences of all this array of horrors. They can see intestine discords, our government disorganized, our wrongs aggravated, multiplied, and un-redressed, peace with dishonor, or war without justice, union, or resources, in 'the calm lights of mild philosophy.' ...

“Let me cheer the mind, weary, no doubt, and ready to despond on this prospect, by presenting another which it is in our power to realize. Is it possible for a real American to look at the prosperity of this country without some desire for its continuance, without some respect for the measures which, many will say, produced, and all will confess, have preserved it? Will he not feel some dread that a change of system will reverse the scene? The well-grounded fears of our citizens, in 1794, were removed by the treaty, but are not forgotten. Then they deemed war nearly inevitable, and would not this adjustment have been considered, at that day, as a happyescape from the calamity? The great interest and the general desire of our people was to enjoy the advantages of neutrality. This instrument, however misrepresented, affords Americans that inestimable security. The cause of our disputes are either cut up by the roots, or referred to a new negotiation after the end of the European war. This was gaining everything. This, alone, would justify the engagements of the government. For, when the fiery vapors of war lowered in the skirts of our horizon, all our wishes were concentrated in this one, that we might escape the desolation of the storm. This treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, marked to our eyes the space where it was raging, and afforded, at the same time, the sure prognostic of fair weather. If we reject it the vivid colors will grow pale; it will be a baleful meteor, portending tempest and war.

“Let us not hesitate, then, to agree to this appropriation to carry it into faithful execution. Thus we shall save the faith of our nation, secure its peace, and diffuse the spirit of confidence and enterprise that will augment its prosperity. The progress of wealth and improvement is wonderful, and some will think, too rapid. The field for exertion is fruitful and vast; and if peace and good government should be preserved, the acquisitions of our citizens are not so pleasing as the proofs of their industry, as the instruments of their future success. The rewards of exertion go to augment its power. Profit is every hour becoming capital. The vast crop of our neutrality is all seed-wheat, and is sown again, to swell, almost beyond calculation, the future harvest of prosperity. In this progress what seems to be fiction is found to fall short of experience.... When I come to the moment of deciding the vote, I start back with dread from the edge of the pit into which we are plunging. In my view, even the minutes I have spent in expostulation, have their value, because they protract the crisis, and the short period in which alone we may resolve to escape it.

“I have thus been led by my feelings to speak more at length than I had intended. Yet I have, perhaps, as little personal interest in the event as any one here. There is, I believe, no member whowill not think his chance to be a witness of the consequences greater than mine. If, however, the vote should pass to reject, and a spirit should rise, as it will, with the public disorders, to make 'confusion worse confounded,' even I, slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may outlive the government and constitution of my country.”

With this touching peroration Mr. Ames closed his remarkable speech, and sat down. For a brief moment there was perfect silence in the house. “Judge Iredell and I happened to sit together,” wrote Vice-President Adams, describing the scene. “Our feelings beat in unison. 'My God! how great he is,' says Iredell; 'how great he has been!'—'Noble!' said I. After some time Iredell breaks out, 'Bless my stars! I never heard anything so great since I was born.'—'Divine!' said I; and thus we went on with our interjections, not to say tears, to the end. Tears enough were shed. Not a dry eye, I believe, in the house, except some of the jackasses who had occasioned the necessity of the oratory. These attempted to laugh, but their visages 'grinned horribly ghastly smiles.' They smiled like Foulon's son-in-law when they made him kiss his father's dead and bleeding hand. Perhaps the speech may not read as well. The situation of the man excited compassion, and interested all hearts in his favor. The ladies wished his soul had a better body.”[96]

The vote was about to be taken, immediately after the conclusion of Ames's speech, when the opposition, alarmed on account of the effect it had probably produced, carried an adjournment. There was a little speaking upon the subject the next day, but no one dared to attempt an answer to Ames's words, or assail his positions. The vote stood forty-nine to forty-nine, when General Muhlenburg, chairman of the committee of the whole, decided the matter by casting his vote for the resolution. It was reported to the house on the thirteenth of May, and, after some delay, the resolution, unamended, declaring that it was expedient to pass laws necessary for carrying the treaty into effect, was adopted, fifty-one to forty-eight, the northern members voting for and the southern against it.

FOOTNOTES:[91]Life of Washington.[92]He referred to Livingston, the author of the resolutions before the house, who was one of the leaders of the populace in New York when Hamilton and King were stoned, while speaking in favor of the treaty, at a public meeting.[93]The following is a copy of Washington's message to the house of representatives on the thirtieth of March, 1796, assigning his reasons for not complying with their resolution of the twenty-fourth:—“With the utmost attention I have considered your resolution of the twenty-fourth instant, requiring me to lay before your house a copy of the instructions to the minister of the United States who negotiated the treaty with the king of Great Britain, together with a correspondence and other documents relative to that treaty, excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed.“In deliberating upon this subject, it was impossible to lose sight of the principle, which some have avowed in its discussion, or to avoid extending my views to the consequences which must flow from the admission of that principle.“I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to withhold any information which the constitution has enjoined upon the president as a duty to give, or which could be required of him by either house of Congress as a right; and with truth I affirm that it has been, as it will continue to be while I have the honor to preside in the government, my constant endeavor to harmonize with the other branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the obligation it imposes to 'preserve, protect, and defend the constitution,' will permit.“The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and, even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions, which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the president, with the advice and consent of the senate; the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the house of representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.“It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the house of representatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat, that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my situation will permit, or the public good shall require, to be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice.“The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the house, leads to some observations on the mode of making treaties under the constitution of the United States.“Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the principles on which the constitution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject; and, from the first establishment of the government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion—that the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and that every treaty, so made and promulgated, thenceforward became the law of the land. It is thus that the treaty-making power has been understood by foreign nations; and, in all the treaties made with them, we have declared, and they have believed, that when ratified by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, they became obligatory. In this construction of the constitution, every house of representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and, until the present time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared, to my knowledge, that this construction was not the true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced; for, till now, without controverting the obligations of such treaties, they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect.“There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with the opinions entertained by the state conventions, when they were deliberating on the constitution; especially by those who objected to it because there was not required, incommercial treaties, the consent of two thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate, instead of two thirds of the senators present; and because, in treaties respecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the concurrence of three fourths of the whole number of both houses respectively was not made necessary.“It is a fact decided by the general convention, and universally understood, that the constitution of the United States was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession.“And it is well known that, under this influence, the smaller states were admitted to an equal representation in the senate with the larger states, and that this branch of the government was invested with great powers; for on the equal participation of those powers the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller states were deemed essentially to depend.“If other proofs than these, and the plain letter of the constitution itself, be necessary to ascertain the point under consideration, they may be found in the journals of the general convention, which I have deposited in the office of the department of state. In those journals it will appear that a proposition was made, 'that no treaty should be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law,' and that the proposition was explicitly rejected.“As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding that the assent of the house of representatives is not necessary to the validity of a treaty; as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits, in itself, all the objects requiring legislative provision, and on these the papers called for can throw no light; and as it is essential to the due administration of the government that the boundaries fixed by the constitution between the different departments should be preserved, a just regard to the constitution and to the duty of my office, under all the circumstances of this case, forbids a compliance with your request.George Washington.”[94]Earnest petitions from these had been sent in to Congress, representing that the property of merchants of the United States, to the amount of five millions of dollars, had been taken from them by the subjects of Great Britain, for which they wanted restitution, and, for that purpose, prayed for measures to execute the provisions of the treaty.[95]History of the United States, second series, i, 603.[96]Letter to Mrs. Adams, April 30, 1796.

[91]Life of Washington.

[92]He referred to Livingston, the author of the resolutions before the house, who was one of the leaders of the populace in New York when Hamilton and King were stoned, while speaking in favor of the treaty, at a public meeting.

[93]The following is a copy of Washington's message to the house of representatives on the thirtieth of March, 1796, assigning his reasons for not complying with their resolution of the twenty-fourth:—“With the utmost attention I have considered your resolution of the twenty-fourth instant, requiring me to lay before your house a copy of the instructions to the minister of the United States who negotiated the treaty with the king of Great Britain, together with a correspondence and other documents relative to that treaty, excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed.“In deliberating upon this subject, it was impossible to lose sight of the principle, which some have avowed in its discussion, or to avoid extending my views to the consequences which must flow from the admission of that principle.“I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to withhold any information which the constitution has enjoined upon the president as a duty to give, or which could be required of him by either house of Congress as a right; and with truth I affirm that it has been, as it will continue to be while I have the honor to preside in the government, my constant endeavor to harmonize with the other branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the obligation it imposes to 'preserve, protect, and defend the constitution,' will permit.“The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and, even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions, which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the president, with the advice and consent of the senate; the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the house of representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.“It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the house of representatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat, that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my situation will permit, or the public good shall require, to be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice.“The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the house, leads to some observations on the mode of making treaties under the constitution of the United States.“Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the principles on which the constitution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject; and, from the first establishment of the government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion—that the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and that every treaty, so made and promulgated, thenceforward became the law of the land. It is thus that the treaty-making power has been understood by foreign nations; and, in all the treaties made with them, we have declared, and they have believed, that when ratified by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, they became obligatory. In this construction of the constitution, every house of representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and, until the present time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared, to my knowledge, that this construction was not the true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced; for, till now, without controverting the obligations of such treaties, they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect.“There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with the opinions entertained by the state conventions, when they were deliberating on the constitution; especially by those who objected to it because there was not required, incommercial treaties, the consent of two thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate, instead of two thirds of the senators present; and because, in treaties respecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the concurrence of three fourths of the whole number of both houses respectively was not made necessary.“It is a fact decided by the general convention, and universally understood, that the constitution of the United States was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession.“And it is well known that, under this influence, the smaller states were admitted to an equal representation in the senate with the larger states, and that this branch of the government was invested with great powers; for on the equal participation of those powers the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller states were deemed essentially to depend.“If other proofs than these, and the plain letter of the constitution itself, be necessary to ascertain the point under consideration, they may be found in the journals of the general convention, which I have deposited in the office of the department of state. In those journals it will appear that a proposition was made, 'that no treaty should be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law,' and that the proposition was explicitly rejected.“As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding that the assent of the house of representatives is not necessary to the validity of a treaty; as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits, in itself, all the objects requiring legislative provision, and on these the papers called for can throw no light; and as it is essential to the due administration of the government that the boundaries fixed by the constitution between the different departments should be preserved, a just regard to the constitution and to the duty of my office, under all the circumstances of this case, forbids a compliance with your request.George Washington.”

“With the utmost attention I have considered your resolution of the twenty-fourth instant, requiring me to lay before your house a copy of the instructions to the minister of the United States who negotiated the treaty with the king of Great Britain, together with a correspondence and other documents relative to that treaty, excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed.“In deliberating upon this subject, it was impossible to lose sight of the principle, which some have avowed in its discussion, or to avoid extending my views to the consequences which must flow from the admission of that principle.“I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to withhold any information which the constitution has enjoined upon the president as a duty to give, or which could be required of him by either house of Congress as a right; and with truth I affirm that it has been, as it will continue to be while I have the honor to preside in the government, my constant endeavor to harmonize with the other branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the obligation it imposes to 'preserve, protect, and defend the constitution,' will permit.“The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and, even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions, which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the president, with the advice and consent of the senate; the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the house of representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.“It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the house of representatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat, that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my situation will permit, or the public good shall require, to be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice.“The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the house, leads to some observations on the mode of making treaties under the constitution of the United States.“Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the principles on which the constitution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject; and, from the first establishment of the government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion—that the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and that every treaty, so made and promulgated, thenceforward became the law of the land. It is thus that the treaty-making power has been understood by foreign nations; and, in all the treaties made with them, we have declared, and they have believed, that when ratified by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, they became obligatory. In this construction of the constitution, every house of representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and, until the present time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared, to my knowledge, that this construction was not the true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced; for, till now, without controverting the obligations of such treaties, they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect.“There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with the opinions entertained by the state conventions, when they were deliberating on the constitution; especially by those who objected to it because there was not required, incommercial treaties, the consent of two thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate, instead of two thirds of the senators present; and because, in treaties respecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the concurrence of three fourths of the whole number of both houses respectively was not made necessary.“It is a fact decided by the general convention, and universally understood, that the constitution of the United States was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession.“And it is well known that, under this influence, the smaller states were admitted to an equal representation in the senate with the larger states, and that this branch of the government was invested with great powers; for on the equal participation of those powers the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller states were deemed essentially to depend.“If other proofs than these, and the plain letter of the constitution itself, be necessary to ascertain the point under consideration, they may be found in the journals of the general convention, which I have deposited in the office of the department of state. In those journals it will appear that a proposition was made, 'that no treaty should be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law,' and that the proposition was explicitly rejected.“As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding that the assent of the house of representatives is not necessary to the validity of a treaty; as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits, in itself, all the objects requiring legislative provision, and on these the papers called for can throw no light; and as it is essential to the due administration of the government that the boundaries fixed by the constitution between the different departments should be preserved, a just regard to the constitution and to the duty of my office, under all the circumstances of this case, forbids a compliance with your request.George Washington.”

“In deliberating upon this subject, it was impossible to lose sight of the principle, which some have avowed in its discussion, or to avoid extending my views to the consequences which must flow from the admission of that principle.

“I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to withhold any information which the constitution has enjoined upon the president as a duty to give, or which could be required of him by either house of Congress as a right; and with truth I affirm that it has been, as it will continue to be while I have the honor to preside in the government, my constant endeavor to harmonize with the other branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the obligation it imposes to 'preserve, protect, and defend the constitution,' will permit.

“The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and, even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions, which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the president, with the advice and consent of the senate; the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the house of representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

“It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the house of representatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat, that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my situation will permit, or the public good shall require, to be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice.

“The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the house, leads to some observations on the mode of making treaties under the constitution of the United States.

“Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the principles on which the constitution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject; and, from the first establishment of the government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion—that the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and that every treaty, so made and promulgated, thenceforward became the law of the land. It is thus that the treaty-making power has been understood by foreign nations; and, in all the treaties made with them, we have declared, and they have believed, that when ratified by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, they became obligatory. In this construction of the constitution, every house of representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and, until the present time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared, to my knowledge, that this construction was not the true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced; for, till now, without controverting the obligations of such treaties, they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect.

“There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with the opinions entertained by the state conventions, when they were deliberating on the constitution; especially by those who objected to it because there was not required, incommercial treaties, the consent of two thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate, instead of two thirds of the senators present; and because, in treaties respecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the concurrence of three fourths of the whole number of both houses respectively was not made necessary.

“It is a fact decided by the general convention, and universally understood, that the constitution of the United States was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession.

“And it is well known that, under this influence, the smaller states were admitted to an equal representation in the senate with the larger states, and that this branch of the government was invested with great powers; for on the equal participation of those powers the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller states were deemed essentially to depend.

“If other proofs than these, and the plain letter of the constitution itself, be necessary to ascertain the point under consideration, they may be found in the journals of the general convention, which I have deposited in the office of the department of state. In those journals it will appear that a proposition was made, 'that no treaty should be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law,' and that the proposition was explicitly rejected.

“As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding that the assent of the house of representatives is not necessary to the validity of a treaty; as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits, in itself, all the objects requiring legislative provision, and on these the papers called for can throw no light; and as it is essential to the due administration of the government that the boundaries fixed by the constitution between the different departments should be preserved, a just regard to the constitution and to the duty of my office, under all the circumstances of this case, forbids a compliance with your request.George Washington.”

[94]Earnest petitions from these had been sent in to Congress, representing that the property of merchants of the United States, to the amount of five millions of dollars, had been taken from them by the subjects of Great Britain, for which they wanted restitution, and, for that purpose, prayed for measures to execute the provisions of the treaty.

[95]History of the United States, second series, i, 603.

[96]Letter to Mrs. Adams, April 30, 1796.

TOP

jefferson's apprehensions concerning jay's treaty—his opinion of gallatin—of the treaty-making power—his letter to mazzei—its effects—disclosure of a confidential paper—jefferson disclaims any participation in the act—his letter to washington, and the reply—ungenerous attacks on washington's character—provision for carrying the treaty into effect—diplomatic changes—washington at mount vernon—efforts to procure the liberation of lafayette—washington's letter to the emperor of germany—washington's farewell address—its authorship.

According to the prediction of Vice-President Adams, the British treaty, after having been “mauled and abused,” was “acquiesced in.” “The treaty will go into operation, and be supported by a great majority of the people,” wrote Jay on the first of May; “a majority comprising the greater part of the men most distinguished by talents, worth, and weight.”[97]

But there were many honest men—men who loved their country, were jealous of its honor, and ready to make personal sacrifices, if necessary, for the commonwealth—who regarded the triumph of the government party, on this occasion, as a public calamity. Among these was Mr. Jefferson, who, from his retirement at Monticello, sent forth, now and then, the thunderbolts of his wrath against political opponents and their measures. He had watched the progress of the treaty in every stage of the ordeal to which it was subjected in Congress, and occasionally gave his views to his friends. He was deeply enamored of Gallatin, and with acute perception, as time demonstrated, he foresaw the value of the young Genevese to his adopted country. “If Mr. Gallatin,” he said, in a letter to Madison on the sixth of March, concerning the operationsof the treasury, “would undertake to reduce this chaos to order, present us with a clear view of our finances, and put them into a form as simple as they will admit, he will merit immortal honor.”

After Gallatin's speech on the treaty, Mr. Jefferson again wrote to Madison, saying, “It is worthy to be printed at the end of the Federalist, as the only rational commentary on the part of the constitution to which it relates.” In reference to the power of the house of representatives, in the matter of treaties, Mr. Jefferson remarked in the same letter, “I see no harm in rendering their sanction necessary, and not much harm in annihilating the whole treaty-making power, except as to making peace. If you decide in favor of your right to refuse your co-operation in any case of treaty, I wonder on what occasion it is to be used, if not in one where the rights, the interest, the honor, and faith of our nation are so grossly sacrificed; when a faction has entered into a conspiracy with the enemies of their country, to chain down the legislature at the feet of both; when the whole mass of your constituents have condemned this work in the most unequivocal manner, and are looking to you as their last hope to save them from the effects of the avarice and corruption of the first agent, the revolutionary machinations of others, and the incomprehensible acquiescence of the only honest man [the president] who has assented to it. I wish that his honesty and his political errors may not furnish a second occasion to exclaim—'curse on his virtues, they have undone his country.'”[98]

On the twenty-fourth of April, in a letter to his friend, Philip Mazzei,[99]then in Florence—a letter which afterward drew down uponthe author the most severe comments—he said, “The aspect of our politics has wonderfully changed since you left us. In place of that noble love of liberty and republican government which carried us triumphantly through the war, an Anglican monarchical and aristocratical party has sprung up, whose avowed object is, to draw over us the substance, as they have already done the form, of the British government. The main body of our citizens, however, remain true to their republican principles; the whole landed interest is republican, and so is a great mass of talent. Against us are the executive; the judiciary; two out of three branches of the legislature; all the officers of the government; all who want to be officers; all timid men who prefer the calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty; British merchants, and Americans trading on British capital; speculators and holders in the banks and public funds, a contrivance invented for the purposes of corruption, and for assimilating us in all things to the rotten as well as the sound parts of the British model. It would give you a fever were I to name to you the apostates who have gone over to these heresies; men who were Samsons in the field and Solomons in the council, but who have had their heads shorn by the harlot England. In short, we are likely to preserve the liberty we have obtained, only by unremitting labors andperils. But we shall preserve it; and our mass of weight and wealth on the good side is so great, as to leave no danger that force will ever be attempted against us. We have only to awake and snap the Lilliputian cords with which they have been entangling us during the first sleep which succeeded our labors.”[100]

A little later, when the government had triumphed in the matter of the treaty, and the public acquiesced, Mr. Jefferson wrote to Monroe, in Paris; “You will have seen, by their proceedings, the truth of what I have always observed to you, that one man outweighs them all in influence over the people, who have supported his judgment against their own, and that of their representatives. Republicanism must lie on its oars, resign the vessel to its pilot, and themselves to the course he thinks best for them.” In this manner the professedly retired statesman, deceived by demagogues, taking Bache's abusive and unscrupulous “Aurora” as his compass in current politics, and with his judgment sadly warped by his prejudices, he threw out, in various directions, ungenerous insinuations against Washington, who, at that moment, was confiding implicitly in Jefferson's integrity, justice, sincerity, and personal friendship. He would not allow himself to be even suspicious of any duplicity or dishonor on the part of his late secretary, even when that gentleman himself supposed Washington had reason to suspect him.

In Bache's “Aurora,” on the ninth of June, were disclosed, by an anonymous writer, a series of questions submitted by Washington, in strict confidence, to the cabinet in 1793, concerning the reception of Genet, and the force of the treaty with France. These were published with the evident design to prejudice the executive in the public mind. This startled Jefferson, and he thought it necessary to put in an immediate disclaimer of all participation in the matter. He wrote to Washington on the nineteenth of June, saying, in reference to the document, “It having been confided to but few hands, makes it truly wonderful how it should have gotthere. I can not be satisfied as to my own part, till I relieve my mind by declaring—and I attest everything sacred and honorable to the declaration—that it has got them, neither through me nor the paper confided to me. This has never been from under my own lock and key, or out of my own hands. No mortal ever knew from me that these questions had been proposed.” Mr. Jefferson then expressed his belief, that one who had been their mutual friend “thought it worth while to sow tares” between the president and himself, and denounced him as an “intriguer, dirtily employed in sifting the conversations of his table, where, alone, he could hear him.”[101]The person here alluded to was General Henry Lee, of Virginia, who had lately become attached to the federal party, and incurred the political enmity of Jefferson.

This letter drew from Washington a most noble reply. On the sixth of July he wrote: “If I had entertained any suspicions before, that the queries, which have been published in Bache's paper, proceeded from you, the assurances you have given of the contrary would have removed them; but the truth is, I harbored none. I am at no loss to conjecture from what source they flowed, through what channel they were conveyed, and for what purpose they and similar publications appear. They were known to be in the hands of Mr. Parker in the early part of the last session of Congress. They were shown about by Mr. Giles during the session, and they made their public exhibition about the close of it.

“Perceiving and, probably, hearing, that no abuse in the gazettes would induce me to take notice of anonymous publications against me, those who were disposed to do mesuch friendly offices, have embraced, without restraint, every opportunity to weaken the confidence of the people; and, by having the whole game in their hands, they have not scrupled to publish things that do not, as well as those which do exist, and to mutilate the latter, so as to make them subserve the purposes which they have in view.“As you have mentioned the subject yourself, it would not be frank, candid, or friendly, to conceal, that your conduct has beenrepresented as derogating from that opinion I had conceived you entertained of me; that, to your particular friends and connections you have described, and they have denounced, me as a person under a dangerous influence; and that, if I would listen more to some other opinions, all would be well. My answer invariably has been, that I had never discovered anything in the conduct of Mr. Jefferson to raise suspicion in my mind of his insincerity; that, if he would retrace my public conduct while he was in the administration, abundant proofs would occur to him, that truth and right decisions were the sole objects of my pursuit; that there were as many instances, within his own knowledge, of my having decidedagainst, as infavor, of the opinions of the persons evidently alluded to; and, moreover, that I was no believer in the infallibility of the politics or measures of any man living. In short, that I was no party man myself, and the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist, to reconcile them.”

“As you have mentioned the subject yourself, it would not be frank, candid, or friendly, to conceal, that your conduct has beenrepresented as derogating from that opinion I had conceived you entertained of me; that, to your particular friends and connections you have described, and they have denounced, me as a person under a dangerous influence; and that, if I would listen more to some other opinions, all would be well. My answer invariably has been, that I had never discovered anything in the conduct of Mr. Jefferson to raise suspicion in my mind of his insincerity; that, if he would retrace my public conduct while he was in the administration, abundant proofs would occur to him, that truth and right decisions were the sole objects of my pursuit; that there were as many instances, within his own knowledge, of my having decidedagainst, as infavor, of the opinions of the persons evidently alluded to; and, moreover, that I was no believer in the infallibility of the politics or measures of any man living. In short, that I was no party man myself, and the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist, to reconcile them.”

This portion of Washington's letter must have been felt by Mr. Jefferson as a severe rebuke of his real insincerity, in throwing out precisely such insinuations as Washington here alludes to. Washington continued:—

“To this I may say, and very truly, that, until within the last year or two, I had no conception that parties would, or even could, go the length I have been witness to; nor did I really believe, until lately, that it was within the bounds of probability, hardly within those of possibility, that, while I was using my utmost exertions to establish a national character of our own, independent, as far as our obligations and justice would permit, of every nation of the earth, and wished, by steering a steady course, to preserve this country from the horrors of a desolating war, I should be accused of being the enemy of one nation, and subject to the influence of another; and, to prove it, that every act of my administration would be tortured, and the grossest and most insidious misrepresentations of these be made, by giving one side only of a subject, and that, too, in such exaggerated and indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero, a notorious defaulter, or even to a commonpickpocket. But enough of this, I have already gone further in the expression of my feelings than I intended.”[102]

When Congress had disposed of the treaty by voting appropriations for the purpose of executing it, nothing remained to complete the business but the appointment of the several officers to carry out its provisions. These were immediately made. David Howell, of Rhode Island, was made commissioner for ascertaining the true river St. Croix; Messrs. Fitzsimons and Innes (the latter soon succeeded by Mr. Sitgreaves) were appointed commissioners on the subject of British debts; and Messrs. Gore and Pinckney commissioners for settling claims for British spoliations.

Some diplomatic changes were made at about this time; Rufus King was appointed minister to England, in place of Thomas Pinckney, who wished to return home; Colonel Humphreys was appointed minister to Spain, in place of Mr. Carmichael, deceased; John Quincy Adams, son of the vice-president, left the Hague, to which he had been accredited, and succeeded Humphreys at Lisbon; and Mr. Murray took Adam's place in Holland. The president was authorized to appoint two or more agents, one to reside in Great Britain, the others at such points as the executive might choose, to investigate and report concerning all impressments of American seamen by British cruisers.

The interesting session of Congress during which Jay's treaty had been the chief topic of debate, was now drawing to a close, and Washington looked to the brief period of repose from public duties, at Mount Vernon, that would succeed the legislative turmoil, with the greatest pleasure. That moment of release came on the first day of June, when the Congress adjourned.

The president's thoughts now turned toward his long-tried friends, and the sweet enjoyments of private life toward which he was hastening. Among the former, the Marquis de Lafayette held a prominent place in his heart. He was yet a prisoner in a far-off dungeon, and his family in exile. Feeble was the arm of any man to give him liberty, especially one stretched toward him from the new republic beyond the sea. Yet Washington left no means untried to liberate his friend. Compelled by circumstances and state policy to be cautious, he was, nevertheless, persevering in his efforts. He well knew that his formal interposition in behalf of the illustrious captive would be unavailing. But he employed the American ministers at European courts in expressing, on every convenient opportunity, unofficially, the interest which the president took in the fate of his friend, and to use every fair means in their power to obtain his release.

While Lafayette was in the hands of the Prussian authorities, James Marshall was sent to Berlin as a special and confidential agent to solicit his discharge. Before Marshall's arrival, Lafayette had been delivered by the king of Prussia into the hands of the emperor of Germany. Mr. Pinckney, the United States minister in London, was then instructed to indicate the wishes of the president concerning the prisoner, to the Austrian minister in England, and to solicit the powerful mediation of the British cabinet. These efforts failed, and Washington, disdaining to make further application to the deputies of sovereignty, whose petty tyranny was proverbial, determined to go to the fountain-head of power in the dominion where his friend was suffering, and, on the fifteenth of May, he wrote as follows to the emperor of Germany:—

“It will readily occur to your majesty, that occasions may sometimes exist, on which official considerations would constrain the chief of a nation to be silent and passive in relation even to objects which affect his sensibility, and claim his interposition as a man. Finding myself precisely in this situation at present, I take the liberty of writing this private letter to your majesty, being persuaded that my motives will also be my apology for it.“In common with the people of this country, I retain a strong and cordial sense of the services rendered to them by the Marquis de Lafayette; and my friendship for him has been constant and sincere. It is natural, therefore, that I should sympathize with him and his family in their misfortunes, and endeavor to mitigate the calamities which they experience; among which, his present confinement is not the least distressing.“I forbear to enlarge on this delicate subject. Permit me only to submit to your majesty's consideration, whether his long imprisonment, and the confiscation of his estates, and the indigence and dispersion of his family, and the painful anxieties incident to all these circumstances, do not form an assemblage of sufferings which recommend him to the mediation of humanity? Allow me, sir, on this occasion to be its organ, and to entreat that he may be permitted to come to this country, on such conditions, and under such restrictions, as your majesty may think it expedient to prescribe.“As it is a maxim with me not to ask what, under similar circumstances, I would not grant, your majesty will do me the justice to believe, that this request appears to me to correspond with those great principles of magnanimity and wisdom which form the basis of sound policy and durable glory.“May the Almighty and Merciful Sovereign of the universe keep your majesty under his protection and guidance.”

“In common with the people of this country, I retain a strong and cordial sense of the services rendered to them by the Marquis de Lafayette; and my friendship for him has been constant and sincere. It is natural, therefore, that I should sympathize with him and his family in their misfortunes, and endeavor to mitigate the calamities which they experience; among which, his present confinement is not the least distressing.

“I forbear to enlarge on this delicate subject. Permit me only to submit to your majesty's consideration, whether his long imprisonment, and the confiscation of his estates, and the indigence and dispersion of his family, and the painful anxieties incident to all these circumstances, do not form an assemblage of sufferings which recommend him to the mediation of humanity? Allow me, sir, on this occasion to be its organ, and to entreat that he may be permitted to come to this country, on such conditions, and under such restrictions, as your majesty may think it expedient to prescribe.

“As it is a maxim with me not to ask what, under similar circumstances, I would not grant, your majesty will do me the justice to believe, that this request appears to me to correspond with those great principles of magnanimity and wisdom which form the basis of sound policy and durable glory.

“May the Almighty and Merciful Sovereign of the universe keep your majesty under his protection and guidance.”

This letter was transmitted to Mr. Pinckney, and by him sent to the emperor, through his minister in Great Britain. “How far it operated,” says Marshall, “in mitigating immediately the rigor of Lafayette's confinement, or in obtaining his liberation, remains unascertained.”

Washington left Philadelphia for Mount Vernon on the thirteenth of June, accompanied by his family, and remained there about two months. During that retirement he made his final arrangements for leaving public life for ever at the close of his term of office, which would occur in March following. We have observed his great reluctance to consent to a second nomination for the chief-magistracyof the republic. The best interests of the commonwealth seemed to require the sacrifice on his part, and it was given, but with a full determination not to yield again, unless there appeared greater danger hovering over his beloved country, which his instrumentality might avert. To this determination he had adhered; and it was always with inexpressible satisfaction that he looked forward to the day when his public labors should cease. But, for cogent reasons, he never made this declaration publicly, until within the last few months of his second administration. His confidential friends well knew his determination, however, and the people generally suspected it. “Those who dreaded a change of system,” says Marshall, “in changing the person of the chief-magistrate, manifested an earnest desire to avoid this hazard, by being permitted once more to offer to the public choice a person, who, amidst all the fierce conflicts of party, still remained the object of public veneration.” But his resolution was fixed. The safety of the nation did not, at that time, seem to require him to remain at its head, notwithstanding there were many and great perils besetting it; and while he was at Mount Vernon he completed the final draft of a “Farewell Address to the people of the United States,” to be published in time for them to choose his successor at the appointed season.

That address had been the subject of deep and anxious thought; and, at the special request of the president, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, Jay, and perhaps others, had given him suggestions in writing, topical and verbal. These he took with him to Mount Vernon, and in the quiet of his library he arranged the address in proper form, using the suggestions of Madison and Hamilton very freely. In the form in which it finally appeared, it remains the noblest production of Washington's mind and heart; and has been pronounced by Alison, the eminent British historian, unequalled by any composition of uninspired wisdom. It is a political legacy which not only the countrymen of Washington, but the inhabitants of the civilized world ought to value as one of the most precious gifts ever bestowed by man upon his race. It is permeated withthe immortal spirit of a trueman, a truepatriot, and a trueChristian.[103]

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