CHAPTER XXX.THE SOLDIER TRIED.—AMERICAN MUTINY.—FOREIGN Judgment.—ARNOLD’S DEPREDATIONS.
Nothing new or unfamiliar to the American student can be said as to the military operations of the British, French and American armies during the closing year of the war for American Independence; but they may be so grouped in their relations to Washington as a Soldier, that he may stand forth more distinctly as both nominal and real Commander-in-Chief. His original commission, it will be remembered, was accompanied by the declaration of Congress that “they would maintain and assist him, and adhere to him, with their lives and fortunes, in the cause of American liberty.” After the Battle of Trenton, when Congress solemnly declared that “the very existence of Civil Liberty depended upon the right execution of military powers,” it invested him with dictatorial authority, being “confident of the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of George Washington.” And in 1778, after the flash of the Burgoyne campaign had spent itself, and the experiences of the American army at Valley Forge attested the necessity for a fighting army under a fighting soldier, Washington was again intrusted with the reorganization of the army, both regular and militia, in respect of all elements of enlistment, outfit, and supply.
From the date of his commission, through all his acts and correspondence, it has been evident, that he has been perfectly frank and consistent in his assignments of officersor troops, either to position or command; and his judgment of men and measures has had constant verification in realized experience.
It was very natural for European monarchs, including Louis XVI., to behold in the very preëminent and assertive force of Washington’s character much of the “one-man power” which was the basis of their own asserted prerogative; and there were astute and ambitious statesmen and soldiers of the Old World who hoped that a new empire, and a new personal dynasty, would yet arise in the western world, to be their associated ally against Great Britain herself. They did not measure the American Revolution by right standards; because they could not conceive, nor comprehend the American conception of, a “sovereign people.”
There was one foreign soldier in the American army, and of royal stock, who must have clung to Washington and his cause, with most ardent passion as well as obedient reverence. Nothing of sacrifice, exposure, or vile jealousy, whether in closet, camp, or field, amid winter’s keenest blasts or summer’s scorching fires, was beyond the life and soul experience of Thaddeus Kosciusko. His name, and that of Pulaski, so dear to Washington, and so true to him, should be ever dear to the American; and in the history of their country’s fall, there should ever be cherished a monumental recognition of ancient Poland and the Pole.
It was one of the most striking characteristics of Washington’s military life that he recognized and trusted so many of these heroic men whose lives had been nursed and developed in the cause of liberty and country. Such men as these beheld in Washington a superhuman regard forman, as man; and the youthful Lafayette almost worshipped, while he obeyed, until his entire soul was penetrated by the spirit and controlled by the example of hisbeloved Chief. Some of these, who survived until the opening of the year 1781, were able to realize that its successive months, however blessed in their ultimate fruition, were months in which Washington passed under heavier yokes and through tougher ordeals than were those of Valley Forge or Yorktown. For the first time during the Revolutionary struggle, the American citizens who did the fighting might well compare their situation under the guardianship of the American Congress, with that of Colonial obligation under the British Parliament and the British crown.
The fluctuations of numbers in the American army seemed very largely to depend upon its vicinity to endangered sections. Remoteness from the seaboard induced indifference to expenditures for the navy, because British ships could not operate on land; and seaboard towns, which were constantly in peril, insisted upon retaining their able-bodied militia within easy reach, until armed vessels could be built and assigned for their protection. The same unpatriotic principle of human nature affected all supplies of food and clothing. It has already been noticed that Washington was profoundly grieved that country people courted the British markets of New York, and that British gold was of such mighty weight in the balance of “stay-at-home comfort,” against personal experience in some distant camp. Starvation and suffering could not fail to arouse resistance to their constraints. The condition of the army was one of protracted agony. Lafayette wrote home to his wife as follows: “Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer one-tenth part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens, to support hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our soldiers,—the hardiest and most patient that are to be found in the world.”
Marshall states the case fairly when he asserts that “it was not easy to persuade the military, that their brethren in civil life were unable to make greater exertions in support of the war, or, that its burdens could not be more equally borne.”
On New Year’s Day, January 1, 1781, the Pennsylvania line (Continentals) revolted, and Captain Billings was killed in the effort to suppress the outbreak. Thirteen hundred men, with six guns, started for Philadelphia. Wayne was powerless to control even his own command; and so advised Washington. The Commander-in-Chief was at first impelled to leave New Windsor and go in person to the camps; but knowing that he had troops who would obey him, whatever conditions might arise, he addressed himself to this state of affairs with a dignity, deliberation, and sympathy, so calm and yet so impressive, that he both retained the full prestige of his position, and secured full control of the disaffection. He allowed passion to subside; and then resolved to execute his own will, at all hazards. The details of his mental struggle, and the precautionary measures taken by him to master the situation, with eager and excited veterans at his back to enforce his will, would fill a volume. Recognizing the neglect of State authorities to furnish their own respective regiments with food, clothing, and money, he proudly, sublimely, and with a dignity beyond any heroic act of the battlefield, called upon the Governors of the Northern States to send their militia, at once,to take care of Clinton’s army in New York, if they wished to prevent the invasion and waste of their own peaceful homes. In other words, as plainly as he could do it, he made the “stay-at-homes” responsible for their own further immunity from battle scenes and battle waste.
This mutiny was indeed, a natural outbreak, inevitable,irresistible! It did not impair loyalty to country. The emergency overwhelmed every purely military obligation in that of self-preservation—of life itself. It did impair discipline, and did disregard authority, for the time; but in its manifestations had many of the elements of lawful revolution. The Statefirst failed in dutyto its defenders. For such a cause, the Revolution had its first outbreaks at Lexington and Concord. Washington was never so great in arms, as when with calm trust and steady nerve he faced this momentous issue. Besides his demand upon the States most exposed to British incursions, for men, he demanded money. Massachusetts and New Hampshire promptly gave twenty-four dollarsextra, in specie, to each enlisted man. Colonel Laurens was appointed as special agent to France, to secure a loan. Eventually, he succeeded; but Count de Vergennes, when advised of his mission, wrote on the fifteenth of February: “Congress relies too much on France for subsidies to maintain their army. They must absolutely refrain from such exorbitant demands. The great expenses of the war render it impossible for France to meet these demands, if persisted in.” Franklin, then at Paris, wrote to his daughter, Mrs. Balche: “If you see Washington, assure him of my very great and sincere respect, and tell him that all the old Generals here amuse themselves in studying the accounts of his operations, and approve highly of his conduct.” Lafayette also wrote, urging full supplies of men and money; with most pointed assurances that the “American States would surely realize success, and be amply able to refund all advances which might be made by the king.”
Up to this time, the individuality of the States, in spite of Washington’s repeated appeals for entire unity of purpose and action on the part of all, had been jealously maintained. A partial relief was afforded, when, on thesecond of March, 1781, the Articles of Confederation finally went into effect, Maryland having yielded her assent on the previous day. Four years and four months had elapsed since their formal adoption and submission to the several States for acceptance.
All the insubordination of the American army before referred to, was well known at British headquarters in New York. That of the previous year had disappointed both Clinton and Knyphausen, who invaded New Jersey, it will be remembered, hoping to reap some benefits from its expression; but now that it assumed such unmistakable signs of armed revolt, they doubled their interest in its movements. General Clinton, mindful of his error on a former occasion, simply watched Washington. He received information of the general insubordination as early as Washington, and on the morning of the twenty-third, sent messengers to the American army with propositions looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents were retained in custody. In writing to Lord Germaine, he says: “General Washington has not moved a man from his army [near West Point] as yet; and as it is probable that their demands are nearly the same with the Pennsylvania line, it is not thought likely that he will. I am, however, in a situation to avail myself of favorable events; but to stir before they offer, might mar all.”
At this period, the influence of the American Commissioners—Adams, Franklin and Jay, was proving very beneficial to the American cause with the Governments of Spain and Holland, as well as with France; and Colonel Laurens, upon his arrival at Paris, after release from prison, pretty plainly assured the French Ministry that it “would be much wiser policy to advance money to America, than to risk such an accommodation with England as would compel America, so near her West Indiapossessions, to make common cause with England against France.” Notwithstanding these negotiations, then in progress, the American army had become reduced to an effective force of barely five thousand men; and the French army could not be disposable for general service while their fleets were so closely confined to the harbor of Newport. The British fleet was wintering at Gardiner’s Bay, L.I., so as to watch all vessels that entered or departed from Long Island Sound, and maintained its blockade. Late in January a violent north-east storm made havoc with the British ships. TheCulloden, line-of-battle ship (74 guns), was sunk. TheBedfordwas dismasted, and theAmericawas driven to sea. Washington seized upon this incident to make a diversion southward and attempt, the capture of Arnold, who was in full commission as a brigadier-general of the British army.
Arnold had left New York with sixteen hundred men, on the nineteenth of the preceding December, for Virginia. His command consisted of the eighteenth British (Scotch) regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Dundas, and the Queen’s Rangers, Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe; the latter being a skilful officer, shrewd and cool, but noted, in the heat of battle, for characteristic ferocity in shortening fights, and thus reducing the number of wounded prisoners to be cared for. Clinton seems not to have fully relied upon the discretion of Arnold, since he reports, having “detailed two officers of tried ability and experience, and possessing the entire confidence of their commander.” As with so many naval expeditions of that period, a gale overtook Arnold on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh of December, scattering his transports, so that without waiting for those still at sea, he landed with twelve hundred men and moved up the James River on the fourth of January. He landed atWestover, twenty-five miles below Richmond, and immediately marched upon the city. On the afternoon of the fifth, he entered Richmond. The militia, under Col. John Nichols, only two hundred in number, assembled upon Richmond Hill, but had to retire before Simcoe’s advance. A few men stationed on Shreve Hill, also retired. At Westham, seven miles above Richmond, a foundry, a laboratory, and some shops were destroyed, as well as the Auditor’s Records, which had been removed from Richmond for safety. Arnold sent a proposition to Governor Jefferson, offering to spare the city if no opposition were made to his vessels ascending the river to remove tobacco and other legitimate plunder of war. Upon rejection of this proposition, he burned so much of the city as time allowed, and returned to Westover, without loss. He carried off seven brass cannon, three hundred stands of arms found in the loft of the Capitol, and a few quartermasters’ stores, as his sole trophies of war. Upon information, however, that Baron Steuben was at Petersburg with some militia, Arnold hastened to Portsmouth to put its defences in better condition.