CHAPTER XIWORKING WITH THE ALLIED NAVIES
The American Navy was the first section of the American fighting forces to take part in the war. It was ready to begin operations at once upon our declaration of war, it lost no time in sending its first contingent across the ocean and the importance of its coöperation with the navies of our co-belligerents constantly increased until the end of hostilities. Aside from the vital consequence of its achievement in operating an Atlantic ferry, one of the capital performances of the entire war, its chief work was done in coöperation with the British, French and Italian navies in European waters from the Mediterranean to the White Sea.
Upon our entrance into the war a patrol force was at once organized charged with the protection of the western waters of the Atlantic and the shores of America, from the Bay of Fundy to Colombia, including the West Indies and all the region west of the 50th degree of longitude. But within a few months it became apparent that the enemy would confine his efforts mainly to European waters and accordingly most of our naval forces were sent overseas. For the protection of our own coasts and coastwise shipping when, during the second summer, enemy submarines appeared along our own shores, submarines, sub-chasers,destroyers, mine sweepers and other small craft of offense and defense were ready to be put into action and prevented the enemy from doing any considerable damage.
At the end of hostilities we had in European waters 364 vessels of all classes, of which 304 were warships, and serving there were 5,000 officers and 70,000 enlisted men of our Navy, a total greater than its full strength when we entered the war. Our destroyers had been steaming an average of 275,000 miles per month and our ships of all classes, including only those actively engaged in naval duties and excluding those operating as escorts, had steamed a total monthly average of 626,000 miles. Individual destroyers steamed a total, during the first year of service overseas, of from 60,000 to 64,000 miles. The Navy established bases at the Azores, Gibraltar, Corfu, at many places along the French coast, at English Channel ports, on the Irish coast, in the North Sea, at Murmansk and at Archangel, fifteen in all. Our 14-inch naval guns mounted on British monitors did their share in the attack on Zeebrugge, and smaller naval guns mounted on floats and manned by Italian crews gave much aid in the defense of Venice.
The bases at the Azores and at Gibraltar, where we maintained a considerable naval force, were provided with all the necessities for our cruisers, destroyers, submarines, chasers and other small craft which joined the Allied navies in the policing of the Mediterranean and the adjacent Atlantic waters where we coöperated in the hunting of the undersea enemy and the protecting of transport and merchant craft. Several of our battleships and cruisers worked with the Italian Navy in Mediterranean waters. Americansub-chasers gave important aid in the battle of Durazzo, in which they were given the advance post of honor and, preceding the Allied fleet, went forward picking a way of safety for the larger vessels through the thickly strewn mine field. Inside the harbor they shared in the battle, aiding in the attacking and sinking of Austrian steamers, destroyers and submarines. Assisting in mining operations and in the construction of a mine barrage was another of the important works of this group of submarine chasers in the Adriatic Sea.
Several naval bases were established along the coast of France and through the last year of the war seventy vessels, of which half were destroyers, operated in these waters, their chief duty being to meet the convoys of American troop and cargo ships and escort them through the danger zone. They also worked up and down the French shores, hunting enemy submarines and escorting coastwise shipping. At all these repair and supply bases it was necessary to provide extensive facilities; a number of huge fuel oil tanks were built, most of the new destroyers and many other ships being oil-burners; several naval hospitals were constructed; a dozen naval port offices were established, from Cherbourg to Marseilles, to expedite the movements of American shipping through as many ports; naval aviation stations were built; rescue tugs and a wrecking steamer watched for and assisted damaged vessels; minesweepers kept open the approaches to the ports.
The principal bases from which our destroyers operated were Gibraltar, Brest and Queenstown, of which the last named was the largest; the submarine chaser bases were at Queenstown, Plymouth andCorfu; and those for our submarines were at the Azores and at Berehaven on the Irish coast. The flotilla of destroyers that was dispatched from the United States a few days after our declaration of war reached Queenstown, part of it within four and the rest within five weeks after that date, and the whole flotilla was at work in coöperation with the British forces within eight weeks after our entrance into the war. In the latter part of 1917 a squadron of six American battleships was sent to strengthen and coöperate with the British Grand Fleet that was on watch in the North Sea to give battle to the German ships if they should come out from their hiding place behind the defenses of Heligoland. It was this vigilant watch of the Grand Fleet, assisted by our battleships, that kept the German navy off the high seas, where it would have raided commerce, made far more difficult the transporting of our troops and war material to France, fought our own and the Allied warships and greatly prolonged the war and made it even more bloody and destructive. Our craft constituted twelve per cent of the fleet that kept the German navy thus bottled up and rendered it incapable of harm.
The American squadron worked in entire harmony with the Grand Fleet, and was assigned to one of the two places of honor and importance in line of battle, the head or rear of the battleship force. So vigilantly did the Grand Fleet keep its watch and so persistently did it go after the enemy whenever he dared to appear, whether in a single ship, a squadron or his entire fleet, and so vigorously chase him back that he ventured out less and less frequently and toward the end rarely came more than a fewmiles from his base. All manner of temptations were used to induce him to come out into the open where battle could be joined—a few ships apparently detached venturing into the Heligoland Bight, merchant ships apparently without protection passing near the entrance to the Bight, and other devices. When the German fleet did emerge and a battle seemed imminent, the American division of battleships headed the line and would have led the attack if the enemy had not slipped quickly back.
The plan of laying a mine barrage across the North Sea, from the Scottish coast to the Norwegian shore waters, originated with the Ordnance Bureau of the American Navy. For some time the British Admiralty insisted that it was not practicable, but after much discussion they finally consented and the details of the operation of the scheme were worked out together. A new type of mine was demanded, because of the depth of the water, and this and a new firing device had already been developed by the Ordnance Bureau of the Navy. The number of mines required to lay a barrage 245 miles long and 20 miles wide was so enormous and the need to have them ready at the earliest possible moment so urgent that it was impossible to provide them by the usual methods of manufacture. Therefore the mine was divided into its many component parts and these were separately produced in as many as four hundred industrial factories. The parts were partially brought together in sub-assemblies in this country, and were thus shipped to Europe, where the complete assembling was done just prior to issue to the mine planters. There were manufactured 100,000 of these mines, of which about 85,000 were shipped abroad, some ofthem being used in similar mine barrages elsewhere. For this purpose a fleet of over fifty merchant ships was taken over by the navy and fitted out for the carrying of all this mine material overseas. Out of the entire fleet only one was lost by enemy action. Mine bases were established on the coast of Scotland, many mine layers and auxiliary vessels were fitted out and the work was carried on at a high rate of speed, sometimes as many as a thousand mines a day being laid. The American Navy furnished all the mines and laid 80 per cent of them for this huge barrage, of a greater length and in deeper water than had ever before been thought possible. The barrage was fatal to at least ten submarines within a short time after it was finished, and had the war continued would have reduced the submarine danger to little consequence.
Immense quantities of oil were needed on the east coast of Scotland for the British and American ships of the Grand Fleet and other purposes and the practice had been to send it on its journey from the United States in tankers around the north coast of Scotland. But enemy submarines took a heavy toll of the precious liquid and the Navy Department suggested the laying of a pipe line across Scotland. The work of laying the line was mainly done by the American Navy, which furnished the pipe for the work. The line could deliver 100 tons per hour and was the longest in Europe. The entire work was completed in six months and was finished on the day when firing ceased.
The relations of the American Navy with the Allied fleets were in every case cordial and harmonious. The close and friendly coöperation was especiallynoteworthy with the British fleet, because the major portion of American operations was with it and the association was closer and more constant. American vessels operated under British command and British under American command effectively and without friction and the ability, skill and seamanlike qualities of each, officers and men alike, won hearty praise from the other. The British Admiralty sent a commission to the American squadron of the Grand Fleet to inquire how the ships were kept in such a state of readiness and high efficiency without sending them to the dockyards.
American naval forces in European waters engaged in 500 battles with submarines, in which it was known that at least ten undersea boats were sunk by them and thirty-six others damaged. Deaths in the Navy from war causes totaled 1,200 and at the close of hostilities there were 15,000 patients in naval hospitals.
In both European and American waters a total of 48 naval vessels of all classes was lost during the war, of which the armored cruiser, San Diego, which struck a mine off the coast of New York, was the most important. The losses were occasioned by submarines, mines, collisions and miscellaneous causes.