"French troops occupying fresh German territory." "Further advance into Germany." "Reinforcements." "French cut off the British bridgehead on the Rhine." "Proposals for new coinage in the Ruhr." What is it all leading to? Is it really reparations? Signor Nitti, who has made a thorough study of all the documents bearing on French designs against Germany, has come definitely to the conclusion that these measures have no reference to the recovery of damages for the devastated area, but that they are all taken in the execution of a vast project for securing French control over all the coal and iron of continental Europe. He supplies chapter and verse for his theory. Something has undoubtedly roused the suspicions of Signor Mussolini. They come rather late in the day to be effective. He naturally does not relish the idea of an Italy whose coal and steel supplies are placed at the mercy of a gigantic trustdirected from Paris. Italy has no coal and iron of her own. Her interest is, therefore, in a free market. Hence Signor Mussolini's alarm. Is there any ground for it? Let those who imagine that Italian statesmen are unnecessarily disturbed read the discussions in the French press leading up to the speeches recently delivered by M. Millerand, M. Barthou, and M. Poincaré.
With regard to M. Barthou's intervention, I feel I must, as one of the founders of the Reparations Commission, say a word. There were important questions of amount, method, and time which could not be determined before the signature of the peace treaty and could not be settled at all without giving Germany a full opportunity of being heard. Hence the appointment of the Reparations Commission. It was called into existence to settle these questions after hearing evidence and deliberating on its effect. Of this commission M. Barthou is now chairman. He, therefore, presides over a body which has committed to its charge judicial functions of a momentous character. He has to adjudicate from time to time on the case presented by Germany under a multitude of different heads. Inflammatory speeches on the very subjects uponwhich he has to preserve judicial calm are quite incompatible with his position. When he occupied the same post M. Poincaré ultimately recognised that he could not continue to write controversial articles on questions which might come before him for decision as a judge. He, therefore, very properly resigned his commissionership.
But to revert to the speeches delivered by these eminent statesmen. If they mean what the actual words convey, then France means to stick to the Ruhr. Not by way of annexation. Oh, no. That, according to M. Barthou, is a "foolish, mendacious and stupid" lie. But France means to hang on to thegagesuntil reparation is paid. What are thegages? The industries of the Ruhr. If the French government is to control the industries which represent the life of this prosperous area for thirty years it assumes greater authority over the district than it exercises over the mining area of the Pas de Calais. In its own mining districts no government takes upon itself—except during a war—to give directions as to the destination and distribution of the coal produced. But there are indications that the control over the Ruhr industries is to be of a much more far-reaching character than this. Andthis is where the hints—broad hints—thrown out by the French press come in. France, in order to secure the payment of the reparation instalments in future, is to be given shares in these great mines and industries. What proportion of shares? Amongst thegagesdemanded by M. Poincaré in August of last year were sixty per cent. of the shares in certain pivotal German industries in the Rhine area. Now the Ruhr industries are clearly to be included within the scope of the demand. France has the iron ore of Lorraine and the coal of the Saar valley. Her financiers have been engaged in buying up coal mines in Silesia. If she can secure the controlling interest in the Ruhr mines and Belgium and Poland can be persuaded to join in the deal, then the continent of Europe will be at the mercy of this immense coal and iron combine.
I said in the previous chapter that the ports were still open. As long as they are, Central Europe can protect itself to a certain extent against this gigantic trust, for the products of Britain and America will be available. But that possibility is to be provided against. Nothing is to be left to chance. One of thegagesis to be control over German customs. How can Germany balance herbudget without a revenue? How can she raise a revenue without a tariff? What more productive tariff than a duty on foreign coal and metal manufactures? And thus all competitive products will be excluded from the German markets. The combine will be supreme.
It is true that if this cynical scheme comes off there is an end of reparations—for the independence of German industry is strangled and its life will soon languish. But there are signs that French enterprise has abandoned all idea of recovering reparations and that it is now brooding upon loot—on an immense scale. For the discussions in the French press contemplate even wider and more far-reaching developments than those involved in the control of German industries. Italy, Poland, and even Russia are to be brought in. The high line taken for years by the Parisian papers about "no traffic with murder" is being given up. Instead we have much sentimental twaddle about restoring the old friendly relations between France and Russia—of course, for a consideration. Russia is to buy; Germany is to manufacture; France is to profit.
These proposals, which have for some time beenin the air, are now actually in type. Now the type is ordinary black—later on it may be red. Twenty lives have already been lost over the preliminaries of execution. I fear there will be many more as the difficulties become more apparent.
It is not without significance that the terms which Germany is to be called upon to accept in the event of her submission have never been formulated. No ultimatum was issued before invasion. If Germany were to-morrow to throw up her hands what conditions would she have to comply with? Who can tell? Germany clearly does not know. The British government does not know. They were never discussed at the Paris conference. M. Poincaré has only asserted with emphasis that he "will not accept promises." If the Ruhr is to be evacuated promises must be accepted at some stage, for Germany cannot deliver ten years' coal instalments in advance, and she cannot pay fifty milliards of gold marks over the counter. So, if M. Poincaré's statement means anything, then the control of Ruhr industries must be vested in France until the whole of the mortgage has been redeemed. Hence the vast plan for the exploitation of Germany, and through Germany of Europe.
A pretty scheme, but—like most plans which make no allowance for human nature—bound to fail. How long would Italy and Russia consent to be exploited for the enrichment of French capitalists? Italy has already made it clear that she has no intention of walking into the trap. Russia may or may not have been approached. It is not improbable that there have been informal soundings. It is not easy to reckon what the Bolshevists may or may not do in any circumstances. But one can be fairly assured that they will not place their heads in the jaws of a rapacious capitalistic crocodile of this character. Brigands are not made of that simple stuff.
Will German statesmen consent to sell their country into political and economic bondage for an indefinite period? It is incredible. No doubt there had been feelers between French and German capitalists for some time before the Ruhr invasion. M. Loucheur and Herr Stinnes are credited with having had conversations on the subject of amalgamating the interests of Lorraine iron ore and Ruhr coal. But the Ruhr invasion has awakened the patriotism of Germany from its stupor. A potent new element has therefore been introducedinto the calculation. This element does not mix well with international finance. It may be depended upon to resist to the last any effort to put German industry under foreign control, and without control thegageis worthless.
Then there is the German workman who must be taken into account. The miner and the engineer in all countries are proverbially independent. They take no orders even from their own governments. During the war they had to be reasoned with before they could be persuaded to take a course urged upon them by the government of the day in the interests of their own country. They will view the commands of a syndicate controlled by foreign governments with suspicion and repugnance. Should disputes arise—and they are more likely than ever to arise constantly under these conditions—who will be responsible for the protection of life, liberty, and property? Will foreign troops operate? Or will the German army and police act practically under orders given from Paris? The popular sympathy will be with the strikers.
It is a fantastic idea born of failure and, therefore, bound itself to be a failure.
London, March 1st, 1923.
When you have walked some distance into a quicksand, and are sinking deeper and deeper with every step you take, it is always difficult to decide whether you are more likely to reach firm ground by pressing forward or by going backward. You must do one or other. You cannot just stand fast, for that is inevitable destruction. The French government clearly are of opinion that safety lies in marching further into the quagmire. So three more German cities have been occupied, more burgomasters and officials expelled, more men and boys shot in the streets, more black troops imported, more regulations and more decrees issued; there are more depressions of French, Belgian and Italian exchanges, more confusion in everybody's business in Central Europe—in a sentence, everywhere there is more quaking sand and less solid coal. The total shortage in deliveries as compared with the promises of Spa was only eight per cent.Had it not been for this fatuous invasion, France during the past six or seven weeks would have already received from the Ruhr nearly 3,000,000 tons in coal and in coke. France has actually received 50,000 tons during this period. A swarm of engineers, railwaymen, bargemen, officials of all kinds, and hotel waiters, supported by a formidable army have in six weeks produced this ridiculous output. No doubt the amount will later on be increased by further pressure and by pouring in more railwaymen, but it will be a long time ere France receives her Spa quota minus eight per cent., and then there will be some months' arrears to make up.
No wonder that M. Loucheur stated flatly in the French Chamber that he did not approve of the Ruhr enterprise. He has one distinct advantage over the Ruhr plungers—he does know something about business. He can boast also of another gift, the possession of which is not without significance when you consider his present attitude. He is an admirable judge of to-morrow's weather. That is a rare endowment amongst politicians. Any simpleton can tell you which way the wind is blowing to-day, but it requires a man of special insight and experience in these matters to forecast the directionof the wind to-morrow. M. Loucheur is one of those exceptionally well-equipped weather prophets. So he satisfies the opinion of to-day by giving his support to M. Poincaré, and he safeguards his position against the morrow's change by stating clearly that he does not approve the policy he supports. I have read no declaration from any French statesman of eminence—with the doubtful exception of M. Barthou—indicating a belief in the wisdom of the venture. And yet French courage, French pride, French loyalty, French patriotism—and maybe French blood and treasure—are committed irretrievably to a reckless gamble which most of the responsible statesmen who led France by their wisdom through her great troubles regard with doubt, anxiety and apprehension.
Will the French government try to extricate themselves from the difficulties into which they have precipitated their country and Europe? I fear not. Heedlessness rushes a man into danger; it needs courage to get out. And when getting out involves an admission of blame there are few men who possess that exalted type of courage. There are other reasons why the present government of France will flounder further into the quicksand. Whengovernments make mistakes in England, the threat of a Parliamentary defeat or a couple of adverse by-elections pulls them out roughly but safely, and the governments start on a new course amid the general satisfaction of friend and foe. The Willesden, Mitcham, and Liverpool elections rescued the government from one of the most hopeless muddles into which any administration has ever contrived to get its affairs. In similar circumstances in France a change of government is negotiated with amazing dexterity and celerity. But you cannot arrange the preliminary overthrow of an existing government unless there is some one in the background ready and willing to form the next. There are generally two or three outstanding men of high repute prepared to serve their country in any emergency. The trouble to-day in France is that every alternative leader disapproves of this enterprise and believes it must ultimately fail. On the other hand, there is no prominent figure in French politics prepared to take upon himself the odium of sounding the retreat. It would always be said that success was in sight, and that had it not been for the new minister's cowardice and perfidy France would have emerged triumphantly out of all herfinancial worries. Thedrapeauwould have been lowered and betrayed. No French statesmen dare face that deadly accusation. So the present French government is tied to the saddle of its charger and is forced to go on.
Another explanation of the difficulty of withdrawing is to be found in the increasing fury of the original fomenters of this rashness. The more fruitless the enterprise the greater the energy they display in spurring the government further into its follies. In the previous article I gave a summary of the ambitious plans they had conceived for syndicating European resources under French control. The industries of Europe controlled from Paris—that is their magnificent dream. Now they propound a new treaty which is to supersede the treaty of Versailles. Boundaries are to be revised, rich provinces and towns practically annexed, the Ruhr coal is to be harnessed to Lorraine coal, and Germany, having been further mutilated and bound, is to be reduced to a state of complete economic subjection. There has been nothing comparable to these ideas since the Norman conquest, when the Saxons, having first of all been disarmed, were reduced to a condition of economic thraldom for theenrichment and glorification of their new masters. Needless to say Britain and America are not to be invited to attend this new peace conference. They are to be graciously informed of the conditions of the new peace when finally established by French arms. The British Empire, which raised millions of men to liberate French soil from the German invaders and which lost hundreds of thousands of its best young lives in the effort, is not even to be consulted as to the settlement which its losses alone make possible. America, who came to the rescue with millions of its bravest, is barely worth a sentence in these ravings of brains intoxicated with an unwholesome mixture of hatred, greed and military arrogance. The French government are not committed by any overt declarations to these schemes; but it is ominous that they issue from the pens whose insistent prodding has driven this government on to its present action. Up to the present no repudiation has come from the head of the government or from any of his subordinates. The very vagueness of his published aims would leave him free to adopt any plans. Pledges for reparation and security will cover a multitude of aggressions.
The British government have just issued as aParliamentary paper a full report of the proceedings of the Paris conference. It is an amazing document. As far as I can see no real endeavour was made by any of its members to prevent a break-up. At the first failure to secure agreement the delegates threw up their hands in despair and sought no alternatives. They agreed about nothing except that it was not worth while spending another day in trying to agree. Even M. Theunis, the resourceful Belgian premier, had nothing to suggest. A blight of sterility seems to have swept over the conference. On this aspect of the fateful and fatal conference of Paris I do not now propose to dwell. I wish to call attention to it for another purpose. I have perused the Blue Book with great care. I was anxious to find out exactly what M. Poincaré proposed to demand of Germany as a condition of submission to the French will. What was Germany to do if she was anxious to avert the fall of the axe? I have read his speeches and annexes in vain for any exposition of these terms. It is true he was never asked the question. That sounds incomprehensible. But every one engaged was in such a hurry to break up the conference and thus put an end to disagreeable disagreements that it never seems to haveoccurred to them to ask this essential question. And the party principally concerned was not represented. The result is that no one knows the terms upon which the French army is prepared to evacuate the Ruhr. Mr. Bonar Law could not explain when questioned in the House of Commons. I am not surprised, for no one has ever told him and he never asked. I am sure that by this time M. Poincaré has quite forgotten why he ever went into the Ruhr. For that, amongst other reasons, he will remain there until something happens that will provide us with an answer.
Most human tragedy is fortuitous.
London, March 10th, 1923.
The French and Belgian governments have slapped another opportunity in the face. To make that slap resound as well as sting, they have accompanied their rejection of the German offer by a savage sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment on the head of the greatest industrial concern in the Ruhr, if not in Europe. What for? Because he ordered the works' syren to sound "cease work" for one day when the French troops occupied the place. There is a swagger of brutality about that sentence which betokens recklessness. It came at a moment when the German government had just made an offer of peace, and when that ally of France who had made the deepest sacrifices in the war to save her and Belgium from ruin was urging the French government to regard that offer at least as a starting-point for discussion. The answer was to treat the German note as an offence, to promulgate that penal sentence which outrages every senseof decency throughout the world, and to refuse to permit an ally, who had been so faithful in the time of trouble for France and Belgium, even the courtesy of a discussion on the tenor of the reply to be given to a note that so vitally concerned the interest of all the Allies without exception. Prussian arrogance in its crudest days can furnish no such example of clumsy and short-sighted ineptitude. It gives point to Lord Robert Cecil's observation in the House of Commons that it is very difficult to reconcile the French attitude with a conception that the French government, with the opinion behind it, desires a settlement.
What is the German offer? It proposes to limit the total obligations of Germany in cash and in kind to thirty milliards of gold marks (£1,500,000,000) to be raised by loans on the international money markets at normal conditions in instalments of:—
There are provisions for payment of interest from July, 1923, onward, and the agreements enteredinto for delivery of payments in kind on account of reparations are to be carried out in accordance with the arrangements already made. Then comes this important provision. After a paragraph in which it is argued that the above figures would strain the resources of Germany to the utmost it adds:—
"Should others not share this opinion, the German government propose to submit the whole reparations problem to an international commission uninfluenced by political considerations, as suggested by State Secretary Hughes."
"Should others not share this opinion, the German government propose to submit the whole reparations problem to an international commission uninfluenced by political considerations, as suggested by State Secretary Hughes."
They further state that the German government are prepared to devise suitable measures in order that the whole German national resources should participate "in guaranteeing the service of the loan." Guarantees are also offered for deliveries in kind. In order to ensure a permanent peace between France and Germany they propose an agreement that all contentious questions arising between them in future should be referred to arbitration. The note finally stipulates that the evacuation of the Ruhr "within the shortest space of time" andthe restoration of treaty conditions in the Rhineland constitute "an essential leading up to negotiations on basis of above ideas." The above represents the substance of the German proposals.
The French and Belgian governments in their reply stand by the May, 1921, schedule of payments and decline to forego even the very problematical "C" bonds of £4,250,000,000. Hitherto it has been common ground that £2,500,000,000 is the figure which Germany can be expected to pay. The French and Belgian governments are now insisting on the full measure of the £6,600,000,000 award. The Hughes proposal they scoff at and treat its putting forward by Germany as part of "an expression of a systematic revolt against the Treaty of Versailles." The real temper and purpose of this intransigeant attitude is to be found in two sentences. Here is the first. Alluding to the resistance offered in the Ruhr to the French attempt to exploit its resources the note says: "The Belgian and French governments cannot take into consideration any German proposal whilst the resistance continues." That is, however complete and satisfactory a proposal may be in itself, it would be rejected unless preceded by abject surrender toFrench designs in the Ruhr. Then later on comes this significant sentence emphasising the moral of the first:—
"The Belgian government and the French government have decided that they will only evacuate the newly occupied territories according to the measure and in proportion to the payments effected. They have nothing to alter in this resolution."
"The Belgian government and the French government have decided that they will only evacuate the newly occupied territories according to the measure and in proportion to the payments effected. They have nothing to alter in this resolution."
An impossible payment is to be insisted upon—costs of occupation are to be added to that, and until both are liquidated French armies are to remain in possession of the richest areas in Germany. Meanwhile the British Empire and the United States of America, who, at a prodigious cost in life and treasure, saved France from a similar humiliation to that which she is now inflicting on Germany, are practically told when they venture to offer suggestions to mind their own business. No interference will be tolerated from meddlers of any sort.
The sum offered by Germany in settlement of reparations is no doubt inadequate. It cannot be accepted by any of the Allies in discharge of theGerman obligations under the treaty. The German government must make a very substantial advance on that offer before they can hope to come to terms with the Allied governments. I have no doubt the German government fully realise that fact, and I am sure they did not put forward these figures as their final tender. They meant them to be taken as a beginning and a basis for negotiation. In fact they say so. When you enter into negotiations your lawyer, if he knows his business, never starts with the figure he is authorised ultimately to propose. Nor does the client always communicate to his advocate the last figure he would be prepared to pay if he had to decide between that and a continuation of the struggle, with its costs and its complications. Once pourparlers begin the original figure disappears, and disappears quickly. That is the history of all negotiation, private and public. A refusal to meet in conference until the figure proposed is acceptable rules out discussion between parties as a means of coming to terms on the main question in a dispute.
I have taken part in the settlement of probably more industrial differences than most politicians. In every case I have started with animpasse. Thefirst meeting of the parties always revealed an apparently unbridgeable chasm between their respective positions; but perseverance and an honest endeavour on both sides to find a solution usually ends in agreement. Goodwill can bridge any abyss. Unconditional surrender if insisted upon between independent bodies is a sure prelude to fresh disputes. The mere fact, therefore, that Germany put forward a proposal which falls short of the needs and equities of the case is not a sufficient reason for declining to meet her representatives at a conference to determine what the right sum should be, and the best method of liquidating it.
But there is another and a stronger reason why the German offer should not have been so peremptorily rejected. It did not end with a submission of an inadequate amount in discharge of reparations claims. Had it done so the French government might perhaps contend that Germany must make up her mind, before she is allowed to confer, to raise that figure to something which at least approximates to the region of acceptability. But even if the French contention in that respect were reasonable, it is ruled out by the circumstance that in this note the German government have proposed analternative if the figure they offer is considered unacceptable. That alternative changes the whole character of the note, when you come to judge of the question of itsbona fides. This proposition consists in the complete and categorical acceptance by the German government of Mr. Secretary Hughes's famous New Haven suggestions. It will be recollected that, as a way out of the reparations entanglement, he proposed that an international expert commission should be set up to inquire into the question of the amount which Germany is capable of paying, and the best method of discharging her obligations once they were fixed. Mr. Hughes made it clear that the United States of America were prepared to assist in such an inquiry. It is this that lent such significance and importance to his speech. When I first read that speech I thought it of such moment that I cabled from Spain to the British and American papers my earnest hope that the Allies, about to sit in conference in Paris, would immediately consider its terms, and act upon it. It seemed to me the supreme opportunity for placing the vexed question which is fretting Europe almost into nervous paralysis on a pathway which must inevitably lead to a real settlement. The moreI think of that proposal, the more am I convinced that it was right, and the more am I perplexed by the rude indifference with which it was treated by the Allied governments. To this hour I am baffled to explain why those who are anxious for a conclusion never brought this momentous declaration of American readiness to take a hand to the notice of the conference. I can suggest explanations, but none which is not a grave reflection on the way in which the proceedings of that conference were handled. I can understand those who wish to exploit reparations for ulterior purposes being anxious to keep America out of the business. But why did Britain, Italy and Belgium neglect this chance of securing the association of the one power which could be helpful to the Allies in reaching a fair and sound decision, and what is equally important, helpful in all subsequent operations for cashing that decision? Now Germany states categorically that, if her cash tender is unacceptable to the Allies, she is willing to leave the question of the amount she is capable of paying to an international tribunal on which America is represented, and to abide by the decision of that tribunal, whatever it may be. That is in substance Mr. Secretary Hughes's suggestion.How can a note containing so reasonable a proposal, and a proposal originally emanating from so powerful and so friendly a quarter, be treated as if it were an insult to the dignity of France—and of Belgium! To declare—as the French note does—that the Hughes proposition is an abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles is to ignore the provisions of that treaty. As a matter of fact it would be a restoration of the treaty. As I have repeatedly pointed out, that treaty delegated the question of the amount which Germany has to pay in respect of reparations to an Allied commission on which the United States of America was to be represented. The function of this commission was to assess the amount of the damages for which Germany is responsible under the treaty, and then to adjudicate on the capacity of Germany to pay those damages in whole or in part.
The commission was authorised to fix the amount of the annual payments to be demanded of Germany on the double basis of liability and capacity. The withdrawal of the only country which had no direct interest in reparations from the treaty left the commission a lop-sided and highly prejudiced tribunal. The reparations commission no longercarries out the treaty idea. Its character has completely changed. It is essential in order to adhere to the Treaty of Versailles that America should have a representative on the tribunal that fixes the payments to be exacted from Germany. The German government now offer to submit the fate of their country to the unaltered clauses of the treaty which was signed in the Galerie des Glaces in June, 1919. France and Belgium have no right in honour to demand submission to any other. Because they insist on enforcing something which is entirely different from the contract entered into by them with Germany in 1919, Europe is disquieted and international relations are saturated with the inflammable spirit of resentment, hatred, and revenge. No wonder Marshal Foch is touring Central Europe to put the Allied armies in order! He seems to me to be the one man in France who has an understanding of what all this is leading up to.
London, May 14th, 1923.
The Germans have tried another note. Inasmuch as all the Allied press without exception are agreed in describing it as a great improvement over the first, it is hardly worth while taking up time and space to demonstrate how the essentials of this more favoured document were contained in its reprobated predecessor. Psychologically it is a decided advance on the first note. It is crisp and condensed, and does not indulge in the irritating processes of an argument. You should never attempt to argue with an angry man who is brandishing a bludgeon—unless you are at a safe distance from him. Germany is in this case at his feet. The second German note therefore is wise in avoiding the provocation of an appeal to reason. It makes its offer simply and uncontentiously.
It also suggests a number of substantial guarantees for the payment of interest on the loans to be raised for reparations purposes. I cannotpretend to assess the value that would be attached to thesegagesby prospective borrowers. I have no doubt they would add materially to the security of the investment. But this array of securities standing alone will not entice the investor to risk his money on a German reparations loan. He will look at Germany as a whole, and not in parts. He will want to know what is likely to happen to that great country during the coming years, and to its industry, its finance, its politics, and its people. A railway which collects its rates and fares in a corrupt currency is of no use as a security for any loan—a customs revenue collected in a fugitive coin is equally worthless. The only reliable basis for a loan is a stable Germany. You can have no stable Germany until you settle reparations. That is, therefore, the first essential preliminary to all discussions ongagesbe theyproductifsor otherwise.
Hence the propositions that really matter in the German note are not those which give a schedule of guarantees, but those which bear on the fixation of the amount which Germany is to be called upon to pay. On this question the note does not increase the sum which the first note estimated as the limit of German capacity. But it reaffirms the readinessof the German government to submit the consideration of the capacity of Germany to pay to an impartial tribunal. It offers to place at the disposal of this body all the material which is necessary to enable it to arrive at a just conclusion. It proceeds to suggest that all further discussion on the subjects at issue between the parties should take place at a conference rather than by interchange of notes. How can any unprejudiced person refuse to recognise the essential reasonableness of this part of the offer? It is common ground that the annuities imposed upon Germany in May, 1921, demand modification. Even M. Poincaré proceeds on that assumption. There is, therefore, a most important and highly difficult figure to be ascertained. What annuity can Germany pay? And when will she be in a position to pay? Is it unreasonable to propose that this question which involves a most searching examination into German assets should be referred to a tribunal which would be capable of giving it calm and judicial consideration? And what objection can there be to discussing the matter at a conference where Germany as well as all the Allies would be represented? If this were a business or a trade dispute these twoproposals would be regarded as eminently sensible and fair, and the party that rejected them would be condemned by public opinion.
What are the objections to acceptance formulated by the French press? Up to the date of writing this article the French government have not officially expressed their views on the German note. But one may safely assume from past experience that Parisian journalists consulted the Quai d'Orsay before writing their critical articles.
The first is that the French government will discuss no proposals emanating from Germany until the latter withdraw its passive resistance to French and Belgian exploitation of the Ruhr. What does this exactly mean? If it imports—as a preliminary condition to conference or consideration of terms—an acquiescence by Germany in the occupation and exploitation by France and Belgium of the Ruhr valley until reparations be fully paid, then the position is hopeless. A German government may submit to such an occupation because it has no force at its command to offer resistance. But no German government can give assent to such an invasion of its territories. A peace signed on such terms would inevitably be repudiated at the first favourableopportunity. Meanwhile there would be constant friction and trouble in the Ruhr. I can hardly believe that this is what the French government mean to insist upon, in spite of an article in theTempswhich bears that interpretation. But they may only ask that whilst terms are being discussed an armistice shall be concluded, the first condition of which will be that all obstacles now interposed in the way of supplying France, Belgium, and Italy with reparation coal and coke shall be withdrawn. An armistice on those terms ought not to be difficult to arrange, especially if the French and Belgian authorities withdraw the ban they have placed on the export of Ruhr products to the unoccupied parts of Germany. Unless the terms are mutually accommodating, I surmise that the German government will experience an insurmountable difficulty in persuading the stubborn miners and railway operatives of the Ruhr to assist in furnishing to France the products of their labour which are denied to their own fellow-countrymen. It is too readily taken for granted that the Ruhr workmen will obey any behest that comes from Berlin. Governments in Germany have ceased to receive that kind of obedience. It is one of the indirect consequences of the greatdisaster that the decrees of Wilhelmstrasse no longer command the respect which attached to them in pre-war days. Still, a conference at which all the interests concerned were represented would experience no difficulty in fixing up stipulations which would make it possible for France to enter a conference on reparations without any suspicion being attached to her ministers that they had lowered the national flag on entering the room. I trust that good sense will prevail over temper and exaggerated pride—on both sides.
Should this preliminary point of honour be disposed of, then what remains? The fixation of the annuities and the guarantees for their payment. What are the objections to accepting the method put forward in the German note for these two points? It is not the German method—it is the American method adopted by the German government. A conference with an impartial tribunal if conference fails. I know of no other way except a resort to blind force.
It is objected that the Treaty of Versailles has already provided such a tribunal in the reparations commission for the specific purpose of adjudicating upon Germany's liability and Germany's capacity,and that to set up another for exactly the same purpose would be to supersede that treaty. There are two answers to this contention. The first is that the reparations commission as at present constituted is not the body to which Germany agreed to refer these questions so vital to her existence. It is not the body which Britain and the other Allies contemplated. The withdrawal of America from the commission—after Germany had already signed the treaty—has completely changed the balance and therefore the character of this tribunal. No man in his senses can pretend that in its mutilated form it is either impartial in its composition or judicial in its methods. M. Poincaré does not conceal the fact that the French government issues orders to its representative on that "judicial" body. The chairman is an eminent French deputy who has played and still plays a conspicuous and influential part in French politics, and is looking forward to pursuing his career as a politician whithersoever it may lead. Ever since he has been chairman he has delivered speeches in public denouncing the party of whose case he is supposed to be the chief judge. All his colleagues represent powers who have a direct pecuniary interest in the result of their decisions. Theonly disinterested power has retired from the commission. The American proposal is very moderate. It implies the restoration of the treaty by reintroducing America to the body that settles reparations. If France objects to the appointment of a separate commission why should it not be agreed between the Allies that their representatives on the body of experts to be set up shall be the men who now constitute the reparations commission? To these the American government could add their nominee. Germany has a right under the treaty to present her case. The whole question of capacity could then be gone into in the light of the experience acquired during the last four years, and a settlement could thus be effected on a sound basis. Such settlement would have a much better chance of being workable, and therefore more durable than terms imposed by force on a people who only accept under duress.
But whatever the French view may be of the suggested annuities or guarantees, or of the impartial commission, it is inconceivable that they should reject the conference. It is the surest road to reparations. At Spa the method of pelting the bewildered Reich with demand notes was for atime abandoned, and that of conference at the same table was substituted. The results were admirable. The process of disarmament made immediate strides towards satisfactory completion, and the coal deliveries became fuller and steadier. At Cannes last year the Allies once more started to confer with German ministers. All those who were present at those discussions—without exception—admit that satisfactory progress was being made towards a comprehensive settlement when the conferees were scattered by a bomb. It is too early yet to estimate the loss which inured to Europe through that explosion. But all idea of discussion between the parties has since been loftily and petulantly dismissed as an exhibition of pernicious weakness. What has been substituted for it? For twelve months we had rather a ridiculous display of feather-rustling about the farmyard to inspire terror. Threatening speeches full of ominous hints of impending action were delivered at intervals in different parts of France. These produced nothing but increased confusion and incapacity to pay. Every speech cost France milliards in postponed reparations. French opinion not unnaturally insisted on some action being taken. Hence this rashinvasion. At Cannes a two-year moratorium would have been accepted as a settlement. Already a year and a half of that period would by now have elapsed. German finances would, under the strict Allied supervision which was conceded, by now have been restored to soundness—the mark would have been stabilised, and a loan could have been negotiated which would have provided the Allies with substantial sums towards lightening the burdens they are all bearing. Confidence would have been restored in Europe, and for the first time there would have been real peace. One can see what the alternative has produced. Whatever the final terms may be, Germany is not in a financial position to pay what she was able to offer then. These eighteen months have been devoted to reducing assiduously German capacity to pay Allied debts, and the value of the German security for such payment. At Cannes the mark stood at 770 to the pound sterling. It now stands at 500,000. Germany will need an extended moratorium to recover from the clumsy mishandling of the past year and a half. The mark has to be picked up out of the abyss into which it has been thrown by those whose interest it was to lift it out of the depression wherein it lay.A debtor on whose restored health and nerve payment entirely depends has been violently pushed down several flights of stairs. It will take him a long time to recover from the bruises, the shake, and the loss of blood. What an achievement in scientific debt collecting! If reparations are ever to be paid the Allies must retrace their steps and get back to conference. Once the parties—all the parties—sit round the table I feel assured that the common sense of most will in the end prevail. We shall never get back what has been lost during 1922-23, but we shall get something that will help. It will take some time to set up the tackle for hoisting the mark out of the crevass and some to do the winding. But the sooner a start is made the less winding there will be to do. So for everybody's sake it is high time to stop the strutting and get back to business.
What a muddle it all is! France and Germany are both anxious to settle in the Ruhr, but are too proud to admit it. The struggle, therefore, goes on, and will continue to the detriment of both. Belgium is sorry she ever entered the Ruhr, but cannot get out of it. Every time she tries to get away France pulls her back roughly by the tail of her coat, so she has to do sentry-go at Essen whilst her franc is leading a wild life at home. Italy has forgotten that she ever sanctioned the occupation, and her moral indignation is mounting rapidly, although it has not yet risen to a height which is visible across the Alps. Great Britain is growling futile notes of dissatisfaction with everybody—France and Germany alike. The confusion of tongues is deafening and paralysing, and no one is quite happy except the spirit of mischief who is holding his sides with ghoulish laughter. He never had sucha time—not since the Tower of Babel. And this time it may end in a second deluge.
The horror of the Great War seems to have unhinged the European mind. Nations do not think normally. The blood pressure is still very high. The excitement over the Ruhr does not tend to improve it. When some of the articles written and speeches delivered to-day come to be read by the diligent historian a generation hence, he will recognise there the ravings of a continent whose mental equilibrium has been upset by a great shock. The real issue involved in all this struggle is a comparatively simple one. How much can Germany pay and in what way can she pay? America, Britain, Italy and Germany are all agreed that the only way to settle that question is to appoint competent experts to investigate and report upon it. The Pope also has blessed this reasonable suggestion. France, on the contrary, says it is a question to be determined by guns and generals—both equally well fitted for that task. Germany must present her accounts to the mitrailleuse and argue her case before the soixante-quinze. It is a mad world.
Every one is interested in one question—orperhaps two. How will it all end and how soon is that end coming? Although I have nothing to fear from recalling the predictions of my early articles on this subject, I hesitate to hazard a fresh forecast. But one may review the possibilities and note the drift of the whirling currents. In assessing the chances, you must begin with some knowledge of the man who will decide the event. M. Poincaré is possessed of undoubted ability and patriotism, but he is also a man who lives in a world of prejudices so dense that they obscure facts. You have but to turn to one statement in his last note where he says the conferences and ultimatums of the past four years secured nothing from Germany. What are the facts? During the three and a half years that preceded the Ruhr invasion, Germany paid to the Allies in cash and in kind over ten milliards of gold marks,—£500,000,000 in sterling, 2,000,000,000 in dollars—a considerable effort for a country which had but lately emerged out of the most exhausting of wars and whose foreign trade was down sixty to seventy per cent. You might imagine that a man who had taken the grave step of ordering armies to invade a neighbour's territories would also have taken the trouble to ascertain the elementary factsof his case. Part of this gigantic sum went to pay for Armies of Occupation; part for Reparations, but it all came out of German assets. Will the next three and a half years bring anything approximating that figure to the Allied coffers?
It is a safe statement to make that no one in charge of the French movements anticipated a resistance approaching in its stubbornness to that which they have encountered. The friendly Press, both in France and in England, foretold a speedy collapse of the German opposition, and on this assumption all the French plans were based. During the first days of the occupation an Englishman asked a French officer how long he thought it would take. The answer is indicative of the spirit in which the venture started: "Optimists think it will take a fortnight," he said; "pessimists think it may take three weeks." A reference to the January telegrams from Paris and Düsseldorf will show that this officer accurately expressed the general sentiment of those who were responsible for the Ruhr invasion. Soldiers estimate the chances of resistance in terms of material and trained men, and statesmen too often build their hopes on the same shallow foundation. They never allow for theindomitable reserves of the human heart, which do not figure in Army Lists or Statesmen's Annuals. The resistance of Paris in 1870 was as confounding to Bismarck as the stubbornness of the Ruhr miners is to Poincaré to-day. The last regular army had been destroyed, all docketed food stores exhausted, and still the struggle of the devoted citizens went on for months. There were few men in England who thought the Boer peasants could continue their resistance for more than three months after our armies reached South Africa. The three months ran into three years and only then capitulated on honourable terms. The Northern States of America never contemplated the possibility of a five years' struggle with a blockaded, starved and overwhelmed Confederacy. The War of 1914-18 is littered with miscalculations attributable to the blind refusal of rulers and their advisers to recognise the moral element as a factor in the reckoning. The Ruhr tragedy is not the first, nor indeed may it be the last, to be initiated by facile memoranda framed by General Staffs and civilian functionaries, drawing their inspiration from pigeonholes.
Whatever may transpire in the Ruhr it is already clear that the estimates of military men, oftransport officials, of intelligence departments, and of presiding Ministers, have been hopelessly falsified. Many more soldiers have been sent into the Ruhr than had been thought necessary: a great deal less coal has come out of the Ruhr than had been confidently expected. There are already as many Frenchmen in the Ruhr as Napoleon commanded at Waterloo; and they have succeeded in sending across the frontier in six months only as much coal as the Germans delivered in one month during the period of "default" which provoked the invasion. Desperate efforts have been made at great cost to increase the yield with a view to satisfying French and foreign opinion that resistance is gradually breaking down. Rubbish is shovelled into wagons in order anyhow to swell the quota. Coal is seized anywhere, even in the streets. And Monsieur Trocquer, the bluff and genial Breton in charge of the transport arrangements, breezily challenges all the critics to look at the mounting pyramids of his dustcart collection and rejoice with him in the triumph of French organisation under his control. Alas, the Celtic fire of Monsieur Trocquer, even when fed by the sweepings of the Ruhr, cannot keep going the blast furnaces of Lorraine! So we finddisappointment and discontent amongst the forge-masters of France.
But there is a limit to human endurance. Either France or Germany must give way in the end. Which will it be, and when will it come—and how? In answering these questions one must remember that for France the honour of her flag is involved in success. Failure would irretrievably damage her prestige. Every Frenchman knows that. That is why French statesmen who disapprove of the invasion support the Government in all their proposals for bringing it to a successful end. And here France has a legitimate complaint against her Allies. It is useless for Italy now to counsel wisdom. Signor Mussolini was present at the "hush Conference" which sanctioned the invasion. He fixed the price of assent in coal tonnage. That price has been regularly paid. Belgium is now becoming scared at the swelling magnitude of the venture. But she committed her own honour as well as that of France to carrying it through. I regret to think that Britain is not free from responsibility in the matter. It is true that her representatives disapproved of the enterprise, but not on grounds of right or justice. On the contrary, whilstexpressing grave doubt as to the ultimate success of the invasion they wished the French Government well in the undertaking on which they were about to embark. Not one of the Allies is in a position with a clean conscience to urge France to haul down her flag. There is only one course which could be urged on the French Government as being consistent with French honour, and that is the reference of the dispute to the League of Nations. Such a reference would be an enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles. That suggestion the British Government have refused to press on France. The struggle must, therefore, proceed to its destined end.
It may be assumed that the British Government will not intervene effectively. How about the ministerial declarations? Surely these strong words must be followed by strong action! Those who rely on that inference know nothing of the men who use the words or of the forces upon which they depend for their ministerial existence. It is true that some weeks ago Mr. Snodgrass took off his coat and proclaimed cryptically, but fearlessly, that unless peace was restored on his terms something would happen. The French Government, unperturbed, replied that they meant to persist in theircourse. So last week Mr. Snodgrass takes off his waistcoat. But do not be alarmed: there will be no blows: his friends will hold him back. Meanwhile, Mr. Winkle has left for Paris in order to lunch with one of the combatants. Next week he will be followed by Mr. Pickwick, who will call on another, and the week after Mr. Tupman proposes to pay another propitiatory visit. It will be an incalculable advantage to M. Poincaré that they each represent a different and conflicting point of view. The French have accurately taken the measure of the mind and muscle of those who indulge in these spectacular exhibitions of ball punching in Westminster with cakes and ale at Rambouillet. We may therefore assume that whatever conversations take place at these general gatherings or ensue from them, the French will not be talked out of the Ruhr.
From the emphatic declarations made by the head of the French Government it is gathered that France will insist at all costs on enforcing her will. She has put forward two demands. The first is that Germany shall abandon passive resistance as an essential preliminary to negotiation. The second is that her forces should remain in the Ruhr until the last payment is made. Will the GermanGovernment accept these conditions? A settlement on these terms is only possible on two assumptions. The first is that a German Government can be found strong enough to accept them and to survive their acceptance. The second is that there is a French Government wise enough to give a liberal interpretation to these demands. The first depends to a large extent on the second.
The events of the past few months have added immeasurably to the difficulties of negotiation. Incidents inseparable from a foreign occupation in any land have exasperated German opinion and reached depths of hatred which had never been stirred even by the Great War—the deportation of 75,000 Germans from their homes in the Ruhr area, the repression, the shooting, the starving, the holding up of food trains until essential supplies rot. The myriad insolences of unchallengeable force, the passions which make French policy so intractable are entirely attributable to the German occupation of France. Frenchmen are now sowing the same seeds of anger in the German breast. Hatreds are bad negotiators. That is why I despair of a real settlement.
But Germany may collapse. She might evenbreak up, temporarily. The authority of the Central Government has already largely disappeared. There is practically no collection of taxes. The mark has gone down in a little over a week from 1,000,000 to the £ to 27,000,000.[3]How can any Government collect taxes in such a fugitive and attenuated currency? You might as well try to collect land taxes on the tail of a comet. The state of the currency is but a symptom of the general disintegration. Berlin has ceased to wield any influence in Bavaria, and the Monarchy might be restored in that Province at no distant date. There is a movement in the Rhineland to set up a Republic freed from the dominion of Prussia. This movement is fostered by French agencies and financed by French subventions. If it is declared Prussia will not be allowed to suppress it. We may, therefore, soon witness a Rhineland Republic whose glorious freedom and independence will be jealously guarded against internal as well as external foes by the coloured warriors of Senegal and Cochin-China. Saxony might be captured by Communists and Prussia be torn between Monarchist and Communist. These are not unlikelyhappenings. Is it too much to say they are not altogether out of the computation of French statesmanship? If Germany dissolves, then the Rhineland and the Ruhr would remain under the dominion of France. France would not secure reparations, but she would enjoy security, and she would, so it is conjectured, enormously enhance her power in the world. An old French dream would be realised. The work of Bismarck would be undone and the achievement of Napoleon would be restored and perpetuated. There is an old Welsh adage which says that it is easy to kindle a fire on an old hearthstone. This idea of a Rhineland under French domination is the old hearthstone of Charlemagne. Mazarin sought to relight its flames. Napoleon the First kindled on it a blaze that scorched Europe. Napoleon the Third had hopes of warming his chilling fortunes at the glow of its embers, and now the great victory of 1918 has set French ambitions once more reviving the fires on the old hearthstone of a Rhineland ruled by the Frank.
Altogether it is a bad look-out for Europe.
London, August 6th, 1923.