THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY
Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch. Dynastic connexions united the two imperial houses; and the common policy of repression of Polish nationality—the fatal legacy of the days of Frederic the Great and Catharine II—united the two empires. National sentiment in Russia was, however, always anti-German; and as early as 1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the Russian Government away from Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and under William II German policy left the Russian connexion, and in close touch with Austria embarked on Balkan adventures which ran counter to Russian aims, while Russia on her side turned to new allies.
The new direction of Russian policy, which has brought the aims of the Russian Government into close accord with the desires of national Slav sentiment, was determined by Balkan conditions. Bismarck had cherished no Balkan ambitions: he had been content to play the part of an 'honest broker' at the Congress of Berlin, and he had spoken of the Bulgarian affair of 1885 as 'not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.' William II apparently thought otherwise. At any rate Germany seems to have conducted, for many years past, a policy of establishing her influence, along with that of Austria, through South-Eastern Europe. And it is this policy which is thefons et origoof the present struggle; for it is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated by Russia, so long as Russia is true to her own Slav blood and to the traditions of centuries.
After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, she turned for compensation to the Balkans. If Venetia was lost, it seemed some recompense when in 1878 Austria occupied Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Hence she could expand southwards—ultimately perhaps to Salonica. Servia, which might have objected, was a vassal kingdom, the protégé of Austria, under the dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope to follow the line to Salonica,[22] so Germany, before the end of the nineteenth century, seems to have conceived of a parallel line of penetration, which would carry her influence through Constantinople, through Konieh, to Bagdad. She has extended her political and economic influence among the small Slav states and in Turkey. In 1898 the King of Roumania (a Hohenzollern by descent) conceded direct communication through his territories between Berlin and Constantinople: in 1899 a German company obtained a concession for the Bagdad railway from Konieh to the head of the Persian Gulf. In a word, Germany began to stand in the way of the Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling in Constantinople: she began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, to exploit his country, and to seek to oust Russia generally from South-Eastern Europe.
In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received a check. A blood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted the pro-Austrian Obrenovitch, and put in its place the rival family of the Karageorgevitch. Under the new dynasty Servia escaped from Austrian tutelage, and became an independent focus of Slav life in close touch with Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, when Austria took advantage of the revolution in Turkey, led by the Young Turks, to annex formally the occupied territories of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Servia, which had hoped to gain these territories, once a part of the old Servian kingdom, was mortally offended, and would have gone to war with Austria, if Russia, her champion under the new dynasty, could only have given her support. But Russia, still weak after the Japanese war, could not do so; Russia, on the contrary, had to suffer the humiliation of giving a pledge to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that she would not support Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. She has saved money, she has reorganized her army, she has done everything in her power to gain security for the future. And now that Austria has sought utterly to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge (unproved, in the sense that no legal proof was offered)[23] of complicity in the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Russia has risked war rather than surrender her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slav sentiment imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia: no government could refuse to listen to the demand. The stake for Russia is not merely the integrity of Servia: it is her prestige among the Slav peoples, of which she is head; and behind all lies the question whether South-Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and lost to Russian influence.
Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern Europe: she has irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier. The vitality and the increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has excited deep German alarm. The German Government has therefore of late years pursued a policy of repression towards its own Slav subjects, the Poles, forbidding the use of the Polish language, and expropriating Polish landowners in order to plant a German garrison in the East. Teutonism is really alarmed at the superior birth-rate and physical vigour of the Slavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic policy, and there has been an extensive boycott of German goods in Russian Poland. The promise made by the Tsar, since the beginning of the war, that he would re-create the old Poland, and give it autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelled from the days, not so far distant in point of time, when it was her policy to repress the Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has made the breach between Germany and Russia final and irreparable.
It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great Slav Empire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders. But why, it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with English? Is there any bond of union except the negative bond of common opposition to Germany? There is. For one thing England and Russia have sought to pursue a common cause—that of international arbitration and of disarmament. If neither has succeeded, it has been something of a bond between the two that both have attempted to succeed. But there are other and more vital factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought Russia for the sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fight Russia for the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, the interest of England in maintaining independence in the South-East of Europe now coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the new constitutional Russia of the Duma is Anglophil.
'The political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were learnt chiefly from England, the study of whose constitutional history had aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelligible to a present-day Englishman. All three Dumas ... were remarkably friendly to England, and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for quotation.'[24]
In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owed much to the inspiration of England.
Notes:
[Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign minister of Austria (1906-1912), started the scheme of the Novi Bazar railway to connect the railways of Bosnia with the (then) Turkish line to Salonica. See alsoCorrespondence, No. 19, Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica railway.']
[Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called proofs, seeAppendix IV,infra.]
[Footnote 24:Camb. Mod. Hist. xii. 379.]
CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS
CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS
The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, is merely intended as an introduction to the analytical and far more detailed account of the negotiations and declarations of those days which the reader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine the narrative to a plain statement of the successive stages in the crisis, neither discussing the motives of the several Powers involved, nor distinguishing the fine shades of difference in the various proposals which were made by would-be mediators.
The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the old quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a visit of ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centre of the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the town, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot by assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (supra,p. 54), and who desired that these provinces should be united to Servia.
The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to the conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from a Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the Servian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who provided the pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed from Servia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian customs-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published no proof of these conclusions,[25] but, on July 23, forwarded them to the Servian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, it was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia within forty-eight hours.[26] This ultimatum included a form of apology to be published on a specified date by the Servian Government, and ten engagements which the Servian Government were to give the Austro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of these engagements is explained in thenext chapter(pp. 103-7).
On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the other Powers of Europe,[27] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper, theNorddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. It was therefore intended to be a public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the 'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power, could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia.[28]
Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with France and Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia could accept some of the Austrian demands.[29] To the Austro-Hungarian Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July 24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges against Servia.[30] On July 25 Russia told England[31] that Servia would punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed to arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy—the four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators.
On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the Servian Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austrian demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points, the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. The Austrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, and criticized its details in an official memorandum.[32] The Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia.
Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England's solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and after July 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France, England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[33] Germany, however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia consented to it.[34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase ordering mobilization,[35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[36] This offer was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[37]
No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28, the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July 29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary.
Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and July 31.[40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military preparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim 'imminent state of war' (drohende Kriegsgefahr) as a counter measure to the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July 30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thus indicated.[43] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russia that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization against both France and Russia.[44] But on July 27, Russia had explained that her mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian frontier.[45] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to participate in the 'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose of mediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.[46] Germany in fact believed, or professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though not proclaimed, was already far advanced.[47]
On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still in progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31, Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany each took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to France asking what course she would take in the event of war between Germany and Russia.
Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir Edward Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made overtures to England, with the object of securing England's neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. On July 29 Germany offered, as the price of English neutrality, to give assurances that, if victorious, she would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France; but refused to give a similar assurance respecting French colonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality.[48] These proposals were refused by England on July 30.[49] On August 1 the German Ambassador unofficially asked England to remain neutral on condition that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey replied that England's hands were still free, and that he could not promise neutrality on that condition alone.[50]
Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that she would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia.[51] On July 31 the English Cabinet, being asked by France to declare definitely on her side, replied that England could give no pledge at present.[52] On the same day England asked France and Germany to engage to respect Belgian neutrality. France assented, Germany evaded giving a reply.[53] But, on August 2, German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; and England promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked by the German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea.[54] On August 4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed to King George announcing that Germany had demanded passage for her troops through Belgian territory, and appealing to England for help.[55] On the same day, August 4, England sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for assurance, before midnight, that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.[56] This demand was taken at Berlin as equivalent to a declaration of war by England against Germany.
DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR
DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR
June 28. Assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg.
July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern waters.
July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the Servian crime laid before the Emperor.
July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French army.
July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway Shares, especially by Berlin operators.
July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the Hungarian Chamber, describes war as a sadultima ratio, 'but every state and nation must be able and willing to make war if it wishes to exist as a state and a nation.'
TheTimesleading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is commented on in Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia.'
July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule problem.
July 21. TheFrankfurter Zeitungwarns Austria-Hungary of the folly of its campaign against Servia.
July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving her 48 hours in which to accept.
July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The Austro-Hungarian demands considered as an indirect challenge to Russia.—Strike at St. Petersburg.
Failure of the conference on Home Rule.
July 25. Saturday. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory by Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave Belgrade.
Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of time-limit allowed to Servia.
Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg.—Serious riot in Dublin.
July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications.
Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered.
Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.
Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night.
July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a conference. German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a 'conference.'
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.
British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres.
Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning the attitude of Great Britain.
TheTimesBerlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser returned this afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam.
July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia.
Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.
Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the Servian reply.
The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar.
July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.
Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise territorial integrity of France, but will not extend the same assurance for French colonies.
Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not necessarily stand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace failed.
Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain indifferent.
The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser; the latter replies.
July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hungarian forces.
The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the gravity of the situation, and postpones discussion of the Home Rule Amending Bill.
The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser.
July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered.
Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect neutrality of Belgium.
France promises to respect Belgian neutrality; Germany is doubtful whether any answer will be returned to this request.
Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its ultimatum to Servia.
Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar.
Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her mobilization should cease within 12 hours.
Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define her attitude in case of a Russo-German war.
English bankers confer with the Government about the financial situation.
Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of English ships at Hamburg.
Orders issued for general mobilization of French army.
Orders issued for general mobilization of German army.
Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg.
Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet will protect the North Coast of France against the German fleet.
Germans enter French territory near Cirey.
Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other members of the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive war.
Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium.
Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of Commons.
Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory.
Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer by midnight.
The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, practically announcing war against Germany and explaining the British position.
Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.
Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his passport.
Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.
Notes:
[Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in the German version of the German White Book (pp. 28-31) from an Austrian official publication of July 27. We print the extracts (the original not being accessible in this country) inAppendix IV.]
[Footnote 26: Full textinfrain Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 18-23); more correctly inCorrespondence respecting the European Crisis, No. 4, Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but the differences between the two versions are immaterial for our present purpose.]
[Footnote 27: See the communication to England inCorrespondence, No. 4.]
[Footnote 28:Correspondence, No. 9, Note communicated by the German Ambassador, July 24.]
[Footnote 29:Correspondence, No. 6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]
[Footnote 30:Correspondence, No. 13, Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.]
[Footnote 31:Correspondence, No. 17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]
[Footnote 32: For text of Servian note seeinfraAppendix I (German White Book, pp. 23-32). The Austrian comments also are given there.]
[Footnote 33:Correspondence, No. 42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 27;ibid. No. 49, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
[Footnote 34:Correspondence, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
[Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46 (infrainAppendix I). The Tsar to His Majesty, July 30.]
[Footnote 36:Correspondence, No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey.]
[Footnote 37: Austria declined conversations on July 28 (Correspondence, No. 93); but for conversations of July 31 seeCorrespondence, No. III; of August I, seeAppendix V.]
[Footnote 38:Correspondence, No. 70 (I). M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, July 28.]
[Footnote 39:Correspondence, No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
[Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43, 45 (inAppendix I,infra).]
[Footnote 41:Correspondence, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42, Exhibit 17 (infra,Appendix I).]
[Footnote 43:Correspondence, No. 105 (Enclosure 3), July 30.]
[Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7; the date of the warning seems to be July 27.]
[Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40, Exhibit II.]
[Footnote 46:Ibid. p. 9.]
[Footnote 47:Ibid. p. 10.]
[Footnote 48:Correspondence, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 49:Ibid. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]
[Footnote 50:Correspondence, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 1.]
[Footnote 51:Ibid. No. 105. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30.]
[Footnote 52:Ibid. No. 119. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
[Footnote 53:Ibid. No. 114, 120, 122.]
[Footnote 54:Ibid. No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2.]
[Footnote 55:Ibid. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4.]
[Footnote 56:Ibid. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4]
NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS
NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS
For purposes of reference the following list ofdramatis personaemay be useful:—
GREAT BRITAIN: King George V,succ. 1910.Foreign Secretary: Sir Edward Grey.Ambassadors from France: M. Paul Cambon.Russia: Count Benckendorff.Germany: Prince Lichnowsky.Austria: Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein.Belgium: Count A. de Lalaing (Minister).
RUSSIA: Emperor Nicholas II,succ. 1894.Foreign Secretary: M. Sazonof.Ambassadors from Great Britain: Sir George Buchanan.France: M. Paléologue.Germany: Count Pourtalès.Austria: Friedrich Count Szápáry.
FRANCE: Raymond Poincaré,President, elected1913.Premier: M. Viviani.Acting Foreign Secretary: M. Doumergue.Ambassadors from Great Britain: Sir Francis Bertie.Russia: M. Isvolsky.M. Sevastopoulo (Charge d'Affaires).Germany: Baron von Schoen.Austria: Count Scézsen.
GERMANY: Emperor William II,succ. 1888.Imperial Chancellor: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.Foreign Secretary: Herr von Jagow.Ambassadors from Great Britain: Sir Edward Goschen.Sir Horace Rumbold (Councillor).Russia:M. Swerbeiev.M. Bronewsky (Charge d'Affaires).France:M. Jules Cambon.Austria: Count Ladislaus Szögyény-Marich.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph,succ. 1848.Foreign Secretary: Count Berchtold.Ambassadors from Great Britain: Sir Maurice de Bunsen.Russia: M. Schebesco.M. Kondachev (Charge d'Affaires).France: M. Crozier.Germany: Herr von Tschirscky-und-Bögendorff.
ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III,succ. 1900.Foreign Secretary: Marquis di San Giuliano.Ambassador from Great Britain: Sir Rennell Rodd.
BELGIUM: King Albert,succ. 1909.Minister of Great Britain: Sir Francis Villiers.
SERVIA: King Peter,succ. 1903.Minister of Great Britain: C.L. des Graz.D.M. Crackanthorpe (First Secretary).Russian Chargé d'Affaires: M. Strandtmann.
Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia.
Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia.
From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers on the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on the Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up the attitude that it was a 'matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone.'[57] Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that the Servian agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[58] In the negotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is that Russia is not to interfere in this matter, although M. Paul Cambon pointed out that 'Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia'.[59]
After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continued to maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and to reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in taking military action in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia'.[60]
At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austria in the Servian business:—
'As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from Belgrade.'[61]
M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined this policy of Germany pretty soon:—
'My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no influence upon their ally.... There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.'[62]
When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion thus:—
'The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and immoral, and she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war.'[63]
And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed with his Russian colleague that
'the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.'[64]
Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning the attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt that this general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and that if the German Government had desired war they could scarcely have acted more efficiently towards that end. No diplomatic pressure was put upon Vienna, which under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to any lengths against Servia. Over and over again the German diplomats were told that Russia was deeply interested in Servia, but they would not listen. As late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused 'to discuss the Servian note', adding that 'Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do'.[65] Next day the German Ambassador at Vienna was continuing 'to feign surprise that Servian affairs could be of such interest to Russia'.[66] But in their White Book, in order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remark that they 'were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field'.[67] Both stories cannot be true: the German Government have, not for the last time in the history of these negotiations, to choose between ineptitude and guilt; the ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact, and the guilt of deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way that Russia was bound to come into the field.
When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he could to obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply by Servia, and to persuade the German Government to use influence with Austria so that she should take a friendly attitude to Servia. On the day of the presentation of the Austrian note he proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, the co-operation of the four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and when the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he took the important step of proposing that the French, Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications'.[68] The proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian Governments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal, and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to impress its real character upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr von Jagow, on receipt of the proposal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, that the conference suggested
'would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it.'
Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that
'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation'.[69]
Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. Some doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection must be to the 'form of the proposal'. 'Perhaps', added Sir Edward Goschen, 'he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.'[70] The next day the same idea was pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:—
'The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable.'[71]
But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then gone so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country.
With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediation acceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the first period of the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility of rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany. The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory and sympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] continues to misrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a conference on the particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the general situation of Europe.
In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at negotiation by direct conversations between the parties concerned, with no advantage, but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion. Down to August 1st both Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find some formula which might be accepted as a basis for postponing hostilities between the Great Powers. And here it may be well to point out that Prince Lichnowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his chiefs. On July 24th, the day after the Austrian note was presented, he was so little acquainted with the true state of affairs, that speaking privately he told Sir Edward Grey 'that a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria'.[73] And in the matter of the conference, on the very day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering the proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, that the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked.[74] The mutual incompatibility of the two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliation between them, on information received from Berlin, that 'the difficulty was rather the "conference" than the principle'.[75] But we may ask whether Herr von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really show that the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing that he said that such a 'conference was not practicable', and that 'it would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments'.[76] But, if it was not the principle that was objected to, but only the form, where are we? We can do nothing else but assume that the German Government objected to the terms employed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble they wasted time until other events made the catastrophe inevitable. Impartiality will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or not; whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid at the door of the German Government.
The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an attempt was then made by several Powers to invite Austria to suspend military action. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, had made on July 25th a distinction between military preparations and military operations, and had urged that his Government had only the former then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that there were great doubts 'whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference'. Even if she had been willing to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simultaneous Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position of Europe could have been improved, for on July 29th that declaration was followed by news of the Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[77]
Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia mobilized against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On being asked what he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said that
'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.'[78]
This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been unreasonable. But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern districts no grounds for German mobilization had yet been provided. No secret was made about this mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin,[79] but it is perhaps as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language used by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four southern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters.'[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, used such language to his home Government, for there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What dispatches appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshingly honest. The military attaché says, 'I deem it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa'. He adds: 'it is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere'.[81]
There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the Germans themselves, no mobilization 'against Germany'. The only thing that looks at all like hostile action is contained in the news sent by the Imperial German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that a 'state of war' (Kriegszustand) had been proclaimed in that district. But this is a very different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow in the northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilization elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at Kovno announced it on July 27th before any Russian mobilization at all had taken place, and the fact that Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the end of July that Government did not considerKriegszustandin Kovno to be equivalent to 'mobilization against Germany'.
Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make war. Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an aggressive attitude, for many people believed that 'Russia neither wanted, nor was in a position to make war'.[82] This attitude of mind was known and deplored in Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest'.[83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by Count Pourtalês, who on July 29 reported that the German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus become an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. The next day the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors 'that absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland'.[84]
After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded the situation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, and strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany. But, though under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof offered on July 30 to stop all military preparations if Austria 'would eliminate from her ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of the sovereignty of Servia'.[85] 'Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,' wrote Sir George Buchanan.[86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed, and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.[87]
Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered a general mobilization.[88] This was answered on the same day by a proclamation ofKriegsgefahrat Berlin, 'as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed'.[89]
Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, that Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations of Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a general mobilization.[90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope that mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as against Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made 'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in the south as well'.[92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, when such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment.
War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams each imploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other's demands,[93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position that 'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[94] This attitude is as inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31 Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians, apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia announced that under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserve her waiting attitude'.[95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia, Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this in which, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issues an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but one answer?
The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized against Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself, and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germany threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military preparations—an inexcusable step, which increased Russia's apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step in consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three empires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russia and Austria,[97] and might have had good results. In fact, the situation was not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing her ultimatum to Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly?