[Footnote 154:Correspondence, No. 4, p. 8.]
[Footnote 155:Ibid. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 27.]
[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (seeinfraAppendix I).]
[Footnote 157:Correspondence, No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 158:Correspondence, No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.]
[Footnote 159:The Times, September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of the contents of the Austrian note, seeApp. V.]
[Footnote 160:Correspondence, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 25.]
[Footnote 161:Ibid. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
[Footnote 162:Ibid. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf. No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 163:Correspondence, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. Cf.supra, p. 99.]
[Footnote 164:Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf. No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29.]
[Footnote 165:Ibid. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 166:Ibid. No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 167:Ibid. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.]
[Footnote 168: p. 15 (seeAppendix Iinfra).]
[Footnote 169: p. 16 (ibid.).]
[Footnote 170:Correspondence, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23), which will be found inAppendix I.]
[Footnote 171:Ibid. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.]
[Footnote 172:Ibid. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.]
[Footnote 173:Correspondence, No. 39. Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32),infrainAppendix I.]
[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. 24et sqq.; seeinfraAppendix I.]
[Footnote 175:Correspondence, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]
[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. 29et sqq.; seeinfraAppendix I.]
[Footnote 177:Correspondence, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
[Footnote 178:Ibid. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is fundamentally a war between two different principles—that ofraison d'état, and that of the rule of law. The antagonism between these two principles appeared in our own internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when the Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice of a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to meet the demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended the rule of law and sought to include the Crown under that law. The same antagonism now appears externally in a struggle between two nations, one of which claims a prerogative to act outside and above the public law of Europe in order to secure the 'safety' of its own state, while the other stands for the rule of public law. The one regards international covenants to which it has pledged its own word as 'scraps of paper' when they stand in the way ofsalus populi; the other regards the maintenance of such covenants as a grave and inevitable obligation.
Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national historian, and whose lectures onPolitikhave become a gospel, the Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final standard what they regard as the national German state.[179] 'The state', says Treitschke, 'is the highest thing in the external society of man: above it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.' There is here no room for comity of nations; for asocietas totius humani generis; for international law in any true sense. What really exists is the exclusive state—der geschlossene Staat—and in another sense than that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes all foreign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreign articles from its shores in order to found a real 'national' economy such as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke this exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly saw', essentially power:der Staat ist Macht. It may be defined as 'the public might for defence and offence'. As the highest duty of the individual is self-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; and self-preservation means power. 'To care for its power is the highest moral duty of the state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might, and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we should misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: the armed sword of the German state is precious because that state is thecolporteurof German culture. And thus Treitschke holds that Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he failed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, that is to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It is naturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture.
Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive. The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the final character of international obligation; the other is the praise of the glory of war.
Salus populi suprema lex; and to it all international 'law' so called must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for its absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound byanyobligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by a state, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the provisorebus sic stantibus. 'A state cannot bind its will for the future over against other states.' International treaties are no absolute limitation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for such time as the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge set over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the last resort subject to its own decision—in other words, to its own repudiation.[180] That the end justifies the means (in other words, that the maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies the violation of an international obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It is ridiculous to advise a state which is in competition with other states to start by taking the catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his master were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by students. There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international law. 'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right (Recht): none can say that one nation has a better conception than another.' 'No self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of Right' to any international rule: 'by so doing it would renounce its own highest ideals.' The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign words and foreign wares will reject international law as something 'foreign'. Again, Bernhardi makes play with the provisorebus sic stantibus; and this, curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may no longer be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is notipso factoa breach of neutrality.'[181]
But it is the glorification of war—war aggressive as well as war defensive—which is the most striking result of the doctrine of the all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the index to Treitschke'sPolitik, under the word War, one reads the following headings—'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an ordinance set by God'; 'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is politicspar excellence'. Two functions, says Treitschke, the state exists to discharge; and these are to administer law, and to make war. Of the two war, since it is politicspar excellence, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a sick nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, war comes to make us realize that we are members one of another. 'Therein lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes before the great thought of the state.' War alone makes us realize the social organism to which we belong: 'it is political idealism which demands war.' And again, 'what a perversion of morality it were, if one struck out of humanity heroism'(Heldentum)—as ifHeldentumcould not exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.'
Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the idealization of war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power' in order to preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state to preserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight, individualism will triumph over the social organism; heroism will perish out of the world. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy'. War, war—the 'strong medicine', the teacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable biological law, the force that spreads the finest culture—war is the law of humanity. And this war is offensive as well as defensive—primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing nation must preserve all its new members in its bosom: it must not let them slip away by emigration to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itself colonies; and since the world is already largely occupied, it must find them by conquest from other powers.[182] Treitschke already cried the watchwords—'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!' Treitschke already designated England as the object of German attack, and began to instil in Germany a hatred of England. England blocked the way to the growth of Germany from a European into a World-power; Germany, to preserve intact for German culture the surplus of the growing population, must be a World-power or perish. And besides, England was a 'sick' state—a sham, an hypocrisy.[183]
The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a moral veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right of conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, tells us that in such cases 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which gives a 'biologically just decision'! And he expresses wonder and surprise at those who think that 'the weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right. The doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly revolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer—the talk of war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the 'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as invalidating supposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium; above all, the talk of power as 'the vehicle of the highest culture'. Treitschke, a stern Protestant, seeks to reconcile the doctrine with Christianity; but the doctrine is all the same pagan. It is the worship of brute force disguised asHeldentum, and of vicious cunning disguised as political morality: it is a mixture of Nietzsche[184] and of Machiavelli. It is a doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to maintain its state', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against faith and charity and humanity and religion', and which will stride ruthlessly to war when 'the day' comes. And when it goes to war, all the veneer of culture goes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said, 'lest in this state, which has been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state should remain.' Mommsen's warning has come true in August, 1914. By their fruits ye shall know them. The fruits ofHeldentumare Louvain smoking in ashes to the sky.
It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life, because it is not only the philosophy of a professor like Treitschke, but also that of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only so, but it is the philosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the Imperial Chancellor himself used this doctrine (with some qualms, it is true) to justify Germany in 'hewing its way' through Belgium. Let us only remember, in justice to a great people, that it is not really the doctrine of Germany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia (though Treitschke will tell us that Germany is 'just merely an extended Prussia'). And let us remember, in extenuation of Prussia, that she has suffered from two things—geographical pressure springing from her mid-European situation, and an evil tradition of ruthless conquest perpetuated by her Hohenzollern rulers since the days of the Great Elector, and especially since Frederic the Great. Geographical pressure on all sides has made Prussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who feels strangled will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathing space, to secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure, Frederic the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his father's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest the partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless conquest irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. It has been easier for England, an island state in the West exempt from pressure, to think in other terms: it has been possible for Russia, secure in the East, to think, and to think nobly (as the present Tsar has done), of international obligation. Nor is it an accident that sees England and Russia united in the common cause of Europe to-day—that sees both championing the cause of small nations, one in the East, the other in the West.[185]
But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia; and we fight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That cause is the public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, great and small, and especially the small. To the doctrine of the almightiness of the state—to the doctrine that all means are justified which are, or seem, necessary to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a European society, or at least a European comity of nations, within which all states stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by which all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are 'in the state and posture of gladiators' in their relations one with another; we stand for the reign of law.
Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out its own internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal cause. We are a people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element. It is no new thing in our history that we should fight for that cause. When England and Revolutionary France went to war in 1793, the cause, on the side of England, was a legal cause. We fought for the public law of Europe, as it had stood since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We did not fight in 1870, because neither France nor Germany had infringed the public law of Europe by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were ready to fight if they did. A fine cartoon inPunch, of August, 1870, shows armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear and shield, with the words—'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't trouble you, dear friend. But if they do——' To-day they have; and England has drawn her sword. How could she have done otherwise, with those traditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon blood—traditions as real and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America as to Anglo-Saxon England; traditions which are the fundamental basis of Anglo-Saxon public life all the world over? America once fought and beat England, in long-forgotten days, on the ground of law. That very ground of law—that law-abidingness which is as deeply engrained in the men of Massachusetts to-day as it is in any Britisher—is a bond of sympathy between the two in this great struggle of the nations.
To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moral hypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing, they feel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for 'world-empire', with its dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged in a life and death struggle with France and Russia. We too, they feel, are Machiavellians; but we have put on what Machiavelli called 'the mantle of superstition', the pretence of morality and law, to cover our craft. It is true that we are fighting for our own interest. But what is our interest? We are fighting for Right, because Right is our supreme interest. The new German political theory enunciates that 'our interest is our right'. The old—the very old—English political theory is, 'The Right is our interest'. It is true that we have everything to gain by defending the cause of international law. Should that prevent us from defending that cause? What do we not lose of precious lives in the defence?
This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a public law of Europe, and for the small nations which it protects. She stands for her own preservation, which is menaced when public law is broken, and the 'ages' slow-bought gain' imperilled.
(Treitschke'sPolitik, lectures delivered in Berlin during the years 1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in 1899. General Bernhardi's book,Deutschland und der nächste Krieg, was published in 1911, and has been translated into English under the titleGermany and the Next War. See also J.A. Cramb,England and Germany, 1914.)
Notes:
[Footnote 179: The unity of the German state is in no small measure a matter of artificial Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschke was the great advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonic origin, and immediately of Saxon birth.]
[Footnote 180: We are reminded of the famous sentence inThe Prince:—Dove non è giudizio da richiamare si guarda al fine.]
[Footnote 181: Bernhardi adds: 'The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the state, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other states.' It would seem to follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium Germany is helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. The suggestion that Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not adopted by the German Government before the war, nor by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech to the Reichstag on the Belgian question (seesupra, p. 91).]
[Footnote 182: It was significant that Germany, while offering to England at the end of July a guarantee of the integrity of the soil of France, would not offer any guarantee of the integrity of French colonies (supra,p. 82).]
[Footnote 183: Nothing has here been said, though much might be said, of the distortion of history and ethnology by German nationalism, or Pan-Germanism. It is well known that the Pan-Germans regard England as Teutonic, and destined to be gathered into the German fold. In these last few weeks we have been reproached as a people for being traitors to our 'Teutonic' blood. Better be traitors to blood than to plain duty; but as a matter of fact our mixed blood has many other strains than the Teutonic. On the aims of the Pan-Germanists readers may with profit consult a book by Paul Vergnet,La France en danger(Oct. 1913).]
[Footnote 184: In fairness to Nietzsche it should be said that in his later years he revolted against the Prussian military system.]
[Footnote 185: German professors have recently reproached England for being allied with 'Muscovite barbarism'. Is Russia so barbarous, whose sovereign convened the first Peace Conference? Have not England and Russia striven together in peace (as they now strive together in war) for a great common cause? The German White Book, which seeks to fasten on Russia the blame of the present war, is oblivious of all that has happened in these matters since 1898. The reader may with advantage refer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by Professor Vinogradoff,Russia: the Psychology of a Nation(Oxford, 1914).]
In conclusion something must be said of the process by which our understanding with France, still so elastic in 1912 and 1913, became the solid alliance which now, on sea and land alike, confronts the German forces. England gave France no positive engagements until the eleventh hour; it may be argued that England gave them far too late, and that the war might never have occurred if England had been less obstinately and judicially pacific. But the English case for the delay is clear. We hesitated to throw in our lot with France, because France would not stand neutral while Germany made war on Russia. We shrank from the incalculable entanglements which seemed to lie before us if we allied ourselves with a power which was so committed. Why, we were asking ourselves, should we fight the battles of Russia in the Balkans?
We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that France might contemplate this policy. She could not define beforehand the limits which she would observe in defending Russia's cause. But she knew, as we now know, that a war with Russia meant, to German statesmen, only a pretext for a new attack on France, even more deadly in intention than that of 1870. France could not do without the help of Russia. How then could she afford to forfeit Russia's friendship by declaring, at Germany's command, that she would do nothing to help Russia?
This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during the last days before the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, however well disposed, could not help her ally in the first weeks of a war; and for France these were the critical weeks, the weeks upon which her own fate must depend. She appealed urgently to England for support.
But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that it could make no definite engagement. This answer, it is true, had been foreshadowed in earlier communications. Sir Edward Grey had made it abundantly clear that there could be no prospect of common action unless France were exposed to 'an unprovoked attack', and no certainty of such action even in that case. But France had staked everything upon the justice of her cause. She had felt that her pacific intentions were clear to all the world; and that England could not, with any self-respect, refuse assistance. The French mobilization had been delayed until July 31st, to convince the British Cabinet of French good faith; and the French fleet had been left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests of England no less than those of France. We can imagine how bitter was the disappointment with which France received the English answer of July 31st.
But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood them. If our answers to France were guarded, our answers to the German overtures of July 29th and August 1st show that we were fighting the battle of France with diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we went still further, by undertaking to defend the French coasts and shipping, if the German fleet should come into the Channel or through the North Sea. To justify our position of reserve from July 31st to August 4th we may quote what Mr. Asquith said the other day (September 4th):—
'No one who has not been in that position can realize the strength, the energy, and the persistence with which we laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest, straining almost to breaking-point our most cherished friendships and obligations.'
Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation had never any prospects of success, because Germany had resolved that it should not succeed. Ought we to have known this from the first? It is easy to be wise after the event. But in England we have Cabinet government and we have Parliamentary government. Before an English minister can act, in a matter of national importance, no matter how positive his own convictions may be, he must convince his colleagues, and they must feel certain of convincing a democracy which is essentially pacific, cautious, slow to move. Nothing short of the German attack on Belgium would have convinced the ordinary Englishman that German statesmanship had degenerated into piracy. That proof was given us on August 4th; and on that day we sent our ultimatum to Berlin.
To-day all England is convinced; and we are fighting back to back with the French for their national existence and our own. Our own, because England's existence depends not only on her sea-power, but upon the maintenance of European state-law. The military spirit which we have described above (Chap. VI) tramples upon the rights of nations because it sees a foe in every equal; because it regards the prosperity of a neighbour as a national misfortune; because it holds that national greatness is only to be realized in the act of destroying or absorbing other nationalities. To those who are not yet visibly assailed, and who possibly believe themselves secure, we can only give the warning:Tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet.
Of the issue England is not afraid. The most unfavourable issue would find her still convinced that she has taken the only course compatible with honour and with public law. Military anarchism shall be destroyed if England, France, and Russia can destroy it. On this object England and France have staked their last ship and their last soldier. But, it may be asked, what state-system do we hope to establish, if and when we are successful in this great crusade?
What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively, is, first, the restitution to Belgium of her former status and whatever else can be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This is the indispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The next essential is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall never experience such another invasion as we have seen in August, 1914; without a France which is prosperous, secure, and independent, European civilization would be irreparably maimed and stunted. The third essential, as essential as the other two, is the conservation of those other nations which can only exist on sufferance so long asRealpolitikis practised with impunity.
To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their friend, and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in her history she has made war upon a would-be despot of the Continent, treating the 'Balance of Power' as a principle for which no sacrifice could be too great. In these struggles she assisted the small Powers, less from altruism than because their interest was her own. She supported Holland against Philip II of Spain and against Louis XIV; against Napoleon she supported not Holland only, but also Portugal and, to the best of her power, Switzerland and Piedmont.
We do not argue—it would be absurd to argue—that England has always been free from reproach in her dealings with the smaller states. Holland may well remember the naval conflicts of the seventeenth century and the English Navigation Laws. But Holland should also remember that, in the seventeenth century, England was not yet a great Power; Holland and England fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent alliances have healed, over a policy which England has long since renounced as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great wrong in 1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark knows now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England. Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no assistance in 1864. That mistake—for it was a mistake of weakness, not deliberate treachery—has brought its own nemesis. We are still paying for that particular mistake, and we are not likely to forget the lesson. The case of Schleswig-Holstein shows how the losses of such a state as Denmark may react on such a state as England.
England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become less prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the long arm of naval power reaches, England is bound to give them whatever help she can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, she could not tolerate their subordination to such a power as Germany aspires to found. Her quarrel is not with the German people, but with the political system for which the German Empire, in its present temper, stands. That system England is bound to resist, no matter by what power it is adopted.
English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with English interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended struggling nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece and Italy for the sake of any help that they could give her. The goodwill of England to Holland, to Switzerland, to the Scandinavian states, is largely based upon their achievements in science and art and literature. They have proved that they can serve the higher interests of humanity. They have contributed to the growth of that common civilization which links together the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and more durable than those of race, of government, of material interest. In this fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we have forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this fortunate position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel her in the same direction.
GERMANY'S REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA
GERMANY'S REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA
How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and thereby made the European War.
WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.
Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin.
Foreign Office,Berlin, August 1914.
On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.
The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servias policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighborly relations.
In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.
It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia.
Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our allys estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.
We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia but have not participated in her preparations.
Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.
The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.
As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced.
From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 1 & 2.]
From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign powers.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 3.]
Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balcan.
In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5.]
The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]
The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in the evening.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]
The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:
"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.
"But mobilization means war.
"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."
[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.]
On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the German military attaché his word of honor that no order to mobilize had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attaché then pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.
In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.
On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison.
In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most emphatic steps.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.]
On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.
France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.]
Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an understanding between these two powers.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16.]
We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened.
In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy.
Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]
On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.
On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows:
"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration,—a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war—should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.
"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.
"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia".
On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army:
"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.
"As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officers word of honor he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.
"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves."
In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with Sasonow. Count Szápáry was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.]
Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.
During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor.
Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.]
During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser, and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.
On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser:
"I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.
"Your cordially devoted
"Nicolas."
This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:
"Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."
Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.]
After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilization if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.
The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.
The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.
The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.
Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:
"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply."
To this H.M. the Kaiser replied:
"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.
Thus Russia began the war against us.
Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 27.]
The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1. p.m. which gave no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.
On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.