CHAPTER XII

Railways in 1918

FOOTNOTES:[2]Much of the material in this Chapter is derived from Milman'sHistory of the Jews, W. Besant and E. H. Palmer'sJerusalem, and George Adam Smith'sHistorical Geography of the Holy Land, to which my acknowledgments are accordingly due.[3]Milman.[4]Milman.[5]Milman.[6]Besant & Palmer.[7]Besant & Palmer.[8]G. A. Smith.

[2]Much of the material in this Chapter is derived from Milman'sHistory of the Jews, W. Besant and E. H. Palmer'sJerusalem, and George Adam Smith'sHistorical Geography of the Holy Land, to which my acknowledgments are accordingly due.

[3]Milman.

[4]Milman.

[5]Milman.

[6]Besant & Palmer.

[7]Besant & Palmer.

[8]G. A. Smith.

An interesting task fell to my lot, in the reduction to order of the chaos existing at Junction Station. This place had been an important rest camp on the enemy's line of communications. That the Germans thought they had come to stay was manifested by the style in which the station and other buildings had been erected, as well as by the plans which they had left behind them for intended future development. Most of the buildings, including an up-to-date flour mill fitted with modern machinery, had been substantially built with stone. The erection of many additional houses was clearly contemplated, while the work had already been put in hand of planting fruit orchards.

The disgusting state in which these premises were left was indescribable. Rotting carcases of beasts lay all about the place, while other filth almost surpassed them in stench. The buildings were infested with flies by day and mosquitoes by night, while other forms of vermin carried on the good work throughout the whole twenty-four hours.

A large amount of stores had been left behind and had fallen into our hands, consisting mainly of grain, flour, and fodder (tibbin). The enemy had destroyed some of the buildings, smashed up the mill machinery, and set on fire as much of the corn as possible. This fire lasted for days, until at length it burned itself out, for it was useless attempting to salve any portion of the grain composing the bonfire.

Before we had so much as taken possession, swarms ofBedouin came through the premises to loot. Thieving with them is instinctive. They could not understand why they had not a right to help themselves to what the Turks had abandoned. However, a strong guard was posted at once; those Bedouin who had taken up their abode on the premises were evicted; and preparations were made to face a somewhat stormy night. All that night through the crack of rifles resounded. Although the bag next morning proved to be small, yet, for days afterwards, Bedouin kept dropping in at our hospitals with bullet wounds to be dressed, as to the cause of which they could offer no satisfactory explanation. After this the looting fell off considerably. Nevertheless, a certain number of looters, averaging about a dozen a day, were caught and put into the Guard Room. We were glad of their assistance, as there was much filthy cleaning up to be done, so, fools that came to loot, remained to scavenge. Once we had an awkward predicament, for the sergeant of the guard, having confined in the same lock-up some looters, whose detention should be for twenty-four hours, and some prisoners, whose detention should be for the duration of the war, could not subsequently tell them apart.

The enemy left here intact an entire Turkish hospital. It was one of the most picturesque of Eastern sights that anybody could wish to see. Crowded together in one huge ward were men of every shade, in variegated costumes, lying on beds with coverlets rivalling Joseph's coat of many colours. Unfortunately, the hospital was infected, or suspected of infection, with typhus. Therefore, as soon as the patients and staff had been evacuated, it was set on fire, and the whole hospital, woodwork, tents and all that they contained, ascended to heaven in a great column of smoke. Among the contents was a nice new camp bedstead. Pending the decision as to the competent military authority in whose custody this should be placed, I gave orders for it to be transferred to my quarters. But, strangely enough, each senior officer that arrived considered that the competent military authority to take charge of this bedstead was himself. It must have had at least a dozen owners by the time that it ascended in smoke. This hospital also contained one case of sardines. It was wonderful how widely spread became the fame of those sardines. Every British officer in Palestine seems to have licked his lips and looked forward to a meal of sardines when he should pass through Junction Station. Unfortunately, nobody could find those sardines. But a week later, when the rush of officers had gone, it was discovered that they had been appropriated as medical comforts by the R.A.M.C. Now, it so happened, that none of the patients then arriving were on a sardine diet, so other measures had to be taken to ensure that the sardines were not wasted.

As the army went forward, they sent back large numbers of Turkish prisoners of war. These were collected at Junction Station, where a compound was formed. Such as were required for labour were temporarily detained, while the others were marched back under guard to railhead.

During this sojourn, the prisoners were usefully employed in clearing up the messes which had been left behind, particularly in burying carcases. At one place we found half-a-dozen dead buffaloes lying half submerged. Before they could be got at and cleared away it was necessary to drain off the water. A party of the prisoners were detailed for this task; a few hours later they were found seriously trying to drain this water away up-hill. Among the prisoners were a few officers. In default of other suitable accommodation, one of them was allowed to live in a room at the Commandant's house. He displayed great anxiety lest somebody should touch the disused telephone or other wires, fire a booby trap possibly left behind by his kind friends, and so blow him to eternity.

There was not much time to spare for contemplation. Nevertheless, in this, the Vale of Sorek, I often thought ofSamson and Delilah, and "Mon coeur s'ouvre à ton voix"; or, pictured the Ark of the Covenant wend its way past my very door, on a cart drawn by two milch kine, on that wonderful journey from Ekron to Beth-Shemesh.

There was plenty of work to be done, in reducing chaos to order, in protecting much valuable property, in meeting the requirements of thousands of passing troops, and in spreading, as it were, the spawn for this mushroom town. It had been an important place under Turkish administration. It promised, under the British régime, to become the most important railway centre in Palestine. Consequently, schemes of water supply, sanitation, and town planning had to be evolved and installed immediately, hospitals opened in the most appropriate buildings, spaces set apart for camping grounds for all classes of troops and animals, huge dumps and supply dumps respectively, railway sidings laid down and cemeteries opened both for Christians and for Mahomedans, while roads had to be improved and sign-boards set up in all directions.

Many and diverse were the arrivals and departures in the course of one busy week. Foremost came the fighting troops of the 21st Corps, the 75th and 54th Divisions, followed later by those of the 20th Corps, the 60th and 74th Divisions. With them arrived field ambulances, which took possession of the best of the buildings and converted them into hospitals. Companies of Royal Engineers arrived, and travelling workshops staffs of the Ordnance Department, and both of these lost no time in opening their workshops. Enormous supply dumps were formed and camel convoys, miles long, arrived with supplies. The camels were specially inconsiderate, and would select awkward spots, like cross-roads, at which to lie down and die. They were welcome to die, if only they could and would have first made adequate arrangements for their own obsequies. A battalion of British West Indians that arrived, aroused both sympathy and amusement.They had marched through torrential rain and arrived soaked to the skin. In spite of a warning as to what they might expect, they rushed for shelter into some of the buildings which had not yet been disinfected; but their exit was even faster than their entrance, and they preferred the wet and cheerless exterior to being eaten alive within. Scarcely a day's march behind the fighting troops, arrived a thousand or more of the Egyptian Labour Corps. These were immediately set to work on the roads, and such good work did they do that the roads were soon in an excellent condition for mechanical transport. Full of irony was the arrival of several guards and a staff of military policeen routefor Jerusalem. It was believed, at this time, that the fall of Jerusalem was imminent. That Britain's fair name might not be sullied by any foolish misbehaviour, or any still more foolish collection of souvenirs, it was decided that guards should at once be mounted upon the Holy Places in Jerusalem. These guards, Christian and Moslem, collected at Junction Station, ready to march straight into the city; but, when its fall was postponedsine die, they had sadly but surely to return to their own regiments. The intention had been to surround Jerusalem with a cordon of British sentries; an order, accordingly, was published that any British soldier found within 5 miles of Jerusalem would be liable to be shot. Our unfortunate British soldiers fighting on Neby Samwil, which was within the prescribed distance, readily endorsed that sentiment, though scarcely in the sense implied by the authorities.

Of all activities at this time of industry, none were greater than those of the railway development companies of the Royal Engineers. The Turkish line had been destroyed in several places and the rolling stock much damaged. Nevertheless, repairs were put in hand immediately, leaky engines were made water-tight, damaged trucks and coaches were made fit to travel, and, within a very short space of time, there was a train running each way between Junction Stationand Deir Sineid. As being the services of primary importance, the first trains were confined to the bringing up of ammunition and the taking down of wounded. The captured rolling stock was limited, and so the number of trains was painfully restricted. Fortunately, this narrow gauge line was of similar gauge to certain light railways in Egypt, and rolling stock from those lines was brought up with all convenient speed. Moreover, two quite new engines, said to have been originally destined for this line but captured at sea during the early days of the war, were hurried up and put into commission. New constructional work was also put in hand at once, including an embankment for continuing the line northwards across the bed of the Wadi Surar (Sorek), the original steel girder bridge having unfortunately been destroyed. The fate of the bridges here was similarly unfortunate. The railway bridge, which should have been blown up before, so as to prevent the escape of the Turkish trains, was only destroyed after they had got away; and so the destruction of this bridge proved of great hindrance to us, but caused no inconvenience whatever to the enemy. The other bridge across the wadi was a timber bridge, which carried the road. As this bridge was insecure and required strengthening, a party of military police were posted upon it to stop all traffic from crossing it through the night. Seized with a brain wave, they lit a fire upon the centre of the bridge. This expedient proved so successful, that it not only stopped the traffic for that night, but for all time. When morning came, it was discovered that they had burnt away the bridge itself, and a new bridge had to be constructed.

An armoured train was improvised from such trucks as were available, the sides being sandbagged and a Lewis gun mounted in front. With this, the railway line was patrolled towards Jerusalem for some miles, until destroyed bridges made further progress impossible. The result of this reconnaissance showed that trains could run for some distance alongthis line, and ammunition trains were pushed forward accordingly.

When I left Junction Station to rejoin the fighting troops, it was well on the high road to importance and fame. This, however, never matured. It was to the policy of railway construction that this place owed its primary existence; it was to an extension of that policy that it looked for its future development; it was through a change in that policy that its glory soon afterwards departed.

The original intention had been to adapt to our use the Turkish railway system, merely broadening the gauge. In that case, our own broad gauge line from Kantara, which, immediately on the fall of Gaza, had been brought through to Deir Sineid, would have been continued along the route of the Turkish line from Deir Sineid to Junction Station. The first months of working this Turkish line, still in its narrow gauge condition as captured, did not afford a promising outlook. These were months of torrential and persistent rain. The country became a quagmire. Landslips along the permanent way, and the washing away of culverts, became of such frequent occurrence, that it was decided to abandon this portion of this line altogether. Committed, therefore, to no predetermined route, the engineers were left with the whole country open to them to choose a course for their new trunk railway to the north. They chose a line much nearer the coast, and approximately followed the border line between the fertile plain and the sand dunes from Deir Sineid as far north as Yebna, thence bearing north-east towards Ramleh and Ludd. This had the effect of making the future railhead at Ludd.

Situate at the cross-roads where the Valley of Ajalon debouches upon the Plain, and the ancient route from Jerusalem to Jaffa crosses the yet more ancient route from Egypt and Gaza to Acre and Damascus, the neighbourhood of Ramleh and Ludd has for many centuries been the site of an important town. In Biblical days it was Ludd; in Crusading days itwas Ramleh. The towns are but a couple of miles apart. And so it came about that now, once again, this spot became the great traffic junction of Palestine.

As time passed on, and as, through the spring and summer of 1918, we held a line across Palestine to the north of and covering Jerusalem and Jaffa, railway development proceeded apace, being focussed on Ludd. In spite of the difficulties of railway engineering in the mountains, the broad gauge line was carried from Ludd through Junction Station right up to Jerusalem. Well-constructed narrow gauge lines were laid down between Ludd and Jaffa, and between railhead and various distributing centres close behind the front line. The line from Junction Station to Beersheba was changed from narrow to broad gauge and extended to Rafa. Thereafter the line was double from Kantara to Rafa. From Rafa, one single line went forward, by Belah, Gaza and Yebna, to Ludd, while another single line went forward to Ludd by way of Beersheba and Junction Station. The advantages of a double line system north of Rafa were thus secured at times of pressure by working the full freight trains forward to Ludd viâ Gaza and Yebna, and working the trains of returned empties back again by way of Beersheba.

Ludd developed apace. Soon were seen all the evidences and activities of a great advanced base and distributing centre. Huge ordnance and supply dumps arose, workshops and depots were to be seen on all sides, a great bakery was installed and even a mineral-water factory. The importance of Ludd far eclipsed the quondam glory of Belah, and came nearer to rivalling that of Kantara.

To an Englishman, the chief interest of Ludd lies in its being the place of martyrdom and burial of St. George. Was it not appropriate that the victorious British armies in Palestine should have been provided and fed from beside the very tomb of their own Patron Saint?

Jerusalem having surrendered on the 9th December, the enemy lay round about in an encircling line on the north and east. The first thing to be done was to make good our hold upon the city. Accordingly, a series of minor operations took place, with the object of clearing the enemy from any points of vantage that he held and driving him further from the city.

On the night of the 26/27th December, determined counter-attacks were delivered by the Turks. They attacked the 53rd Division at points east of Jerusalem, and the 60th to the north, their principal objective being Tel el Ful, a conspicuous hill 3 miles east of Neby Samwil, from which Jerusalem and the intervening ground could be overlooked. On the morning of the 28th, a lull occurred in the fighting, followed by an attack of unexpected strength against the whole front. The successes gained by this attack were short-lived. A counter-attack by the 74th and 10th Divisions, further to the left, now made itself felt. This was launched against the enemy's reserves, and thus deprived the enemy of the initiative. The Turkish attack being spent, a general advance northward, took place, not, however, without further heavy fighting. Pursuing our advantage, we further advanced our line on the 30th, and occupied a line from Beitior (Bethel), 2 miles north-east of Bireh, to Janieh and Ras Kerker, 7 miles west, north-west of Bireh. Bireh, which had been our objective in November, was, at last, securely in our possession. The Turkishattempt to recapture Jerusalem had ended in crushing defeat.

Throughout the winter months the weather was miserably wet, and the troops in Palestine, whether engaged in active operations or merely holding the line, suffered intense discomfort. The mails brought us letters from our friends at home, saying how much they envied us who were spending Christmas in the Holy Land. But those who were up the line spent Christmas Day soaked to the skin in a gale of wind and rain, while their Christmas dinner consisted of half-rations of bully beef and biscuit. They were wishing themselves anywhere else upon this earth. The appalling weather conditions made it impossible to get more than the bare necessities of life forward from railhead, and tons of Christmas luxuries sent from England through Egypt lay soaked and rotting in dumps at Deir Sineid.

January was much too wet for operations in this country. In February, however, General Allenby determined on the capture of Jericho. The country from round Jerusalem slopes down, as we have seen, very abruptly to Jericho and the Jordan Valley. Precipitous slopes, rocky ridges and narrow ledges, confined the advance to definite lines on which the enemy could concentrate fire. The advance began on the 19th, and, by the evening of the 20th, the 60th Division had reached a line 4 miles west of the cliffs overlooking Jericho. In the meantime, the mounted troops were working on the right or south of the infantry, towards the commanding position of Neby Musa, near the north-west corner of the Dead Sea. This advance was held up at the last wadi which was directly overlooked by, and subjected to, a heavy fire from Neby Musa. Other mounted troops, further to the right, discovered a way down to the Jordan Plain, where they were firmly established by dusk. That night the Turks withdrew, and our mounted troops, moving up the Plain, entered Jericho on the morning of the 21st.

There are two or three routes between Jericho and thesummit of the Judæan plateau. That by which the British had now come down was not the route followed by Joshua and the Israelites. They, on the other hand, ascended by a route farther north, through Mukhmas (Michmash) and Beitin (Bethel), thus reaching the summit near Bireh. The route followed by the pilgrims was that of the main road, which hereafter became the main line of supply of the forces operating in this direction.

Having secured Jericho and the low country beyond as far as the Jordan, operations were now commenced with the object of pushing the enemy northwards, and clearing him from another substantial portion of Palestine. This would, at the same time, broaden the base for future operations which were contemplated across the River Jordan.

Operations on a large scale were commenced on March 9th. Both the 20th and 21st Corps were engaged. We will, however, consider here only the operations of the 20th Corps, leaving those of the 21st until a subsequent chapter. The reader is already familiar with the type of country, which resembled that between Jerusalem and Jericho. The downward slopes were exceptionally steep, in places precipitous. The slopes were swept by machine-gun and rifle fire, and the beds of the wadis were enfiladed. The ascent on the far side was steeply terraced. Men had alternately to hoist and pull each other up under fire, and finally to expel the enemy from the summits in hand-to-hand fighting. Under these conditions no rapid advance could be looked for.

The 60th Division, by night, crossed the Wadi el Auja, north of Jericho (not to be confused with the wadi of the same name to the north of Jaffa). This Division seized a position astride the Beisan-Jericho road. The 53rd Division captured Tel-Asur, a conspicuous landmark among a mass of high hills, which mountain the enemy tried repeatedly, but in vain, to recover. Farther to the left, a counter-attack was repulsed by the 10th Division. At the conclusion of the operations,the high ground covering the approaches to the Jordan by the Jericho-Beisan Road had been secured, and also, farther west, linking up with the 21st Corps, the high ground stretching across the hills of Mount Ephraim.

We come now to the passage of the River Jordan and the operations in Eastern Palestine. It will be remembered, from what has already been written,[9]that active operations were in progress about this time between the Turks south-east of the Dead Sea and our Arab allies, the troops of the King of the Hejaz. The Turkish line of communications ran down the Hejaz Railway through eastern Palestine, temptingly near our forces at Jericho. It will also be remembered,[10]that the Jordan Valley, and ascent therefrom into the hills of Eastern Palestine are unique. It would therefore have been difficult or impossible to cut the Turks' Hejaz communications by maintaining a permanentgarrisonastride the railway, such garrison being based on Jericho with an extremely vulnerable line of communications across the valley. It was thought, however, that much useful service might be rendered to the Arabs if a raiding force were to cross the Jordan and destroy the railway in the neighbourhood of Amman.

The country between the Jordan and Amman offered many obstacles to our advance. There were the marshes of the Jordan Valley to be crossed, ridges of clay to be surmounted, scrub to be negotiated, followed by an ascent of 3,500 feet. The metalled road to Amman crosses the Jordan at the Ghoraniyeh Bridge, and reaches the hills at Shunet Nimrin. It then winds up a wadi to Es Salt, whence it strikes due eastward to Amman.

The operations commenced in the latter part of March. No serious obstacle was encountered until the crossings of the Jordan were reached. A small party was sent in motor-boats across the Dead Sea to dispose of any enemy who might be in the district to the north-east of the Dead Sea, but theymet with few traces of the enemy. The enemy had destroyed the bridge at Ghoraniyeh early in the month. Other means had therefore to be devised for effecting a crossing. "Jordan overfloweth all his banks all the time of harvest." On the 28th March, owing to heavy rain, the river rose 9 feet. Floods had, therefore, to be contended with. The current is at all times rapid, and the banks, on account of the floods, are boggy and difficult for the approach of transport. On the night of the 21st/22nd March, the main crossings of the river were attempted, both at Ghoraniyeh, and a few miles further south at Hajlah, where the Pilgrim Road from Jerusalem reaches the Jordan. At the former point three attempts to swim the river were made, under fire, by men with ropes attached to their bodies, but in each case the swimmers were carried away by the strong current and found it impossible to reach the opposite bank. Then a punt was launched, but this was no sooner launched than it was swept away. The attempt was commenced in the bright moonlight, but was much hampered by enemy fire. It was renewed after the moon had gone down, but then it was impossible to find the easiest route or to negotiate the current in the dark. Farther down stream, however, the efforts met with better fortune. A small party succeeded in swimming across in the dark and landing on the left bank. These towed a rope behind them, by which, after landing, they hauled across light rafts. The crossing by the raft-loads of men had to be carried out in the face of some hostile fire. Portions of the scrub had been set on fire by the enemy, and these fires to some extent lit up the rafts as they were being pulled across. By daylight, 300 men had been got across, and a small bridge-head established. A barrel bridge was without delay constructed by the Engineers. Very little progress could be made that day as the scrub was infested with enemy machine guns. On the following night, however, a rush was made, and the bridge-head enlarged to a width of 1,500 yards. That night the Engineers constructed a steelpontoon bridge, and an entire cavalry regiment was passed over by dawn. The cavalry soon cleared away the enemy, not only fromHajlah, but also from in front of Ghoraniyeh. Bridges were built now at Ghoraniyeh and the passage of the river assured.

Having successfully crossed the Jordan, the force pushed on eastwards across the low country, meeting with some opposition. Eventually we reached Shunat Nimrin. The enemy retreating up the Es Salt road were bombed and machine-gunned by our aircraft. Part of our force, following on their heels, entered Es Salt on the 25th, while, on the 26th, our mounted troops occupied Amman. The railway to the south of the station was successfully cut, but north of Amman the cutting was not complete. Consequently, the enemy were able to receive considerable reinforcements. Before Amman could be attacked in strength some 4,000 Turks were in position covering the viaduct and tunnel, while 2,000 more were moving on Es Salt from the north. Five miles of railway line were however, destroyed, while much other damage was done to the railway line. But, in view of the strength of the enemy and the difficulties of our communications (we had only been able to bring forward mountain-artillery), our force withdrew.

The raid had not entirely fulfilled its object, but much good work had been done, and it had materially assisted Sherif Faisal with his Hejaz troops in his operations further south against Maan.

Our force returning from Eastern Palestine did not abandon the hardly-won eastern bank of the Jordan. Bridge-heads were retained. The Turks, however, became aggressive, and, on the 11th April, attacked our bridge-head at Ghoraniyeh. They were repulsed from here and driven back to Shunet Nimrin, which they strongly garrisoned.

On the 30th April another raid was made across the Jordan. This time our infantry attacked the Shunet Nimrin position, while the cavalry, intending to cut off the garrison, movedround the flank and reached Es Salt. But a strong Turkish force, crossing the Jordan from the Nablus area at Jisr ed Damieh, drove back the cavalry, who lost nine guns in their retirement. This raid had been planned to co-operate with the Beni Sakr Arabs. Their promised assistance did not materialize, and the whole force was brought back to the crossings of the Jordan.

Thenceforth, until the sweep of the following September the Jordan river and bridge-heads remained our front line.

FOOTNOTES:[9]See before Chapter III.[10]See before Chapter IV.

[9]See before Chapter III.

[10]See before Chapter IV.

In the last chapter we saw how, after the capture of Jerusalem, the 20th Corps proceeded to improve the line on the right. We will now follow the operations of the 21st Corps on the left.

The first operation of importance was that carried out by the 52nd Division on the extreme left. On the night of the 20th/21st December, 1917, crossings, partly by fording and partly by rafts, were effected over the Wadi Auja, a few miles to the north of Jaffa. The high ground overlooking the wadi from the north was rushed before dawn, and a line was consolidated which effectually deprived the enemy of all observation from the north over the Valley of the Wadi Auja. Incidentally, the distance between the enemy and Jaffa was increased from 3 to 8 miles. This safeguarded Jaffa and its harbour, and the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road. Further adjustments of the line were made, including the capture of Rantieh on the railway and El Tine and Bornat to the right, which gave commanding views over the forward country and increased elbow room to the troops covering Ludd and Ramleh.

As the result of these operations the line ran, at the beginning of March, approximately as follows. The 60th Division on the right had reached the Jordan, our line running along that river as far north as the Wadi Auja and then bending westwards. On their left came the 53rd Division, a little to the north of Bireh, and on their left again the 10th Division completed the front of the 20th Corps. They joined up the 75th Division, whose frontage ran from Midieh (the Modin of theMaccabees) through Kibbiah to the foot-hills at Et Tireh; from here the 54th Division extended across the Plain; while the 52nd Division held the sector close to the sea, a little to the north of the other Wadi Auja.

Country round Rafat

Except for occasional rains, our soldiering in the 75th Division sector, throughout February and the early part of March, was campaigningde luxe. The enemy had gone right back to the line of the Wadi Deir Ballut, leaving a No Man's Land in front of us about 4 miles across. He held advanced posts a mile or two in front of our line, but his guns had been taken well back out of range. We therefore enjoyed immunity both from sniping and shelling, and could move about in front of our line without anxiety, even in broad daylight. The observation posts that we occupied commanded extensive views across No Man's Land, and we should have had early intimation had there been any considerable hostile movement.

We thus had opportunities for training, and preparing ourselves for the next forward push. The whole battalion was put through a course of musketry. The forward slopes of our position provided an admirable field firing range, with all No Man's Land for the stray bullets to spend themselves upon. How it must have made the Turk itch to see men lying about in platoons in the open before his very eyes, and how he must have longed to have had a gun within range, and to have dispersed us with a few rounds of shrapnel. We also instituted a very successful shooting-gallery. In the front line beer was seldom procurable, though much appreciated. Such as we were able to obtain from the canteen was taken to the rifle range. An empty bottle was set up 200 yards in front of the firer and a full one behind him. If he hit the former he became entitled to the contents of the latter. Each man was entitled to one free shot, and as many more as he liked at a cost of a penny each. The result was, that, at a very nominal cost to the canteen funds, the individual shooting of the battalion considerably improved.

Aerial activity was interesting. We soon became accustomed to the distinctive hum of the Hun machines flying high above us, followed by the barking of our "Archies." Then we could trace the track of the planes across the sky by the line of white smoke puffs left by our bursting archy shells. Archy seldom reckons to get a direct hit on a plane, but, by the expenditure of quantities of ammunition, he makes the Hun fly too high to see anything of value or to drop bombs with much hope of success. More tangible results were obtained by our fighting planes, which engaged the Hun in the air. A pretty little fight took place a thousand feet or so above our heads, between two of our planes and a couple of Huns. After preliminary circling and manœuvring for place, during which one Hun machine discreetly went all out for home, one of our planes swooped straight on to the remaining Hun, pouring a burst of Lewis gun fire into the pilot and observer at short range. Badly wounded, the Hun pilot turned his machine full speed for home. But our other plane, which had retained its altitude, hovered over him, headed him off from home, and shepherded him down on to the Plain, where he was forced to land and was captured. On another occasion, we were puzzled to see a Hun plane, returning from our lines, pitch in enemy territory, and, though unattacked, go up in smoke and flame. Subsequent reports furnished an explanation. The Hun pilot had descended without being very sure of his whereabouts. The Turks, mistaking him for a Britisher, opened fire upon him with a machine gun. Thereupon, believing himself to be in hostile territory, the pilot burnt his machine and surrendered—to his own friends!

Campaigningde luxe! The wild flowers did all that lay in their power to add to the luxury. The warm sun of February and March, following the drenching rain of the winter, produces in Palestine a profusion of beautiful flowers that is probably surpassed nowhere. The country-side was literally carpeted with choice flowers of sweet smell and varied colour.To mention but a few—there were red, white, and blue anemones; cyclamen, white, pink and mauve; aromatic herbs; poppies and corn-flowers; scarlet tulips; pink phlox; blue irises, velvety arum lilies, black and crimson, tall, stately hollyhocks. And the catalogue is scarce begun. Truly a floral Paradise!

Early in March came rumours of a forward move. The nominal pretext was an improvement of our line. Other motives may possibly have been influencing the higher authorities, such as keeping the initiative in our hands, fostering an aggressive spirit, and feeling the strength of the enemy with a view to subsequent operations on a larger scale.

Almost opposite Jaffa the central range of Judæan hills is cleft by a great gorge. Starting at a point on the edge of, and almost overlooking the Jordan Valley, it runs approximately due east and west, with many turns and even hairpin bends, until it debouches on the Plain at Mejdel Yaba, thence forming a main tributary of the River Auja. In the days of the Maccabees this gorge formed the frontier between the Jews and the Samaritans. This gorge is the Wadi Deir Ballut. The sides of this wadi are at all points steep, at some precipitous, presenting in places an almost sheer drop of several hundred feet. The bed of the wadi is from a hundred to a couple of hundred yards wide and the surface level. Thus the Wadi Ballut formed an admirable defensive line for the Turk; after it had passed into our hands, it provided us with an admirable line of communication.

The Turk, at this time, held the line of the Wadi Ballut with such advanced posts as could deny to our patrols all access to the wadi. Available information about the wadi was thus restricted to reports and maps, and was none too ample or reliable. The intermediate country consisted of approximately flat "merjs," intersected with wadis, and dotted about with hills, villages, and other features of tactical importance. At this time of the year it somewhat resembled the generalappearance of Exmoor. For several days prior to the advance patrols were sent out into No Man's Land, that as much as possible might be ascertained about, and as many as possible be made familiar with, the terrain over which we had to operate.

On the 12th March, the whole 75th Division, in co-operation with the Divisions on its flanks, moved forward. The operations of this day were perhaps little more than minor operations, certainly not one of the decisive battles of the war, although their effect in drawing reinforcements to Palestine may have had far-reaching results in other zones such as Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, as they formed such a pretty field day, so like our manœuvres at home, I venture upon a short description, in the hope that it may be of interest to those whose soldiering experience has been confined to the home front. There was no horrid barbed wire to contend with, nor gas. There were not even trenches, for the Turks' defence work here consisted only of stone walls, technically known as sangars. During the commencing stages we were not even shelled.

Shortly after dawn, our heavy artillery opened the ball by shelling the advanced posts of the enemy. At seven o'clock the whole line moved forward. Our first objective, a prominent knoll, was 4,000 yards away, and no previous opposition was expected. Having assumed the appropriate formation before crossing the crest, we moved forward in "artillery" formation, that is to say, in lines of platoons in file. For the non-military reader, it should be explained that this is the formation in which troops are considered least vulnerable against artillery or distant rifle and machine-gun fire. Great care was taken to ensure that direction was maintained, an officer with compass being specially detailed for this purpose, and that touch was not lost with the units on either flank. A battery of field artillery had been detailed to support the advance of this battalion; the forward observation officer went forwardwith the infantry; the battery, less one section temporarily left behind, moved forward close behind us to a previously selected position from which the Deir Ballut Ridge would be within easy range. A section of machine gunners moved forward close behind the leading companies. In a fold of the ground, some 1,400 yards short of the first objective, the infantry shook out into lines of skirmishers. They continued their advance, and occupied the knoll which was their first objective without opposition.

Meanwhile, after a concentrated bombardment on the left, the first and second of the enemy's forward posts were captured without serious opposition; it appeared probable that these had been occupied mainly for observation and that his principal resistance was to be offered upon the Ballut Ridge.

After a short halt on the first objective, to conform to the time-table, we moved forward again in the same formation against our second objective, a ridge which seemed to overlook the Wadi Deir Ballut. We still met with no opposition, until we put our heads up over the ridge, when we were greeted with a torrent of bullets from machine guns posted on the opposite side of the wadi. This wadi, it will be remembered, was to usterra incognita. The first thing to be done therefore was to make a hurried reconnaissance, and decide on the best method of getting down and across. It was found that the descent was almost a sheer precipice, and that we had not one but two wadis to cross; a smaller tributary wadi, scarcely marked on the map, forming, in fact, a rather serious obstacle. Carrying out such a reconnaissance, upon a forward slope, under machine gun fire from across the wadi, was none too easy. It had been intended that the leading company, which took the ridge, should at once open covering fire across the wadi, whilst the company following should pass through them and cross the wadi under cover of their fire. However, the difficulty of taking up suitable positions for seeing the target, and the extremity of the range (about 1,500 yards), made itinadvisable for the infantry to fire. But the machine gunners attached to us soon brought their machine guns into action, while our artillery f.o.o. took up a position on the ridge from which he could fire his guns to good effect.

About this time, away to our left, developed the attack on Mejdel Yaba. This village occupies a commanding position overlooking the Plain, and, in Crusading days, was a fortress. That phase of the battle proved an artillery action pure and simple. The whole artillery of a Division, with several heavies added, was concentrated on that luckless spot. It afforded a spectacle not soon to be forgotten. When the infantry arrived, they found the work all over; the Turks had all been killed by the bombardment or fled from the village, most of the latter having been cut off and killed by our machine guns. Before leaving, the Turks had taken the precaution of interviewing the headman of the village and cutting his throat.

To return to our own corner of the picture, under cover of the fire of our own artillery and machine guns the first company went forward. Slipping down that mountain side was a veritable case of running the gauntlet. But, once the bottom of the first wadi was reached, some cover was afforded for a breather. Almost in front of us, on the far ridge, lay the village of Deir Ballut, on which the enemy evidently intended to base their strongest resistance. On our left, the infantry were making a good pace; on the right they were held up, but, seeing us going forward, they pushed forward too, so that pressure might be maintained all along the line. The enemy had organized his defences and placed his machine guns with great skill. The slopes of the wadi were too steep for good shooting straight down the slope. So he had taken full advantage of the curves and hairpin bends of the wadi to place his machine guns in position sweeping the spurs and giving each other mutual support. Our leading company lost no time in getting to work. They dumped their packs and set out at once to storm the ridge. Meanwhile, our infantry advancingon the left, had taken some of the enemy machine guns in flank, forcing them to withdraw, which materially assisted the advance of the leading company. And so the leading company, closely followed by companies in support, established itself on the Ridge.

The fiercest of the fighting, however, was yet to come. A great burst of machine-gun fire caused the leading platoon to take cover under one of the terraces. Hence they were at once led forward again. The Turks now delivered a strong counter-attack. Seeing this, the leading platoon dashed forward with their bayonets, led by the company cook, and the Turks were put to flight. The Lewis-gunners caught them as they were getting away and effectually quenched all desire to renew the counter-attack. Then the company pushed forward, and, ignoring the village of Deir Ballut, with its machine guns tried to get across the line of retreat from the village. Seeing this, the Turks evacuated Deir Ballut, and, under cover of machine guns posted on the further ridges, those left alive made good their escape. That evening found us in undisputed possession of Deir Ballut Ridge from beyond the village of Deir Ballut down to the Plain at Mejdel Yaba.

We now found ourselves well established in the Mountains of Ephraim, and at no great distance from the enemy. After the taking of Ballut Ridge he had dropped back, and was soon seen to be entrenching and sangaring a new line from 2,000 to 4,000 yards further north. Ballut Ridge had been fixed as our final objective. Had there been possible roads by which guns and supplies could have been brought forward, an immediate pursuit or attack of the enemy might have proved successful; but, with such hopeless communications, deliberate action was a necessity.

After the Ridge had been captured, the enemy were pursued with all the fire from rifles, machine guns and artillery that could be brought to bear. Cavalry, or even infantry pursuit across these mountains was out of the question. An outpost line was established and the troops settled down to a wet and somewhat cheerless night. The mountain sides had been so steep that it had been impossible to bring up any comforts, and even the camels bearing the reserve supply of ammunition could only be got forward with extreme difficulty. Except for shelling, we were left unmolested during the night and next morning, which gave us the opportunity of constructing sangars, making tracks for the pack transport animals, and generally making ourselves more comfortable. Patrols were sent forward, and it was ascertained that the country to our immediate front was clear of the enemy.

The effect of this advance was to draw down reinforcementsinto this sector, and to divert into Palestine reserves of Turkish troops; these came largely from the Caucasus, where the total collapse of Russia had set many good Turkish troops at liberty. There was evidence that these troops had been intended for an offensive campaign in Mesopotamia. It is probable, therefore, that this advance, indirectly, yet substantially, contributed to the defence of Mesopotamia, for the Turkish offensive in that area never materialized. Two or three German Divisions came down to stiffen up the Turks, and from this time forward the resistance which we had to face became unmistakeably hardened. The days of campaigningde luxehad gone for ever. Before our "archies" could get forward, the Hun aeroplanes had very much their own way, and, flying low, dropped bombs and machine-gunned us in a manner that was most uncomfortable. Enemy artillery shelled any movements on the forward slope, and brought a searching fire to bear, in the hope of damaging our bivouac areas behind the crest. The manner in which the front line was held in the mountains by the Turks as well as by ourselves, was as follows. Strong sangars were constituted on the forward slope of a hill or ridge. By day these were occupied only by a small and well-protected observation party, at times supplemented with a Lewis gun team; and the remainder of the garrison were withdrawn behind the crest to bivouac areas on the reverse slope. At dusk, the garrison moved forward and manned the front line, being withdrawn again during the half-light of dawn. Thus the hostile artillery could never see a target upon which to fire. Searching a steep reverse slope with guns is almost impossible while, even with howitzers, unless observation can be obtained, an enormous amount of ammunition has to be fired to secure any result.

Meanwhile, preparations proceeded apace. With a genius little short of that which has made roads across the Himalayas and the Alps, roads were soon engineered down and up the steep sides of the Wadi, so that within two or three weeks itwas possible to bring guns across the Wadi and over the Ballut Ridge. Water supplies, of which excellent springs were discovered in the bed of the wadi, were developed; later, the cisterns on the hills were closed down to prevent mosquito breeding and malaria.

On the 14th March, the enemy moved forward to counter-attack the Ballut Ridge line, but were caught in close formation by our artillery and the counter-attack never developed. On the 19th, a slight advance was made on our right, which brought the village of Beit Rima (possibly the Ramathaim of the Maccabees) within our line. Another forward move was evidently in the wind and patrolling activity increased all along our line.

A detailed account of one of these patrol incidents may be instructive as affording an example of how such a patrol should be handled. The patrol commander was an experienced soldier who had seen service with almost every battalion of the regiment and in most of the theatres of this war; his sleeve was covered with wound stripes, and hostile snipers only made him angry.

The orders which he received were to patrol as far as Ikba, and to protect some senior officers, who wished to make a reconnaissance and for whose safety he was responsible. He had under his command one platoon, consisting of three sections of riflemen and one of Lewis gunners; also one other officer to assist.

A glance at the sketch map will show Ballut Ridge, which formed our front line, and Three Bushes Hill, the most forward position held by the enemy. Ikba, or to give it its full name, Khurbet Umm el Ikba, thus lay in No Man's Land at no great distance from the enemy. Though standing on a hill and commanding an admirable view of the surrounding country, it is overlooked at a range of a mile from Three Bushes Hill, and also at shorter distances within effective rifle range from the points marked A, B and C, and, to some extent, from thepoint marked E. F is a lower knoll, commanded from Ikba. Both E and F are commanded from A.

Moving forward before dawn, the patrol commander led his patrol forward down the Wadi Ikba. Each section was kept apart, and moved forward in single file under its own commander. To each section commander were given precise orders as to the position which he was to occupy, what he was to do, and when he was to withdraw. One section moved down the ridge on the right of the wadi, and took up a position at the point B. One section, with the junior officer, moved first along the wadi bed, and then, while it was still only half light, ascended the left-hand spur and took up a position at A. The Lewis-gun team occupied the hill at C. The remaining section, which had been kept in reserve at the hills about D, now moved forward and occupied Ikba. All being reported clear, the senior officers moved forward, arriving at Ikba just as the daylight became strong enough for them to obtain the forward view of the enemy country which they desired.

An even better view of the country seemed probable from the spur at A. So across there went the officers, including the patrol commander. By the time they arrived, rifle reports were cracking, and the situation was becoming interesting. The reconnaissance finished, the patrol commander gave the senior officers five minutes in which to withdraw, before the expiration of which he would not begin to withdraw his patrol.

Meanwhile, the enemy upon Three Bushes Hill, had espied the party in Ikba, and set out to capture the patrol. Creeping along under cover, they established themselves at the point E. Thence they started to move on to the point F, but came under fire from the section on point A. It became a case of running the gauntlet, but the section were shooting well and dropped their men. The section at Ikba was withdrawing; the enemy, failing to realize that the spur A was occupied, rushed across to A intending to shoot up the wadi at the section withdrawing from Ikba. They were greetedwith a warm reception from the section already at A and beat a hasty retreat. The section at A now withdrew up the wadi, covered by the fire of the section still in position at B and by the Lewis gunners at C. The reserve section from Ikba, who had been the first to withdraw, had meanwhile taken up another section in rear, and, under their protection, the section at B and the Lewis-gunners from C withdrew up the wadi. The enemy had apparently had enough of it, for the pursuit was not pressed. A few rounds of shrapnel were fired at us as a parting present, but no casualties were sustained. This patrol commander had paid attention to, and illustrated the soundness of, the cardinal principles of mountain fighting, namely, the necessity for seizing and piquetting the commanding heights, and the support of the movement of one party of troops by the fire of other parties already in position. The plan of using the Lewis gun as a reserve of fire, kept well back to cover the retirement of the remainder, was undoubtedly sound. Had the commanding heights not been first secured, it is difficult to see how the patrol could have withdrawn in the face of the enemy without confusion and without casualty.

On the 27th March the whole line moved forward. The advance was only intended to be for a depth of about a mile, in order to secure a better tactical line for defence. None of the objectives were believed to be held by the enemy. Accordingly, the advance was carried out by night. A full moon, giving light throughout the night, facilitated the operation. As soon as daylight was gone, the whole line crept noiselessly forward, with bayonets fixed ready to meet any possible opposition with cold steel. Away to our right, the enemy detected movement, and put down a barrage. But their firing was somewhat wild; the barrage came down behind the advancing troops and caused no casualties. On our front the enemy had not awakened to what was taking place, and our objectives were attained without molestation. It wasrealized that our new positions would be overlooked from the enemy's observation posts on Three Bushes Hill and on Arara, and that, when they saw us by daylight occupying the nearer ridges, they would shell us unmercifully. Accordingly, the remainder of the night was not devoted to sleep, but to the intensive building of sangars on the new defensive line, and the preparations of bivouac areas in such few spots as might be under cover from view and from fire. When morning came, the enemy commenced to shell, but the night had not been wasted, and our fellows had made themselves secure.

This new line was not very comfortable. To such an extent was it overlooked by the enemy that all movement by day was out of the question, and even incinerator fires had for a time to be forbidden. The enemy attacked this new line a few days after it had been taken up. However, our artillery caught the enemy's troops in close order before they had been deployed, and so we experienced no greater inconvenience than a bombardment, doing no great damage. It was not expected that this new line would have to be held for any great length of time. Already preparations were being pushed on for another encounter with the enemy.

We have seen, in an earlier chapter, that throughout the campaign in Palestine the left British flank, near the sea, was at all times much in advance of the right. We have already discussed the cause and advantages; there was one distinct disadvantage. As the trend of the country sloped up from the Maritime Plain, the enemy on our right front was on higher ground and had the advantages of observation. If there were a commanding position to our front, and we moved forward and captured it, we found that there were yet other positions beyond, from which that position was itself commanded. Our positions on the Ephraim Mountains along the Ballut Ridge were at this time overlooked from three commanding hills in the possession of the enemy, known as Arara, Rafat, and Three Bushes. Further to the right were the villages of El Kep and Berukin, also on high ground. Owing to the conformation of the country the key of this district was Arara.

In order to improve the general line, and in preparation for a further advance, it was decided to move forward and to capture all these commanding positions. Accordingly, on the morning of the 9th April, the line moved forward. The village of El Kep was a nest of machine guns. After heavy bombardment it was captured after stubborn resistance. Berukin was also captured after sharp fighting, but further progress in this locality was held up. Next day these villages were heavilycounter-attacked, and, though they were firmly held, further progress was out of the question.

Meanwhile, a battalion of Somersets had captured Rafat, and a battalion of Dorsets Three Bushes Hill. Enemy shelling now became intense, followed up by counter-attacks, all of which were repulsed.

The intention had been that the Somersets should capture Rafat first and then take Arara, the main objective of these operations. The capture of Three Bushes Hill was necessary to secure Arara and Rafat from reverse fire. But, to enable Arara to be held, it was also necessary to capture other heights to the south-east, notably one called The Pimple. Most of these heights were captured, but, although determined efforts were made, the enemy could not be dislodged from The Pimple. Nevertheless, the Somersets moved forward from Rafat and successfully established themselves upon Arara. Here they were fired at from all sides. They found that Arara was itself commanded from a height called Sheikh Silbih, a thousand or two yards beyond, while the reserve fire from the machine guns on The Pimple soon made their position on Arara untenable. They fell back upon, and firmly established themselves in, their positions at Rafat. One lad, who was left behind in this retirement, had a terrible experience. Wounded in three or four places, he was unable to withdraw with the remainder of his company. He lay out on Arara for three days, after which he was discovered by some Turks. These proceeded to strip him, whereupon he made known to them that he was still alive. They then bayonetted him, and left him for dead. He lay out there for yet another day, now naked, when he was found by a German stretcher-party. These took pity upon him, and removed him to a hospital where he was nursed back to life.

The position on Three Bushes Hill had become interesting. If left in our undisputed possession, it would have rendered the main line of enemy trenches untenable. On the otherhand, if the enemy could drive us off, he might from there roll up Rafat and our other positions. He therefore made several determined attempts throughout the day to retake this hill. The position was not altogether unlike that on Spion Kop. Each side clung to the slope immediately below the summit, the forward slope being untenable through shell fire; our guns were unable to silence the hostile batteries. There was this difference, however, from Spion Kop, for here there was no question at present of withdrawing. The difficulties of bringing supplies, water and ammunition up, and the even greater difficulty of carrying the wounded down a pathless precipice 400 feet high, can be better imagined than described. This work had mostly to be done by night, for our communication line was under enemy observation. The last of the ambulance camels, which were evacuating wounded from the regimental aid post had not crossed the Ballut Ridge and got out of sight before dawn, and were shelled accordingly.

The enemy delivered counter-attacks again in the night; these also were repulsed. Next morning he changed his tactics. Continuing to shell the back areas, he now pushed up snipers, who established themselves where they could fire at any movement. In so far as the snipers near the summit of the ridge were concerned, a service of counter-sniping was established. But, what was more difficult to deal with, he established snipers on the lower slopes of his own side of the ridge, who could look down upon, and make themselves unpleasant towards, Rafat. Accordingly, it was decided to clear the forward slope.

The Dorsets had now been fighting on the hill for forty-eight hours. Accordingly, on the night of the 10th/11th, they were relieved by an Indian battalion, the Outrans. Just before dawn this battalion moved forward, surprised the Turks, drove them down the hill and consolidated a line along the forward slope, with observation posts and Lewis gunners,withdrawing the remainder of the battalion behind the crest.

The sniping had thus been stopped for the time, and the day was passed in comparative quiet. At dusk, that evening, down came one of the most furious bombardments put down by the enemy in Palestine. Guns from all quarters concentrated on the hill, and practically blotted out the devoted band that were holding the forward line. The bombardment was followed up by a determined counter-attack, but this was repulsed, the battalion of Dorsets being brought back to support the Outrans on the hill.

It was now realized that the only way by which the Arara position could be captured and held, was by a general advance of the line to at least a thousand yards farther to the north, so as to capture The Pimple, Sheikh Subih, and the enemy works beyond Three Bushes. Accordingly, preparations were put in hand, and all was ready for this further advance, when there came—the disaster in France.

The great German offensive in France had commenced on the 21st March, and, a few days later, occurred that great break through which very nearly altered the whole complexion of the war. At first this was not allowed to prejudice the operations in Palestine. But, as the seriousness of the situation in France became realized, no effort was spared to collect more men to fill the gap. Orders were given to cease all further active operations on a large scale in Palestine, and to send to France all the men that could be spared.

Accordingly, there was no alternative but to consolidate, to heavily wire and sangar in upon the line that had been already reached, making such tactical readjustments as were necessary.

It might appear at first sight that the net result of these operations was negative, and that the poor fellows who had given their lives here had died in vain. But this was not so. Rafat was destined to become famous. It was fortified on an almost impregnable scale, thousands of pounds were spent,and a couple of million sand-bags were worked into its defences. A veritable fortress was established which overlooked much of the enemy positions. More than once was this fortress attacked by the Turks, but in vain. It ultimately formed the firm pivot on which was based the great sweep which conquered Palestine.

Feeling between the Turks and the Germans was growing intensely bitter. Germans were not allowed to walk about singly behind the Turkish lines, for fear of assassination. In an attack made by them in the Jordan Valley in July, not only did the Turks fail to move forward in support of the Germans, but they actually fired upon the Germans, when, through lack of that support, they were compelled to retire. It was a case of "a house divided against itself" and it could not therefore hope long to stand.

Active operations on a large scale in Palestine having been stopped, the army was not reorganized. It was a matter of keen regret to many who had followed the fortunes of this campaign since the days of Gaza, that they and their battalions were not to play a part in the final act. The 52nd and the 74th Divisions were withdrawn entirely, their places being taken by the 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions from Mesopotamia. All those remaining, except the 54th, were converted into Indian Divisions, 75 per cent of their battalions being withdrawn and replaced by fresh battalions from India. Those withdrawn were, in some cases, sent to France, in others, broken up and used for reinforcements in the country. Hitherto the army in Palestine had consisted mainly of Territorials. Henceforth it was to consist mainly of Indians.

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