[15]A straw vote taken in 311 colleges and including 158,000 students and professors showed an inclination to favor Wilson rather than Lodge, but the greatest number approved compromise: four per cent favored a new treaty with Germany; eight per cent favored killing the Versailles treaty; only seventeen per cent approved the Lodge programme; thirty per cent approved ratification of the treaty without change; and thirty-eight per cent favored compromise.
[15]A straw vote taken in 311 colleges and including 158,000 students and professors showed an inclination to favor Wilson rather than Lodge, but the greatest number approved compromise: four per cent favored a new treaty with Germany; eight per cent favored killing the Versailles treaty; only seventeen per cent approved the Lodge programme; thirty per cent approved ratification of the treaty without change; and thirty-eight per cent favored compromise.
On the 31st of January the country was startled by the publication of a letter written by Viscount Grey, who had been appointed British Ambassador to the United States, but who had returned to England after a four months' stay, during which he had been unable to secure an interview with the sick President. In this letter he attempted to explain to the British the causes of American hesitancy to accept the League. He then went on to state that the success of the League depended upon the adherence of the United States, and while admitting the serious character of the reservations proposed by Senator Lodge, insisted that American coöperation ought not to be refused because conditions were attached. His views were unofficial, but it seemed clear that they were approved by the British Cabinet, and they received a chorus of endorsement from the French and British press.
The publication of Grey's letter opened a path to peace to both Senate and President had they been willing to follow it. The Senate, by very slight verbal softening of the language of its reservations, the President by taking the British Ambassador at his word, might have reached an agreement.The Lodge group, however, which had shown some indications of a desire for compromise, was threatened by the "die-hards" who were determined to defeat the treaty; fearing beyond everything to break party unity, Lodge finally refused to alter the language of the strong reservation on Article X, which stated that the United States would assume no obligation to preserve the independence of other nations by military force or the use of its resources or any form of economic discrimination, unless Congress should first so provide. Inasmuch as the economic outlawry of the offending state was the means which Wilson chiefly counted upon, the reservation took all practical significance from Article X, since the delays resulting from congressional deliberation would prevent effective action. The President, possibly believing that imperialist elements abroad were not sorry to see Article X nullified, refused to accept the resolution of ratification so long as it contained this reservation. "The imperialist," he wrote, "wants no League of Nations, but if, in response to the universal cry of masses everywhere, there is to be one, he is interested to secure one suited to his own purposes, one that will permit him to continue the historic game of pawns and peoples—the juggling of provinces, the old balance of power, and the inevitable wars attendant upon these things. The reservation proposed would perpetuate the old order. Does any one really want to see the old game played again? Can any one really venture to take part in reviving the old order? The enemies of a League of Nations have by every true instinct centered their efforts against Article X, for it is undoubtedly the foundation of the whole structure. It is the bulwark, and the only bulwark of the rising democracy of the world against the forces of imperialism and reaction."
The deadlock was complete, and on March 19, 1920, when the vote on ratification was taken, the necessary two-thirds were lacking by seven votes. At the last moment a number of Democrats joined with the Republican reservationists, making fifty-seven in favor of ratification. On the other hand the bitter-end Republicans voted against it with the Democrats who stood by the President, thus throwing thirty-seven votes against ratification. It had taken the Peace Conference five months to construct the treaty with Germany in all its complexities, and secure the unanimous approval of the delegates of thirty-one states.The Senate had consumed more than eight months merely in criticizing the treaty and had finally refused to ratify it.
We are, perhaps, too close to the event to attempt any apportionment of responsibility for this failure to cap our military successes by a peace which—when all has been said—was the nearest possible approach to the ideal peace. It is clear that the blame is not entirely on one side. Historians will doubtless level the indictment of ignorance and political obliquity against the Senators who tried, either directly or indirectly, to defeat the treaty; they will find much justification for their charge, although it will be more difficult to determine the dividing line between mere incapacity to appreciate the necessities of the world, and the desire to discredit, at any cost, the work of Woodrow Wilson. On the other hand, the President cannot escape blame, although the charge will be merely that of tactical incapacity and mistaken judgment. His inability to combine with the moderate Republican Senators first gave a chance to those who wanted to defeat the treaty. His obstinate refusal to accept reservations at the end, when it was clear that the treaty could not be ratified without them, showed a regard for form, at the expense of practical benefit.Granted that the reservations altered the character of the League or the character of American participation in it, some sort of a League was essential and the sooner the United States entered the better it would be. Its success would not rest upon phrases, but upon the spirit of the nations that composed it; the building-up of a new and better international order would not be determined by this reservation or that. Wilson's claim to high rank as a statesmen would probably be more clear if he had accepted what was possible at the moment, in the hope that the League would be improved as the country and the world became better educated.
By the accident of history the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, which he designed to utilize for a series of social reforms, was characterized by the supreme importance of foreign affairs. Whatever the significance of the legislative enactments of his first year of office, he will be remembered as the neutrality President, the war President, and the peace President. Each phase of his administration represents a distinct aspect of his policy and called into prominence distinct aspects of his character. It is the third, however, which gives to his administration the place of importance which it will hold in history; not merely because of the stamp which he attempted to place upon the peace, but because the two earlier phases are in truth expressive of his whole-hearted devotion to the cause of peace. The tenacity with which he held to neutrality in the face of intense provocation resulted less from hisappreciation of the pacific sentiments of the nation, or a desire to assure its economic prosperity, than it did from his instinctive abhorrence of war. When finally forced into war, he based his action upon the hope of securing a new international order which would make war in the future impossible or less frequent. In his mind the war was always waged in order to ensure peace.
Whatever his mistakes or successes as neutrality President or war President, therefore, it is as peace President that he will be judged by history. Inevitably future generations will study with especial attention the unfolding of his constructive peace policy, from his declaration of the Fourteen Points to the Peace Conference. In reality his policy of international service, to be rendered by the strong nations of the world in behalf of peace and of absolute justice toward the weaker nations, was developed all through the year 1916. It was then that he seized upon a League of Nations as the essential instrument. But the true significance of this policy was hardly perceived before the speech of the Fourteen Points, in January, 1918. That speech gave to Wilson his position in the world, as prëeminent exponent of the new ideals of international relations.
What the President demanded was nothing new. The principle of justice, as the underlying basis of intercourse between nations, has received wide support at all epochs of history; the cause of international peace, as an ultimate ideal, has always been advocated in the abstract; the idea of a League of Nations has frequently been mooted. But it was Wilson's fate to be ruler of a great nation at the moment when the need of peace, justice, and international organization was more clearly demonstrated than ever before in the world's history. Germany's cynical disregard of Belgian independence, the horrors and waste of the war for which Germany was chiefly responsible, the diplomatic disorganization of Europe, which permitted this world disaster, desired by merely a handful of firebrands—all these tragic and pitiful facts had been burned into the mind of the age. There was a definite determination that a recurrence of such catastrophes should not be permitted. The period of the war will be regarded by future historians as one of transition from the international chaos of the nineteenth century to an organization of nations, which, however loose, should crystallize the conscience of the world, preserve its peace, and translate into international politics the standards of morality which have been set up for the individual.
In this transition President Wilson played a part of the first importance. His rôle was not so much that of the executive leader as of the prophet. He was not the first to catch the significance of the transition, nor did he possess the executive qualities which would enable him to break down all obstacles and translate ideals into facts. But he alone of the notable statesmen of the world was able to express adequately the ill-defined hopes of the peoples of all nations. He gave utterance to the words which the world had been waiting for, and they carried weight because of his position. Alone of the great powers the United States had no selfish designs to hide behind fair promises of a better future. As President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson might look for the confidence of Europe; there was no European Government which could arouse similar trust. So long as the war lasted, the President's success as a prophet of the ideal was assured, alike by his ability to voice inarticulate hopes and by reason of his position as chief of the most powerful and most disinterested nation of the world.
But with the end of the war he faced a new task and one which was infinitely more difficult. The flush of victory obliterated from the minds of many in the Allied countries the high ideals which they had nourished during the bitterness of the struggle. The moment had arrived when practical advantage might be taken from the defeat of the enemy, and it seemed madness to surrender such advantage for the sake of quixotic ideals. The statesmen of Europe once more viewed affairs through the colored prism of national selfishness. In America, where Wilsonian ideals had at best been imperfectly appreciated, men were wearied by international problems and longed for a return to the simple complexity of the business life which they understood. The President was confronted by a double problem. He must win from Europe acceptance of his programme, crystallized in the League of Nations; from his fellow countrymen he must secure the support necessary if the United States were to continue to play the rôle in world affairs which she had undertaken during the war, and which alone would make possible an effective League of Nations. To meet the difficulties of the task, President Wilson was imperfectly equipped. He lacked the dynamic qualities of a Roosevelt, which might have enabled him to carry his opponents off their feet by an overwhelming rush; he was not endowed with the tactical genius of a skillful negotiator; he was, above all, handicapped by the personal hostilities which he had aroused at home.
In Europe the President achieved at least partial success. He proved unable to marshal the forces of liberalism in such a way as to carry his complete programme to victory, and the sacrifices which he made to the spirit of selfish nationalism cost him the support and the confidence of many progressive elements, while they did not placate the hostility of the reactionaries. But he secured the League of Nations, the symbol and the instrument of the new international organization which he sought. Thereby at least a beginning was made in concrete form, which might later be developed, when the force of the post-bellum reaction had wasted itself.
At home, however, the forces of opposition proved strong enough to rob the President of what might have been a triumph. He lacked the capacity to reconcile his personal and political opponents, as well as the ability to compromise with the elements that were inclined to meet him half-way. In accordance with his basic principles he appealed from the politicians to the people. But here again he failed, whether because of personal unpopularity, or because of the poor publicity which had been given his efforts at Paris, or because of the physical breakdown which shattered his persuasive powers and finally led to his retirement from the struggle. The vindication which he sought in the presidential election of 1920 was denied him. The country was tired of a Democratic Administration and gave to the Republican candidate an overwhelming plurality. The sole comfort that Wilson could take, in the face of the election returns, was that both candidates had declared for the principle of international organization and that the most distinguished supporters of the successful Republican candidate had pledged themselves to a League of Nations.
The months that followed the President's return from Paris until the close of his administration thus form a period of personal tragedy. He had achieved a broad measure of success in Europe, where the difficulties appeared stupendous, only to have the cup dashed from his lips at the last moment in his own country. The bitterness of the experience was intensified by his physical helplessness.But we should lack perspective if we made the mistake of confusing personal tragedy with failure. His work remained uncrowned, but there was much that could never be undone. The articulate expression of the hopes of the world, which President Wilson voiced during the war, remains imperishable as a guide to this and future generations. The League of Nations, weakened by the absence of the United States but actually organized and in operation, was the President's work. Whatever the fortunes of this particular League the steps taken toward international coöperation by its foundation can never be completely retraced.
Woodrow Wilson, however, is not to be assessed by his accomplishment. It is as prophet and not as man of action that he will be regarded by history. Like the prophets of old, like Luther or Mazzini, he lacked the capacity for carrying to practical success the ideal which he preached. But to assume that he must accordingly be adjudged a failure is to ignore the significance of the ideals to which he awakened the world. Much there was that was unattainable and intangible, but its value to mankind in the development of international relations may be inestimable.
Not on the vulgar massCalled "work" must sentence passThings done, that took the eye and had the price....But all, the world's coarse thumbAnd finger failed to plumb,So passed in making up the main account;All instincts immature,All purposes unsure,That weighed not as his work, yet swelled the man's amount.
Not on the vulgar massCalled "work" must sentence passThings done, that took the eye and had the price....But all, the world's coarse thumbAnd finger failed to plumb,So passed in making up the main account;All instincts immature,All purposes unsure,That weighed not as his work, yet swelled the man's amount.
Thus far no adequate biography of President Wilson, covering his career through the Peace Conference, has been published. The most suggestive is Henry Jones Ford'sWoodrow Wilson: The Man and His Work(1916) which stops with the close of the first term. The author, a Princeton professor, is a warm personal and political admirer of the President, but he makes a definite attempt at critical appreciation. W. E. Dodd'sWoodrow Wilson and His Work(1920) is comprehensive and brings the story to the end of the Peace Conference, but it is marred by eulogistic interpretation and anti-capitalistic bias. An interesting effort to interpret the President to British readers in the form of biography has been made by H. W. Harris inPresident Wilson: His Problems and His Policy(1917). W. B. Hale, inThe Story of a Style(1920), attempts to analyze the motives by which the President is inspired. But the best material to serve this end is to be found in the President's writings, especiallyCongressional Government(1885),An Old Master and Other Political Essays(1893),Constitutional Government in the United States(1908),The New Freedom(1913),International Ideals(1919). The two last-named are collections of addresses made in explanation and advocacy of his plans of domestic and international reform.The most convenient edition of the President's official writings and speeches is Albert Shaw'sPresident Wilson's State Papers and Addresses(1918), edited with an analytical index.
For the period of neutrality a storehouse of facts is to be found inThe New York Times Current History, published monthly. TheAmerican Year Bookcontains a succinct narrative of the events of each year, which may be supplemented by that in theAnnual Registerwhich is written from the British point of view. A brief résumé of Wilson's first term is contained in F. A. Ogg'sNational Progress(1918). More detailed is the first volume of J. B. McMaster'sThe United States in the World War(1918), which is based upon the newspapers and necessarily lacks perspective, but is comprehensive and extremely useful for purposes of reference. The clearest outline of President Wilson's treatment of foreign affairs is to be found in E. E. Robinson and V. J. West'sThe Foreign Policy of President Wilson, 1913-1917(1917). The narrative is brief but interpretative and is followed by numerous excerpts from the President's speeches and state papers. The tone of the narrative is extremely favorable and President Wilson is credited with consistency rather than capacity for development, but the arrangement is excellent. More comprehensive is the edition by J. B. Scott, entitledPresident Wilson's Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers(1918). Johann von Bernstorff'sMy Three Years in America(1920) is a well-reasoned apologia by the German Ambassador, which contains information of much value; it is not impossible for the critically minded to distinguish the true from the false. The description of German criminal activities contained in Horst von der Goltz'sMy Adventures as a German Secret Agent(1917), should be checked up with the report of the Senate Committee of Inquiry into the German propaganda.The Real Colonel House, by A. D. Howden-Smith (1918), throws useful sidelights on Wilson and contains valuable material on the activities of Colonel House as negotiator before the entrance into the war of the United States.
The best general narrative of America's war effort is J. S. Bassett'sOur War with Germany(1919); it is clear and succinct, beginning with the early effects of the war on the United States in 1914, and ending with the Peace Conference. An interesting, but irritating, account is to be found in George Creel'sThe War, the World and Wilson(1920), which is passionate in its defense of the President, and blurs truth with inaccuracy on almost every page. F. F. Kelly'sWhat America Did(1919) is a brief popular account of the building of the army at home and abroad and the organization of industry: clear, inaccurate, uncritical. The most convenient summary of the organization of national resources is F. L. Paxson's "The American War Government," inThe American Historical Review, October, 1920, which should be supplemented by theHandbook of Economic Agencies for the War of 1917, monograph No. 3 of the Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff (1919). The former contains many references in footnotes, of which the most important are theReport of the Chief of Staff(1919) and theReport of the Provost Marshal General(1919). The publishedInvestigation of the War Department, Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs(1918) is invaluableThe most complete information on ordnance is to be found in the report of General Benedict Crowell,America's Munitions, 1917-1918(1919); it is an official defense and should be read critically. A graphic picture of American accomplishments is given in L. P. Ayres'sThe War with Germany; A Statistical Summary(1919). The best account of operations in France is still General Pershing'sReport to the Secretary of War, which is printed inNew York Times Current History, January and February, 1920. It may be supplemented by Shipley Thomas'sThe History of the A. E. F.(1920).
The American point of view on the Peace Conference is set forth authoritatively inWhat Really Happened at Paris(1921), a collection of lectures delivered by members of the American Peace Commission and edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour.Some Problems of the Peace Conference(1920), by C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, is an accurate and comprehensive analysis of the territorial questions settled at Paris. The British point of view and the most important documents are given inA History of the Peace Conference of Paris(1920), written chiefly by British delegates and edited by H. W. V. Temperley. The French point of view is admirably presented in André Tardieu'sThe Truth about the Treaty(1921). An excellent picture of the conflict of interests and the manner in which they were decided is to be found in C. T. Thompson'sThe Peace Conference Day by Day(1920). Robert Lansing'sThe Peace Negotiations(1921) is interesting as giving the opinions of an American Commissioner who disagreed with Mr. Wilson's methods at Paris. J. M. Keynes'sThe Economic Consequences of the Peace(1920) contains an economic analysis which is more trustworthy than his brilliant, but misleading, picture of the Conference. It should not be read except in company with the authoritative and accurateThe Making of the Reparation and Economic Clauses(1920), by B. M. Baruch. A clever but superficial criticism of President Wilson's peace policies is to be found in J. M. Beck'sThe Passing of the Freedom(1920).
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