Those last days before the Treaty was finished were among the hardest of the entire Conference. As I have said before, the most difficult and dangerous problems had inevitably been left to the last, and had all to be finally settled in those crowded days of late April.
Consider, for a moment, the exact situation at Paris on April 29th, when the Japanese-Chinese crises reached the explosive point.
It was on that very day that the German delegates were coming morosely into Versailles, ready for a treaty that was not yet finished. The Three—for Orlando had then withdrawn from the Conference—had been gradually lengthening their sessions, the discussions were longer and more acrimonious. They were tired out. Only six days before, on April 23rd, the High Council had been hopelessly deadlocked on the Italian question. The President had issued his bold message to the world regarding the disposition of Fiume and the Italian delegation departed from Paris with the expectation that their withdrawal would either force the hands of the Conference, or break it up.
While this crisis was at its height the Belgian delegation, which had long been restive over the non-settlement of Belgian claims for reparations, became insistent. They had no place in the Supreme Council and they were worried lest the French and British—neither of whom could begin to get enough money out of Germany to pay for its losses—would take the lion's share and leave Belgium unrestored. The little nations were always worried at Paris lest the big ones take everything and leave them nothing! Very little appeared in the news at the time concerning the Belgian demands, but they reached practically an ultimatum: if Belgium were not satisfied she also would withdraw from the Conference and refuse to sign the Treaty.
It was at this critical moment that the Chinese-Japanese question had to be settled. It had to be settled because the disposition of German rights in China (unlike Italian claims in the Adriatic) had to go into the German Treaty before it was presented to Brockdorff Rantzau and his delegates at Versailles; and because the Japanese would not sign the Treaty unless it was settled. The defection of Japan, added to that of Italy and the possible withdrawal of Belgium, would have made the situation desperate.
The two principal things that Japan wanted at the Peace Conference were: first, a recognition in the Covenant of the League of Nations of the "equality of the nations and the just treatment of their nationals"; and, second, the recognition of certain rights over the former German concessions in China (Shantung.)
After a struggle lasting all through the Conference, Japan had finally lost out, in the meeting of the League of Nations Commission on April 11th, in her first great contention. She was refused the recognition of racial or even national equality which she demanded although a majority of the nations represented on the League of Nations Commission agreed with her that her desire for such recognition was just and should find a place in the Covenant….
Few people realize how sharply the Japanese felt this hurt to their pride: and few people realize the meaning of this struggle, as a forerunner of one of the great coming struggles of civilization—the race struggle….
Having lost out in their first great contention the Japanese came to the settlement of their second demand with a feeling of irritation but with added determination. The Japanese delegates were the least expressive of any at the Conference: they said the least: but they were the firmest of any in hewing to the line of their interests and their agreements. It must not be forgotten also, in all fairness, that the Japanese delegates, not less than the British, French, and American, had their own domestic political problems, and opposition, and that there was a powerful demand in Japan that, while all the other nations were securing some return for their losses and sacrifices in the war, Japan should also get some return.
At the same time Japan was in a stronger position than any other of the Allied and Associated Powers except the United States. She had been little hurt, and much strengthened by the war. She was far distant from danger; she did not need the League of Nations as much as did the countries of Europe; and, more than anything else, she occupied a strong legal status, for her claims were supported by treaties both with China and the Allies; and she was, moreover, in a position, if she were rendered desperate, to take by force what she considered to be her rights if the Allies refused to accord them.
At a dark moment of the war, the spring of 1917, the British and French, in order to sharpen Japanese support of the allied cause, made private agreements to sustain the claims of Japan at the Peace Conference to German rights in Shantung. It thus happened, in the Council of Three, for Orlando had then gone home, that two of the powers, Great Britain and France, were bound by their pledged word to Japan. Indeed, the British argued that they felt themselves indebted to the Japanese not only as a long-friendly ally but for helping to keep the Pacific free of the enemy while Australian troops were being transported to Europe and thus relieving a great burden for the British fleet. It must not be forgotten that China was also bound by the Treaty and Notes of 1915 and the Notes of 1918 with Japan— although China vigorously asserted that all of these agreements were entered into upon her part under coercion by Japan. In fact, one of the Chinese delegates at Paris had actually signed one of the agreements which he was now asking the Conference to overthrow.
It was not only this wire entanglement of treaties which Mr. Wilson found in his advance, but it must be said, in all frankness, that, in opposing Japan's demands for economic privileges and a "sphere of influence" in China, he was also opposing a principle which every other strong nation at the Conference believed in and acted upon, if not in China, then elsewhere in the world. Japan asserted that she was only asking for the rights already conceded to other nations. Japan was thus in a very strong position in insisting upon her claims, and China in a very weak position.
In this crisis Mr. Wilson was face to face with difficult alternatives. If he stood stiffly for immediate justice to China, he would have to force Great Britain and France to break their pledged word with Japan. Even if he succeeded in doing this, he still would have had to face the probability, practically the certainty, that Japan would withdraw from the Conference and go home. This would not only keep Japan out of the League, but it would go far toward eventually disrupting the Peace Conference, already shaken by the withdrawal of Italy and the dangerous defection of Belgium. Such a weakening of the Peace Conference and of the Alliance of the Great Powers would have the immediate effect of encouraging the Germans not to sign the Treaty and of holding off in the hope that the forces of industrial unrest then spreading all over Europe might overwhelm France or Italy. It would also have a highly irritating effect upon all the bolshevist elements in Europe—increasing uncertainty, and the spread of anarchical conditions. With Japan out of the association of western nations there was also the possibility, voiced just at this time in both French and British newspapers, that she would begin building up alliances of her own in the East—possibly with Germany and Russia. Indeed, if the truth were told, this was probably the most important consideration of all in shaping the final decision. It was the plain issue between the recrudescence, in a new and more dangerous form, of the old system of military alliances and balances of power, and the new system of world organization in a league of nations. It was the militaristic Prussian idea against the American Wilsonian idea.
No statesman probably ever had a more difficult problem presented to him than did Mr. Wilson upon the momentous 29th of April, 1919. At that moment three things seemed of extreme importance if anything was to be saved out of the wreckage of the world. The first was a speedy peace, so that men everywhere might return to the work of production and reconstruction and the avenues of trade everywhere be opened. Peace and work! The second was of supreme importance—keeping the great Allies firmly welded together to steady a world which was threatened with anarchy. It was absolutely necessary to keep a going concern in the world! The third was to perpetuate this world organization in a league of nations: this the most important of all, for it had reference to the avalanche of new problems which were just ahead.
If the Conference were broken up, or even if Italy remained out, and Japan went out, these things would be impossible. On the other hand, if the Allies could be kept firmly together, peace established, and a league of nations brought into being, there was a chance of going forward with world reconstruction on the broadest lines, and of the full realization of the principles of justice laid down in the Armistice terms and accepted by all nations. The Treaty, after all, is no final settlement; it is only one step in the great process of world reconstruction.
It was with all these considerations in view that the Shantung settlement was made by the Council of Three sitting in the President's house in the Place des États-Unis—with the Japanese in full agreement.
This settlement was in two parts, the first set forth in the Treaty itself, and the second a special agreement of the three Great Powers with Japan. I find that this fact is not clear to many people, who look for the entire settlement in the Treaty itself.
Under sections 156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty all the rights at Kiauchow and in Shantung Province formerly belonging to Germany are transferred without reservation to Japan. This conforms broadly with the various treaties, and gives a proud nation what it considered its full rights.
On the other hand, the Japanese delegates at the Conference, on behalf of their government, made a voluntary agreement "to hand back the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao."
Under this agreement, by which Japan makes an unqualified recession of the sovereign rights in Shantung to China, she also agrees to remove all Japanese troops remaining on the peninsula "at the earliest possible time."
Japan thus gets only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are already possessed by one or two great powers and the whole future relationship between the two countries falls at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations, by the provisions of which the territorial integrity and political independence of China will be insured.
If the President had risked everything in standing for the immediate and complete realization of the Chinese demands, and had broken up the Conference upon that issue, it would not have put Japan either politically or economically out of China. Neither our people nor the British would go to war with Japan solely to keep her out of Shantung. The only hope of China in the future—and Wilson looks not only to the removal of the sphere of influence which Japan controls but to the removal of all other spheres of foreign influence in China—is through a firm world organization, a league of nations in which these problems can be brought up for peaceful settlement…. "The settlement, of course, was a compromise: a balance of considerations. It was the problem of the President, all through the Conference, when to 'accommodate' and when to use decided policies. 'The wisdom of the statesman,' said Cavour (quoted by Thayer in his admirable 'Life'), 'consists in discerning when the time has come for the one or the other.'"
"The Shantung decision is about as good a settlement as could be had out of a dirty past."
Even I felt bitterly critical of what seemed to me to be the President's surrender to Japan in the matter of Shantung. But when he returned and told me the whole story and explained the complicated and delicate world situation which confronted him, I agreed with him that he had obtained out of a bad mess the best possible settlement.
In addition to the various cabled messages which passed between the President and myself, which will be found in Appendix "C," was the following:
Received at The White House, Washington,April 30, 1919.
ParisTUMULTY, White House,Washington.
The Japanese-Chinese matter has been settled in a way which seems to me as satisfactory as could be got out of the tangle of treaties in which China herself was involved, and it is important that the exact facts should be known. I therefore send you the following for public use at such time as the matter may come under public discussion. In the Treaty all the rights at Kiao-Chau and in Shantung Province belonging to Germany are to be transferred without opposition to Japan, but Japan voluntarily engages, in answer to the questions put in Conference, that it will be her immediate policy toQuotehand back the surveyed peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtau. Owners of the railway will use special police only to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose. The police force will be composed of Chinese and such Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway may select will be appointed by the Chinese governmentEnd quote.
It was understood in addition that inasmuch as the sovereign rights receded to China were to be unqualified, all Japanese troops remaining on the peninsula should be withdrawn at the earliest possible time. Japan thus gets only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are possessed by one or two other great powers and are only too common in China, and the future relationship between the two countries falls at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations of territorial integrity and political independence. I find a general disposition to look with favour upon the proposal that at an early date throughout the mediation of the League of Nations all extraordinary foreign rights in China and all spheres of influence should be abrogated by the common consent of all the nations concerned. I regard the assurances given by Japan as very satisfactory in view of the complicated circumstances. Please do not give out any of the above as a quotation from me, but use it in some other form for public information at the right time.
To one standing on the side-lines in the capital of the nation and witnessing the play of the ardent passions of the people of the Irish race, demanding that some affirmative action be taken by our government to bring about the realization of the right of self-determination for Ireland, it seemed as if the American President, Woodrow Wilson, who first gave utterance to the ideal of self-determination for all the oppressed peoples of the world, was woefully unmindful of the age-long struggle that Irishmen had been making to free their own beloved land from British domination. But to those, like myself, who were on the inside of affairs, it was evident that in every proper and legitimate way the American President was cautiously searching for efficient means to advance the cause of self-government in Ireland and to bring about a definite and satisfactory solution of this complicated problem.
Embarrassed as he was by a delicate diplomatic situation, which to a great extent governed his conduct, he was not free openly to espouse the cause of Ireland. To have done so would have been to add difficulties to an already chaotic world situation. He was compelled in what he was seeking to do for Ireland to move quietly and by informal conferences impressively to lay the case of Ireland before those who sought his counsel in the matter. Unfortunately, these quiet methods of helpfulness which he brought to the task were the things that drew the fire of criticism and even distrust of many men of the Irish race in America, who in their passionate devotion to the cause which lay so close to their hearts could see only a direct route to accomplishing what they had in mind.
Long before the European war the President and I had often discussed the Irish cause and how to make his influence felt in a way that would bring results without becoming involved in diplomatic snarls with Great Britain. He was of the opinion that the Irish problem could not be settled by force, for the spirit of Ireland, which for centuries had been demanding justice, was unconquerable. He pointed out to me on many occasions when we discussed this delicate matter, that the policy of force and reprisal which the English Government had for centuries practised in had but strengthened the tenacious purpose of the Irish people and had only succeeded in keeping under the surface the seething dissatisfaction of that indomitable race.
I recall that at the conclusion of one of our talks after a Cabinet meeting, shaking his head as if he despaired of a settlement, the President said: "European statesmen can never learn that humanity can be welded together only by love, by sympathy, and by justice, and not by jealousy and hatred." He was certain that the failure of England to find an adjustment was intensifying feeling not only in our own country, but throughout the world, and that the agitation for a settlement would spread like a contagion and would inevitably result in a great national crisis.
An interesting comment on the President's attitude toward the Irish question appears in an article in theAtlantic Monthlyfor October, 1921. The article is by Joseph Fort Newton, in his series, "Preaching in London." The comment is as follows:
To-day a distinguished London minister told me a story about the President, for which he vouches. He had it from the late Sylvester Horne—Member of Parliament and minister of Whitefield's Chapel—who had known the President for years before he was elevated to his high office. Home happened to be in America—where he was always a welcome guest—before the war, shortly after the President was inaugurated, and he called at the White House to pay his respects. In the course of the talk, he expressed satisfaction that the relations between England and America would be in safe hands while the President was in office. The President said nothing, and Horne wondered at it. Finally he forced the issue, putting it as a question point-blank. The President said, addressing him in the familiar language of religious fellowship: "Brother Horne, one of the greatest calamities that has befallen mankind will come during my term of office. It will come from Germany. Go home and settle the Irish question, and there will be no doubt as to where America will stand."
In discussing the matter with me, he said: "The whole policy of Great Britain in its treatment of the Irish question has unfortunately been based upon a policy of fear and not a policy of trusting the Irish people. How magnificently the policy of trust and faith worked out in the case of the Boers. Unfortunately, the people of Ireland now believe that the basis of England's policy toward them is revenge, malice, and destruction. You remember, Tumulty, how the haters of the South in the days of reconstruction sought to poison Lincoln's mind by instilling into it everything that might lead him in his treatment of the South toward a policy of reprisal, but he contemptuously turned away from every suggestion as a base and ignoble thing. Faith on the part of Great Britain in the deep humanity and inherent generosity of the Irish people is the only force that will ever lead to a settlement of this question. English statesmen must realize that in the last analysis force never permanently settles anything. It only produces hatreds and resentments that make a solution of any question difficult and almost impossible. I have tried to impress upon the Englishmen with whom I have discussed this matter that there never can be a real comradeship between America and England until this issue is definitely settled and out of the way."
Many times in informal discussions with British representatives that came to the White House the President sought to impress upon them the necessity for a solution, pointing out to them how their failure was embarrassing our relations with Great Britain at every point. I am sure that if he could with propriety have done so, Woodrow Wilson would long ago have directly suggested to Great Britain a settlement of the Irish question, but, unfortunately, serious diplomatic obstacles lay in the way of an open espousal of the Irish cause. He was sadly aware that under international law no nation has the right to interest itself in anything that directly concerns the affairs of another friendly nation, for by the traditions of diplomacy such "interference" puts in jeopardy the cordial relations of the nations involved in such controversy.
Long before he became president, Woodrow Wilson had eloquently declared his attitude with reference to self-government for Ireland and had openly espoused the cause of Irish freedom. In a speech delivered at New Brunswick, New Jersey, on October 26, 1910, he said:
Have you read the papers recently attentively enough to notice the rumours that are coming across the waters? What are the rumours? The rumours are that the English programme includes, not only self- government for Ireland, but self government for Scotland, and the drawing together in London or somewhere else of a parliament which will represent the British Empire in a great confederated state upon the model, no doubt, of the United States of America, and having its power to the end of the world. What is at the bottom of that programme? At the bottom of it is the idea that no little group of men like the English people have the right to govern men in all parts of the world without drawing them into real substantial partnership, where their voice will count with equal weight with the voice of other parts of the country.
This voice that has been crying in Ireland, this voice for home rule, is a voice which is now supported by the opinion of the world; this impulse is a spirit which ought to be respected and recognized in the British Constitution. It means not mere vague talk of men's rights, men's emotions, and men's inveterate and traditional principles, but it means the embodiment of these things in something that is going to be done, that will look with hope to the programme that may come out of these conferences.
If those who conduct the Government of Great Britain are not careful the restlessness will spread with rapid agitation until the whole country is aflame, and then there will be revolution and a change of government.
In this speech he plainly indicated that his plan for the settlement of the Irish question was the establishment of some forum to which the cause of Ireland might be brought, where the full force of the public opinion of the world, including the United States, could be brought to play in a vigorous and whole-hearted insistence upon a solution of this world- disturbing question.
As we read the daily papers, containing accounts of the disturbances in Ireland, what a prophetic vision underlay the declaration contained in the speech of Woodrow Wilson in 1910!
If those who conduct the Government of Great Britain are not careful the restlessness will spread with rapid agitation until the whole country is aflame, and then there will be revolution and a change of government.
I recall his passionate resentment of the attitude and threats of Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Unionist forces in the British Parliament, when he read the following statement of Carson carried in the American Press, after the passage of Home Rule through the House of Lords: "In the event of this proposed parliament being thrust upon us, we solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves not to recognize its authority. I do not care two pence whether this is treason or not."
Discussing Carson's utterance the President said: "I would like to be in Mr. Asquith's place. I would show this rebel whether he would recognize the authority of the Government or flaunt it. He ought to be hanged for treason. If Asquith does not call this gentleman's bluff, the contagion of unrest and rebellion in Ireland will spread until only a major operation will save the Empire. Dallying with gentlemen of this kind who openly advocate revolution will only add to the difficulties. If those in authority in England will only act firmly now, their difficulties will be lessened. A little of the firmness and courage of Andrew Jackson would force a settlement of the Irish question right now."
The President did not agree with the friends of Irish freedom in America that coercive methods put upon England through the instrumentality of the United States could accomplish anything. When he left for the other side to take part in the Peace Conference, the future of Ireland was much in his thoughts, but his solution of the problem lay in the establishment of a forum under the League of Nations before which not only the cause of Ireland but the cause of any oppressed people might be brought to the judgment of mankind.
Ireland's affairs were always in the background of the President's thoughts and he welcomed conversations with those who were in a position to offer helpful suggestions. I append a correspondence, intimate in character and now for the first time "exposed to the public view," between the President, Mr. Sidney Brooks, a noted English writer, and myself:
Friday, April 20, 1917.
After several months in America I am now returning to England, returning, I need not say, in a very happy mood and with the consciousness that the relations between our two countries are at length set fair. There is nothing nearer to my heart than improving them, and I believe I see how they could be improved and particularly how the last great obstacle to their betterment—I mean, of course, Ireland—could be lessened, if not removed. I should very greatly value an opportunity of setting before you some views I have formed on the matter, if an opportunity could be found before the arrival of the British Commission.
I leave Washington on Sunday and sail for England on the following Saturday, but not, I trust, without being able to pay you my respects and say my adieux in person.
Believe me, dear Mr. President,
Yours very sincerely,SIDNEY BROOKS.
THE PRESIDENT,The White House.
In forwarding this letter to the President, I accompanied it by the following note:
April 20, 1917.
I just had a little talk with Sidney Brooks who says he has been in correspondence with Lloyd George and Lord Northcliffe with reference to the Home Rule question. He believes that just a little push by you in your private talk with Mr. Balfour would put over home rule. He says if you could bring home to Balfour the amount of American public sentiment which favours it and how a denial of it is working to the disadvantage of England in this country, it would make a great impression. He says after the war there will of course be a great and generous cooperation between England and this country; but that there will never be genuine cooperation between the people of America and the people of England until the Irish question is settled.
Sincerely yours,TUMULTY.
The President replied to me in the following note:
Confidentially (for I beg that you will be careful not to speak of or intimate this), I have been doing a number of things about this which I hope may bear fruit.
Mr. John D. Crimmins, a leading Irish sympathizer, addressed the following letter to the President:
Washington, D. C., April 28, 1917.
The press this morning leads to the impression that at some timely hour, in your own manner, you will have a word on the Irish problem that at this moment appears to be near solution.
It would be most timely and would have the heartfelt gratitude of millions of people in this and other lands who have long hoped, and many prayed, for Ireland as a small nation to have autonomy, thereby establishing peace with England and among English-speaking people. Then if an emergency should arise there would be all for one and one for all. Mr. President, you have gone a long step in that direction in declaring the rights of small nations—another step may be the means of reaching the goal for the Irish people.
Faithfully yours,JOHN D. CRIMMINS.
His Excellency,Woodrow Wilson.
The President read this letter with a great deal of interest and sent me the following note, evidencing his sincere interest in all that Mr. Crimmins had said:
You are right about Mr. Crimmins having been a good friend, but I don't like to write any letters on this subject at present. I would appreciate it very much if you would assure him of my interest and of your knowledge of the fact that I am showing in every way I possibly can my sympathy with the claim of Ireland for home rule.
On December 3, 1919, Bishop Shahan, of the Catholic University, addresseda letter to the President in behalf of the rector and faculties of theCatholic University of America with reference to the question of HomeRule, to which the President replied:
3 December, 1919.
Allow me to acknowledge your letter of November 30th written in behalf of the rector and faculties of the Catholic University of America, and to say that it will be my endeavour in regard to every question which arises before the Peace Conference to do my utmost to bring about the realization of the principles to which your letter refers. The difficulties and delicacy of the task are very great, and I cannot confidently forecast what I can do. I can only say that I shall be watchful of every opportunity to insist upon the principles I have enunciated.
Cordially and sincerely yours,WOODROW WILSON.
The Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, Rector,Catholic University of America,Washington, D. C.
On December 3, 1918, he addressed a letter to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, ofMontana, as follows:
3 December, 1919.
I appreciate the importance of a proper solution of the Irish question and thank you for the suggestions of your letter of yesterday. Until I get on the other side and find my footing in delicate matters of this sort I cannot forecast with any degree of confidence what influence I can exercise, but you may be sure that I shall keep this important interest in mind and shall use my influence at every opportunity to bring about a just and satisfactory solution.
I greatly value the expressions of your confidence and feel very much strengthened by them.
With the best wishes,
Cordially and sincerely yours,WOODROW WILSON.
Hon. Thomas J. Walsh,United States Senate.
While the President was in Paris, I constantly kept him in touch with the situation in this country, and that he was interested in bringing to the attention of the Peace Conference the cause of Ireland is made clear by the following cables that were exchanged between us.
On June 7, 1919, I cabled Admiral Grayson, for the President as follows:
The White House, Washington, 7 June, 1919.
You cannot overestimate real intensity of feeling behind Irish question here. It is growing every day and is not at all confined to Irishmen. The passage of resolution of sympathy with almost unanimous vote in Senate last night is but a slight evidence of interest here. I wish the President could do just a little for I fear reaction here upon League of Nations. If this situation could be straightened out, it would help a great deal.
The President himself replied to this cable, showing the depth of his interest in the matter:
Paris, 8 June, 1919.
I have tried to help in the Irish matter, but the extraordinary indiscretion of the American delegation over here has almost completely blocked everything.
On June 9, 1919, I received a further cable from the President, as follows:
Paris, 9 June, 1919.
The American Committee of Irishmen have made it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to render the assistance we were diligently trying to render in the matter of bringing the Irish aspirations to the attention of the Peace Conference. By our unofficial activity in the matter we had practically cleared the way for the coming of the Irish Representatives to Paris when the American Commission went to Ireland and behaved in a way which so inflamed British opinion that the situation has got quite out of hand, and we are utterly at a loss how to act in the matter without involving the Government of the United States with the Government of Great Britain in a way which might create an actual breach between the two. I made an effort day before yesterday in this matter which shows, I am afraid, the utter futility of further efforts. I am distressed that the American Commission should have acted with such extreme indiscretion and lack of sense, and can at the moment see nothing further to do.
To this cable I replied as follows:
The White House, Washington, 9 June, 1919.
Thanks for message about Ireland, Hope you will not allow indiscretions of American Commission to influence your judgment against Ireland. Lloyd George's mistakes in handling this will be his undoing, for it has in it the elements of a revolution. It is our own political situation here and the fate of the Treaty itself that concern me. In this country the Irish are united in this matter and in every large city and town are carrying on a propaganda, asking that Ireland be given the right of self-determination. George Creel, in a powerful article yesterday in the newspapers, said:QuoteThe question of Ireland cannot be ignored, either in honour or decencyEnd quote. I trust you can say a word. Could you not ask that Irish delegates be given a chance to present their case to the Conference?
On June 25, 1919, I sent the following cable to the President:
General Maurice, in wonderful article in New YorkTimeson League of Nations, says about Ireland:QuoteOne obvious need to complete the process of bringing all nations together is that we should show that we know what America did in the war, but there is another obvious need, which presents greater difficulties. We must have a policy in regard to Ireland, which we can explain to the American people. At present Ireland threatens to reopen all the rifts which comradeship in the war is closingEnd quote.
The New York EveningPostof last night prints the following editorial:
QuoteSelf-Government for the Irish people, short of independence, is a right and a necessity, and it is a satisfaction that once more a movement is under way for the establishment of Ireland on the basis which logic and history have determined—a dominion on an equal footing with the other dominions under the British crownEnd quote.
Frankly, this represents the opinion of the average man in America, without regard to race or religion. The arrival of De Valera in America is going to intensify the feeling and the Republicans will take full advantage of it. Now that the League of Nations is on its feet, we should take the lead in this matter. It would do more toward bringing about a real comradeship between England and America than anything that could happen. I think that the situation in Africa, India, and the seriousness of the situation in Canada, will inevitably force England to consider these matters. It is in anticipation of this that I am anxious to have you play a leading part in this situation. It would do much to make the League of Nations a living, vital force in the affairs of the world. There are no boundary lines between free peoples any more.
* * * * *
TUMULTY,White House, Washington.
Paris,June 27, 1919.
I entirely agree with the general tenor of your cable of the twenty- fifth about the Irish question and I firmly believe when the League of Nations is once organized it will afford a forum not now available for bringing the opinion of the world and of the United States in particular to bear on just such problems.
Of course, the thing which lay close to Woodrow Wilson's heart was the setting up of the League of Nations. Unless England and France should consent to the establishment of a league as part of a world settlement, any solution of the Irish question through the influence of world opinion was not in the reckoning. The wise, prudent thing, therefore, to do was first to establish a world court before which the cause of any oppressed peoples might be brought. This is just what he had in mind and what he succeeded in doing. To have thrust a settlement of Ireland's affairs into the foreground of the Peace Conference and to have made it asine qua nonwould have been futile and foolish and might have resulted in disaster. Unfortunately, the friends of Irish freedom, deprecating and bitterly resenting well-considered methods like this, were desirous of having the matter thrust into the early conferences at Paris. The President knew that England would never consent to this and would resent any attempt on his part to carry out idea. If the President had done so, England would undoubtedly have withdrawn from the Conference and thus the great cause of the League of Nations, which formed the foundation stone upon which the Armistice was based, would have gone by the board. The President was looking far beyond a mere recognition of the Irish Republic. He was seeking to accomplish its security and guarantee its permanency through the instrumentality of a world court like the League of Nations. What would it have availed Ireland to have been granted Dominion government or independence unless contemporaneously with the grant there was set up an instrumentality that would guarantee and protect it? The only thing upon which the Peace Conference functioned was the settlement of the affairs of those nations affected by the war.
Why didn't Wilson bring Ireland's cause to the attention of the PeaceConference? was the query which frequently reached us at the White House.The President in his Western speeches discussed this matter in thefollowing way:
"It was not within the privilege of the Conference of peace to act upon the right of self-determination of any peoples except those which had been included in the territories of the defeated empires—that is to say, it was not then within their power—but the moment the Covenant of the League of Nations is adopted it becomes their right. If the desire for self- determination of any people in the world is likely to affect the peace of the world or the good understanding between nations it becomes the business of the League; it becomes the right of any member of the League to call attention to it; it becomes the function of the League to bring the whole process of the opinion of the world to bear upon that very matter.
"Article XI is the favourite article in the Treaty so far as I am concerned. It says that every matter which is likely to affect the peace of the world is everybody's business; that it shall be the friendly right of any nation to call attention of the League to anything that is likely to affect the peace of the world or the good understanding between nations, upon which the peace of the world depends, whether that matter immediately concerns the nation drawing attention to it or not. In other words, at present we have to mind our own business, under the rules of diplomacy and established custom. Under the covenant of the League of Nations we can mind other people's business, and anything that affects the peace of the world, whether we are parties to it or not, can by our delegates be brought to the attention of mankind. We can force a nation on the other side of the globe to bring to that bar of mankind any wrong that is afoot in that part of the world which is likely to affect the good understanding between nations, and we can oblige them to show cause why it should not be remedied. There is not an oppressed people in the world which cannot henceforth get a hearing at that forum, and you know what a hearing will mean if the cause of those people is just. The one thing that those doing injustice have most reason to dread is publicity and discussion. At present what is the state of international law and understanding? No nation has the right to call attention to anything that does not directly affect its own affairs. If it does, it cannot only be told to mind its own business, but it risks the cordial relationship between itself and the nation whose affairs it draws under discussion; whereas, under Article XI, which I had the honour of advocating, the very sensible provision is made that the peace of the world transcends all the susceptibilities of nations and governments, and that they are obliged to consent to discuss and explain anything which does affect the good understanding between nations."
Sir Frederick Pollock, in his valuable work on the League of Nations, comments pointedly on this privilege:
Various Irish writers, including some who deserve serious attention, have raised the question whether the standing problem of Irish autonomy can come before the League of Nations. There is only one way in which this could happen—namely, that the Government of the United States should declare Irish-American sympathy with unsatisfied nationalist claims in Ireland to be capable of disturbing good understanding between Great Britain and the United States. That is a possible event if a solution is not reached within a reasonable time, but it is more likely that a confidential intimation from the United States would not only precede a formal reference to the Council, but avoid the necessity for it.
The friends of Ireland in this country have often asked me the question:"Would Woodrow Wilson have intervened in behalf of Ireland?"
I can answer this question only by saying that Ireland has never had a truer friend than Woodrow Wilson. From the day that we went to war it has been his steadfast purpose to induce the Government of England to settle the Irish question justly and permanently. His statesmanlike approach to a settlement of the problem is the only one that holds hope of success.
As I completed this chapter, an article appeared in a Washington newspaper apparently confirmatory of the President's foresight, showing that by September, 1921, Mr. De Valera had arrived at the same view. The article seems to show Mr. De Valera as insisting that the British Government grant Ireland membership in the League of Nations as one of the guarantees of autonomy.
As for myself, I believe that Ireland is going to be free in company with the rest of the world and in accordance with a new world order which shall function through the machinery for justice and liberty which is provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and is provided for nowhere else.
One of the things for which the Wilson Administration was held to "strict accountability" was the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, establishing nation-wide prohibition.
Unfair critics of the President, in their foolish attempt to charge the Administration with every unusual happening in the eight years of Democratic control, had stated that the President was the real motive force that lay back of the movement to establish the Eighteenth Amendment as part of the fundamental law of the country. As a matter of fact, during the discussion of this amendment in the Senate and House, the President maintained toward it an attitude of absolute neutrality. While he was an ardent advocate of temperance, he felt that Congress in enforcing the amendment by the passage of the Volstead Act, so extreme and unreasonable in character, had gone a long way toward alienating the support of every temperance-loving citizen in the country, and that certain of its provisions had struck at the foundation of our government by its arbitrary interference with personal liberty and freedom. He felt that the practical unanimity with which the Eighteenth Amendment was supported arose from a nation-wide resentment against abuses by the American saloon and the economic evils that had grown out of the unorganized liquor traffic. He felt that it was unreasonable for Congress, in the Volstead Act, to declare any beverage containing an excess of one half of one per cent. of alcohol intoxicating and that to frame a law which arbitrarily places intoxicating and non-intoxicating beverages within the same classification was openly to invite mental resentment against it. He was of the opinion that it required no compromise or weakening of the Eighteenth Amendment in order to deal justly and fairly with the serious protests that followed the enactment into law of the Volstead Act. He was, therefore, in favour of permitting the manufacture and sale, under proper governmental regulations, of light wines and beers, which action in his opinion would make it much easier to enforce the amendment in its essential particulars and would help to end the illicit traffic in liquor which the Volstead Act fostered by its very severity. This would put back of the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment the public sentiment always necessary to the execution of laws. Satisfied with a reasonable recognition of their rights to personal liberty and control of their personal habits, he believed that the American people would be the readier to turn their attention to the grave issues of reconstruction and steadier in meeting these issues which would test to the utmost our capacity for progressive self-government.
Time and time again when we discussed the Volstead Act, he would say: "The wrong way of doing the right thing. You cannot regulate the morals and habits of a great cosmopolitan people by placing unreasonable restrictions upon their liberty and freedom. All such attempts can only end in failure and disappointment. In the last analysis, in these matters that seek to regulate personal habits and customs, public opinion is the great regulator."
In New Jersey, where he served as governor, the liquor question had been for many years a burning issue and had been thrust into every gubernatorial campaign up to the time when Woodrow Wilson as governor took hold of the situation. Many political futures had been wrecked and wasted by ambitious politicians who tried to "pussyfoot" on this issue. But there was no shying away from it by Woodrow Wilson. When the question was presented to him by the ardent advocates of the Anti-Saloon League early in his administration as governor, without evasion of any kind, he stated his views in the following letter addressed to the head of the Anti-Saloon League:
Executive Office,Trenton, New Jersey.
I am in favour of local option. I am a thorough believer in local self-government and believe that every self-governing community which constitutes a social unit should have the right to control the matter of the regulation or the withholding of licenses.
But the questions involved are social and moral, not political, and are not susceptible of being made parts of a party programme. Whenever they have been made the subject matter of party contests, they have cut the lines of party organization and party action athwart, to the utter confusion of political action in every other field. They have thrown every other question, however important, into the background and have made constructive party action impossible for long years together.
So far as I am myself concerned, therefore, I can never consent to have the question of local option made an issue between political parties in this state. My judgment is very clear in this matter. I do not believe that party programmes of the highest consequence to the political life of the state and the nation ought to be thrust to one side and hopelessly embarrassed for long periods together by making a political issue of a great question that is essentially non- political, non-partisan, moral and social in its nature.
Holding these views, that the liquor question was one which was "essentially non-political, non-partisan, moral and social in its nature," the President refused by any act of his to influence public opinion when the Eighteenth Amendment was up for consideration in the Senate and House.
He deeply resented and strenuously opposed the passage of war-time prohibition as uncalled for and unnecessary. In his opinion, it was not a food-conservation measure, but an out-and-out attempt by the anti-saloon forces to use the war emergency to declare the country "dry" by Congressional action. There was another reason for his attitude of opposition to war-time prohibition. He believed with an embargo placed upon beer, the consumption of whiskey, of which there were large stocks in the country, would be stimulated and increased to a great extent. In this opinion he was supported by Mr Herbert Hoover, Food Administrator. In a letter of May 28, 1918, to Senator Sheppard, the leader of the prohibition forces in the Senate, he explained his opposition to war-time prohibition in these words:
May 28, 1918.
HON. MORRIS SHEPPARD,United States Senate.
I was very much distressed by the action of the House. I do not think that it is wise or fair to attempt to put such compulsion on the Executive in a matter in which he has already acted almost to the limit of his authority. What is almost entirely overlooked is that there were, as I am informed, very large stocks of whiskey in this country, and it seems to me quite certain that if the brewing of beer were prevented entirely, along with all other drinks, many of them harmless, which are derived from food and food stuffs, the consumption of whiskey would be stimulated and increased to a very considerable extent.
My own judgment is that it is wise and statesmanlike to let the situation stand as it is for the present, until at any rate I shall be apprised by the Food Administration that it is necessary in the way suggested still further to conserve the supply of food and food stuffs. The Food Administration has not thought it necessary to go any further than we have in that matter already gone.
I thank you most cordially, Senator, for your kindness in consulting me in this matter, which is of very considerable importance, and has a very distinct bearing upon many collateral questions.
Cordially and sincerely yours,WOODROW WILSON.
War-time prohibition was ingenuously made part of the Agricultural Appropriation Bill, which contained many items necessary for the effective prosecution of the war. So strongly did the President feel about the matter, that I am frank to say that if war-time prohibition had stood alone and was disconnected from any other bill, I believe it would have been vetoed.
After the Armistice, agitation at once began, inspired by the "dry" advocates throughout the country, to prolong war-time prohibition, but the President felt that the object and purpose of war-time prohibition, if any ever existed, having been served, it was only right, proper, and fair that there should be an immediate repeal of it, and that only resentment and restlessness throughout the country would follow the attempt to prolong war-time prohibition beyond the time provided in the statute which created it.
It was unfortunate that the "dry" advocates did not see the thing through the eyes of the President. Apparently not fully satisfied with the victory they had won through the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, they sought to push the advantage thus gained still further, and through war-time prohibition to establish their policy of restriction as a permanent policy of the country. Realizing that prohibition as a permanent policy and by constitutional amendment had been definitely established in a constitutional way, the President was reluctant to take a stand that would even in spirit be a violation of this, but he also felt that the "dry" advocates were simply using a war crisis ruthlessly to press forward their views and to cajole vacillating congressmen into supporting it because it was known as a "dry" measure. In a letter which I addressed to the President on September 7, 1918, I strongly urged the veto of the Agricultural Appropriation Bill containing war-time prohibition:
September 7, 1918.
In the discussion we had a few days ago with reference to the pending "dry" legislation, I tried to emphasize the fact that under the Food Control Law you had the power to do what Congress is now seeking to do in a way that will cause great irritation. Your action of yesterday fixing December first as the day on which the prohibition of the manufacture of beer is to take place, I believe, strengthens what I said. Your action and the action of the Senate a day or two ago in giving you the right to establish zones about shipyards and munitions plants again shows the unnecessary character of this legislation. You are, therefore, now in a strong position to veto this legislation as unnecessary and unwarranted.
In view of all of this, I wish to emphasize the dangers, both of a political and industrial character, that confront us should we agree to go forward with those who favour legislation of this radical and restricted character. Even the most ardent prohibitionists fear the reactionary effect of this legislation upon the pending constitutional amendment. I am afraid of its effects upon the voters of our party in the large centres of population throughout the country, and of the deep resentment from all classes that is bound to follow.
In matters of legislation that seek to regulate the morals and habits of the people, the average American feels the only safe course to follow is the method set forth in the Constitution for the regulation of these vital matters. The proponents of this measure agree that it is not a conservation measure, but that it is an out-and-out attempt to declare the country "dry." In my opinion, it is mob legislation, pure and simple.
The danger of submitting quietly to any class legislation that has its basis in intolerance, especially at a time like this where the emotions of people can be whipped into a fury, is obvious. Your strength in the country comes from the feeling on the part of the people that under no circumstances can you be "hazed" by any class. If you yield in this instance, similar demands from other sources will rise to harass and embarrass you.
The viewpoint of the gentlemen on the Hill in charge of this bill is provincial. They have no idea of the readjustments that will have to come in the finances of our largest cities and municipalities through the country. Tax rates are bound to go up. Increased taxation in large cities, coming at a time when federal taxes are growing more burdensome, is bound to play a large part in the opinion of the people, and we cannot escape our responsibility if we seem to be afraid to oppose legislation of this kind. Our policy in every matter at this time should be one based upon magnanimity and tolerance toward every class and interest in the country.
Under date of May 9, 1919, I sent the following cable to the President who was then in Paris:
I sincerely hope you will consider the advisability of raising the embargo on beer. The most violent reaction has taken place throughout the country since the enactment of this law, especially in the larger cities. It is not, I assure you, the result of brewery propaganda. It comes from many of the humbler sort who resent this kind of federal interference with their rights. We are being blamed for all this restrictive legislation because you insist upon closing down all breweries and thus making prohibition effective July first. The country would be more ready to accept prohibition brought about by Constitutional amendment than have it made effective by Presidential ukase. The psychological effect of raising this embargo would be of incalculable benefit to America in every way at this time. The SpringfieldRepublicansays,QuoteThe establishment of national prohibition by Federal statute, through the mere act of Congress, does not appeal to one as so desirable as the establishment of national prohibition by the direct action of three fourths of the statesEnd Quote. The war-time Prohibition Law, according to the text of the Act, was enacted for the purpose of conserving the man-power of the nation and to increase the efficiency in the production of arms, munitions, ships, and for the Army and Navy.
The New YorkWorld, in an editorial, says:QuoteThis war-time prohibition act is breeding social, industrial, and economic discontent every day. What makes it still more infamous is that under its provisions the rich man, because he has money, can accumulate for his personal consumption whatever stocks of wines and liquors he pleases, but the workingman, because he cannot afford to lay in a supply of anything, is deprived even of a glass of beer with his evening meal. There has never been another such measure of outrageous class and social discrimination on the statute books of the United States. It should never have been enacted by Congress. It should never have been signed by the President. If it is not repealed it is bound to cause more trouble than any other piece of Federal legislation since the Fugitive Slave ActEnd Quote.
By taking vigorous action in this matter, you would do more for the cause of real temperance and hearten those people who feel the sting of the wave of intolerance which is now spreading over the country than anything you could think of. I wish I could meet you face to face and try to impress upon you the utter necessity for this action. You will have to take action soon.
On May 12, 1919, I received the following cable from the President:
Paris.
TUMULTY, White House,Washington.
Please ask the Attorney General to advise me what action I can take with regard to removing the ban from the manufacture of drink and as to the form the action should take.
On May 12, 1919, I replied to this cable as follows:
White House, Washington,May 12, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,Paris, France.
Have consulted Attorney General with regard to removing ban upon manufacture of alcoholic liquor. Am in receipt of a letter from him in which he says:QuoteThe only action you can take until demobilization may be determined and proclaimed, will be to issue a public statement or send a message to Congress declaring that since the purpose of the Act has been entirely satisfied, nothing prevents your lifting the ban on the manufacture and sale of beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquors except the limitations imposed by the Act which maintains it in force until demobilization is terminated after the conclusion of the war.End Quote
On May 20, 1919, in a message to Congress, the President made the following recommendation with reference to war-time prohibition:
The demobilization of the military forces of the country has progressed to such a point that it seems to me entirely safe now to remove the ban upon the manufacture and sale of wines and beers, but I am advised that without further legislation I have not the legal authority to remove the present restrictions. I therefore recommend that the Act approved November 21, 1918, entitled "an Act to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, the purposes of the Act, entitled 'An Act to provide further for the national security and defense by stimulating agriculture and facilitating the distribution of agricultural products, and for other purposes,' be amended and repealed in so far as it applies to wines and beers."
Congress refused to act upon the President's recommendation.
Under date of June 27, 1919, I sent the following cable to the President:
There are only four days left until nation-wide prohibition becomes effective and the country will go on a whiskey basis unless you act to suspend it. Everything that has happened in the last few weeks confirms the views I expressed to you in May excepting that added force has been given to every argument made, especially by the action of the American Federation of Labour whose membership almost unanimously voted at its convention for lifting the ban. The action of Canada in lifting the ban is regarded by the country as significant. Workingmen and common people all over the country cannot understand why light wines and beer cannot be permitted until the Constitutional amendment becomes effective. Only this week the Pennsylvania Legislature voted to legalize two and three-quarters per cent, beer and light wines. Similar action will follow in other states. The consensus of opinion in the press is that if prohibition is to be effective, it might better be by action of three quarters of the states rather than by Presidential proclamation for which you alone and our party would bear the responsibility. The prohibitionists in Congress are fearful that the enforcement of wartime prohibition will cause a harmful reaction on real prohibition, and I believe that they are secretly in favour of your lifting the ban for this reason. Demobilization figures officially announced by the War Department show that the number of troops now remaining in service is practically only the number of troops in the Regular Army. Samuel Gompers, Mary Roberts Rinehart, Mrs. Douglass Robinson, sister of the late Theodore Roosevelt, Miss Gertrude Atherton, Frank S. Goodnow, president of Johns Hopkins University, and Cardinal Gibbons out in strong statement favouring retention of beer and light wines. If you do not intend to lift the ban on July first, you can announce your intention to suspend it as soon as the War Department notifies you demobilization is accomplished which, the best opinion says, will be August first. The feeling all over the country is one of harmful uncertainty and I strongly recommend that a definite announcement, of some nature which will clear the atmosphere, be made.
On June 28, 1919, I again cabled the President, as follows:
The White House, Washington,28 June, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,Paris.
Received your message saying that you do not intend to lift the ban. The Republicans have been industriously spreading the story throughout the country that you in fact have power under the Act of November 21, 1918, to lift the ban. I think it important, wise, and politic, therefore, for you to make a statement which we can issue from the White House along the following lines:QuoteI am convinced that I have no legal power at this time in the matter of the ban of liquor. Under the Act of November 21, 1918, my power to take action is restricted. The Act provides that after June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President, it shall be unlawful, etc. This law does not specify that the ban shall be lifted with the signing of peace but with the termination of the demobilization of the troops, and I cannot say that that has been accomplished. My information from the War Department is that there are still a million men in the service under the emergency call. It is clear, therefore, that the failure of Congress to act upon the suggestion contained in my message of the 20th of May, 1919, asking for a repeal of the Act of November 21, 1918, so far as it applies to wines and beers, makes it impossible to act in this matter at this time. Of course when demobilization is terminated, my power to act without congressional action will be exercisedEnd quote.