FINIS

73New YorkWorld, February 26, 1920.

Finally, there is the speech of Lenin before the Council of the People’s Commissaries during the negotiations upon the ill-starred Prinkipo Conference proposal, in which he said:

The successful development of the Bolshevist doctrine throughout the world can only be effected by means of periods of rest during which we may recuperate and gather new strength for further exertions. I have neverhesitated to come to terms with bourgeois governments, when by so doing I thought I could weaken the bourgeoisie. It is sound strategy in war to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of a mortal blow possible. This was the policy we adopted toward the German Empire, and it has proved successful.The time has now come for us to conclude a second Brest-Litovsk, this time with the Entente. We must make peace not only with the Entente, but also with Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, and all the other forces which are opposing us in Russia.We must be prepared to make every concession, promise, and sacrifice in order to entice our foes into the conclusion of this peace.We shall know that we have but concluded a truce permitting us to complete our preparations for a decisive onslaught which will assure our triumph.

In view of these utterances, and scores of others like them, of what value are the “assurances of non-interference”—or any other assurances—offered by Chicherine, Lenin, and the rest? But we are not confined to mere utterances: there are deeds aplenty which fully bear out the inferences we have from the words of the Bolshevist leaders. In a London court, before Mr. Justice Neville, it was brought out that the Bolshevist envoy, Litvinov, had been guilty of using his position to promote revolutionary agitation. Not only had Litvinov committed a breach of agreement, said Mr. Justice Neville, but he had been guilty of a breach of public law. A circular letter to the British trades-unions was read by the justice, containing these words: “Hence it is that the Russian revolutionaries are summoningthe proletarians of all countries to a revolutionary fight against their government.” Even worse was the case of the Bolshevist ambassador, Joffe, who was expelled from Berlin for using his diplomatic position to wage a propaganda for the overthrow of the German Government, and this notwithstanding the fact that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in its second article specifically forbade “any agitation against the state and military institutions of Germany.”

In an official note to the German Foreign Office, published inIzvestia, December 26, 1918, Chicherine boasted that millions of rubles had been sent to Berlin for the purpose of revolutionary propaganda. The duplicity revealed by this note was quite characteristic of the Bolshevist régime and in keeping with the record of Chicherine himself in his relations with the British Government during his stay in London, where he acted as one of the representatives of the Russians in London who were seeking repatriation.Izvestia, on January 1, 1919, contained an article by Joffe on “Revolutionary Methods,” in which he said: “Having accepted this forcibly imposed treaty [Brest-Litovsk], revolutionary Russia of course had to accept its second article, which forbade ‘any agitation against the state and military institutions of Germany.’ But both the Russian Government as a whole and its accredited representative in Berlinnever concealed the fact that they were not observing this article and did not intend to do so.” As a matter of fact, the agitation against the German Government by the Bolsheviki continued even after the so-called supplementarytreaties of Brest-Litovsk, dated August 27, 1918, which, as pointed out by the United States Department of State, were not signed under duress, as was the original treaty, but were actively sought for and gladly signed by the Bolsheviki.

In view of these indisputable facts, is there any honest and worthy reason for suspending judgment upon the character of the Soviet Government? Surely it must be plainly evident to every candid and dispassionate mind that Bolshevism is practically a negation of every principle of honor and good faith essential to friendly and co-operative relations among governments in modern civilization. The Bolsheviki have outlawed themselves and placed themselves outside the pale of the community of nations.

The merits of Sovietism as a method of government do not here and now concern us. But we are entitled to demand that those who urge us to adopt it furnish some evidence of its superiority in practice. Up to the present time, no such evidence has been offered by those who advocate the change; on the other hand, all the available evidence tends to show that Soviet government, far from being superior to our own, is markedly inferior to it. We are entitled, surely, to call attention to the fact that, so far as it has been tried in Russia, Sovietism has resulted in an enormous increase in bureaucracy; that it has not done away with corruption and favoritism in government; that it has shown itself to be capable of every abuse of which other forms of government, whether despotic, oligarchic, or democratic, have been capable. It has not givenRussia a government one whit more humane or just, one whit less oppressive or corrupt than czarism. It seems to be inherently bureaucratic and therefore inefficient. Be that how it may, it is impossible to deny that it has failed and failed utterly. Even the Bolsheviki, whose sole excuse for their assault upon the rapidly evolving democracy of Russia was their faith in the superiority of Sovietism over parliamentary government, have found it necessary to abandon it, not only in government, but in industry and in military organization.

In industry Sovietism, so far as it has been tried in Russia, has shown itself to be markedly inferior to the methods of industrial organization common to the great industrial nations, and the so-called Soviet Government itself, which is in reality an oligarchy, has had to abandon it and to revert to the essential principles and methods of capitalist industry. This is not the charge of a hostile critic: it is the confession of Lenin, of Trotsky, of Krassin, of Rykov, and practically every acknowledged Bolshevist authority. We do not say that the Soviet idea contains nothing of good; we do not deny that, under a democratic government, Soviets might have aided, and may yet aid, to democratize Russian industrial life. What we do say is that the Bolsheviki have failed to make them of the slightest service to the Russian people; that Bolshevism has completely failed to organize the industrial life of Russia, either on Soviet lines or any other, and has had to revert to capitalism and to call upon the capitalists of other lands to come and rescue them from utter destruction. After ruthlessly exterminatingtheir own capitalists, they have been compelled to offer to give foreign capitalists, in the shape of vast economic concessions, a mortgage upon the great heritage of future generations of the Russian people and the right to exploit their toil.

So, too, with the military organization of the country: Starting out with Soviet management in the army, the present rulers of Russia soon discovered that the system would not work. As early as January, 1918, Krylenko, Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the Bolsheviki, reported to the Central Executive Committee that the soldiers’ committees were “the only remnant of the army.” In May, 1919, Trotsky was preaching the necessity of “respect for military science” and of “a genuine army, properly organized and firmly ruled by a single hand.” Conscription was introduced, not by law enacted by responsible elected representatives of the people, but by decree. It was enforced with a brutality and savagery unknown to this age in any other country. Just as in industry the “bourgeois specialists” were brought back and compelled to work under espionage and duress, so the officers of the old imperial army were brought back and held to their tasks by terror, their wives and children and other relatives being held as hostages for their conduct.Izvestiapublished, September 18, 1918, Trotsky’s famous Order No. 903, which read: “Seeing the increasing number of deserters, especially among the commanders, orders are issued toarrest as hostagesall the members of the family one can lay hands on: father, mother, brother, sister, wife, and children.”Another order issued by Trotsky in the summer of 1919 said, “In case an officer goes over to the enemy,his family should be made to feel the consequences of his betrayal.”

Pravda74published an article giving an account of the formation of a Red cavalry regiment. From that article we learn that every officer mobilized in the Red Army had to sign the following statement:

74No. 11, 1919.

I have received due notice that in the event of my being guilty of treason or betrayal in regard to the Soviet Government, my nearest relatives [names given] residing at [full address given] will be responsible for me.

What this meant is known from the many news items in the Bolshevist press relating to the arrest, imprisonment, and even shooting of the relatives of deserters. To cite only one example: theKrasnaya Gazeta, November 4, 1919, published a “preliminary list” of nine deserting Red Army officers whose relatives—including mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, and wives—had been arrested.Izvestiaprinted a list of deserters’ relatives condemned to be shot,including children fourteen and sixteen years old.

At the Joint Conference on National Economy in Moscow, January, 1920, Lenin summed up the experience of the Bolsheviki with Soviet direction of the army, saying, “In the organization of the army we have passed from the principle of commanding by committee to the direct command ofthe chiefs. We must do the same in the organization of government and industry.” And again, “The experience of our army shows us that primitive organization based on the collectivist principle becomes transformed into an administration based upon the principle of individual power.” In theProgram of the Communistswe read that “The demand that the military command should be elective ... has no significance with reference to the Red Army, composed of class-conscious workmen and peasants.” In a pamphlet issued by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in the latter part of 1918 we read that “Regimental Committees, acting as administrative organs, cannot exist in the Soviet Army.” These quotations amply prove that Sovietism in the army was found undesirable and unworkable by the Bolsheviki themselves and by them abandoned.

We remember the glowing promises with which the first Red Army was launched: volunteers considering it an honor to be permitted to fight for the Communist Utopia; the “collective self-discipline”; the direction of the whole military organization by soldiers’ committees, and all the rest of the wild vision. We compare it with the brutal reality, and the contrast between the hope and the reality is the measure of the ghastly failure of Bolshevism. The military system of the Bolsheviki is infinitely more brutal than the old Prussian system was. The Red Army is an army of slaves driven by terrorized slaves. Sovietism proved a fool’s fantasy. The old military discipline came back harsher than ever; the death penaltywas restored; conscription and mobilization at the point of the bayonet were carried out with a ferocity never equaled in any modern nation, not even in Russia under Czar Nicholas II. Was there ever a more complete failure?

The mass of evidence we have cited from Bolshevist authorities warrants the judgment that Sovietism, as exemplified during the Bolshevist régime, in every department of the national life, is at best an utterly impracticable Utopian scheme. Certainly every fair-minded person of normal intelligence must agree that there is nothing in the record of the experiment—a record, be it remembered, made by the Bolsheviki themselves—to rouse enthusiastic hopes or to justify any civilized nation in throwing aside the existing machinery of government and industrial organization and immediately substituting Sovietism therefor.

As for Bolshevism, in contradistinction from Sovietism, there can be no hesitation in reaching a verdict upon the evidence supplied by its own accredited spokesmen and official records. We have not massed the isolated crimes of individuals and mobs and presented the result as a picture of Russian life. That would be as unjust as to list all the accounts of race riots, lynchings, and murders in this country and offering the list as a fair picture of American life. Ignoring these things completely, we have taken the laws and decrees of Soviet Russia; its characteristic institutions; the things done by its government; the writings and speeches of its statesmen and recognized interpreters; the cold figures of its own reports of industry and agriculture.The result is a picture of Bolshevism, self-drawn, more ugly and repellent than the most malicious imagination could have drawn.

On the other side there is no single worthy creative achievement to be recorded. There are almost innumerable “decrees,” some of them attractive enough, but there are no actual achievements of merit to be credited to the Bolsheviki. Even in the matter of education, concerning which we have heard so much, there is not a scintilla of evidence that will bear examination which tends to show that they have actually accomplished anything which Russia will gratefully remember or cherish in the days that are to come. The much-vaunted “Proletcult” of Soviet Russia is in practice little more than a means of providing jobs for Communists. The Bolshevist publicist, Mizkevich, made this charge inIzvestia, March 22, 1919. “The Proletcult is using up our not very numerous forces, and spending public money, which it gets from ... the Commissariat for Public Instruction, on the same work that is done by the Public Instruction departments ... opposes its own work for the creation of proletarian culture to the same work of the agents of the proletarian authority, and thus creates confusion in the minds of the proletarian mass.”

The Bolsheviki have published decrees and articles on education with great freedom, but they have done little else except harm. They have weakened the great universities and rudely interrupted the development of the great movement to improve and extend popular education initiatedshortly before the Revolution by Count Ignatiev, the best friend of popular education that ever held office in Russia, compared to whom Lunacharsky is a cretin. They have imposed upon the universities and schools the bureaucratic rule of men most of whom know nothing of university requirements, are at best poorly educated and sometimes even illiterate.

Promising peace and freedom from militarism, they betrayed their Allies and played the game of their foes; they brought new wars upon the already war-weary nation and imposed upon it a militarism more brutal than the old. Promising freedom, they have developed a tyranny more brutal and oppressive than that of the Romanovs. Promising humane and just government, they instituted theChresvychaikasand a vast, corrupt bureaucracy. Promising to so organize production that there should be plenty for all and poverty for none, they ruined industrial production, decreased agricultural production to a perilously low level and so that famine reigned in a land of plentiful resources, human and material. Promising to make the workers masters of the machines, free citizens in a great industrial democracy, they have destroyed the machines, forced the workers to take the places of beasts of burden, and made them bond-slaves.

The evidence is in: let the jury render its verdict.

DOCUMENTS

Thedisastrous undermining of the country’s food-supply, the serious heritage of the four years’ war, continues to extend more and more, and to be more and more acute. While the consuming provincial governments are starving, in the producing governments there are at the present moment, as before, large reserves of grain of the harvests of 1916 and 1917 not yet even threshed. This grain is in the hands of tight-fisted village dealers and profiteers, of the village bourgeoisie. Well fed and well provided for, having accumulated enormous sums of money obtained during the years of war, the village bourgeoisie remains stubbornly deaf and indifferent to the wailings of starving workmen and peasant poverty, and does not bring the grain to the collecting-points. The grain is held with the hope of compelling the government to raise repeatedly the prices of grain, at the same time that the holders sell their grain at home at fabulous prices to grain speculators.

An end must be put to this obstinacy of the greedy village grain-profiteers. The food experience of former years showed that the breaking of fixed prices and the denial of grain monopoly, while lessening the possibility of feasting for our group of capitalists, would make bread completely inaccessible to our many millions ofworkmen and would subject them to inevitable death from starvation.

The answer to the violence of grain-owners toward the starving poor must be violence toward the bourgeoisie.

Not a pood should remain in the hands of those holding the grain, except the quantity needed for sowing the fields and provisioning their families until the new harvest.

This policy must be put into force at once, especially since the German occupation of the Ukraine compels us to get along with grain resources which will hardly suffice for sowing and curtailed use.

Having considered the situation thus created, and taking into account that only with the most rigid calculation and equal distribution of all grain reserves can Russia pass through the food crisis, the Central Executive Committee of All Russia has decreed:

1. Confirming the fixity of the grain monopoly and fixed prices, and also the necessity of a merciless struggle with grain speculators, to compel each grain-owner to declare the surplus above what is needed to sow the fields and for personal use, according to established normal quantities, until the new harvest, and to surrender the same within a week after the publication of this decision in each village. The order of these declarations is to be determined by the People’s Food Commissioner through the local food organizations.

2. To call upon workmen and poor peasants to unite at once for a merciless struggle with grain-hoarders.

3. To declare all those who have a surplus of grain and who do not bring it to the collecting-points, and likewise those who waste grain reserves on illicit distillation of alcohol and do not bring them to the collecting-point, enemies of the people; to turn them over to the Revolutionary Tribunal, imprison them for not less than ten years, confiscate their entire property, anddrive them out forever from the communes; while the distillers are, besides, to be condemned to compulsory communal work.

In case an excess of grain which was not declared for surrender, in compliance with Article I, is found in the possession of any one the grain is to be taken away from him without pay, while the sum, according to fixed prices, due for the undeclared surpluses is to be paid, one-half to the person who points out the concealed surpluses, after they have been placed at the collecting-points, and the other half to the village commune. Declarations concerning the concealed surpluses are made by the local food organizations.

Further, taking into consideration that the struggle with the food crisis demands the application of quick and decisive measures, that the more fruitful realization of these measures demands in its turn the centralization of all orders dealing with the food question in one organization, and that this organization appears to be the People’s Food Commissioner, the Central Executive Committee of All Russia hereby orders, for the more successful struggle with the food crisis, that the People’s Food Commissioner be given the following powers:

1. To publish obligatory regulations regarding the food situation, exceeding the usual limits of the People’s Food Commissioner’s competence.

2. To abrogate the orders of local food bodies and other organizations contravening the plans and actions of the People’s Commissioner.

3. To demand from institutions and organizations of all departments the carrying out of the regulations of the People’s Food Commissioner in connection with the food situation without evasions and at once.

4. To use the armed forces in case resistance is shown to the removal of food grains or other food products.

5. To dissolve or reorganize the food agencies inplaces where they might resist the orders of the People’s Commissioner.

6. To discharge, transfer, turn over to the Revolutionary Tribunal, or subject to arrest officials and employees of all departments and public organizations in case of interference with the orders of the People’s Commissioner.

7. To transfer the present powers, in addition to the right to subject to arrest, above, to other persons and institutions in various places, with the approval of the Council of the People’s Commissioners.

8. All understandings of the People’s Commissioner, related in character to the Department of Ways of Communication and the Supreme Council of National Economy, are to be carried through upon consultation with the corresponding departments.

9. The regulations and orders of the People’s Commissioner, issued in accordance with the present powers, are verified by his college, which has the right, without suspending their operation, of referring them to the Council of Public Commissioners.

10. The present decree becomes effective from the date of its signature and is to be put into operation by telegraph.

Published May 14, 1918.

1. The Central Administration of Nationalized Undertakings, of whatever branch of industry, assigns for each large nationalized undertaking technical and administrative directors, in whose hands are placed theactual administration and direction of the entire activity of the undertaking. They are responsible to the Central Administration and the Commissioner appointed by it.

2. The technical director appoints technical employees and gives all orders regarding the technical administration of the undertaking. The factory committee may, however, complain regarding these appointments and orders to the Commissioner of the Central Administration, and then to the Central Administration itself; but only the Commissioner and Central Administration may stop the appointments and order of the technical director.

3. In connection with the Administrative Director there is an Economic Administrative Council, consisting of delegates from laborers, employees, and engineers of the undertaking. The Council examines the estimates of the undertaking, the plan of its works, the rules of internal distribution, complaints, the material and moral conditions of the work and life of the workmen and employees, and likewise all questions regarding the progress of the undertaking.

4. On questions of a technical character relating to the enterprise the Council has only a consultative voice, but on other questions a decisive voice, on condition, however, that the Administrative Director appointed by the Central Administration has the right to appeal from the orders of the Council to the Commissioner of the Central Administration.

5. The duty of acting upon decisions of the Economic Administrative Council belongs to the Administrative Director.

6. The Council of the enterprise has the right to make representation to the Central Administration regarding a change of the directors of the enterprise, and to present its own candidates.

7. Depending on the size and importance of theenterprise, the Central Administration may appoint several technical and administrative directors.

8. The composition of the Economic Administrative Council of the enterprise consists of (a) a representative of the workmen of the undertaking; (b) a representative of the other employees; (c) a representative of the highest technical and commercial personnel; (d) the directors of the undertaking, appointed by the Central Administration; (e) representatives of the local or regional council of professional unions, of the people’s economic council, of the council of workmen’s deputies, and to the professional council of that branch of industry to which the given enterprise belongs; (f) a representative of the workmen’s co-operative council; and (g) a representative of the Soviet of peasants’ deputies of the corresponding region.

9. In the composition of the Economic Administrative Council of the enterprise, representatives of workmen and other employees, as mentioned in points (a) and (b) of Article VIII, may furnish only half of the number of members.

10. The workmen’s control of nationalized undertakings is realized by leaving all declarations and orders of the factory committee, or of the controlling commission, to the judgment and decision of the Economic Administrative Council of the enterprise.

11. The workmen, employees, and highest technical and commercial personnel of nationalized undertakings are in duty bound before the Russian Soviet Republic to observe industrial discipline and to carry out conscientiously and accurately the work assigned to them. To the Economic Administrative Council are given judicial rights, including that of dismissal without notice for longer or shorter periods, together with the declaration of a boycott for non-proletariat recognition of their rights and duties.

12. In the case of those industrial branches for which Central Administrations have not yet been formed, all their rights are vested in provincial councils of the national economy, and in corresponding industrial sections of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.

13. The estimates and plan of work of a nationalized undertaking must be presented by its Economic Administrative Council to the Central Administration of a given industrial branch at least as often as once in three months, through the provincial organizations, where such have been established.

14. The management of nationalized undertakings, where such management has heretofore been organized on other principles because of the absence of a general plan and general orders for the whole of Russia, must now be reorganized, in accordance with the present regulation, within the next three months (i.e., by the end of May, new style).

15. For the consideration of the declarations of the Economic Administrative Council concerning the activity of the directors of the undertaking at the Central Administration of a given branch of industry, a special section is established, composed one-third of representatives of general governmental, political, and economic institutions of the proletariat, one-third of representatives of workmen and other employees of the given industrial branch, and one-third of representatives of the directing, technical, and commercial personnel and its professional organizations.

16. The present order must be posted on the premises of each nationalized undertaking.

Note.—Small nationalized enterprises are managed on similar principles, with the proviso that the duties of technical and administrative directors may be combined in one person, and the numerical strength of the Economic Administrative Council may be cut down by the omission of representatives of one or another institution or organization.

17. A Central Administration [Principal Committee] for each nationalized branch of industry is to be established in connection with the Supreme Council of the National Economy, to be composed one-third of representatives of workmen and employees of a given industrial branch; one-third of representatives of the general proletariat, general governmental, political, and economic organizations and institutions (Supreme Council of National Economy, the People’s Commissioners, All-Russian Council of Professional Unions, All-Russian Council of Workmen’s Co-operative Unions, Central Executive Committee of the Councils of Workmen’s Delegates) and one-third of representatives of scientific bodies, of the supreme technical and commercial personnel, and of democratic organizations of All Russia (Council of the Congresses of All Russia, co-operative unions of consumers, councils of peasants’ deputies).

18. The Central Administration selects its bureau, for which all orders of the Central Administration are obligatory, which conducts the current work and carries into effect the general plans for the undertaking.

19. The Central Administration organizes provincial and local administrations of a given industrial branch, on principles similar to those on which its own organization is based.

20. The rights and duties of each Central Administration are indicated in the order concerning the establishment of each of them, but in each case each Central Administration unites, in its own hands (a) the management of the enterprises of a given industrial branch, (b) their financing, (c) their technical unification or reconstruction, (d) standardization of the working conditions of the given industrial branch.

21. All orders of the Supreme Council of NationalEconomy are obligatory for each Central Administration; the Central Administration comes in contact with the Supreme Council in the person of the bureau of productive organization of the Supreme Council of National Economy through the corresponding productive sections.

22. When the Central Administration for any industrial branch which has not yet been nationalized is organized, it has the right to sequestrate the enterprises of the given branch, and equally, without sequestration, to prevent its managers completely or in part from engaging in its administration, appoint commissioners, give orders, which are obligatory, to the owners of non-nationalized enterprises, and incur expenses on account of these enterprises for measures which the Central Administration may consider necessary; and likewise to combine into a technical whole separate enterprises or parts of the same, to transfer from some enterprises to others fuel and customers’ orders, and establish prices upon articles of production and commerce.

23. The Central Administration controls imports and exports of corresponding goods for a period which it determines, for which purpose it forms a part of the general governmental organizations of external commerce.

24. The Central Administration has the right to concentrate, in its hands and in institutions established by it, both the entire preparation of articles necessary for a given branch of industry (raw material, machinery, etc.) and the disposal to enterprises subject to it of all products and acceptances of orders for them.

25. Upon the introduction of nationalization into any industrial branch, or into any individual enterprise, thecorresponding Central Administration (or the temporary Central Administration appointed with its rights) takes under its management the nationalized enterprises, each separately, and preserves the large ones as separate administrative units, annexing to them the smaller ones.

26. Until the nationalized enterprises have been taken over by the Central Administration (or principal commissioner) all former managers or directorates must continue their work in its entirety in the usual manner, and under the supervision of the corresponding commissioner (if one has been appointed), taking all measures necessary for the preservation of the national property and for the continuous course of operations.

27. The Central Administration and its organs establish new managements and technical administrative directorates of enterprises.

28. Technical administrative directorates of nationalized enterprises are organized according to Part I of this Regulation.

29. The management of a large undertaking, treated as a separate administrative unit, is organized with a view to securing, in as large a measure as possible, the utilization of the technical and commercial experience accumulated by the undertaking; for which purpose there are included in the composition of the new management not only representatives of the laborers and employees of the enterprise (to the number of one-third of the general numerical strength of the management) and of the Central Administration itself (to the number of one-third or less, as the Central Administration shall see fit), but also, as far as possible, members of former managements, excepting persons specially removed by the Central Administration and, upon their refusal, representatives of any special competent organizations, even if they are not proletariat (to a number notexceeding one-third of the general membership of the management).

30. When nationalization is introduced, whether of the entire branch of the industry or of separate enterprises, the Central Administrations are permitted, in order to facilitate the change, to pay to the highest technical and commercial personnel their present salaries, and even, in case of refusal on their part to work and the impossibility of filling their places with other persons, to introduce for their benefit obligatory work and to bring suit against them.

31. The former management of each nationalized undertaking must prepare a report for the last year of operation and an inventory of the undertaking, in accordance with which inventory the new management verifies the properties taken over. The actual taking over of the enterprise is done by the new management immediately upon its confirmation by the principal committee, without waiting for the presentation of the inventory and report.

32. Upon receipt in their locality of notice of the nationalization of some enterprise, and until the organization of the management and its administration by the Central Administration (or the principal commissioner, or institution having the rights of the principal commissioner) the workmen and employees of the given enterprise, and, if possible, also the Council of Workmen’s Deputies, the Council of National Economy, and Council of Professional Unions, select temporary commissioners, under whose supervision and observation (and, if necessary, under whose management) the activity of the undertaking continues. The workmen and employees of the given enterprise, and the regional councils of national economy, of professional unions, and of workmen’s delegates have the right also to organize temporary managements and directorates ofnationalized enterprises until the same are completely established by the Central Administration.

33. If the initiative for the nationalization of a given enterprise comes, not from the general governmental and proletariat organs authorized for that purpose, but from the workmen of a given enterprise or from some local or regional organization, then they propose to the Supreme Council of National Economy, in the bureau of organization of production, that the necessary steps be undertaken through the proper production sections, according to the decree of 28th February regarding the method of confiscating enterprises.

34. In exceptional cases local labor organizations are given the right to take temporarily under their management the given enterprise, if circumstances do not permit of awaiting the decision of the question in the regular order, but on condition that such action be immediately brought to the notice of the nearest provincial council of national economy, which then puts a temporary sequestration upon the enterprise pending the complete solution of the question of nationalization by the Supreme Council of National Economy; or, if it shall consider the reasons insufficient, or nationalization clearly inexpedient, or a prolonged sequestration unnecessary, it directs a temporary sequestration or even directly re-establishes the former management of the enterprise under its supervision, or introduces into the composition of the management representatives of labor organizations.

35. The present order must be furnished by the professional unions of All Russia to all their local divisions, and by the councils of factory committees to all factory committees, and must be published in full in theIzvestiaof all provincial councils of workmen’s and peasants’ deputies.

Published March 7, 1918.

I. Agencies of Workers’ Control in Each Enterprise.

I.Control in each enterprise is organized either by the Shop or Factory Committee, or by the General Assembly of workers and employees of the enterprise, who elect a Special Commission of Control.II.The Shop or Factory Committee may be included in its entirety in the Control Commission, to which may be elected also technical experts and other employees of the enterprise. In large-scale enterprises, participation of the employees in the Control Commission is compulsory. In large-scale enterprises a portion of the members of the Control Commission is elected by trade sections and classes, at the rate of one to each trade section or class.III.The workers and employees not members of the Control Commission may not enter into relations with the management of the enterprise on the subject of control except upon the direct order and with the previous authorization of the Commission.IV.The Control Commission is responsible for its activity to the General Assembly of employees and workers of the enterprise, as well as to the agency of workers’ control upon which it is dependent and under the direction of which it functions. It makes a report of its activity at least twice a month to these two bodies.

I.Control in each enterprise is organized either by the Shop or Factory Committee, or by the General Assembly of workers and employees of the enterprise, who elect a Special Commission of Control.

II.The Shop or Factory Committee may be included in its entirety in the Control Commission, to which may be elected also technical experts and other employees of the enterprise. In large-scale enterprises, participation of the employees in the Control Commission is compulsory. In large-scale enterprises a portion of the members of the Control Commission is elected by trade sections and classes, at the rate of one to each trade section or class.

III.The workers and employees not members of the Control Commission may not enter into relations with the management of the enterprise on the subject of control except upon the direct order and with the previous authorization of the Commission.

IV.The Control Commission is responsible for its activity to the General Assembly of employees and workers of the enterprise, as well as to the agency of workers’ control upon which it is dependent and under the direction of which it functions. It makes a report of its activity at least twice a month to these two bodies.

II. Duties and Privileges of the Control Commission.

V.The Control Commission of each enterprise is required:1. To determine the stock of goods and fuel possessed by the plant, and the amount of these needed respectively for the machinery of production, the technical personnel, and the laborers by specialties.2. To determine to what extent the plant is provided with everything that is necessary to insure its normal operation.3. To forecast whether there is danger of the plant closing down or lowering production, and what the causes are.4. To determine the number of workers by specialties likely to be unemployed, basing the estimate upon the reserve supply and the expected receipt of fuel and materials.5.To determine the measures to be taken to maintain discipline in work among the workers and employees.6. To superintend the execution of the decisions of governmental agencies regulating the buying and selling of goods.7. (a)To prevent the arbitrary removal of machines, materials, fuel, etc., from the plant without authorization from the agencies which regulate economic affairs, and to see that inventories are not tampered with.(b) To assist in explaining the causes of the lowering of production and to take measures for raising it.8. To assist in elucidating the possibility of a complete or partial utilization of the plant for some kind of production (especiallyhow to pass from a war to a peace footing, and what kind of production should be undertaken), to determine what changes should be made in the equipment of the plant and in the number of its personnel to accomplish this purpose; to determine in what period of time these changes can be effected; to determine what is necessary in order to make them, and the probable amount of production after the change is made to another kind of manufacture.9. To aid in the study of the possibility of developing the kinds of labor required by the necessities of peace-times, such as the method of using three shifts of workmen, or any other method, by furnishing information on the possibilities of housing the additional number of laborers and their families.10.To see that the production of the plant is maintained at the figures to be fixed by the governmental regulating agencies, and, until such time as these figures shall have been fixed, to see that the production reaches the normal average for the plant, judged by a standard of conscientious labor.11. To co-operate in estimating costs of production of the plant upon the demand of the higher agency of workers’ control or upon the demand of the governmental regulating institutions.VI.Upon the owner of the plant, the decisions of the Control Commission, which are intended to assure him the possibility of accomplishing the objects stated in the precedingarticles, are binding. In particular the Commission may, of itself or through its delegates:1. Inspect the business correspondence of the plant, all the books and all the accounts pertaining to its past or present operation.2. Inspect all the divisions of the plant—shops, stores, offices, etc.3. Be present at meetings of the representatives of the directing agencies; make statements and address interpellations to them on all questions relating to control.VII.The right to give orders to the directors of the plant, and the management and operation of the plant are reserved to the owner. The Control Commission does not participate in the management of the plant and has no responsibility for its development and operation. This responsibility rests upon the owner.VIII.The Control Commission is not concerned with financial questions of the plant. If such questions arise they are forwarded to the governmental regulating institutions.IX.The Control Commission of each enterprise may, through the higher organ of workers’ control, recommend for the consideration of the governmental regulating institutions the question of the sequestration of the plant or other measures of constraint upon the plant, but it has not the right to seize and direct the enterprise.

V.The Control Commission of each enterprise is required:

1. To determine the stock of goods and fuel possessed by the plant, and the amount of these needed respectively for the machinery of production, the technical personnel, and the laborers by specialties.2. To determine to what extent the plant is provided with everything that is necessary to insure its normal operation.3. To forecast whether there is danger of the plant closing down or lowering production, and what the causes are.4. To determine the number of workers by specialties likely to be unemployed, basing the estimate upon the reserve supply and the expected receipt of fuel and materials.5.To determine the measures to be taken to maintain discipline in work among the workers and employees.6. To superintend the execution of the decisions of governmental agencies regulating the buying and selling of goods.7. (a)To prevent the arbitrary removal of machines, materials, fuel, etc., from the plant without authorization from the agencies which regulate economic affairs, and to see that inventories are not tampered with.(b) To assist in explaining the causes of the lowering of production and to take measures for raising it.8. To assist in elucidating the possibility of a complete or partial utilization of the plant for some kind of production (especiallyhow to pass from a war to a peace footing, and what kind of production should be undertaken), to determine what changes should be made in the equipment of the plant and in the number of its personnel to accomplish this purpose; to determine in what period of time these changes can be effected; to determine what is necessary in order to make them, and the probable amount of production after the change is made to another kind of manufacture.9. To aid in the study of the possibility of developing the kinds of labor required by the necessities of peace-times, such as the method of using three shifts of workmen, or any other method, by furnishing information on the possibilities of housing the additional number of laborers and their families.10.To see that the production of the plant is maintained at the figures to be fixed by the governmental regulating agencies, and, until such time as these figures shall have been fixed, to see that the production reaches the normal average for the plant, judged by a standard of conscientious labor.11. To co-operate in estimating costs of production of the plant upon the demand of the higher agency of workers’ control or upon the demand of the governmental regulating institutions.

2. To determine to what extent the plant is provided with everything that is necessary to insure its normal operation.

3. To forecast whether there is danger of the plant closing down or lowering production, and what the causes are.

4. To determine the number of workers by specialties likely to be unemployed, basing the estimate upon the reserve supply and the expected receipt of fuel and materials.

5.To determine the measures to be taken to maintain discipline in work among the workers and employees.

6. To superintend the execution of the decisions of governmental agencies regulating the buying and selling of goods.

7. (a)To prevent the arbitrary removal of machines, materials, fuel, etc., from the plant without authorization from the agencies which regulate economic affairs, and to see that inventories are not tampered with.

(b) To assist in explaining the causes of the lowering of production and to take measures for raising it.

8. To assist in elucidating the possibility of a complete or partial utilization of the plant for some kind of production (especiallyhow to pass from a war to a peace footing, and what kind of production should be undertaken), to determine what changes should be made in the equipment of the plant and in the number of its personnel to accomplish this purpose; to determine in what period of time these changes can be effected; to determine what is necessary in order to make them, and the probable amount of production after the change is made to another kind of manufacture.

9. To aid in the study of the possibility of developing the kinds of labor required by the necessities of peace-times, such as the method of using three shifts of workmen, or any other method, by furnishing information on the possibilities of housing the additional number of laborers and their families.

10.To see that the production of the plant is maintained at the figures to be fixed by the governmental regulating agencies, and, until such time as these figures shall have been fixed, to see that the production reaches the normal average for the plant, judged by a standard of conscientious labor.

11. To co-operate in estimating costs of production of the plant upon the demand of the higher agency of workers’ control or upon the demand of the governmental regulating institutions.

VI.Upon the owner of the plant, the decisions of the Control Commission, which are intended to assure him the possibility of accomplishing the objects stated in the precedingarticles, are binding. In particular the Commission may, of itself or through its delegates:

1. Inspect the business correspondence of the plant, all the books and all the accounts pertaining to its past or present operation.2. Inspect all the divisions of the plant—shops, stores, offices, etc.3. Be present at meetings of the representatives of the directing agencies; make statements and address interpellations to them on all questions relating to control.

1. Inspect the business correspondence of the plant, all the books and all the accounts pertaining to its past or present operation.

2. Inspect all the divisions of the plant—shops, stores, offices, etc.

3. Be present at meetings of the representatives of the directing agencies; make statements and address interpellations to them on all questions relating to control.

VII.The right to give orders to the directors of the plant, and the management and operation of the plant are reserved to the owner. The Control Commission does not participate in the management of the plant and has no responsibility for its development and operation. This responsibility rests upon the owner.

VIII.The Control Commission is not concerned with financial questions of the plant. If such questions arise they are forwarded to the governmental regulating institutions.

IX.The Control Commission of each enterprise may, through the higher organ of workers’ control, recommend for the consideration of the governmental regulating institutions the question of the sequestration of the plant or other measures of constraint upon the plant, but it has not the right to seize and direct the enterprise.

III. Resources of the Control Commission of each Plant.

X.To cover the expenses of the Control Commission, the owner is bound to place at its disposal not more than two per cent. of theamount paid out by the plant in wages. The wages lost by the members of the Factory or Shop Committee and by the members of the Control Commission as a result of performing their duties during working hours when they cannot be performed otherwise, are paid out of this two-per-cent. account. Control over expenditures from the above-mentioned fund is exercised by the Commission of Control and Distribution of the trades-unions of the industrial branch concerned.

IV. Higher Agencies of Workers’ Control.

XI.The organ immediately superior to the Control Commission of each enterprise consists of the Commission of Control and Distribution of the trades-union of the industrial branch to which the plant in question belongs.All decisions of the Control Commissions of each enterprise may be appealed to the Commission of Control and Distribution of the trades-union exercising jurisdiction.XII.At least half of the members of the Commission of Control and Distribution are elected by the Control Commissions (or their delegates) of all plants belonging to the same branch of industry. These are convened by the directors of the trades-union. The other members are elected by the directors, or by delegates, or else by the General Assembly of the trades-union. Engineers, statisticians, and other persons who may be of use, are eligible to election to membership in the Commission of Control and Distribution.XIII.The executive directorate of the union is authorized to direct and review the activity of the Commission of Control and Distribution and of the Control Commission of each plant under its jurisdiction.XIV.The Control Commission of each plant constitutes the executive agency of the Commission of Control and Distribution for its branch of industry, and is bound to make its activity conform to the decisions of the latter.XV.The Commission of Control and Distribution of the trades-union has the authority of its own accord to convene the General Assembly of workers and employees of each enterprise, to require new elections of Control Commissions of each plant, and likewise to propose to the governmental regulating agencies the temporary closing down of plants or the dismissal of all the personnel or of a part of it, in case the workers employed in the plant will not submit to its decisions.XVI.The Commission of Control and Distribution has entire control over all branches of industry within its district, and according to the needs of any one plant in fuel, materials, equipment, etc., assists that plant in obtaining supplies from the reserve of other plants of the same kind either in active operation or idle. If other means cannot be found, it proposes to the Governmental Regulating Commissions to close down particular plants so that others may be sustained, or to place the workmen and employees of plants which have been closed down, either temporarily or definitively, in other plants engaged in thesame kind of manufacture, or to take any other measures which are likely to prevent the closing down of plants or an interruption in their operation, or which are thought capable of insuring the regular operation of said plants in conformity with the plans and decisions of the governmental regulating agencies.Remark.—The Commissions of Control and Distribution issue technical instructions for the Control Commissions of each plant of their branch of industry and according to their technical specialties. These instructions must not in any respect be inconsistent with these regulations.XVII.Appeal may be made against all decisions and all acts of the Commission of Control and Distribution to the regional Council of Workers’ Control.XVIII.The operating expenses of the Commission of Control and Distribution for each branch of industry are covered by the balances in the treasury of each plant (Art. 17) and by equal assessments on the state and the trades-union exercising jurisdiction.XIX.The Local Council of Workers’ Control considers and decides all questions of a general nature for all or for any of the Commissions of Control and Distribution of a given locality and co-ordinates their activity to conform with advices received from the All-Russian Council of Control by the Workers.XX.Each Council of Workers’ Control should enact compulsory regulations to govern the working discipline of the workmen and employees of the plants under its jurisdiction.XXI.The Local Council of Workers’ Control may establish within it a council of experts, economists, statisticians, engineers, or other persons who may be useful.XXII.The All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control may charge the All-Russian Trades-Union or the regional trades-union of any branch of industry with the duty of forming an All-Russian Commission or a Regional Commission of Control and Distribution, for the given branch of industry. The regulations for such an All-Russian or Regional Commission of Control and Distribution, drafted by the Union, must be approved by the All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control.XXIII.All decisions of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers’ Control and all decisions of other governmental regulating agencies in the realm of economic regularization are binding upon all the agencies of the institution of workers’ control.XXIV.These regulations are binding upon all institutions of workers’ control, and applyin tototo plants which employ one hundred or more workmen and employees. Control over plants employing a smaller personnel will be effected as far as possible on the basis of these instructions as a model.

All decisions of the Control Commissions of each enterprise may be appealed to the Commission of Control and Distribution of the trades-union exercising jurisdiction.

XII.At least half of the members of the Commission of Control and Distribution are elected by the Control Commissions (or their delegates) of all plants belonging to the same branch of industry. These are convened by the directors of the trades-union. The other members are elected by the directors, or by delegates, or else by the General Assembly of the trades-union. Engineers, statisticians, and other persons who may be of use, are eligible to election to membership in the Commission of Control and Distribution.

XIII.The executive directorate of the union is authorized to direct and review the activity of the Commission of Control and Distribution and of the Control Commission of each plant under its jurisdiction.

XIV.The Control Commission of each plant constitutes the executive agency of the Commission of Control and Distribution for its branch of industry, and is bound to make its activity conform to the decisions of the latter.

XV.The Commission of Control and Distribution of the trades-union has the authority of its own accord to convene the General Assembly of workers and employees of each enterprise, to require new elections of Control Commissions of each plant, and likewise to propose to the governmental regulating agencies the temporary closing down of plants or the dismissal of all the personnel or of a part of it, in case the workers employed in the plant will not submit to its decisions.

XVI.The Commission of Control and Distribution has entire control over all branches of industry within its district, and according to the needs of any one plant in fuel, materials, equipment, etc., assists that plant in obtaining supplies from the reserve of other plants of the same kind either in active operation or idle. If other means cannot be found, it proposes to the Governmental Regulating Commissions to close down particular plants so that others may be sustained, or to place the workmen and employees of plants which have been closed down, either temporarily or definitively, in other plants engaged in thesame kind of manufacture, or to take any other measures which are likely to prevent the closing down of plants or an interruption in their operation, or which are thought capable of insuring the regular operation of said plants in conformity with the plans and decisions of the governmental regulating agencies.

Remark.—The Commissions of Control and Distribution issue technical instructions for the Control Commissions of each plant of their branch of industry and according to their technical specialties. These instructions must not in any respect be inconsistent with these regulations.

XVII.Appeal may be made against all decisions and all acts of the Commission of Control and Distribution to the regional Council of Workers’ Control.

XVIII.The operating expenses of the Commission of Control and Distribution for each branch of industry are covered by the balances in the treasury of each plant (Art. 17) and by equal assessments on the state and the trades-union exercising jurisdiction.

XIX.The Local Council of Workers’ Control considers and decides all questions of a general nature for all or for any of the Commissions of Control and Distribution of a given locality and co-ordinates their activity to conform with advices received from the All-Russian Council of Control by the Workers.

XX.Each Council of Workers’ Control should enact compulsory regulations to govern the working discipline of the workmen and employees of the plants under its jurisdiction.

XXI.The Local Council of Workers’ Control may establish within it a council of experts, economists, statisticians, engineers, or other persons who may be useful.

XXII.The All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control may charge the All-Russian Trades-Union or the regional trades-union of any branch of industry with the duty of forming an All-Russian Commission or a Regional Commission of Control and Distribution, for the given branch of industry. The regulations for such an All-Russian or Regional Commission of Control and Distribution, drafted by the Union, must be approved by the All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control.

XXIII.All decisions of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers’ Control and all decisions of other governmental regulating agencies in the realm of economic regularization are binding upon all the agencies of the institution of workers’ control.

XXIV.These regulations are binding upon all institutions of workers’ control, and applyin tototo plants which employ one hundred or more workmen and employees. Control over plants employing a smaller personnel will be effected as far as possible on the basis of these instructions as a model.

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