Chapter 30

23.See Lardner, vol. xii. p. 22.

24.Lardner, vol. ii. p. 598.

25.See Lardner’s Recapitulation, vol. xii, p. 53.

26.See Lardner’s Recapitulation, vol. xii. p. 53.

27.Lardner, vol. ii. p. 808.

28.Lardner, vol. xiv. p. 455.

29.Lardner, vol. xiv. p. 458.

30.Lardner, vol. i. p. 313.

31.Iren. advers. Haer. quoted by Lardner, vol. xv. p. 425.

32.Lardner, vol. viii. p. 106.

33.See the tracts written in the controversy between Tunstal and Middleton upon certain suspected epistles ascribed to Cicero.

34.I believe that there is a great deal of truth in Dr. Lardner’s observations, that comparatively few of those books, which we call apocryphal, were strictly and originally forgeries. See Lardner, vol. xii. p. 167.

35.Lardner, vol. x. p. 103.

36.Lardner, vol. xi. p. 88.

37.לך שבע שנים are wanting only in 85 and 112 of Kennicott.

38.See Ques.154.

39.῾Υπερανω αὐτῆς.

40.[ἐν ἡ] ενoftentimes signifies, Cum, ad, prope, juxta,as well as in.

41.“The most ancient tradition among all nations, is exactly agreeable to the relation ofMoses. For his description of the original of the world is almost the very same as in the ancientPhœnicianhistories, which are translated byPhilo BibliusfromSanchoniathon’sCollection; and a good part of it is to be found among theIndiansandEgyptians; whence it is that inLinus,Hesiod, and many otherGreekwriters, mention is made of aChaos, (signified by some under the name of an Egg) and of the framing of animals, and also of man’s formation after the divine image, and the dominion given him over all living creatures; which are to be seen in many writers, particularly inOvid, who transcribed them from theGreek. That all things were made by the Word of God, is asserted byEpicharmus, and thePlatonists; and before them, by the most ancient writer (I do not mean of those Hymns which go under his name, but) of those Verses which were of old calledOrpheus’s; not becauseOrpheuscomposed them, but because they contained his doctrines. AndEmpedoclesacknowledged, that the sun was not the original light, but the receptacle of light, (the storehouse and vehicle of fire, as the ancient Christians express it.)Aratus, andCatullus, thought the divine residence was above the starry orb; in whichHomersays, there is a continual light.Thalestaught from the ancient schools, that God was the oldest of beings, because not begotten; that the world was most beautiful, because the workmanship of God; that darkness was before light, which latter we find inOrpheus’sVerses, andHesiod, whence it was, that the nations, who were most tenacious of ancient customs, reckoned the time by nights.Anaxagorasaffirmed, that all things were regulated by the supreme mind:Aratus, that the stars were made by God;Virgil, from theGreeks, that Life was infused into things by the Spirit of God;Hesiod,Homer, andCallimachus, that man was formed of clay; lastly,Maximus Tyriusasserts, that it was a constant tradition received by all nations, that there was one supreme God, the cause of all things. And we learn fromJosephus,Philo,Tibullus,Clemens Alexandrinus, andLucian, (for I need not mention theHebrews) that the memory of the seven days’ work was preserved, not only among theGreeksandItalians, by honouring the seventh day; but also amongst theCeltæandIndians, who all measured the time by weeks; as we learn fromPhilostratus,Dion Cassius, andJustin Martyr, and also the most ancient names of the day. TheEgyptianstell us, that at first men led their lives in great simplicity, their bodies being naked, whence arose the poet’s fiction of the Golden Age, famous among theIndians, asStraboremarks,Maimonidestakes notice, that the history ofAdam, ofEve, of the tree, and of the serpent, was extant among the idolatrousIndiansin his time: and there are many witnesses in our age, who testify that the same is still to be found amongst theheathendwelling inPeru, and thePhilippineislands, people belonging to the sameIndia; the name ofAdamamongst theBrachmans; and that it was reckoned six thousand years since the creation of the world, by those ofSiam.Berosusin his history ofChaldea,Manethosin his ofEgypt,Hieromin his ofPhœnicia,Histæus,Hecatæus,Hillanicusin theirs ofGreece, andHesiodamong the Poets; all assert that the lives of those who descended from the first men, were almost a thousand years in length; which is the less incredible, because the historians of many nations (particularlyPausaniasandPhilostratusamongst theGreeks, andPlinyamongst theRomans) relate, that men’s bodies, upon opening their sepulchres, were found to be much larger in old time. AndCatullus, after many of theGreeks, relates, that divine visions were made to men before their great and manifold crimes did, as it were, hinder God, and those Spirits that attend him, from holding any correspondence with men. We almost every where, in theGreekandLatinhistorians, meet with the savage life of the Giants, mentioned byMoses. And it is very remarkable concerning the deluge, that the memory of almost all nations ends in the history of it, even those nations which were unknown till our forefathers discovered them: so thatVarrocalls allthatthe unknown time. And all those things which we read in the poets, wrapped up in fables (a Liberty they allow themselves) are delivered by the ancient writers according to truth and reality; that is, agreeable toMoses; as you may see inBerosus’sHistory ofChaldea,Abydenus’sofAssyria, who mentions the dove that was sent out of the ark; and inPlutarchfrom theGreeks; and inLucian, who says, that inHierapolisofSyria, there was remaining a most ancient history of the ark, and of the preserving a few not only of mankind, but also of other living creatures. The same history was extant also inMoloand inNicolaus Damascenus; which latter names the ark, which we also find in the history ofDeucalioninApollodorus; and manySpaniardsaffirm, that in several parts ofAmerica, asCuba,Mechoacana,Nicaraga, is preserved the memory of the deluge, the saving alive of animals, especially the raven and dove; and the deluge itself in that part calledGolden Castile. That remark ofPliny’s, thatJoppawas built before the Flood, discovers what part of the earth men inhabited before the Flood. The place where the ark rested after the deluge on theGordyæanmountains, is evident from the constant tradition of theArmeniansfrom all past ages, down to this very day.Japhet, the father of theEuropeans, and from himJon, or, as they formerly pronounced it,Javonof theGreeks, andHammonof theAfricans, are names to be seen inMoses, andJosephusand others observe the like footsteps in the names of other places and nations. And which of the poets is it, in which we do not find mention made of the attempt to climb the heavens?Diodoris Siculus,Strabo,Tacitus,Pliny,Solinus, speak of the burning ofSodom.Herodotus,Diodorus,Strabo,Philo Biblius, testify the ancient custom of Circumcision, which is confirmed by those nations descended fromAbraham, not onlyHebrews, but alsoIdumæans,Ismaelites, and others. The history ofAbraham,Isaac,Jacob, andJoseph, agreeable withMoses, was extant of old inPhilo Bibliusout ofSanchoniathon, inBerosus,Hecatæus,Damascenus,Artapanus,Eupolemus,Demetrius, and partly in the ancient writers of the Orphic Verses; and something of it is still extant inJustin, out ofTrogus Pompeius. By almost all which, is related also the history ofMoses, and his principal acts. The Orphic Verses expressly mention his being taken out of the water, and the two tables that were given him by God. To these we may addPolemon; and several things about his coming out ofEgypt, from theEgyptianwriters,Menetho,Lysimachus,Chæremon. Neither can any prudent man think it at all credible, thatMoses, who had so many enemies, not only of theEgyptians, but also of many other nations, as theIdumæans,Arabians, andPhœnicians, would venture to relate any thing concerning the creation of the world, or the original of things, which could be confuted by more ancient writings, or was contradictory to the ancient and received opinions: or that he would relate any thing of matters in his own time, that could be confuted by the testimony of many persons then alive,Diodorus Siculus,Strabo, andPliny,Tacitus, and after themDionysius Longinus(concerning loftiness of Speech) make mention ofMoses. Besides theTalmudists,PlinyandApuleius, speak ofJamnesandMambres, who resistedMosesinEgypt. Some things there are in other writings, and many things amongst thePythagoreans, about the Law and Rites given byMoses,StraboandJustin, out ofTrogus, remarkably testify concerning the religion and righteousness of the ancientJews; so that there seems to be no need of mentioning what is found, or has formerly been found ofJoshuaand others, agreeable to theHebrewbooks; seeing, that whoever gives credit toMoses(which it is a shame for any one to refuse) cannot but believe those famous miracles done by the hand of God; which is the principal thing here aimed at. Now that the miracles of late date, such as those ofElija,Elisha, and others, should not be counterfeit, there is this further argument; that in those timesJudæawas become more known, and because of the difference of religion was hated by the neighbours, who could very easily confute the first rise of a lie. The history ofJonah’sbeing three days in the whale’s belly is inLycophronandÆneus Gazeus, only under the name ofHerculus; to advance whose fame, every thing that was great and noble used to be related of him, asTacitusobserves. Certainly nothing but the manifest evidence of the history could compelJulian(who was as great an enemy to theJewsas to the Christians) to confess that there were some men inspired by the divine Spirit amongst theJews, and that fire descended from heaven, and consumed the sacrifices ofMosesandElias. And here it is worthy of observation, that there was not only very severe punishments threatened amongst theHebrews, to any who should falsely assume the gift of prophecy, but very many kings, who by that means might have procured great authority to themselves, and many learned men, such asEsdrasand others, dared not to assume this honour to themselves; nay, some ages before Christ’s time, nobody dared to do it. Much less could so many thousand people be imposed upon, in avouching a constant and public miracle, I mean that of the oracle, which shined on the High Priest’s breast, which is so firmly believed by all theJews, to have remained till the destruction of the first temple, that their ancestors must of necessity be well assured of the truth of it.”Grotius.

Grotius.

42.Vid. Joseph Antiq.

43.Reason will affirm that every effect speaks a cause; then we ask how it should happen that a dozen illiterate fishermen and mechanicks of Galilee, after the wisdom of the philosophers had left the world in darkness, should have introduced so much light of knowledge, that our children and servants are wiser than the ancient philosophers? Let no one say, that they only began, what the wisdom of after ages have carried on towards perfection. The writings of the apostles are the same to this day; as is proved by the earliest versions, quotations, and manuscripts. So perfect was the system of morals they left, that no error has been detected in it, and all attempts to build upon or add to it, have only exposed the ignorance of the individuals who have essayed to do so.How has it happened that whilst learned men have ever been at discord about the nature, and true foundation of the obligation of virtue, these despised fishermen, have shown the true foundation and nature of duty, and have erred in no particular? Is it not strange that whilst the wisdom of the philosophers made their purest virtue but a more refined pride, these poor men laid the ax to the root of that pride, and taught the world that even their virtues brought them under additional obligations to Divine grace? Is it not remarkable that the system taught by these unlearned men should so perfectly coincide with what is discovered in the works of God, that whilst it aims to eradicate sin, it represents it as in every instance eventually productive of the glory of that God, who brings good out of the evil, and light out of the darkness?How is it to be accounted for, that when the most learned rabbies perverted the law, and knew not its meaning, that a few crude and uninstructed fishermen should remove their false constructions of that law, explain the types, shadows, promises and prophecies, show how the truth and justice of God might be clear in the pardon of sin, and set the labouring conscience at rest? How came the fishermen of Galilee to discover to the wise and learned what they had never conjectured, and truths, which only attentive minds at the present time can acquiesce in, that all things are certain, because foreknown, and foreknown because Divine knowledge must be infinite and eternal, and yet that rational creatures may be capable of choosing and refusing, though they must be wholly dependent? Is it not passing strange that the wisdom of Philosophers, the learning of Rabbies, the power of Kings and Emperors, the influence of thousands of priests, the prejudices of the world, and the malice of the wicked should be overcome by twelve poor fishermen? How is it to be accounted for that these twelve poor illiterate men should have effected such surprising changes, that modern infidels are ashamed of the evidence of their ancient predecessors, and are obliged to borrow from the fishermen of Galilee a portion of the knowledge they have introduced, without which the opposers of the Gospel must fall into contempt? Is any man so credulous as to imagine men of no better education and opportunities, possessed of themselves all this knowledge? when or where has the natural world produced such a phænomenon? they declared that it was not of themselves, but, that such feeble instruments were chosen, that the power might appear to be what it really was, from God. This testimony they confirmed by miracles, and sealed with their blood.

How has it happened that whilst learned men have ever been at discord about the nature, and true foundation of the obligation of virtue, these despised fishermen, have shown the true foundation and nature of duty, and have erred in no particular? Is it not strange that whilst the wisdom of the philosophers made their purest virtue but a more refined pride, these poor men laid the ax to the root of that pride, and taught the world that even their virtues brought them under additional obligations to Divine grace? Is it not remarkable that the system taught by these unlearned men should so perfectly coincide with what is discovered in the works of God, that whilst it aims to eradicate sin, it represents it as in every instance eventually productive of the glory of that God, who brings good out of the evil, and light out of the darkness?

How is it to be accounted for, that when the most learned rabbies perverted the law, and knew not its meaning, that a few crude and uninstructed fishermen should remove their false constructions of that law, explain the types, shadows, promises and prophecies, show how the truth and justice of God might be clear in the pardon of sin, and set the labouring conscience at rest? How came the fishermen of Galilee to discover to the wise and learned what they had never conjectured, and truths, which only attentive minds at the present time can acquiesce in, that all things are certain, because foreknown, and foreknown because Divine knowledge must be infinite and eternal, and yet that rational creatures may be capable of choosing and refusing, though they must be wholly dependent? Is it not passing strange that the wisdom of Philosophers, the learning of Rabbies, the power of Kings and Emperors, the influence of thousands of priests, the prejudices of the world, and the malice of the wicked should be overcome by twelve poor fishermen? How is it to be accounted for that these twelve poor illiterate men should have effected such surprising changes, that modern infidels are ashamed of the evidence of their ancient predecessors, and are obliged to borrow from the fishermen of Galilee a portion of the knowledge they have introduced, without which the opposers of the Gospel must fall into contempt? Is any man so credulous as to imagine men of no better education and opportunities, possessed of themselves all this knowledge? when or where has the natural world produced such a phænomenon? they declared that it was not of themselves, but, that such feeble instruments were chosen, that the power might appear to be what it really was, from God. This testimony they confirmed by miracles, and sealed with their blood.

44.Vide Dodd. Expos. 3 vol. app.—Dick on Insp.—Parry’s Enq.—Hawker, &c.

45.This description of the Spirit’s witness resembles sensible assurance; that there may be such an immediate suggestion, or impression is possible; but the Spirit’s witness is the image of God, and is of adoption.—Vide Edwards’s works, vol. 4. p. 161.

46.What we are to believe reaches to Qu. 91. the rest is of practice.

47.That is unto the 91st Quest.

48.His ideas are not the effects, but causes of things. Vide post p.124,125.

49.There is not succession in His ideas, but he exists in every point of time.

50.Effects spring frompower, notlaws, and prove avirtual, or influential, revelation, anessentialubiquity.

51.Quest. xv. and xviii.

52.Quest. lxvii.

53.Vide Edwards on Free-will, part I. sect. IV.

54.The Divine knowledge is as undeniable as the Divine existence, and as certain as human knowledge. “He that formed the eye doth he not see? He that planted the ear doth he not hear? He that teacheth man knowledge doth he not know?” But though human knowledge proves the Divine, as the effect does its cause, it by no means follows, that they are similar. Our knowledge principally consists of the images of things in the mind, or springs from them; but if the Divine knowledge were such, it would result that things were prior to his knowledge, and so that he is not the Creator of them; all things must therefore be the representations of his ideas, as an edifice represents the plan of the skilful architect. On this account our knowledge is superficial, extending only to the external appearances of things; but their intimate natures are known to him, who made them conformed to his original ideas. Our knowledge is circumscribed, extending only to the things which are the objects of our senses, or which have been described to us; but the universe, with all its parts, the greatest and the smallest things, are all known to him, who called them into existence, and moulded them according to his own plan. Our knowledge embraces only the things which are, or have been; with respect to the future, we can know nothing, except as he, upon whom it depends, shall reveal it to us; or as we may draw inferences from his course of action in former instances. But the Creator knows not only the past and the present, but the future. He knows the future, because it wholly depends on him; and nothing can take place without him, otherwise it is independent of God, but this is incompatible with his supremacy. If he know not the future, his knowledge is imperfect; if he is to know hereafter what he does not now know, he is increasing in knowledge, this would argue imperfection; if his knowledge be imperfect, he is imperfect; and if he be imperfect, he is not God.—But all things to come are to be what he designs they shall be; there accompanies his knowledge of the future, also a purpose, that the thing designed shall be effectuated; and his wisdom and power being infinite guarantee the accomplishment of his purposes.To be the subjects of foreknowledge, such as has been mentioned, implies the absolute certainty of the things, or occurrences, thus foreknown. A failure in their production, would not less prove imperfection, than a defect of the foreknowledge of them. Contingency belongs not to the things in futurity, but to the defective knowledge of imperfect beings, and is always proportional to our ignorance.That the future is categorically certain with God, appears by the invariable succession of effects to their causes in the natural world; miracles themselves may not be exceptions; but would always, it is probable, flow from the same causes, which are occult from us. The voluntary actions of moral agents, how uncertain soever to themselves, are also not exceptions from the Divine knowledge and purposes; “He doth his will in the army of Heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth”; “The wrath of man praises him, and the remainder he doth restrain.” Every prophecy, which has been fulfilled, so far as it was accomplished by the voluntary actions of men, proves the certainty of the divine foreknowledge, the absolute certainty of the then future event, and that the will of man is among the various means, which God is pleased to make use of to accomplish his purposes.If there be such certainty in God’s foreknowledge, and in the events themselves in the Kingdom of Providence, we may reasonably expect his conduct will be similar in the Kingdom of Grace; and the more especially if man’s salvation from first to last springs from, and is carried on, and accomplished by him.

To be the subjects of foreknowledge, such as has been mentioned, implies the absolute certainty of the things, or occurrences, thus foreknown. A failure in their production, would not less prove imperfection, than a defect of the foreknowledge of them. Contingency belongs not to the things in futurity, but to the defective knowledge of imperfect beings, and is always proportional to our ignorance.

That the future is categorically certain with God, appears by the invariable succession of effects to their causes in the natural world; miracles themselves may not be exceptions; but would always, it is probable, flow from the same causes, which are occult from us. The voluntary actions of moral agents, how uncertain soever to themselves, are also not exceptions from the Divine knowledge and purposes; “He doth his will in the army of Heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth”; “The wrath of man praises him, and the remainder he doth restrain.” Every prophecy, which has been fulfilled, so far as it was accomplished by the voluntary actions of men, proves the certainty of the divine foreknowledge, the absolute certainty of the then future event, and that the will of man is among the various means, which God is pleased to make use of to accomplish his purposes.

If there be such certainty in God’s foreknowledge, and in the events themselves in the Kingdom of Providence, we may reasonably expect his conduct will be similar in the Kingdom of Grace; and the more especially if man’s salvation from first to last springs from, and is carried on, and accomplished by him.

55.As knowledge is a faculty of which wisdom is the due exercise, the proofs of divine wisdom are so many evidences of the knowledge of God. Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends, and the selection of means most suitable to attain them. The testimonies of the wisdom of God must therefore be as numerous and various, as the works of his creation. The mutual relations and subserviency of one thing to another; as the heat of the sun, to produce rain; both, to produce vegetation; and all, to sustain life; ensation, digestion, muscular motion, the circulation of the fluids, and, still more, intelligence, and above all, the moral faculty, or power of distinguishing good and evil, are unequivocal proofs of the wisdom, and consequently of the knowledge, of God.—He that formed the eye, doth he not see: he that planted the ear, &c.Mortal artificers are deemed to understand their own work, though ignorant of the formation of the materials and instruments they use: but the Creator uses no mean or material which he has not formed. He therefore knows, from the globe to the particle of dust or fluid, and from the largest living creature to the smallest insect. He has knowledge equally of the other worlds of this system, and every system; of all things in heaven, earth, and hell.Our knowledge is conversant about his works; he knows all things which are known to us, and those things which have not come to our knowledge.He formed and sustains the human mind, and knows the thoughts: this is necessary to him as our Judge. He knows equally all spiritual creatures, and sustains his holy spirits in holiness.Our knowledge springs from things; but things spring from his purposes: they are, because he knows them; otherwise they existed before his knowledge, and so independently of him.We know but the external appearances, he the intimate nature of things. We inquire into the properties of things by our senses, by comparing them, by analizing, &c: but nothing possesses a property which he did not purpose and give; otherwise his hands have wrought more than he intended. We look up through effects unto their causes: he looks down through intermediate causes, and sees them all to be effects from him.We are furnished with memories to bring up ideas, being only able to contemplate a part at a time; but his comprehension embraces all things.He never changes; his purposes of the future embrace eternity: all things that are really future are certain, because his purposes cannot fail of accomplishment. But all future things to us are contingent, except as he has revealed their certainty. That the future is known to him, also appears by the accomplishment of every prophecy.But man’s sin receives hereby no apology. He gives the brutal creation the capacity of deriving pleasure from gratification of sense, and provides for such appetites. He offers to man, pleasures which are intellectual: he has tendered him the means, and requires man to seek his spiritual happiness in God. When he refuses and withholds his return of service from God, man is alone to blame. And the more numerous and powerful the motives which he resists, the guilt is the greater. The divine foreknowledge of this is no excuse for man. When the Lord overpowers man’s evil with good, the glory of man’s salvation belongs to God.

Mortal artificers are deemed to understand their own work, though ignorant of the formation of the materials and instruments they use: but the Creator uses no mean or material which he has not formed. He therefore knows, from the globe to the particle of dust or fluid, and from the largest living creature to the smallest insect. He has knowledge equally of the other worlds of this system, and every system; of all things in heaven, earth, and hell.

Our knowledge is conversant about his works; he knows all things which are known to us, and those things which have not come to our knowledge.

He formed and sustains the human mind, and knows the thoughts: this is necessary to him as our Judge. He knows equally all spiritual creatures, and sustains his holy spirits in holiness.

Our knowledge springs from things; but things spring from his purposes: they are, because he knows them; otherwise they existed before his knowledge, and so independently of him.

We know but the external appearances, he the intimate nature of things. We inquire into the properties of things by our senses, by comparing them, by analizing, &c: but nothing possesses a property which he did not purpose and give; otherwise his hands have wrought more than he intended. We look up through effects unto their causes: he looks down through intermediate causes, and sees them all to be effects from him.

We are furnished with memories to bring up ideas, being only able to contemplate a part at a time; but his comprehension embraces all things.

He never changes; his purposes of the future embrace eternity: all things that are really future are certain, because his purposes cannot fail of accomplishment. But all future things to us are contingent, except as he has revealed their certainty. That the future is known to him, also appears by the accomplishment of every prophecy.

But man’s sin receives hereby no apology. He gives the brutal creation the capacity of deriving pleasure from gratification of sense, and provides for such appetites. He offers to man, pleasures which are intellectual: he has tendered him the means, and requires man to seek his spiritual happiness in God. When he refuses and withholds his return of service from God, man is alone to blame. And the more numerous and powerful the motives which he resists, the guilt is the greater. The divine foreknowledge of this is no excuse for man. When the Lord overpowers man’s evil with good, the glory of man’s salvation belongs to God.

56.See Ray’s Wisdom of God in the Works of Creation, and Derham’s Physico-Theology.See also Fenelon, Newenlyle, Paley, and Adams’s Philosophy.

57.See Page46.

58.See Quest. clvi. and clvii.

59.Quest. xvi. xvii. xxi. and xxx.

60.The Quest. xliv. and lxxi.

61.Quest. xxix. and lxxix.

62.All the good which we behold in Creation, Providence, and redemption, flows from goodness in God, and are the proofs of this attribute. If all the evil, which we discover, springs from the liberty given to creatures to conform, or not, to the revealed will; or if all moral evil be productive of good,the remainder being restrained; then the evil, which exists, is no exception to the proofs of Divine goodness. What Deity now is, he always was; he has not derived his goodness; he is not a compounded being; his goodness therefore belongs to his essence. His goodness has been distinguished intoimmanentandcommunicative. The latter discovers to us the former, but his communicative goodness, though flowing in ten thousand streams, and incalculable, is less than his immanent, which is an eternal fountain of excellency.Infinite knowledge discerns things as they are, and a perfect being will esteem that to be best, which is so; God therefore discerns, and esteems his own immanent goodness as infinitely exceeding all the good, which appears in his works, for the excellency in these is but an imperfect representation of himself. The happiness of Deity must consist consequently in his own self-complacency;he made all things for his pleasure, or glory, but they are only so far pleasing, as they reflect his own picture to himself. Yet when we suppose Deity to be the subject of motives, we are ever in danger of erring.Divine communicative goodness has been termedbenevolencewhen in intention,beneficencewhen carried into effect. This is nearly the same asmoral rectitude, because the government of the Universe must, that it may produce the good of the whole, be administered in righteousness. The correct administration of justice in rewarding every good, if there be merit in a creature, and punishing every evil is no less an effect of benevolence, than the conferring of benefits, which are purely gratuitous. In like manner the punishment of offenders in civil society has for its object general utility, whether we imagine the power which judges and inflicts, to spring from the social compact, or to have been ordained of God.The cutting off of flagrant offenders, as by the deluge, the destruction of Sodom, &c. has been obviously designed to prevent the spreading contagion of sin. But there is a time appointed, unto which all things are tending, and unto which men generally refer the wrongs they sustain, in which perfect justice shall be administered. Some attributes of Deity seem to be ground of terror, and others of love; but God is one; he is subject to no perturbation of mind; his wrath and indignation are but other terms for his steady and unchangeable goodness, bearing down the evil, which sinful creatures oppose to his purposes of general advantage. Those acts of justice which are accounted by the guilty to be unnecessary severity, are deemed, by glorified saints and angels, the effects of that goodness, which they make the subject of their Hallelujahs. Thus the highest proof of God’s goodness consisted in his not sparing his own Son, nor abating any thing from the demands of his law. After this all hopes that Divine goodness shall favour the finally impenitent must be utterly vain.

Infinite knowledge discerns things as they are, and a perfect being will esteem that to be best, which is so; God therefore discerns, and esteems his own immanent goodness as infinitely exceeding all the good, which appears in his works, for the excellency in these is but an imperfect representation of himself. The happiness of Deity must consist consequently in his own self-complacency;he made all things for his pleasure, or glory, but they are only so far pleasing, as they reflect his own picture to himself. Yet when we suppose Deity to be the subject of motives, we are ever in danger of erring.

Divine communicative goodness has been termedbenevolencewhen in intention,beneficencewhen carried into effect. This is nearly the same asmoral rectitude, because the government of the Universe must, that it may produce the good of the whole, be administered in righteousness. The correct administration of justice in rewarding every good, if there be merit in a creature, and punishing every evil is no less an effect of benevolence, than the conferring of benefits, which are purely gratuitous. In like manner the punishment of offenders in civil society has for its object general utility, whether we imagine the power which judges and inflicts, to spring from the social compact, or to have been ordained of God.

The cutting off of flagrant offenders, as by the deluge, the destruction of Sodom, &c. has been obviously designed to prevent the spreading contagion of sin. But there is a time appointed, unto which all things are tending, and unto which men generally refer the wrongs they sustain, in which perfect justice shall be administered. Some attributes of Deity seem to be ground of terror, and others of love; but God is one; he is subject to no perturbation of mind; his wrath and indignation are but other terms for his steady and unchangeable goodness, bearing down the evil, which sinful creatures oppose to his purposes of general advantage. Those acts of justice which are accounted by the guilty to be unnecessary severity, are deemed, by glorified saints and angels, the effects of that goodness, which they make the subject of their Hallelujahs. Thus the highest proof of God’s goodness consisted in his not sparing his own Son, nor abating any thing from the demands of his law. After this all hopes that Divine goodness shall favour the finally impenitent must be utterly vain.

63.“Mark iii. 11, v. 7; Luke viii. 28; and Mat. viii. 29. These extraordinary personages in the New Testament, are not calleddevils, Διαβολοι, in the original; that word never occurring in the Christian scriptures, but in the singular number, and as applied to one Being alone. They are calleddæmons, Δαιμονες or Δαιμονια. Yet they are plainly devils in fact; being called Unclean Spirits, though sometimes only Spirits (Mark ix. 20; and Luke x. 20;) and showing themselves to be devils, by their whole history. In Mat. xii. 24 and 26 particularly, the Pharisees say ‘our Saviour casts out devils, (dæmons) by Beelzebub the prince of the devils (dæmons);’ and our Saviour replies, that then ‘Satan casts out Satan.’ See also Luke x. 17-18; where the apostles rejoicing declare, ‘even the devils (dæmons) are subject unto us;’ and our Saviour says unto them, ‘I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.’ So very false in itself, and directly contradicted by the very words of our Saviour, is that hypothesis of Dr. Campbell’s in his new translation of the Gospels; which asserts these possessions of the New Testament to be nowhere attributed to the devil, and which avers the dominion or authority of the devil to be nowhere ascribed to the dæmons! Beelzebub is expressly called theprinceof the dæmons, the dæmons are expressly denominatedSatanwith him, and these are only inferior devils subordinate to the great one. And though the worddæmons(as Dr. Campbell urges) might critically be more exact in a translation; yet the worddevilsbetter accords, with the usages of our language and the course of our ideas. Exactness therefore has been properly sacrificed to utility.”WHITAKER.

WHITAKER.

64.See Quest. xx.

65.See Quest.cv.

66.“As gravity is the common quality of all bodies, arising not from the nature and properties of matter, nor to be explained without the agency of a foreign cause, yet producing numberless uniform effects in the corporeal system, it is in all reason to be attributed to one contrivance, rather than the different designs of two or more partial independent causes. What a vast variety of appearances in nature depend on this one? The self-balanced earth hangs upon its centre; the mountains are set fast; there is a perpetual flux and reflux of the sea; vapours continually arise; the clouds are balanced till by their own weight they descend in rain; animals breathe and move; the heavenly bodies hold their stations, and go on in their constant course, by the force of gravity, after theordinanceof that wisdom which appointed them this law. Now when we see a multitude of effects proceeding from one Cause, effects so various in their kind and so important, a Cause simple and unvaried in all the diversity produced by it, can we avoid ascribing this to an unity of intelligence, if there be intelligence in it all? For could we suppose different independent beings, acting with different designs, and by distinct operations to have formed the several parts of the world, and the several species of creatures which are in it, what reason can be imagined why they should all be governed by, and all necessarily depend upon, one law? The Maker of the sun, or, if a partial cause of nature could be supposed to have an understanding large enough for it, the Contriver of the whole visible heavens, must, one would think, have finished his scheme independently on any other, without borrowing aid from the work of another God. In like manner the Gods of the seas and of the dry land, and the Creator of animals, would have completed their several systems, each by itself, not depending on any other for its order and preservation. Whereas, on the contrary, we see in fact they are none of them independent, but all held together by the common bond of gravity. The heavens and the earth continue in their situations at a proper distance from each other by the force of this law; the sea keeps within its channels; and animals live and move by it. All which lead us to acknowledge one directing Counsel in the whole frame. For what but an understanding which comprehends the whole extent of nature, reaching from the utmost circuit of heaven to the centre of the earth, could have fixed such a common law, so necessary to all its parts, that without it not one of them could subsist, nor the harmony of the whole be preserved? The strict cohesion of the parts which constitute particular bodies requires a peculiar cement, different from that of the gravitating force; and as it can never be explained by the nature and properties of matter itself, and is absolutely necessary to the forms and the uses of bodies in the several far distant regions of the world, it must in like manner be attributed to the contrivance of an understanding, and the agency of a power, which takes in the whole corporeal system, not to a partial cause, limited in its intelligence and operation.“2dly, The beautiful order and harmony of the universe, since it must be acknowledged to be the work of understanding, has all the appearance which is necessary to satisfy any fair inquirer, of its being formed under the direction of one governing wisdom. Disconcerted counsels can never produce harmony. If a plurality of intelligent causes pursue each his separate design, disunion will continually cleave to their works; but when we see an intire piece made up of many parts, all corresponding to each other, and conspiring together so as to answer one common end, we naturally conclude unity of design. As a work of art is formed according to the preconceived idea of a designing artificer, without which it has not its necessary intireness and uniformity, the same may be observed in the works of nature. A tree is as much one as a house; an animal as complete a system in it self, (only much more curiously framed,) as a clock. If we carry our views farther into nature, and take in whole regions of the universe, with all their contents, the same characters of unity are still visible. The earth itself is not a confused mass, or a medley of incoherent and unrelated parts, but a well contrived fabric, fitted and plainly designed for use. If we consider what a multitude of living creatures are in it, of different kinds and degrees of perfection, each sort having proper apartments assigned them, where they dwell conveniently together, with suitable provision made for them, and instincts directing them to the use of it; if we consider the interests of the several kinds, not interfering in the main, but rather serviceable to each other, furnished with necessary defences against the inconveniences to which they are liable, either by the preventing care of nature, which without any thought of their own has provided for their safety, by the appointed advantages of their situation, or by an implanted wisdom directing them to find out the means of it; and if we consider the constant interposition of the same liberal intelligent nature, appearing by the daily new productions from the same fertile womb of the earth, whereby the returning wants of animals are relieved with fresh supplies, all the species of living things having the common benefit of the air, without which they could not subsist, and the light of the sun, which cannot at once illuminate the whole globe, being dispensed among them with so good œconomy, that they have every one what is sufficient to guide them in the exercise of their proper functions, that they may fulfil the purposes of their beings;—when we consider all this, can we doubt but the earth is disposed and governed by one intending Cause? If in a large house, wherein are many mansions, and a vast variety of inhabitants, there appears exact order, all from the highest to the lowest continually attending their proper business, and all lodged and constantly provided for suitably to their several conditions, we find ourselves obliged to acknowledge one wise œconomy. And if in a great city or commonwealth there be a perfectly regular administration, so that not only the whole society enjoys an undisturbed peace, but every member has the station assigned him which he is best qualified to fill; the unenvied chiefs constantly attend their more important cares, served by the busy inferiors, who have all a suitable accommodation, and food convenient for them, the very meanest ministering to the public utility and protected by the public care; if, I say, in such a community we must conclude there is a ruling Counsel, which if not naturally, yet is politically one, and, unless united, could not produce such harmony and order, much more have we reason to recognize one governing Intelligence in the earth, in which there are so many ranks of beings disposed of in the most convenient manner, having all their several provinces appointed to them, and their several kinds and degrees of enjoyment liberally provided for, without encroaching upon, but rather being mutually useful to each other, according to a settled and obvious subordination. What else can account for this but a sovereign Wisdom, a common provident nature, presiding over, and caring for the whole?“But the earth, as great as it appears to us, complicated in its frame, and having such a variety in its constitution, sustaining and nourishing so many tribes of animals, yet is not an intire system by itself, but has a relation to, and dependence on, other parts of the universe, as well as the beings it contains have upon it. It owes its stability to the common law of gravitation; it derives its light and its heat from the sun, by which it is rendered fruitful and commodious to its inhabitants. In short, a bond of union runs through the whole circle of being, as far as human knowledge reaches; and we have reason to make the same judgment concerning the parts of the world which we do not know, and to conclude that they all together compose one great whole, which naturally leads us to acknowledge one supreme uniting Intelligence. To object against this the possibility of wild confusion reigning in worlds unknown is to feign, and not to argue; and to suppose disorder prevalent in an infinity of being which we are unacquainted with, which is theAtheistichypothesis, is to take away all rational foundation for regularity any where, though we see it actually obtains every where, as far as our observation can reach. But confining our speculations on this subject within the compass of known existence, as we ought to do in a fair inquiry, the apparent order of the effects is a strong evidence of unity in the Cause. For if different independent causes produced, each, a part, why are there no footsteps of this in the whole extent of nature? Why does not so much as one piece appear, as the separate monument of its author’s power and wisdom? From divided counsels one would naturally expect interfering schemes; but, on the contrary, we see an universal harmony. Men indeed from a sense of their indigence, and by the direction of instincts, which must be attributed to the designing author of their constitution, join in societies; which, though composed of many, are governed by one counsel: but that is only an artificial union, a submission to the majority, or to those who have the supreme power delegated to them, rather than an agreement in design. But this cannot be the case of independent beings, self-existent, and each complete in itself, without relation to any other. And yet we see in nature a perfect harmony, from whence it is plain there must be an agreement at least in counsel and design, if we could suppose a plurality of independent causes. But whence comes this agreement? To say by chance, isatheistically, and very unreasonably, to attribute the most perfect of all effects, universal order, to no cause at all. If we say by design, it must be one comprehensive design forming the whole scheme of nature and providence, which directly brings us to what we are looking for, one sovereign commanding Intelligence in the universe, or one God. This was the argument by which some of the ancient philosophers proved that there is one only eternal and independent Principle, the Fountain of being and the Author of all things.Pythagorascalled it aMonad; andAristotleargued from the phænomena that all things are plainly co-ordered, to one, the whole world conspiring into agreeing harmony: Whereas, if there were many independent principles, the system of the world must needs have been incoherent and inconspiring; like an ill-agreeingdrama, botched up of many impertinentintersertions. And he concludes that things are well administered, which they could not be under the government of many, alluding to the verse inHomer, Ουκ αγαθον Πολυκοιρανιη, εις Κοιρανος εστω.“3dly, The condition and order of inferior, derived, and evidently dependent intelligent agents shew not only intelligence, but unity of intelligence, in the Cause of them. Every man, a single active conscious self, is the image of his Maker. There is in him one undivided animating principle, which in its perceptions and operations runs through the whole system of matter that it inhabits; it perceives for all the most distant parts of the body; it cares for all, and governs all, leading us, as a resemblance, to form an idea of the one great quickening Spirit, which presides over the whole frame of nature, the spring of motion and all operation in it, understanding and active in all the parts of the universe, not as its soul indeed, but as its Lord, by whose vital directing influence it is, though so vast a bulk, and consisting of so many parts, united into one regular fabric. Again, the general apparent likeness which there is among all the individuals of the human kind is a strong evidence of their being the children of one Father. I do not mean principally the similitude of the exterior form, (though even that, in reason, should be attributed to the direction of one intelligent Cause,) but that whereby we are especially God’s offspring, our intellectual capacities, which as far as we can judge are very nearly alike. A great difference there may be, no doubt there is, in the improvement of them; but the powers themselves, and all the original modes of perception, in the different individuals of mankind, seem to resemble each other, as much as any real distinct things in nature. Now from a multitude, or a constant series of similar effects which do not arise from necessity, we infer unity of design in the Cause. So great a number of rational beings as the whole human race, disposed of in the same manner, endued with like faculties and affections, having many, and those principal things in their condition, common, provided for out of the same fund, and made for the same purposes, may reasonably be supposed to belong to one family, to be derived from the same origin, and still under the same paternal care.“Above all, the moral capacity of mankind, which is a most important part of their constitution, tending to the highest perfection of their nature, and the principal bond of regular society among them, as it proceeds from a wise intending Cause, shews unity of wisdom in the Cause; and the government over the moral, as well as the natural, world evidently appears to be a monarchy.”ABERNETHY

“2dly, The beautiful order and harmony of the universe, since it must be acknowledged to be the work of understanding, has all the appearance which is necessary to satisfy any fair inquirer, of its being formed under the direction of one governing wisdom. Disconcerted counsels can never produce harmony. If a plurality of intelligent causes pursue each his separate design, disunion will continually cleave to their works; but when we see an intire piece made up of many parts, all corresponding to each other, and conspiring together so as to answer one common end, we naturally conclude unity of design. As a work of art is formed according to the preconceived idea of a designing artificer, without which it has not its necessary intireness and uniformity, the same may be observed in the works of nature. A tree is as much one as a house; an animal as complete a system in it self, (only much more curiously framed,) as a clock. If we carry our views farther into nature, and take in whole regions of the universe, with all their contents, the same characters of unity are still visible. The earth itself is not a confused mass, or a medley of incoherent and unrelated parts, but a well contrived fabric, fitted and plainly designed for use. If we consider what a multitude of living creatures are in it, of different kinds and degrees of perfection, each sort having proper apartments assigned them, where they dwell conveniently together, with suitable provision made for them, and instincts directing them to the use of it; if we consider the interests of the several kinds, not interfering in the main, but rather serviceable to each other, furnished with necessary defences against the inconveniences to which they are liable, either by the preventing care of nature, which without any thought of their own has provided for their safety, by the appointed advantages of their situation, or by an implanted wisdom directing them to find out the means of it; and if we consider the constant interposition of the same liberal intelligent nature, appearing by the daily new productions from the same fertile womb of the earth, whereby the returning wants of animals are relieved with fresh supplies, all the species of living things having the common benefit of the air, without which they could not subsist, and the light of the sun, which cannot at once illuminate the whole globe, being dispensed among them with so good œconomy, that they have every one what is sufficient to guide them in the exercise of their proper functions, that they may fulfil the purposes of their beings;—when we consider all this, can we doubt but the earth is disposed and governed by one intending Cause? If in a large house, wherein are many mansions, and a vast variety of inhabitants, there appears exact order, all from the highest to the lowest continually attending their proper business, and all lodged and constantly provided for suitably to their several conditions, we find ourselves obliged to acknowledge one wise œconomy. And if in a great city or commonwealth there be a perfectly regular administration, so that not only the whole society enjoys an undisturbed peace, but every member has the station assigned him which he is best qualified to fill; the unenvied chiefs constantly attend their more important cares, served by the busy inferiors, who have all a suitable accommodation, and food convenient for them, the very meanest ministering to the public utility and protected by the public care; if, I say, in such a community we must conclude there is a ruling Counsel, which if not naturally, yet is politically one, and, unless united, could not produce such harmony and order, much more have we reason to recognize one governing Intelligence in the earth, in which there are so many ranks of beings disposed of in the most convenient manner, having all their several provinces appointed to them, and their several kinds and degrees of enjoyment liberally provided for, without encroaching upon, but rather being mutually useful to each other, according to a settled and obvious subordination. What else can account for this but a sovereign Wisdom, a common provident nature, presiding over, and caring for the whole?

“But the earth, as great as it appears to us, complicated in its frame, and having such a variety in its constitution, sustaining and nourishing so many tribes of animals, yet is not an intire system by itself, but has a relation to, and dependence on, other parts of the universe, as well as the beings it contains have upon it. It owes its stability to the common law of gravitation; it derives its light and its heat from the sun, by which it is rendered fruitful and commodious to its inhabitants. In short, a bond of union runs through the whole circle of being, as far as human knowledge reaches; and we have reason to make the same judgment concerning the parts of the world which we do not know, and to conclude that they all together compose one great whole, which naturally leads us to acknowledge one supreme uniting Intelligence. To object against this the possibility of wild confusion reigning in worlds unknown is to feign, and not to argue; and to suppose disorder prevalent in an infinity of being which we are unacquainted with, which is theAtheistichypothesis, is to take away all rational foundation for regularity any where, though we see it actually obtains every where, as far as our observation can reach. But confining our speculations on this subject within the compass of known existence, as we ought to do in a fair inquiry, the apparent order of the effects is a strong evidence of unity in the Cause. For if different independent causes produced, each, a part, why are there no footsteps of this in the whole extent of nature? Why does not so much as one piece appear, as the separate monument of its author’s power and wisdom? From divided counsels one would naturally expect interfering schemes; but, on the contrary, we see an universal harmony. Men indeed from a sense of their indigence, and by the direction of instincts, which must be attributed to the designing author of their constitution, join in societies; which, though composed of many, are governed by one counsel: but that is only an artificial union, a submission to the majority, or to those who have the supreme power delegated to them, rather than an agreement in design. But this cannot be the case of independent beings, self-existent, and each complete in itself, without relation to any other. And yet we see in nature a perfect harmony, from whence it is plain there must be an agreement at least in counsel and design, if we could suppose a plurality of independent causes. But whence comes this agreement? To say by chance, isatheistically, and very unreasonably, to attribute the most perfect of all effects, universal order, to no cause at all. If we say by design, it must be one comprehensive design forming the whole scheme of nature and providence, which directly brings us to what we are looking for, one sovereign commanding Intelligence in the universe, or one God. This was the argument by which some of the ancient philosophers proved that there is one only eternal and independent Principle, the Fountain of being and the Author of all things.Pythagorascalled it aMonad; andAristotleargued from the phænomena that all things are plainly co-ordered, to one, the whole world conspiring into agreeing harmony: Whereas, if there were many independent principles, the system of the world must needs have been incoherent and inconspiring; like an ill-agreeingdrama, botched up of many impertinentintersertions. And he concludes that things are well administered, which they could not be under the government of many, alluding to the verse inHomer, Ουκ αγαθον Πολυκοιρανιη, εις Κοιρανος εστω.

“3dly, The condition and order of inferior, derived, and evidently dependent intelligent agents shew not only intelligence, but unity of intelligence, in the Cause of them. Every man, a single active conscious self, is the image of his Maker. There is in him one undivided animating principle, which in its perceptions and operations runs through the whole system of matter that it inhabits; it perceives for all the most distant parts of the body; it cares for all, and governs all, leading us, as a resemblance, to form an idea of the one great quickening Spirit, which presides over the whole frame of nature, the spring of motion and all operation in it, understanding and active in all the parts of the universe, not as its soul indeed, but as its Lord, by whose vital directing influence it is, though so vast a bulk, and consisting of so many parts, united into one regular fabric. Again, the general apparent likeness which there is among all the individuals of the human kind is a strong evidence of their being the children of one Father. I do not mean principally the similitude of the exterior form, (though even that, in reason, should be attributed to the direction of one intelligent Cause,) but that whereby we are especially God’s offspring, our intellectual capacities, which as far as we can judge are very nearly alike. A great difference there may be, no doubt there is, in the improvement of them; but the powers themselves, and all the original modes of perception, in the different individuals of mankind, seem to resemble each other, as much as any real distinct things in nature. Now from a multitude, or a constant series of similar effects which do not arise from necessity, we infer unity of design in the Cause. So great a number of rational beings as the whole human race, disposed of in the same manner, endued with like faculties and affections, having many, and those principal things in their condition, common, provided for out of the same fund, and made for the same purposes, may reasonably be supposed to belong to one family, to be derived from the same origin, and still under the same paternal care.

“Above all, the moral capacity of mankind, which is a most important part of their constitution, tending to the highest perfection of their nature, and the principal bond of regular society among them, as it proceeds from a wise intending Cause, shews unity of wisdom in the Cause; and the government over the moral, as well as the natural, world evidently appears to be a monarchy.”

ABERNETHY

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