CHAP. VIII.
Thereis no country with which Great Britain is likely so soon to come into hostile contact as the United States of America, and for such a war we must certainly want an army such as I have in view.
It has long been the fashion, and I believe it is the object of many interested and designing men, to endeavour to have the United States of America considered as much more powerful and dangerous to Great Britain then they really are. No nation, nor body of men, be they who they may, composed of such heterogeneous materials, scattered over so vast an extent of territory, in which the laws, enacted by an often unruly legislature, are so powerless, and in many places so weakly administered, as not to be able to prevent aggressions upon an unoffending neighbour, or to afford sufficient protection to the peaceably inclined against the hand of violence, can possibly be considered powerful. I am aware that parts of the United States ought, to a certain extent, to be looked upon as exceptions, but, generally speaking, this is by no means an over-drawn picture of what is the state of society in that part of the world.
If Great Britain was only prepared to convince theworld of her strength in steam ships, and to send forth even a portion of them from the St. Lawrence, and from other points in our valuable North American possessions, she must in a very short time destroy, or shut up in their ports, in hopeless inactivity, all the so much boasted of Navy or traders of the United States. And it might be asked—would any other power, when they saw we were really in earnest, dare to aid them in their difficulties; and what would then become of their immense commerce, from which alone they derive their present importance? Are not the feelings and interests of the Northern, Southern and inland States directly opposed to each other; and would not the continuance of the last war, for even a short time longer, have had the effect of causing discontents and divisions amongst the several States, already independent of each other, which could never again, in all human probability, have been brought in consequence to act in unison.
But to convince even the most incredulous of this, and of the kind of spirit which was found to exist amongst the people of the States, and to point out clearly with what zeal and patriotism we were opposed in the last war in the march of our troops upon Plattsburg, I have only to lay before them some Brigade orders which were issued by Sir Thomas Brisbane at the time.
"No. 5. None of the inhabitants of the country are to be prevented from passing the advanced posts either to the front or rear, from one hour after sunrise till sunset; and they are to be permitted to drive in cattle, or any thing else they may think fit; but officers commandingpicquets are to be very careful in examining those who pass; and must take up, and send to the head-quarters of the Brigade (Dowy's house) such as may appear suspicious.
"No. 7. Major-General Brisbane having received instructions to advance with the troops under his command into the territory of the United States, avails himself of the opportunity, to request that commanding officers will use every exertion to maintain the strictest discipline in their corps; and he holds them responsible, that in every instance when a complaint is made to them of any injury sustained by the inhabitants, that it is inquired into, and if necessary redressed; and whatever damage is done, that it is instantly paid for and charged against those concerned, and where this cannot be ascertained to the corps in general, so that unoffending people may not be sufferers.
"In taking the necessary precautions against individuals, who may so far forget what is due to themselves and their country, as to commit acts of plunder or violence, the Major-General is at the same time fully convinced, that the troops in general are determined, that their conduct shall not bring disgrace upon the British name; he therefore calls upon them to discover those who may be guilty of acts of plunder or oppression, that they may be brought to the punishment they merit; and the soldiers must soon find that such a line of conduct will add much to their comforts; for the inhabitants of the country finding that they are properly treated and protected, will bring every article requisite intothe camp; for those who remain quiet in their homes are not in the smallest degree to be molested, nor is their property to be taken from them without their full consent and its being paid for; as it is not against such persons that Great Britain makes war, but against the Government whose folly and ambition have brought the miseries of war into their country, and the army and individuals in arms for its support.
"The Major-General commanding has requested the magistrates of the country, to explain to the people his object and determination, on entering the American territory; and he trusts that the conduct of the soldiers will be such as to reflect no shade of dishonour on their country."
The apparent state of indifference of the people was so great, and the effects of these orders, which were widely circulated, so evident, that we found all the houses occupied, and every thing might have led us to suppose we were still marching through Canada; and I do not remember that a shot was fired at us until we fell in with some of the United States troops as we approached Plattsburg.
Owing to a want of arrangement, and of sufficient preparation on our part, we were last war unsuccessful upon Lake Champlain, and upon its shores; and I had the mortification of seeing our fleet discomfited in Plattsburg Bay. In consequence of this, and of the advanced state of the season, and as no calculations of any kind seemed to have been made for contingencies, our fine, but feebly commanded, army had to fall back upon Canada; andthe extensive and important conquests, which were supposed to have been the objects of those who ordered us to advance into the States, had to be abandoned.
The Americans pretended, that, in our retreat, they hotly pursued, and occasioned us great losses; but there was no foundation whatever for what they in this respect asserted, or for what was said on this subject in their newspapers; for our only loss, I may say, consisted in some heavy shot and an old gun, taken from the Americans, and which had been left many years before in the States when General Burgoyne's expedition failed, and which the state of the roads obliged us to throw into the swamps, and in some worthless men who deserted from their corps; for, whatever might have been said to the contrary, nothing could be more unhurried or undisturbed than we were in all our movements during the retreat. I do, however, recollect, that in crossing the bridge at Champlain with the rear-guard, on our return, that a Yankee had the impudence to say, when spoken to with civility: "I guess as how you are not playing Yankee doodle now." Some of the soldiers were inclined to have thrown him into the river, but of course this was not allowed.
I was attached as Brigade-Major to the strong brigade (about 5,000 men) of the army, which, under Sir Thomas Brisbane, formed its rear-guard, and I can safely say, that although various stratagems were practised, and every thing done by him so as to induce the American commander to approach us, he never was able to succeed. I only mention this to show what grounds theyhad for boasting. But is it not also too bad and vexatious that works written by American authors are patronized and lauded even in the United Kingdom, not so much perhaps on account of their style of composition, or literary merits, as for the subjects they contain; which are intended to extol, chiefly at the expense of our navy, fierce and lawless men, many of whom were actually British subjects? Yet who can for a moment suppose, that sending British seamen or landsmen to the other side of the Atlantic, can deprive them of their natural courage. There is, however, a degree of moral depravity existing throughout the Union, which must always prevent these extraordinary Republicans, should they even become more powerful than they are at present, from being able to cope with us in war. And in speaking of the degree of liberty enjoyed in the United States and in Great Britain, what comparison can be drawn in this respect between the two countries?—for who would prefer the tyrannical rule of a usually tumultuous Democracy to the mixed Government under which all men enjoy protection and sufficient liberty in the United Kingdoms, and all over our vast empire, without its being allowed to become licentiousness?
As for the unfinished works at Plattsburg, had not Sir George Prevost halted the troops, led by experienced and often before distinguished generals, rapidly advancing against them, they must, with their commander and all his troops, have been, I have no hesitation in saying, in twenty minutes more in our possession; but as for the idea which was foolishly entertained by some atthe time, of our being able, if successful in the assault of the works, to re-capture our lost ship and vessels, it was too absurd to merit a moment's consideration.
The following official document will, I expect, be read with interest, as it certainly removes much of the blame from Sir George Prevost for the attack having been made upon the American fleet by ours in an unprepared state; at least our Commodore (whether he was injudiciously urged to go forward or not I cannot tell) acted with a perfect knowledge of what he was about to attempt, and it would have been produced had the former been brought to a court-martial as intended. But the question should have been, why was the fine army, confided to Sir George Prevost, pushed forward at all into the United States, especially in the month of September, before our superiority on Lake Champlain had been established? Extract from a communication to Major-General De Rottenburg, dated Friday evening, 10 o'clock,P.M.:—
"I have this moment received from Captain Downie intelligence of his intention to weigh and proceed with the squadron, from its anchorage off Chazy, about midnight, with the expectation of rounding into the Bay of Plattsburg about the dawn of day, and with the intention of commencing an immediate attack on the enemy's ship, vessels, and gun-boats, if the anchorage they are in affords any chance of success; in consequence you are to hold the left division in readiness to execute the contemplated service at six o'clock to-morrow morning.
"The batteries directed to be completed and armed inthe course of the night, are to open on the enemy's position the instant the naval action has commenced. You will cause the necessary preparations to be made for the rocket service of each battery.
(Signed), "G. Prevost,"Commander of the Forces."
I shall pass this over without any remark, leaving it to the reader to judge for himself; but we had far too many commanders, for they were actually in each other's way. Here was Sir George Prevost himself, Baron De Rottenburg and his staff, a brilliant head-quarter staff, consisting of Adjutant and Quarter-master-general, assistants to both; Military Secretary, Aides-de-Camp, Chiefs of Engineers, Artillery, &c. &c., in short, enough to have caused confusion in an army three times our numbers, and much more so amongst the three brigades, whose experienced generals and staff wanted no help.
The moment the naval action commenced, the batteries, which had been constructed entirely under Sir Thomas Brisbane's directions, opened such a well-directed fire, that they apparently demolished all before them, and in a very short time nearly silenced that of the enemy's guns in their works. Under the protection of our artillery, the bridge over the Seranac, (the planks only of which the Americans in their retreat had been able to destroy or take up,) was repaired in a few minutes by materials we had ready for the purpose; part of the troops, under Sir Thomas Brisbane were moving down to pass by it to the assault, and the greater part were marching rapidly under General Sir Manley Power, andSir Frederick Robinson, with the intention of effectually cutting off the enemy's retreat, when the order from Sir George Prevost to halt arrived, in consequence of our fleet having been discomfited upon the Lake. It is, however, to be regretted that the works were not allowed to be carried, for it would have prevented much boasting, and would have served in some manner to counterbalance the loss of our vessels. But what I witnessed during the whole of this unfortunate and miscalculated business, convinced me that the enterprise which embraced, as we understood, many extensive and important objects, no doubt suggested from England, had been begun without almost any fixed plan, carried on in considerable ignorance of the country, and ultimately abandoned, because of an event, the probability of which occurring, from the state of the two fleets, might, in a great measure, have been calculated upon.
Any one of the three strong brigades into which our force was divided was sufficient alone for all we had hitherto undertaken, and also for the reduction of Plattsburg, if properly handled by an able and experienced officer: but the ideas of military matters entertained by the Generals and Staff we found in possession of power were very different from ours; and I merely mention this to shew, that until our Staff had acquired experience under the Duke of Wellington, they were in general very deficient, and, as a further proof of this, I must observe, that nothing could betray greater weakness and indecision than the manner in which it was proposed to move upon Plattsburg.
It was at first intended that we were to have had a large body of Indian warriors along with us in our invasion of the States; and Sir Thomas Brisbane, attended by his Staff and several other officers, had to go through all the customary ceremonies of war councils, speeches, dances, presents, feastings, drinkings, &c., but after all we only took them with us as far as the village of Champlain, and from thence, to my great delight, at the request of Sir Thomas Brisbane, they were sent back into Canada.
It was also intended that the whole army were to have moved in one column, by the road leading to Plattsburg, which crosses the Dead Creek, near to its mouth, where there is a bridge, and a ford a little lower down, where it enters the Lake, and there we knew the enemy had for some time been preparing to receive us. Sir Thomas Brisbane, who led the advance, not looking upon this plan as judicious, and being also fully aware of the difficulties which this Creek even naturally presented, sent me from Champlain, accompanied by some flank companies and Indian warriors, which altogether formed a strong reconnoitring party, to ascertain if a road fit for the march of troops and cannon, (of which we had lately heard), could not be found to our right, and by which the formidable position of the Dead Creek might be turned. I marched by what is called the Batemantown road, and very soon found that it had been made, even as far as Plattsburg, fit for any military purposes, at least, at that time of the year.
Sir Thomas Brisbane, at such an evident proof of wantof necessary and proper information on the part of our Staff, (for we were still strangers in the country), had almost made up his mind to allow them to take their own way and to march as they intended; but those feelings he has so often evinced for the welfare of those placed under his command, and for the good of the service; together with being convinced, that his brigade must have suffered severely in forcing the Creek, induced him to communicate in time with head-quarters on the subject, and the consequence was, that the whole arrangements were altered; his own column only marching towards the mouth of the Creek, and the other two taking the road, which, it had been ascertained, turned the enemy's position. The result was, that the Americans had to retreat upon Plattsburg without being able to offer almost any resistance; and the only loss, I may say, we did sustain was from the fire from the enemy's gun-boats stationed at the mouth of the creek, where we were obliged to ford it, as the bridge had been nearly destroyed. Sir Thomas Brisbane was anxious to have turned our field artillery against the gun-boats. But a senior general, who happened to be present, would not allow this to be done; as he said it would only the more attract the enemy's fire towards a point upon which it was already directed with right good will. He, however, at last went off, as my general had previously done with the advance towards Plattsburg, when our rocket-brigade was brought forward, and a rocket well laid by the officer commanding it, having, I believe the very first discharge, struck one gun-boat, and as we heard afterwards woundedthe officer commanding on board, and as it in its continued flight went close over most of the others, the whole took to their oars in an instant, and we were no more molested by them.
Up to this period the war had been carried on in a very irritating manner, and in some instances in a way which could produce no advantage to either party; for even sentinels on their posts were cautiously approached and fired at.
Sir Thomas Brisbane proposed to the American generals Izard and M'Combe, to put an end to such barbarities, and in future to carry on military operations in the manner adopted by European nations. This being readily agreed to by them, I did not hear of another instance of the kind occurring upon either side as long as the war lasted; indeed, this kind of polite intercourse between the generals was attended with the best results, not only amongst those under them, but also produced feelings of respect and offers of attention, if opportunity offered, after the war was over.
Neither during our expedition to Plattsburg, nor for some time afterwards were our affairs in the Lower Province well managed. Just before the closing in of the ice on the lake, and when a part of the United States fleet were still at Plattsburg, but, as we well knew, from good authority, completely off their guard, and full of that dangerous confidence often arising out of a victory too easily achieved, it was arranged to surprise and capture them by our gun-boats, and a number of batteaux manned by volunteers, of which there were hundredsfrom the regiments. The attempt was intended to have been made in the night; the soldiers in the batteaux being armed with cutlasses, pistols, and with boarding pikes, of which there were plenty at Isle aux Noix; and the following letter was addressed, by order of Sir Thomas Brisbane, by me to the lieutenant of the Navy in command of the gun-boats there; who, as it may be well supposed, being delighted at an opportunity of retaliating upon the Americans, most readily agreed to the proposal contained in it.
"St. Johns, November 12, 1814."Sir,"Major-General Brisbane has desired me to communicate the following circumstances to you, with a view to induce you to co-operate in an attack upon such of the enemy's fleet as still remain in the Bay of Plattsburg, upon which, with your assistance, it is proposed by Sir George Prevost to make the attempt."The enemy's force there, by the latest information, consists of only two sloops, and seven gun-boats, indifferently manned, and little or no attention is paid to the common measures of precaution. It is therefore natural to suppose, a sudden attack, or even surprise, might be attempted with every prospect of success."On our part we can only employ batteaux for this enterprise, manned by volunteers from the regiments, in such numbers as you would think necessary to act along with your gun boats; and the strength of your crews could be increased if you require it. Of course, thewhole will be under your direction, and success must depend upon secrecy, rapid preparation and action."Major-General Brisbane, therefore, begs you will ascertain if the report of the strength and number of vessels in Plattsburg Bay be correct, and at all events, he requests that you will lose no time in coming here to arrange matters, or should you not think such an undertaking practicable, you will be so good as to point out in what the difficulties consist. It is, however, obvious, that when affairs of this nature are once proposed, the sooner they are carried into execution the better, or else entirely laid aside."
"St. Johns, November 12, 1814."Sir,
"Major-General Brisbane has desired me to communicate the following circumstances to you, with a view to induce you to co-operate in an attack upon such of the enemy's fleet as still remain in the Bay of Plattsburg, upon which, with your assistance, it is proposed by Sir George Prevost to make the attempt.
"The enemy's force there, by the latest information, consists of only two sloops, and seven gun-boats, indifferently manned, and little or no attention is paid to the common measures of precaution. It is therefore natural to suppose, a sudden attack, or even surprise, might be attempted with every prospect of success.
"On our part we can only employ batteaux for this enterprise, manned by volunteers from the regiments, in such numbers as you would think necessary to act along with your gun boats; and the strength of your crews could be increased if you require it. Of course, thewhole will be under your direction, and success must depend upon secrecy, rapid preparation and action.
"Major-General Brisbane, therefore, begs you will ascertain if the report of the strength and number of vessels in Plattsburg Bay be correct, and at all events, he requests that you will lose no time in coming here to arrange matters, or should you not think such an undertaking practicable, you will be so good as to point out in what the difficulties consist. It is, however, obvious, that when affairs of this nature are once proposed, the sooner they are carried into execution the better, or else entirely laid aside."
This well arranged attack, which, if successful, would have greatly improved our situation upon the Lake the following spring, had the war lasted, was, however, put a stop to only a few hours before the departure of the expedition, by an express from the General commanding the forces, who had become apprehensive that the attempt was too hazardous.
I am induced to continue this subject for various reasons, but principally because much that occurred during the last war in North America, is at this moment becoming interesting; and useful conclusions, in both a naval and military point of view, may be drawn from what has already taken place there.
After the disappointment to our hopes of retaliating upon it, the whole of the enemy's fleet were laid up for the winter at Whitehall, at the head of Lake Champlain. It was again proposed by Sir Thomas Brisbane, and agreed to by Sir George Prevost, to destroy them by an expeditionof five thousand men, which were to have started suddenly under the orders of the former, to be conveyed to the point of attack, with their supplies of provisions, and combustibles for destroying the ships, &c. over the ice and snow in sledges. This also, from the excellent information we had been able to procure, held out every prospect of complete success; but the same timid councils again prevailed, and this second, but much more important expedition, when about to start, was almost similarly countermanded; and the disappointment was particularly felt by us, for several of the regiments which were to have been employed in this enterprise, formed part of the force which was not long after assembled under Sir Thomas Brisbane at Paris, and when the Duke of Wellington inspected it, he was pleased to say, that had these fine regiments (and they amounted to nearly nine thousand men) been in time for Waterloo, the Prussians would not have been wanted upon that occasion. I must also add, that most of these corps had been formed and accustomed to war under his Grace in Portugal, Spain, and the south of France; and having been found at the end of the war to be the most efficient of the army, they had been at once ordered off to North America, where, from the way in which things were managed, they had not the power of farther distinguishing themselves.
But I could, if necessary, show that at last we would have completely effected our object in destroying the American fleet at Whitehall; but in a very different manner, and which, from the share I had in the transaction,and from the secrecy I thus feel imposed upon me, I do not consider myself at liberty to disclose, and which the notification of peace with the United States alone prevented. At that moment it was quite evident that the effects of the war had begun to be most seriously felt; and it was also an expensive, and as the Duke of Wellington would pronounce it to be,a useless little warfor Great Britain to be so long engaged in. If we are again provoked to hostilities, which is very probable, the people of the United States should be made to feel what are the effects of a war carried on in earnest in their own country, by such a powerful empire as Great Britain; but for this our navy and army must be properly prepared.
I have for several years past given the subject of our Boundaries with the United States much consideration, and I have endeavoured to obtain, by all the means I could bring to my aid, a correct view of it; but what has been published in the "Times," of the 27th of April, and 26th of May, 1840, as communications from Mr. Waddilove to the Editor, puts the whole of that long misunderstood question, in so much clearer a light than what I had prepared for this work (though I had come nearly to the same conclusion) that I hope I shall be excused for giving them in this place.
THE TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
[TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.]
Extract from the definitive treaty of peace and friendship between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, signed at Paris, September, 3, 1783.
The first article recognizes the several States.
The second proceeds as follows:—
"And that all disputes which might arise in future on the subject of the boundaries of the said United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared that the following are and shall be their boundaries viz.,—from the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix to the highlands, along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north-western-most head of the Connecticut River, thence down along the middle of that river to the 45th degree of north latitude."
"If it can be shown, as it easily may, that there existed a then known tract of country called "the Highlands," which had been in use in former official documents, and which did separate the river flowing south into the Atlantic Ocean from others flowing into the St. Lawrence and into the St. John, which emptied itself into the Bay of Fundy, not into the Atlantic Ocean,—if also the documents of the period show that it was a leading object with Great Britain to preserve to their dependenciesthe exclusive navigation of the river St. John, and that the river St. Croix, and the line drawn north from it to the said highlands, were fixed as boundaries to the land conceded to the States, for the purpose of securing this exclusive possession,—if it can be shown that a tract of country so circumstanced was one of the concessions specially objected by Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, Lord North, and Mr. Sheridan, in the debates upon the peace (wherein upon a division, the numbers were, against the Ministry 224, in favour 208), under the name Penobscot, the principal river of the tract, which, with its tributary streams did rise on the south side of these highlands, and did fall into the Atlantic Ocean—if, too, as appears from all these circumstances, the district now called Maine, was no other than the district ceded to Massachusetts, under the name Penobscot, the very objections made by these leading oppositionists afford the strongest possible proof that the claims of an additional extent now made by Maine and Massachusetts were unjust and unreasonable, and more palpably absurd and untenable, when it is considered, that with a view to obtaining a right to the navigation of the St. John, the negociators did actually endeavour to obtain the portion of country lying between the St. Croix—the St. Croix line and the St John, then first attached to the government of Nova Scotia—and that the secret articles of Congress prove it to have been a subject of debate, whether the war should be continued on account of such additional territory, (a question which was decided in the negative). The very contest about the navigation of the St. John, also is in itself a proof ofthe unsoundness of the claim, for it would be of little value to shut out the mouth of the St. John, and the extent of its course cut off by the St. Croix, and the northern line, if, by allowing America possessions beyond the then known highlands, you had conceded a territory connecting them with the St. John; and such would be the case by allowing the extension of their settlements beyond the highlands to the Aristook. I take it this fact of itself is sufficient to prove the injustice of the claim.
"Moreover, the district so conceded, under the name Penobscot, and which is no other than the present Maine, does actually fulfil the special conditions laid down in the second article. It includes all the rivers which flow from the highlands, and fall into the Atlantic, and includes no other, and after crossing these said highlands, not one river, except the St. John, does flow south towards the Atlantic, except as a tributary stream of the St. John, through the Bay of Fundy.
"Neither can it be said that these tracts were then as little known at the conclusion of a war, in which every part had been traversed, as they have been to later Colonial Ministers, for the Government of that day met the objections made to the cession of Penobscot in this way:—One objector had stated that it ought not to have been ceded by a maritime state, on account of the wonderful supply of excellent timber for masts which it was known to afford. In opposition to which, the Minister stated, "that it was proved by the certificate of Captain Twiss, one of the ablest surveyors in the service, that there was not a tree in the tract capable of making a mast."
"And one leading member of the Opposition, condemning the neglect of Government in not making terms for the deserted loyalists, who had forfeited their property by adhering to Great Britain, put his question in these terms—"Could not all the surrenders we were to make—the surrender of New York, the surrender of Charleston, of Long Island, Staten Island, Penobscot, and Savanna, purchase security for these meritorious persons?" Now, how much stronger would have been the argument, if the cession of Penobscot had not been limited, as the British boundary line limits it, by the highlands, but had extended further, so as to entitle the States to the waters of the St. John, and enable them to cut off the communication between Canada and Nova Scotia? He adds also, that the inhabitants of these very places were armed with us in the defence of their estates, and therefore we can only attribute the rise of Maine as a State to the circumstance of Massachusetts becoming possessed of the confiscated estates of Penobscot, the boundaries of the state of Massachusetts having previously been in a direct line from the Connecticut River to the Bay of Passamaquoddy.
"That the description given in the treaty of 1783, Art. 2,—'A line drawn due north from the heads of the St. Croix to the highlands, along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean,' was a description known and acknowledged in 1783 both to American and British commanders and negotiators, is proved by the fact of that description being used not only in the act of 1774, but in the Royal proclamation of 1763.And this point is confirmed by another fact—viz. the movement of a detachment of the American army under Colonel Arnold for the invasion of Canada from the side of New England, while General Montgomerie invaded it by the upper side and the lakes, in September, 1775, in not more than seven years before the preliminaries of peace; and it is also to be observed that no part of Arnold's route came near the northern ridge of highland to which the Americans lay claim, and which in fact does not divide the rivers falling into the St. Lawrence from those falling into the Atlantic Ocean, but only divides those falling into the St. Lawrence from those falling into the St. John; whereas the ridge claimed by Britain, referred to in the 14th George III., 1774, and in the Royal proclamation of 1763, does actually separate all the rivers flowing southward into the Atlantic from all the rivers which flow north and north-east, whether they fall into the St. Lawrence or into the St. John; and further, upon the north side of the ridge claimed by Britain as the bound there does not rise a single river which falls into the Atlantic, while all the rivers rising on the south of the British boundary do fall into the Atlantic. It is a long passage to copy, but the whole may give your readers a better notion of the country traversed than were I merely to transcribe the passage which proves my point. Under that passage I shall therefore place a score:—
"'On the 22d of September, 1775, Arnold embarked upon the Kennebec (one of the rivers rising on the south of the British ridge, and flowing towards the Atlantic), in 200 batteaux, and proceeded with great difficulty up thatriver, having a rapid stream, with a rocky bottom and shores, continually interrupted by falls and carrying places, with numberless other impediments to encounter. In this passage the batteaux were frequently filled with water, or overset, in consequence of which arms, ammunition, and stores were lost to a great extent. At the numerous carrying places, besides the labour of loading and reloading, they were obliged to convey the boats on their shoulders. The great carrying place was above 12 miles across. That part of the detachment which was not employed in the batteaux marched along the banks of the river, and the boats and men being disposed in three divisions, each division encamped together every night. Nor was the march by land more eligible than the passage by water. They had thick woods, deep swamps, difficult mountains, and precipices, alternately to encounter, and were at times obliged to cut their way for miles through the thickets. The constant fatigue and labour caused many to fall sick, which added to their difficulties, and provisions became at length so scarce, that some of the men ate their dogs, and whatever else of any kind which could be converted into food.
"'Arriving at the head of the Kennebec, they sent back their sick, and one of their colonels took that opportunity of returning with his division, without the knowledge or consent of the Commander-in-Chief. By this desertion Arnold's detachment was reduced about one-third: they, however, proceeded with their usual constancy:and having crossed the Heights of Land, as a ridge that extends quite through that continent is called, andfrom whence the waters on either side take courses directly contrary to those on the other, they at length arrived at the head of the Chaudiere, which, running through Canada,falls into the River St. Lawrence near Quebec. Their difficulties were now growing to an end, and they soon approached the inhabited parts of Canada; on the 3d of November a party, which they had pushed forward, returned with provisions, and they soon after came to a house, being the first they had beheld for 31 days, having spent the whole time in traversing a hideous wilderness, without meeting anything human.'
"Now, here you have, in the report of a campaign made by an American general eight years before the peace, viz. in 1775, and printed in an EnglishAnnual Registerfive years before the peace, viz. 1799, as direct a reference to the same marked distinction of rivers flowing different ways, in consequence of the peculiar nature of the country, as it is possible to desire; and you have an acknowledgment,totidem verbis, that the then known designation of such tract was no other than that used in the article of the subsequent treaty, as it had been also used in the 14th of George III. by the British Legislature and in the Royal proclamation of 1763, and upon examining any map, that of the Useful Knowledge Society or any other, it will be seen that all the rivers rising on the south side of the British boundary do fulfil the terms of the above treaty, and that all on the other, or north side, do, as the above account of Arnold's march expresses it, 'take courses directly contrary.' The rivers on the south side flow towards the Atlantic Ocean, not one onthe other side does flow towards it—in itself the most indisputable proof that the American claim cannot stand with those words of the article which assign to them only that tract of territory wherein the rivers flow towards and 'fall into the Atlantic Ocean.'
"I may here remark, that as the proclamation of 1763 is the earliest reference I know to these highlands so dividing the rivers, and as that proclamation proceeds from west to east, and as General Arnold found at the west end the peculiar marks required, the only really amicable, and perhaps the only certain, mode of ascertaining the bound, would be not to start on a loose cruise for highlands at the line of St. Croix, which can itself only be determined by its abutment with the specified highlands (in fact, I believe this loose and hand-over-head mode of proceeding has produced all the difficulty), but to start the search where General Arnold crossed, and run the line eastward according to the direction of the rivers, giving all the territory wherein 'the rivers fall into the Atlantic,' as by the treaty, to America, that wherein 'the rivers flow the contrary way' to Britain; for with this report of General Arnold's march seven years before under our view, it is impossible to believe that General Washington would have sanctioned a reference to so marked a distinction as these so-called 'highlands' in one sense, while he meant, in future times, the reference to be interpreted in another. Viewing the matter according to these lights, which is the only just mode of viewing it, as a case between Christians, Penobscot, the cession of which was reprobated in the British Parliament at the time(and when many officers who had been employed in Canada and in the States were present in both Houses), does fulfil the terms required by the treaty—namely, it embraces all the rivers which, rising on the south of Arnold's ridge, flow towards and 'fall into the Atlantic Ocean;' whereas, neither the boundary claimed by America nor the line set out by the King of Holland as a fair compromise, acceded to by the sufferer, Britain, and refused by the gainer, America, can in any wise be said to meet.
"I know not, Sir, whether you will think these remarks, and this information, upon a question likely to terminate in a war, or a disgraceful concession of the just rights of the British nation, may be useful or acceptable to you; but, such as they are, you are welcome to them, and may use them as you please; and allow me at the same time to add, there are other parts of the history of the same period which would cast considerable light upon the present extraordinary proceedings of the British Government in regard to Canada.
"I have the honour to remain, Sir,"Your obedient servant,"W.J.D. Waddilove."
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
"My intention is now to show you, from a document already quoted, the Royal proclamation of 1763, a further confirmation that the division expressed, 'Rivers falling one way, and rivers falling directly contrary into the Atlantic,' was a distinction perfectly well understood, and that this peculiar expression being applicable to"Penobscot," was the probable reason why that district was ceded in 1783, and many tribes of Indians driven from a hunting ground previously enjoyed, under the protection of the British Crown. If I recollect right, some influential member of the opponents of Lord Shelburne's peace stated in debate, that above 20 tribes, whom we were bound by previous treaties and wampum belts to protect, were driven from their homes by this unnecessary cession, for it may be here remarked that one uniform condition of all treaties with that ill-used race of men, by whomsoever made (Sir W. Johnson or others), was this—for the sole purpose of guarding themselves against the wanton aggression of the settlers, provided the tracts ceded be always appropriated to His Majesty's sole use, and that the lines be run in the presence of the British authority, and some of their own chiefs, to prevent disputes hereafter.
"The 11th clause of the proclamation, evidently with a view to this feeling on the part of the Indians, runs thus. After setting out the limits and grants, &c. in the previous part of the instrument (binding upon America, as well as upon ourselves, except where they may be specifically relieved from its effect by the express words of the treaty of 1783, since they were at the time British subjects) we read—
"'Whereas, it is just and reasonable, and essential to our interest andthe security of ourcolonies (the States then included), that the several nations or tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbedin the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by, us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their hunting grounds; we do therefore, with the advice of our Privy Council, declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that no governor or commander-in-chief, in any of our colonies, Quebec, &c. do presume, upon any pretence whatever, to grant warrants of survey, or pass any patents for lands beyond the bounds of their respective governments, as described in their commissions.' Now mark: 'As also that no governor or commander-in-chief of our colonies or plantations in Americado presumefor the present, and until our further pleasure be known, to grant warrants of survey, or pass patents,for any lands beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic Oceanfrom the west or north-west, or upon any lands whatever, which not having been ceded to, or purchased by, us, as aforesaid,are reserved to the said Indians or any of them.' Now, will any man of common reflection say, that under such circumstances, known to all our governors and commanders-in-chief, of course also to all engaged in the internal legislation of the plantations, there could be any obscurity to admit of dispute in the reference made to this precise mark of distinction—'beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers falling into the Atlantic?' the same mark being again referred to in the Imperial Act 14th George III., 1774, in nearly the same words, only adding 'the highlands,' &c., dividing, &c., again expressly described in the account of General Arnold'smarch over the very country; and lastly, briefly referred to in the treaty of 1783, the very brevity and looseness of the expression being the strongest possible proof of the notoriety of such division and landmark. I confess, Sir, I cannot divine any mode of escape from the dilemma in which the sticklers for this unreasonable claim are placed—either to recede from what is palpably an unjust pretence, or to stamp Washington, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jay as the most consummate knaves, adopting a loose phraseology to escape at a future time from the effects of their own treaty. To the latter alternative no Englishman acquainted with the history of Washington's glorious, and—except in one point, too stern an adherence to what he conceived to be justice-unblemished career, will ever be disposed to accede.
"The next point on which I engaged to remark was the probable reason which induced Lord Shelburne to cede a country which the Indians had possessed, and thereby drive so many tribes from their homes, and the tombs of their ancestors, to them a heavier blow than any other That the Indians did possess it, is proved not only by the statement in the Imperial Parliament, but also by the fact of sundry raids occasionally made by them from this tract upon the settlers of Nova Scotia, known to be at that time altogether confined to the region about Pasamaquoddy Bay, which now forms the southern part of New Brunswick.
"Now the clause which I have quoted above I conceive to afford that probable reason. The governors, &c. arerestricted not to grant warrants of survey on any pretence 'beyond the heads and sources of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic.' Though I believe it admits a question whether any patents were passed extending the British settlements beyond the 45th degree of north latitude, for the old geographers carry the line along that degree to the Bay of Pasamaquoddy, and bound Massachusetts on the west by New Hampshire—though the description of General Arnold's march is a traverse of a wild wilderness, wherein 'human face divine' seems never to have been seen, yet this clause most decidedly leaves a discretion in the Governor of Massachusetts, when population required it, to extend his surveys and his patents as far north as the heads of those rivers which fall into the Atlantic. The district now called Maine, then Penobscot, is exactly a tract so situated, and, whatever might have been the original intentions of the Crown as regarded the Indians within this tract, the discretion so given formed a just and proper reason, when peace was to be established, why the territory so described should be ceded to the United States, and that very cession of a country so circumstanced affords the strongest possible confirmation that 'the heads and sources of the rivers falling into the Atlantic' literally were the limits referred to in 1783, and that no just claim can be made out in the face of this evidence to a territory in which, by the confession of General Arnold's march, the rivers fall 'the contrary way.' I shall not trouble you further. A war founded on unjust aggression can never expect God's blessing upon it. Acalm produced by concession to unjust aggression can never end in lasting peace.
"'If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter, for he that is higher than the highest regardeth." Eccles. v. 8.
I remain, Sir, your obedient servant.W.J.D. Waddilove."Beacon Grange, April 28."
After Great Britain had acknowledged the independence of the several States, if the true spirit of this treaty were not to be strictly adhered to, it must have been obvious at the time, that it would be impossible for her to defend her remaining North American possessions; much less be able at any future period to make them sufficiently powerful to cope with the United States. But surely with the Treaty, and the various documents alluded to by Mr. Waddilove, in their hands, a commission, composed of able military men, sent out to that part of the world, could so well define the boundary between the two countries, as to leave no further doubts upon the minds of our Government, as to the line of conduct to be with justice pursued towards the United States and also towards our North American possessions; and they would then be enabled also to act with that firmness and decision with which these republicans should be met in all our dealings with them. The idea of umpires ought not for a moment be tolerated—the treaty and the features of the country render them quite unnecessary. Without havingany ambitious views, Great Britain evidently wants this disputed territory, if it were only for the security of her North American Provinces; and it might reasonably be expected that this point could be amicably arranged, if there is a sincere wish for peace, and any thing like good will towards us to be found in the United States. If therefore we are provoked to war, by simply working on both flanks of any body of troops hazarded by the States into the country alluded to, their fate may be pretty easily guessed or calculated upon; for we could have no difficulty in acting at once from Quebec, Halifax, &c.; and if hereafter emigration from the United Kingdom were duly and liberally encouraged, as it should be, into a country rightfully belonging to the British Empire, abounding in small lakes and fine rivers, we might soon begin to talk not only of our valuable but also of our powerful American colonies; especially if convicts, in place of being all sent to New Holland, were employed to make good roads to connect the countries lying between the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence. These convicts should never upon any account be allowed to become settlers.
Having so far entered upon the subject, I think I ought to proceed in what I hope may be useful; and whilst I speak from observations made upon the spot, I must take the liberty of reminding the reader that during the period occupied by "improvements" in the States; the Canadas, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, &c., though somewhat retarded by late events, have not been standing still.
The country behind the line running from Lake St. Francis, to Lake Memphremagog, ought as soon as possible to be secured from sudden incursions, by a few respectable forts, or strong redoubts; capable of affording good cover for a certain number of cavalry and infantry; situations for which, upon or close to the present frontier, can be found, so that that entrance into Lower Canada may be covered. The line mentioned being taken as a base, and Isle aux Noix, Ash Island, and the part of the frontier extending along from the La Colle river towards Lake St. Francis being judiciously protected, the Lower Province would thus be secured from the inroads of brigands from the adjoining States; and if they, or if even an army should venture forward in that direction, it would not be quite easy for them to return; especially if the redoubts I speak of, are by the labour of soldiers made strong enough to require a week's regular siege for their capture, and which might be scientifically thrown up at no great expense. They should, however, be connected with each other by military roads; the making of which, as well as constructing the redoubts, would be excellent practice for the regular troops I am so anxious to have called out; who could never be better employed, (for habits of labour are essential to them,) than in works of this kind; and I hope I have already shown, that veterans are quite unfit for the duties of our North American frontiers.
The thick, in some places, almost impassable woods and swamps, extending often for a considerable distance along the frontier line of the Lower Province, render itdifficult to make arrangements to oppose inroads from the States; for it is impossible to calculate upon the direction in which an enemy's force may make its appearance, and in order to watch all the roads or approaches, especially in winter, our troops must necessarily be too much scattered over the country; for owing to want of cover, they cannot be kept in sufficient bodies, but so far to the rear as to expose the advanced posts to be overpowered and cut off.
The following documents, which appear to be official, will show clearly, that I have not without good reason made the foregoing observations respecting the state of our affairs with the United States, and which call for energetic measures on our part.
"MILITARY AND NAVAL PREPARATIONS ON OUR NORTHERN FRONTIERS.
"The Chair submitted the following message from the President of the United States:—
"TO THE SENATE.
"I communicate to the Senate, in compliance with their resolution of the 12th instant, a report from the Secretary of War, containing information on the subject of that resolution.
"M. Van Buren."Washington, March 28."
"War Department, March 27.
"Sir,—The resolution of the Senate of the 12th inst. 'That the President of the United States be requested to communicate to the Senate, if in his judgment compatiblewith the public interest, any information which may be in the possession of the Government, or which can be conveniently obtained, of the military and naval preparations of the British authorities on the northern frontiers of the United States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean, designating the permanent from the temporary and field works, and particularly noting those which are within the claimed limits of the United States,' having been referred by you to this department, it was immediately referred to Major-General Scott, and other officers who have been stationed on the frontier referred to, for such information on the subject as they possessed, and could readily procure; and an examination is now in progress for such as may be contained in the files of the department. General Scott is the only officer yet heard from, and a copy of his report is herewith submitted, together with a copy of that to which he refers, made upon the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant. As soon as the other officers who have been called upon are heard from, and the examination of the files of the department is completed, any further information which may be thus acquired will be immediately laid before you.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,"J.R. Poinsett.
"To the President of the United States."
"Head Quarters, Eastern Division, Elizabethtown, New Jersey, March 23, 1840.
"Sir,—I have received from your office, copies of tworesolutions, passed respectively, the 12th and 9th instant, one by the Senate, and the other by the House of Representatives; and I am asked for 'any information on the subject of both, or either of the resolutions, that may be in [my] possession.'
"In respect to the naval force recently maintained upon the American lakes by Great Britain, I have just had the honour to report to the Secretary of War, by whom the resolution of the House of Representatives (of the 9th instant) was directly referred to me.
"I now confine myself to the Senate's resolution, respecting 'military (I omit naval) preparations of the British authorities on the northern frontiers of the United States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean, distinguishing the permanent from the temporary and field works, and particularly noting those which are within the claimed limits of the United States.'
"I will here remark, that however well my duties have made me acquainted with the greater part of the line in question, I have paid but slight attention to the forts and barracks erected by the British authorities near the borders of Maine, above Fredericton, in New Brunswick, or in Upper Canada, above Cornwall, being of the fixed opinion which need not here be developed, that all such structures would be of little or no military value to either of the parties in the event of a new war between the United States and Great Britain.
"I was last summer at the foot of Lake Superior, and neither saw nor heard of any British fort or barrack on the St. Mary's River, the outlet of that lake.
"Between Lakes Huron and Erie the British have three sets of barracks—one at Windsor, opposite to Detroit; one at Sandwich, a little lower down; and the third at Malden, 18 miles from the first; all built of sawed logs, strengthened by block-houses, loopholes, &c. Malden has been a military post, with slight defences. These have been recently strengthened. The works at Sandwich and Windsor have also, I think, been erected within the last six or eight months.
"Near the mouth of the Niagara the British have two small forts—George and Messisanga. Both existed during the last war. The latter may be termed a permanent work. Slight barracks have been erected within the last two years on the same side, near the Falls, and at Chippawa, with breast works at the latter place; but nothing, I believe, above the works first named, on the Niagara, which can be termed a fort.
"Since the commencement of the recent troubles in the Canadas, and (consequent thereupon) within our limits, Fort William Henry, at Kingston, and Fort Wellington (opposite Ogdensburg old works,) have both been strengthened within themselves, besides the addition of dependencies. These forts may be called permanent.
"On the St. Lawrence, below Prescott, and confronting our territory, I know of no other military post; 12 miles above, at Brockville, there may be temporary barracks and breastworks. I know that of late Brockville has been a military station.
"In the system of defences on the approaches to Montreal, the Isle Aux Noix, a few miles below our line, and in the outlet of Lake Champlain, stands at the head. This island contains within itself a system of permanent works of great strength. On them the British Government has, from time to time, since the peace of 1815, expended much skill and labour.
"Odletown, near our line, on the western side of Lake Champlain, has been a station for a body of Canadian militia for two years, to guard the neighbourhood from refugee incendiarism from our side. I think that barracks have been erected there for the accommodation of those troops, and also at a station, with the like object, near Alburgh, in Vermont.
"It is believed that there are no important British forts or extensive British barracks, on our borders, from Vermont to Maine.
"In respect to such structures on the disputed territory, Governor Fairfield's published letters contain fuller information than has reached me through any other channel. I have heard of no new military preparations by the British authorities on the St Croix or Pasamaquoddy Bay.
"Among such preparations, perhaps I ought not to omit the fact that Great Britain, besides numerous corps of well-organized and well instructed militia, has at this time within her North American provinces more than 20,000 of her best regular troops. The whole of those forces might be brought to the verge of our territory in afew days. Two-thirds of that regular force has arrived out since the spring of 1838.
"I remain, Sir, with great respect,"Your most obedient servant,"Winfield Scott."Brigadier General R. Jones, Adjutant-GeneralUnited States Army."
BRITISH ARMED VESSELS ON THE LAKES.
"The papers on this subject submitted to Congress by the President, in compliance with a resolution of the House, show that at the close of navigation last fall, two steamers (owned or hired by the British authorities), one schooner, and a number of barges, were employed on Lake Ontario, and the river St. Lawrence, as a security against an apprehended renewal of the troubles of the preceding year; and from the annexed communication of Mr. Forsyth, there is reason to expect that even this small force, or at least a part of it, will be soon withdrawn."
"Department of State, Washington, March 13.
"The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, requesting the President to communicate to that body, 'if compatible with the public service, whether the Government of Great Britain have expressed to the Government of the United States a desire to annul the arrangements entered into betweenthe two Governments in the month of April, 1817, respecting the naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes; and that, if said arrangements be not annulled, whether there has been any violation of the same by the authorities of Great Britain,' has the honour to report to the President a copy of the only communication on file in this department on the subject to which the resolution refers. Prior to the date of that communication, the Secretary of State, in an interview invited for that purpose, called Mr. Fox's attention to the disregard by Her Majesty's colonial authorities of the conventional arrangement between the two countries, as to the extent of naval armaments upon the lakes.
"In the autumn of the past year the Secretary of State made known verbally to Mr. Fox, that the cause assigned in his note no longer existing, the President expected that the British armament upon the lakes would be placed upon the footing prescribed by the convention. Mr. Fox engaged to communicate without delay to his Government the substance of the conversation between them: and expressed his own conviction, that if the winter then ensuing passed without renewed attempts to disturb the tranquillity of the Canadas, there could be no sufficient motive for either Government maintaining a force beyond that authorized by the convention of 1817.
"All of which is respectfully submitted."John Forsyth.
"To the President of the United States."
The instructions which were deemed expedient to be given to Colonel Sir William Williams of the 13th Regiment, commanding Isle aux Noix and its dependencies in 1814, after we lost the superiority on Lake Champlain, will clearly show that what I have proposed should be seriously considered; and also support my opinion of the necessity of establishing the fortresses I have mentioned, in which troops could at all times be comfortably quartered; indeed, with such neighbours as the Americans, our possessions can never be safe from insult without them.
"St John's, November 9, 1814."Sir,
"I am commanded by Major-General Brisbane to transmit, for your guidance, the following instructions, which are to be acted upon as far as circumstances will permit, in case of an attack upon any of the advanced posts; not that the Major-General has reason to conclude the enemy have such an object in view; but the confusion always arising out of unexpected occurrences in time of war, must as far as possible be avoided or guarded against; and you ought also to be aware of his intentions in case of such events happening.
"1st. The enemy appearing in force in the direction of Caldwell's Manor, coming from Missisquoi Bay.
"It is not probable that the enemy would appear in that direction with any other intention, but for a demonstration, unless he came with the determination of attacking Isle aux Noix, in which case it is to be expected he will bring with him, if before the frost sets in, the means of water conveyance on the south river, or if afterwards,means of transport for heavy guns on the ice. His intentions, therefore, in these respects can be easily ascertained. If the former should be his object, a force must be detached into the Manor, or the concessions, (say five companies under a field-officer) to keep him in check, and to prevent the country from being over-run and plundered; this may in a great measure be effected by the choice of favourable situations or positions, but no general affair must be permitted without the consent of the Major-General.
"Whilst the enemy might be thus manœuvring, a real attack would likely take place on the line of the La Colle and Ash Island. Such an attack is not improbable, although the enemy could have no other object in view but to beat up our cantonments, and cause the troops, in some measure, to take the field exposed to the inclemency of the season, and might be effected with only a small part of his force. The whole of the posts upon that line must be ordered to hold out till reinforcements can arrive from this place; for until then it would not be safe to detach but small parties from the garrison of Isle aux Noix. A force from L'Acadie could only be brought up in support of the bridge. La Colle Mill and its dependencies must look to Isle aux Noix alone for assistance.
"2ndly, If the enemy should come with the intention of attacking Isle aux Noix with heavy guns, a certain time is requisite for him to make his arrangements; and measures could be taken on our part to frustrate his views.
"For some time longer, it is in the enemy's power tomake an attack by means of his fleet, upon Ash Island and La Colle, in conjunction with a force acting in Caldwell's Manor; the necessity therefore, of keeping the guns in battery there, as long as possible, even till the frost sets in, must be obvious.
"It is not probable that the enemy might venture to pass Isle aux Noix entirely, and move down the Richlieu at once upon this place; which might perhaps be the case, if collecting a sufficient force, he should meditate the invasion of the Lower Province. Under such circumstances, the posts on the La Colle might be greatly exposed. It would then be for you to act powerfully on his line of operations; and as most likely, in such a case, your communications with the advanced posts might be attempted to be cut off, it would therefore be advisable, after destroying the road from the Mill to La Colle bridge, to withdraw the troops from the former and Ash Island (after destroying the works) to Isle aux Noix, which would place at your disposal sufficient means to annoy an invading army. Of course the Burtonville road from the bridge would be disputed to the utmost.
"3rd. The enemy appearing in force in Odletown.
"This is not likely to happen until the frost sets in; and could only have in view the occupation of the posts of the La Colle and Ash Island; objects of the first importance to us to prevent; and an attack on that side in force must distract us much more than in the direction of Caldwell's Manor, and in this case it would be reasonable to expect a diversion on the right bank of the river, or even if the enemy has sufficient force, a dash down theSouth river upon the Isle aux Noix, which would make it hazardous to detach much from it for the support of the advance before the troops from this can arrive; yet a force could be easily, at this season, brought up to support the bridge of La Colle, which is in itself no position to be held against cannon; but the entrance of the Burtonville road is very favourable for light troops and if they are judiciously posted there, it would be next to impossible for the enemy to force a passage in that direction, and it is not very likely such an attempt would be made; the danger rests in La Colle Mill being taken, by which means we might be forced to retire back on the road to L'Acadie, whereby the troops intrusted with the defence of that entrance would be totally deprived of cover.
"Lastly. Any advance of the enemy upon us could deviate but little from what has been stated in numbers one, two, and three, with any chance of success; it must, therefore, be evident throughout the whole, that the arrival of reinforcements from the rear is the primary object; it, upon this account, becomes essential, that the Major-General should receive the earliest possible intelligence of the appearance of the enemy in any direction, and he, therefore, desires me to request, that in any instructions you may give to the officers in command of the advanced posts,sending immediate informationof suspicious movements in their front may be held up to them as of the first importance.
"I am also to acquaint you, that we do not, at present, possess, at St. John's, more means than wouldenable us to move one regiment at a time up the river Richlieu to your assistance."
No doubt, since 1814, the number of roads from the States into the Canadas have been considerably increased, which must render it still more difficult, without the redoubts I speak of, to make arrangements for the protection of the country; I hope, however, that what has been said, and what are shown to be the difficulties to be met with and overcome, together with the anxiety evinced on the part of the American Government, as to any preparations we may have made in case of a war, to which they evidently look forward, will receive timely and serious consideration, but in any future contest with the United States, the command of Lake Champlain ought instantly to be acquired; and our superiority in war steamers upon all the Lakes cannot possibly be dispensed with, if these fine and valuable provinces of the empire are to be protected from inroads, and consequent devastation; and such is my opinion of the loyalty of the people in general of the Canadas, and even of the Canadians of the French extraction in the Lower Province, if not allowed to be misled by designing men, that, I am convinced, they would readily contribute towards their own defence, rather than be brought under the democratical rule of the United States.
If the whole of our North American territories had arrived at a certain point, when an increased, educated, and intelligent population, and improved resources, had made it safe for them as one nation, to be allowedentirely to manage their own affairs without any interference on the part of the mother country, and that they really desired to do so, Great Britain ought readily to comply with their wishes, yet still remaining their friend and protector, and receiving, in return, every commercial advantage; but to abandon them in their present weak and distracted state, as some men have ignorantly talked of, and even recommended, would only be throwing them into the power of ourfriendlyneighbours, who, thus strengthened, and we proportionally weakened, might, to a certain degree, become more formidable.
I beg, however, to ask, why is Great Britain become, as it were, timid, or reluctant to declare, that no act nor pretensions on the part of the United States can give them a right to incorporate British subjects into their Union without the consent of our Government; and why is it not made known, by proclamation, or otherwise, all over the world, that British-born subjects have no right to renounce, and that they can never be looked upon as having renounced, in whatever part of the world they may think fit to reside, their allegiance to their Queen; and that if any of them are taken in arms on land, or upon the seas, fighting against their countrymen, they shall be tried and condemned as traitors, and become liable to be punished as such. It may probably be said, that in case of a war, this would render desperate many thousands of our seamen now navigating the United States' ships at high rates of wages, and would cause those in their ships of war tofight with a halter about their necks. This might, perhaps, be the case at first with a few of the worthless; but let our seamen be offered the same, or even higher wages than they can receive in the ships of war of the States, or in those of any other country, and I cannot, for a moment believe, that brave men, the descendants of many of those who fought with Nelson, and our other renowned naval chiefs, will abandon their country, though it may have shown itself, perhaps, ungrateful to them or their fathers for former services.
But surely it ought to be high time for us to consider the effects produced by our now rather too long triedreciprocal system of tradewith other nations, in which I have never heard, that we had been fairly met, nor do I believe we ever will be met by any of them. Let us, therefore, lay aside for the moment, the wild, and to the generality of men, incomprehensible theories, clothed in the mystical jargon of political economists; and permit me to ask any man of common sense, where reciprocity is to be found in the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and the United States? I suppose reciprocity to mean, in this instance, mutual benefits conferred and received.
A few years ago—and I am not aware of any important change having since taken place—Great Britain professed her principles as regarded reciprocity to be,—"To abolish all discriminating duties affecting the like productions of foreign countries, and in lieu thereof to establish one uniform Tariff for the whole.