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[Footnote 1:Tattvavais'âradîandYogavârttika, I. 4.]
[Footnote 2: This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with Sâ@mkhya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things (e.g. the snake and the rope) that is the cause of illusion; it is therefore called theakhyâti(non-apprehension) theory of illusion which must be distinguished from theanyathâkhyâti(misapprehension) theory of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehending one (e.g. the rope) for the other (e.g. snake).Yogavârttika,I. 8.]
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Yoga holds a slightly different view and supposes that the puru@sa not only fails to distinguish the difference between itself and the buddhi but positively takes the transformations of buddhi as its own. It is no non-perception of the difference but positively false knowledge, that we take the puru@sa to be that which it is not (anyathâkhyâti). It takes the changing, impure, sorrowful, and objective prak@rti or buddhi to be the changeless, pure, happiness-begetting subject. It wrongly thinks buddhi to be the self and regards it as pure, permanent and capable of giving us happiness. This is the avidyâ of Yoga. A buddhi associated with a puru@sa is dominated by such an avidyâ, and when birth after birth the same buddhi is associated with the same puru@sa, it cannot easily get rid of this avidyâ. If in the meantime pralaya takes place, the buddhi is submerged in the prak@rti, and the avidyâ also sleeps with it. When at the beginning of the next creation the individual buddhis associated with the puru@sas emerge, the old avidyâs also become manifest by virtue of it and the buddhis associate themselves with the puru@sas to which they were attached before the pralaya. Thus proceeds the course of sa@msâra. When the avidyâ of a person is rooted out by the rise of true knowledge, the buddhi fails to attach itself to the puru@sa and is forever dissociated from it, and this is the state of mukti.
The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.
It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the puru@sa. What is the process of this experience? Sâ@mkhya (as explained by Vâcaspati) holds that through the senses the buddhi comes into touch with external objects. At the first moment of this touch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particulars of the thing cannot be noticed. This is callednirvikalpa pratyak@sa(indeterminate perception). At the next moment by the function of thesa@mkalpa(synthesis) andvikalpa(abstraction or imagination) of manas (mind-organ) the thing is perceived in all its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates, and associates the sense-data received through the senses, and
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thus generates the determinate perception, which when intelligized by the puru@sa and associated with it becomes interpreted as the experience of the person. The action of the senses, ahamkâra, and buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at other times as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously. Vijñâna Bhik@su differs from this view of Vâcaspati, and denies the synthetic activity of the mind-organ (manas), and says that the buddhi directly comes into touch with the objects through the senses. At the first moment of touch the perception is indeterminate, but at the second moment it becomes clear and determinate [Footnote ref 1]. It is evident that on this view the importance of manas is reduced to a minimum and it is regarded as being only the faculty of desire, doubt and imagination.
Buddhi, including ahamkâra and the senses, often calledcittain Yoga, is always incessantly suffering changes like the flame of a lamp, it is made up of a large preponderance of the pure sattva substances, and is constantly moulding itself from one content to another. These images by the dual reflection of buddhi and puru@sa are constantly becoming conscious, and are being interpreted as the experiences of a person. The existence of the puru@sa is to be postulated for explaining the illumination of consciousness and for explaining experience and moral endeavour. The buddhi is spread all over the body, as it were, for it is by its functions that the life of the body is kept up; for the Sâ@mkhya does not admit any separate prana vâyu (vital breath) to keep the body living. What are calledvâyus(bio-motor force) in Vedânta are but the different modes of operation of this category of buddhi, which acts all through the body and by its diverse movements performs the life-functions and sense-functions of the body.
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[Footnote 1: As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes place through the senses, the sense data of colours, etc., are modified by the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things are however perceived by the senses directly, but the time-order is a scheme of the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds that the external objects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which they are reflected, like trees in a lake
"tasmims'ca darpane sphâre samasta vastudrstayah imâstâh pratibimbanti sarasiva tatadrumâh"Yogavarttika, I. 4.
The buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it by the senses, or rather the mind flows out through the senses to the external objects and assumes their forms: "indriyânyeva pranâlikâ cittasancaranamargah taih samyujya tadgola kadvârâ bâhyavastusûparaktasya cittasyendryasahityenaivârthakarah parinâmo bhavati"Yogavârttika, I. VI. 7. ContrastTattvakaumudî, 27 and 30.]
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Apart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, or rather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root impressions (sa@mskâras) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies of all past lives (vâsanâ) [Footnote ref 1]. These sa@mskâras are revived under suitable associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of births in their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives the same citta was always following him. The citta has thus collected within itself the instincts and tendencies of all those different animal lives. It is knotted with these vâsanâs like a net. If a man passes into a dog life by rebirth, the vâsanâs of a dog life, which the man must have had in some of his previous infinite number of births, are revived, and the man's tendencies become like those of a dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomes attached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revival of the vâsanâ suitable to each particular birth that there cannot be any collision such as might have occurred if the instincts and tendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one was born as man.
The sa@mskâras represent the root impressions by which any habit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure in which he took delight for some time, or any passions which were
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[Footnote 1: The word sa@mskâra is used by Pâ@nini who probably preceded Buddha in three different senses (1) improving a thing as distinguished from generating a new quality (Sata utkar@sâdhâna@m sa@mskâra@h, Kâs'ila on Pâ@nini, VI. ii. 16), (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and (3) adornment (Pâ@nini, VI. i. 137, 138). In the Pi@takas the word sa@nkhâra is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing, perfecting, embellishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas (collected by Childers). In fact sa@nkhâra stands for almost anything of which impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so many diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning of aggregation (samavâyaof Pâ@nini) is prominent. The wordsa@mskarotiis used in Kau@sîtaki, II. 6, Chândogya IV. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and B@rhadâra@nyaka, VI. iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yet come across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. The meaning of sa@mskâra in Hindu philosophy is altogether different. It means the impressions (which exist subconsciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in subconscious states and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (sm@rti). The word vâsanâ (Yoga sûtra, IV. 24) seems to be a later word. The earlier Upanis@sads do not mention it and so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Pâli pi@takas.Abhidhânappadîpikâof Moggallâna mentions it, and it occurs in the Muktika Upani@sad. It comes from the root "vas" to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense of sa@mskâra, and inVyâsabhâ@syathey are identified in IV. 9. But vâsanâ generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But sa@mskâras are the sub-conscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. Vâsanâs are innate sa@mskâras not acquired in this life. SeeVyâsabhâ@sya, Tattvâvais'âradîandYogavârttika, II. 13.]
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engrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these might not now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experienced before has so moulded and given shape to the citta that the citta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even without any such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival of any undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that its roots as already left in the citta in the form of sa@mskâras should be eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a contrary tendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its own sa@mskâra naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirable sa@mskâras.
Apart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (ce@s@tâ) by which the conative senses are brought into relation to their objects. There is also the reserved potent power (s'akti) of citta, by which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continue to persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involved in the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yoga method of practice, which consists in steadying a particular state of mind to the exclusion of others.
Merit or demerit (pu@nya, pâpa) also is imbedded in the citta as its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, and giving pleasures and pains in accordance with it.
Sorrow and its Dissolution [Footnote ref 1].
Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that all experience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the pain substance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all combinations, all intellectual operations are fraught with some degree of painful feeling. Moreover even in states of temporary pleasure, we had sorrow at the previous moment when we had solicited it, and we have sorrow even when we enjoy it, for we have the fear that we may lose it. The sum total of sorrows is thus much greater than the pleasures, and the pleasures only strengthen the keenness of the sorrow. The wiser the man the greater is his capacity of realizing that the world and our experiences are all full of sorrow. For unless a man is convinced of this great truth that all is sorrow, and that temporary pleasures, whether generated by ordinary worldly experience or by enjoying heavenly experiences through the performance of Vedic sacrifices, are quite unable to
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[Footnote 1: Tattavais'âradî and Yogavârttika, II. 15, and Tattvakaumudî,I.]
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eradicate the roots of sorrow, he will not be anxious for mukti or the final uprooting of pains. A man must feel that all pleasures lead to sorrow, and that the ordinary ways of removing sorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot remove them ultimately; he must turn his back on the pleasures of the world and on the pleasures of paradise. The performances of sacrifices according to the Vedic rites may indeed give happiness, but as these involve the sacrifice of animals they must involve some sins and hence also some pains. Thus the performance of these cannot be regarded as desirable. It is when a man ceases from seeking pleasures that he thinks how best he can eradicate the roots of sorrow. Philosophy shows how extensive is sorrow, why sorrow comes, what is the way to uproot it, and what is the state when it is uprooted. The man who has resolved to uproot sorrow turns to philosophy to find out the means of doing it.
The way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practical enquiry of the Sâ@mkhya philosophy [Footnote ref 1]. All experiences are sorrow. Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experiences may be shut out for ever. Death cannot bring it, for after death we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and puru@sa are associated with each other, the sufferings will continue. Citta must be dissociated from puru@sa. Citta or buddhi, Sâ@mkhya says, is associated with puru@sa because of the non-distinction of itself from buddhi [Footnote ref 2]. It is necessary therefore that in buddhi we should be able to generate the true conception of the nature of puru@sa; when this true conception of puru@sa arises in the buddhi it feels itself to be different, and distinct, from and quite unrelated to puru@sa, and thus ignorance is destroyed. As a result of that, buddhi turns its back on puru@sa and can no longer bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevocably connected with sorrow, and thus the puru@sa remains in its true form. This according to Sâ@mkhya philosophy is alone adequate to being about the liberation of the puru@sa. Prak@rti which was leading us through cycles of experiences from birth to birth, fulfils its final purpose when this true knowledge arises differentiating
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[Footnote 1: Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is the cessation of the rebirth-process which is so much associated with sorrow {du@hkhabahla@h sa@msârah heya@h).]
[Footnote 2: The wordcittais a Yoga term. It is so called because it is the repository of all sub-conscious states. Sâmkhyn generally uses, the word buddhi. Both the words mean the same substance, the mind, but they emphasize its two different functions. Buddhi means intellection.]
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puru@sa from prak@rti. This final purpose being attained the prak@rti can never again bind the purusa with reference to whom this right knowledge was generated; for other puru@sas however the bondage remains as before, and they continue their experiences from one birth to another in an endless cycle.
Yoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient. In order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a true knowledge differentiating puru@sa and buddhi should arise, but it is necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, all its samskaras should be once for all destroyed never to be revived again. At this stage the buddhi is transformed into its purest state, reflecting steadily the true nature of the puru@sa. This is thekevala(oneness) state of existence after which (all sa@mskâras, all avidyâ being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent any longer to hold on to the puru@sa, and like a stone hurled from a mountain top, gravitates back into the prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. To destroy the old sa@mskâras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, a graduated course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice should be so arranged that by generating the practice of living higher and better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtler states, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yogin advances he has to give up what he had adopted as good and try for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches the state when the buddhi is in its ultimate perfection and purity. At this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the puru@sa, and final liberation takes place.
Karmas in Yoga are divided into four classes: (1)s'uklaor white (pu@nya, those that produce happiness), (2)k@r@s@naor black (pâpa, those that produce sorrow), (3)s'ukla-k@r@s@na(pu@nya-pâpa, most of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly vicious as they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of many insects), (4)as'uklâk@r@s@na(those inner acts of self-abnegation, and meditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains). All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work in the world and avoid taking the lives of insects [Footnote ref 2]. All karmas
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[Footnote 1: Both Sâ@mkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state aKaivalya(alone-ness), the former because all sorrows have been absolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because at this state puru@sa remains for ever alone without any association with buddhi, seeSâ@mkhya kârikâ, 68 andYoga sûtras, IV. 34.]
[Footnote 2:Vyâsabhâ@syaandTattvavais'âradî, IV. 7.]
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proceed from the five-fold afflictions (kles'as), namelyavidyâ, asmitâ, râga, dve@saandabhinives'a.
We have already noticed what was meant by avidyâ. It consists generally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking it as permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledge while remaining in this form further manifests itself in the other four forms of asmitâ, etc. Asmitâ means the thinking of worldly objects and our experiences as really belonging to us—the sense of "mine" or "I" to things that really are the qualities or transformations of the gu@nas. Râga means the consequent attachment to pleasures and things. Dve@sa means aversion or antipathy to unpleasant things. Abhinives'a is the desire for life or love of life—the will to be. We proceed to work because we think our experiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our family to be our own, our possessions to be our own; because we are attached to these; because we feel great antipathy against any mischief that might befall them, and also because we love our life and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These all proceed, as is easy to see, from their root avidyâ, which consists in the false identification of buddhi with puru@sa. These five, avidyâ, asmitâ, râga, dve@sa and abhinives'a, permeate our buddhi, and lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These together with the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi as a particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birth to birth, and it is hard to get rid of them [Footnote ref 1]. The karma in the aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification of it is calledkarmâs'aya. (the bed of karma for the puru@sa to lie in). We perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (kles'a) of the buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain or modification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to the teleology of the prak@rti and the removal of obstacles in the course of its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will of Îs'vara that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuous one pleasure.
The karmas performed in the present life will generally accumulate, and when the time for giving their fruits comes, such a life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for him according to the evolution of prak@rti as shall make it possible for him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the
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[Footnote 1:Vyâsabhâ@syaandTattvavais'âradî, II. 3-9.]
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present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth (as this or that animal or man), the period of life (âyu@s) and the painful or pleasurable experiences (bhoga) destined for that life. Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often produce their effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has done certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which he requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which he requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain in abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first and then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his good actions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions, all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot again be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those karmas which have already ripened. This is thejîvanmuktistage, when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering mundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already ripened (ti@s@thati sa@mskâravas'ât cakrabhramivaddh@rtas'arîra@h).
Citta.
The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patañjali in hisYoga sûtrain the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration may be brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against a mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct. The citta which has the concentration of the former type is calledk@sipta(wild) and of the latter typepramû@dha(ignorant). There is another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in which concentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining steady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to another thing and so on. This is called thevik@sipta(unsteady) stage of mind (cittabhûmi). As distinguished from these there is an advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily on an object for a long time. This is theekâgra(one-pointed) stage. There is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processes are absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti, and is called thenirodha(cessation) state of citta. The purpose of Yoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta.
The cittas have five processes (v@rtti), (1)pramâ@na[Footnote ref 1] (valid
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[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any cognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not on correspondence with external facts or objects (svata@h prâmâ@nya@m svata@h aprâmâ@nya@m). The contribution of Sâ@mkhya to the doctrine of inference is not definitely known. What little Vâcaspati says on the subject has been borrowed from Vâtsyâyana such as thepûrvavat, s'e@savatandsâmânyatodr@s@tatypes of inference, and these may better be consulted in our chapter on Nyâya or in the Tâtparya@tîkâ_ of Vâcaspati. Sâ@mkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds of inference "mâtrânimittasa@myogivirodhisahacâribhi@h. Svasvâmibadhyaghâtâdyai@h sâ@mkhyânâ@m saptadhânumâ" (Tâtparya@tîkâ, p. 109). Sâ@mkhya definition of inference as given by Udyotakara (I.I. V) is "sambandhâdekasmât pratyak@sacche@sasiddhiranumânam."]
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cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference and scriptural testimony), (2)viparyaya(false knowledge, illusion, etc.), (3)vikalpa(abstraction, construction and different kinds of imagination), (4)nidrâ(sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which tamas tends to predominate), (5)sm@rti(memory).
These states of mind (v@rtti) comprise our inner experience. When they lead us towards sâ@msara into the course of passions and their satisfactions, they are said to bekli@s@ta(afflicted or leading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, they are calledakli@s@ta(unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards sa@msara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of mind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states, and whichever state should tend towards our final good (liberation) must be regarded as good.
This draws attention to that important characteristic of citta, that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and sometimes towards bad (sâ@msara). It is like a river, as the _Vyâsabhâ@sya says, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the good. The teleology of prak@rti requires that it should produce in man the sâ@msara as well as the liberation tendency.
Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts, and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows that our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation [Footnote ref 1]. Removal of pains
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[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction of three kinds of sorrows,âdhyâtmika(generated internally by the illness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind),âdhibhautika(generated externally by the injuries inflicted by other men, beasts, etc.) andâdhidaivika(generated by the injuries inflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours (puru@sârtha).]
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is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible tendency of the mind. Man has power (s'akti) stored up in his citta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may gradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the other. He must succeed in this, since prak@rti wants liberation for her final realization [Footnote ref 1].
Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).
The purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind on the gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation, so that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and more weakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mind can be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should be purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yogin should practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (ahi@msâ), absolute and strict truthfulness (satya), non-stealing (asteya), absolute sexual restraint (brahmacarya) and the acceptance of nothing but that which is absolutely necessary (aparigraha). These are collectively calledyama. Again side by side with these abstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablutions and inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, the habit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping the body unmoved and remaining silent in speech (tapas), the study of philosophy (svâdhyâya) and meditation on Îs'vara (Îs'varapra@nidhâna). These are collectively calledniyamas. To these are also to be added certain other moral disciplines such aspratipak@sa-bhâvanâ, maitrî, karu@nâ, muditâandupek@sâ. Pratipak@sa-bhâvanâ means that whenever a bad thought (e.g. selfish motive) may come one should practise the opposite good thought (self-sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope. Most of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relations with our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mere abstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one should habituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations with our fellow-beings. The practice of maitrî means to think of all beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves to think this, we can never be displeased with them. So too one should practise karu@nâ or kindly feeling for sufferers, muditâ
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[Footnote 1: See my "Yoga Psychology,"Quest, October, 1921.]
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or a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upek@sâ or a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others. The last one indicates that the yogin should not take any note of the vices of vicious men.
When the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures (vairâgya) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the performances of Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its dross and made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin may attain liberation by a constant practice (abhyâsa) attended with faith, confidence (s'raddhâ), strength of purpose and execution (vîrya) arid wisdom (prajñâ) attained at each advance.
The Yoga Meditation.
When the mind has become pure the chances of its being ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (âsana) and fixes his mind on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should fix it on Îs'vara, for in that case Îs'vara being pleased removes many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for him to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice, and can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration (samâdhi) of his mind. There are four states of this unifying concentration namelyvitarka, vicâra, ânandaandasmitâ. Of these vitarka and vicâra have each two varieties,savitarka, nirvitarka, savicâra, nirvicâra[Footnote ref 1]. When the mind concentrates on objects, remembering their names and qualities, it is called the savitarka stage; when on the five tanmâtras with a remembrance of their qualities it is called savicâra, and when it is one with the tanmâtras without any notion of their qualities it is called nirvicâra. Higher than these are the ânanda and the asmitâ states. In the ânanda state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its functions of the senses causing pleasure. In the asmitâ stage buddhi concentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifications. In all these stages there are objects on which the mind consciously concentrates, these are therefore called thesamprajñâta(with knowledge of objects) types of samâdhi. Next to this comes the last stage of samâdhi called theasamprajñâtaor nirodha samâdhi, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining
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[Footnote 1: Vâcaspati, however, thinks that ânanda and asmitâ have also two other varieties, which is denied by Bhik@su.]
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long in this stage the old potencies (sa@mskâras) or impressions due to the continued experience of worldly events tending towards the objective world or towards any process of experiencing inner thinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of the nirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when the buddhi becomes as pure as the puru@sa, and after that the citta not being able to bind the puru@sa any longer returns back to prak@rti.
In order to practise this concentration one has to see that there may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select a quiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstacles is, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. This has to be stopped by the practice ofprâ@nâyâma. Prâ@nâyâma consists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and then giving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily for hours, days, months and even years. When there is no need of taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retained steady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed.
The process of practising concentration is begun by sitting in a steady posture, holding the breath by prâ@nâyâma, excluding all other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (dhâra@nâ). At first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the same thought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is calleddhyâna.After sufficient practice in dhyâna the mind attains the power of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes one with its object and there is no change or repetition. There is no consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mind becomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is calledsamâdhi[Footnote ref 1]. We have already described the six stages of samâdhi. As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of samâdhi, he passes on to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwards he attains miraculous powers (vibhûti) and his faith and hope in the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with them many temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and even though the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax. His wisdom (prajñâ) also increases at each step. Prajñâ knowledge is as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to
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[Footnote 1: It should be noted that the wordsamâdhicannot properly be translated either by "concentration" or by "meditation." It means that peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes one with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing states.]
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certain gross things and certain gross qualities [Footnote ref 1] prajñâ has no such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, the tanmâtras, the gu@nas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all their subtle conditions and qualities [Footnote ref 2]. As the potencies (sa@mskâra) of the prajñâ wisdom grow in strength the potencies of ordinary knowledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remain always in his prajñâ wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this prajñâ that it leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to sa@msâra. The final prajñâs which lead to liberation are of seven kinds, namely, (1) I have known the world, the object of suffering and misery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds and roots of sa@msâra have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more of it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact of direct cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge in the shape of a discrimination of puru@sa from prak@rti has been understood. The other three are not psychological but are rather metaphysical processes associated with the situation. They are as follows: (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience and emancipation (bhogaandapavarga) has been realized. (6) The strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gu@nas drives them into prak@rti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops. (7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the gu@nas become merged in the prak@rti and remain there for ever. The puru@sa having passed beyond the bondage of the gu@nas shines forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness in this Sâ@mkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prak@rti. It is thus a state of pure intelligence. What the Sâ@mkhya tries to achieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected discipline of the will and psychological control of the mental states.
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[Footnote 1: The limitations which baffle perception are counted in theKârikâas follows: Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky), extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ (e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object (e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight), being mixed up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown into a lake).]
[Footnote 2: Though all things are but the modifications of gu@nas yet the real nature of the gu@nas is never revealed by the sense knowledge. What appears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic (mâyâ):
"Gunânâ@m parama@m rûpam na d@r@s@tipatham@rcchati Yattu d@rs@tipatham prâptam tanmâyeva sutucchakam."
Vyâsabhâ@sya, IV. 13.
The real nature of the gu@nas is thus revealed only byprajñâ.]
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Criticism of Buddhism and Sâ@mkhya from theNyâya standpoint.
The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary; each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to another group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation representing milk generates the collocation of curd it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming the cause-collocation and themodus operandiis unintelligible; the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment. The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness, blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience. Moreover there would be no difference between material (upâdâna, e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (nimittaandsahakâri, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental causes, as such.
Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its
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effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the moment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is that causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we perceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as future and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.
The Sâ@mkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is already existent even before the causal movement for the production of the effect, is also baseless. Sâ@mkhya says that the oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of clay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never carry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug. What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest or actual? What does potential state mean? The potential state of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state of the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Sâ@mkhya that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again Sâ@mkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different
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from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss that the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puru@sa and then again on buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul (âtman) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why Sâ@mkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge, feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double reflection. Again Sâ@mkhya prak@rti is non-intelligent, and where is the guarantee that she (prak@rti) will not bind the wise again and will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puru@sa become bound down? Prak@rti is being utilized for enjoyment by the infinite number of puru@sas, and she is no delicate girl (as Sâ@mkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puru@sa ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure (sukha), sorrow (du@hkha) and a blinding feeling through ignorance (moha) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what impudence could Sâ@mkhya think of these as material substances? Again their cosmology of a mahat, aha@mkâra, the tanmâtras, is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders. The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction in the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other systems. (SeeNyâyamañjarî,pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)
Nyâya and Vais'e@sika sûtras.
It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyâya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in the days of the Upani@sads, and the art of disputation was regarded even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by the namevâkovâkya. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Âpastamba who according to Bühler lived before the third century B.C. used the word Nyâya in the sense of Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. The word Nyâya derived
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[Footnote 1Âpastamba,trans. by Bühler, Introduction, p. XXVII., andBodas's article on theHistorical Survey of Indian Logicin the BombayBranch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.]
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from the rootnîis sometimes explained as that by which sentences and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered into combination) were called Nyâya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on the strength of Kau@tilya's enumeration of thevidyâ(sciences) as Ânvîk@sikî (the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge by further scrutiny),trayî(the three Vedas),vârttâ(the sciences of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), andda@n@danîti(polity), and the enumeration of the philosophies as Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Lokâyata and Ânvîk@sikî, supposes that theNyâya sûtrawas not in existence in Kau@tilya's time 300 B.C.) [Footnote ref 2]. Kau@tilya's reference to Nyâya as Ânvîk@sikî only suggests that the word Nyâya was not a familiar name for Ânvîk@sikî in Kau@tilya's time. He seems to misunderstand Vâtsyâyana in thinking that Vâtsyâyana distinguishes Nyâya from the Ânvîk@sikî in holding that while the latter only means the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics. What appears from Vâtsyâyana's statement inNyâya sûtraI.i. 1 is this that he points out that the science which was known in his time as Nyâya was the same as was referred to as Ânvîk@sikî by Kau@tilya. He distinctly identifies Nyâyavidyâ with Ânvîk@sikî, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories such assa@ms'aya(doubt) etc., though these were already contained within the first two termspramâ@na(means of cognition) andprameya(objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its special and separate branches (p@rthakprasthâna) were treated, Nyâyavidyâ would simply become metaphysics (adhyâtmavidyâ) like the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Nyâya as the means of determining the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon by Vâtsyâyana and is sanctioned by Vâcaspati in hisNyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâI.i. 1). He compares the meaning of the word Nyâya (pramâ@nairarthaparîk@sa@nam—to scrutinize an object by means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word ânvîk@sikî (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception and scriptures). Vâtsyâyana of course points out that so far as this logical side of Nyâya is concerned it has the widest scope for
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[Footnote 1: Kâlidâsa'sKumârasambhava "Udghâto pra@navayâsâm nyâyaistribhirudîra@nam," also Mallinâtha's gloss on it.]
[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi's "The early history of Indian Philosophy,"Indian Antiquary, 1918.]
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itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences [Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Nyâya is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vâtsyâyana himself designates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasthâna (separate branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vâtsyâyana or Kau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made after Kau@tilya. Vâtsyâyana has no doubt put more stress on the importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics oradhyâtmavidyâwas acknowledged by all. But the importance of the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of the dharmas'âstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend any support to it, and Vâtsyâyana had to seek the support of Kau@tilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau@tilya was not satisfied by counting Ânvîk@sikî as one of the four vidyâs but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with Sâ@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kau@tilya's time Nyâya was composed of two branches, one as adhyâtmavidyâ and another as a science of logic or rather of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external, and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might not attract sufficient attention. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda S'âstrî in an article in theJournal of the Bengal Asiatic Society1905 says that as Vâcaspati made two attempts to collect theNyâya sûtras, one asNyâyasûciand the other asNyâyasûtroddhâra, it seems that even in Vâcaspati's time he was not certain as to the authenticity of many of theNyâya sûtras. He further points out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sûtras were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyâya and Yoga. He also
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[Footnote 1:Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam(that by which one is led to act is calledprayojanam);yamartham abhîpsan jihâsan vâ karma ârabhate tenânena sarve prâ@nina@h sarvâ@ni karmâ@ni sarvâs'ca vidyâ@h vyâptâ@h tadâs'rayâs'ca nyâya@h pravarttate(all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana, and all these depend on Nyâya).Vâtsyâyana bhâs'ya, I.i. 1.]
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thinks that the sûtras underwent two additions, one at the hands of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs of the interpolation of many of the sûtras makes the fixing of the date of the original part of theNyâya sûtrasstill more difficult, for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of theNyâya sûtrason the basis of references to S'ûnyavâda naturally loses its value, except on the supposition that all references to S'ûnyavâda must be later than Nâgârjuna, which is not correct, since theMahâyâna sûtraswritten before Nâgârjuna also held the S'ûnyavâda doctrine.
The late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na inJ.R.A.S.1918 thinks that the earlier part of Nyâya was written by Gautama about 550 B.C. whereas theNyâya sûtrasof Ak@sapâda were written about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyâya in the sense of logic inMahâbhârataI.I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment of the subject that the fixing of the date of Ak@sapâda was made to fit in somehow with his idea that Ak@sapâda wrote hisNyâya sûtrasunder the influence of Aristotle—a supposition which does not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part of the Nyâya. Goldstücker says that both Patañjali (140 B.C.) and Kâtyâyana (fourth century B.C.) knew theNyâya sûtras[Footnote ref 1]. We know that Kau@tilya knew the Nyâya in some form as Ânvîk@sikî in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say that the Nyâya existed in some form as early as the fourth century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think that at least some of the present sûtras were written some time in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Bâdarâya@na's sûtras make allusions to the Vais'e@sika doctrines and not to Nyâya. On this ground he thinks thatVais'e@sika sûtraswere written before Bâdarâyana'sBrahma-sûtras, whereas the Nyâya sûtras were written later. Candrakânta Tarkâla@mkâra also contends in his
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[Footnote 1: Goldstücker'sPâ@nini, p. 157.]
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edition of Vais'e@sika that theVais'e@sika sûtraswere earlier than the Nyâya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that theVais'e@sika sûtraswere written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes one of theVais'e@sika sûtras, but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the Vais`e@sika physics [Footnote ref 1]. TheLa@nkâvatâra sûtra(which as it was quoted by As'vagho@sa is earlier than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing that theVais'e@sika sûtrasare probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2].
It is certain that even the logical part of the presentNyâya sûtraswas preceded by previous speculations on the subject by thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which the sûtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (avayava) Vâtsyâyana says that this sûtra was written to refute the views of those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. TheVais'e@sika sûtrasalso give us some of the earliest types of inference, which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyâya doctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].
Does Vais'e@sika represent an Old School of Mîmâ@msâ?
The Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Nyâya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ, older than that represented in theMîmâ@msâ sûtras.But a closer inspection of theVais'e@sika sûtrasseems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes aVais'e@sika sûtra.An examination of Caraka'sSûtrasthâna(I.35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of theBhâ@sâparicchedabefore him.Caraka sûtraorkârikâ(I.i. 36) says that the gu@nas are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the gu@na "para" (universality) and end with "prayatna" (effort) together with the sense-qualities (sârthâ). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found in theVais'e@sika sûtra(I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gu@nas,
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[Footnote 1:Caraka, S'ârîra, 39.]
[Footnote 2: See the next section.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana's Bhâ@sya on theNyâya sûtras,I.i.32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found inDas'avaikâlikaniryuktias noted before.]
[Footnote 4:Nyâya sûtraI.i. 5, andVais'e@sika sûtrasIX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]
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heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oiliness(sneha), elasticity (sa@mskâra), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma); in one part of the sûtra the enumeration begins with "para" (universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's sûtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the Vais'e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated.Bhâ@sâpariccheda(a later Vais'e@sika compendium), is a compilation from some very old kârikâs which are referred to by Vis'vanâtha as being collected from "atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h"—(from very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of sâmânya and vis'e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in theVais'e@sika sûtrathat sâmânya (generality) and vi'se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's sûtras were therefore probably written at a time when the Vais'e@sika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.
TheVais'e@sika sûtrasseem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mîmâ@msâ doctrines and occasionally to Sâ@mkhya. There is no reason to suppose that the Mîmâ@msâ doctrines referred to allude to theMîmâ@msâ sûtrasof Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyâya phraseology of "pûrvavat" and "s'e@savat" was not known.Vais'e@sika sûtrasin more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vetâs'vatara Upani@sad refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the
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[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha's article inJ.A.S.B., 1908.]
[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that sâmânya is that which produces unity and vis'e@sa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Sâmânya and vis'e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]
[Footnote 3:Vais'e@sika sûtra(II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]
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systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these sûtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic.
TheVais'e@sika sûtrabegins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, "dharma" This is we know the manifest duty of Mîmâ@msâ and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins hisMîmâ@msâ sûtrasby defining "dharma". This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'e@sika, viz, the description of the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (nihsreyasa) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3]. The fact that the Vais'e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also thead@r@s@ta(unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows that Ka@nâda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The
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[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara I.i.2]
[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of theKalâpa Vyâkara@na, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Ka@nâda in hisVais'e@sika sûtras, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himâlaya).
"Dnarma@m vyâkhyâtukâmasya @sa@tpadârthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukâmasya sâgaragamanopamam."]
[Footnote 3: The sutra "Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmâ@nyam(I.i.3 and X.ii.9) has been explained byUpaskâraas meaning "The Veda being the word of Îs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of Îs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyâya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of VI.ii.1.]
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description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated inUpaskara) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Ka@nâda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to this, Ka@nâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (snana), fasting, holy student life (brahmacarya), remaining at the house of the teacher (gurukulavasa), retired forest life (vanaprastha), sacrifice (yajña), gifts (dana), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).
He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how
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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@nâda is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mîmâ@msâ will show that the later Mîmâ@msâ writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mîmâ@msâ differs from Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no Îs'vara is mentioned, and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with Mîmâ@msâ. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of theVais`e@sika sûtras.It is probable that Ka@nâda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mîmâ@msâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of theVais'e@sika sûtras,the view was probably what is represented in theVais'e@sika sûtras.As there is no reference to Îs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâ@msâ philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and the Mîmâ@msâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@nâda gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâ@msâ view as we know from the later Mîmâ@msâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is
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[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in hisUpaskâra(II. ii. 36 by adding an "api" to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as sâ@mkhya and bhava instead of sâ@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyâya Vais'e@sika view.]
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that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (âgama). To this the final Vais'e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as "I" (aham), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (aham) (III. ii. 10-18, also IX. i. 11).
These considerations lead me to think that the Vais'e@sika represented a school of Mîmâ@msâ thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.
Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sûtras.
TheVais'e@sika sûtrasbegin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (dharma) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (ni@hs'reyasa) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sûtra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (dravya), quality (gu@na), class concept (sâmdânya), particularity (vis'e@sa), and inherence (samavâyay) [Footnote ref 1]. The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The gu@nas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to species [Footnote ref 2]. Action (karma) means upward movement
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[Footnote 1:Upaskâranotes that vis'e@sa here refers to the ultimate differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same element has specific features of difference.]
[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oiliness (sneha), elasticity (sa@mskâra), merit (dharma), and demerit (adharma) have been altogether omitted. These are all counted in later Vais'e@sika commentaries and compendiums. It must be noted that "gu@na" in Vas'e@sika means qualities and not subtle reals or substances as in Sâ@mkhya Yoga. Gu@na in Vas'e@sika would be akin to what Yoga would calldharma.]
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downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal movement. The three common qualities of dravya, gu@na and karma are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other dravyas and the gu@nas other gu@nas. But karma is not necessarily produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or its effect but the gu@nas are destroyed both by the cause and by the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses karma and gu@na and is regarded as the material (samavayi) cause. Gu@nas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gu@nas, and are not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is devoid of gu@na, cannot remain at one time in more than one object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi) of (derivative) dravyas, gu@na, and karma, gu@na is also the non-material cause (asamavayi) of dravya, gu@na and karma. Karma is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion (vega). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be produced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to gu@na in this that it does not produce karma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contact and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma not being connected with more than one thing is not produced by more than one thing [Footnote ref 2]. A dravya is the result of many contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the cause of dravya and karma [Footnote ref 3].
In the second chapter of the first book Ka@nâda first says that if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause even though there may not be the effect. He next says that genus (samanya) and species (visesa) are relative to the understanding;