Postponing our views about the time of Patañjali the Yoga editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing the other workKitâb Pâtanjal, of which Alberuni speaks, for our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous one and he translates it along with another book calledSânka(Sâ@mkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that this book was not the presentYoga sûtraof Patañjali, though it had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation. The book was called by AlberuniKitâb Pâtanjal, which is to be translated as the book of Pâtañjala, because in another place, speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when translated stands as "the author of the book of Pâtanjal." It had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes many extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in theYoga sûtra, but the manner in which these are described (so
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist referencenaraika-cittatantram vastu tadapramâ@nakam tadâ kim syât(IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vyâsabhâ@sya, as Bhoja, who had consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count it as sûtra.]
234
far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change from what we find in theYoga sûtra. Following the idea of God in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption with him and beatitude is obtained [Footnote ref 1].
The idea of soul is the same as we find in theYoga sûtra.The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation corresponding to the four stages we have as in theYoga sûtra.He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation, of which the first is theabhyâsa(habit) of Patañjali, and the object of this abhyâsa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The second stands for vairâgya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf.Yoga sûtra,I. 23 and I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasâyana or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the same as in theYoga sûtra,II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being one with him. The Brahman is conceived as anurddhvamûla avâks'âkha as'vattha(a tree with roots upwards and branches below), after the Upani@sad fashion, the upper root is pure Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Cf.Yoga sûtraI. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. TheYoga sûtrasspeak of Is'vâra (God) as an eternally emancipated puru@sa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of concentration. The commentator Vyâsa notes that he is the best object, for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No argument is given in theYoga sûtrasof the existence of God.]
[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]
235
object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the roots.
The difference of this system from that of theYoga sûtrais: (1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] and the niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any connection with God as we find in theYoga sûtrahas been lost sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in God; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significance of Yoga as control of mental states (citta@rttinirodha) is lost sight of, and (7) rasâyana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the means of salvation.
From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patañjali'sYoga sûtrain the direction of Vedânta and Tantra, and as such it probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga doctrine of the sûtras entered into a new channel in such a way that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments of Vedânta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the author mentions rasâyana as a means of salvation, it is very probable that he flourished after Nâgarjuna and was probably the same person who wrotePâtañjala tantra, who has been quoted by S'ivadâsa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of by Nâges'a as "CarakePatañjali@h." We can also assume with some degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that Cakrapa@ni and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with the writer of the _Mahâbhâ@sya. It is also very probable that Cakrapâ@ni by his line "pâtañjalamahâbhâ@syacarakapratisa@msk@rtai@h" refers to this work which was called "Pâtañjala." The commentator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvîpas and the sâgaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in theVyâsabhâ@sya, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably written at a time when theVyâsabhâ@syawas not written or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sâ@mkhya, gives a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]
[Footnote 2: Cf. the account ofPâs'upatadars'anainSarvadas'anasa@mgraha.]
236
also described the book as being very famous at the time, and Bhoja and Cakrapâ@ni also probably confused him with Patañjali the grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this book of Patañjali was probably written by some other Patañjali within the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not be improbable that whenVyâsabhâ@syaquotes in III. 44 as "itiPatañjali@h," he refers to this Patañjali.
The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrâya@na Upani@sad consisted of six a@ngas or accessories, namely prâ@nâyâma, pratyâhâra, dhyâna, dhara@nâ, tarka and samâdhi [Footnote ref 1]. Comparing this list with that of the list in theYoga sûtraswe find that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been replaced by âsana. Now from the account of the sixty-two heresies given in theBrahmajâla suttawe know that there were people who either from meditation of three degrees or through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samâdhi or Dhyâna school as belonging to one class of thinkers called s'âs'vatavâda, and from the inclusion of tarka as an a@nga in samâdhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the a@ngas given in Maitrâya@nî Upani@sad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine, when the Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being grafted on each other, and when the Sa@mkhya method of discussion did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The substitution of âsana for tarka in the list of Patañjali shows that the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sa@mkhya. The introduction of ahi@msâ (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha (want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santo@sa (contentment) as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is deemed impossible (for the first time in the sûtras), probably marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrî, karu@nâ, muditâ, upek@sâ is also equally significant, as we do not find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation. Beginning from theÂcârâ@ngasûtra, Uttarâdhyayanasûtra,
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:prâ@nâyâmah pratyâhârah dhyânam dhara@nâ tarkah samâdhih sa@da@nga ityucyate yoga(Maitr. 6 8).]
237
theSûtrak@rtâ@ngasûtra,etc., and passing through Umâsvati'sTattvârthâdhigamasûtrato Hemacandra'sYogas'âstrawe find that the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the opinion expressed in Alberuni'sPâtanjalthat these cannot give salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the path to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics of the sa@msâra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination, decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism. Avidyâ is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidyâ should not be confused with the Vedânta avidyâ of S'a@nkara, as it is an avidyâ of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidyâ is the ignorance of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sûtra "anityâs'ucidu@hkhânâtmasu nityas'ucidu@hkhâtmakhyâtiravidyâ" (II. 5).
The ground of our existing is our will to live (abhinives'a). "This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts off being for us at least [Footnote ref 2]." This is true as much of Buddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used in the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things in this section is to show that theYoga sûtrasproper (first three chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Yoga sûtra,II. 15, 16. 17.Yathâcikitsâs'âstra@m caturvyûha@m rogo rogahetuh ârogya@m bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapi s'âstram caturvyûhameva; tadyathâ sa@msâra@h, sa@msârahetu@h mok@sa@h mok@sopâya@h; duhkhabahula@h sa@msâro heya@h, pradhânapuru@sayo@h sa@myogo heyahetu@h, sa@myogasyâtyantikî niv@rttirhâna@m hanopâya@h samyagdar`sanam, Vyâsabhâ@sya, II. 15]
[Footnote 2: Oldenberg'sBuddhism[Footnote ref 1].]
238
a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another. As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed to think that the date of the first three chapters of theYoga sûtrasmust be placed about the second century B.C. Since there is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the grammarian Patañjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may take them as being identical [Footnote ref 1].
The Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Puru@sa.
The Sâ@mkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls andprak@rti, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are many, and had it not been so (the Sâ@mkhya argues) with the birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one all would have died [Footnote ref 2].
The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly grasp in order to understand the Sâ@mkhya philosophy. Unlike the Jaina soul possessinganantajñâna, anantadars'ana, anantasukha, andanantavîryya, the Sâ@mkhya soul is described as being devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute pure consciousness (cit). The Sâ@mkhya view differs from the Vedânta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (ânanda) [Footnote ref 3]. Bliss with Sâ@mkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it belongs to prak@rti and does not constitute the nature of soul; secondly, according to Vedânta the individual souls (Jîva) are
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See S.N. Das Gupta,Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought,ch. II. The most important point in favour of this identification seems to be that both the Patañjalis as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine ofspho@tawhich was denied even by Sâ@mkhya. On the doctrine of Spho@ta see myStudy of Patanjali, Appendix I.]
[Footnote 2:Kârikâ, 18.]
[Footnote 3: See Citsukha'sTattvapradîpikâ,IV.]
239
but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the Brahman, but according to Sâ@mkhya they are all real and many.
The most interesting feature of Sâ@mkhya as of Vedânta is the analysis of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya holds that our knowledge of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind, the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go, they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things, and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest. These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious, if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted as the experience of a person [Footnote ref 1]. We know that the Upani@sads consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas, and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes. The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self" but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other things, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The Jains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the veil. Sâ@mkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image of knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle matter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance, and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves, the pictures appear one by one before the light and arc illuminated. So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would be blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Tattakaumudî5;Yogavârttika, IV. 22;Vijñânâm@rtabhâ@sya, p. 74;YogavârttikaandTattvavais'âradî, I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20;Vyâsabhâ@sya,I. 6, 7.]
240
so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious. This principle of consciousness (cit) cannot indeed be separately perceivedper se, but the presence of this principle in all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference. This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality, no impurity [Footnote ref 1]. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes place in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it, and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is but a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the principle of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge carries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness, it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness. Knowledge-revelation is not just the unveiling or revelation of a particular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation of the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening, pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind knowledge-stuff.
The Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse constituent parts, and had held that the coming together of these brought about the conscious states. This coming together was to them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unity or coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentary collocation. With Sã@mkhya however the self, the purecit, is neither illusory nor an abstraction; it is concrete but transcendent. Coming into touch with it gives unity to all the movements of the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwise have remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming into connection with this principle of intelligence that they are interpreted as the systematic and coherent experience of a person, and may thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means the expression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is important to note that Sâ@mkhya has two terms to denote the two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of awareness as such (cit) and the content (buddhi) which is the form of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.]
241
knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a system of experience. This principle of intelligence is called puru@sa. There is a separate puru@sa in Sâ@mkhya for each individual, and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedânta âtman however is different from the Sâ@mkhya puru@sa in this that it is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory mâyâ it appears as many.
Thought and Matter.
A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter are, why then should the puru@sa illuminate it and not external material objects. The answer that Sâ@mkhya gives is that the knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objects in this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (sattva), which resembles the light of puru@sa, and is thus fit for reflecting and absorbing the light of the puru@sa. The two principal characteristics of external gross matter are mass and energy. But it has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographed by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able to catch the reflection of thecit—the super-translucent transcendent principle of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour, and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter did not possess some of the essential substances of which the copy was made up. But this plastic entity (sattva) which is so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination in matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in
242
thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have movement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images do not extend in space, but they can represent space. The translucent and plastic element of thought (sattva) in association with movement (rajas) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation of all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction (tamas) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and discloses things in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff) holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter darkness, and actual knowledge comes before our view as though by the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the light of the puru@sa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its stores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture or idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates that in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests itself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both thought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a plasticity of intelligence-stuff (sattva), energy-stuff (rajas), and mass-stuff (tamas), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last two are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought.
Feelings, the Ultimate Substances [Footnote ref 1].
Another question that arises in this connection is the position of feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Sâmkhya holds that the three characteristic constituents that we have analyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most interesting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that we think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If we should analyze any percept into the crude and undeveloped sensations of which it is composed at the first moment of its appearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, and we find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image. Even in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act of knowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower down the scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations of matter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling which never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scale of evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last there comes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Kârikâ, 12, with Gau@dpâda and Nârâya@natîrtha.]
243
reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark the earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in ordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certain stage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at a certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes with matter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves, the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross matter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in taking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which gross matter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed to take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember the Sâ@mkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances which are in essence but three types of feeling entities. The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we have noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestations of three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings that we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings that we call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither sorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression (vi@sâda) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of manifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as shining (prakâs'a), energy (prav@rtti), obstruction (niyama), there are three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as the ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of gross matter and thought by their varying modifications.
The Gu@nas [Footnote ref 1].
These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically calledgu@nain Sâ@mkhya philosophy. Gu@na in Sanskrit has three meanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These entities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it may be mentioned in this connection that in Sâ@mkhya philosophy there is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each and every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What we call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance of a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Yogavârttika, II. 18; Bhâvâga@nes'a'sTattvayâthârthyadîpana, pp. 1-3;Vijñânâm@rtabhâ@sya, p. 100;Tattvakaumudî, 13; also Gau@dapâda and Nârâya@natîrtha, 13.]
244
signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts; any object we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Sâ@mkhya holds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality, however fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding subtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a quality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects but also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities were thus called gu@nas probably to suggest that they are the entities which by their various modifications manifest themselves as gu@nas or qualities. These subtle entities may also be called gu@nas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes by which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and matter. These may also be called gu@nas as things of secondary importance, because though permanent and indestructible, they continually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual groupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalterably constant like the souls (puru@sa). Moreover the object of the world process being the enjoyment and salvation of the puru@sas, the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of primary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined to justify the name gu@na as applied to these subtle entities, it should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or subtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gu@nas are infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristics as described above they have been arranged in three classes or types calledsattva(intelligence-stuff),rajas(energy-stuff) andtamas(mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle substances which agree in certain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called thesattva-gu@nasand those which behave as units of activity are called therajo-gu@nasand those which behave as factors of obstruction, mass or materiality are calledtamo-gu@nas. These subtle gu@na substances are united in different proportions (e.g. a larger number of sattva substances with a lesser number of rajas or tamas, or a larger number of tamas substances with a smaller number of rajas and sattva substances and so on in varying proportions), and as a result of this, different substances with different qualities come into being. Though attached to one another when united in different proportions, they mutually act and react upon one another, and thus by their combined resultant produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is however
245
one and only one stage in which the gu@nas are not compounded in varying proportions. In this state each of the gu@na substances is opposed by each of the other gu@na substances, and thus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in which none of the characters of the gu@nas manifest themselves. This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It is a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium of the gu@nas is called prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. This is a state which cannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose, but it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the earliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications take place.
Prak@rti and its Evolution.
Sâ@mkhya believes that before this world came into being there was such a state of dissolution—a state in which the gu@na compounds had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prak@rti. Then later on disturbance arose in the prak@rti, and as a result of that a process of unequal aggregation of the gu@nas in varying proportions took place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold. Prak@rti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the gu@nas, thus gradually evolved and became more and more determinate, differentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The gu@nas are always uniting, separating, and uniting again [Footnote ref 2]. Varying qualities of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on one another and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve from the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite or qualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to produce the world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendencies never coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energy there is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter, resistance, stability, is due to tamas, and all conscious manifestation to sattva. The particular gu@na which happens to be predominant in any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon and others become latent, though their presence is inferred by their
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Yogavârttika,II. 19, andPravacanabhâ@sya,I. 61.]
[Footnote 2:Kaumudî13-16;Tattvavais'âradîII. 20, IV. 13, 14; alsoYogavârttika,IV. 13,14.]
246
effect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energy latent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In a moving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass is partially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings of the gu@nas in different proportions presuppose the state of prak@rti as the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies to conscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, are exactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass, and the process of cosmic evolution is at rest. When this equilibrium is once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a natural affinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for other reals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, there arises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at different moments. When one gu@na is preponderant in any particular collocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary series beginning from the first disturbance of the prak@rti to the final transformation as the world-order, is subject to "a definite law which it cannot overstep." In the words of Dr B.N.Seal [Footnote ref 1], "the process of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated (vai@samya) within the undifferentiated (sâmyâvasthâ) of the determinate (vies'a) within the indeterminate (avis'esa) of the coherent (yutasiddha) within the incoherent (ayutasiddha). The order of succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to the parts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole." The meaning of such an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in the shape of the evolving collocations of gu@na reals take place within the body of the prak@rti. Prak@rti consisting of the infinite reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or that the totality of the gu@nas in the prak@rti has been unhinged from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast number of gu@nas constituting the worlds of thought and matter has been upset. These gu@nas once thrown out of balance begin to group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of aggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way that the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones, so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist.
_____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Dr B.N. Seal'sPositive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, 1915, p.7.]
247
For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this second stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the second stage is made good by a refilling from the prak@rti. So also, as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals of the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the first stage from the prak@rti. Thus by a succession of refillings the process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where there is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical and physical changes of qualities in things which had already evolved. Evolution (tattvântarapari@nâma) in Sâ@mkhya means the development of categories of existence and not mere changes of qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental). Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent category of being, and offers scope to the more and more differentiated and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiation of new stages as integrated in previous stages (sa@ms@rstaviveka).
Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium.
But how or rather why prak@rti should be disturbed is the most knotty point in Sâ@mkhya. It is postulated that the prak@rti or the sum-total of the gu@nas is so connected with the puru@sas, and there is such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prak@rti, that all its evolution and transformations tike place for the sake of the diverse puru@sas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them to absolute freedom or mukti. A return of this manifold world into the quiescent state (pralaya) of prak@rti takes place when the karmas of all puru@sas collectively require that there should be such a temporary cessation of all experience. At such a moment the gu@na compounds are gradually broken, and there is a backward movement (pratisañcara) till everything is reduced, to the gu@nas in their elementary disintegrated state when their mutual opposition brings about their equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not a mere passive state, but one of utmost tension; there is intense activity, but the activity here does not lead to the generation of new things and qualities (visad@rs'a-pari@nâma); this course of new
248
production being suspended, the activity here repeats the same state (sad@rs'a-pari@nâma) of equilibrium, so that there is no change or new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension of the teleology or purpose of the gu@nas, or an absolute break of the course of gu@na evolution; for the state of pralaya, since it has been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulated karmas of puru@sas, and since there is still the activity of the gu@nas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production, is also a stage of the sa@msâra cycle. The state of mukti (liberation) is of course quite different, for in that stage the movement of the gu@nas ceases forever with reference to the liberated soul. But still the question remains, what breaks the state of equilibrium? The Sâ@mkhya answer is that it is due to the transcendental (non-mechanical) influence of the puru@sa [Footnote ref 1]. This influence of the puru@sa again, if it means anything, means that there is inherent in the gu@nas a teleology that all their movements or modifications should take place in such a way that these may serve the purposes of the puru@sas. Thus when the karmas of the puru@sas had demanded that there should be a suspension of all experience, for a period there was a pralaya. At the end of it, it is the same inherent purpose of the prak@rti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitable world for the experiences of the puru@sas by which its quiescent state is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at the inherent teleology of the prak@rti, which demands that a state of pralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity should begin. Since there is a purpose in the gu@nas which brought them to a state of equilibrium, the state of equilibrium also presupposes that it also may be broken up again when the purpose so demands. Thus the inherent purpose of the prak@rti brought about the state of pralaya and then broke it up for the creative work again, and it is this natural change in the prak@rti that may be regarded from another point of view as the transcendental influence of the puru@sas.
Mahat and Aha@mkâra.
The first evolute of the prak@rti is generated by a preponderance of the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that the disturbance of the equilibrium of prak@rti for new creation takes place by the will of Îs'vara (God).]
249
within it the minds (buddhi) of all puru@sas which were lost in the prak@rti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution of prak@rti to serve the puru@sas is thus manifested by the separating out of the old buddhis or minds (of the puru@sas) which hold within themselves the old specific ignorance (avidyâ) inherent in them with reference to each puru@sa with which any particular buddhi is associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi) or all the puru@sas is therefore calledbuddhitattva.It is a state which holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all individuals. The individual buddhis of individual puru@sas are on one hand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated with their specific puru@sas. When some buddhis once begin to be separated from the prak@rti, other buddhi evolutions take place. In other words, we are to understand that once the transformation of buddhis is effected for the service of the puru@sas, all the other direct transformations that take place from the prak@rti take the same line, i.e. a preponderance of sattva being once created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other transformations of prak@rti that follow them have also the sattva preponderance, which thus have exactly the same composition as the first buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prak@rti becomes buddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be regarded as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it all the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising all creation, and is thus calledmahat(the great one). It is calledli@nga(sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the ground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distinguished from the prak@rti which is calledali@nga,i.e. of which no li@nga or characterise may be affirmed.
This mahat-tatva being once produced, further modifications begin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of undulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas preponderance and tama preponderance. This state when the mahat is disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of tamas, rajas and sattva's calledaha@mkâra,and the above three tendencies are respectiviy calledtâmasika aha@mkâraorbhûtâdi,râjasikaortaijasa aha@mâra,andvaikârika aha@mkâra.The râjasika aha@mkâra cannot make a new preponderance by itself; it only
250
helps (sahakâri) the transformations of the sattva preponderance and the tamas preponderance. The development of the former preponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more and more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva preponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on the line of sattva development could only take place when the buddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first development of the buddhi on this line is calledsâttvikaorvaikârika aha@mkâra. This aha@mkâra represents the development in buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine," and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi the function of which is a mere understanding and general datun as thisness.
The ego or aha@mkâra (abhimâna-dravya) is the specific expression of the general consciousness which takes experience as mine. The function of the ego is therefore calledabhimâna(self-assertion). From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision, touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five cognitive senses of speech, handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative sense; theprâ@nas(bio-motor force) which help both conation and cognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The individual aha@mkâras and senses are related to the individual buddhis by the developing sattva determinations from which they had come into being. Each buddhi with its own group of aka@mkâra (ego) and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar other buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as knowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different for each individual, but so far as a general mind (kâra@na buddhi) apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of all buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi is separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated ignorance (avidyâ). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of aha@mkâra and the senses are so related that though they are different from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We must again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling, for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to aha@mkâra, the deficiency of buddhi is made good by prak@rti; again as aha@mkâra partially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the deficiency
251
is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the change and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good and kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state and finally from prak@rti.
The Tanmâtras and the Paramâ@nus [Footnote ref 1].
The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped by the liberated rajas of aha@mkâra, in order to make itself preponderant, and this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcoming the sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi, is calledbhûtâdi.From this bhûtâdi with the help of rajas are generated thetanmâtras,the immediately preceding causes of the gross elements. The bhûtâdi thus represents only the intermediate stage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamas reals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the tanmâtras. There has been some controversy between Sâ@mkhya and Yoga as to whether the tanmâtras are generated from the mahat or from aha@mkâra. The situation becomes intelligible if we remember that evolution here does not mean coming out or emanation, but increasing differentiation in integration within the evolving whole. Thus the regroupings of tamas reals marks the differentiation which takes place within the mahat but through its stage as bhûtâdi. Bhûtâdi is absolutely homogeneous and inert, devoid of all physical and chemical characters except quantum or mass. The second stadium tanmâtra represents subtle matter, vibratory, impingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy. These "potentials" arise from the unequal aggregation of the original mass-units in different proportions and collocations with an unequal distribution of the original energy (rajas). The tanmâtras possess something more than quantum of mass and energy; they possess physical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of viscous and cohesive attraction [Footnote ref. 2].
In intimate relation with those physical characters they also possess the potentials of the energies represented by sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell; but, being subtle matter, they are devoid
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the translations of Sanskrit terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely indebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as given in Ray'sHindu Chemistry.The credit of explaining Sâ@mkhya physics, in the light of the text belongs entirely to him.]
[Footnote 2: Dr Seal'sPositive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.]
252
of the peculiar forms which these "potentials" assume in particles of gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In other words, the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiar transformations by new groupings or collocations before they can act as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutest particles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (atîndriyabut notanudbhûta) [Footnote ref 1].
Of the tanmatras thes'abdaorâkâs'a tanmâtra(the sound-potential) is first generated directly from the bhûtâdi. Next comes thespars'aor thevâyu tanmâtra(touch-potential) which is generated by the union of a unit of tamas from bhûtâdi with the âkâs'a tanmâtra. Therûpa tanmâtra(colour-potential) is generated similarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from bhûtâdi; therasa tanmâtra(taste-potential) or theap tunmâtrais also similarly formed. This ap tanmâtra again by its union with a unit of tamas from bhûtâdi produces thegândha tanmâtra(smell-potential) or thek@siti tanmâtra[Footnote ref 2]. The difference of tanmâtras or infra-atomic units and atoms (paramâ@nu) is this, that the tanmâtras have only the potential power of affecting our senses, which must be grouped and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence as atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses. It is important in this connection to point out that the classification of all gross objects as k@siti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoman is not based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of view of the five senses through which knowledge of them could be brought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend a particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be grasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence of these five elements, the existence of the five potential states or tanmâtras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five gross forms.
The five classes of atoms are generated from the tanmâtras as follows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matter from bhûtâdi generates the âkâsa-atom. The touch-potentials combine with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Dr Seal'sPositive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.]
[Footnote 2: There were various ways in which the genesis of tanmâtras and atoms were explained in literatures other than Sâ@mkhya; for some account of it see Dr Seal'sPositive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.]
253
vâyu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials and sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom. The taste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentials and sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and the smell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate the earth-atom. The âkâs'a-atom possesses penetrability, the vâyu-atom impact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat and light, the ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atom cohesive attraction. The âkâsa we have seen forms the transition link from the bhûtâdi to the tanmâtra and from the tanmâtra to the atomic production; it therefore deserves a special notice at this stage. Sâ@mkhya distinguishes between a kâra@na-âkâs'a and kâryâkâs'a. The kâra@na-âkâs'a (non-atomic and all-pervasive) is the formless tamas—the mass in prak@rti or bhûtâdi; it is indeed all-pervasive, and is not a mere negation, a mere unoccupiedness (âvara@nâbhâva) or vacuum [Footnote ref 1]. When energy is first associated with this tamas element it gives rise to the sound-potential; the atomic âkâs'a is the result of the integration of the original mass-units from bhûtâdi with this sound-potential (s'abda tanmâtra). Such an âkâs'a-atom is called the kâryâkâs'a; it is formed everywhere and held up in the original kâra@na âkâs'a as the medium for the development of vâyu atoms. Being atomic it occupies limited space.
The aha@mkâra and the five tanmâtras are technically calledavis'e@saor indeterminate, for further determinations or differentiations of them for the formation of newer categories of existence are possible. The eleven senses and the five atoms are calledvis'e@sa,i.e. determinate, for they cannot further be so determined as to form a new category of existence. It is thus that the course of evolution which started in the prak@rti reaches its furthest limit in the production of the senses on the one side and the atoms on the other. Changes no doubt take place in bodies having atomic constitution, but these changes are changes of quality due to spatial changes in the position of the atoms or to the introduction of new atoms and their re-arrangement. But these are not such that a newer category of existence could be formed by them which was substantially different from the combined atoms.
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Dr B.N. Seal in describing this âkâs'a says "Âkâs'a corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle)." Ray'sHistory of Hindu Chemistry, p. 88.]
254
The changes that take place in the atomic constitution of things certainly deserve to be noticed. But before we go on to this, it will be better to enquire about the principle of causation according to which the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga evolution should be comprehended or interpreted.
Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy [Footnote ref 1].
The question is raised, how can the prak@rti supply the deficiencies made in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes from them? When from mahat some tanmâtras have evolved, or when from the tanmâtras some atoms have evolved, how can the deficiency in mahat and the tanmâtras be made good by the prak@rti?
Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk, changes into curd, and so on? Sâ@mkhya says that "as the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same ultimate Energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes, and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the gu@nas, but without creation of anything new. What is called the (material) cause is only the power which is efficient in the production or rather the vehicle of the power. This power is the unmanifested (or potential) form of the Energy set free (udbhûta-v@rtti) in the effect. But the concomitant conditions are necessary to call forth the so-called material cause into activity [Footnote ref 2]." The appearance of an effect (such as the manifestation of the figure of the statue in the marble block by the causal efficiency of the sculptor's art) is only its passage from potentiality to actuality and the concomitant conditions (sahakâri-s'akti) or efficient cause (nimitta-kâra@na, such as the sculptor's art) is a sort of mechanical help or instrumental help to this passage or the transition [Footnote ref 3]. The refilling from prak@rti thus means nothing more than this, that by the inherent teleology of the prak@rti, the reals there are so collocated as to be transformed into mahat as those of the mahat have been collocated to form the bhûtâdi or the tanmâtras.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Vyâsabhâ@syaandYogavârttika, IV. 3;Tattvavais'âradî,IV. 3.]
[Footnote 2: Ray,History of Hindu Chemistry, p. 72.]
[Footnote 3:Ibid.p. 73.]
255
Yoga however explains this more vividly on the basis of transformation of the liberated potential energy. The sum of material causes potentially contains the energy manifested in the sum of effects. When the effectuating condition is added to the sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of energy together with a fresh collocation(gu@nasannives'avis'e@sa). As the owner of an adjacent field in transferring water from one field to another of the same or lower level has only to remove the obstructing mud barriers, whereupon the water flows of itself to the other field, so when the efficient or instrumental causes (such as the sculptor's art) remove the barrier inherent in any collocation against its transformation into any other collocation, the energy from that collocation flows out in a corresponding manner and determines the collocation. Thus for example the energy which collocated the milk-atoms to form milk was in a state of arrest in the milk state. If by heat or other causes this barrier is removed, the energy naturally changes direction in a corresponding manner and collocates the atoms accordingly for the formation of curd. So also as soon as the barriers are removed from the prak@rti, guided by the constant will of Îs'vara, the reals in equilibrium in the state of prak@rti leave their state of arrest and evolve themselves into mahat, etc.
Change as the formation of new collocations.
It is easy to see from what we have already said that any collocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form, unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the present collocation could be removed by some other extraneous instrumental cause. All gross things are formed by the collocation of the five atoms of k@siti, ap, tejas, marut, and vyoman. The difference between one thing and another is simply this, that its collocation of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atoms is different from that in another. The formation of a collocation has an inherent barrier against any change, which keeps that collocation in a state of equilibrium, and it is easy to see that these barriers exist in infinite directions in which all the other infinite objects of the world exist. From whichever side the barrier is removed, the energy flows in that direction and helps the
256
formation of a corresponding object. Provided the suitable barriers could be removed, anything could be changed into any other thing. And it is believed that the Yogins can acquire the powers by which they can remove any barriers, and thus make anything out of any other thing. But generally in the normal course of events the line of evolution follows "a definite law which cannot be overstepped" (pari@nâmakramaniyama) or in other words there are some natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus the evolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of those lines where the barriers could not be removed. Thus saffron grows in countries like Kashmere and not in Bengal, this is limitation of countries (des'âpabandha); certain kinds of paddy grow in the rainy season only, this is limitation of season or time (kâlâpabandha); deer cannot beget men, this is limitation by form (âkârâpabandha); curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes (nimittâpabandha). The evolutionary course can thus follow only that path which is not barricaded by any of these limitations or natural obstructions [Footnote ref 1].
Change is taking place everywhere, from the smallest and least to the highest. Atoms and reals are continually vibrating and changing places in any and every object. At each moment the whole universe is undergoing change, and the collocation of atoms at any moment is different from what it was at the previous moment. When these changes are perceivable, they are perceived asdharmapari@nâmaor changes ofdharmaor quality; but perceived or unperceived the changes are continually going on. This change of appearance may be viewed from another aspect by virtue of which we may call it present or past, and old or new, and these are respectively called thelak@sa@napari@nâmaandavasthâpari@nâma. At every moment every object of the world is undergoing evolution or change, change as past, present and future, as new, old or unborn. When any change is in a potential state we call it future, when manifested present, when it becomes sub-latent again it is said to be past. Thus it is that the potential, manifest, and sub-latent changes of a thing are called future, present and past [Footnote ref 2].
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Vyâsabhâ@sya, Tattvavais'âradîandYogavârttika,III. 14.]
[Footnote 2: It is well to note in this connection that Sâ@mkhya-yoga does not admit the existence of time as an independent entity like the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika. Time represents the order of moments in which the mind grasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a construction of the mind (buddhi-nirmâ@na). The time required by an atom to move its own measure of space is called a moment (k@sa@na) or one unit of time. Vijñâna Bhik@su regards one unit movement of the gu@nas or reals as a moment. When by true wisdom the gu@nas are perceived as they are both the illusory notions of time and space vanish.Vyâsabhâ@sya, Tattvavais'âradî, andYogavârttika, III. 52 and III. 13.]
257
Causation as Satkâryavâda (the theory that the effect potentially exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause).
The above consideration brings us to an important aspect of the Sâ@mkhya view of causation assatkâryavâda. Sâ@mkhya holds that there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent; causation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality due to certain changes of collocations in the causes which were already held in them in a potential form. Production of effect only means an internal change of the arrangement of atoms in the cause, and this exists in it in a potential form, and just a little loosening of the barrier which was standing in the way of the happening of such a change of arrangement will produce the desired new collocation—the effect. This doctrine is calledsatkâryavâda,i.e. that the kârya or effect issator existent even before the causal operation to produce the effect was launched. The oil exists in the sesarnum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk, The causal operation (kârakaiyâpâra) only renders that manifest (âvirbhûta) which was formerly in an unmanifested condition (tirohita) [Footnote ref 1].
The Buddhists also believed in change, as much as Sâ@mkhya did, but with them there was no background to the change; every change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it was past, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. There were only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms and qualities, but there was no permanent underlying dharma or substance. Sâ@mkhya also holds in the continual change of dharmas, but it also holds that these dharmas represent only the conditions of the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the reals change constantly, but the reals themselves are unchangeable. The effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it came into being for a moment and was lost. On account of this theory of causation and also on account of their doctrine of s'ûnya, they were calledvainâs'ikas(nihilists) by the Vedântins. This doctrine is therefore contrasted to Sâ@mkhya doctrine asasatkâryavâda.
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Tattvakaumudî,9.]
258
The jain view holds that both these views are relatively true and that from one point of view satkâryavâda is true and from another asatkâryavâda. The Sâ@mkhya view that the cause is continually transforming itself into its effects is technically calledpari@nâmavâdaas against the Vedânta view called thevivarttavâda: that cause remains ever the same, and what we call effects are but illusory impositions of mere unreal appearance of name and form—mere Maya [Footnote ref. 1].
Sâ@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism.
Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite number of reals produce all the world and its transformations; whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of cause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which prevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the first disturbance of the equilibrium of the prak@rti? Sâ@mkhya denies the existence of Îs'vara (God) or any other exterior influence, and holds that there is an inherent tendency in these reals which guides all their movements. This tendency or teleology demands that the movements of the reals should be in such a manner that they may render some service to the souls either in the direction of enjoyment or salvation. It is by the natural course of such a tendency that prak@rti is disturbed, and the gu@nas develop on two lines—on the mental plane,cittaor mind comprising the sense faculties, and on the objective plane as material objects; and it is in fulfilment of the demands of this tendency that on the one hand take place subjective experiences as the changes of the buddhi and on the other the infinite modes of the changes of objective things. It is this tendency to be of service to the puru@sas (puru@sârthatâ) that guides all the movements of the reals, restrains all disorder, renders the world a fit object of experience, and finally rouses them to turn back from the world and seek to attain liberation from the association of prak@rti and its gratuitous service, which causes us all this trouble of sa@msâra.
Yoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Both the Vedânta and the Sâ@mkhya theories of causation are sometimes loosely calledsatkâryyavâda.But correctly speaking as some discerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedânta theory of causation should be called satkâra@navâda for according to it thekâra@na(cause) alone exists (sat) and allkâryyas,(effects) are illusory appearances of the kâra@na; but according to Sâ@mkhya the kâryya exists in a potential state in the kâra@na and is hence always existing and real.]
259
prak@rti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe, how can it determine what course of evolution will be of the best service to the puru@sas, how can it remove its own barriers and lend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prak@rti equilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate the evolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according to their bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones? There must be some intelligent Being who should help the course of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony may be attained. This Being is Îs'vara. Îs'vara is a puru@sa who had never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. His body is of pure sattva quality which can never be touched by ignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a permanent wish that those barriers in the course of the evolution of the reals by which the evolution of the gu@nas may best serve the double interest of the puru@sa's experience (bhoga) and liberation (apavarga) should be removed. It is according to this permanent will of Îs'vara that the proper barriers are removed and the gu@nas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the service of the best interests of the puru@sas. Îs'vara has not created the prak@rti; he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prak@rti in its quiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent order by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order of the world is brought about. This acknowledgement of Îs'vara in Yoga and its denial by Sâ@mkhya marks the main theoretic difference between the two according to which the Yoga and Sâ@mkhya are distinguished as Ses'vara Sâ@mkhya (Sâ@mkhya with Îs'vara) and Nirîs'vara Sâ@mkhya (Atheistic Sâ@mkhya) [Footnote ref 1].
Buddhi and Puru@sa.
The question again arises that though puru@sa is pure intelligence, the gu@nas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how can the latter come into touch with the former? Moreover, the puru@sa is pure inactive intelligence without any touch of impurity and what service or need can such a puru@sa have of the gu@nas? This difficulty is anticipated by Sâ@mkhya, which has already made room for its answer by assuming that one class of the gu@nas called sattva is such that it resembles the purity and the intelligence of the puru@sa to a very high degree, so much so
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Tattvavais'âradî,IV. 3;Yogavârttika,I. 24; andPravavanabhâsya,V. 1-12.]
260
that it can reflect the intelligence of the puru@sa, and thus render its non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were intelligent. Thus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitional operations are really the non-intelligent transformations of the buddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtue of the reflection of the puru@sa in the buddhi, these appear as if they are intelligent. The self (puru@sa) according to Sâ@mkhya-Yoga is not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Its existence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds and grounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directly noticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Through beginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changing states of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changes are further so associated with the reflection of the puru@sa in the buddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the puru@sa. This association of the buddhi with the reflection of the puru@sa in the buddhi has such a special fitness (yogyatâ) that it is interpreted as the experience of the puru@sa. This explanation of Vâcaspati of the situation is objected to by Vijñâna Bhik@su. Vijñâna Bhik@su says that the association of the buddhi with the image of the puru@sa cannot give us the notion of a real person who undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed therefore that when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the puru@sa, it is then superimposed upon the puru@sa, and we have the notion of an abiding person who experiences [Footnote ref 1]. Whatever may be the explanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the puru@sa is somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection ofciton buddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the puru@sa cannot realize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own. Buddhi resembles puru@sa in transparency, and the puru@sa fails to differentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as a result of this non-distinction the puru@sa becomes bound down to the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that the buddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non-distinction of puru@sa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi is what is meant byavidyâ(non-knowledge) in Sâ@mkhya, and is the root of all experience and all misery [Footnote ref 2].