[Footnote 4: Buddhagho@sa'sAtthasâlinî, p. 371.]
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The di@t@thâsavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical views stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines. The kâmasâvas stand in the way of one's entering into the way of Nirvâ@na (anâgâmimagga) and the bhavâsavas and avijjâsavas stand in the way of one's attaining arha or final emancipation. When theMajjhima Nikâyasays that from the rise of the âsavas avijjâ rises, it evidently counts avijjâ there as in some sense separate from the other âsavas, such as those of attachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge about sorrow.
The afflictions (kilesas) do not differ much from the âsavas for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar to us, such as covetousness (lobha), anger or hatred (dosa), infatuation (moha), arrogance, pride or vanity (mâna), heresy (di@t@thi), doubt or uncertainty (vicikicchâ), idleness (thîna), boastfulness (udhacca), shamelessness (ahirika) and hardness of heartanottapa); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the âsavas. In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha, dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are associated with the vedanâkkhandha, saññâkkhandha, sa@nkhârakkhandha and viññânakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind [Footnote ref 1].
Sîla and Samâdhi.
We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the tangles of desire (ta@nhâ ja@tâ), and the only way by which these may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (sîla), concentration (samâdhi) and wisdom (paññâ). Sîla briefly means the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (sabbapâpassa akara@nam). With sîla therefore the first start has to be made, for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances. This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performance of the sîla would lead one to the first two successive stages of sainthood, viz. the sotâpannabhâva (the stage in which one is put in the right current) and the sakadâgâmibhâva (the stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samâdhi is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old kilesas are destroyed and the ta@nhâ or desire is removed and
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[Footnote 1:Dhammasa@nga@ni,p. 180.]
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by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It directly brings in paññâ (true wisdom) and by paññâ the saint achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an arhat [Footnote ref 1]. Wisdom (paññâ) is right knowledge about the four âriya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause of destruction.
Sîla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. Sîla thus means 1. right volition (cetanâ), 2. the associated mental states (cetasika), 3. mental control (sa@mvara) and 4. the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind by the preceding three sîlas called avîtikkama. Sa@mvara is spoken of as being of five kinds, 1. Pâ@timokkhasa@mvara (the control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisa@mvara (the control of mindfulness), 3. Ñânasa@mvara (the control of knowledge), 4. Khantisa@mvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasa@mvara (the control of active self-restraint). Pâ@timokkhasa@mvara means all self-control in general. Satisa@mvara means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good associations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness (sati) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may lead in the right direction. Khantisa@mvara is that by which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence to sîla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (kamma) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (samâdhânam, upadhâra@na@m, pati@t@thâ) [Footnote ref 2].
The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting, dining, etc., which are called the dhûta@ngas or pure disciplinary parts [Footnote ref 3]. The practice of sîla and the dhûtangas help the sage to adopt the course of samâdhi. Samâdhi as we have seen means the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (kusalacittekaggatâ samâdhi@h) together with its states upon one particular object (ekâramma@na) so that they may completely cease to shift and change (sammâ ca avikkhipamânâ) [Footnote ref 4].
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[Footnote 1:Visuddhimagga Nidânâdikathâ.]
[Footnote 2:Visuddhimagga-sîlaniddeso, pp. 7 and 8.]
[Footnote 3:Visuddhimagga, II.]
[Footnote 4:Visuddhimagga, pp. 84-85.]
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The man who has practised sîla must train his mind first in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire the chief concentration of meditation called jhâna (fixed and steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind for the acquirement of jhânasamâdhi eventually lead to it and are called upacâra samâdhi (preliminary samâdhi) as distinguished from the jhânasamâdhi called the appanâsamâdhi (achieved samâdhi) [Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating and drinking (âhâre pa@tikkûlasaññâ) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows will come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, k@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase of a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called catudhâtuvavatthânabhâvanâ (the meditation of the body as being made up of the four elements) [Footnote ref 3]. Thirdly he has to habituate his mind to think again and again (anussati) about the virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sa@ngha (the monks following the Buddha), the gods and the law (dhamma) of the Buddha, about the good effects of sîla, and the making of gifts (câgânussati), about the nature of death (mara@nânussati) and about the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena (upasamânussati) [Footnote ref 4].
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[Footnote 1: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the interconnection of jhâna (Skr.dhyâna) with its accessory stages called parikammas (Visuddhimagga,pp. 85 f.).]
[Footnote 2:Visuddhimagga, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic attitude, "Imañ ca pana âhâre pa@tikulasaññâ@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@no rasata@nhâya cittam pa@tilîyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so, kantâranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado âhâra@m âhâreti yâvad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natthâya," p. 347. The mind of him who inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to sustain himself in crossing a forest.]
[Footnote 3:Visuddhimagga, pp. 347-370.]
[Footnote 4:Visuddhimagga, pp. 197-294.]
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Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations called the upacâra samâdhi we come to those other sources of concentration and meditation called the appanâsamâdhi which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samâdhi. The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbâna. In the first part of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are, and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the dead carcases are as loathsome as they [Footnote ref.1] This is called asubhakamma@t@thâna or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our bodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter into the first jhâna by leading his mind away from his body. This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness about the nature of the body [Footnote ref 2]. As an aid to concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling (passâsa) and the exhaling (âssâsa) of his breath, so that instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. This is called the anapânasati or the mindfulness of inhalation and exhalation [Footnote ref 3]
Next to this we come to Brahmavihâra, the fourfold meditation of metta (universal friendship), karu@nâ (universal pity), muditâ (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and upekkhâ (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinking how he should himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not
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[Footnote 1:Visuddhimagga,VI.]
[Footnote 2:Ibid.pp. 239-266.]
[Footnote 3:Ibid.pp. 266-292.]
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connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others. He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by anger, he would spoil all his sîla which he was so carefully practising. If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury, should he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If he were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas are momentary (kha@nikattâ); that there no longer existed the khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was injured was himself an indispensable element in the production of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and there could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible and of being angry with him. If even after thinking in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself in an attitude of universal friendship [Footnote ref 1]. This is called the mettâ-bhâvana. In the meditation of universal pity (karu@nâ) also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to Nibbâna, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow [Footnote ref 2].
We next come to the jhânas with the help of material things as objects of concentration called the Kasi@nam. These objects of concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space (parîcchinnâkâsa). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes
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[Footnote 1:Visuddhimagga, pp. 295-314.]
[Footnote 2:Ibid.pp. 314-315.]
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with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.
In the first stages of the first meditation (pathamam jhânam) the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without any quivering. This state is called vicâra (steadily moving). The first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa'sVisuddhimaggato the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with a buoyant exaltation (pîti) and a steady inward bliss called sukha [Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this first jhâna roots out five ties of avijjâ, kamacchando (dallying with desires), vyâpâdo (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikicchâ (doubt). The five elements of which this jhâna is constituted are vitakka, vicâra, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).
When the sage masters the first jhâna he finds it defective and wants to enter into the second meditation (dutiyam jhânam), where there is neither any vitakka nor vicâra of the first jhâna, but the mind is in one unruffled state (ekodibhâvam). It is a much steadier state and does not possess the movement which characterized the vitakka and the vicâra stages of the first jhâna and is therefore a very placid state (vitakka-vicârakkhobha-virahe@na ativiya acalatâ suppasannatâ ca). It is however associated with pîti, sukha and ekaggatâ as the first jhâna was.
When the second jhâna is mastered the sage becomes disinclined towards the enjoyment of the pîti of that stage and becomes indifferent to them (upekkhako). A sage in this stage sees the objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all the âsavas of the sage become loosened (khî@nâsava). The enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the
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[Footnote 1: Where there is pîti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not necessarily be pîti.Vîsuddhimagga, p. 145.]
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mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes to turn back to the enjoyment of pîti again. The two characteristics of this jhâna are sukha and ekaggatâ. It should however be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here, the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it (atimadhhurasukhe sukhapâramippatte pi tatiyajjhâne upekkhako, na tattha sukhâbhisangena âka@d@dhiyati) [Footnote ref 1]. The earth ball (pa@thavî) is however still the object of the jhâna.
In the fourth or the last jhâna both the sukha (happiness) and the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by supreme and absolute indifference (upekkhâ) which was slowly growing in all the various stages of the jhânas. The characteristics of this jhâna are therefore upekkhâ and ekaggatâ. With the mastery of this jhâna comes final perfection and total extinction of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an arhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas, no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and sufferings—Nibbâna.
Kamma.
In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha Nikâya also we read how Pâyâsi was trying to give his reasons in support of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3]." Some of his arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions we do not find at the time of the death of any person that his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of
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[Footnote 1:Visuddhimagga, p. 163.]
[Footnote 2:Majjhima Nikâya, I.p. 296, andVisuddhimagga, pp. 167-168.]
[Footnote 3:Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 349;D. N.II. pp. 317 ff.]
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Pâyâsi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the Upani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In theMilinda Pañha, we find Nâgasena saying "it is through a difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree, some wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1]." We have seen in the third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by the Upani@sad sages.
But karma could produce its effect in this life or any other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation. But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2]." Karma by itself without craving (ta@nhâ) is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Thus we read in theMahâsatipa@t@thâna sutta, "even this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnote ref 3]." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it dwell [Footnote ref 4]." Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first ârya satya (noble truth).
The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5]."
When the desire or craving (ta@nhâ) has once ceased the sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad
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[Footnote 1: Warren'sBuddhism in Translations, p. 215.]
[Footnote 2:Ibid.pp. 216-217.]
[Footnote 3:Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 340.]
[Footnote 4:Ibid.p. 341.]
[Footnote 5:Ibid.p. 341.]
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fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as Moggallâna did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of his desire [Footnote ref 1].
Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and mind (kâyika,vâcikaandmânasika). The root of this kamma is however volition (cetanâ) and the states associated with it [Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (vâcika) and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (mânasika) [Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.
Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into four classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity, (2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which contribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4].
Final extinction of sorrow (nibbâna) takes place as the natural result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallée Poussin has pointed out that in the Pâli texts Nibbâna has sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].
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[Footnote 1: SeeKathâvatthuand Warren'sBuddhism in Translations, pp, 221 ff.]
[Footnote 2:Atthasâlinî, p. 88.]
[Footnote 3: SeeAtthasâlinî, p. 90.]
[Footnote 4: SeeAtthasâlinî, p. 89.]
[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Valláe Poussin's article in theE. R.E.onNirvâ@na. See alsoCullavagga, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids'sPsalmsof the early Buddhists, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii;Dîgha,II. 15;Udâna, VIII.;Sa@myutta, III. 109.]
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Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbâna inPali Text Society Journal, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space (âkâsa) or consciousness (viññâna) attained to a state in which they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of Nibbâna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task to explain Nibbâna in terms of worldly experience, and there is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to think of a Tathâgata as existing eternally (s'âs'vata) or not-existing (as'âs'vata) or whether he is existing as well as not existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbâna is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.
Later Buddhistic writers like Nâgârjuna and Candrakîrtti took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There is no difference between the worldly stage (sa@msâra) and Nibbâna, for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during the sa@msâra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbâna.
Upani@sads and Buddhism.
The Upani@sads had discovered that the true self was ânanda (bliss) [Footnote ref 1]. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly presupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was the self (attâ) it must be bliss. The Upani@sads had asserted that the self(âtman) was indestructible and eternal [Footnote ref 2]. If we are allowed
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[Footnote 1: Tait, II.5.]
[Footnote 2: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13.]
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to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss, because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upani@sads, but he who carefully reads the Upani@sads cannot but think that the reason why the Upani@sads speak of the self as bliss is that it is eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the Upani@sads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self [Footnote ref 1]. The point at which Buddhism parted from the Upani@sads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upani@sads doubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is found in the Upani@sads that there was associated with these a permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined as this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (neti neti) [Footnote ref 2]. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me as my self [Footnote ref 3].
The true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendental experience as it were, for they said that it could not be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out as "there," behind all the changing mental categories. The Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (rûpa) or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He
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[Footnote 1:Sa@myutta Nikûya, III. pp. 44-45 ff.]
[Footnote 2: See B@rh. IV. iv. Chândogya, VIII. 7-12.]
[Footnote 3:Sa@myutta Nikaya, III 45.]
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experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or experienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of experiences that he considered as the perception of the self [Footnote ref 1].
The Upani@sads did not try to establish any school of discipline or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge. The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow. Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates, ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance about the means of bringing about this extinction represent the fourfold ignorance (avijjâ) [Footnote ref 2]. The avidyâ, which is equivalent to the Pâli word avijjâ, occurs in the Upani@sads also, but there it means ignorance about the âtman doctrine, and it is sometimes contrasted with vidyâ or true knowledge about the self (âtman) [Footnote ref 3]. With the Upani@sads the highest truth was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow [Footnote ref 4]. This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (âriya sacca)—sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto.
There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we may ordinarily be led to suppose.
Thus it is said in theVisuddhimagga"inasmuch however as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming into existence and a disappearing from existence…and is empty of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,—…or in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and similarly with reference to Karma and the rest—therefore is it to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with a twelvefold emptiness [Footnote ref 5]."
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[Footnote 1:Samyutta Nikâya, II. 46.]
[Footnote 2:Majjhima Nikâya, I.p. 54.]
[Footnote 3: Châ. I.i. 10. B@rh. IV. 3.20. There are some passages where vidyâ and avidyâ have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, I's'â 9-11.]
[Footnote 4:A@ng. Nikâya, III. 85.]
[Footnote 5 Warren'sBuddhism in Translations(Visuddhimagga, chap.XVII.), p. 175.]
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The Schools of Theravâda Buddhism.
There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death. Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesâli decided against the V@rjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas, they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahâsa@ngha) and came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus came to be called as the Mahâsa@nghikas [Footnote ref 1]. According to Vasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahâsa@nghikas seceded in 400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise first to the three schools Ekavyavahârikas, Lokottaravâdins, and Kukkulikas and after that the Bahus'rutîyas. In the course of the next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the Prajñaptivâdins, Caittikas, Aparas'ailas and Uttaras'ailas. The Theravâda or the Sthaviravâda school which had convened the council of Vesâli developed during the second and first century B.C. into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas, Mahîs'âsakas, Kâs'yapîyas, Sa@nkrântikas (more well known as Sautrântikas) and the Vâtsiputtrîyas which latter was again split up into the Dharmottarîyas, Bhadrayânîyas, Sammitîyas and Channâgarikas. The main branch of the Theravâda school was from the second century downwards known as the Hetuvâdins or Sarvâstivâdins [Footnote ref 2]. TheMahâbodhiva@msaidentifies the Theravâda school with the Vibhajjavâdins. The commentator of theKathâvatthuwho probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little. Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of
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[Footnote 1: TheMahâva@msadiffers fromDîpava@msain holding that the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahâsa@nghikas, but it was the Mahâsa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. TheMahâbodhiva@msa, which according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.—1000 A.D., follows the Mahava@msa in holding the Mahâsa@nghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.
Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council ofPâ@taliputra. See introduction to translation ofKathâvatthubyMrs Rhys Davids.]
[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs RhysDavids's translation ofKathâvatthu, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]
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certain schools, of the Mahâsa@nghikas, Lokottaravâdins, Ekavyavahârikas, Kakkulikas, Prajñaptivâdins and Sarvâstivâdins, but these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the Mahâsa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with mind (citta) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajñaptivâdins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, (3) that the Sarvâstivâdins believed that everything existed. From the discussions found in theKathâvatthualso we may know the views of some of the schools on some points which are not always devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism were not so many different systems but only differed from one another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. These schools are however not very important for a history of later Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct contact, are the Sarvâstivâdins including the Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâ@sikas, the Yogâcâra or the Vijñânavâdins and the Mâdhyamikas or the S'ûnyavâdins. We do not know which of the diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, the Sautrântika, Vaibhâ@sika, Yogâcâra and the Mâdhyamika schools. But as these schools were most important in relation to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can about these systems of Buddhistic thought.
When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them the Vijñânavâdins or the Yogâcâras and the S'ûnyavâdins, they often refer to the Sarvûstivûdins by which they mean both the Sautrûntikas and the Vaibhû@sikas, ignoring the difference that exists between these two schools. It is well to mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravûda doctrines
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as expressed in the Pâli works. The Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus theAbhidharmakos'as'âstraof Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhâ@sika was commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautrântika. The difference between the Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas that attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1]. Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentaryTarkarahasyadîpikâ on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccayasays that the Vaibhâsika was but another name of the Âryasammitîya school. According to Gu@naratna the Vaibhâ@sikas held that things existed for four moments, the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out in Vastlbandhu'sAbhidharmakos'athat the Vaibhâ@sikas believed these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of Yas'omitra onAbhidharmakos'a kârikâ, V. 25). The self called pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was formless and was produced along with its object by the very same conditions (arthasahabhâsî ekasamâgryadhînah). The Sautrântikas according to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul but only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, âkâs'a and pudgala are but names (sa@mjñâmâtram), mere assertions (pratijñâmâtram), mere limitations (samv@rtamâtram) and mere phenomena (vyavahâramâtram). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal and all pervasive soul. External objects are never directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all compounded things are momentary (k@sa@nikâh sarvasa@mskârâh).
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[Footnote 1: Mâdhavâcârya'sSarvadars'anasa@mgraha, chapter II.S'âstradîpikâ, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalañanda's commentary (onBhâmatî)Vedântakalpataru, p 286. "vaibhâ@sikasya bâhyo'rtha@h pratyak@sa@h, sautrântikasya jñânagatâkâravaicitrye@n anumeya@h." The nature of the inference of the Sautrântikas is shown thus by Amalânanda (1247-1260 A.D.) "ye yasmin satyapi kâdâcitkâ@h te tadatiriktâpek@sâ@h" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects)Vedântakalpataru, p. 289.]
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The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is intended to be signified by that word (anyâpoha@h s'abdârtha@h). Salvation (mok@sa) comes as the result of the destruction of the process of knowledge through continual meditation that there is no soul [Footnote ref 1].
One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavâdins, Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâ@sikas or the Sarvâstivâdins appears to refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest with Buddhist philosophy. ThusAbhidharmakos'a(v. 24…) describes the Sarvâstivâdins as those who maintain the universal existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavâdins are those "who maintain that the present elements and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition." There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrâta, Gho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrâta maintained that when an element enters different times, its existence changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes though the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that "when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspects without being severed from its future and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra held that an entity is called present, past and future according as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva maintained the view that just as the same woman may be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the preceding or the succeeding moment.
All these schools are in some sense Sarvâstivâdins, for they maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhâ@sika finds them all defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrâta's
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[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna'sTarkarahasyadîpikâ, pp. 46-47.]
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view is only a veiled Sâ@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them. The Vaibhâ@sika finds himself in agreement with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time. The Sautrântika however thought that the Vaibhâ@sika's doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist. He objected to the Vaibhâ@sika view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are
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never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhâ@sika suggests, but past passions leave residues which become the causes of new passions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].
Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of the Vâtsiputtrîyas and the Sarvâstivâdins as represented by Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of the existence of soul inAbhidharmakos'a. The argument of Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and must be something different from the elements or entities of a personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging being would be without any practical efficiency (arthakriyâkâritva) which alone determines or proves existence. The soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are only the elements of a personal life. But the Vâtsiputtrîya school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is separate from it, so the soul is an individual (pudgala) which has a separate existence, though we could not say that it was altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as
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[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion ofAbhidharmakoiaby my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]
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belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,' 'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments coming in close succession being called Devadatta)."
The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say "this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away having reached an age." Only so much description can be understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are
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conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation 'individual' but a common name for the different elements of which it is composed."
The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is just because there did not exist any living being as "individual," as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional name for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].
The only book of the Sammitîyas known to us and that by name only is theSammitîyas'âstratranslated into Chinese between 350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however probably lost [Footnote ref 2].
The Vaibhâ@sikas are identified with the Sarvâstivâdins who according toDîpava@msaV. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, branched off from the Mahîs'âsakas, who in their turn had separated from the Theravâda school.
From theKathâvatthuwe know (1) that the Sabbatthivâdins believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual process, (3) that consciousness or even samâdhi was nothing but
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[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation ofA@s@tamakos'asthânanibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky,Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie, 1919.]
[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallée Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitîyas in theE. R.E.He there says that in theAbhidharmakos'avyâkhyâthe Sammitîyas have been identified with the Vâtsîputtrîyas and that many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibhâ@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvâna can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and rebirth calledantarâbhava; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (tyagânvaya) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (paribhogânvaya pu@nya); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala cannot be said to be transitory (anitye) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (skandhas) shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by Professor De la Vallée Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have noticed above.]
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a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1]. The Sabbatthivâdins or Sarvâstivâdins have a vast Abhidharma literature still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the Abhidharma of the Theravâda school which we have already mentioned [Footnote ref 2]. These are 1.Jñânaprasthâna S'âstraof Kâtyâyanîputtra which passed by the name ofMahâ Vibhâ@sâfrom which the Sabbatthivâdins who followed it are called Vaibhâ@sikas [Footnote ref 3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by As'vagho@sa. 2.Dharmaskandhaby S'âriputtra. 3.Dhâtukâyaby Pûr@na. 4.Prajñaptis'âstraby Maudgalyâyana. 5.Vijñânakâyaby Devak@sema. 6.Sa@ngîtiparyyâyaby Sâriputtra andPrakara@napâdaby Vasumitra. Vasubandhu (420 A.D.-500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibhâ@sika [Footnote ref 4] system in verses (kârikâ) known as theAbhidharmakos'a, to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the nameAbhidharma Kos'abhâ@syain which he pointed out some of the defects of the Vaibhâ@sika school from the Sautrântika point of view [Footnote ref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gu@namati and later on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautrântika and called his workAbhidharmakos'a vyâkhyâ; Sa@nghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu wroteSamayapradipaandNyâyânusâra(Chinese translations of which are available) on strict Vaibhâ@sika lines. We hear also of other Vaibhâ@sika writers such as Dharmatrâta, Gho@saka, Vasumitra and Bhadanta, the writer ofSa@myuktâbhidharmas'âstraandMahâvibhâ@sâ. Di@nnâga(480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhâ@sika or a Sautrântika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote his famous workPramâ@nasamuccayain which he established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vâtsyâyana the celebrated commentator of theNyâya sûtras; but we regret
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[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translationKathâvatthu, p. xix, and Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]
[Footnote 2:Mahâvyutpattigives two names for Sarvâstivâda, viz. Mûlasarvâstivâda and Âryyasarvâstivâda. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks of Âryyamûlasarvâstivâda and Mûlasarvâstivâda. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu says (P.T.S.1904-1905) that Paramârtha, in his life of Vasubandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, who studied it there.]
[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (P.T.S.1904-1905) that Kâtyâyanîputtra's work was probably a compilation from other Vibhâ@sâs which existed before the Chinese translations and Vibhâ@sâ texts dated 383 A.D.]
[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's articleJ.R.A.S.1905.]
[Footnote 5: The Sautrântikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibhâ@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the Suttapi@taka.]
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to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into any of the modern European or Indian languages.
The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivâdins from the Chinese versions of theAbhidharmakos'a, Mahâvibhâ@sâs'âstra, etc., rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch, which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.
The Sabbatthivâdins admitted the five skandhas, twelve âyatanas, eighteen dhâtus, the three asa@msk@rta dharmas of pratisa@mkhyânirodha apratisa@mkhyânirodha and âkâs'a, and the sa@msk@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rûpa (matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental) [Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together (sa@msk@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the rûpa, citta, etc., are thus called sa@msk@rta dharmas (composite things or collocations—sambhûyakâri). The rûpa dharmas are eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14 cittaviprayukta sa@mskâra dharmas (non-mental composite things); adding to these the three asa@msk@rta dharmas we have the seventy-five dharmas. Rûpa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum is known as paramâ@nu, which is the minutest form of rûpa. It cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible. But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary flash into being. The simple atoms are calleddravyaparamâ@nuand the compound onessa@mghâtaparamâ@nu. In the words of Prof. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramâ@nus combine together to form an a@nu, and it is in this combined form only that they become perceptible. The combination takes place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and
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[Footnote 1:Systems of Buddhistic Thought, published by the CalcuttaUniversity.]
[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvâstivâdins in his bhâ@sya on theBrahma-sûtrasII. 2 notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen.]
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others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities of all the mahâbhûtas are inherent in the paramâ@nus. The special characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to form each of the elements; the difference between the different elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics though present remained only in a potential form. The mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, (1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such asdh@rtior attraction,sa@mgrahaor cohesion,paktior chemical heat, andvyûhanaor clustering and collecting). These combine together naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction between the Vaibhâ@sika Sarvâstivadins and other forms of Buddhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, owing to their constant change of combination. Avidyâ is not regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of pratîtyasamutpâda; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual, but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion and represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidyâ, which through sa@mskâra, etc., produces nâmarûpa in the case of a particular individual, is not his avidyâ in the present existence but the avidyâ of his past existence bearing fruit in the present life.
"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The Sarvâstivâdins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the case of composite things (sa@mprayukta hetu) and in the case of
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[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kumârajîva's Chinese version ofÂryyadeva's commentary on theMâdhyamika s'âstra(chapter XX. Kârikâ 9).]
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the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum of "vijñâna" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and the aggregate of the five senses (indriyas) is called the perceiver. It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a substratum formed of them.
The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of appearance (sa@msthâna) of long, short, round, square, high, low, straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (kâyendriya) has for its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other energies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse thought (vijñâna); each of the five senses is an agent without which none of the five vijñânas would become capable of perceiving an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal senses consists of a combination of paramâ@nus, which are extremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed on our person which is designated as avijñapti rûpa. It is called rûpa because it is a result or effect of rûpa-contact; it is called avijñapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered as twofold, namely, that as thought (cetana karma) and that as activity (caitasika karma). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.
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that due to body-motion (kâyika karma) and speech (vâcika karma). Both these may again be latent (avijñapti) and patent (vijñapti), giving us the kâyika-vijnñpti karma, kâyikâvijñapti karma, vâcika-vijñapti karma and vâcikâvijñapti karma. Avijñapti rûpa and avijñapti karma are what we should call in modern phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but are similar to those which are known, they are called avijñapti.
The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it wills (cetati), manas because it thinks (manvate) and vijñâna because it discriminates (nirdis'ati). The discrimination may be of three kinds: (1) svabhâva nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination), (2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present, past and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination referring only to the past). The senses only possess thesvabhâva nirdes'a, the other two belong exclusively to manovijñâna. Each of the vijñânas as associated with its specific sense discriminates its particular object and perceives its general characteristics; the six vijñânas combine to form what is known as the Vijñânaskandha, which is presided over by mind (mano). There are forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rta dharmas âkâs'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance (nîrûpâkhya, non-rûpa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhyâ nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because they are non-existent but because the conditions which would have made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rta dharma, pratisa@mkhyâ nirodha, is the final deliverance from bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These are called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negation they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1].
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[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hînayâna thinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nâgârjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]
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Mahâyânism.
It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahâyânism took its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahâsa@nghikas separated themselves from the Theravâdins probably some time in 400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be labelled as Mahâyâna were gradually on the way to taking their first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works which are regarded as various Mahâyâna sûtras, some of which are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others as late as 300 or 400 A.D.[Footnote ref 1]. These Mahâyânasûtras, also called the Vaipulyasûtras, are generally all in the form of instructions given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravâda school.
The word Hînayâna refers to the schools of Theravâda, and as such it is contrasted with Mahâyâna. The words are generally translated as small vehicle (hîna= small,yâna= vehicle) and great vehicle (mahâ= great,yâna= vehicle). But this translation by no means expresses what is meant by Mahâyâna and Hînayâna [Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A.D.) in hisMahâyânasûtrâla@mkâragives
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[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these sûtras are found inCandrakîrtti's commentary on theMâdhyamîka kârikâsof Nâgârjuna; some ofthese are the following:A@s@tasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ(translated intoChinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ, Gaganagañja,Samâdhisûtra, Tathâgataguhyasûtra, D@r@dhâdhyâs'ayasañcodanâsûtra,Dhyâyitamu@s@tisûtra, Pitâputrasamâgamasûtra, Mahâyânasûtra,Mâradamanasûtra, Ratnakû@tasûtra, Ratnacû@dâparip@rcchâsûtra,Ratnameghasûtra, Ratnarâs`isûtra, Ratnâkarasûtra,Râ@s@trapâlaparip@rcchâsûtra, La@nkâvatârasûtra, Lalitavistarasûtra,Vajracchedikâsûtra, Vimalakîrttinirdes'asûtra, S'âlistambhasûtra,Samâdhirajasutra, Sukhâvatîvyûha, Suvar@naprabhâsasûtra,Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255),Amitâyurdhyânasûtra, Hastikâkhyasûtra, etc.]
[Footnote 2: The word Yâna is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle (Lalitavistara, pp. 25, 38;Prajñâpâramitâ, pp. 24, 319;Samâdhirâjasûtra, p. 1;Karu@nâpu@ndarîka, p. 67;La@nkâvatârasûtra, pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yâna is as old as the Upani@sads where we read of Devayâna and Pit@ryâna. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear inLa@nkâvatâraof S'râvakayâna (career of the S'râvakas or the Theravâdin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayâna (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha yâna (career of the Buddhas), Ekayâna (one career), Devayâna (career of the gods), Brahmayâna (career of becoming a Brahmâ), Tathâgatayâna (career of a Tathâgata). In one placeLankâvatârasays that ordinarily distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (Lankâvatâra, p. 68).]