FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[20]Bird,Annals of Natal, i. 307.[21]Among the reasons of the protest drawn up about May, 1837, were: That Natal was not part of the British dominions, but belonged to the resident European inhabitants; that the power given to Gardiner extended only to British subjects, and did not empower him to punish acts of aggression committed by Natives upon British residents; that Gardiner had been given no civil jurisdiction. The colonists, moreover, expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would take over the country and appoint Magistrates.—Bird,Ibid.i. 320.[22]The military system, however, was not permitted to operate universally as in Zululand, though there was no objection to Chiefs maintaining a certain amount of military organization within their respective tribes.[23]The policy was to distribute the refugees over the European farms. "Each farmer was allowed 5 families on his farm, but not any more without consent of the authorities."—Proceedings, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 20, 25.[24]Henry Cloete,Evidence, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 18. 25.[25]Ibid.i. 25. 27.[26]Shepstone arrived in 1845, but did not begin to hold office till January, 1846.—Proceedings, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 58.[27]The very able report of this Commission was dated 30th March, 1847, and will be foundin extensoin i. pp. 62-67 of the publication referred to in the preceding note.[28]Dated 27th April, 1864.[29]Memorandum, T. Shepstone to Legislative Council, 18th June, 1849.[30]Ibid.[31]Chiefs were called on by Magistrates to supply labourers according to the size of their tribes.[32]Zululand was annexed to Natal in December, 1897, when practically the same system of Native administration in vogue at that time was permitted to continue.[33]The statistics here given are for the year 1906.[34]These include those (23) of the so-called Northern Districts—a tract of country annexed to Natal on the conclusion of the last Boer War.[35]Total, £2,618 for the year.[36]Total, £1,200, of which £500 was paid to Dinuzulu, £60 to each of three of his uncles, and £300 to Mciteki (formerly Zibebu).[37]At the last Census (May, 1911), the total number of Natives in South Africa was 4,019,006 (males, 2,012,949; females, 1,996,057).[38]The word "kraal" which will henceforth be used, is derived from the Dutch "coraal."[39]For many years past, many Chiefs had portions of their tribes living in two, three or more Magisterial divisions. In such cases, a Chief was called on to nominate a headman, with powers almost equal to his own, to control each section. It was, moreover, the Government's policy, on the death of such Chief, to make an arrangement whereby the outlying sections would be absorbed by Chiefs actually resident in the Magisterial districts in which such sections happened to be.[40]Zululand, with a Native population of about 170,000, became, as has been seen, a province of Natal in 1897.[41]Preamble, Act No. 49, 1903.[42]See p. 24. A separate Trust, though consisting of the same personnel, was created in 1909 for Zululand. In this territory alone, the area reserved for Native occupation amounts to nearly 4,000,000 acres.[43]£3 a hut was at first levied, subsequently reduced to 30s.[44]Law No. 28, 1865.[45]Some 1,800 men, women and children had been exempted by 31st December, 1908.[46]Law No. 11, 1865.

[20]Bird,Annals of Natal, i. 307.

[21]Among the reasons of the protest drawn up about May, 1837, were: That Natal was not part of the British dominions, but belonged to the resident European inhabitants; that the power given to Gardiner extended only to British subjects, and did not empower him to punish acts of aggression committed by Natives upon British residents; that Gardiner had been given no civil jurisdiction. The colonists, moreover, expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would take over the country and appoint Magistrates.—Bird,Ibid.i. 320.

[22]The military system, however, was not permitted to operate universally as in Zululand, though there was no objection to Chiefs maintaining a certain amount of military organization within their respective tribes.

[23]The policy was to distribute the refugees over the European farms. "Each farmer was allowed 5 families on his farm, but not any more without consent of the authorities."—Proceedings, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 20, 25.

[24]Henry Cloete,Evidence, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 18. 25.

[25]Ibid.i. 25. 27.

[26]Shepstone arrived in 1845, but did not begin to hold office till January, 1846.—Proceedings, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 58.

[27]The very able report of this Commission was dated 30th March, 1847, and will be foundin extensoin i. pp. 62-67 of the publication referred to in the preceding note.

[28]Dated 27th April, 1864.

[29]Memorandum, T. Shepstone to Legislative Council, 18th June, 1849.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Chiefs were called on by Magistrates to supply labourers according to the size of their tribes.

[32]Zululand was annexed to Natal in December, 1897, when practically the same system of Native administration in vogue at that time was permitted to continue.

[33]The statistics here given are for the year 1906.

[34]These include those (23) of the so-called Northern Districts—a tract of country annexed to Natal on the conclusion of the last Boer War.

[35]Total, £2,618 for the year.

[36]Total, £1,200, of which £500 was paid to Dinuzulu, £60 to each of three of his uncles, and £300 to Mciteki (formerly Zibebu).

[37]At the last Census (May, 1911), the total number of Natives in South Africa was 4,019,006 (males, 2,012,949; females, 1,996,057).

[38]The word "kraal" which will henceforth be used, is derived from the Dutch "coraal."

[39]For many years past, many Chiefs had portions of their tribes living in two, three or more Magisterial divisions. In such cases, a Chief was called on to nominate a headman, with powers almost equal to his own, to control each section. It was, moreover, the Government's policy, on the death of such Chief, to make an arrangement whereby the outlying sections would be absorbed by Chiefs actually resident in the Magisterial districts in which such sections happened to be.

[40]Zululand, with a Native population of about 170,000, became, as has been seen, a province of Natal in 1897.

[41]Preamble, Act No. 49, 1903.

[42]See p. 24. A separate Trust, though consisting of the same personnel, was created in 1909 for Zululand. In this territory alone, the area reserved for Native occupation amounts to nearly 4,000,000 acres.

[43]£3 a hut was at first levied, subsequently reduced to 30s.

[44]Law No. 28, 1865.

[45]Some 1,800 men, women and children had been exempted by 31st December, 1908.

[46]Law No. 11, 1865.

STATE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION ON THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.

Whenit is borne in mind that the campaign which forms the subject of this history is probably the first to be conducted from start to finish by a British Colony, independently of other than merely moral assistance of Imperial troops, the contents of this chapter will probably prove of greater interest to the reader than would otherwise have been the case. No apology is, therefore, needed for attempting to describe the beginnings and development of military organization in Natal, and to show how it became possible for the Colony, aided to some extent by her sister Colonies, to deal as successfully as she did with the Rebellion.[47]

In 1893, when the Imperial Government granted responsible government to Natal, it was arranged that the Colony should assume direct control of her large Native population. It was, at the same time, decided that the garrison of Imperial troops should remain for a period of five years, so as to afford the colonists time within which to organize a defence force.

After the expiry of the five years, the Imperial Government began gradually to withdraw the troops.

A Volunteer Act was passed by Natal in 1895. The post of Commandant of Volunteers was conferred on Colonel (now Major-General Sir John) Dartnell, K.C.B.,C.M.G., who, in addition to having for years controlled the various, though small, volunteer corps, had, for twenty-two years, been in command of the Natal Mounted Police. On his resignation from the former office in 1898, he was succeeded by his staff officer, Major W. Royston, who, promoted to the rank of Colonel, continued in command until his untimely death in 1902. Colonel H.P. Leader, of the Imperial Army, succeeded. He was assisted by the four District Adjutants who were in charge of a like number of military districts into which the Colony was divided.

Much useful work was accomplished between 1893 and 1902 towards increasing the strength and efficiency of the force, as well as placing it on a sound war footing. To Colonel Royston belongs a large measure of credit for the high degree of organization achieved, notably in connection with the Boer War. During this war, of course, all Natal troops took the field to assist in repelling invasion. The alacrity with which they responded to the calls, and the smartness with which the duties assigned them were carried out, were commented on in the most favourable terms by the distinguished general officers in charge of the operations. But, notwithstanding the promptness displayed, it was impossible to disguise the fact that, out of an available manhood of 12,000, only 2,000 were actuallyliablefor service.[48]It is, therefore, not surprising that Parliament should have been ready to provide for a better and more comprehensive system of defence than was possible under the Volunteer Act.

Organization proper, in the sense of exclusively local adjustment and systematization of local forces andmatériel, could not and did not begin until some years after the bestowal of autonomy on Natal, and the first step in the process was the passing by the legislature of the Militia Act (1903) imposing on every class of the European inhabitants, between certain ages, the liabilityto undergo military training and service. By exacting compulsory service universally, with, of course, certain exceptions, a powerful instrument was placed in the hands of the Commandant of Militia, and one which enabled the Colony to be put in a more thorough-going state of defence than had ever before been attempted.

The word "organization" is used here in a precise and definite sense, and is taken to mean establishment of the requisite regiments or corps, personnel, horses, arms, transport, etc., and a placing of the same by constant training, inspection or otherwise, in a condition of readiness, with the object, on the outbreak of hostilities, of realizing, in the shortest possible time, the general purpose in the minds of those in authority. Connected with such organization is the ascertainment by the responsible officer of the resources of his command in regard to provisions, labourers, horses, the means of transporting troops and stores, and the obtaining of accurate knowledge of all the strategic features of the country, of fortified places, and the means of defence, the erection of lagers, making of roads and means of communication, and of every particular which may increase his power of acting with advantage against an enemy.[49]But it is one thing to enact a law and frame accompanying regulations, quite another to see that the various provisions are complied with by the three arms and administrative services in such way as will conduce to efficiency and the smooth working of every part when the force is called upon to take the field.

General peace organization, of course, in the way of holding annual camps of exercise, rifle meetings, sending of patrols from time to time through Native locations, arranging for the conveyance of camp equipment, saddlery, etc., by railway or by ox and mule waggon, purchase and hire of remounts, registration and insurance of horses, etc., continued just as they had done for years prior to the passing of the Militia Act, except that improvements on the efforts of preceding years were continually being introduced.

Having regard to the great importance of the new Act, it is proposed to allude briefly to the genesis thereof, to some of its principal features, and to the way in which it was administered. Unless the fundamental provisions are grasped at the outset, it is not unlikely that indistinct impressions will arise in the mind of the reader, with the result that the achievements of the Colony during an important crisis, full of meaning as they are and of lessons for the future, will be insufficiently appreciated.

In 1902, a motion, introduced into Parliament by Mr. (now Sir) Thomas Watt, K.C.M.G., member for Newcastle, in favour of universal compulsory service, was carried unanimously. A bill was next drafted and formally introduced by the Prime Minister, Sir Albert Hime, K.C.M.G., but was withdrawn. This was followed by the appointment of a Commission in November, 1902, under the chairmanship of Mr. Ernest L. Acutt, C.M.G., "to consider and report upon the general measures proper to be taken for the defence of the Colony and to advise as to the most suitable mode of constituting a defence force according to the general object of the bill (No. 36), which was introduced into Parliament at its last ordinary session."

This Commission reported in favour of compulsory military service, drafted another bill and recommended the enactment thereof. The recommendations were supported by the then Commandant of Volunteers (Colonel Leader, whose services had been specially lent to Natal by the Imperial Government). This officer was appointed to take command of the troops during the period of their transition from a volunteer to a militia force, or otherwise to institute such other radical changes as might appear imperative.

The bill was passed into law with but little opposition towards the end of 1903.[50]The labour of initiating, drafting and supporting in Parliament this statesmanlike measure was undertaken chiefly by Sir Thomas Watt.

Among its principal features were the following:

"That the Militia, with the Governor as Commander-in-Chief, and a Commandant of Militia, with the rank of Colonel, as responsible for the administration of all Militia and Defence matters, should consist of all the male inhabitants of European descent in the Colony, from the age of 18 to the age of 50 years inclusively ... not being aliens." Certain exemptions were allowed.

The Force was divided into four classes:

"(a) Active Militia, consisting of all men who may volunteer and who may be accepted for service in this class, and all other men who may be balloted for service.

"(b) Militia First Reserve, consisting of all unmarried men from 18 to 30 years of age inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia.

"(c) Militia Second Reserve, consisting of all married men between 18 and 30 years of age inclusive, and all men from 31 to 40 years of age inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia.

"(d) Militia Third Reserve, consisting of all men from 41 to 50 years of age inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia...."

The strength of the Active Militia was to be determined from time to time, by the Governor-in-Council, but, in time of peace, might not exceed 4,000 men.

Whenever called out for active service, it became competent for the Governor-in-Council to place the Militia "under the orders of the Commander of His Majesty's Regular Forces in the Colony, provided such officer shall not be below the substantive rank of Major-General in the Army."[51]

In the event of the Active Militia being mobilized for military service, the Commandant was required to advertise in the Government Gazette and the press for volunteers, and "should enough men have not volunteered and been accepted in any district to complete the quota required for that district," within the time specified, "the men enrolled in the Militia First Reserve shall beballoted for" and "any man balloted for ... shall be attached to such corps in his military district as the District Commandant may notify."

The period of service in time of peace was not less than three years, irrespective of age at time of enrolment.

The Militia Reserves were liable to be called out by the Governor-in-Council for active service in time of "war, invasion or insurrection, or danger of any of them." Their officers (designated Chief Leaders and Sub-Leaders) were appointed "at the instance of the Commandant of Militia in pursuance of a vote passed by a majority of the members of such Militia Reserves," in accordance with the regulations.

In so far as the Native, Indian or coloured male population (outnumbering the European by about 10 to 1) was concerned, the Act empowered the Governor to call out any portion thereof, being British subjects, for military training or service in time of peace, or for active service in time of war, and to form the same into contingents for employment as scouts, drivers, labourers, stretcher-bearers, etc., under officers subject to the Commandant of Militia.

An amending Act, passed in 1906, enabled the Commandant to call out the Reserves for training, and so introduce some degree of organization among them, impossible under the main Act.

Although, during 1906, the entire European population was under 100,000, it was found that 5,000 men (all volunteers) were at the disposal of the State as Active Militia, with about 15,000 Reserves, divided into the three classes referred to.

A defect in the principal Act was the concession to Reserves of the privilege of electing their own officers (Chief Leaders and Sub-Leaders), as the selections, in many cases, were not determined by the military knowledge, military service, firmness of character and so forth of the candidate, but simply by the degree of wealth possessed, or popularity enjoyed, by him in the district. When the Reserves of certain parts were called out foractive service, the seriousness of this mistake speedily manifested itself, with the result that the best efforts of which some of the corps were capable were not put forth. Having regard to the numerical strength of the Reserves, it was of the greatest importance that only efficient officers should have been selected.

But, given the power of exacting compulsory service and the availability ofmatériel, there was wanting another and most important factor, namely, something which could so co-ordinate and systematize the heterogeneous elements as to weld them into that for which they were intended, namely, an engine of war, endowed with the power of life, movement and destruction. There was wanted, in short, an organizer. It was one thing for the legislature to provide the law, the money, the men, the horses, the equipment, ordnance and transport, but he that was to transform these masses of incongruous material into the desired entity could only be born, not made.

Without the active sympathy of a Government, an organizer can accomplish but little. To prepare for war is a task which, in order that it may be properly fulfilled, exacts tribute in numberless directions. Its dimensions are of universal scope and variety, and, unless the State is prepared to meet the reasonable demand of its agent, his efforts are foredoomed to failure. As the goal is to transform the material at hand into a living thing, it devolves on a Government to see that means are forthcoming or the efforts of the artificer become lacking both in efficiency and usefulness. This lesson the Government of Natal had learnt far better than did Canning and his Council at the time of the Indian Mutiny. Instead of refusing offers of assistance from local volunteers, every expedient was adopted by Natal to encourage volunteering; instead of an unsympathetic ruler, the Colony found in the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, an ideal helmsman, who, supported by a strong and capable Ministry[52]and afar-seeing Commandant, strained every nerve to suppress the Insurrection in a swift and vigorous manner, well knowing that clemency and indecision would help only to aggravate the situation and imperil the State.

On the Militia Act becoming law in 1904, the Government appointed its Commandant of Volunteers, Col. H.P. Leader, as the first Commandant of Militia. He, thereupon, temporarily assumed the rank of Brigadier General. A District Commandant was also appointed to each of the three military districts into which the Colony was then divided.

Assisted by these officers, his staff and the various commanding officers of corps, the Commandant took early steps to establish the system envisaged by the Act.

It will be remembered that May 31st, 1902, saw the conclusion of hostilities between England and the South African Republics. In that great conflict, Natal had thrown all her regular volunteer forces, numbering only about 2000 men, into the field.[53]Such forces, distinctly well-organized, were maintained at a high state of efficiency as long as the war lasted.

There can be no question but that the exacting discipline undergone by the troops during the Boer War prepared them and the rest of the Colony for the compulsory service imposed by the 1903 Act. But for the serious risks and trials of that war, even though commonly said to have "killed volunteering" in Natal, it is highly probable greater objection would have been offered than was done when the Militia bill was debated in Parliament. The War was, indeed, a blessing in disguise for Natal. It taught her manhood what defensive warfare was, as well as the necessity of establishing an adequate and constantly efficient force. In these circumstances, Leader found his task much easier than it would have been under ordinary conditions. His commanding and other officers were allready and eager to co-operate. If he was crippled for the want of funds, owing to the Colony passing through a time of severe financial depression, an excellent spirit prevailed, men being anxious to enrol in the various corps and help forward the realization of the general purposes of the Act.

Among the District Commandants was Lieut.-Col. (now Colonel), H.T. Bru-de-Wold, D.S.O., C.M.G., V.D., J.P.[54]This officer, whilst discharging the ordinary duties of his post, observed, not long after peace had been concluded with the Boers, what, no doubt, a number of other colonists also did, namely, that there was a certain amount of restlessness and disregard of authority among the younger sections of the Natives of his district which, on its south-western side, bordered on Pondoland. He made a point of visiting European homesteads in various parts, where he found his observations frequently corroborated, whilst his attention was drawn to other suspicious indications. He took steps to gather, from all available sources, information regarding the tribes, including those living along the border in the Cape Colony. Their probable fighting strength was ascertained, as also tribal differences, distinctions being drawn between hereditary blood-feuds and those of a minor character. Those tribes that had established intimate relations by marriage, etc., or were off-shoots of existing older stocks, though commonly designated by different names, were also noted. These particulars were tabulated so as to show which group was likely to take the field against another in the event of hostilities, and so on. By degrees, there grew up in his mind the idea that an open rupture between the white and the black races would occur in the near future, and on such presentiment appearing more reasonable and palpable as time went on, he set himself to consider howfar he would be ready should any such contingency arise in his particular district. He prepared mobilization schemes on a small scale, that is to say, assumed a revolt had broken out at a particular point within the Colony, and then devoted himself to utilizing all available resources so as to grapple with the imaginary outbreak in the most effective manner. These schemes, along with others on somewhat similar lines by the other district officers, were submitted to headquarters. Those by Bru-de-Wold evoked a special interest, with the result that he was invited to prepare others. This time, he was not limited to the resources of his own district, but was instructed to lay under tribute those of the entire Colony. This "day-dreaming," as persons devoid of a military sense may choose to style it, soon turned out to be, not only an amusing and engrossing pastime, but the thing of all others that the Colony stood most in need of at that particular juncture. That this view is correct, will become clearer the further we proceed.

On the post of Commandant being vacated by Leader in August, 1905, Bru-de-Wold was appointed thereto with the rank of Colonel.

But, although Col. Bru-de-Wold was so mindful of the necessity of preparing for war, it is only fair to remember that the foundations of Militia organization were laid whilst the first Commandant was still in office, not to refer to the various other and important contributory efforts in earlier days. The organization of the Volunteers during the Boer War, for instance, was everything that could have been desired, though, of course, it differed in character from a scheme which had in view hostilities with savages, who might rise in a number of places at the same moment. Royston had in view and prepared for possible hostilities with civilized forces livingbeyond the bordersof the Colony, a very different undertaking to operating against barbarians residingwithinthe Colony. "For the latter, one must have each division complete in itself, but, in organizing for a European war, one knows perfectly well that he must collect his men together inthe bulk before there is to be any resort to arms at all. So long as one's brigade is organized as a brigade, that is sound. In Native warfare, however, there should be organization practically of the individuals, for each of these might be called on to deal with a Native enemy in his immediate vicinity. Just before the Rebellion, each little unit was absolutely complete and prepared to take the field as it stood."[55]

Manuals of instruction based on those of the Imperial army, but adapted to local requirements, were prepared and issued. In these, the various duties of each arm, on receipt of an order to mobilize, were fully and clearly set forth.

Had Leader not felt obliged to resign, it is more than probable that with, for instance, so enthusiastic a lieutenant as Bru-de-Wold, the highly creditable system subsequently developed by the latter would have fully matured. But, whatevermayhave happened in his time, cannot be allowed to obscure well-deserved distinction and prevent the bestowal of that meed of praise the Colony owes to the man who, if he did not actually initiate, took infinite pains, in season and out of season, assisted by an efficient and willing staff, to further the scheme, until it actually assumed the solidarity it did and that capacity for simultaneous and harmonious movement which are the leading characteristics of every sound system of defence. Natal, therefore, owes her gratitude to Col. Bru-de-Wold as to one who, keenly alive to her best interests, in the face of much political and other discouragement, resolutely held to the course he had embarked on, until the long-entertained idea had been fairly realized. Without him, it is conceivable, the Colony might have become so involved during the Rebellion as to have been unable to suppress it without appealing for help to the Mother Country, when the command of the whole of the operations would have passed automatically from her own hands to those of the Imperial Government. That is to say, a Colony which, but adozen or so years previously, had deliberately resolved to take on the burden of responsible government and all attendant risks, would have been so far incapable of exercising control and utilizing her own resources as, at the first sign of trouble in connection with purely internal affairs, to seek the aid of external authority to set them in order. Had any such assistance been invoked and rendered, Natal must inevitably have forfeited, especially in the eyes of the Natives, much of the prestige she had so long enjoyed and which she was determined, if possible, to maintain. But let no one suppose these remarks to be made in any ungenerous spirit or unmindfully of that bond of sympathy and warm attachment that will for ever endure between the Motherland and her sons in Natal. It is impossible to gauge the degree to which Natal is indebted to the "old block" of which she is but a chip; her social system, laws, education, and institutions were, for the most part, "made in England," so, too, were many of the better features of the military system of which she is so justly proud. She is not oblivious of the instruction and encouragement her officers have received from innumerable representatives of His Majesty's army, in South Africa and at home, or of the keen interest that has constantly been shown in the general development of her forces.

COLONEL H.T. BRU-DE-WOLD,C.M.G., D.S.O.,Commandant of Militia.MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN G. DARTNELL,K.C.B., C.M.G.COLONEL G. LEUCHARS, C.M.G., D.S.O.SIR ABE BAILEY, K.C.M.G.

COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE MILITIA.

Active Militia.—The strength of the Active Militia was limited to 4,000 in time of peace. This figure, as a matter of fact, was never reached, owing to the severe financial depression the Colony passed through in the years 1902-1906, and later. Although the strength rose from 1,864 officers and men in 1902 to 3,449 in 1904—that it did not increase beyond the latter figure was due to Government fixing 3,500 as the temporary maximum strength—it decreased in 1906 to 2,854. Consequently, there was a shortfall of no less than 1,146 men on a maximum authorized peace establishment at the outbreak of the Rebellion.In his report, dated January, 1907, Bru-de-Wold says: "Assuming office in October, 1905,[56]during a period of great financial depression, I was confronted with the task of immediately reducing expenditure.... At the same time, I was convinced that, at no period since I became connected with the Defence Forces of the Colony, had there been a greater urgency for efficiency and readiness to take the field. I felt sure that the Native trouble, which I had seen for some years past drawing nearer and nearer, was now within a measurable distance, and in my own mind I fixed the latter end of May or June as the most probable time for the disturbance to break out. I was instructed to reduce the Active Militia to 2,500 of all ranks...."[57]Again: "To organize the Force with its reduced numbers, and still to retain its efficiency as an effective fighting force, I arranged a Peace and War establishment for each regiment, the ranks to be filled up when required for war purposes by supernumeraries, or special service men...."[58]

Nothing could show more clearly than the foregoing facts how severe must have been the financial depression through which the Colony passed in 1905 and 1906, and how great the risks run by being compelled to reduce to 2,500 men, the first line of defence of a Colony controlling about a million warlike savages. When, as then situated, Natal determined to deal with the trouble by means of her own resources, she took a bold and even hazardous course. But it was just such decision that appealed to the imagination of the staunchest of her colonists, and it was not long before she had the satisfaction of knowing that her courageous attitude was amply justified by the results.

Having decided, in 1904, to recruit to a figure fallingshort by 500 of the maximum peace strength authorized by law, and again, in 1905, directed a further reduction by 1,000 men, it would be thought the Government, on the first acts of rebellion occurring in February and April, would have been only too glad to avail themselves of the power to ballot for recruits,[59]to raise the depleted ranks to at least the maximum peace establishment. By rights, the final word as to when the ballot should be brought into force, should rest with the officer responsible for the defence of the country. Experience has shown that an elective ministry will not so act if it can possibly be avoided.[60]If not imperative, so as to restore the authorized establishment, such necessity certainly appeared to arise when the character of theterrainselected by the rebels came to be closely considered. For operations in connection with Nkandhla forest alone—an area covering 100 square miles,i.e.equivalent to that of Greater London, some 10,000 European troops were declared by competent military advisers to be required. If others advised lesser numbers, it was because they were confident (though having no military reasons for saying so) that their extremely elusive foes could be hoodwinked at their own game, and in a country, too, as well-known to them as a cornfield is to the mice that run up and down and between the growing stalks.

The Government, of which The Hon. C.J. Smythe was Prime Minister and Sir Thomas Watt Minister of Defence, declined to use the ballot. The reasons for such paradoxical attitude were briefly these: Owing to the reports of unrest and threatened attack received almost daily from widely-separated parts, in some cases panic-stricken men, women and children taking refuge in lagers and clamouring for help, it was desirable to allay the panic; this alarm must have been greatly heightened had there been sudden recourse to the ballot, which the unexpected initial success of the April rising appeared to demand.Owing to there being no general organization among the rebels, it was highly probable outbreaks would occur here and there, until, having acquired sufficient momentum, a large force had been successfully massed on ground favourable to their tactics. Thus, to denude any particular district of men, was practically to offer it to the enemy as a convenient point of attack. It should be borne in mind that the scanty European population was so distributed as to be almost in every direction in the immediate vicinity of what are known as Native locations. These, laid off for the exclusive use of the Natives as far back as 1845, were made numerous and kept separate for the very reason that, through one large group of Natives gradually losing touch with the others, their power for mischief, in the event of hostilities, would be reduced, whilst Europeans, taking up their abode, either as farmers or as townsmen, on the intervening territory, would serve to leaven the aborigines with civilized habits, and promote their spiritual and material advancement.

On the other hand, it is no less true of savage than of civilized warfare, that the best defence consists in attacking the enemy wherever he may be found, and not leaving the initiative to be taken by him. The latter method, it is true, leaves exposed numerous vulnerable points, at each of which, owing to greater numbers, he ought in theory to succeed.

The Government decided to call for volunteers among the colonists and to attract the many soldiers of fortune and adventurous spirits in South Africa by offering them inducements to join specially-raised corps. It was in this way that the required number of men was obtained. Those Militia Reserves in the various districts who had not taken the field were thereupon able to assemble, elect officers, select lagers and take other measures for the defence of their respective districts.

The Reserves.—In view of the necessity of hastening on the organization of the Active Militia, and of the difficulties in preparing rolls, as required by law, complete lists of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reserves could not be made untilthe Rebellion was over and, indeed, not until after the conclusion of the Dinuzulu expedition (December, 1907 to March, 1908).

At the beginning of 1906, the numbers of the Reserves were approximately: First, 5,050, Second, 6,875, Third, 3,175; Total, 15,100.

In January and February, 1906, beginning at Dundee, meetings were convened for the purpose of electing Chief Leaders in terms of the Act. After the various classes of Reserves had been organized, Lieut.-Col. (now Colonel) A.T.G. Wales was placed in command.

Among these men were to be found many ex-soldiers and volunteers, who had fought in nearly all the campaigns of the preceding thirty years. There were also many Dutchmen who had fought against England during the Boer War, but who had since become valuable acquisitions to South Africa's fighting material.

Notwithstanding the presence of "old campaigners," it was soon patent that the majority of the men had not received any military training worthy the name. To remedy this serious defect, only one way seems to be open—do as Australia did later, in 1908, viz. compel every man and boy within the State to undergo a systematic course annually.

As in the case of the Militia, the Government was obliged to keep down expenses in regard to the Reserves. Such action was felt more by the latter forces than by established corps, and yet nothing was more reasonable than that the Active Militia should, whenever necessary, be in a position to draw without delay on the younger branches of the Reserves.

Cadets.—See p. 65.

Intelligence and Maps.—In this connection again, nothing but the want of funds rendered it impossible to employ officers and other agents to collect necessary and readily-accessible information before the Rebellion began. Practically all the Magistrates, however, Police, farmers, planters, etc., were emissaries of the Government, though not placed directly or indirectly in touch with the Militiadepartment as they might have been. Many of these employed Native servants, who, in their turn, were in intimate and constant touch with their own countrymen.

"Immediately previous to the outbreak of the Rebellion," says the Commandant, "I received a great deal of information from people in outlying districts, but, as there was no intelligence department to classify, sift and deal with this, it was very difficult to place much reliance on the information thus obtained. Ultimately, the acting Chief Commissioner of Police (Lieut.-Col. W.J. Clarke) gave orders to the police in the rural districts to collect information from farmers and others and to send everything direct to him."[61]This Police officer, owing to his excellent knowledge of the country, and the various informants, was able to condense and appreciate all that came to hand and thereafter place classified summaries at the Commandant's disposal, and very valuable these proved to be. "Subsequently all this was stopped as, for some reason unknown to me, the Commissioner,i.e.the permanent officer, was either unwilling or unable to continue the system."[62]

As regards maps, not the Commandant, but the state of the treasury was to blame. "The want of maps (on military lines, normal scale) has been greatly felt in Natal and has rendered combined action practically impossible. The failure of the Langalibalele expedition was due to the want of reliable maps."[63]Surveying was habitually confined to areas set apart for European occupation, that is, the most accessible portions, whilst the great Native locations, situate for the most part in broken, bushy and untraversable regions, remained unsurveyed. Thus, when, on hostilities occurring, the rebels selected as theirterrainthe great Tugela valley (to a distance of 10 or 12 miles on either side and some 60-80 miles along the river), the Nkandhla-Qudeni district, and the Umvotivalley, their choice was, in each instance, ground the Staff and the Surveyor General's department knew either very little, or nothing at all, about. There were, indeed, the map by Altern—of the Zululand side—and that by Middleton—of Nkandhla district, but, insufficient as these excellent maps were, they did not become available for the troops until long after the Rebellion had started, and when most of the information therein had already been ascertained by commanding officers by personal observation, inquiry of local residents, or direct reconnaissance.[64]

In so far, however, as the various columns in the field were concerned, they were singularly well-equipped with intelligence of every kind. This arose from rapidly adapting themselves to circumstances—a characteristic usually displayed by colonial volunteers of long standing. They, fortunately, experienced but little difficulty in securing capable European and Native agents in every direction.

Transport.—The authority given by law to the Commandant to "prepare a register of all animals and vehicles suitable for transport or military purposes throughout the Colony or any part thereof" was taken advantage of in good time, with the result that, when the Rebellion broke out, full particulars as to where vehicles, drivers and animals could be obtained, had been collected.

The same law empowered the Governor, in the event of war, invasion or insurrection, to "authorise the issue of requisitions, requiring all persons to furnish such animals, vehicles and other necessary things as may be demanded from them for military use." On failure to supply, the property could be taken possession of by, or on behalf of, the Commandant. There was, however, a proviso to the effect that "not more than fifty per cent. of the animals and vehicles suitable for transport or military purposes belonging to any person" might be requisitioned.Payment, fixed by the regulations, was, of course, made to persons from whom animals, etc., were taken.

When the first mobilization at Pietermaritzburg and other centres took place early in February, there was but one officer in the department, Captain (now Major) C. Victor Hosken, with one sergeant. No plant of any description belonged to that or any other Militia department. But, so thoroughly had the preliminary preparations been made, that Hosken was able to supply the force then called out with all necessary vehicles, draught animals, drivers, leaders, etc., on the day appointed for it to take the field. The mobilizations of 5th and 19th April, 3rd May, etc., were all dealt with with similar promptitude and equally satisfactory results. On none of these occasions was there any recourse to commandeering (impressing) for the Transport department. Such action was not resorted to until the troops moved from Zululand to Mapumulo division (June 19), when, owing to the impossibility of obtaining transport in any other way, seven or eight waggons were commandeered. The otherwise invariable rule was to hire in the ordinary way. To be able, however, to do this with rapidity and success, it was necessary to ascertain beforehand exactly where, what kind and how many vehicles, animals, etc., could be obtained.

On June 11th, when the largest number of troops was in the field, the Transport staff had increased to 5 officers, 12 n.c.o.'s and 30 men. The largest number of waggons in the field at one time—11th July—(including those for supply and regimental purposes), was 440, together with 14 mule waggons, 18 ambulances and 10 water-carts, with approximately 12,000 oxen and 364 mules. In addition to the foregoing, the mounted contingent from the Transvaal (T.M.R.) had its own mule transport, though the department supplied it with ox-waggons for carrying supplies, ammunition, etc.

It fell, moreover, to the department to arrange for the movement of men, horses, equipment, etc., from point to point by rail, such arrangements, both on mobilizationand demobilization—thanks to the ever prompt and unfailing co-operation of all Natal Government Railways officials, whose loyal endeavours contributed very materially to the success of the campaign—were uniformly satisfactory, although they had, as a rule, to be carried out on the shortest notice.

The Commandant, in his report for 1906, drew attention to pack transport being indispensable when mobilizing mounted forces. The mounted corps were possessed of such transport. "When, however, the regiments have taken the field, the true first line of transport must be provided, and this must consist of mule transport." The system of transport, as a whole, was deficient in so far as what is here referred to as the "true first line" was concerned.

Medical.—The Natal Medical Corps was in a position to provide officers and men to all the forces, including detachments, as soon as they took the field. The ordinary medical equipment, similar to that in use in the Imperial service, was adequate and up-to-date. Lieut.-Col. J. Hyslop, D.S.O., Principal Medical Officer, points out that "there was, however, a shortage of ambulance waggons, which had to be made up by the most suitable vehicles we could find. These latter ... were not nearly so useful as the 'Natal ambulance,' which is specially constructed to meet the conditions of the country. Arrangements had been made some time prior to the Rebellion whereby, in case of necessity, civilian hospitals were to be available as base hospitals, and several were so used." Among these was the Victoria Hospital at Eshowe. Authority was given for the Principal Medical Officer to call on District Surgeons "to attend troops stationed in their respective districts, by way of relieving the Militia Medical staff," thereby enabling them to devote more attention to field duties. With the enrolment of irregular troops, it became necessary to increase the personnel of the corps; later in the campaign, the stretcher-bearers, supplied by the Natal Indian community, were a further welcome addition.

General medical assistance was rendered, not only to Europeans, but to various Native contingents and levies, and to a number of the rebels as well.

Veterinary and Remounts.—The Veterinary Corps was insufficiently organized, with the result that, generally speaking, officers were called on to treat more animals than they were able to cope with.

The supply of remounts became a serious matter. "It is much easier," says the Commandant, "to get men than to get horses on which to mount them. During the late operations, the horse supply of the Colony was exhausted practically within the first month, and, within a few months, it was a very difficult matter to purchase a fairly good horse, either in the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, or Cape Colony, and we had to import a shipment of horses from South America. Fortunately, the campaign ended about the time these horses arrived, so that they were not required for the field. But, had the campaign been prolonged, as it easily might have been, shipment after shipment of horses would have had to be imported, and these would necessarily have been unbroken horses, as the contractor was unable to complete his contract to supply the requisite number of broken horses for the first shipment."[65]

Ordnance and Equipment.—The withdrawal of the Imperial troops carried with it the closing down of the Imperial Ordnance stores in Pietermaritzburg. This necessitated stocking by the local Ordnance department of material considerably in excess of what it had been the rule to keep. Instead of limiting the stock to peace requirements, it had to be expanded to those of war.

When mobilization took place, the whole of the Militia forces were duly equipped, whilst demands from the field were promptly and satisfactorily met.

"In dealing with the equipping of irregular corps and Militia Reserves," says the Ordnance Officer, Major F. Choles,[66]"for which no provision was made, thesuccess ... attained ... was due to the foresight of this department in having placed to 'reserve stocks,' from time to time, such stores as were necessary for contingencies, such as the late Rebellion. These stores were a portion of stocks obtained under the ordinary annual votes during the last few years." Owing to recommendations in respect of reserve clothing not having been given effect to, uniforms had to be obtained from such local sources as were available, with the result that inferior materials at high prices were the only goods to be had.

At various troop headquarters, armouries had been provided. These proved most useful and time-saving, especially as the system mobilization of the mounted forces was always "forward" to the scene of disturbance.

In so far as arms, ammunition and equipment were concerned, the Colony, on the outbreak of hostilities, was fully prepared to meet all reasonable demands likely to be made. The rifles and ammunition were, moreover, of the best and latest types. This satisfactory state of affairs was owing chiefly to continued representation by the Commandant to his Minister to the effect that, although the country was evidently on the eve of a rising, there was an insufficiency of both arms and ammunition, particularly the latter. There was, for instance, little or no Mark V ammunition in stock. During November, 1905, authority was given to indent for 1,000 stand of arms and 5,000,000 rounds of ammunition. The first lot arrived in Durban late in January, and the first outbreak of rebellion occurred on the 8th of the following month.

Service Corps (Supplies).—This department, when the first mobilization occurred, had a staff of 2 officers and 24 men. This strength was increased as necessity arose, until it stood at 2 officers, 38 clerks, 9 bakers, 7 butchers, 55 grocers and issuers; total, 135. Some 30 Natives were also employed.

The officer in charge, Captain Ambrose Prior, found it necessary to establish no less than twenty depôts in different parts of Natal and Zululand, whilst, in addition, a supply detachment accompanied each of five operating columns.

The want of properly-trained men at the outset was severely felt, involving, as it did, considerable risk in handling large quantities of supplies. It was fortunate that intelligent out-of-work men were readily procurable. These were trained and distributed among the depôts as soon as they became efficient.

Field bakeries were formed at Nkandhla, Thring's Post, and Mapumulo, and proved very successful. At one time, those at Nkandhla and Thring's Post turned out as much as 4,000-5,000 lbs. of bread daily. Owing to lack of system in the management of loot stock, field butcheries proved a failure, the Government, in consequence, being put to needless expense in procuring meat.

Co-operation between this and the Transport department was everything that could have been desired.

Telegraph Corps.—This corps, under Captain F. Fraser, was most efficient and well-equipped. It was, however, handicapped owing to its small establishment, so much so that it was necessary to apply to the Cape Colony for signallers. Some of the corps members had gone through an army class of instruction at Pretoria. The good effects of that training were very noticeable.

Engineer Corps.—Owing to the peace establishment of the Active Militia having been reduced to 2,500, the formation of an Engineer Corps was impossible. As, however, searchlights are very desirable accessories in Native warfare for defensive purposes, arrangements were made, with the assistance of Captain Mills, of the Natal Government Railways, to secure a couple of instruments and appurtenances, together with the necessary trained men for working them. Another of these instruments (under Major W.H. Pickburn) was lent by the Transvaal Government and proved especially useful at Nkandhla.

THE NATAL POLICE.

Although forming no part of the Militia, the Natal Police, a smart, well-equipped and efficient force, under the command of Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel, C.M.G., took aprominent part throughout the operations. Its personnel consisted of Europeans and Natives; the latter, however, were not called out for service. The European section numbered 40 officers and 1,126 of other ranks. Over two-thirds were mounted, but it was found impracticable, owing to there being 143 police stations to look after, to put more than 210 into the field.

RIFLE ASSOCIATIONS.

There were no fewer than 117 of these Associations in 1906 in various parts of the Colony, with an aggregate membership of about 7,000.

On the passing of the Militia Act, the Associations, which were invaluable agencies for training men to shoot, ceased to form part of the defence of the Colony, as practically all members were liable to serve in the different classes of the Reserves.

TROOPS TEMPORARILY RECRUITED BY THE NATAL GOVERNMENT.

These corps and their strengths were: Royston's Horse, 550; Natal Rangers, 800; Zululand Police, 90; Natal Native Horse, 300; the first two were European, the others Native (with European officers). There were, in addition, various Native infantry contingents or levies, whose aggregate strength amounted to about 6,000. The assistance given by the Cape and Transvaal Colonies and Sir Abe Bailey is referred to further on under "Offers of Assistance."

Royston's Horse.—When, in the middle of April, matters became serious and it appeared necessary to dispatch a large force to Nkandhla, the Government decided to deal with the position as far as possible from Natal resources. The required force might, indeed, have been obtained from such Active Militia corps as had not up till then taken the field, but, owing to the Militia Reserves not being sufficiently organized, it was found necessary to retainportions of the Active Militia in Natal to deal with any rising that might occur during the absence of the troops in Zululand, hence the decision to recruit this special contingent of mounted men. Recruiting took place in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and Johannesburg. The corps was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O., and formed part of the "Zululand Field Force" that left for Nkandhla at the beginning of May. Towards the end of the campaign the corps was enlarged, notably by men recruited in the Cape Colony.

Natal Rangers.—This infantry regiment was raised because Ministers considered it against the interests of the Colony to keep the Militia Reserves in the field for any length of time. A considerable saving was effected through raising the corps, owing to the pay of the men being at lower rates. Recruiting took place chiefly in Johannesburg and Durban. As regards that done in Johannesburg, the Colony was most fortunate in securing the assistance of the Transvaal Commandant of Volunteers.

Zululand Police(Natives).—This particularly useful and efficient infantry corps, originally formed in 1883 by Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel, C.M.G., was disbanded on Zululand being annexed to Natal (December, 1897). Its strength then was about 200. When temporarily re-established, on the outbreak of rebellion, under Inspector Fairlie of the Natal Police, its numbers were between 80 and 90. For further information see Appendix XI.

TheNatal Native Horse, commanded by Major G. Moe, were enrolled at Edendale, Nyanyadu, and other parts of the Colony in February, 1906. Some difficulty was at first met with in providing horses, owing to many having been sold by the Natives as remounts to agents of the German Government in connection with the South-West Africa campaign. Further particulars regarding this corps will be found in Appendix XI.

Native levies.—These were called out as necessity arose, but only in such areas as fell within the theatre of operations, and, except about 120 Basutos (Nqutu district), were unmounted; for the most part, they were armed onlywith their large ox-hide shields and assegais.[67]As the great majority were under "tribal" rule, the several contingents were commanded by their own Chiefs, without regard either to age or military fitness. Among the most capable Chiefs were Sibindi, Sitshitshili, Mfungelwa, and Mveli.[68]

OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE.

(a)The Imperial Government.—When, consequent upon the assumption by Natal of responsible government, the Imperial Government proceeded gradually to withdraw the regular troops, it so happened that, on the outbreak of rebellion, a mere handful of men remained at Pietermaritzburg. The withdrawal, however unobtrusively it had occurred, did not escape the notice of sundry nervous Europeans, or the Natives. The latter, when their resentment had been aroused by the poll tax (to be referred to later), were not slow in making one another believe that the withdrawal had its origin in dissension that had arisen between Natal and Great Britain. Disgusted with the manner in which Natal was governing her Native population, England, it was said, had turned her back on, and would no longer help, her Colony. This absurd rumour succeeded in obtaining considerable credence, and threatened to undermine the public sense of security, especially of loyally disposed Natives. It was, therefore, with something of avidity that the offer of the Imperial Government of 10th February (the day following the proclamation of martial law), that a regiment should proceed to Pietermaritzburg, was accepted by Natal. In accepting, however, the Government said it did not anticipate that the troops would be required for active service. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in South Africa had wired that he held in readiness a battalion at Pretoria, as wellas the Standerton Mobile Column. It was arranged that the former should proceed to Natal. The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders accordingly received orders without delay, and reached Pietermaritzburg three days later (13th). The General, at the same time, offered to increase the number to 4,300 if required. The occasion to apply for the increase fortunately did not arise. The presence of the troops (they were present until the conclusion of hostilities) had a most reassuring and salutary effect, and gave exactly that touch of moral support the situation required. It was as successful in giving the lie to the false rumour referred to as if a whole army corps had been mobilized for the purpose.

The hand of the Imperial Government was seen in yet another direction. When, prior to the first outbreak (February 8th), the Governor ascertained that H.M.S.Terpsichorewould arrive at Durban on the 21st February, in connection with the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Connaught, he requested Admiral Durnford to expedite the ship's movements, as the presence of a man-of-war at Durban at that time would tend to allay the prevailing excitement. The request was promptly acceded to, and theTerpsichoresteamed into Durban a week sooner than had been previously arranged. Later, whilst proposing the vessel should accompany the Duke on his departure from Durban, on the 27th February, the Admiral offered to cancel his orders in the event of the political situation being such that her continued presence would be desirable. There being, by that time, no immediate cause for anxiety, the arrangements which had already been made for departure were not interfered with.

(b)Other Offers.—A few days after the second and more serious stage of the Rebellion had begun, theCapeandTransvaal Governmentswired intimating a readiness to assist in any way. This was followed, a few days later, by an offer from the latter Government of 500 Volunteers, armed, equipped, and maintained whilst in the field at its own expense, whilst the Cape Government offered six maxims, armed by Cape Mounted Riflemen, as wellas a Signalling Corps. These and two further generous offers—one by Mr. (now Sir) Abe Bailey of Johannesburg, to raise, equip, and maintain at his own expense a contingent of 150 men (25 being mounted) of the Lancaster and York Association, and the other by theNatal Indian Congress, of a corps of 25 stretcher-bearers,—were gratefully accepted.

The first three offers will be more fully dealt with in subsequent chapters.

A large number of other opportune and generous offers were received from various sources in England, South Africa, etc., but as the Government had decided that, unless a serious development of hostilities took place, no efforts would be made to recruit outside South Africa, and in South Africa only in case of absolute necessity, they were not accepted. They were, however, gratefully acknowledged and borne in mind.

Among the Colony's staunchest supporters was a small knot of Natalians living in London, headed by Major Gen. Sir John Dartnell, K.C.B., the Right Hon. Sir Albert Hime, P.C., K.C.M.G., and Sir Walter Peace, K.C.M.G. These lost no time in convening a meeting, cabling an assurance of unqualified support of the Ministry, and thereafter dispatching, at the earliest opportunity, 27 Rexer guns, a most valuable arm, especially in Native warfare, that had only just come into the market.[69]

THE CADETS.

The Cadet system, one of the principal institutions of the Colony, and one that at once attracts the attention of a visitor, be he soldier or civilian, has been in existence for many years. The first corps was formed at a private school in Hermannsburg in the year 1869. Hilton College and other schools were not long in following the example. The principles governing the system in its later developments and in vogue in 1906 will be found in the MilitiaAct, 1903. The Cadets were under the general supervision of the Commandant of Militia and the special control of an officer of the permanent Militia staff, under the style of "Commandant of Cadets." For many years, the latter officer was Lieut.-Col. W.H.A. Molyneux, V.D., owing to whose energy and devotion, assisted to the utmost by the Superintendent of Education (C.J. Mudie, Esq.), the efficiency of the various corps rose to a standard previously unapproached. No opportunity was lost of promoting the interests of his charges and rendering their course of training so popular and successful as to become the envy of other states, not excluding the Mother Country.

The Cadets began their training at the age of ten; they were not enrolled for military service, although steps were taken to induce lads of eighteen, in the senior corps, to join the Active Militia. They were taught to march, go through the physical, manual, and firing exercises, as well as simple parade and field movements, as laid down in the manual of drill for the mounted forces.

Boys between ten and fourteen were drilled without arms and instructed in musketry, for both of which an efficiency standard was laid down.

In 1896 the total number of Cadets on the muster roll was 1,931 (25 corps). In 1906 they had increased to about 3,500, with nearly 50 separate corps, 3 being those of senior Cadets. The senior corps, on account of lads being required by their parents to enter business at early ages, were much more difficult to control, and therefore did not prove nearly as successful as the junior ones.

With the system so long in vogue, it followed that the majority of the Natal troops (including Reserves) which took part in the Rebellion had, at one time or another, been trained as Cadets in the rudiments of soldiery. It was largely due to having had such experience that the men were as generally efficient as they were.

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