FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[205]By this time, Van Rooyen and his men had got back from Zululand.[206]In consequence of Bambata's and Sigananda'simpis'raiding tactics. Many cattle were at the same time driven into Natal.[207]Two of Gayede's sons were killed in the action at Bobe.[208]The strength and disposition of Leuchars' forces, at 3rd May, was as follows: AtMazongwane(high up Inadi River)—U.M.R., 192; N.F.A., 37; N.M.C., 3; N.V.C., 2; N.T.C., 6. AtGreytown—N.R.R., 44; N.S.C., 6; U.M.R., 7; Reserves, 81. AtKrantzkop—N.R.R., 58; Reserves, 81; U.M.R., 5; N.S.C., 1. AtKeate's Drift—U.M.R., 31. AtMapumulo—U.M.R., 20.[209]These springs are in the bed of the Tugela River, some nine miles from Krantzkop.[210]His force was composed as follows: U.M.R., 150; 1st Umvoti Reserves, 40; 2nd Umvoti Reserves, 30; Krantzkop Reserves, 50; N.F.A., two guns; N.R.R., 50; and 25 men of Sibindi's levy.[211]Reports had been received as far back as the 19th ult. of messengers having come to Mtele from Mehlokazulu and Faku in Zululand asking him to co-operate. On his agreeing, Mehlokazulu instructed Kula through Mtele "to wait until fighting had commenced in earnest in Zululand, when he was to attack Pomeroy and then proceed against Greytown."[212]When at Nondweni, a small party visited the spot where the Prince Imperial and others were killed during the Zulu War. The memorial cairn and graveyard, in charge of a Native headman, were found to be in good order.[213]An account of the position and occurrences at Umsinga will be found in Chapter XV.[214]It will be seen in Chapter XV., that a column (under Murray-Smith) was posted at Fort Murray-Smith, a couple of miles from Helpmakaar, simultaneously with the departure of the Zululand Field Force for Nkandhla from Dundee on the 1st May.[215]Mackay was not advised, as the only means of communication, a telephone, was eighteen miles away.[216]The sun rose, on the day in question, at about 6.45 a.m.[217]Mackay camped at Isandhlwana on the night of the 27th. He operated at Malakata on the morning of the 28th, and at Hlazakazi at 1.30 p.m. on the same day.[218]On Sibindi's levy getting within about three miles of the kraal of Nyoniyezwe, the minor for whom Sibindi was acting, they started to sing their ancient, tribal war-song. Up to that moment, the women had been in hiding in various places, owing to uncertainty as to whether theimpithey had, two or three hours before, seen descending to the Buffalo from the direction of Mpukunyoni, was the enemy, or men of their own tribe. The sun had, in the meantime, set, and it had begun to get dark. On recognizing the old familiar song, and realizing that their men were returning triumphant, they forthwith emerged from their respective hiding-places and kraals, and, one and all, wherever, on the bush-covered mountain, they happened to be, accorded their heroes so weird and fantastic a greeting as will not quickly be forgotten by the European troops who had the privilege of hearing and witnessing it. At least sixty to seventy women, faces smeared with light-coloured clay, and carrying little hand-brooms, with leaves bound round their ankles, approached the advancing column, shrieking at the top of their voices as they ran about: "Ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki,—Kuhle kwetu!" (Oh! joy in our homes!) The oft-repeated cries were heard in all directions. Not only did this serve as a welcome to the warriors, but as an alarm to all of the tribe who were too far off to hear the famous war-song.

[205]By this time, Van Rooyen and his men had got back from Zululand.

[206]In consequence of Bambata's and Sigananda'simpis'raiding tactics. Many cattle were at the same time driven into Natal.

[207]Two of Gayede's sons were killed in the action at Bobe.

[208]The strength and disposition of Leuchars' forces, at 3rd May, was as follows: AtMazongwane(high up Inadi River)—U.M.R., 192; N.F.A., 37; N.M.C., 3; N.V.C., 2; N.T.C., 6. AtGreytown—N.R.R., 44; N.S.C., 6; U.M.R., 7; Reserves, 81. AtKrantzkop—N.R.R., 58; Reserves, 81; U.M.R., 5; N.S.C., 1. AtKeate's Drift—U.M.R., 31. AtMapumulo—U.M.R., 20.

[209]These springs are in the bed of the Tugela River, some nine miles from Krantzkop.

[210]His force was composed as follows: U.M.R., 150; 1st Umvoti Reserves, 40; 2nd Umvoti Reserves, 30; Krantzkop Reserves, 50; N.F.A., two guns; N.R.R., 50; and 25 men of Sibindi's levy.

[211]Reports had been received as far back as the 19th ult. of messengers having come to Mtele from Mehlokazulu and Faku in Zululand asking him to co-operate. On his agreeing, Mehlokazulu instructed Kula through Mtele "to wait until fighting had commenced in earnest in Zululand, when he was to attack Pomeroy and then proceed against Greytown."

[212]When at Nondweni, a small party visited the spot where the Prince Imperial and others were killed during the Zulu War. The memorial cairn and graveyard, in charge of a Native headman, were found to be in good order.

[213]An account of the position and occurrences at Umsinga will be found in Chapter XV.

[214]It will be seen in Chapter XV., that a column (under Murray-Smith) was posted at Fort Murray-Smith, a couple of miles from Helpmakaar, simultaneously with the departure of the Zululand Field Force for Nkandhla from Dundee on the 1st May.

[215]Mackay was not advised, as the only means of communication, a telephone, was eighteen miles away.

[216]The sun rose, on the day in question, at about 6.45 a.m.

[217]Mackay camped at Isandhlwana on the night of the 27th. He operated at Malakata on the morning of the 28th, and at Hlazakazi at 1.30 p.m. on the same day.

[218]On Sibindi's levy getting within about three miles of the kraal of Nyoniyezwe, the minor for whom Sibindi was acting, they started to sing their ancient, tribal war-song. Up to that moment, the women had been in hiding in various places, owing to uncertainty as to whether theimpithey had, two or three hours before, seen descending to the Buffalo from the direction of Mpukunyoni, was the enemy, or men of their own tribe. The sun had, in the meantime, set, and it had begun to get dark. On recognizing the old familiar song, and realizing that their men were returning triumphant, they forthwith emerged from their respective hiding-places and kraals, and, one and all, wherever, on the bush-covered mountain, they happened to be, accorded their heroes so weird and fantastic a greeting as will not quickly be forgotten by the European troops who had the privilege of hearing and witnessing it. At least sixty to seventy women, faces smeared with light-coloured clay, and carrying little hand-brooms, with leaves bound round their ankles, approached the advancing column, shrieking at the top of their voices as they ran about: "Ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki,—Kuhle kwetu!" (Oh! joy in our homes!) The oft-repeated cries were heard in all directions. Not only did this serve as a welcome to the warriors, but as an alarm to all of the tribe who were too far off to hear the famous war-song.

FURTHER OPERATIONS BY ZULULAND FIELD FORCE.—ACTION AT MANZIPAMBANA.—ENEMY DECIDES TO MOVE IN FORCE TO MOME.

HithertoMcKenzie's efforts to come into conflict with the enemy had met with comparatively little success, and this in spite of the fact that the Zululand Field Force had been over three weeks on the spot. Ever since the force arrived, the men had, indeed, been kept particularly busy. Reconnaissances had been carried out time after time in Insuze valley and at Nkandhla by McKenzie, and in the neighbourhood of Macala and Qudeni by Barker, four columns had made a converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave (the enemy's headquarters), then had come Sigananda's negotiations for surrender, the reconnaissance to Macala, followed by further activity in the directions of Tate, Mome and Komo. In the course of the operations, many rebels had been come across, but as they were nearly always in small parties, it was impossible for those unacquainted with the peculiar conditions to repress feelings of disappointment with the results that had been achieved by the end of May, especially as intelligence went to show that Bambata and Company were at the head of at least 1,000 men, and that these numbers were constantly increasing. Where was this ever-vanishingimpi? What was the best way of making it fight? That was the problem McKenzie was called on to solve. He had not merely to be ready to fight when it suited him to do so, but to hunt for the rebels and make them fight, however much in favour of the latter locality and time mighthappen to be. His difficulties were, therefore, primarily and, indeed, almost entirely of a strategical character. He, of course, knew of the rebels' perpetually shifting from one place to another on purpose to avoid a conflict, and, at the same time, of always being on the alert to take advantage of detached sections of the troops. That such were their methods had of itself required time to ascertain. The methods were novel. There was nothing of that kind during the Zulu War.[219]Sometimes the enemy would be at Nkandhla, at others at Macala. At each of these places there were dense forests and rocky hiding-places. The intervening country, moreover, was exceedingly rough, but so well known to the rebels that they could travel over it by night with the greatest ease. In these circumstances, in addition to robbing them of all food supplies to be found about Nkandhla, the O.C. came to the conclusion that the only policy was to drive the forests in as thorough and systematic a manner as possible. But to carry this out effectively with the men at his disposal was out of the question. That, at any rate, was the view of General Stephenson and other competent authorities. Hence he was compelled to adopt procedure which he felt might easily fail in actually cornering the enemy. However, in order that the best might be done, he decided to undertake and persevere with the drives. These it was necessary to carry out section by section, as it was quite impracticable, owing to their magnitude and interconnection, to attempt the whole of the forests in one day. If the enemy's strategy was to keep shifting about, the troops could at least help him to shift about a little more, and perhaps rather more than he had intended to do.

Whilst the troops, after operating at Tate gorge, were taking a much-needed rest on the 31st May, Mansel and Barker were summoned to Nomangci. Colonel McKenzie then proceeded with these and other officers to the heightsabove Mome valley, where the proposed drives were to begin, and explained the plans he had in mind for the following day.

On the 1st June, all the troops moved out at an early hour. When daylight appeared, Gun Hill had already been occupied by two 15-pounders, N.F.A., and two pompoms. The valley was heavily shelled and searched in every direction from above, as well as by Mansel from below, but without much result. The men then proceeded on foot with the Native levies to drive both sides and bottom of the valley in the following order: McKenzie's worked down the western slopes, whilst Mansel's ascended the ridge on the east as far as Esipongweni peak, near Sigananda's kraal, Enhlweni, and then down towards the river bed.

McKenzie's men, consisting of 400 R.H., 150 Z.M.R., 140 D.L.I., 100 N.P., and 100 Nongqai, or about 900 in all,[220]with about the same number of Native levies, moved in single file down an open ridge along the north edge of Esigqumeni forest and in the direction of the waterfall. On entering the forest, the Nongqai and levies were distributed along the line of troops. When the head of the column had got within a few yards of the Mome stream, "files right" was given, which brought the troops into line formation facing down the stream and towards the stronghold. The shelling from Gun Hill began when the head of the column was about half-way down, and continued until it had reached the Mome. Mansel's guns shelled the same forests from the mouth of the valley. Many of the shells burst over the troops, whilst others did so at the proper place. The column halted whilst Eziwojeni forest was being shelled. During the shelling, which lasted nearly an hour, one of R.H. was grazed across the forehead by one of the bullets of a shrapnel shell, whilst one of the levies was struck by a shell on the leg and seriously wounded. The troops remained in line formation until the right flank was in position.

Whilst waiting for the order to advance, one of General Stephenson's staff officers (who was with one or twoothers), when in the act of taking a photograph, was fired at by a rebel at a distance of about twenty yards. The charge, evidently one of slugs, luckily struck no one. One of the officers immediately fired three times with his revolver in the direction the shot had come from. This caused a little confusion, as some of the men, believing the enemy to be near, also began firing ahead. Just before resuming the advance, three volleys were fired in the direction to be traversed in order to clear the way. The left flank kept as close to the Mome as possible. Progress was slow on account of the abnormally steep and difficult nature of the ground.

Just above the thick forest at the bottom of the waterfall, orders were given to the troops in the higher portions of the forest to wheel gradually to the left and in the direction of the forest below, it being at the time thought that a number of rebels had gathered there to make a stand. In consequence of this, a section on the extreme left flank lost touch, but continued to move downwards. A number of other men in different parts of the line also temporarily lost touch.

In the meantime, on the opposite or eastern side of the valley, the T.M.R. had gradually worked their way up and co-operated generally in accordance with the plan. "A troop (T.M.R.), in the advance, occupied a kopje and sent ten of the men up the ridge to round up cattle, which they succeeded in doing. In retiring, a sniper on their left flank, concealed in the bush, shot Tpr. Steyn, who some days afterwards died from the effects of the wound. Three of his comrades immediately went to his assistance and carried him along, whilst two men went in advance and the remaining four protected the rear. The retirement was conducted with coolness and precision, and both General Stephenson and Colonel McKenzie, who witnessed the movement from Gun Hill, openly expressed their approval of the men's conduct."[221]After the forests in the immediate vicinity of the waterfall had been driven, the troops withdrew.

As a result of the operations, a considerable number of women and children emerged from the forest. They carried white flags. They were directed to a place of safety during the operations and subsequently returned to the bush. Much pains was taken, without success, to discover Sigananda's whereabouts. Only three rebels were killed; twenty-four surrendered to the troops. Traces of recent extensive occupation were, however, found. Information received at the time went to show that the enemy had vacated the gorge on the preceding day. About 300 cattle and many goats were captured. Sigananda's Enhlweni kraal was destroyed. Two men (including Steyn) of the T.M.R. were wounded by snipers.

Mpikwa, one of Sigananda's principal indunas, surrendered at the magistracy during the day with seventy-six men of the same tribe. Among these was a brother of Sigananda. All declared they were opposed to their Chief's conduct and, had, therefore, refrained from participating in the Rebellion.

On the 2nd June, McKenzie moved his camp to the east and further up the Mome stream, with the object of making an extensive drive to the east through the heart of the Nkandhla forests (Dukuza), as well as over Bomvana ridge where large numbers of cattle had been repeatedly seen and in which direction Sigananda'simpiwas then said to be. The Z.M.R. and N.C. were left to occupy the camp until dark when, with their fires alight, they were to withdraw, so as to lead the enemy to suppose the locality was still being occupied. A 15-pounder and a pompom, moreover, supported by the Z.M.R., continued to shell the upper portions of Mome gorge until dusk, with the view of keeping the enemy from entering the bush that had been driven that day.

Since McKenzie's departure from Insuze valley on the 23rd May, Mansel's column, when not actually engaged in a combined movement with that of McKenzie, had operated within a radius of five or six miles of the grave and succeeded in capturing considerable quantities of cattle, goats, etc., besides doing other useful work.

Colonel Woolls-Sampson at this stage received orders to proceed to Pietermaritzburg to confer with the Acting Commandant (Major-General Sir John Dartnell, K.C.B.)[222]and the Government. Major C.N.H. Rodwell, N.C., now assumed the duties of Chief Staff Officer, with the local rank of Lieut.-Colonel.

McKenzie left with his forces at 7 a.m. on the 3rd June, with the object of making an extensive drive in an easterly direction. Mansel, with N.P. and T.M.R., proceeded from his camp to the vicinity of Komo Hill. The guns and pompoms took up positions covering the general advance of the former column. Colonel McKenzie, accompanied by General Stephenson and his bodyguard of N.C., moved round open ground on the north to a position some three miles in a direct line from Bomvana ridge. The Z.M.R. occupied a kopje about one mile west of where it was proposed the drive should cease. Here they were subsequently joined by the O.C. Troops and General Stephenson, N.C. being strengthened by a troop temporarily detached from the Z.M.R.

R.H., D.L.I., and N.D.M.R., together with the Native levies, after crossing the head of the Mome valley, lined up along the edge of the bush, where instructions were given to the officers to drive the bush in line, with one European to every three levies, thus 1 *** 1 *** 1 *** 1. The objective pointed out was a knoll, which could be seen over the bush and beside the Nkandhla-Eshowe road. The N.D.M.R. took the left, D.L.I. the centre, and R.H. the right. As regards R.H., A and D squadrons were on the left, C in the centre, E and B on the right. Royston himself was on the right.

The idea was that, on the march through the bush, R.H. were to join forces with Mansel's men, who would move on the right from Cetshwayo's grave, whilst the left of the line was protected by McKenzie and the men posted near him on the open tops of the overlooking ridges.

After proceeding through the forest for about two miles over extremely broken country, the centre of the R.H. section of the line found that the spruit Royston had directed the right of the line to rest on was joined by another flowing down from the left front.

On C squadron, in command of Capt. E.G. Clerk, reaching the spruit referred to, a number of tracks of Natives were observed, so fresh as to appear to have been caused but a few minutes before. Following these, the men, still in fair line, came in contact with a party of thirty to forty rebels. A number of these were killed as they endeavoured to escape. Shortly after, it was discovered that touch had been completely lost with the two squadrons on the left, and that Royston with B and E had swung away more to the right and were at that time on the far side of a very high and narrow kopje. Four rebels were chased by men of C up this hill and would have escaped altogether had not the attention of men on the hill been attracted. The latter moved along the crest and shot the fugitives. Corporal Alexander, C squadron, killed later in the day, did some very accurate shooting at some Natives who were, as they thought, securely hidden on their side of the same kopje, sniping at members of C squadron in the valley below. These were shot by him at a range of about 500 yards.

After what remained of C had moved on, sixamadhlangala(war-huts) beside the spruit were destroyed. Here a quantity of goods looted from Davis's waggon on the 29th May was found. About a mile and a half further on, the men emerged, about 1.30 p.m., on to an open ridge, where some forty-five men of the squadrons on C's right, together with some Native levies, were come upon. Here Clerk found instructions had just come from Colonel McKenzie through Colonel W.S. Shepstone to move on, as Royston, with the remainder of the right wing, was said to be in advance on the right. There was, however, ground for doubting the intelligence, as firing could be faintly heard away on the right and slightly to the rear. At this time, it was not known to C where the R.H.squadrons on the left, much less the D.L.I. and the N.D.M.R., had got to. After a few minutes' halt, Clerk gave the word to move forward. London, supported by Lieuts. Fryer and Midgley and others of R.H. were put on the right, with the main body of levies, whilst Clerk, supported by Lieut. Stewart and Sergt.-Major Webber, took the extreme left. Lieut. Shepstone, who was with a portion of the levies and some of R.H. on the left, soon completely detached himself. Many Native footprints were seen; indeed, there was every sign of a large body of the enemy being close in advance. Six cattle that were come upon was a further indication. "I passed the word down the line," says Clerk,[223]"to keep a sharp look-out, explaining that I knew we were close on the enemy. At this time, a number of the levies had moved from their proper position and were bunched up near me, close on my right. The nearest European was Corpl. Alexander, about ten yards off on my right. Hawkins was next to him, then Holmes, Flynn, Corpl. Woolnough (A squad), Act.-Sergt. Fraser, Harding, Wilkinson, Bouck, Nesbit and others. After passing the word of warning, we moved about 200 yards and had just crossed a smalldonga, when I thought I noticed something move on my left. On searching the bush, we failed to find anybody, though we noticed that the Natives' tracks were very numerous and fresh. We moved forward till the left was about twenty yards across thedonga, the right not having yet crossed it, when a Native stepped out of a thick bush, between forty to fifty paces away on our left front. He was armed with, I think, a breech-loader. He fired the charge, striking close to the third man's feet (Hawkins). This appeared to be the signal, as immediately on the report, the forest on our left and left front seemed to be alive with the enemy. It looked like an overturned hive more than anything else. They must have been lying down till the shot was fired. They yelled 'Usutu!' and something like 'Zuzu!' and charged at us, one horn swinging round on our left and the othertowards our right and breaking. I turned to call to the men, only to find that the Native levies were running for their lives, not directly back the way we had come, but down the line, straight down to our right. This served to break our line a lot and create a gap between the 7th and 8th men. Seeing that there was no chance of making a stand where we were, I shouted to the men to move back and rally in thedongalower down. Knowing that unless the centre were checked in some way, the enemy would cut us up before we could get back to thedonga, I emptied my carbine (magazine) into the main lot at about twenty yards distance and about seventy from where I was afterwards lying. This served to check them for a minute or two and I took advantage of it to run after the men. While doing so, I slipped another cartridge into the breech of my carbine and had just succeeded in doing so, when I ran into another lot of the enemy who had charged between thedongaand myself (i.e.between where I first fired on the enemy and the position at which we rallied), as if to partly surround the party in thedonga. I thereupon fired five shots at them with my revolver as I ran towards my men. The enemy broke, and left, as I thought, a clear line to thedonga, where I could hear Fraser's voice calling out, 'Here we are, Sir!' Just then a Native rose from the low bush in front of me,i.e.between me and where I heard Fraser's voice. He had a stabbing-assegai and some sort of weapon—it seemed like an old muzzle-loading gun. He raised the assegai, but as he did so, I snapped at him the last shot in my revolver and he fell. As he fell, another Native appeared suddenly on my left—I think he had been behind a small tree. He was within stabbing distance before I noticed him, my attention having been engaged with the other man. I had no time to aim my carbine, merely being able to swing it up and parry his thrust. I narrowly escaped being wounded, for the assegai just grazed the right eyelid (I thought my eye was out, as the blood flowed over my cheek and almost blinded me). Catching my foot in something I fell, but the slopeof the ground being very steep, I succeeded in throwing myself right over. I turned over purposely and, in so doing, again faced my adversary. Swinging my carbine forward, I pulled the trigger, not, however, with the ordinary finger, for which there was no time, but with my little finger which happened to be in position at that instant. The shot struck the man in the chest and he fell forward past me on my left about seven yards from the east edge of thedonga. I remarked that this man had bound round his forehead a broad band of Turkey-red, as well as a stiff peak of red over the centre of the forehead.[224]The first of the other two had a narrow strip of red cloth round his forehead. I also noticed that a great number of the remainder of the enemy had Turkey-red round their heads. Recovering my footing, I ran down and leaped into thedonga, where I found Fraser, Woolnough, Alexander, Holmes, Flynn and Hawkins. The rebels seemed to surround us immediately and I had succeeded in firing only about two shots when Alexander staggered forward crying out, 'Oh, my God, pull this out, pull this out!' referring to an assegai which had been driven into the middle of his back. Someone pulled the assegai out and he sank down and died immediately. This assegai had been thrown from a distance of about ten yards up thedongaby one of the enemy who was there. Almost immediately afterwards, Hawkins staggered forward and sank against the east bank just on my right, with two assegais in his back. He remained in a crouching position and, from the peculiar sound, I knew his lung had been injured. Once he cried to someone to shoot him and put him out of his misery. Just as he fell, I felt a shock through my left upper arm, which caused my hand to lose its power; owing to this, I dropped my carbine. Stooping quickly to pick it up, I found that my left hand was useless and that I could not grasp anything. The little finger only retained its normal power. I seated myself on a rootwhich was jutting slightly out of the bank and, raising the carbine with my right hand, succeeded in loading it by gripping it between my knees. I then fired it by lifting it with the right hand and pulling the trigger with the little finger of my left. I continued doing this until loss of blood compelled me to abandon the carbine in favour of my revolver, which I had to load in the same way,i.e.between my knees.

"Shortly after I was wounded, I heard Holmes say, 'Ah! I've got it!'; he went on to explain that a bullet had gone through his thigh. He, however, continued firing, merely relieving himself by leaning against a tree which grew from the bank of thedonga. Woolnough had already been wounded in the ankle, and was lying close by the bank on the eastern side of thedonga. Flynn had blood streaming from wounds on the face, but Fraser, though in a very exposed position (with a white shirt on), suffered no injury whatever. All this time we were crying: 'Rally here, Royston's,' thinking it possible that the men further down thedongamight succeed in forcing their way to us, or that Colonel Royston might be within hearing and come to our assistance. I also shouted out, 'Give it to them, boys!' intending that the enemy should hear, as I supposed a few of them might know English. I knew that the men lower down were busily engaged from the firing I could hear, and occasionally I could hear Sergt.-Major Webber's voice encouraging our men.

"The Natives had made two charges when, as I was aiming at one up thedonga, about twenty yards off, a thrown assegai penetrated my right forearm.

"We were by this time getting very weak from loss of blood, and, as our fighting strength was four only, viz. Fraser, Holmes, Flynn and myself, things were looking very serious. I personally felt very weak but, after drinking some water from Flynn's water-bottle, I revived in time to assist in repelling the third charge. We succeeded in driving them back again, but I knew that unless help arrived soon, we would be overcome and, speaking to Fraser and Flynn, said if they succeeded in getting out totell the Colonel that we had left our mark on the enemy. A minute or so later, Holmes said, 'Look out, they're preparing to rush again.' I, at that moment, was loading my revolver with the last six cartridges I had. I succeeded in getting five in, but dropped the sixth. I fired two shots at some Natives in thedonga, twenty to thirty yards up. Holmes fired at them at the same time. They both dropped, I am certain Holmes killed one, but am not sure of the other. At this moment, shouting and shooting attracted our attention, and to our relief we saw other members of the regiment coming to our assistance, amongst the first being Lieuts. Male, Jones, and Oswald, then Colonel Royston a second or two later, he having stopped to bandage levy-leader W.H.E. Hopkins, who had been shot on the side of the head when running by the side of Colonel Royston in advance of the relieving party."

MANZIPAMBANAAction at its height

The foregoing account is necessarily confined to what took place in Clerk's immediate vicinity. The following particulars, taken from others who were engaged, are intended to supplement Clerk's graphic narrative.

The action occurred at the bottom of a large valley, which lies wholly within Dukuza forest, and through which flows the Manzipambana stream. There are remarkably few stones about, except in thedongaor water-course, which runs almost due north and south. The gully in question is but 130 yards long; it slopes steeply on the east, and is 12 to 14 ft. wide and about 6 ft. deep where Clerk lay. The forest is not very dense at this particular spot, one being able to see fifty yards all round. The enemy, about 300 strong—all exceptionally well-built men—was congregated in one spot. Although he must have been within twenty yards, the late Alexander, when sent forward to the left by Clerk to reconnoitre, did not see theimpi, no doubt because lying flat on the ground in accordance with custom, and behind trees and other cover. Although frequent efforts were made by the rebels to charge one or other of the three groups of R.H. in that vicinity, not one was pressed home, due no doubt to theaccuracy of the shooting, and to the fact that the 'horns' failed to get round at the lower end owing to the length of the line. Each of these groups was engaged, though at longer ranges than Clerk's group had to fire at. More than once the highest and the lowest groups fired at one another when masked by the rebels. Where Clerk was, the fighting was almost hand to hand. Many assegais were thrown and shots fired by the rebels. The engagement did not last more than fifteen to eighteen minutes.

It is difficult to determine how many of the enemy were killed; the number was at first given as fifty-three, but probably some of these were merely wounded and got away. In view of the duration of the action, and of its having taken place at short range, with at least twenty-four rifles, the killed were probably not less than thirty-five. The having of about nine head of cattle with them is noteworthy as evidence of an intention on the part of the rebels to decoy by offering a bait. As soon as the action commenced, the cattle were driven ahead, as if to confuse or afford cover. A device of this sort, it will be remembered, was adopted when the rebels made their first charge at Mpukunyoni. The enemy was in possession of anything from a dozen to three dozen guns of different kinds, but his shooting was distinctly poor; more casualties, however, were attributable to gun-fire, such as it was, in this action than in any other of the campaign.

The conduct of the levies in desertingen blocat so critical a moment is a lesson to be carefully borne in mind in the future. At the same time, it is fair to point out that they were not being led by anyone well-known to them, or familiar with their language; there were not more than fifty, and these were separated from the rest of their party. In this connection, it was unfortunate that the levy-leader attached to that part of the line was not at hand to give such moral support as he could. The fact that one or more of the enemy wore Turkey-red, thereby becoming undistinguishable from the levies, may be due to such or similar material having been among the goods in the waggon looted by the rebels a few days before.

It was most providential that Royston was within reach. Had he not come when he did, the party must have been annihilated. When the relieving party heard their comrades' shouts, they set out as fast as they could down a steep incline nearly a mile away from the scene of the action. Royston was accompanied by Hopkins, Oswald, Male and others. Hopkins, struck by a bullet on the side of the head, fell, rose, plunged forward again down the hill, only to fall again, when he was assisted by Royston. The enemy was found on all sides, especially east of the donga, but, on seeing reinforcements arrive, showed no disposition to fight, especially after Major A.W. Fraser, with his officers, n.c.o.'s and men had deployed on the east. The wounded were attended on the spot by the rescuers and, a few minutes later, by Capt. Austin Robinson, N.M.C., who was most assiduous in the discharge of his duties under difficult conditions.

There were four killed, viz. Corpl. E. Alexander and Tprs. J.L. Bouck, Harding and S.J. Robertson; eleven were wounded: Capt. E.G. Clerk, Lieuts. P. Male and Oswald, Corpl. Woolnough, and Tprs. J. Hawkins, F. Flynn, W.C. Holmes, W.H.E. Hopkins, D.C. Swart, J. Mann and H.D.M. Barnett. Of the latter, Clerk, Hawkins, Holmes, Hopkins and Swart were wounded severely. Hawkins succumbed to his injuries the same evening.

"All the units engaged inflicted severe losses on the enemy during the day's operations, and over 150 were killed, ten of them by Colonel Mansel's force. Over two hundred head of cattle were captured. It was again a very hard day for the troops, who had to work dismounted over exceedingly difficult country."[225]

Colonel McKenzie moved his column through the forest on the following day (4th June) along the road (Nkandhla to Eshowe), to join Mansel's force near Bobe ridge. The combined force thereupon drove through the forest on the eastern side of the road, making towards Sibuda peak. N.N.C., T.M.R. and Natives were on the left of the line;D.L.I, and Nongqai in the centre; and N.C., Z.M.R. and R.H. on the right. The N.D.M.R. occupied high ground near the objective towards which the troops were working. Owing to no rebels being found in the vast area traversed, it seemed that the enemy had moved back to the western or Mome side of the forests. With the forces at his disposal, it was quite impossible for McKenzie to prevent such breaking back. His idea, under the circumstances, was to harass the enemy as much as possible, by constantly driving him from one position to another.

It was on this day that the Natal Rangers (seven companies, with Maxims and signallers), under Lieut.-Col. J. Dick, D.L.I., arrived at Nomangci camp. Their arrival was most opportune. They soon proved to be a valuable addition to the forces.

A detachment of 85 N.N.H. (under Major G. Moe, U.M.R.), also came in on the 4th, with a number of remounts. Many of the corps had seen service during the Zulu War and on other occasions. Their enrolment was, therefore, wise, not only from a political, but also from a military point of view.[226]

On the 5th, the men, including those of Mansel's column, thoroughly exhausted by the heavy climbing and driving, were given a complete rest.

Leaving sufficient troops to take charge of the camp, McKenzie proceeded, on the following day, to drive that portion of the forests which slopes away downwards from the waggon road in the direction of Insuze and Manzipambana rivers. The line of drivers, which included N.R. and N.N.H., swept along both sides of the Manzipambana, and through what is acknowledged by Native residents to be the densest and least frequented portion of the forest. The N.N.C., T.M.R., N.P. and Nongqai, under Barker, co-operated effectively on the south. Only ten rebels were shot, as but few of the enemy were come upon during the operations. These again covered an enormous and particularly rugged area.[227]Intelligence at this time went to show that the enemy was gradually quitting Nkandhla for Macala and the Qudeni forests, as a result of the frequent and thorough-going driving being done by the troops.

"The force bivouacked for the night at the Nkunzana stream," says McKenzie. "The next morning (7th June), I moved up the Bobe ridge, and having received information that Sigananda was in the bush facing the south of the road from Bobe ridge to the Isibuda (Esibudeni) hill, I made a drive through that section of the forest and also shelled the bush, the guns having come out of camp to join me. Unfortunately some pompom shells struck very close to the squadron of the Natal Carbineers, but, fortunately, no one was hit. No trace of Sigananda could be found. Twenty rebels were killed. A large number of cattle were taken and stores of grain destroyed."

After an exceedingly trying day, McKenzie withdrew for the night to Nomangci (the infantry being assisted by ox-waggons sent from camp to meet them), whilst Barker returned to his camp near the grave.

It became necessary to give the troops another rest on the 8th. Many of the men had, by this time, completely worn out their boots and clothing, in consequence of the rough work in the forests.

As the forests now appeared to be clear of rebels, in so far, at any rate, as large parties of them were concerned, McKenzie began to work out plans for a combined move of all the columns, including those of Leuchars and Mackay, to Qudeni, where the enemy was reported to have mustered in considerable strength.

Heliographic communication was established with Mackay at Madhlozi mountain. During the day (9th), small drives of bushes took place in the neighbourhood of the camp, unattended, however, with any success.

At night, however, intelligence of such vital importancewas received as to enable McKenzie, not only to come face to face with his long-sought-for enemy, but, by taking advantage of the opportunity to the maximum, to deal him a crushing blow, so decisive, indeed, as to bring the Rebellion in Zululand to an abrupt end, much to the relief of the Colony and not least of the troops themselves.

Reference has already been made to the local intelligence staff, Lieut. Hedges and Sergts. Calverley and Titlestad. These officers, all of the Z.M.R., and intimately acquainted with Zululand, had, for some days past, been endeavouring to locate Sigananda. This was done with the assistance of Mandisindaba, a man who had for long been known to Calverley. He had been induced by the latter to surrender with his family a few days previously. This was allowed by McKenzie to take place on condition that he went to the Mome and ascertained Sigananda's whereabouts as precisely as possible. Accompanied by two or three Native scouts and two rebel spies—the latter disguised as messengers from Dinuzulu—Mandisindaba proceeded to the gorge. Whilst walking through a forest, the party accidentally met a member of Sigananda's tribe who, it so happened, was also in search of Sigananda. On being informed that two of the party were messengers from "the Prince" and were carrying a message which they had been directed to deliver to the Chief, the man referred to announced that he had been sent by Bambata and Mehlokazulu, then bivouacked at Kombe forest (fifteen miles west of Mome), to inform Sigananda that they would leave there with the whole of their forces (including many of Sigananda's tribe)—some twenty-three companies in all—that very evening, and, travelling viâ Macala, camp near the junction of the Mome and Insuze, with the object of entering the Nkandhla forests.

Whilst endeavouring to locate the Chief, the party separated themselves from Bambata's messenger. The former presently succeeded in obtaining information as to Sigananda's approximate whereabouts, when they immediately withdrew to carry back their extremely important intelligence. This was received at an appointed rendezvous, and at once,i.e.at 9.30 p.m., conveyed to Colonel McKenzie.

After considering the matter, McKenzie concluded that, although the rebels might reach Mome during the night, they would probably not enter the forests until daylight. He accordingly decided to try and prevent their entry, a decision which, having regard to the lateness of the hour and the great difficulties to be overcome, called for that swiftness and directness of action which are so characteristic of the man.

Whilst plans and arrangements were being made for the move, a message was received from the Magistrate at Empandhleni, confirming in all essentials the intelligence that had already been brought in.

This corroborative information had also been obtained by Native scouts—two very plucky men, one of them called Bayekana, who had themselves seen Bambata and Mehlokazulu'simpiin the Kombe forest, and further ascertained from people in the vicinity that the intention was to move to the Mome the same night. This intelligence was at once transmitted by special runners over a distance of twenty-five miles to the Magistrate, who, again, was six miles from Nomangci.

Presuming that the rebels would move down the Insuze valley, that being their easiest route, it became necessary to place the responsibility of preventing the entry primarily on the column already in the vicinity of the grave. This column, in the absence of Mansel on duty in Pietermaritzburg, was then under the command of Lieut.-Col. W.F. Barker, D.S.O.[228]

The instructions issued at 10.30 p.m. by McKenzie to Barker, being important, are givenin extenso:

"From O.C. Troops to Colonel Barker."On receipt of this despatch, you will please moveat once, with all available men (leaving sufficient for thedefence of your camp), to the mouth of the Mome valley. I have information that animpiis coming down from Qudeni to enter the Mome valley between this and to-morrow morning. Please try and way-lay thisimpiand prevent them from entering the Mome, and at daylight block the mouth of the Mome at once. It is anticipated that they will not enter the Mome till daylight."I have reliable information as to almost the exact spot Sigananda is in and I am moving from here to surround him. He is supposed to be just below the Mome stronghold, a little lower down than where we burnt his kraal. I will cut off this portion at daylight and drive down towards you, so please do all you can to prevent his escape, and to co-operate with me generally."At daylight, please send the Zululand Police and Native levies up to Sigananda's kraal, which you burnt the day we attacked the stronghold, where they will join my forces. You must take your gun[229]and Maxims in case you meet theimpi, which is reported to be of strength."Look out for my signals."

"From O.C. Troops to Colonel Barker.

"On receipt of this despatch, you will please moveat once, with all available men (leaving sufficient for thedefence of your camp), to the mouth of the Mome valley. I have information that animpiis coming down from Qudeni to enter the Mome valley between this and to-morrow morning. Please try and way-lay thisimpiand prevent them from entering the Mome, and at daylight block the mouth of the Mome at once. It is anticipated that they will not enter the Mome till daylight.

"I have reliable information as to almost the exact spot Sigananda is in and I am moving from here to surround him. He is supposed to be just below the Mome stronghold, a little lower down than where we burnt his kraal. I will cut off this portion at daylight and drive down towards you, so please do all you can to prevent his escape, and to co-operate with me generally.

"At daylight, please send the Zululand Police and Native levies up to Sigananda's kraal, which you burnt the day we attacked the stronghold, where they will join my forces. You must take your gun[229]and Maxims in case you meet theimpi, which is reported to be of strength.

"Look out for my signals."

FOOTNOTES:[219]Small parties of troops were, of course, sometimes swooped down on suddenly in 1879 and overwhelmed,e.g.the Prince Imperial's party and the Intombi disaster. Such tactics, however, were merely incidental or subsidiary to those generally practised.[220]N.C. remained with the O.C. troops at Gun Hill during the drive.[221]W. Bosman,The Natal Rebellion of 1906, p. 66.[222]This appointment had become necessary early in June, owing to Colonel Bru-de-Wold being obliged, through illness, to temporarily relinquish the duties of his office.[223]The following account is now published for the first time.[224]This cloth (Turkey-red) had been issued to members of levies as a badge to indicate that they were loyalists. It was worn either round the left arm or round the head (above the forehead).[225]Report, Col. D. McKenzie, September, 1906.[226]Some account of the excellent services performed by N.N.H. will be found in Appendix XI.[227]During this drive, a few N.N.H. were directed to look after the horses. One of the men, Hendrick Mkabela, seeing a party of rebels, with twenty-one head of cattle, attacked them and, though single-handed, succeeded in capturing the stock, and subsequently handing it over to the Provost-Marshal.[228]Barker had assumed duty on the 8th.[229]Barker had two 15-pounders.

[219]Small parties of troops were, of course, sometimes swooped down on suddenly in 1879 and overwhelmed,e.g.the Prince Imperial's party and the Intombi disaster. Such tactics, however, were merely incidental or subsidiary to those generally practised.

[220]N.C. remained with the O.C. troops at Gun Hill during the drive.

[221]W. Bosman,The Natal Rebellion of 1906, p. 66.

[222]This appointment had become necessary early in June, owing to Colonel Bru-de-Wold being obliged, through illness, to temporarily relinquish the duties of his office.

[223]The following account is now published for the first time.

[224]This cloth (Turkey-red) had been issued to members of levies as a badge to indicate that they were loyalists. It was worn either round the left arm or round the head (above the forehead).

[225]Report, Col. D. McKenzie, September, 1906.

[226]Some account of the excellent services performed by N.N.H. will be found in Appendix XI.

[227]During this drive, a few N.N.H. were directed to look after the horses. One of the men, Hendrick Mkabela, seeing a party of rebels, with twenty-one head of cattle, attacked them and, though single-handed, succeeded in capturing the stock, and subsequently handing it over to the Provost-Marshal.

[228]Barker had assumed duty on the 8th.

[229]Barker had two 15-pounders.

ACTION AT MOME[230]GORGE.

Ofso important a nature were McKenzie's instructions, that three men were employed to carry them to Barker, who was known to be camped three or four miles from the grave.[231]The three selected were Tprs. C.W. Johnson (because of his knowledge of the district), G.O. Oliver (because of his ability to speak Zulu), and W. Deeley (as additional rider in case of accidents)—all of the Z.M.R. In informing the men of the contents of his despatch, McKenzie explained he did so, so that, in case of mishap, one or other of them should ride through and acquaint Barker thereof, even though only verbally.

It was just about 10 p.m. when the men, quitting Nomangci camp, moved towards the road a mile off. Once in it, they pushed forward at a sharp pace, which increased to a gallop on entering, as they presently did, the great black forest. The speed at which they went naturally caused the clatter of the horses' hoofs to reverberate loudly in the still, dark avenue formed by the trees on either side. It was for a double purpose they galloped along as they did, firstly, to convey the intelligence with utmost speed, secondly, to give the impression to any ofthe enemy that might be lurking about—for the entire route to be traversed was held by him—that the party was larger than it really was. After proceeding about half a mile in the forest, a large tree was found lying at right angles across the road. It had not fallen by accident, but had been chopped to come down as it had done, so as to obstruct waggons going to and fro. (Only a few days before, it will be remembered, a waggon carrying supplies had been captured in this locality). Leaping the hurdle, the riders were next surprised at seeing a fire burning but a short distance away to the right, one of them declaring he heard persons running from there further into the forest. It was not until they had got to the looted store at Sibudeni peak, where they left the road to proceed along a rough track leading through other dense forests and broken country to Bobe ridge, that the horses were pulled in and compelled, owing to the nature of the ground, to proceed at a walk. At this point, two or three cow-hides were found tightly stretched and pegged out to dry across the said track. To prevent more noise than necessary at this dangerous part (it was one of the enemy's principal outposts—the attack on Mansel of 5th May began near there), the men dismounted, made a detour round the hides, and then went on again as before. They soon emerged altogether from the forest, descended the long steep Bobe ridge, and crossed the Halambu stream at the bottom. Here doubt arose as to the whereabouts of the Transvaalers' camp, but the existence of fresh wheel-marks, fortunately noticed in the nick of time leading off the well-beaten Fort Yolland track, induced the men to follow them, with the result that, after proceeding but a few hundred yards, they found the object of their mission had been successfully achieved. To be passed through the lines of sleeping soldiers and on to the Officer Commanding was the work of but a few moments. The despatch was safely delivered at about 1 a.m.[232]

Barker at once made arrangements to move as directed. He had all the officers and men quietly roused. Calling the former together, he read them the despatch and made known the order of march, anticipating he would be in time to lie in ambush at Tate gorge, that being a part of the country which lent itself well to such tactics.[233]The strictest orders were issued that there was to be neither smoking nor talking. Leaving a force sufficient to defend the camp, the rest of the column moved off at 2 a.m. It was made up as follows: T.M.R. (three squadrons—B, C and D); N.P. (90); N.F.A. (one section—two 15-pounders); one Maxim gun; one Colt gun; Nongqai (100); and a levy of about 800 Natives (Chiefs Mfungelwa and Hatshi).

When near Cetshwayo's grave, Inspector C.E. Fairlie, with Nongqai and levies, branched off to the right and proceeded to a position overlooking a small neck in that large bend of the Mome stream situate some 200 yards below where the "pear-shaped" forest (Dobo), tapering down, abuts on the said stream. He was directed to stop the rebels on their making an appearance at the neck. If nothing happened for an hour after daybreak, he was to proceed up to Sigananda's already burnt Enhlweni kraal and there, as directed, co-operate with McKenzie's forces.

On reaching the entrance of Mome gorge, the advanced guard of the main body, consisting of a troop of C squadron, had already moved across the comparatively level ground opposite the mouth, when Barker and those with him, glancing over their right shoulders, observed a number of fires burning brightly in the gorge, some 1,000 yards away. There were about sixty. It seemed as if the troops had come too late. Word to halt was immediately passed along. The guns at the moment were half a mile inrear. On looking intently, it seemed as if figures were moving in front of the fires. The time then was about 4 a.m. Barker dismounted, and, taking two or three men with him, advanced on foot along the slope of the small ridge on the west of the mouth of the gorge to obtain a nearer view. Having satisfied himself the enemy was actually bivouacked on an old mealie garden, and in considerable force, exactly where the fires were, he proceeded to make his dispositions for attack, which, it was arranged, should begin as soon as daylight came. B and D squadrons and a Maxim gun were posted on a ridge to the immediate east of the Mome stream, where a good field of fire could be commanded. C squadron and fifty N.P. with a Colt gun, occupied the eastern face of a low ridge on the west, whilst the rest of the Police, except the troop that formed an escort to the guns posted on a prominent and detached hillock (in front of the mouth of the gorge), were kept in reserve out of sight and close to where the road passes between the gun position and the said low ridge on the west. The object of the latter force was to prevent a possible breaking back of the enemy into Insuze valley. The guns, crossing at the drift, purposely made a big detour to the left, skirted the left bank of the Insuze, and came up the southern face of the hillock referred to.[234]As it was, it was feared the noise was enough to alarm the enemy.

When Fairlie arrived at his position, finding the enemy bivouacked immediately below him, he detached about twenty Nongqai and 400 of the Native levy, with two or three Europeans, to hold ground north of him, and opposite and within 100 yards of where the Dobo bush meets the Mome.

The orders were that not a shot was to be fired nor the slightest noise made until daybreak, when a round from the 15-pounders was to be taken as the signal for a general fusillade. Barker made it known that he himself was with the guns.

For about two hours everybody remained in position,perfectly still. As silent were they as their sleeping foes. The fires died out gradually, one by one. The time was one of the greatest anxiety for the commanding officer, as he did not know but that the whole of his remarkably elusive foe had slipped through the neck immediately in rear of their bivouac, which neck, owing to the nature of the country, it was impossible to completely block in rear without disclosing the presence of a hostile force. Owing to a heavy mist that arose towards dawn, making it difficult to discern objects at a distance of 200 yards, daylight was longer than usual in coming.

After watching for a long time through field-glasses, the mist cleared slightly, when Barker saw something resembling the outline of a burnt kraal where he had hoped to set eyes on the enemy himself. Suddenly remembering no burnt kraal existed on that particular spot a few days previously, he looked again, when he became convinced that what he beheld was nothing else but the enemy himself, drawn up in a circle—the inevitable circle in which orders are given as to engaging an enemy. Barker, moreover, saw enough to convince him that he had himself by then been seen.

The preconcerted signal was fired a few seconds later, not, however, by the 15-pounders, but by the Maxim under Lieut. R.G. Forbes, on the opposite or eastern side. What occurred at that point was this: D squadron under Capt. H. McKay, lay on Forbes's immediate right. Forbes's orders were not to fire without consulting McKay, and fire was on no account to be opened unless found to be absolutely imperative, viz. to prevent actual escape of the enemy up the gorge. If, however, it started in any other quarter, the Maxim was, of course, to do likewise. Just as it began to get light, the time being about 6.50 a.m., Forbes and McKay, using a good pair of field-glasses, 400 yards closer to the enemy than Barker, could see the rebels getting up and forming themselves into companies. It appeared as if they were about to move up the Mome and towards the redoubtable stronghold. McKay declined to give the order to fire until, after closer examination, heagreed that, by not opening, the first company, then obviously on the move, must be lost. "All right, have a go," he cried, whereupon the Maxim blazed forth at a range which, as it turned out, had been correctly fixed at 600 yards.

As soon as the Maxim started, practically simultaneous volleys broke from all troops east and west, including the two 15-pounders and Colt gun—the whole forming almost a semi-circle of flame in the gloomy, early dawn. The consternation among the rebels was such as, for a few moments, to paralyze action; they rushed wildly to and fro, throwing down coats, tin cans, equipment, etc. and seeking shelter in the greatest disorder, anywhere and everywhere. Large numbers dashed through the neck in the hope of escaping to their original destination, only to be met, first by well-directed fire of the men posted immediately above that part on the east, and, where these failed, by that of men (also on the east), detached from Fairlie and pushed forward still nearer the Dobo forest. Thus those fortunate in escaping the hail of bullets at the mouth had to continue to run the gauntlet for another 200 or 300 yards over rugged country. The day of reckoning had come, and come with a vengeance. Some, by sheer perseverance and good luck, succeeded in reaching the forest immediately below the waterfall, where they were, of course, safe; but, on this retreat being completely cut off by McKenzie, as will presently be seen, the fugitives found themselves forced to enter the then only available shelter, namely the Dobo forest; but to proceed thither was no better than jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. That forest was nothing less than a huge trap, capable of being completely surrounded and driven at leisure. Moreover, in attempting to gain entrance thereto, more than one sharp encounter took place with the Nongqai, levies, and supporting European troops.

At 7.5 a.m. the "cease fire" was sounded, when the troops were directed to leave the ridges and drive down the slopes, as well as over the area and along the stream in the immediate vicinity of the bivouac, also between theneck and Dobo. Much of the ground was covered with shrubs, long grass or rushes, and, here and there, the banks of the stream were hollowed out through the action of the water. In carrying out the movement, several cases occurred of individual rebels feigning death, when, on being more closely examined, they suddenly jumped up and attacked, either by seizing their assailant's rifle, or lunging at him with an up-till-then carefully concealed assegai.

Having described how Barker (who happened to be nearest the enemy) carried out the instructions he had received from McKenzie, it is necessary now to see what action was being simultaneously taken by the latter. The infantry and artillery were moved from Nomangci at 3 a.m. and the mounted troops at 3.30 a.m. to co-operate with Barker by descending both ridges overlooking Mome gorge, with the principal object of cutting the enemy off from the stronghold on fleeing from Barker below.[235]The western side was occupied by N.C. (C squad), Z.M.R. (about 100), N.D.M.R. (about 100), R.H. (about 450), D.L.I. (about 140), N.F.A. (one 15-pounder), two pompoms, a Maxim detachment, and a Native levy. The eastern side was held by the Natal Rangers (with Maxim guns), under Lieut.-Col. J. Dick.[236]

As part of McKenzie's plan was to effect the capture of Sigananda, he dismounted the Z.M.R. and marched them and the D.L.I. in single file, together with the Native levy, down to the large forest known as Mvalasango (on the west of the waterfall), in which Sigananda was said to be, with the object of driving it. The men were lining the edge of this forest, extremely dense and steep at that part, and awaiting the order to move forward into the bush, under Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston, when the loud and simultaneous fire already referred to burst from Barker's Maxim, artillery and rifles, about 2,500 yards further down.The first thought that flashed across McKenzie's mind was that Barker had trapped the rebels at the mouth whilst they were marching to enter. If such surmise were true, it became necessary at once to prevent fugitives from retreating towards Tate gorge and Macala. With this object in view, the troops were recalled and the order given to mount, the intention being to move down into the Insuze valley by way of Gcongco ridge which, as will be remembered, had been used on the occasion of the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave. These movements, although extremely difficult in the mist and dark, were carried out with great rapidity and dash, but resulted only in the troops being presently wheeled to a position lower down the gorge than the one just vacated. McKenzie came to the decision to right about wheel whilst on the gallop, owing to seeing that the flash from the fire of Barker's 15-pounders, 1,400 feet below, was directed up the Mome instead of westwards as at first anticipated. To return to hold ground half-way between top and bottom of the gorge and 300 yards from the edge of Dobo, was a matter of but a few moments. On this hurried rush back, a solitary armed rebel was come upon and shot whilst attempting to escape in the mist.

Alive to the importance of swift movement, McKenzie dashed down the side of the gorge at a pace that excited at once the surprise and envy of his men. These could but follow to the best of their ability. He grasped the situation in an instant—his eye for country is proverbial. He saw that the main line of retreat, the disposition of forces then being what it was, must necessarily be up the Dobo, to the top of the ridge (down whose eastern slopes that forest grew), and from thence into as precipitous though narrower a ravine on the west. Stringent orders were thereupon given for that particular topmost part to be effectively guarded by Royston's Horse, who were, moreover, ordered to connect with Barker's left. So important did McKenzie deem this, and rightly so, that a staff officer was at once sent to see that the order he had already sent by another staff officer was, as a matter of fact, being properlyexecuted.[237]His next act, as essential as the other, was to push troops down to check the rebels already making along the river banks towards the waterfall and the large dense forests in that neighbourhood. Detachments of the Z.M.R., N.D.M.R. and R.H., having once more dismounted, accordingly ran down to the Mome and there effectually cut off such fugitives as had not already made good their escape, compelling them to find refuge, though only for a time as it happened, in the pear-shaped or Dobo bush. At the same time, the N.C. Maxim (Sergt. Ross), was smartly got down to a suitable position and greatly assisted in preventing the enemy's escape.

The Rangers had originally been directed to hold the upper eastern ridge of the Mome and get in touch with Fairlie. On leaving Nomangci camp at 3 a.m., they were obliged to traverse a large section of forest along narrow paths, where they were delayed owing to the guides for a time losing their way, so much so, that when the action started, the men had barely emerged from the forest at the left rear of the waterfall. On hearing the fire, however, they pushed forward at a brisk pace to occupy the ground assigned them.

When the action was at its height, they were required to move down and assist men of N.C., Z.M.R., R.H. and other corps in cutting off the retreat. The necessary orders, however, could not be conveyed, as there was insufficient sunshine to use the heliograph. The semaphore was tried, but also proved unsuccessful. It is, however, doubtful, if, had the men come down, they would have been in time to be of material assistance.

After running down to check escapes along the banks of the Mome, the detachments of Z.M.R., N.D.M.R., N.C. and R.H. that had assembled there, when it was evident the fugitives had been cut off, were reinforced and then directed by McKenzie to drive, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Royston, down the Mome through the scruband bush towards the lower part of Dobo. In the course of this drive, the notorious ringleader, Mehlokazulu, one of the men who started the Zulu War, was shot. He was wearing a new pair of riding trousers, shirt, socks and overcoat, whilst a pair of new tanned boots was being carried for him by one of his servants.

About 9 a.m. Barker got into communication with McKenzie by semaphore, when he received orders to move his guns to the ridge in immediate rear of the enemy's bivouac (where the neck referred to was), and to search Dobo thoroughly with shrapnel. The forest was accordingly shelled from top to bottom. The enemy, realizing that he had been caught in a trap, could do nothing else than conceal himself as effectually as possible among the numerous boulders, crevices and other hiding-places to be found there. The troops at the bottom, including Nongqai and levies, now began to drive the bush upwards. They had not proceeded many yards before Colonel McKenzie directed them to withdraw, climb the western face of the gorge immediately north of Dobo, and, joined on top by N.D.M.R., R.H., D.L.I. and B and C companies N.R. (which battalion had been ordered to come down from the opposite side of the gorge)[238]to drive downwards towards the Mome. The reason for operating in this way was because, by advancing upwards, the troops were at a disadvantage, as the rebels, most of whom still retained possession of their assegais, would have been able to throw with effect at men climbing under the greatest difficulties up so steep an incline.

It was already 2 p.m. when the drivers, purposely as numerous as possible, were in position. N.R., R.H., and D.L.I. took the left, N.D.M.R. the centre, with Nongqai and levies on the right. The rate of progress, owing to the exceptionally steep and rugged area, and to the enemy having concealed himself in various and most ingeniousways, was very slow. Steps, too, had to be taken to see that the line advanced in as uniform a manner as possible to prevent accidents. Occasionally Nongqai or levies on the right, more used to such movements than Europeans, got ahead, when they had to be halted to allow the rest to move up. With the constant interruptions that occurred, it is surprising the drive was conducted as well as it was.

After reaching a point about three-quarters of the way down, it was seen the Nongqai had again swung round in advance and partly overlapped. If their being in advance had been dangerous when higher up, it was more so now where the bush, narrowing as it approached the Mome, was only 250 yards across instead of 1,200. All this time, independent firing had been going on in various directions and many rebels were killed. Fairlie, who led the Nongqai, fearing accidents, decided to withdraw, leaving the rest of the bush to be completed by such troops as remained. He directed the "assembly" to be sounded. The effect of this unfortunate mistake was that, not only did all the Nongqai begin to leave, but also all the European troops and Native levy (though not so fast), for, hearing the call, the majority naturally supposed it had been ordered by the general officer commanding. Had the "assembly" not been sounded, the rest of the bush—only a small portion remained—must have been as thoroughly driven as that already done, with the result that many rebels, who had continually slipped further and further to the bottom end as they heard the drivers advancing, would not have escaped as they did. For all anyone knew at the time, Bambata and other important rebels were among those who escaped. When the bugle sounded, it was already late (4.30 p.m.), though not so late as those engaged supposed, nor too late for the drive to be completed. Exactly how many rebels escaped at that particular spot it is impossible to say. A hundred would probably be beyond the mark.

After withdrawing from Mvalasango forest, in which it was supposed Sigananda was concealed, McKenzie couldnot, of course, take steps to drive it that day. Even supposing Sigananda was there, which, as a matter of fact, was not the case—information subsequently obtained proved he was in the small gorge immediately on the west of Mome—the futility of driving increased every moment after withdrawing to cut off the enemy. Sigananda, on hearing the fire at the mouth (supposing him to have been in the gorge), would naturally have retreated further into his stronghold, and to one or other of its innumerable recesses where, after the delay of say an hour or two, it would have been utterly impossible, even for the total forces engaged, to have found him, had they been withdrawn from all parts of the field to undertake the search.

Among the slain were Mtele[239]of Umsinga division uncle of Chief Kula, who will be dealt with at length in Chapter XV.; Nondubela (aliasMavukutu), a Chief also of Umsinga division and an associate of Mehlokazulu; Paula and Moses, the Christian teachers who had joined Bambata at Mpanza; and the rebel protagonist Bambata himself.

The death of Bambata occurred as follows: Some time after those who fled into Dobo had passed in, and shortly before the shelling thereof, a solitary unarmed man, with but a shirt on, was seen making his way up the Mome stream, walking in the water. The first to notice him was a Native loyalist, some sixty yards away on the left bank of the Mome. Behind the man in the shirt, however, on the right bank, and only ten yards off, was another loyalist. The man in the water perceived the Native sixty yards off, but not the one in rear. Seeing the more distant man rushing to attack him, he left the water, but no sooner did he mount the right bank, than the one in rear, seizing the opportunity, darted forward and planted his long-bladed assegai in the rebel's body. This happened just as that part, where Dobo abuts on the Mome, had been reached. The loyalist, a powerfully built fellow, endeavoured to withdraw the weapon, the only one he had, with the object of again stabbing his far-from-dead foe. But, havingthrust too hard, the assegai had got so bent that it could not be extricated. The unfortunate victim had by this time fallen. Presently, the man who had first observed him, crossed the stream and, raising his assegai, attempted to thrust at the half-prostrate form. Quick as lightning, the latter—never uttering a sound—clutched the assegai with both hands before it had struck him, and violently struggled for its possession. It seemed he must succeed, notwithstanding two were against him. He fought with the valour of despair. By this time, however, a Nongqai, also on the left bank, had noticed what was afoot. Coming up quickly, he raised his rifle and shot the rebel through the head. And there, after further unsuccessful efforts to withdraw the assegai, the corpse was left to lie. None of those present bothered themselves with deceased's identity. As the establishment of such identity did not take place until a couple of days afterwards, and then only under special circumstances, the rest of the story must be reserved for its proper place.

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