FOOTNOTES:

MOMEDispositions are at beginning of action; for subsequent ones, see Reference and textREFERENCEA =Colonel McKenzie's position during actionB =Where N.C., N.D.M.R, and R.H. prevented escape of rebelsC, D, E =Positions N.C., D.L.I., N.D.M.R. respectively, at 7.30 a.m.F =Squadron, R.H., 8 a.m.G =Barker's 15-pdrs., 8 a.m.HtoJ =Barker's force was operating at 8 a.m. between these pointsK =Bambata killed hereLtoM =Line held by N.R., 8 a.m.N =Mehlokazulu killed hereEnemy; after being repulsed at G, fled to forest near waterfall, also to Dobo (pear-shaped) forest

When the last troops (among them the D.L.I. and the Native levy) had emerged from Dobo, orders were given for the columns to march back to their respective camps. Needless to say the infantry that had taken part in the last drive, were thoroughly exhausted by the time they got back. For them, indeed, the day had been particularly long and arduous.

It is only to be expected that the enemy's losses were severe. The total, however, as has been proved by subsequent enquiry, was not so great as believed by some. The estimates were at first fixed at anything between five and six hundred. Taking into consideration the accounts given by rebels, by members of various units that took part, and others likely to know, it would appear the number was about five hundred. The losses amongst McKenzie's troops, including Barker, were small. Capt. S.C. Macfarlane (D.S.O.), T.M.R., was killed (probably by his own side, through his pushing further forward in the early dawn than directed to do). Lieut. C. Marsden, R.H., and Tpr. F.H. Glover (I.L.H.), T.M.R., were mortallywounded, and eight other Europeans wounded. Sergt. Mahashahasha, Z.N.P. (Nongqai), and members of the levies were also wounded. This great disparity in losses of the opposing forces is, of course, accounted for by the fact that the rebels were taken at a disadvantage. It is only natural that heavy losses would have resulted on well-armed troops waylaying the enemy as was done on the day in question. The rebels knew perfectly well what the result of clashing with European troops would be (this from lessons drawn especially from the Zulu War), even where the ground was not particularly favourable to either side. They had still to experience the effects where, with greatly inferior weapons, they were tactically at serious disadvantage. Such contingency they were, of course, awaremightoccur. No doubt, looking on their opponents as slow and ponderous, they thought it would never arise. It is, however, the unlikely that occurs in war. There is no question that the end they kept constantly in mind was in some way or another to secure tactical advantages over detached sections of European troops similar to that obtained over themselves by the latter on the 10th of June, when, it is needless to add, they would have administered punishment even more severe and relentless than was meted out to them then.

To be shot down or stabbed in battle is regarded by Natives as the natural consequence of war, and, when an advantage has been obtained, they are surprised if it be not used to the greatest effect. It is difficult to describe the contempt with which the warlike Zulu regards what we are pleased to style magnanimity—the magnanimity, for instance, of Gladstone in 1881, with certain victory in view, and the magnanimity of restoring Cetshwayo to Zululand in 1883. They reason thus: Two peoples are at war; one must defeat the other, and the best way is to do so in a thorough-going way. Nothing, they hold, is so effective and lesson-serving as wholesale slaughter. Anything else is to pander to future trouble and misery. When the blow has to be struck, let each strike and strike severely. To spare an enemy during continuance ofhostilities is fatal. As well spare flames doing their best to burn down a kraal.

Curious incidents sometimes occur on the eve of momentous events, but escape narration because irrelevant to the issue. An exception must be made on the present occasion, for the story will at least surprise any Zulu that happens to hear it. "As we were marching at a walk on the night in question," says Barker, "and when about two miles to the south of Cetshwayo's grave, I and my Adjutant (Capt. W. Jardine) leading, I noticed in our path a black cat. I called Jardine's attention to it, jocularly supposing it to be a sign of luck ahead. It was moonlight, and before the mist had come on. The cat, black all over, was evidently tame. It led the way towards the Mome. I afterwards forgot and lost sight of it. On our way back after the fight, coming along last, as I wanted to see all our men out, the same cat entered my path and came along. Again I lost sight of it, but next morning found it lying on or near my pillow. After this, it remained in camp and became a regimental favourite. I subsequently took it to the Transvaal."

The chapter will conclude with a brief survey of what took place among the rebels themselves between the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave (17th May), and their collapse at Mome.

Not satisfied that the order to rebel had emanated from Dinuzulu, as declared to be the case by Cakijana and Bambata, seeing the promised reinforcements had not arrived, Mangati resolved to visit Usutu and learn the truth from Dinuzulu himself. Bambata decided to accompany him, but Cakijana, owing to the wound he had received, could not go. The two, accompanied by two other mounted men, rode off on the 20th. Interviews took place, probably on 24th (Queen's birthday), and 25th, between them and Dinuzulu. The latter denied having started or authorized the Rebellion, emphasizing he had merely said to Bambata: "If you people want to fight, why do you not all unite and fight the whites?" He said, again, to Mangati: "If you people desire to fight, go anddo so, it is not my doing. Go and join Mehlokazulu. I hear he also has joined the rebels. After joining him, go and join Sigananda, and, if necessary, go on fighting till you get to Natal.... Sigananda's messengers are here now to report that the white people have burnt my father's grave and are unearthing my father's bones. I tell you now, go and join Mehlokazulu and do what he tells you."[240]After spending two days at Usutu, where they were fed and hospitably treated by the man who, but five weeks before, had sent the loyal and reassuring statement printed on p. 214, and beginning: "I am not surprised that the Natal Government should have doubt as to my loyalty.... I can only say I am perfectly loyal and am most anxious to give proof of this...." the rebel ringleaders departed with a blessing from that 'loyal' and 'much maligned' Chief, to use their best endeavours to overthrow the white man's rule.

By the time Mangati and Bambata had got back to the area of hostilities, Leuchars had fought his action at Mpukunyoni (28th). Mehlokazulu and other leaders from the north-west moved to Nkonyeni forest, near Kombe. After the fight at Manzipambana (3rd June), the greater portion of the Nkandhla rebels collected at Macala. Bambata, leaving Macala with his tribesmen, got into touch with Mehlokazulu, and returned with him and them on the 7th to mass at Macala. Here, the combined forces were informed by Mangati that he had just returned from Dinuzulu whose wish it was that Macala—"a man with a temper"—should take supreme command, and Mganu command the regiment Mavalana. Under this arrangement, Bambata and Mangati assumed the title of 'princes.'

Finding theimpihad, for the most part, gone to Macala, Sigananda sent word to Bambata to return at once, as, having started a rebellion in his (Sigananda's) ward, it was unfair to desert, leaving him to cope as best he could with the enraged Europeans. Bambata had deceived them once by declaring the white man's bullets would not 'enter,' was he going to do so again by throwing over theoriginal plan of adopting Nkandhla as the principal rallying-ground? The reply was that the forces would return at once.

It was now resolved by the leaders to further increase their numbers if possible. A large force accordingly proceeded on the 7th to the Tugela, near Watton's store, where Mangati alone paid a visit to a son of Chief Gayede to induce him, as diplomatically as he could, to join them. The son explained his father was ill and unable to join, being a mere "dog of the Government." The primary object of the expedition was to put Gayede and another adjoining Chief, Hlangabeza, to death, whereupon their people would probably espouse the cause of the rebels. These irregular and hazardous proceedings were strongly disapproved by Macala and others. These men, therefore, refrained from accompanying the force.

After visiting Watton's store, theimpibivouacked in Zululand, close to the river. It was mid-day before they were again astir. A couple of Native police from Krantzkop were soon observed on the opposite bank. They began shouting at the rebels. Cakijana dismounted, dropped on his knee, and shot one of them dead, after which the force moved back to Macala.

There being no reason why theimpi, considerably augmented by the arrival of Mehlokazulu's and other men, should not return to Nkandhla to continue tactics up till then comparatively successful, a start was made for the Mome between 6 and 7 p.m. on the 9th. The men, leaving in batches, marched in the loosest order. When close to Tate, they got reliable intelligence that Barker was still near Insuze river, although his waggons had gone off to Fort Yolland. Ndabaningi believed the news, but Mehlokazulu ridiculed it, retorting that the informants were partial to Europeans and purposely wished to mislead.

Mangati, with four companies, moved at once up the Mome gorge and bivouacked near the waterfall. Owing to sheer obstinacy on Mehlokazulu's part, the mainimpicamped at the mouth of the gorge instead of moving further in with Mangati. It was, moreover, owing to himthat intelligence brought about 3.30 a.m., three hours before the action began, by a little boy to the effect that some waggons were approaching was ignored—these 'waggons,' as it happened, being the two 15-pounders and ammunition waggons. In reply, Mehlokazulu described the intelligence as rubbish, for he had himself seen from Macala every waggon belonging to Barker's column trek off towards Fort Yolland. Thus, this vaunted leader, chiefly on account of personal fatigue, did his side the greatest possible disservice, forfeiting his own life in addition.

After hearing the little boy's story, Ndabaningi detached himself with a section of the rebels and followed Mangati, leaving Mehlokazulu and Bambata with the bulk of theimpibehind.

The aggregate force that came from Macala would have been anything between 1,200 to 1,500 strong. Of these, probably not more than 1,000 were in action, if so many.

Had the whole body entered the stronghold unperceived, the plan was to rest a day, then begin attacking the surrounding Chiefs and looting their stock. These Chiefs, although members of their tribes had become rebels, had themselves refrained from joining. It was, therefore, supposed that, on conclusion of hostilities, they would visit their displeasure on those who had rebelled. Consequently, the intention was to deal vigorously with and kill off these half-hearted men; such were the tactics of Tshaka, for, after killing the leaders, the ordinary people, it was found, flocked to the 'conqueror.' The policy, furthermore, was to lie in wait for small parties of the Government forces near, but especiallyin, the forests, and massacre them before reinforcements could arrive, as, indeed, had almost happened at Manzipambana.

The reader will naturally wonder what became of the newly-appointed commanders, Macala and Mganu. Macala thought it wiser to push into the gorge. He joined Mangati and Ndabaningi, leaving the headstrong Mehlokazulu and Bambata to look after themselves. Mganu, however, remained.

On Bambata and Mehlokazulu's suspicions being aroused, scouts were sent out to examine the ridge on the west, occupied by part of Barker's force. These returned a few minutes before the Maxim opened to report troops were really there. Theimpiwas speedily roused and formed into anumkumbi, that is, the 'circle' Barker had seen. Bambata then completely lost his head, so much so that Mganu, in the absence of Macala, was called on to take general command. He immediately gave such orders as appeared necessary to meet the situation. His own regiment, Mavalana, was told to charge at Barker in one direction, and the others to do likewise in another. But before the men (already arranged in companies) could move forward (notbackwardas McKay and Forbes had believed), the Maxim began—not from the ridge suspected by the rebels, but from a different one. What followed at this stage has already been related. It remains to add that, when it became a case ofsauve qui peut, the majority turned and made over the neck in rear as hard as they could. It flashed across the minds of those familiar with that part of the country that Dobo was a snare; that being the case, there was nothing for it but to run the gauntlet towards the waterfall. This, as has been seen, many accordingly did.

And so, as far as the ordinary rebel could see, the great storm that was to come turned out to be nothing more than a thunder of artillery and hail of bullets, brought on by that very race against whom the mysterious command had been specially directed. Truly, the manner in which Dinuzulu had directed the elements left much to be desired.

FOOTNOTES:[230]This word is dissyllabic, and pronounced 'maw-me' (the 'e' being as in 'met').[231]Owing to the insanitary state of his camp (the site having recently been used by three columns), Barker got permission from McKenzie to move about three miles to the south-east of the grave, and out of sight of Macala. This had occurred on the afternoon of the 8th. On the same day, all the supply waggons (empty) trekked back to Fort Yolland. Little did Barker suppose that this lucky move would make the enemy believe the column had vanished as well.[232]Some fifteen miles of difficult country had been traversed. The feat was a noteworthy one; it had called for courage and daring, and well deserved the Distinguished Conduct Medal afterwards awarded to each of the men.[233]The mouth of Tate gorge is about a mile west of the mouth of Mome gorge, and is on the route along which, as hinted in McKenzie's despatch, the enemy would probably travel. In Barker's view, it was just possible the enemy, although bound for Mome, would proceed thither through Tate. It will be seen later, McKenzie, notwithstanding his written instructions, entertained similar suspicions.[234]This is the hill referred to on p. 246.[235]Orders were given for the searchlight to be kept flashing throughout the night, to give the enemy the impression that the troops were quietly resting on Nomangci—a ruse that exactly served its purpose.[236]F company (Capt. Forsbrook) was, however, at Mangeni. It joined the regiment on the 14th June.[237]It so happened that a squadron of R.H., which, for a few minutes had gone astray during the gallop on top, had already been made by Major A.W. Fraser to occupy a portion of the position in question, and so prevent escapes then already beginning to occur.[238]The battalion moved in line of companies, searching the bush-covered gulliesen route; a number of rebels was come upon. A and H companies lined the river, whilst parties of D, E and G lined one of the sides of Dobo bush as it was being driven. The work done by the regiment, especially B and C companies, was very useful.[239]It is believed by some that this man escaped.[240]Cd. 3888, p. 185.

[230]This word is dissyllabic, and pronounced 'maw-me' (the 'e' being as in 'met').

[231]Owing to the insanitary state of his camp (the site having recently been used by three columns), Barker got permission from McKenzie to move about three miles to the south-east of the grave, and out of sight of Macala. This had occurred on the afternoon of the 8th. On the same day, all the supply waggons (empty) trekked back to Fort Yolland. Little did Barker suppose that this lucky move would make the enemy believe the column had vanished as well.

[232]Some fifteen miles of difficult country had been traversed. The feat was a noteworthy one; it had called for courage and daring, and well deserved the Distinguished Conduct Medal afterwards awarded to each of the men.

[233]The mouth of Tate gorge is about a mile west of the mouth of Mome gorge, and is on the route along which, as hinted in McKenzie's despatch, the enemy would probably travel. In Barker's view, it was just possible the enemy, although bound for Mome, would proceed thither through Tate. It will be seen later, McKenzie, notwithstanding his written instructions, entertained similar suspicions.

[234]This is the hill referred to on p. 246.

[235]Orders were given for the searchlight to be kept flashing throughout the night, to give the enemy the impression that the troops were quietly resting on Nomangci—a ruse that exactly served its purpose.

[236]F company (Capt. Forsbrook) was, however, at Mangeni. It joined the regiment on the 14th June.

[237]It so happened that a squadron of R.H., which, for a few minutes had gone astray during the gallop on top, had already been made by Major A.W. Fraser to occupy a portion of the position in question, and so prevent escapes then already beginning to occur.

[238]The battalion moved in line of companies, searching the bush-covered gulliesen route; a number of rebels was come upon. A and H companies lined the river, whilst parties of D, E and G lined one of the sides of Dobo bush as it was being driven. The work done by the regiment, especially B and C companies, was very useful.

[239]It is believed by some that this man escaped.

[240]Cd. 3888, p. 185.

STATE OF AFFAIRS AT UMSINGA.—OPERATIONS BY MURRAY-SMITH'S COLUMN.—FURTHER OPERATIONS BY UMVOTI FIELD FORCE AND MACKAY'S COLUMN.

AlthoughNkandhla had been selected by the rebel leaders as theirterrain, that was not to say outbreaks would not occur in other parts of the Colony as well. Indeed, one of the objects of making Sigananda's stronghold the principal rallying-point was to encourage overt acts of rebellion in other parts from knowledge of the fact that, so long as the fastness was held, it was available as a general headquarters and place of refuge. As an illustration of this, the disaffected men of Ngobizembe's tribe who, after being punished in the middle of March by Leuchars—being by themselves powerless to resist the troops—made off from Mapumulo and joined Bambata at Nkandhla. Mehlokazulu and other Chiefs, as has already been seen, broke from Nqutu and adjoining districts to do the same. The principle upon which all these men acted seems to have been that, where local confederates were not strong enough to offer resistance on the spot, either from want of numbers or suitable fastnesses, they would move to Nkandhla, but where the prospects were not unfavourable, as at Umsinga and Mapumulo, each with a teeming Native, and sparse European, population, they would resolve to try their chances there and then, in the hope that, by creating additional and widely-separated areas of disturbance, the difficulties of the troops would beincreased, when other tribes would follow one or other of the alternatives referred to, always with the ulterior motive of causing the country to riseen bloc.

In view of the importance of Umsinga and Mapumulo, both districts being within forty to forty-five miles of Nkandhla by such routes as Native pedestrians ordinarily travel, it is well to understand the position at those places.

In Umsinga district there were, in 1906, ten tribes, by far the largest being that of Kula. The total huts owned by members of his tribe was upwards of 4,500.[241]The huts (in the same district) of the other nine tribes together did not amount to 4,000. To so great an extent did Kula over-shadow the other Chiefs, that it is unnecessary to make more than passing reference to the latter.

Kula was a young man, grandson of Ngoza, once famous throughout Natal and Zululand as Sir Theophilus Shepstone's principal induna. Ngoza, after serving in a position of trust and responsibility for many years, was appointed Chief over a tract of country vacated in 1858 by a Chief Matshana[242]to escape arrest. The ward was 450 square miles in extent, almost the whole falling within one magisterial division.

The Poll Tax Act and regulations were promulgated to the Natives of Umsinga in September, 1905, visits being paid by the Magistrate to four centres for the purpose. The announcement was well received. The only matter commented on by the Natives was that young men and boys (over 18) were held liable for the tax, instead of their fathers, as in the case of the hut tax. It was thought this would promote greater independence than was already being exhibited towards parents, and, at the same time, lead to youths retaining their earnings, instead of handing them over to their fathers or guardians, as up till then customary, on the plea of having to meet obligations of their own towards the State.

Kula and the smallest local Chief, Nondubela, soon began to influence their respective people against paying the tax. Their intrigues were extended to other Chiefs near them, both in Natal and Zululand. Early in December (1905), the same two tribes began to prepare for rebellion. Supplies of assegais, shields andtshokobezibadges were obtained. The young men of all the Umsinga Chiefs were called on to pay the poll tax subsequently to 20th January, though payment, it was explained, might be made at any time between then and 31st May. Only one of the Chiefs made earnest and successful endeavours to induce his men to pay, viz. Tulwana, a man who had always been conspicuous for his loyalty to the Government. Nondubela instructed his men not to pay, nor did any do so until after the Rebellion had broken out and several reverses had been sustained by the rebels. Kula advised his tribe to pay a few pounds, and so throw dust in the eyes of the Government. £98 out of £1,500 is all that was paid by his people.

In February, two of the same man's tribe, constables at Tugela Ferry, were charged and convicted of conspiring to murder the European police at that place and seize their arms and ammunition. The conspiracy was exposed by one of Chief Sibindi's men—a fellow constable.

Kula, a man of intemperate habits, had for long been a source of annoyance. In 1898, he openly organized his tribe into regiments. He was reproved for so doing by the Supreme Chief. Between 1898 and May, 1906, he was repeatedly fined, either for refusing or neglecting to supply labourers for the Public Works Department. In January, he was warned by the U.S.N.A. to be more careful. "The Government," this officer said to him, "is lenient, but will not put up with annoyance such as this for ever." In July, 1905, the Governor (Sir Henry McCallum) paid a visit to Pomeroy. The Chiefs were summoned to greet him. Kula arrived with a mounted cavalcade and deliberately galloped past the King's representative without saluting. For this gross disrespect he was cautioned by His Excellency in person.

On the 4th March, 1906, about fifty men of the tribe residing at Elands Kraal, under headman Mabulawo, openly took up arms. This caused all European farmers in the neighbourhood to flee precipitately from their homes. Theimpicontinued under arms and defied the local police, with the result that thirty-six of the Police Field Force, under Sub-Inspector C.R. Ottley, were sent to Umsinga to restore order. Ottley, however, deemed it inadvisable to attempt more with so small a force than camp near the court-house. On the 23rd, Kula held a large beer-drink at his kraal within two miles of the magistracy. An armed force was there assembled, it was said, for the purpose of killing the police and court officials. On the night fixed for the massacre, Kula, it seems, got drunk, when some of the more loyal headmen of the tribe bound him up, thereby preventing him from carrying his supposed threat into execution.

After these proceedings had been reported, Kula was summoned to Pietermaritzburg by the Supreme Chief. He at first hesitated about complying, but, on being pressed by his headmen, obeyed. Upon being questioned at headquarters by the Minister for Native Affairs, he denied everything that had occurred, but, in the face of irrefutable evidence, was ordered to arrest Mabulawo and all who had been or were still under arms. Twelve days later, the headman was brought to the Magistrate, unaccompanied, however, by any of those who had armed. On the 23rd April, a largeimpiwas organized to release Mabulawo. The latter was now driven off in Dr. Keith Murray's trap to Pietermaritzburg. When theimpiheard of this, and of the fact that thirty of the Umsinga Reserves had been mobilized and posted at the magistracy, they withdrew to their kraals.

Ever since the 4th March, the affairs of the district had been going from bad to worse. Europeans and loyal Natives were assaulted by disaffected Natives with impunity, so much so that the police were directed to desist from attending beer-drinks in uniform, and not to arrest any Native in the presence of others. By this time, Kula'stribe had virtually become master of the district, doing whatever appeared right in its own eyes.

It so happened the Magistrate (Mr. A.E. Harrington) was collecting hut tax at Keate's Drift when Mr. Cross and party were fired on by Bambata and others in Mpanza valley (3rd April). Chiefs Silwana and Sibindi were ordered to arm and prevent the rebel Chief from crossing into their wards. As soon as the message reached Sibindi, he did all he could to assist, in fact most of his tribe in Umsinga division were mobilized within two hours. Silwana's response was half-hearted. About 11 p.m. the same day, Ottley and twenty men arrived at the drift from Pomeroy, six hours after hearing of Bambata's outbreak. The Magistrate, Umsinga, proceeded the next day (4th) to collect taxes at Tugela Ferry, where, however, but few paid.

The unrest among the Umsinga Natives now became more accentuated. Mtele, Kula's uncle and principal induna at Elands Kraal, mobilized the whole of the people under his charge. Nondubela joined him. The indunas of that portion of Ngqambuzana's tribe, which was in Umsinga division, were reported by the Chief as intending to cross into Zululand and join the rebels. All the Europeans of the district went into lager at Helpmakaar, excepting the court officials. The Umsinga Reserves were joined by those of Dundee, Newcastle and Weenen early in May, together with a composite Militia force under Major W. Murray-Smith, N.M.R.

Kula reported by messengers on the 4th May that Mtele was in open rebellion. Harrington, in reply, remarked that he had two months previously told Kula a portion of his tribe was in rebellion, but this had been denied; "he sends only now to tell me what I knew two months ago." Before receipt of this message, Kula had openly declared that he would never come to the court again.

In consequence of a large number of Natives being expected at the magistracy to pay taxes, a squadron N.M.R. (Capt. P.M. Rattray, D.S.O.), with a few Reserves under Chief Leader D.C. Uys, was sent there from Helpmakaar at 6.30 a.m. on the 8th, pending arrival the same day of Lieut. G.R. Richards, M.L.A., and a squadron (100) N.C. Kula, probably because he saw troops proceeding to the magistracy, deemed it prudent to visit it too. Accompanied by a dozen of his leading men, he arrived shortly before 11 a.m. Almost simultaneously, Richards rode in with his men. Harrington conferred with the latter, Rattray and Uys. He pointed out the degree to which Kula was implicated in the Rebellion, and suggested the man should be removed from the district. Richards, then in charge of the post, though not senior officer, decided, with the concurrence of the other officers, to transfer the Chief to make the statement he had already made respecting disloyalty in his tribe to the Officer Commanding at Helpmakaar. Kula was informed of the decision. A few minutes later, he was required to proceed with Rattray and his men to Helpmakaar. Six headmen were allowed to accompany the Chief. On arrival at Helpmakaar, Kula was closely examined by Lieut.-Col. A.T.G. Wales, who, in his turn, resolved to keep him in custody pending receipt of orders from the Government.

The Government was naturally placed in an awkward position by these unexpected and unusual proceedings. Richards, of course, had made no actual arrest, and, in referring the question of the advisability of Kula's continued presence in the district to the officer at Helpmakaar, had done so because the point at issue appeared to be one not for him but for some higher authority to decide. The Commandant was surprised at Richards' action, and could he at once have got into communication with the responsible officers, the probabilities are that Kula would not have been either arrested or detained, as everything pointed to his committing himself sooner or later, when he would have been either captured or shot as a rebel.

Under the circumstances, in view of the then greatly disturbed condition of the country, the Government caused the Chief to be conveyed on the 9th from Helpmakaar to Pietermaritzburg, where he was detained, though not in custody.

Those best competent to judge, firmly believe the arrest or enforced removal of this important Chief at that particular moment checked the spread of rebellion in those parts. This, indeed, was subsequently realized by the Government. Thus, though there was irregularity in the way in which Kula was removed, the step was justified by peace being maintained at a time when a rising was imminent in the thickly-populated district over which he had control.[243]

Kula's brother, Manuka, tried to usurp control of the tribe after the former's departure. On such endeavour being detected, he was promptly placed under arrest.

Simultaneously with the dispatch of the Zululand Field Force to Nkandhla (1st May), squadron A (with the Sydenham troop of B), N.M.R. (about 110), under Lieut.-Col. H. Sparks, V.D., were detailed for Mapumulo, whilst the remainder of the regiment (160) proceeded viâ Dundee to Helpmakaar, under Major W. Murray-Smith. A force,[244]under the command of Murray-Smith (with Capt. G.T. Hurst as Staff Officer), left Dundee for Helpmakaar on the 5th. It reached its destination on the 6th, but moved on the 7th to a new site two miles off, where a strong lager of wire entanglements was speedily erected.

It was from the foregoing column that the detachments proceeded to garrison Pomeroy, as already noticed in connection with Kula's removal. Patrols, too, were sent out in various directions. These obtained intelligence in confirmation of Mtele and Nondubela being in open rebellion.

When Wales left for Pietermaritzburg on duty (11th), Murray-Smith took over the command. Finding the Natives referred to were actually in rebellion, Murray-Smith decided to attack and prevent them from inducing others to take up arms. An armed body of 200 to 300 was discovered at a kraal in a valley some four or five miles from the camp. As, however, the Commandant's instructions were that the column should simply proceed to Helpmakaar and, having fortified itself, await Mackay's arrival, it became necessary for permission to assume the offensive to be obtained. This Colonel Bru-de-Wold, after carefully considering the situation, gave in a few hours by telephone.

On the following day (12th May), Rattray was accordingly detailed to take command of the mounted troops, viz. 60 to 80 N.C. (Lieut. P.W. Stride); 60 to 80 N.M.R.; about 150 Newcastle, Ladysmith, Dundee and Estcourt Reserves; and 8 Umsinga Reserves under Chief Leader A. Müller, the latter being guides and scouts.

Leaving camp before daybreak, the force moved towards Elands Kraal, some ten miles away. About 9 a.m., the scouts got in touch with the enemy and exchanged a few shots. Rattray, close at hand, pushed on at a gallop up a hill and attacked Mtele'simpi, about 150 to 200 strong, the latter partly concealed in bushes. Theimpi, making neither charge nor stand, was forthwith driven into an adjoining valley, through which they were promptly pursued by N.C. and N.M.R. as far as the Buffalo (about two miles), as well as in other directions. On reaching the river, the Natives scattered more than they had already done, some crossing into Zululand, whilst others concealed themselves in as extraordinarily rough country on the Natal side.

The Reserves, with a Maxim (N.M.R.), took ground where the enemy had first been seen. From such position, a continuous fire was kept up, which proved very effective in breaking down any opposition that might have been offered in such extremely rugged and out-of-the-way country.

The main force with Murray-Smith had, in the meantime, occupied high ground overlooking the Elands Kraal settlement and the Buffalo valley. Here the N.F.A., supporting and covering Rattray, opened and kept up ashrapnel fire on groups of retreating Natives. Such, however, was ineffective on account of the long range.

The whole action, including pursuit, lasted about two hours. The troops suffered no casualties; of the rebels, twenty-nine were killed, eight prisoners were taken, and thirty cattle captured.

On an examination of the scene being made, two camps of war-huts were found (about a mile apart). Food and clothing belonging to the insurgents were discovered at the back of the hill on which they were first sighted.

Two days later, Murray-Smith took a force (including N.C. at Pomeroy, then having been relieved by N.R.R.) to Nondubela's kraal, at a hill called Nqoro, near Buffel's Hoek, but the rebels, on the alert in consequence of the action at Elands Kraal, escaped to Zululand. It was on the same day that Mackay crossed into Natal at Rorke's Drift.[245]Had it been possible for him to co-operate, Nondubela and his force might not have escaped as cheaply as they did. As it was, Murray-Smith went with a section of his force to Rorke's Drift, then down the right bank of the Buffalo, whilst another section, under Rattray, proceeded by road viâ Elands Kraal valley, and, after crossing Mazabeko stream, converged with the main body on Nqoro bill (below Fugitives' Drift). On this occasion, all kraals that were come across belonging to rebels were destroyed. Over forty miles were covered during the day. The feature of the day's operations, however, was the splendid performance of the guns (N.F.A.) under Wilson, which travelled a distance of not less than forty miles.

In addition totshokobezibadges, it was noticed that strips of white goat-skin, about an inch broad and tied round the neck, were used by Natives of these parts to indicate being in rebellion. The prisoners, as well as the killed, were found wearing them.

As soon as Mackay arrived, he took command and operated as already described in Chapter XII.

Orders were received from the Commandant on 16thMay for 100 N.M.R. and 100 N.R.R.[246]under Murray-Smith, to escort a convoy of fifty-one waggons (supplies, etc.), from Dundee to Nkandhla. Leaving on the 17th, the escort, strengthened at Vant's Drift by 100 N.C. under Richards, arrived at Nkandhla viâ Nqutu, Nondweni and Owen's store, on the 24th. On the following day, the escort, less the N.C.—detached to become bodyguard to Colonel McKenzie—was ordered to return with the empty waggons to Dundee and join the Umvoti Field Force (then under command of Major W.J.S. Newmarch, U.M.R.) at Greytown, and do so viâ Tugela Ferry. Murray-Smith left Nkandhla on the 26th and, returning viâ Nqutu, reached Dundee on the 30th.

The night the escort reached Nqutu (28th May), an absurd scare arose out of a belief that Mehlokazulu intended attacking the village the same night. The Basutos had, in consequence, mobilized and taken refuge at the gaol. As, at this time, Mackay was camped sixteen miles away at Isandhlwana, it is difficult to understand how the scare arose.

On arriving at Dundee, Murray-Smith got orders from Leuchars to proceedby railto Greytown, leaving N.R.R. at Dundee. He accordingly entrained on the 1st June, reached Greytown 6 a.m. on the following day, and joined the U.F.F. at Spitzkop on the 3rd, temporarily taking command.

Shortly after, Mackay moved into Nqutu district, Zululand (27th May), to co-operate with Leuchars. Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton was appointed to command at Helpmakaar.

On being appointed (29th May), to the command of all troops south of Tugela and in Nqutu district, Zululand,i.e.the whole of Natal plus Nqutu, Leuchars, as has been seen, visited Helpmakaar to direct operations from there. He arrived at that place on the 2nd June to find that 1,000 of Chief Silwana's men had suddenly, and without reference to the Commandant of Militia, or to himself, beencalled out by the Minister for Native Affairs, with orders to be at Pomeroy on the 3rd. Efforts were at once made to secure a European leader. The men displayed no enthusiasm whatever and were barely civil. Although called out under the authority of the Native Code as an ordinary levy, they asked to be armed with rifles and supplied with blankets. The applications could not be entertained. Warnings were received that the levy was not to be trusted. It was freely stated that Silwana had forbidden the men to cross into Zululand. At Gordon Memorial mission station they looted a European house. On a false alarm occurring one night, a number of the younger men sprang to arms with the war-cry, "Usutu!" Under these circumstances, Leuchars decided to send them back to Weenen. Urgent requests, however, came from Government and the Magistrate of Weenen to give them a trial. Mr. G.A. Jackson, who knew the people, was accordingly appointed to lead them. The order to return to their homes was withdrawn. They were told Jackson would take them next day (7th) to a locality where a number of returned rebels of Manuka's section was in hiding. As there was a tribal feud of long standing between Silwana's and Kula's people, it was thought the levy would have undertaken the duty with alacrity. Jackson went to Helpmakaar to arrange for supplies. On getting back to Pomeroy next morning to lead the levy on, he found no less than 600 had deserted during the night. Although about 100 of those remaining volunteered to go forward, they were carried away by the majority, who, packing up their bundles, made for their homes. After expressing regret at the behaviour of their men, the indunas proceeded to do likewise.[247]

By way of facilitating control of the forces in Umsinga and Nqutu districts, those under Mackay, less the Reserves sent back to Helpmakaar, were separated from the Helpmakaar Field Force and formed into a distinct column, with instructions to confine their operations to the basin of the Buffalo and the north-west portion of Qudenimountain. Mackay's column then consisted of the N.C., Right and Left Wings; N.R., one company; N.F.A., one battery (six guns); and N.N.H., one squadron.

The Mapumulo garrison was detached from the U.F.F. and became a separate column under Sparks, with authority to turn out 200 from each of two loyal tribes to assist in searching for and arresting returned rebels of Ngobizembe's tribe.

The H.F.F. was now made up of the garrisons of Pomeroy, Fort Murray-Smith,[248]Helpmakaar, Paddafontein and Dundee. Wales was appointed to command vice Weighton, who had been ordered to take over court-martial duties.

Further proof was given by the Transvaal at this juncture of an earnest desire to assist Natal in her trouble. That patriotic and well-known organization, the Lancaster and York Association, Johannesburg, conceived the idea of offering Natal the services of 150 men (twenty-five of them mounted). On approaching the President, Mr. (now Sir) Abe Bailey, K.C.M.G., the latter not only approved the proposal, but undertook to defray all expenses of equipment, clothing, saddlery, etc.—excepting only salaries and food supplies—out of his own pocket. This generous offer was most gratefully accepted by the Natal Government. So enthusiastically did Mr. Joe Bell, Mr. W. Beachy-Head and other members of the Association take the matter up, ably assisted by the Staff of the Transvaal Volunteer Headquarters, that after beginning to enrol on the 1st June, the corps, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Thomas Peakman, C.M.G., with Capt. G.H. Helbert, as Adjutant, actually presented itself for inspection at 3 p.m. on the 3rd,[249]and, moving off by train at 5.15 p.m., reached Dundee at 9.30 a.m. on the following day, prepared for any service that might be required.

The greatest pains had been taken to select only the most efficient out of the 1,500 applications handed in. Therapidity with which the men were enrolled, clothed, equipped and entrained was as surprising to the people of Johannesburg as it was to the Colony of Natal. The L and Y, or 'Rosebuds,' as the corps was more familiarly styled, were directed to attach themselves to Mackay's column. This they did at Mangeni on the 9th June. Peakman was appointed second in command of the column, and he and his contingent remained with it until the end of the operations in Zululand.

Intelligence was received by McKenzie (at Nomangci) on the 9th June of the presence of a strong rebel force at Kotongweni mountain (i.e.close to the Tugela, above Watton's Drift). This was probably the force whose expedition was referred to on p. 315, although the expedition there dealt with was confined to the neighbourhood of Watton's Drift. McKenzie ordered the U.F.F. to make a night march on 12th and, crossing next morning near Ngubevu Drift, to work down Mfongozi valley, where a column from Nkandhla would be ready to co-operate. Leuchars thereupon re-mobilized the 1st and 2nd Krantzkop Reserves, instructing van Rooyen to march down the Dimane valley to the Tugela and prevent the enemy from breaking into Natal from Kotongweni, on their being pressed on the Zululand side. The O.C. Helpmakaar, moreover, was directed to co-operate on the north-west by moving a force of Reserves, N.R.R. and D.L.I. to look out at the Buffalo for any of the enemy who might be returning to their homes in that direction. It was at this time (10th), it will be remembered, that the Mome action took place.

The U.F.F., joined by Sibindi, who had again voluntarily mobilized his men, crossed at Ngubevu and proceeded to Mfongozi valley, where touch was got with Mackay, but, in spite of constant efforts, communication could not be opened up with the column from Nkandhla until 11 a.m. on the following day. Leuchars operated in Mfongozi valley both on the 13th and 14th, capturing many cattle. After he had conferred with ColonelMcKenzie, a decision was come to for both columns to operate at Kotongweni on the following day. Five hundred of Sibindi's men accordingly went down Mfongozi river to the Tugela, whilst McKenzie operated from the top of the mountain. The operations, however, proved unsuccessful.

The O.C. Troops now directed Leuchars to return to Broeder's Hoek, about twelve miles from Krantzkop magistracy, keeping his own force in the vicinity of Kombe forest. Mackay was instructed to remain on Qudeni mountain during a three days' armistice which was proclaimed at the same time, to afford rebels an opportunity of surrendering. Captive women were utilized to make the proclamation known to those who were in hiding.

The U.F.F. marched viâ Ngubevu to Broeder's Hoek. The Reserves at Helpmakaar were demobilized on 16th and 17th June, with exception of those of Umsinga, who were retained as garrison at Helpmakaar lager, it being still unsafe for the women and children who had taken refuge there to return to their farms.

With the object of relieving some of the men of Mackay's force, two squadrons B.M.R. and one squadron N.C.(D), were mobilized, and sent under Arnott to Dundee on the 18th.[250]Major Moe proceeded, at the same time, with the whole of the N.N.H. to Pomeroy, in order to bring rebels of Kula's tribe to book, also escort to Pomeroy Chief Makafula of Nqutu district whom Mackay had been directed to arrest. The arrest, however, was not made, as Mackay, who had been in close touch with the Chief, had good grounds for believing he was not disloyal, as supposed to be the case by those at a distance. In this view, Mackay was supported by the Magistrate.

Whilst contemplating a demonstration in Silwana's location by Mackay's column from the Umsinga side, and by the U.F.F. from that of Greytown, Leuchars received a wire from O.C. Mapumulo reporting that his convoy had been attacked on the morning of the 19th at Oglesby's store, near Otimati, when one man had been killed andanother wounded. He thereupon caused his forces to concentrate at Mapumulo as speedily as possible.

Before describing the position at Mapumulo, a thickly-populated district which now became the principal focus of rebellion, it will be necessary to take up the threads once more at Nkandhla and narrate what happened between the action at Mome gorge (10th) and the outbreak at Mapumulo just referred to.

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