FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[241]Giving, roughly, a population of 18,000 souls, or about 2,500 fighting men.[242]The man referred to frequently in this history as Matshana ka Mondise.[243]Kula's uncle, Mtele, with the portion of the tribe that rebelled with him, formed part of the force that attacked Leuchars at Mpukunyoni.[244]It was made up of 200 N.C., Right Wing (Major A.C. Townsend); 160 N.M.R. (Capt. P.M. Rattray); N.F.A. (four guns) (Major C. Wilson); 55 N.R.R. (Lieut. A. McKenzie); and departmental details. Whenen routeto Helpmakaar, it was joined by the following Reserves: 80 Newcastle (Chief Leader Adendorff); 200 Estcourt (Chief Leader A.F. Henderson, C.M.G.); 55 Dundee (Chief Leader D.C. Uys).[245]His and Murray-Smith's men met near the Buffalo and moved back together to the latter's camp.[246]N.R.R. were relieved at Pomeroy on the 16th by D.L.I. (100) (Capt. W.P.M. Henderson), the latter having arrived at Helpmakaar on the preceding day from Dundee with a convoy of supplies.[247]Report, Colonel G. Leuchars, C.M.G., 23rd Nov. 1906.[248]That is, the lager, consisting chiefly of wire entanglements, erected about two miles from Helpmakaar.[249]By the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.[250]Only, as will appear later, to proceed at once to Stanger.

[241]Giving, roughly, a population of 18,000 souls, or about 2,500 fighting men.

[242]The man referred to frequently in this history as Matshana ka Mondise.

[243]Kula's uncle, Mtele, with the portion of the tribe that rebelled with him, formed part of the force that attacked Leuchars at Mpukunyoni.

[244]It was made up of 200 N.C., Right Wing (Major A.C. Townsend); 160 N.M.R. (Capt. P.M. Rattray); N.F.A. (four guns) (Major C. Wilson); 55 N.R.R. (Lieut. A. McKenzie); and departmental details. Whenen routeto Helpmakaar, it was joined by the following Reserves: 80 Newcastle (Chief Leader Adendorff); 200 Estcourt (Chief Leader A.F. Henderson, C.M.G.); 55 Dundee (Chief Leader D.C. Uys).

[245]His and Murray-Smith's men met near the Buffalo and moved back together to the latter's camp.

[246]N.R.R. were relieved at Pomeroy on the 16th by D.L.I. (100) (Capt. W.P.M. Henderson), the latter having arrived at Helpmakaar on the preceding day from Dundee with a convoy of supplies.

[247]Report, Colonel G. Leuchars, C.M.G., 23rd Nov. 1906.

[248]That is, the lager, consisting chiefly of wire entanglements, erected about two miles from Helpmakaar.

[249]By the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

[250]Only, as will appear later, to proceed at once to Stanger.

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS, NKANDHLA.—VISIT OF DINUZULU'S INDUNAS TO PIETERMARITZBURG.—POSITION AT MAPUMULO.—ACTIONS AT OTIMATI AND PEYANA (HLONONO).

Referencewas made towards the close of the preceding chapter to a combined move by Leuchars, Mackay and a column from Nkandhla in the direction of Kotongweni on the 15th June. The object was to drive the enemy with his stock from Qudeni mountain into the valley of the Mfongozi river. The Nkandhla column, commanded by McKenzie, consisted of the 'divisional troops' shown at the foot of the page.[251]

The transport and N.F.A. (pompoms), with an escort of N.R. (three companies, A, D and E, Major Boyd-Wilson), proceeded on the 12th viâ Nkandhla and Ensingabantu to Ntingwe. On the same day, the remainder of the divisional troops and R.H. (temporarily detached from Royston's Brigade), visited and thoroughly searched Ofenigorge and ridgeen route. Ofeni[252]is a remarkable chasm, about five miles to the south of Empandhleni. A small stream that rises there and descends rapidly to the Insuze, has the same name. The sides of the chasm, which are over 300 feet in height, are linked together by means of a tiny, natural bridge but a few feet in width. Makahleleka, one of Sigananda's many and more important sons, was declared to be in hiding at this uncanny place. The search, however, resulted in practically no rebels being found. The troops afterwards proceeded to Titlestad's store, at Ntingwe, where they bivouacked for the night.

Although the foregoing movement was carried out expressly with the object of co-operating on the 13th with Leuchars and Mackay, then near Kotongweni and Qudeni respectively, the plan, in so far as McKenzie was concerned, was disturbed through receipt of intelligence to the effect that Bambata, Cakijana and Mangati had taken refuge in the bush at Macala. To surround the mountain by daybreak on the 13th then, of course, became the immediate object. Barker was ordered to co-operate. He was to take up positions on the south, whilst McKenzie would do likewise in other directions. When dawn broke and the latter's troops were in the positions assigned, Barker was found exactly where it was desired he should be,i.e.at the lower end of Macala bush. The fastness, which lay in a bush at the top of the mountain, consisted of great masses of rock lying one on top of the other in such a way as to form, below the surface of the ground, a network of dark passages, the one communicating with the other. Only with the greatest difficulty could people who had taken refuge there be found and, when this occurred, the searchers, on account of the irregular formation of the labyrinth and its narrow passages, ran serious risks when dealing with a desperate enemy, especially one who had reduced the length of his assegai to enable it to be used with the best effect. A Native levy which had accompanied the column, was instructed to drive the bush,whilst being supported by the troops. During this operation, a rebel, who was concealed under the rocks, stabbed one of the levy in the leg. On the drive, which was partially successful, coming to an end, the underground passages were entered and thoroughly searched by the N.C., with the result that a number of other rebels was killed. It afterwards transpired that these Natives, when at first they had found themselves surprised by the troops, ran to the rock 'warren,' never dreaming "people with boots on," as they put it, would venture to explore so dark and perplexing a spot. The principal object of the quest, however, was not attained, though Bambata's witch-doctor, Malaza, was among the slain. Some 450 cattle were captured during the day. McKenzie withdrew to Ntingwe, and Barker to near Cetshwayo's grave.

Whilst the foregoing operations were in progress, the Z.M.R., under Vanderplank, proceeded to the hill Jokwana, west of Macala, to get in touch with Leuchars and Mackay, and to advise the former of what was taking place at Macala. He was, moreover, to co-operate as well as he could in carrying out the original plan. Owing, however, to the haze, communication could not be established.

On the day following, 14th June, McKenzie moved up towards Kombe forest, where he succeeded in getting into communication with Leuchars. A drive of the combined forces through the valley that lay between them was accordingly arranged and took place the same day, but without result. Colonels McKenzie and Leuchars met, when further combined operations were arranged to take place on the 15th at Kotongweni, where Mangati and Cakijana were then alleged to be hiding in caves. On the departure of the O.C. Troops from Nomangci, Lieut.-Col. J.S. Wylie, D.L.I., was placed in charge of the camp. Hedges, Calverley and Titlestad were, at the same time, instructed to try and locate Sigananda, with a view to bringing about his capture or surrender. One or other of these alternatives appeared imminent. As a result of the untiring and well-directed efforts of these officers, not onlywas the rebel leader's whereabouts discovered, but, on his being persuaded to surrender, he did so forthwith, not, however, to Wylie, but to an officer of lower rank. The latter's action, with Wylie in camp, was inexcusable, and his acceptance of the surrender irregular and invalid, as, of course, the only person competent to announce the terms of surrender was the O.C. Troops. Unfortunately, the last-named did not receive a notification as to what had happened until twenty-four hours later. He decided that the surrender was to be unconditional and be accompanied with those of all the Chief's people, together with their arms. To this Sigananda agreed. On the 16th, he was conveyed by the balance of R.H. at Nomangci to Empandhleni.

Boyd-Wilson, by making a creditable forced march with the transport, succeeded in joining McKenzie at Kombe on the 14th.

The combined operations at Kotongweni (15th) proved disappointing. In the neighbourhood of the camp, however, where the bushes were searched by N.R., thirteen rebels were shot, whilst a large quantity of goods, probably looted from European stores in the vicinity, was discovered. Owing to Mackay not having got in touch with McKenzie on the 13th, his column was unable to take part in the operations.

In the meantime, reliable intelligence had reached Nomangci of Bambata having been killed during the action at Mome. Because of a rumour circulated on the day of the action that he had escaped with a wound, it obviously became necessary to take the greatest pains in securing identification. Two of his tribe, who had been brought from Greytown in April in anticipation of difficulty in connection with matters of identification, happened to be still at Empandhleni. These were conducted on the 13th to the spot where the body was lying, namely, at the very bottom of the gorge, within half a dozen yards of the right bank of the Mome, and just where the Dobo or 'pear-shaped' forest abuts on the stream. Although the inspection took place five days after death, the features, byreason of the extreme cold in the gorge at that time of year—mid-winter—were remarkably well preserved. The two Native informants, who were intimately acquainted with Bambata, had no difficulty in recognizing the body as that of their Chief. Such peculiarities as had been describedbeforehandby these and other relatives and acquaintances as characteristic of Bambata, were found about the body—tallying exactly. Among them were: a gap between the two middle upper teeth; slight beard, rather under, than on the front of, the chin; a scar immediately below one eye, and another on the cheek opposite; a high instep. As, however, the officer in charge wished to put the matter beyond all doubt, and as to carry a corpse already five days old up the sides of a gorge, about whose steepness so much has already been written, was out of the question, he directed the head to be removed and brought instead. As a result of this, decisive corroborative evidence was secured. This must have been wanting had timidity been permitted to usurp the ordinary dictates of common sense. It was, of course, of the utmost importance to prove that the principal ringleader in a serious rebellion, a man then still believed by many of his followers to possess supernatural powers, was really dead. Care was taken to keep the head in a decent manner until the plain and necessary object, solely on account of which it had been removed, was served. At no time whilst it was in charge of the troops, was there the slightest act of disrespect towards it or the deceased's memory. It was not exposed to public view, but kept by one of the medical officers in a manner the most proper under the circumstances. It was, moreover, impossible for anyone to see it without permission, which, again, was withheld, except for the necessary purpose of identification. In addition to the two Natives referred to, three others, viz. a prisoner who had come from Natal with Bambata, and two men of Sigananda's tribe who knew Bambata well, were sent by the Acting Magistrate to see the head; this they at once recognized as Bambata's.

As soon as identification had been completed, the head was taken back to the gorge and there buried along with the body.[253]

After the finding of Bambata's body and the surrender of Sigananda, General Stephenson, who had witnessed the operations at Nkandhla for nearly three weeks, left with his staff for the Transvaal, viâ Pietermaritzburg.

Before proceeding with his chief staff officer and bodyguard to Empandhleni on the 16th, McKenzie, convinced that the Rebellion was then practically over, allowed the levies to return to their homes for three days. During this period, he gave out, all operations would be suspended, to afford those in hiding an opportunity of surrendering. The levies were accordingly told to try and induce rebels of their respective tribes to come in. Sigananda was, at the same time, directed to send messengers to members of his and Ndube's tribes who had rebelled, by way of bringing about speedy and general surrenders. Among those who were successful in this connection was Sergt. E. Titlestad, of the Intelligence Department, and for long a storekeeper at Ntingwe. Proceeding to Qudeni forest he, in a couple of days, managed to induce 284 men to return with him to camp. McKenzie's column, then taken command of by Royston, moved to Ndikwe stream, north-east of and below Ensingabantu store.

With the Rebellion in Zululand at an end, nothing remained but to clear the country in the direction of Qudeni, Mfongozi and towards Nqutu, that is, to receive surrenders or make arrests where rebels, generally the most culpable, were unwilling to come in. Woolls-Sampson, having returned from his visit to Pietermaritzburg,[254]was,on the 20th, given command of a column.[255]He was instructed to form a depôt at Ensingabantu and to operate in that part of the country.

It was at this stage that news of the outbreak at Mapumulo on the 19th was received. In addition to instructing Leuchars to push forward the U.F.F. to the scene of disturbance, Mansel was ordered by the O.C. Troops to camp at Middle Drift, from which place patrols were to be thrown out in all directions, particularly up and down Tugela valley, so as to intercept movements towards Zululand of rebels then stated to be collecting on the right bank of the Tugela, between Middle Drift and Bond's Drift.

Mackay and Royston proceeded, in the meantime, to clear country in the vicinity of their respective camps. On the 22nd, two squadrons N.C., with the mounted section, L and Y, and a Native levy, left on a patrol in the direction of the Buffalo river. Very difficult country was traversed. A remarkable gorge, known as Emlola-mazembe (where axes are ground), was come upon in a small and peculiarly-secluded valley, through which the Gubazi stream passes. At the lower end of the valley, the stream runs through a huge cleft, the stone walls of which are about 150 feet high and only about 12 feet apart at the top. The cleft extends some 100 or so yards before the water flows from a large dark pool at this uncanny spot into another valley beyond. No wonder that such place had, until that very day, been occupied by rebels.

A notable arrest was made about this time near Empandhleni, viz. Bekuzulu, brother of the late Mehlokazulu. This man, who was a rebel, was being harboured at a kraal. The head of the kraal was, of course, also arrested.

At Empangeni on the coast, a Chief Bejana had recently failed to comply with the orders of the local Magistrate. Without informing Colonel McKenzie of what was taking place, a small party of N.P. proceeded to Empangeni to effect the man's arrest, but, feeling later on they were not strong enough, applied for reinforcements. The idea of sending a small party on such a mission appeared more likely to provoke than suppress rebellious tendencies, consequently Barker was directed to assume command and make the arrest. Owing, however, to instructions received from headquarters, the expedition did not take place, although Barker's orders were not definitely cancelled until he had got as far as Entumeni.

The Government, as stated in Chapter IX., felt it necessary for Dinuzulu "to take some action to show his loyalty." It was thought he and Meiteki should visit Pietermaritzburg and advise as to the state of affairs in Zululand. The proposal, however, was allowed to drop for the time being. On the 29th May, the Governor again strongly urged it. Mr. Saunders then acquiesced. An invitation was conveyed to Dinuzulu, who replied (2nd June) that he was in bad health, and that he wished to discuss the matter with his headmen. The headmen were summoned, but, owing to the alleged death of one of the Chief's children just at that moment, his meeting with them was delayed. The headmen saw the necessity for making the visit, but remarked that "in Dinuzulu's present state of health, they feared he would never reach, but die on the road." Permission was sought to send a large deputation of indunas instead. In acceding to the request, the Governor suggested that the Chief should himself go to the telephone at Nongoma and be there to refer to whilst the interview lasted. About twenty indunas, headed by Mankulumana, accordingly proceeded to Pietermaritzburg, accompanied by the Commissioner and the local Magistrate. They had three interviews with Sir Henry McCallum on the 20th, 21st and 22nd. The latter reported that the men had replied in a straight-forward and satisfactory manner to questions put to them, so much so that he and the Minister for Native Affairs were persuaded "that Dinuzulu's name had been used as a 'stalking-horse' by different malcontents to incite their neighbours to rebellion." It was in this way, they believed,that many of the false rumours of which the Chief complained had arisen. It transpired from the interviews that messengers had reached Dinuzulu from three Natal Chiefs, whose coming he had failed to report in accordance with instructions previously given him by the Governor. The indunas were told to inform Dinuzulu that he had disobeyed orders, and that he was to be more careful in future.

On account of ill-health, Dinuzulu did not proceed to the telephone office at Nongoma, as desired by the Governor.

The situation at Mapumulo now began to grow more serious. It developed with the same remarkable rapidity that had been witnessed at Nkandhla. At such a time, given a few weeks of incubation, a Zulu is nothing if not swift and vigorous in his movements. To organize is, with him, instinctive. To-day the country may be still and deserted, to-morrow it is overrun by great 'swarms,' calledimpis, sprung from nobody knows where.

McKenzie made up his mind to withdraw from Zululand all troops that could be spared and proceed with them towards Mapumulo, so as to confine the Rebellion as much as possible to the vicinity of the fresh outbreak.[256]Royston's brigade remained at Ndikwe, with orders to operate through Mehlokazulu's ward towards Nqutu,clearing up generally and receiving as many surrenders as possible. The Commissioner for Native Affairs was at first of opinion the latter action might be misunderstood by loyal Zulus, but, after further consideration, concurred in it.

Woolls-Sampson left Empandhleni on the 23rd June,[257]and, marching viâ Fort Yolland, took up a position on the northern side of the Tugela at or near the precipice known as Isiwasamanqe, with the object of preventing Natal rebels from breaking into Zululand. The loyal tribes of that part, including that of Mtonga,[258]assisted with levies. Strict orders were, at the same time, given to Woolls-Sampson to take every precaution to prevent looting of property, or damage to crops, kraals, etc., of friendly Natives.

As, at this juncture, everything pointed to a peaceful state of affairs in Zululand, the O.C. Troops left Empandhleni on the morning of the 25th. By this date, the majority of rebels in Nkandhla district had surrendered. The garrisons at Empandhleni and Ensingabantu were, nevertheless, allowed to remain, owing to the inadvisability of entirely and suddenly denuding the country of troops. Just before he left, the indunas and Native messengers at the magistracy asked to see Colonel McKenzie, when they expressed their gratitude for the Rebellion having been so rapidly suppressed and peace restored once more. They, at the same time, warned him "just to glance back occasionally, as a grass fire, when put out, often starts again in rear." This McKenzie took to mean that Dinuzulu was still in his rear and might have to be dealt with.

These facts are sufficient to show that, to the action at Mome, must be attributed the complete and almost immediate collapse of the Rebellion in Zululand. After that fight, there was no further opposition in any direction inZululand. Throughout Nkandhla and Nqutu districts peace and good order were restored almost at a single stroke. A decisive blow, and all was over. That was what McKenzie constantly aimed at, that was what the Government desired him to aim at, because the more summary the punishment, the sooner would peace be restored and destruction of life put an end to. War is not a pastime, as some people seem to think, but a reality, as stern in operation as any law of nature. At any rate, that is how it is viewed by Zulus, and the sooner Europeans look at it in the same way when at war with these tribes, the better for them and the tribes.

Although, for a few days, many rebels remained in hiding, none ventured to take refuge in the stronghold which, having become a place of bad omen, was entirely deserted. It had become the home of the dead. Nor did the few more prominent rebels like Cakijana, Mangati and Magadise, fearing the consequences of their misdeeds, make further use of it during the many weeks they roamed about from one place of hiding to another.

It will be remembered that Mapumulo district was visited by a column (under Leuchars) during March, when a large cattle fine was levied on Ngobizembe and members of his tribe for defiant conduct towards the Magistrate.

As part of the general plan for coping with the Rebellion, the Commandant of Militia decided at the end of April to establish a garrison at Mapumulo. This took place simultaneously with the Z.F.F. leaving Dundee for Nkandhla, and the garrisoning of such other places as Helpmakaar, Krantzkop, and Greytown in Natal, and Empandhleni, Fort Yolland, and Eshowe in Zululand.

It was known that the Natives at Mapumulo were liable to rise at any moment, hence the question as to how the outbreak could be delayed at once occurred to the Commandant, for he had not sufficient troops to operate in that part as well as at Nkandhla and other places. Calling to mind what he had read and studied of Cape and otherNative wars as to how Natives, setting no value on time, had often been prevented from precipitating a conflict through troops being frequently moved about in such a way as not to run risks of being ambushed, he decided to garrison the place with a small force which, strongly entrenched behind wire entanglements, would be adequate in case of a rush, though not strong enough should the O.C., losing his head, feel inclined to act on the aggressive. Lieut.-Col. H. Sparks, V.D., was the officer selected for the post, firstly, because he was intimately acquainted with the district, and secondly, because of his being a cautious leader. He was instructed to have the district well patrolled, but on no account to come into collision with the enemy unless his lager was attacked. Stores, etc., were to be drawn from Stanger, but, unless a strong escort accompanied the waggons, drivers and voorloopers were to have no escort at all.

The force, consisting of 120 N.M.R. and 50 D.L.I., arrived at Mapumulo on the 2nd May. Sparks found the Natives, barely fifty miles from Nkandhla as the crow flies, with the Tugela between, in a very disturbed state, notably the tribes of Ndhlovu, Meseni, and Ngobizembe. They were all palpably in sympathy with Bambata. A lager of wire entanglements was erected about the gaol and court-house. Patrols were sent out daily to Balcomb's and Allan's stores,i.e.north and north-west, as well as to Thring's Post and Umvoti Drift, in Meseni's ward. On the 15th May, a large one went into the latter ward, where armed Natives were observed on the hills. These were said to be awaiting an opportunity of joining Bambata at Nkandhla.

Reports were continually brought in by scouts that Natives of certain tribes were being doctored for war, after which they proceeded to Nkandhla. One of the Chiefs concerned helped to ascertain the kraals of those who had so gone off. Sparks adopted the ingenious expedient of distraining all cattle belonging to these kraals until the rebels who ordinarily lived there had been surrendered, and, in several instances, with every success.The O.C., moreover, ably assisted by the Magistrate (Colonel T. Maxwell),[259]got into touch with a number of loyal Chiefs and headmen. In these and other ways, these two officers succeeded in maintaining order until after the decisive blow had been struck at Mome.

Of the Chiefs in Mapumulo, Lower Tugela and Ndwedwe[260]divisions, two or three, apart from those already referred to, call for special mention.

Meseni was head of the Qwabe tribe, one of the most ancient and famous tribes in Natal and Zululand.[261]On the death of his father Musi, some years before the Rebellion, a dispute arose as to the heir, when the Governor, after inquiry, decided to divide the tribe. Meseni was appointed Chief over the principal section, whilst his nephew, Siziba (a minor), was awarded another section, as well as the property left by Musi. This decision, however, caused considerable dissatisfaction. The Magistrate of Lower Tugela (Mr. F.P. Shuter), was shortly after made Chief over Siziba's section. This gave great offence to Meseni. A fight took place between the two factions. Although, in Meseni's view, one party was as guilty as the other, his men were more severely punished than those presided over by the Magistrate. This Meseni felt to be unjust. He became disrespectful to Mr. Shuter. Such offence, as well as his assembling men with the alleged intention of attacking another Chief, with whom some difference had arisen, were reported, when nearly 1,000 huts of his tribe (i.e.the section in Lower Tugela division), were detached and put under other Chiefs.

When those of Meseni's tribe in Mapumulo division were called together by the Magistrate for the purpose of the poll tax being explained, they behaved in an insolent and defiant manner. This occurred at Gaillard's store, Umvoti, whilst the Chief himself was at Stanger in connection with the faction fight referred to. Such absence did not, of course, prevent his being called on for an explanation by Leuchars in March. He was ordered to arrest and hand over all such as had misbehaved. This Meseni said it was impossible to do within the three days allowed, especially as many weeks had elapsed since the affair. He, however, brought in a number, who were punished. For failing to hand over about 200, he was later on arrested and imprisoned at Mapumulo. After being in gaol for about six weeks, he was released by order of the Government, without, however, having been brought to trial. When, with the fighting going on at Nkandhla, the people at Mapumulo began to assume a rebellious attitude, Meseni was ordered to come in but did not do so. In May and June, when larger numbers of troops came to the district, he called up his people, as he says, to protect himself. Action of that kind, of course, at once gave the impression that he was in rebellion.

Ndhlovu ka Timuni, of the Zulu tribe, was a Chief with considerable influence in Mapumulo division.[262]Owing to a mistake, he was summoned to Stanger in April. On instructions from Mapumulo, he was placed under arrest and subsequently removed to that place, where he was detained for a time and then released.

The people of both these tribes broke into rebellion in June. Associated with them were the Chiefs Matshwili and Mlungwana, also portions of Ntshingumuzi's, Swaimana's and other tribes. Ntshingumuzi himself did not rebel, though a relation of his, a young man Mahlanga, vigorously coerced many to rise and join Matshwili.

But although, as in the cases of Meseni and Ndhlovu, there was apparently some cause for complaint, purelyNative influences of a distinctly disloyal character were at work, and this prior to either of the arrests referred to.

As far back as January and February, for instance, a large portion of Ntshingumuzi's tribe had been doctored for war, whilst practically the whole of those of Mlungwana and Matshwili had gone through the same performance.[263]There is no act, passive in its nature, which a Native can commit that betrays hostile intent more plainly than being doctored for war. Once such ceremonies are held, all that remains is to await the signal for a simultaneous rising.

Early in June, two messengers (one a headringed man) arrived from Siteku, an uncle of Dinuzulu, living near Melmoth in Zululand. This man (Siteku) incited the tribes of Ndhlovu, Matshwili and Meseni to rebel and kill all the white people; "Bambata has not been killed," he said, "but is in hiding in the Tugela valley." He threatenedNdhlovu with violence if his people did not rise. Calling to mind an occasion on which a relation of that Chief had, some seventy years before, failed to assist the Zulus against the Boers, Ndhlovu was warned that although his relation had escaped punishment at the hands of the Zulus, he (Ndhlovu) was not to be too sure such luck would be his own during the existing crisis. Ndhlovu states that a messenger from the tribe of Mtonga (another uncle of Dinuzulu, living in Eshowe district), also came and incited him to take up arms.

It was in these and other ways, too numerous to be noticed in detail, that the majority of the Native population at Mapumulo decided to rebel. Those who did, began by arming and organizing themselves quietly in their respective wards. And the more they massed and organized, the more confident they were of success. To such a pitch did the excitement grow, that Ndhlovu resolved to step forth and give the required signal.

It so happened that on Monday, the 18th June, a convoy of nine waggons, drawn by oxen, left Stanger for Mapumulo. The waggons outspanned for the night 200 yards from Oglesby's store, near the Otimati stream, and some six miles from Mapumulo. On receipt of news of the locality being in a greatly disturbed state, an early start was made on the following day. The usual Native driver and voorlooper (leader) accompanied each waggon, also a European conductor (Q.-M.-Sergt. L.E. Knox, N.M.R.), Trooper Albert Powell, of the same regiment (who was returning from sick leave), and a Griqua. Just as the waggons had begun to descend a white cutting, some fifty or sixty rebels of Ndhlovu's tribe, wearingtshokobezibadges, sprang up on either side and made for the leading waggon. Knox was struck with a knobstick, and stabbed in the right thigh (the assegai penetrating to the stomach). He jumped from the waggons, dashed through his assailants and made off for Mapumulo along the road as hard as he could go. Being a good athlete, he quickly out-distanced the rebels and arrived at the magistracy shortly before 9. In the meantime, Powell, who was onthe last waggon, ran to Oglesby's store. The Oglesbys (father and son), did what they could. The former was in the act of conducting Powell to a cave a few hundred yards off, when theimpicame in sight and overtook them. Powell, who, like Knox, was in uniform, was immediately stabbed to death, but Oglesby and his son, well known to the Natives of that part, were not touched.

The drivers and voorloopers ran off for a time as soon as the attack began, although the rebels shouted that, being Natives and having been commandeered for service, they would not be molested. The oxen were not interfered with, nor were any contents of the waggons worth referring to looted.

Early the same morning (19th), Corporal J. Koster, N.M.R., rode off from Mapumulo towards Stanger on leave. After going about eight miles, and at 7 a.m., when on a short-cut, he was suddenly attacked from the lower side of the path by eight rebels of Ndhlovu's tribe. The telegraph wire between Mapumulo and Stanger had just been cut. It was possibly in anticipation of a despatch-rider going that way, that the Natives lay there in ambush. Assegais were flung at Koster, who narrowly escaped being killed as he rode past. One of them struck his horse, piercing a kidney. After galloping about 300 yards, he dismounted and fired several shots at the enemy, who at once decamped. These shots were heard by the rebels then engaged with Knox some three miles off, and to this may be due their not having pursued Knox further than they did. Koster then passed on to Thring's Post, where he was informed that a Norwegian storeman, Sangreid, and Mr. W.C. Robbins (Stock Inspector), had been murdered during the night in Mr. Thring's dwelling-house, some 400 yards from the store. After obtaining a trap and pair at Bull's some miles nearer Stanger, Koster returned to Thring's. He found Sangreid dead, but Robbins living, though severely wounded.

Theimpithat attacked Sangreid and Robbins was also from Ndhlovu's tribe, evidently the same men that subsequently attacked Knox. Robbins' life was saved by oneof the rebels, owing to his being well known in the district. Sangreid was brutally murdered in his bedroom, late at night, for no offence whatever.

The stores at Thring's Post and Oglesby's were looted, as also the cattle belonging to the former place. Oglesby's store was not looted until it had been vacated by the owners.

On Knox reaching Mapumulo, it so happened a patrol was about to leave for Balcomb's, six miles north-west of the magistracy. A hurried account of what had occurred was given to Lieut.-Col. J. Ritchie, V.D., who, after directing others to follow in support, left with Capt. W.H. Smith and eleven N.M.R. at a gallop for the spot at which the convoy had been attacked. On getting within a couple of hundred yards of Oglesby's store, a large track, evidently of theimpi, was come upon. Following this, the men passed through a Mission Station (Norwegian), about a thousand yards from the store. Near this station, which was still being occupied by the missionary, four armed Natives, evidently scouts, were seen on a hill on their left front. These immediately disappeared into a large valley and towards a kraal belonging to Chief Ndhlovu (Ezintandaneni). Ritchie galloped to a high ridge overlooking the valley. A solitary horse was observed some distance below tied to a tree, whilst a number of cattle, which afterwards turned out to be those seized at Thring's Post, were seen grazing within the immediate vicinity of the kraal. The men dismounted and descended the rocky, steep slopes towards the kraal. This, in respect of the position they then occupied, lay between them and the magistracy. After proceeding about 120 yards, and when about the same distance from the kraal, they were suddenly surprised by animpiabout 200 strong, up to that moment concealed near a bed of reeds in one of the two forks at the head of a kloof or small valley running past, and on the immediate north of, the kraal. As soon as the enemy showed himself, he charged upwards at them, shouting Dinuzulu's war-cry "Usutu!" The troops opened fire at once at fifty yards. This hadthe effect of checking the advance for the time being. "They attempted several times," says Ritchie, "to get round our flanks and ... in fact had almost succeeded, when Knox and Campbell came up with the supports.... The rebels had again to take shelter under the cliff and behind the rocks. Shortly after this, they made one more determined rush to get up over the rocks, where eight or ten of us were standing. They came to within five yards, but, although all had their assegais poised ready for throwing, only one was actually thrown. The fire seemed to paralyse them. The assegai that was thrown just grazed the head of one of the men."

OTIMATISketch PlanReferenceA.Ndhlovu's Kraal.C.Those of Enemy that escaped fled pastBin this direction. Others went down stream on left.D.Bed of reedsEnemy.Point where troops were attacked when moving towardsAfromX.XPoint from which sketch was made.

It was but a few minutes after Ritchie had gone off from Mapumulo, that Capt. A.G. Knox, brother of the man already referred to, and Capt. W.A. Campbell left with about fifty men in support of Ritchie as directed. They arrived on the ridge referred to just before the charge. Their appearance was most opportune as, having descended as far as they had done, Ritchie and the others wouldprobably have been annihilated had the rebels not been checked as they were from the ridge. Finding the supports too strong, the enemy retreated down the valley up which they had come, many being shot as they ran. The locality being 'thorn-country' afforded cover—even though it was winter—of which full advantage was taken by the enemy. The troops now combined and drove the valley from which the attack had come, as well as a similar one 120 yards from the kraal on the south, in which other rebels were found concealed. One or two of the ridges were also driven.

During the drives, which extended over about a mile of country, many armed Natives withdrew from their hiding-places and were shot as they ran down the streams towards the still more rugged country below. Lieut. R. Armstrong and another, who had become detached from the main body, took up a position below Luhoho's kraal and commanded the fugitives' main route atC(videplan) with considerable effect.

Towards the conclusion of the drives, intelligence was received that Ngobizembe's men, under Sambela, about 600 strong, were approaching from the direction in which the rebels had just fled. Owing to accounts subsequently received from the fugitives, they decided not to continue the advance.

The total strength of the N.M.R. engaged on this occasion was sixty-six (made up of the Stanger and Greenwood Park troops, exclusive of twelve men sent by Sparks to Nyamazana to expose themselves to the enemy in Meseni's ward, and thereby prevent the latter from joining theimpiat Otimati). About 150 rebels were killed and four prisoners captured during the operations, which lasted an hour and a half. There were no casualties among the N.M.R. Powell's body was found later the same day in a horribly mutilated and scarcely recognizable condition, having been dragged by the rebels some 300 yards from where he had been killed to a place where it was supposed it would not be found. It was then removed to Oglesby's store.

The number of rebels killed in this action was greater, in proportion to the number of troops engaged, than in any other action of the campaign. From start to finish, the proceedings reflect the greatest credit on Ritchie and his men, not the least remarkable feature being the rapidity with which the men got into action. Only fifty minutes elapsed between their leaving camp and firing the first shot, although the distance travelled was fully seven and a half miles.

It afterwards transpired that the rebels, led by Ndhlovu himself, were expecting Ritchie and the few with him to go to the kraal, when the plan was to cut them off in rear. No doubt the horse and cattle had been purposely left as baits. Before the arrival of the troops, the enemy were in the cattle-kraal. They slipped into the valleys on either side at the last moment.

After the action, Ritchie sent Smith with sixteen men to investigate what had occurred at Thring's Post. As many of the enemy were still lurking about the broken country in the vicinity of Oglesby's, the reconnaissance caused both sections of the troops to run considerable risks.

When Sparks ascertained that the wire between him and Stanger had been cut, he sent telegrams asking for reinforcements to Kearsney, for transmission to headquarters. The men who carried the despatches were Sergts. A.J. Wadman and J.E. Sjöblom. Leaving at 10 a.m., they found the wire had been cut a few yards from the store at Thring's Post. When proceeding along the short-cut on which Koster had, unknown to them, been attacked the same morning, they found some fifty or sixty of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off. On reaching Thring's Post, they found the store upside down, a great many goods having been looted and the rest scattered on the floor. "I noticed," says Wadman, "about ten mice which I had previously seen at the store had been let out of their cage and then stabbed with assegais." After delivering the despatches, the men returned to Mapumulo the same night.

On this same eventful day (19th), Sub-Inspector A.S.Clifton, of the Natal Police, arrived at Thring's Post with about a dozen men, and removed the deceased Mr. Sangreid, as well as Mr. Robbins, to Stanger.

The troops ordered by Leuchars at this juncture to concentrate at Mapumulo were N.M.R., under Murray-Smith; U.F.F., under Major W.J.S. Newmarch; two squadrons B.M.R. mobilized on the 14th and originally directed to proceed, with D squadron, N.C. (Capt. J.W.V. Montgomery), to Helpmakaar;[264]and C.M.R. Maxim detachment (Capt. M. Humphery). The first-named regiment, receiving orders at 2 p.m. on the 20th, left at 5 p.m. in light marching order, and, after off-saddling for four hours at Balcomb's, reached Mapumulo before dawn on the following day. A portion of the regiment made a reconnaissance the same morning in the neighbourhood of Oglesby's store. Powell's body was brought back and buried at the magistracy.

Further reconnaissances took place towards Otimati and Isiwasezimbuzi, near the Tugela, on the 22nd and 23rd respectively.

A patrol under Knox proceeded on the 25th to Hlonono Mission Station, when many of the enemy in the low country of Meseni's ward were located.

Arnott's column reached Otimati drift on the 24th. As the camp was to be a standing one, the waggons were formed into a lager, strengthened with barbed-wire entanglements.

Leuchars, who reached Arnott on the morning of the 27th with the greater portion of the Mapumulo force, now decided that a reconnaissance in force should take place in the direction of the hill Peyana, some three miles to the south-west of Thring's Post, and two from Hlonono Mission Station. The troops, including a section ofC Battery, N.F.A. (Currie); four C.M.R. Maxims (Humphery), and two Maxims and one Rexer, N.M.R., left camp at 9.30 a.m. under the command of Lieut.-Col. Arnott.[265]The N.M.R., 350 (Murray-Smith), were in advance, N.C., 100 (Montgomery), on the left, and B.M.R., 100, supporting. The Carbineers, besides supporting on the left, covered a convoy of waggons then on the way to Kearsney, escorted by a troop B.M.R.

After branching off due west from the main road at Thring's Post, some difficulty was experienced in getting the two field guns down a rough incline. These guns, with a troop N.M.R. as escort, took up a position and unlimbered atC(videplan), which covered some 2,000 yards to right and left front; N.C. took high ground to the left atD, from where a deep kloof to their front was commanded; N.M.R. moved in extended order to neckA, and halted on the ridges to right and left thereof, with B.M.R. supporting in immediate rear on the right. These dispositions were made owing to the broken nature of the ground, which favoured ambuscade, and had up till then been held daily by the enemy's outposts. The track along which the column had to advance skirted to the right of, and under, Peyana hill (B), by which it was commanded.

When the troops were engaged occupying the ground referred to, the time now being about noon, some half a dozen of the enemy's decoys were observed on hillEto the west of Peyana, freely exposing themselves. This was almost a certain indication that the enemy was in ambush somewhere, most probably behind Peyana, and overlooking the route along which the troops were moving.

After the ridges referred to had been properly held, two troops N.M.R. were sent forward to scout before the column proceeded further towards the decoys. One troop advanced to within 100 yards of the crest of Peyana, the other halted in support, about 150 yards in rear. Lieut. P. Addison, in command of the advanced troop, then wentforward alone mounted, accompanied by his dog. He rode to a neck near the crest and to within thirty yards of the enemy, who were about 400 strong, lying concealed in a slight depression out of sight of the troops atA. In the immediate rear of the enemy, was a bushy krantz. On seeing the rebels, Addison shouted "Here they are," and, turning immediately, rode back to rejoin his troop, and then on to the main position atA. The troops supporting had already been ordered to retire. As Addison was turning, the enemy roseen masse, then crouched, only to rise again in an instant, crying "Usutu! Usutu!" as they charged down the steep, grassy slopes in open order at the retiring troops. N.M.R. atA, with three Maxims (C.M.R. and N.M.R.), and the Rexer,[266]could not open fire because of the enemy being masked by the retiring troops. In the meantime, however, the two 15-pounders on higher ground opened with shrapnel at about 1,800 yards, over the troops atA, as well as those retiring. One of the two or three shells fired struck right in the middle of the swiftly-moving mass, but, failing to burst, did no harm. In a few seconds, heavy rifle and machine fire broke from the N.M.R., who were reinforced at the same moment by a squadron of their own regiment, up till then kept in reserve, but which, on seeing the charge, was at once pushed forward to assist on the left.

The combined fire had the effect of checking the rush and breaking the rebels into three bodies. One of these (i.e.the larger portion) ran into a valley immediately below the ridge south of the neck referred to, where it hid in scrub and such other cover as could be found; another fled to the left of N.M.R. position and disappeared into a kloof, but, when making down the kloof, was met by a hot fire from N.C. atD, when a number of casualties was sustained. The centre portion continued the charge, and came within a few yards ofAbefore it was stopped; the rebels then turned and fled to the south-west. At this particular moment, the N.M.R., as well as the ridge on which they were, masked the fire of the field gunsatC, which had, for a few seconds, been directed at the charging rebels.[267]

After the rush had been broken, N.M.R. galloped in line of squadrons up Peyana, accompanied by the machine guns. It so happened that a large portion of the enemy (about 300), had taken no part whatever in the charge. They preferred to lie in wait, that, no doubt, being part of the plan. They were discovered a few yards from where the first lot had started. For the most part, they turned right about and fled, under rifle and shell fire, down the precipitous and bushy country in rear ofB.

When the position at the kop had been taken, Arnott ordered the B.M.R. (by this time strengthened by C squadron, under Capt. J.L. Gordon),[268]to descend on foot into the small valley of scrub, etc., on the right of, and below,A. This was thereupon driven from top to bottom by C squadron at the point of the bayonet. Gordon sighted a largeimpiin Mvoti valley that had not been engaged; he continued to watch its movements until recalled to the column.

Arnott now marched in open order, with as broad a front as the country would permit, until Hlonono Mission Station was reached. Here the ridges overlooking low ground on the south-west were lined, with a front of about half a mile. The main body of the rebels, estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 strong, was presently seen about one and a half miles off, and between the station and Meseni's principal kraal, evidently trying to get round the column's right flank. As soon as it came within artillery range, fire was opened from Itshelensimbi hill. This, in a few minutes, succeeded in checking the advance.

The object of the reconnaissance having been achieved, viz. locating the position and strength of the enemy, the column began to withdraw to the camp at Otimati. During the retirement, which was carried out in goodorder, the field guns shelled theimpiwhenever it appeared, thereby preventing the rear-guard from being harassed in any way.

Some seventy Natives were killed during the engagement. The casualties among the troops were of a minor description, no one being killed.

Examination of the plan will show that the ambush was of a very ingenious character, the locality selected being exactly suited for the purpose. Troops less wary would probably have been trapped. The plan evidently was to draw them towardsE, when the twoimpis, barely fifty yards from one another atB, would have pounced upon them front and rear.

The rebels, who were under the command of a brother of Meseni, Muziwenkosi, carried ordinary shields and assegais. One of them used a rifle, whilst others had shot-guns. All wore thetshokobezibadge.

The decoys, who were seen before the action began, openly signalled to the twoimpison Peyana, visible to them, but invisible to the advancing column. This was done by sweeping the grass to right and left with their shields. Such action, of course, immediately aroused the suspicions of the troops.

On Addison galloping back to rejoin his men, the dog, a white pointer, missed him and got in amongst the rebels. These he followed, barking at them in the liveliest manner.

PEYANA (HLONONO)SKETCH PLANDispositions at the beginning of the action.REFERENCEA =Neck.B =Peyana hill.C =Gun position.D =N.C. position.E =Where decoys were seen.F =Trig. beacon.N.C., etc.See Abbreviations.The enemy.=Scrub and swamp.Line of troops' advance is from Thring's Post viâ F towards E.Retreat of Impi 1 as per arrows; Impi 2 made off through bush in its rear towards Umvoti R.

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