FOOTNOTES:

On London and the others getting to the river, a ringed Native, who had hurled an assegai at one of the levies, was immediately shot. Some fifty temporary war-huts were found in an open glade, also five rebels. The huts were burnt, though later on. After the party had worked about ten yards up the river with some sixty levies, eight rebels sprang from behind a large boulder and ran off. It had evidently been their intention to way-lay the invaders, but, realizing that discretion was the better part of valour, made off up the stream, when three were shot. On the boulder referred to being reached, a number of rebels charged the party, shouting "Usutu! Usutu!" Just at that point the Tate makes a peculiar bend, the right bank being precipitous. Round this the enemy, about seventy, rushed forward, and threw their assegais. These were badly aimed, no doubt owing to the demoralizing effect caused by London's firing "loopers" from a shot-gun at a distance of fifteen to twenty yards. The attack did not last more than a minute, after which the rebels disappeared behind the bend. A few feeble attempts at attack were next made by fifteen to twenty at a time. It was noticed "Usutu! Usutu!" was shouted a few seconds before actually charging, thereby giving the impression that the enemy wanted to stir up courage, forgetting that shouting gave warning of their intention. In the meantime, Lieuts. Shepstone and Richardson, also with levies, were engaged in the rear. Rebels who had evaded the foremost party were prevented by them from escaping towards the Insuze.

Intelligence was at this stage received of the presence of a largeimpifurther up the ravine. London, feeling he was not strong enough, sent to Vanderplank for reinforcements and awaited a reply. Word came back at 2 p.m. to the effect that those engaged below were to withdraw and return to camp. An unsuccessful appeal for help wasalso made to nine or ten Z.M.R. who happened to be within reach. Efforts to make the main body of R.H. hear were futile, owing to these men being too high up, consequently the party had the mortification of having to withdraw with the enemy in its immediate front.

Tpr. T. Malone, R.H., was shot about 2 p.m. through the neck by a rebel who was below him. The rebel was killed and the Martini-Henry rifle he had was recovered.

During the day, over forty of the enemy were killed, and over 400 cattle, besides many goats, seized. Had Mansel's column combined in the operations, they must have proved much more successful. The moral effect of these operations was, nevertheless, very great, for, as subsequently remarked by the enemy, they realized they had no stronghold or retreat that could be regarded as secure when attacked by McKenzie's men.

The troops camped that night close to and east of London's Kop. During the evening, news was brought that the waggon of a Mr. Davis, who had been authorized to keep a dry canteen, had been looted by rebels in the main Nkandhla forest. It seems the vehicle had been unable to keep up with the transport belonging to the column. It followed as best it could, but being late, and the column out of sight, the owner decided to leave it to its fate. The waggon, in charge of its Native driver, continued along the road through a portion of the forest. It was captured shortly after and driven into the forest, the driver and voorlooper being taken prisoners. The Z.M.R. investigated the matter on the following morning. Responsibility for the loss fell wholly on the owner, who had been duly warned of the risks he was running.

Early on the 30th, accompanied by the guns and pompoms, McKenzie made a further reconnaissance of the Mome valley from the heights on the immediate west. At noon, the whole of the Tate valley was thoroughly driven. R.H. and D.L.I. (under Lieut.-Col. Royston) took part in the drive, the former being, of course, dismounted. The N.C. proceeded to the west side of the gorge to prevent rebels escaping in that direction towardsMacala. The Native levies (under London) also took part. They drove up the valley from its mouth as far as the other troops, which had entered higher up and worked down the stream. Twenty-one rebels were killed; the operations, which were of a very arduous nature, much of the climbing having to be done up and down exceedingly steep and rocky places, lasted the whole day. Notwithstanding the difficulties, as great as any that could have been encountered in the Mome valley, every man performed the work required of him in an eminently satisfactory manner.

The bodies of eighteen of those killed the day before were found in one cave, and twelve in another, dragged thither by their relatives. Two instruments of strange workmanship and evidently regarded as 'firearms' were also found. They were made of wood and cartridge cases, the latter telescoped slightly into one another, with bands of metal ingeniously bound round where the joins occurred. One of these curios—they were nothing more—had two barrels, the other one.

By this time, the Government, having realized the necessity of appointing an officer in supreme command of all the forces in Zululand and Natal, with the object of ensuring effective combination over the large areas occupied and traversed by the enemy, decided to appoint McKenzie to the position. The appointment took effect on the 30th May. Nor was it too soon that the step was taken. Although Leuchars had done his best to co-operate, notably on the day of the general converging movement on the grave (17th), his efforts, through his not having received earlier notice, were not as effective as they might have been. There were instances of lack of combination in other directions. As regards Mackay, the Commandant of Militia had intended he should remain at Helpmakaar, to keep in check the large tribes of that part known to be disaffected. Owing to misunderstanding, however, arising out of communicating through the telephone over a long distance, Mackay had moved to operate down the leftbank of the Buffalo in Zululand,[204]that being the side on which, from his recent experience, he considered his efforts would prove most useful—not so much to engage the enemy, as to force him to concentrate at Nkandhla. Whether this view was right or not, the fact of Mackay's leaving the position assigned him, revealed weakness in the arrangements, which, it was considered, would be best remedied by investing an officer in the field with power to immediately control the actions of every column.

Having already begun to deal with the problem at Nkandhla, McKenzie decided to remain where he was and personally direct the operations at that place. Leuchars, who had hitherto so ably conducted them in Natal, was accordingly requested to continue as he had been doing, until McKenzie, having accomplished what was necessary at Nkandhla, was free to undertake immediate supervision elsewhere.

FOOTNOTES:[189]This mountain, which has a forest on its western, steep and rocky face, was soon to become one of the rebels' principal rallying-points.[190]Foully murdered later, as will be seen, because of his loyalty.[191]His force included a levy of about 450 loyal Natives, called out by the C.N.A.[192]This particular spur is famous in Zulu history as being that down which Tshaka led his army about 1823, when pursued by his most formidable rival Zwide. In going down Gcongco, however, Tshaka was merelypretendingto flee, and, the spur being abnormally steep, made it appear all the more probable that his retirement was genuine flight, instead of a stroke of genius by a master in tactics. After continuing to fly for some distance, he suddenly rounded on his pursuers, and, taking them at a great disadvantage, practically annihilated them.[193]His force on this occasion was: Five squadrons, R.H. (Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston); 60 D.L.I. (Major G.J. Molyneux), and some 600 Natives (Lieut. W.H. London). Each man carried three days' rations. The artillery was sent to Empandhleni with regimental transport, escorted by D.L.I. Mr. B. Colenbrander, the local Magistrate, with an excellent knowledge of the affairs of his district, also accompanied the column.[194]Report. Colonel D. McKenzie. September, 1906. The state of the grave in 1906 is described on p. 210.[195]200 N.D.M.R., 100 Z.M.R., 128 N.P., 540 T.M.R., 300 R.H., 30 M.I., D.L.I. = 1,298, also 100 Nongqai and 1,500 Natives (levies).[196]On the occasion of the reconnaissance to Macala, the O.C. Troops, noticing a small kopje at the mouth of Mome gorge, on which guns could be placed to shell the gorge, caused a sketch to be prepared and subsequently handed to Barker.[197]The columns as re-formed were as follows:Under McKenzie's direct command—Northern District Mounted Rifles, Zululand Mounted Rifles, Royston's Horse, Natal Field Artillery (two 15-pounders and two pompoms), Durban Light Infantry (two companies).Under Mansel's command—Natal Naval Corps, Transvaal Mounted Rifles, Natal Police (Field Force), Natal Field Artillery (two 15-pounders), Nongqai (Zululand Native Police).[198]Particularly was this the case at Ezigqileni, the principal kraal of the care-taker of Cetshwayo's grave. This small kraal (close to the Nkunzana river), a few hundred yards from the grave, contained no fewer than nineteen large grain pits, that is, about five times as many as the average for a kraal of that size.[199]Report. September, 1906.[200]It will presently be seen that Sigananda did not come in, at any rate, not on the day he had said he would do so.[201]Among the other officers were: Major A.B. Boyd-Wilson, second in command; Lieut.-Col. J.J. Furze, T.L.I. (temporarily assuming the rank of Major), commanding Right Half; and Captain O. Schuller, T.L.I., Adjutant.[202]Consisting of 100 N.C. (this squadron—under Capt. G.R. Richards—is the one that arrived with Murray-Smith on the 24th), 100 Z.M.R., 300 R.H., 120 N.D.M.R., 20 T.M.R., 25 M.I., D.L.I., and 300 Natives.[203]Report. September, 1906.[204]His column then consisted of the whole of N.C., Right and Left Wings (excepting D squadron); a section, N.F.A.; and the Estcourt, Ladysmith, Dundee, and Newcastle Reserves.Mackay, of course, knew that Helpmakaar was an important strategical post, but, with the recent removal of Kula, the still more recent smashing up of Mtele's and Nondubela's factions by Murray-Smith, and his own operations round about Mahlaba (see p. 267), he decided to recommend his moving to Nqutu district in order to drive on to McKenzie the local and other rebels known to be there. Believing the recommendation had been approved by the Commandant, which, however, was certainly not the case, he took with him the troops referred to. This meant that Helpmakaar became practically evacuated, for the N.M.R., until recently posted at Helpmakaar, got orders from the Commandant on the 25th, when at Nkandhla, to join the U.F.F. at Greytown as speedily as possible. Had Mackay known that his action involved the almost total evacuation of Helpmakaar, he probably would not have taken with him as many troops as he did.

[189]This mountain, which has a forest on its western, steep and rocky face, was soon to become one of the rebels' principal rallying-points.

[190]Foully murdered later, as will be seen, because of his loyalty.

[191]His force included a levy of about 450 loyal Natives, called out by the C.N.A.

[192]This particular spur is famous in Zulu history as being that down which Tshaka led his army about 1823, when pursued by his most formidable rival Zwide. In going down Gcongco, however, Tshaka was merelypretendingto flee, and, the spur being abnormally steep, made it appear all the more probable that his retirement was genuine flight, instead of a stroke of genius by a master in tactics. After continuing to fly for some distance, he suddenly rounded on his pursuers, and, taking them at a great disadvantage, practically annihilated them.

[193]His force on this occasion was: Five squadrons, R.H. (Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston); 60 D.L.I. (Major G.J. Molyneux), and some 600 Natives (Lieut. W.H. London). Each man carried three days' rations. The artillery was sent to Empandhleni with regimental transport, escorted by D.L.I. Mr. B. Colenbrander, the local Magistrate, with an excellent knowledge of the affairs of his district, also accompanied the column.

[194]Report. Colonel D. McKenzie. September, 1906. The state of the grave in 1906 is described on p. 210.

[195]200 N.D.M.R., 100 Z.M.R., 128 N.P., 540 T.M.R., 300 R.H., 30 M.I., D.L.I. = 1,298, also 100 Nongqai and 1,500 Natives (levies).

[196]On the occasion of the reconnaissance to Macala, the O.C. Troops, noticing a small kopje at the mouth of Mome gorge, on which guns could be placed to shell the gorge, caused a sketch to be prepared and subsequently handed to Barker.

[197]The columns as re-formed were as follows:Under McKenzie's direct command—Northern District Mounted Rifles, Zululand Mounted Rifles, Royston's Horse, Natal Field Artillery (two 15-pounders and two pompoms), Durban Light Infantry (two companies).Under Mansel's command—Natal Naval Corps, Transvaal Mounted Rifles, Natal Police (Field Force), Natal Field Artillery (two 15-pounders), Nongqai (Zululand Native Police).

[198]Particularly was this the case at Ezigqileni, the principal kraal of the care-taker of Cetshwayo's grave. This small kraal (close to the Nkunzana river), a few hundred yards from the grave, contained no fewer than nineteen large grain pits, that is, about five times as many as the average for a kraal of that size.

[199]Report. September, 1906.

[200]It will presently be seen that Sigananda did not come in, at any rate, not on the day he had said he would do so.

[201]Among the other officers were: Major A.B. Boyd-Wilson, second in command; Lieut.-Col. J.J. Furze, T.L.I. (temporarily assuming the rank of Major), commanding Right Half; and Captain O. Schuller, T.L.I., Adjutant.

[202]Consisting of 100 N.C. (this squadron—under Capt. G.R. Richards—is the one that arrived with Murray-Smith on the 24th), 100 Z.M.R., 300 R.H., 120 N.D.M.R., 20 T.M.R., 25 M.I., D.L.I., and 300 Natives.

[203]Report. September, 1906.

[204]His column then consisted of the whole of N.C., Right and Left Wings (excepting D squadron); a section, N.F.A.; and the Estcourt, Ladysmith, Dundee, and Newcastle Reserves.Mackay, of course, knew that Helpmakaar was an important strategical post, but, with the recent removal of Kula, the still more recent smashing up of Mtele's and Nondubela's factions by Murray-Smith, and his own operations round about Mahlaba (see p. 267), he decided to recommend his moving to Nqutu district in order to drive on to McKenzie the local and other rebels known to be there. Believing the recommendation had been approved by the Commandant, which, however, was certainly not the case, he took with him the troops referred to. This meant that Helpmakaar became practically evacuated, for the N.M.R., until recently posted at Helpmakaar, got orders from the Commandant on the 25th, when at Nkandhla, to join the U.F.F. at Greytown as speedily as possible. Had Mackay known that his action involved the almost total evacuation of Helpmakaar, he probably would not have taken with him as many troops as he did.

[204]His column then consisted of the whole of N.C., Right and Left Wings (excepting D squadron); a section, N.F.A.; and the Estcourt, Ladysmith, Dundee, and Newcastle Reserves.

Mackay, of course, knew that Helpmakaar was an important strategical post, but, with the recent removal of Kula, the still more recent smashing up of Mtele's and Nondubela's factions by Murray-Smith, and his own operations round about Mahlaba (see p. 267), he decided to recommend his moving to Nqutu district in order to drive on to McKenzie the local and other rebels known to be there. Believing the recommendation had been approved by the Commandant, which, however, was certainly not the case, he took with him the troops referred to. This meant that Helpmakaar became practically evacuated, for the N.M.R., until recently posted at Helpmakaar, got orders from the Commandant on the 25th, when at Nkandhla, to join the U.F.F. at Greytown as speedily as possible. Had Mackay known that his action involved the almost total evacuation of Helpmakaar, he probably would not have taken with him as many troops as he did.

OPERATIONS BY (a) UMVOTI FIELD FORCE, (b) MACKAY'S COLUMN.—BATTLE OF MPUKUNYONI.

Beforeproceeding to describe McKenzie's further operations at Nkandhla, it is necessary to turn to the Natal side of the Tugela, and see what account was being given of itself by the Umvoti Field Force. Except for his co-operating with McKenzie, Barker, and Mansel on the 17th May, in the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave, the last we saw of Leuchars was when his force, having failed to get in touch with Bambata at Mpanza, withdrew to Greytown on April the 11th.

Although Bambata had escaped, there was still work to be done in the ex-Chief's ward. A composite squadron (100), under Major S. Carter, accordingly proceeded thither on Thursday the 12th to destroy rebels' kraals and capture stock, as well as escort members of the Natal Telegraph Corps on their way to repair the line recently cut in a couple of places. This force remained in the thorns until Saturday night, when all the stock that had been captured was brought back, including four prisoners. The troops had been accompanied by Funizwe, Bambata's own younger brother. This man pointed out the kraals of rebels and generally assisted the troops in other ways.

A squadron (62) under Capt. W.J. Gallwey, was sent on Sunday the 15th to Krantzkop (Hopetown), where there was much unrest. The Reserves of that part had, in consequence, mobilized and gone with the other European residents into lager.[205]Those of the ordinaryNative Police employed at the magistracy, who were members of more or less disaffected tribes in the immediate vicinity, and therefore suspected of being disloyal, were replaced by others from Estcourt division.

By this time, Magwababa, who, it will be recollected, had been carried off some distance by Bambata, had returned from Pietermaritzburg. He, Funizwe and others were interviewed by Leuchars at Greytown in regard to the future management of the tribe. A few loyalists, whose kraals had been burnt and their stock seized by mistake, were told that compensation, assessed by a Board, would be paid by the Government.

Between the 13th and 19th, the country round about Greytown was thoroughly patrolled. On the latter day, a sale of loot stock, captured in Bambata's ward, was held, realizing nearly £2,000.

Capt. J. Stuart, N.F.A., was, on the 21st, sent with Funizwe and four other Natives to Empandhleni. These Natives were required by the Commissioner in Zululand for identifying rebels of Bambata's tribe whenever necessary. The party, travelling by Ngubevu drift and Qudeni, reached their destination on the 23rd.

Much disquieting information was received about this time at Krantzkop, chiefly from members of tribes adjacent to Nkandhla district. One of the Chiefs, Hlangabeza, assembled his tribe although his application to do so had been refused by the Magistrate. The Intelligence Officer at this important post was Capt. M. Landsberg, U.M.R., whose information from the date of his assumption of duty to the conclusion of the Rebellion was remarkably full and accurate.

Leuchars visited Krantzkop on the 22nd, finding the defences highly satisfactory.

A company of the Natal Royal Rifles was dispatched on the 26th April to Krantzkop to take up the garrison duties being performed by the U.M.R. squadron. Capt. J. Fraser and forty men, N.R.R., came to Greytown to replace those sent to Krantzkop. At this time, it was ascertained that many loyalists were crossing fromZululand into Natal.[206]The Chiefs were accordingly warned to report all refugees and cattle entering their wards.

Lieut. J.H.C. Nuss, with thirty men, was directed by Leuchars to proceed to Keate's Drift, Mooi River, to relieve the N.P. stationed there; the latter travelled by rail to Gingindhlovu and joined Mansel's column at Fort Yolland on the 2nd May, three days before the action at Bobe.

The attitude of the Chiefs Gayede and Hlangabeza continued for some time to cause much apprehension, especially owing to their being so close to the disaffected areas in Zululand, and from the fact that many inter-marriages were known to have taken place between their tribes and those in the Nkandhla district. As a result of this intimacy, many refugees fled into their wards. On one occasion, Mbuzana, of Mpumela's tribe, crossed into Gayede's ward for protection with the inmates of twenty-eight kraals. Strict orders were given that invasion of their wards by rebels was to be resisted by force. It was discovered that they were not properly guarding the drifts, and, in fact, acting as spies on behalf of the enemy. To so great an extent did they sympathize with the rebels that, had our arms suffered a reverse, they would probably have rebelled. As it was, a portion of Tshutshutshu's tribe was reported to be arming and eleven kraals of Gayede's tribe as having joined Sigananda,[207]whilst small batches of Ngobizembe's (in Mapumulo division) proceeded to Nkandhla, some of them already doctored for war.

News arrived on the 30th that rebels were busy removing grain from their kraals to the forests at Nkandhla. A patrol of fifty men from the U.F.F. visited Middle Drift.

On the 1st May, the U.F.F. marched to a position near the Inadi, where it was joined by the squadronthat had been posted at Krantzkop, as well as by about eighty of the First Umvoti Reserves, under Chief Leader J.A. Nel.[208]

A patrol by a squadron was made through Sibindi's ward, the tribe much appreciating the action. Owing to this Chief's activity on behalf of the Government, he had become intensely disliked by the many who were in sympathy with the rebels, with the result that his people were in danger of attack at any moment by Gayede's tribe, or other neighbouring ones.

A squadron U.M.R., under Capt. E. Simkins, with forty Reserves from Krantzkop, proceeded on the 5th to Watton's store, in consequence of information to the effect that animpihad been seen in that locality, and that the store had been looted and burnt; the intelligence was subsequently found to be correct. The party crossed into Nkandhla district, destroyed several kraals there and seized about sixty cattle.

These cattle were subsequently claimed by loyalists of Mpumela's tribe, who had taken refuge in Natal. The stock had been driven by them to graze across the river in Zululand,i.e.in the district from which they had recently fled. After inquiry of the Commissioner in Zululand, the stock was restored to the claimants.

At this time, many women and children belonging to Bambata's tribe were wandering about without sufficient food, and hiding in bushes in the wards of Bambata, Sibindi and Silwana. Sibindi asked permission to collect those in his ward and take them to Greytown. On permission being granted, all who came in were fed and well looked after. A suggestion by Leuchars that a concentration camp should be erected for them at Pietermaritzburg was not acted upon. All the women had, therefore, to be placed temporarily in charge of theirrelations,i.e.members of adjoining tribes that had hitherto remained loyal.

Requiring in the field a larger force of mounted men than was already at his disposal, Leuchars, on the authority of the Commandant, caused the First Greytown Reserves to be re-mobilized and to proceed to Greytown to relieve the Umvoti District Reserves, who thereupon joined him at the farm "Solitude," some six miles from Krantzkop magistracy and nearer the Tugela.

Persistent rumours were afloat to the effect that Gayede and Hlangabeza's tribes would join the rebels should the latter invade Natal. It was also reported on reliable authority that large numbers of Kula's tribe were in arms under that Chief's uncle Mtele in the Umsinga division. It further transpired that Gobeyana, a son of Gayede, had actually asked his father's permission to arm the tribe and aid the enemy, after Bambata, flying from Mpanza, had gone through his ward. Permission was, however, refused.

On the other hand, an offer of help was received from Chief Ngqambuzana of Weenen division in the event of its being required by the Government.

In consequence of the Zululand Field Force being sent to Nkandhla—arriving there, as has been seen, on the 8th May—it now became necessary for Leuchars to co-operate as much as possible in connection therewith, without, however, actually crossing into Zululand, except for a few hours at a time. This policy, which was quite in harmony with the Commandant's general plan of campaign and, indeed, formed an essential part thereof, was adhered to so long as Nkandhla continued to be the principal rallying-ground of the rebels. The U.F.F. accordingly confined its attentions primarily to the rugged regions immediately south of the Tugela and lying between Middle Drift and Ngubevu. Thus, whilst keeping such powerful Chiefs as Silwana, Hlangabeza and Gayede in check, by constantly demonstrating in or near their tribes, the column was, at the same time, in the position of being able to assist materially in Zululand in anyextensive, quickly-executed operations the O.C. at Nkandhla might wish to undertake.

Moving to "Solitude" on the 10th, Leuchars, on the 11th, having heard that the rebels were in strength at Macala, marched at 2 a.m. with 150 U.M.R. and 60 Umvoti Reserves for Watton's Drift. He reached it at sunrise and, crossing at once, occupied ridges facing the drift. None of the enemy were to be seen. He then proceeded for about eight miles down the river, clearing a belt of country on the left bank to a width of five or six miles. Returning to a spot opposite the drift, the column, after a halt, moved up the Manyane valley to a point immediately below and about 1,500 yards from the Macala bush. Numbers of the enemy could be seen scouting on the hill-tops, but they would not allow the troops to come within range. The Tugela drift was reached at 5, and the camp at "Solitude" at 8 p.m. The eighteen hours' march, with but two halts, through exceedingly rough country, was well borne by man and beast.

Owing to difficulties as regards water, the U.F.F. was obliged to move to the farm "Spekfontein" and nearer to Krantzkop magistracy. Further intelligence was there received from different sources betraying a strong disposition on the part of Chiefs Kula in Umsinga, Gayede in Krantzkop, and Meseni, Mtamo, Ndhlovu, Swaimana and Ngobizembe in Mapumulo, divisions, to rebel as soon as others like Mehlokazulu had actually begun to fight in Zululand. Swaimana personally was loyal, though practically the whole of his tribe was the reverse. The various tribes in Mapumulo division were, moreover, observed to be openly carrying arms. Their demeanour was insolent. The people of Ngobizembe's tribe were being doctored for war. The kraals of loyalists, too, near Hot Springs[209]were being burnt by rebels. Chief Mpumela applied for permission to come into Natal, as he was being harassed by the enemy. This Leucharsrefused to grant, instructing him to place himself under the protection of the nearest column in Zululand.

Under the foregoing circumstances, Leuchars resolved to make a dash into Zululand through Middle Drift. After moving to Krantzkop on the 14th, he marched to the drift, reaching it at 5 a.m.[210]Here the N.R.R. were left, also a squadron of U.M.R.; the remainder of the force moved to Hot Springs. The 15-pounders, with a troop U.M.R., were placed on a position commanding the opposite country. The rest of the force operated in Zululand in a north-easterly direction. Many kraals were destroyed and 400 cattle captured, also goats. Small parties of the enemy were seen and fired on, ten being killed; as a rule, however, they were careful to keep on the hill-tops and beyond rifle range. "An unfortunate accident," says Leuchars, "occurred during the operations, which resulted in the wounding of a woman and a child. Two men were observed running across a mealie-field and were fired upon at about 1,000 yards. They escaped, but the woman and child, who were hiding in a mealie hut past which the men ran, were wounded. The medical officer attended to them and they were placed in charge of an elderly male prisoner who was released to take care of them."

The column returned to Hot Springs at 3 p.m. Here it was found the goats would not face the water, so had to be left. While crossing the remainder of the stock, a few shots were fired at those engaged in the work. Sibindi's men were left in charge of the goats, whilst Leuchars went on to Middle Drift. Presently, word came that the former had been again sniped at. A troop was immediately sent back, when a couple of rebels were observed crossing from an island to the Zululand side. One of them was captured. The goats were got across with great difficulty on the 16th.

It was at this stage that Leuchars received the invitationto co-operate in the general converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave. His operations on that occasion have already been described on pp. 242-244.

The troops re-crossed the river at 7 a.m. on the 18th, reached Hot Springs camp at mid-day, and moved up to Krantzkop the following morning. The N.F.A. horses performed the heavy work required of them on this occasion without a hitch, although a section of the road up a steep cutting was greatly out of repair.

The country between Middle and Watton's Drifts having been fairly well cleared, Leuchars resolved to take his force viâ Inadi to Ngubevu, "so as to be in a position to co-operate with any column which might work towards the Mfongozi from the Zululand side." Nuss, at Keate's Drift, relieved by twenty-five N.R.R., and the detachment of the 1st Umvoti District Reserves, at Greytown, joined Leuchars at Ngubevu on the 21st. The 2nd U.D.R. were sent back to Greytown for demobilization. Leuchars' force now consisted of U.M.R.; 1st U.D.R.; and twenty Krantzkop Reserves.

Intelligence was received to the effect that a rebelimpiunder Mtele was camped where the Mazabeko stream joins the Buffalo, whilst Kula's brother Manuka, induna over that portion of the tribe which occupied the Mngeni valley, was in league with Mtele.[211]

Leuchars pitched his camp beside the Mfongozi road drift. A strong bush fence was erected round the camp. Here a message was received from Sibindi to say he was mobilizing and would join the U.F.F. forthwith. He was, however, directed to stand fast for the night. He came over on the 22nd, to say that if the column was crossing into Zululand, he would like to accompany it with his levy. Leuchars replied that he had no intention of doing this and instructed him to cross into the Umsingaportion of his ward, and, after taking up a suitable position on his boundary, to watch the actions of Manuka's people whose ward was conterminous with his own. "This action of Sibindi in mobilizing hisimpi," says Leuchars, "was entirely voluntary, as I had not sent word to him of my intention to pass through his location."

A troop went into Zululand on the 23rd to reconnoitre. On the 24th, it was reported that Gunderson's store on the Qudeni had been looted, and that animpiof about 150 was in Hlatikulu forest (Qudeni). Further intelligence went to show that Manuka's section of Kula's tribe had risen and joined the rebels under Mtele and Mehlokazulu. It also appeared that the Kombe forest and Qudeni mountain generally were now the principal resorts of the enemy.

Being of the view that co-operation between the different columns was essential to success, Leuchars wired in this sense to the Commandant of Militia as well as to McKenzie and Mackay. The latter, on this day, was engaged operating in difficult country about Mahlaba, barely seven miles, as it happened, from Mpukunyoni hill (in Zululand), soon to become the scene of a notable action by Leuchars. Leuchars rode to Tugela Ferry, on the Pomeroy-Greytown road, on the 25th, to confer by telephone with the Commandant. At 9 p.m. he received a wire from McKenzie saying a column was being sent to the bush close to Ensingabantu store, and that it was timed to arrive there at dawn (26th). A messenger was thereupon sent by Leuchars to Major W.J.S. Newmarch, instructing him to proceed with three squadrons to the neck overlooking Mfongozi valley and there keep a sharp look-out for rebels who might fly from McKenzie. Leuchars joined Newmarch at 2.30 p.m. Small parties of the enemy were seen about Hlatikulu, but out of reach. Nothing was seen or heard of McKenzie's column. On Leuchars' retiring, a hundred or so of the enemy came out of Hlatikulu to watch his departure; owing, however, to the lateness of the hour and to difficult intervening country, no attempt was made to engage or trap them.

OPERATIONS BY MACKAY'S COLUMN

Mackay left Empandhleni for Helpmakaar viâ Nondweni and Nqutu on the 11th May, returning by the same route he had taken on the forward journey. Nothing of importance occurred on the march. Nondweni was reached on the 13th.[212]

When at Empandhleni, he had received unsatisfactory accounts of Mehlokazulu's behaviour towards the Magistrate. Notwithstanding two or three orders to appear at the magistracy (Nqutu) he had failed to do so on the plea of ill-health. On reaching Nqutu, Mackay sent his Intelligence Officer, Capt. J. Stuart, accompanied by Sergt. Roberts, N.P., early on the 16th, to Mehlokazulu's kraal to instruct that Chief to meet him the same afternoon at Rorke's Drift. Stuart visited three kraals, but could not find Mehlokazulu; the latter purposely avoided a meeting. He vacated his third and furthest kraal Pumulefile (with death comes rest) at dawn, no doubt because suspicious of being in some way deceived. This kraal was at the foot of a precipice and reached only with difficulty by horsemen. Every effort was made to find him, but, in the absence of his induna, his mother and wives either did not know or would reveal nothing. In consequence of this well-intentioned mission—carried out in the belief that a man, for years notorious as one of the actual starters of the Zulu War of 1879, would probably wish not to be associated a second time with such nefarious practices—Mehlokazulu, realizing he had lost an opportunity of coming to the troops and explaining his conduct, forthwith quitted his kraal and ward and entered upon a mad career of open rebellion. He collected as many malcontents as he could from his own tribe—luckily, however, the majority of the tribe remained loyal to the Government—and combined with those on theopposite side of the Buffalo in Natal under Nondubela (Mavukutu) and Mtele, who had just clashed with the N.M.R. at Elands Kraal (12th May).[213]The amalgamated force, constantly threatened by Mackay's strong and active column, decided to move towards the storm-centre at Nkandhla, picking up recruits in Faku's and other Chiefs' wards on the way down. The largest number of accessions was obtained from the ancient Ntombela tribe under Faku (the last of Sir Garnet Wolseley's famous "thirteen kinglets"), whilst a few came from Matshana ka Mondise's and other tribes. The tribes of Mpiyake, Matshana ka Sitshakuza, Gadaleni, Nonga-mulana (a near relation of Bambata) and the Basutos, under Mayime, remained entirely loyal throughout the Rebellion.

The posting of a column near Helpmakaar, where Mackay arrived on the 14th May,[214]was a wise and far-sighted step on the part of the Commandant, for it had the effect of holding both Kula in Natal and Mehlokazulu in check. As it happened, the rebels fled before Mackay's column wherever it went, no doubt because of its being extra strong and because it traversed ground that did not afford much cover, though often difficult to operate in, especially near and on both sides of the Buffalo.

At 6 a.m. on the 23rd, all available men were promptly sent to defend Helpmakaar on receipt of a report that Mehlokazulu'simpi, said to have just entered Natal, was about to attack the village. The news, however, turned out to be false.

Mackay operated on the 24th and 25th May in the exceedingly rough country about Mahlaba and Mahlabana (in Natal), barely seven miles as the crow flies from Mpukunyoni. This, together with his further moves in the direction of Rorke's Drift on the 26th, and Isandhlwanaon the 27th, undoubtedly had the effect of driving the rebels from those parts of Natal and Zululand, further into Zululand, and, as it happened, right on to Leuchars, who, as will presently be seen, stepped across at Ngubevu to Mpukunyoni on the 27th and almost immediately came into conflict with a large force of the enemy.

As already explained, it was owing to a misunderstanding that Mackay, on the morning of the 26th, left his camp near Helpmakaar for Zululand.

At 9 p.m. (26th), Leuchars got a wire from Mackay, saying he was marching with a force 600 strong from Rorke's Drift on the 27th to operate about ten miles down the Buffalo river on the Zululand side. He at once decided to move into Zululand with a force and gain touch with Mackay, though he did not inform Mackay he was doing so.[215]Orders were sent to Sibindi (then in Umsinga division) to march hisimpiacross the Buffalo to meet Leuchars in the vicinity of Ngqulu and Mpukunyoni hills, six miles west of Qudeni mountain. Owing to the country on both sides of the Buffalo being exceedingly broken, orders were given that only a top-coat or blanket, 3 lbs. of grain, and one day's rations were to be carried. The actual duration of the incursion was to be governed by circumstances, it being felt that, in case of necessity, the troops could easily live on the country for a week.

Getting away at 5.30 a.m. (27th), the force, consisting of 180 U.M.R. and 60 U.D.R., with the Krantzkop Reserves, after much severe climbing over rocky thorn country, reached the ledge about half-way up on the western face of Qudeni mountain.

On the way up, Colonel Leuchars' horse, which had got above him, fell. It knocked him down and rolled over him. But for a thorn bush, it must have gone to the bottom of the mountain. Leuchars, who was badly bruised and shaken, had great difficulty in getting along, either walking or riding. Although he must have been in great pain, he did not delay the column.

A number of recently vacated huts belonging to disloyal members of Mbuzo's tribe were destroyed, as also supplies of grain found there. Many rebels could be seen on the mountain top, but as it was important to keep the appointment with Sibindi, the column was not delayed on their account.

As far as could be seen, there were no cattle in Mbuzo's ward, which lay to the right along the Tugela. All had apparently been removed to the top of the mountain. In Matshana ka Mondise's ward, however, there were large numbers, but they were for the most part the property of Matshana himself. They were not interfered with, as all the intelligence went to show that that Chief and the majority of his people were loyal, although five of his sons had rebelled. A number of kraals in the ward, belonging to rebels, were destroyed.

Matshana's kraal on the Qudeni was reached at 11.30 a.m., when an interview took place between Leuchars and the Chief. The latter was delighted to see a European force, as he was afraid lest the rebels, led by his sons—who wished him out of the way—should attack him. He was, therefore, sorry to learn the column would be in that part only a day or so, leaving him to protect himself as best he could in the absence of his loyal young men. These, in response to the Government's call, had gone off to assist at Nkandhla.

Guides were now furnished by the Chief, when the force moved to Mpukunyoni hill, reaching there at 12.30 p.m. After off-saddling for an hour at another of Matshana's kraals, the troops divided into three sections and proceeded to different positions on the long ridge opposite to, and immediately north of, Mpukunyoni. One of these bodies surprised a party of ten armed rebels driving cattle towards Faku's ward, nearly the whole of whose people were already in open rebellion. A troop, under Lieut. H.E.G. Fannin, was dismounted and sent to a small, wooded valley into which these rebels had fled. The valley was driven, with the result that eight Natives were killed and the cattle captured.

The other portions of the force had, in the meantime, gone off to the north-east into Faku's ward, where they burnt a number of kraals.

At 4.30 p.m. Sibindi joined Leuchars with about 1,100 men.

It now became necessary to select a site on which to bivouack for the night. The only water available was a little stream called Burobo, which flows from east to west, and about a mile from Mpukunyoni. Between the stream and Mpukunyoni the country is intersected bydongaswhich run from the base of the hill to open on to different parts of the stream. With the object of being near water, Leuchars selected an old mealie garden between two of thedongasreferred to, and only 200 yards from the stream. This spot was by no means a good one for defensive purposes, being in the midst of broken and somewhat bush-covered country, with high tambookie grass, and commanded by high ground in several directions, especially on the immediate north. In other respects the ground was favourable for a Zulu army to operate in. The 'chest' could form up and advance unseen up adongain one direction, whilst somewhat similar advantages were available for each of the 'horns.' From a soldier's point of view, therefore, the site was somewhat questionable. There was, indeed, safer ground higher up nearer the hill, but Leuchars was a diplomat as well as a soldier, and, with a lengthy experience in Natal, he thoroughly understood the Native character. He knew that manœuvring in itself would have little or no effect on the rebels. As at Nkandhla, a collision was essential, but to bring it about, it was necessary to give the enemy a fancied advantage.

The bivouac took the form of a square, each side of which was 120 yards long. Two squadrons U.M.R. (Headquarters and City) occupied the eastern face; one squadron U.M.R. (Noodsberg) and one squadron U.D.R. the southern; and Sibindi the other two faces. Sibindi's men were particularly adapted for night work, having magnificent eyesight, and a keen sense of hearing.

The squadron which had been operating on the north-east, returned at 6 p.m. to report having observed animpi, about the same size as Sibindi's, moving towards Mpukunyoni from high hills on the north-east. This force, Leuchars concluded, was moving away from Mackay. It was, however, too late then to operate against it.

Soon after the men had settled down for the night, a man arrived from Matshana ka Mondise to warn Leuchars to be particularly careful as the enemy was near by, and to point out that, in his opinion, the column had bivouacked in a dangerous locality.

Every precaution was taken to safeguard the square against surprise. Sentries and pickets were directed to be extra vigilant. During the night, which was a bitterly cold one, two false alarms occurred, one at 10.30 p.m., the other about 2 a.m., both caused by young sentries of Sibindi's levy. The alacrity with which every man sprang to his place, without the least confusion, was highly satisfactory.

At 4.30 a.m. all stood to arms. Half an hour later, a troop under Lieut. J.H.C. Nuss was sent out, with orders to reconnoitre in the direction in which theimpihad been seen the previous evening. If it was not in sight, he was to go to a suitable hill and try and get into communication with Mackay by heliograph.

About 6 a.m., however, Nuss and his troop, after firing a couple of shots by way of alarm, rode back to report that the enemy was approaching in force and was close at hand. As he spoke, the latter could be heard shouting their war-cry "Usutu" as they advanced. In a few moments, a dark mass could be observed in the half-light of early dawn,[216]streaming rapidly over a small neck some 700 yards north-east of the square. They moved at once into the bed of the stream where, it so happened, the cattle seized by Leuchars on the preceding day had been left for the night. A smaller force (left 'horn') could, about the same time, be seen sweeping along the foot of Mpukunyoni in rear of the bivouac, as if to attack fromthedongaon the west. Another force, evidently the right 'horn,' detaching itself from the 'chest,' came down the stream to engage the north side of the square.

The attack opened at 6.15 a.m. on the eastern face, by the enemy causing the cattle, which they had driven ahead of them, to rush wildly at the square on emerging from thedongareferred to. The order was thereupon given to fire, when, at the first volley, fifteen of the cattle fell within 15 or 20 yards of the troops. Two or three of those rebels who were advancing under cover of the cattle were also killed. This had the effect of checking the enemy's rush for a time. The rebels then proceeded to encircle the square, keeping well under the excellent available cover. Repeated attempts were made to rush at the bivouac through the open ground between it and thedongas, but, on each occasion, the attack was overwhelmed by steady, well-directed fire.

The fight had by now assumed practically all the characteristics peculiar to South African warfare. There were the Militia Reserves, the majority of them Dutchmen, their horses already saddled, prepared, in accordance with the practice of their forefathers, on being too hardly pressed, to mount and retire to the next ridge and again contend against overwhelming odds. There, too, were the Active Militia, most of them the descendants of Scotchmen or Englishmen, who, true to the custom oftheirancestors, had, with saddles planted on the ground, taken shelter behind them, having come to stay and fight to the bitter end.

The enemy, again, delivered his attack in true Zulu style. The 'horns' had deployed from the 'chest' to right and left in the ancient orthodox manner with the idea of encircling, closing in on, and eventually massacring, their opponents to a man. Sibindi and his men, too, were there, though only at a later stage did they get a chance of exhibiting the martial instincts of their tribe.

Whilst the various attacks were in progress, the leaders urging the men to close in, it was observed that the enemy had approached to within 80 yards of Sibindi's men,causing the latter to become a little nervous. It was accordingly considered necessary for all sides of the square to be held by riflemen. To do this, some were withdrawn from other parts, and the sides of the square reduced by about 20 yards. The movement, which took place about 6.45 a.m., was carried out with the utmost coolness, enabling the enemy to be opposed at every point with heavy, effective fire.

During the whole of this time, there had been an incessant fire from two or three men who were armed with modern weapons and concealed on the long high ridge on the north. They were between 700 and 800 yards from the square. This fire caused a considerable number of casualties, including Tpr. H. Steele, U.D.R., killed; Tprs. S. Mackenzie and P. Braithwaite, U.D.R., wounded; sub-Leader T.J. van Rooyen, Krantzkop Reserves, wounded (three places); twenty-one men of Sibindi's levy, wounded—three of them succumbing to their injuries within three hours. There were also many narrow escapes, and casualties among the horses. All but three of the casualties among the men were caused by Mauser bullets.

The whole of the cover on the ridge in question was carefully searched by picked marksmen. Later on a man, reported to be Faku's induna, was found dead there. The principal sniper, however, escaped, a man named Magadise.

Up to 7.30 a.m., Sibindi's men had remained practically inactive. When superseded by the riflemen, they had withdrawn into the square. They did not, however, like quitting the cover afforded by the grass. They then quietly abided the issue, sustaining the many casualties referred to whilst conforming to methods of warfare which must have appeared to them strange. When, however, the enemy's attacks became less vigorous, they realized that their turn to pursue must shortly arrive. The order came. In about five minutes, Sibindi got his men to charge. This they did strictly in accordance with the custom of their forefathers, shouting their tribal war-cry "Undi! Undi" as they bounded forth to deal destruction to their flying foes.

Many rebels escaped viâ the waterfall and down the great valley on the west of the square. Others were pursued up the ridge, and in numerous other directions. The levy alone succeeded in killing thirteen at the waterfall.

A squadron was sent in pursuit of those that had attacked from thedongaon the west and then retreated round Mpukunyoni. Troops were, moreover, sent in pursuit to the north-east. One of these discovered the enemy's blankets, etc., at a kraal about one and a half miles off. The things has been left there just prior to attacking.

The dead were counted in th scrub anddongasimmediately round the lager, fifty-seven bodies being found, exclusive of those killed by Sibindi's men. The aggregate was probably not less than a hundred. Among the slain was Babazeleni, Faku's chief induna and principal commander of theimpi.

The losses sustained by the Reserves were attributed by Leuchars to their having saddled up when the alarm was given, and stood on their line with the bridles over their arms. The saddled horses naturally afforded a good target for the snipers.

The wounded were attended to by Dr. C.H. Crass, N.M.C., who, with three members of the Signalling Corps as assistants, performed his duties during the action and afterwards in an eminently satisfactory manner.

The attacking rebels proved to be only about 800 strong. They were composed of Faku's and Mtele's tribes, with some from Makafula and Mehlokazulu. A number of them were Christians. One of these, as was proved from a pocket-book found on him, was a certificated preacher of the Gordon Memorial Mission, Natal.

Owing to several of the wounded having to be carried on improvised stretchers, to there being no sign of Mackay, and to the enemy having been seen at Qudeni on the 27th, Leuchars resolved to return to Ngubevu, though by a different route, namely viâ Ngqulu, the Buffalo valley and Sibindi's location.

MPUKUNYONIDispositions are at momentimpiappeared on the neck near AScale: 4 inches = 1 mile. Contours Ver. Int. = 30 ft.REFERENCEA =Position of the cattleB =Where first attack beganC =Point of subsequent attack. Enemy advanced to C under cover of dongaD =Point of another attack,—from the river bedEandF =Enemy's snipers; most destructive was at EG =Waterfall; many escaped hereH =Where enemy stopped before attacking. Clothing left at the two trees near byJ =Leuchars' squareK =Where Nuss was when he caught sight ofimpicrescent =Enemy.__.__Lines of enemy's advance

The return journey began at 10.30 a.m., but provedmost arduous on account of the wounded having to be carried by relays of U.M.R., the Reserves, and Sibindi's levy. After the column had gone three or four miles, gun fire could be heard, and shells were seen bursting on Hlazakazi Mountain, about eight or nine miles to the north in a direct line.[217]

A halt was called at the Buffalo at 3 p.m., after which the column moved on to the Copper Syndicate Works on Umsinga Mountain, where Steele was buried.

In consequence of having stabbed and killed a number of the enemy, Sibindi's men, on the march back, carried their assegais, as customary on such occasions, with the blades upwards. On getting to the Buffalo, they bound certain green rushes round their heads, and otherwise doctored and cleansed themselves.

The column moved further up the same mountain and, at 7 p.m., bivouacked for the night at the kraal of Sikota, one of Sibindi's indunas.[218]

At 11 a.m. on the same day, Leuchars sent a message to Lieut. M.W. Bennett, N.F.A., who was in charge of the camp at Ngubevu, directing him to send bread for the troops, also medical comforts and stretchers for thewounded. These reached the column about 3 a.m. on the 29th.

The march was resumed at 7 a.m. on the following morning, the camp at Ngubevu being reached at 1 p.m.

The Krantzkop Reserves were now sent back to Krantzkop, with orders for the Second and Third Krantzkop Reserves to demobilize.

At the moment Leuchars was dealing the enemy a heavy blow at Mpukunyoni (28th), Mackay was operating in difficult country about Malakata and Hlazakazi mountains, some fifteen and eleven miles respectively from Mpukunyoni in a direct line.

Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton, N.C., on Mackay's departure, was sent to take command at Helpmakaar. He directed Mackay to return; the order was, however, countermanded by Leuchars, who, as has already been observed, was put in command of all the forces in Natal. Mackay was thereupon instructed to continue to operate in Nqutu and western portions of Nkandhla divisions as an independent column.

Between the 28th May and 10th June, Mackay operated between Isandhlwana and Madhlozi mountain. On the 28th, a reconnaissance was made in the direction of a well-watered valley of vast extent known as Mangeni, in which some 2,000 head of cattle and many goats were discovered, evidently placed there by Natives for safety. Mehlokazulu and two or three followers were observed on the east side of the valley hurriedly escaping towards Qudeni. It being too late to seize the stock, steps were taken early the following morning to collect and bring it to camp. On other days, special pains were taken in the wards of Makafula, Faku and other Chiefs to ascertain promptly the kraals of rebels, especially such as had joined the force that attacked Leuchars at Mpukunyoni. The stock belonging to them was thereupon seized and, after returning what was proved to belong to loyalists—done on the advice of a specially-appointed Board—the balance was sent forward to Dundee to be sold by public auction.

Whilst Mackay was encamped at Mangeni, information was received to the effect that Mehlokazulu, Mtele and other rebel leaders, had, two weeks prior to attacking Leuchars, assembled their men at a kraal overlooking Mangeni and there had them formally doctored for war. As, however, the kraal in question was within view of Helpmakaar, although hardly less than twenty-five miles away, it was deemed unsafe for the ceremonies to take place in its immediate vicinity, for fear lest the European troops stationed there, then 800 strong, should, by means of field-glasses and what not, see what was being done! A spot close by, but well out of sight, was accordingly chosen, and there the ceremonies were performed on orthodox lines, two head of cattle being killed for theimpi. There were two doctors. The principal one was Magadise, afterwards, as has been seen, one of the snipers at Mpukunyoni. It was here, too, that Mehlokazulu declared his policy to be to wait and see what the white people intended doing. He would not, he said, go forward and assume the offensive, but wait to be attacked, when a stubborn resistance would be offered. After being doctored, the bulk of the forces were accordingly told to return to their kraals and await further orders. This advice was publicly approved by Babazeleni, the man of Faku's tribe who commanded and was killed at Mpukunyoni. It was about this time, too, that the small store, a mile from the kraal where the doctoring took place, was burnt to the ground.

Among the Chiefs who attended the above gathering was Makafula. He went because his ward had been chosen by Mehlokazulu as a convenient rallying-point for the insurgents in that part of the country. He was much afraid of the notorious Chief, who might have caused him to be attacked and exterminated forthwith had he held back. Mackay, it will be remembered, did not leave Empandhleni for Helpmakaar, viâ Nondweni, till the 11th May, which was just about the day that the above doctoring took place. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that Makafula temporarily identified himself with the rebels solely because of there being no Europeantroops in the vicinity to which he could have gone for protection. His act would, nevertheless, have been regarded as treasonable had not the Chief immediately dispatched a messenger to the local magistrate, Mr. Hignett, to report exactly what he had done, and by what reasons he had been actuated in so doing. "Acting on my advice," says the Magistrate (who had presided over the district for over six years), "though desirous of retiring from his ward, he (Makafula) remained at his post at great personal risk, and, under the pretence of interesting himself in the rebel designs, acted as an informant." Predicaments of this kind frequently occurred in various parts of the Colony, and, too impatient to personally inquire into the circumstances, commanding officers sometimes concluded that sedition had been committed, when the act had sprung from motives entirely dissociated from a spirit of disloyalty. When rebellion breaks out it is, of course, difficult to weigh and consider evidence that is at all involved, the impulse being to assume from even the most trivial indications that the worst has happened, and, therefore, that the most severe punishment must be meted out at once to fit the supposed crime.

Among the Chiefs who afforded Mackay assistance in the way of scouts was the Basuto Mayime. His people had been settled in the country ever since the Zulu War, having been granted land in consideration of notable services rendered by them during that campaign.

Mackay's operations at this time were confined to those parts of Nqutu district that abutted on the Buffalo river. He operated in, and thoroughly patrolled, such parts as Isandhlwana, Malakata, Hlazakazi and Mangeni. Steps were taken to ascertain all kraals from which Natives had deserted to join the rebels, whereupon their stock was seized and confiscated. Owing to these measures, which included the destruction of Mehlokazulu's most important kraal, Mackay assisted materially in causing the situation at Nkandhla to mature, besides restraining many from rebelling through fear of their stock being looted by the enemy. But for such activity, Mehlokazulu, for instance,would not have amalgamated his forces with those of Bambata as soon as he did. Mackay, in fact, compelled the foregoing, Mtele, Nondubela and other leaders, with their followers, to act with greater precipitation than it was in their interest to do. Had more time been allowed, it is more than likely that a far greaterimpiwould have been raised in Nqutu district than the one that actually went forward to Nkandhla. If, again, Mehlokazulu had been afforded the opportunity, it is not improbable he would have resorted to tactics similar to those adopted by Bambata and Sigananda towards seemingly neutral or half-hearted tribes,i.e.dragooned them, by seizure of stock, etc., into taking up arms against the Government.

The Reserves attached to Mackay's column were ordered, on the 5th June, to demobilize at Helpmakaar. The excellent services rendered by the men whilst in the field were suitably acknowledged by the Commanding Officer.

When McKenzie was appointed to take supreme command in Natal and Zululand (30th May), Leuchars was instructed to continue to command all troops in Natal as well as those in Nqutu district, though in future under McKenzie.

After placing Newmarch in temporary command of the U.F.F., with Capt. W.N. Angus as staff officer, Leuchars proceeded with Carter viâ Greytown to Helpmakaar to direct operations from that point.

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