CHAPTER VIII.
Mode of Election of Senators—of Representatives.—Personal Votes and Property-Votes.—Voting by Ballot.—Eligibility of Candidates.—Aboriginal Blood.—Mixed Blood.—Government Rent.—Public Expenditure.—Unwise Economy.—Choice of Statesmen.—Explanations.
Mr. Adamson,—properly designated as the worshipful Christopher Adamson,—being himself a member of the senate of his own state of Bath, obtained for the strangers, as a special favour, permission to witness the mode of election of a senator to fill up a vacancy which had just occurred.
He explained to them, that, in this particular state, the members of the senate, or upper house, are elected by the lower house (or commons); and that the appointment is for life, or till resignation. But though in these particulars the constitution of this state differsfrom that of several of the others, themodeof election is similar to that by which several of the public functionaries are chosen in all the states. No personal canvassing, he informed them, is allowed in any case; nor is it regular to ask or to promise a vote. But at the time of the election, the president or chairman of the assembly solemnly admonishes the voters of their obligation to divest themselves, as far as possible, of all personal bias, and nominate such persons as they shall in their consciences believe to be most fit. Admonitions of this kind stand in the place of the oaths which in Europe are usually administered on such occasions. The commons-assembly having been duly convened, each member was directed to write down on separate slips of paper, and deliver to the president, the names of five persons as candidates; or, notmorethan five: for he was at liberty to write fewer; or, if he pleased, none at all.
The president next proceeded to inspect their names, and select the five that had the greatest number of votes. It so happened on this occasion that there weresixnames, ofwhich two had each the same number of votes. This, as Mr. Adamson explained, creates no difficulty, and only prolongs in a trifling degree the business of the election. All six names were put in nomination; and each member was next called on to give his voteagainstone of the six, by giving in a paper inscribed with the name of the candidate he wished to have struck off the list. The one who had the greatest number of these counter-votes being then removed from the list, the remaining five were proposed in like manner, to have one name struck off; and the same process was repeated till only one remained, who was thereupon declared duly elected. For example: suppose the five names that, in the first instance, have most votes, to beA,B,C,D, andE, and these being put in nomination, in the counter-votingAhas the most votes against him; thenB,C,D, andEare proposed in like manner, andBis struck off by a majority of counter-votes; there remainC,D, andE, from which, by the same process,CandDare successively struck off: thenEis the one elected.
If in any case the number of counter-votes against two of the names are equal, and that number exceeds the votes against any other one, thenbothnames are struck off, except it should happen that they are thelasttwo; in which case, of course, the question is, whetherDorEshall be elected: and if on this question the numbers are equal, the president has the casting vote.
Mr. Adamson was about to answer the inquiries of the visitors as to the peculiar advantages proposed by this mode of election, when a blunt, humorous-looking commoner, who sat near them, interposed, by telling them that, in plain terms, this was the advantage; that each voter placed hisown friendfirst, and thebest candidatesecond, and so the best was elected in the end. Mr. Adamson replied with a smile, that, making due allowance for satire, there was a good deal of truth in the statement.
“It is a truth,” said he, “that has been presented to you, dressed with vinegar alone, which you may easily suppose might fairly be tempered with a due proportion of oil. ButI will leave that to your own reflections; only reminding you of the well-known instance of the Grecian states discussing the respective merits of the several commanders after the overthrow of Xerxes. Each state, it was observed, placedtheir owncommander first on the list of merit, and allotted the second place to Themistocles the Athenian; whence it was reasonably inferred that Themistocles was clearly the most distinguished of all. Now, suppose he had been candidate for a prize in some assembly in which the Athenians were not present; he would not, you observe, have obtained a single vote according to the direct mode of voting, while on our plan he would have gained a decisive triumph. I have heard also of a new-comer in some town consulting each of his neighbours as to the choice of a physician, and fixing on the one whom most of them accounted the second-best; each placing his own family physician first.”
The travellers having inquired into the mode of appointment of the lower house, were informedthat the members are the representatives each of a certain town or district, as in England, America, &c.; and that they are elected for seven years at the utmost; one-seventh of the house, by lot, going out every year, but being capable, however, of re-election.
There is, besides this, a power lodged in a certain council of state and president,—for this state is a republic,—to dissolve the house and appoint a general election. In all the states there is a house of representatives, constituted substantially on the same principle. In their designations, and in some points of detail, there are several differences.
In the election of members all citizens have, in most of the states, a vote, though not allequalvotes. Any citizen, who is unconvicted of any crime, of sound mind, and of a certain specified age, (in the state of Bath it is thirty-five,) is entitled to be enrolled as a voter, on producing a certificate of his having gone through a certain course of elementary school-learning, and attained the required proficiency. He is then entitled to what is called apersonalvote;i. e.a vote without any reference to the amount of his property. In Bath, and some of the other states, an individual may have conferred on him the honour and privilege of a double or treble personal vote, in consideration of peculiar public services or personal qualifications.
Besides this, each individual who may pay a certainproportionof taxes,—i. e.who may possess a certain amount of taxable property,—is entitled, on that ground, to aproperty-vote;[3]if he has a certain greater amount specified,—which is more, however, than double the first,—he has a second property-vote; and so on, up to a certain limited number. In the republic of Bath, six is the utmost number of property-votes that one person can hold; but this varies in the several states; the distinction of personal and property-votes, and the power of holding more than one of the latter, are regulations common to all.
3. Any property not taxable,—as, for instance, professional income,—the holder may, if he think fit, enroll as equivalent to so much land, and pay taxes accordingly, which entitles him to a corresponding number of votes.
3. Any property not taxable,—as, for instance, professional income,—the holder may, if he think fit, enroll as equivalent to so much land, and pay taxes accordingly, which entitles him to a corresponding number of votes.
“This part of our system,” Mr. Adamson remarkedto them, “is not so much unlike that of Great Britain as you had at the first glance conceived: for with you, if a man chance to have landed property in severaldifferent counties, he is entitled to a vote in each; and this is nearly equivalent to his having several votes in one county, should all the property chance to be in that one. The anomaly is withyou; in giving one man more direct influence in the election of the legislature than another, who, perhaps, has double his estate, but all within one county. I say,” continued he, “directinfluence; because, indirectly, a rich man among you does, it appears, influence his tenants, tradesmen, and other dependents in their votes. With us, the weight which property has, and ought to have, is allowed to operatedirectlyandopenly: with you, on the system of single votes, it does not.
“And accordingly you apprehend, I find, a danger in the threatened introduction of the ballot; as tending to place the richest and poorest on a footing of democratical equality, by taking away the indirect influence of the one over the votes of the other. And it isremarkable that the tendency of the ballot to produce this effect,—which is manifestly the greatdangerto be apprehended from it,—seems to beassertedby its advocates among you, anddeniedby its opponents. With us, on the contrary, there is no such consequence to be apprehended; and, accordingly, our voting for representatives is always by ballot. On our system, this is not only unobjectionable but highly important; for, as the successful candidate is elected by the majority ofvotes, while it is possible that his opponent might be supported by a much greater number ofvoters, it would be very inexpedient to let this be publicly displayed and recorded; as it might tend to array the wealthier and poorer classes against each other.
“On the whole,” added he, “our system seems to be the simplest and most effectual for preserving that principle whichmustbe maintained in everygoodrepresentative system; viz. thatpersonsandpropertyshould both be represented. The democrat aims at a representation ofpersons alone; at putting on a political level those who have the largest stake in thecountry, and those who have little or none. The aristocrat (or rather, oligarchist) is for representingproperty alone; as if thetaxesimposed by the legislature towards the expenses of the state were everything, and thelife and libertyof individuals, which may be affected by the laws passed, were nothing. The true wisdom, surely, is to takebothinto account, and to provide that both persons and property shall be duly represented.”
In all the states but one, all persons are eligible to a seat in the lower house,—that of representatives,—who possess certain property and personal qualifications. In that one,—the kingdom of Upper-London, a small state, which was separated, above a hundred years since, from that of Nether-London,—a sort of hereditary restriction exists, which, at the first glance, appeared to the travellers exceedingly whimsical. No one is eligible to their commons’ assembly who is not descended, or married to one who is, from both blacks and whites.
The origin of the regulation was this:—Beforethe state was separated, the district which constitutes its present territory was occupied by a considerable proportion of blacks, viz. the descendants of the allied and reclaimed aboriginals formerly described. It was observed by the then king of Nether-London, (then called New-London,) that the whites of pure blood were beginning to hold aloof, not only from the blacks, but from those of mixed breed, and to disdain associating with them on equal terms, however personally deserving. To remedy this state of things, and prevent a mutual alienation between two sets of fellow-citizens, the king,—who seems to have inherited something of the eccentric, original, and daring character of the younger Müller, from a daughter of whom he was descended,—devised the plan, which, with the concurrence of the legislature, he carried into effect, for constituting this district—a thriving and, in other respects, promising one—into a distinct state, under some peculiar regulations.
A brother of his own was appointed the first king of it,—whose wife is said to have been a lady of beauty and accomplishments, thoughshe had a slight mixture of aboriginal blood. Inducements were held out to several of the most respectable and intelligent persons in various states who were of mixed race, to come and settle in the new kingdom. Some of the ablest of these,—who, by the bye, are said to have had a considerable over-proportion of European blood in their veins,—together with others of purely white race, were nominated as the original senate (or upper house); and the lower house was, by a fundamental law, to consist exclusively, and for ever, of persons of mixed race, or who are married to such. And, to this day, no one is eligible who cannot prove his descent, or his wife’s, from blacks and whites.
This, however, is easily done at present; for the descent may be ever so remote, the mixture ever so unequal. Every one, therefore, is eligible, of whom any ancestor has been enrolled as such. There are, accordingly, many members of the house who, perhaps, have not above ¹⁄₁₆ or ¹⁄₃₂ of aboriginal blood; and, indeed, most of the population are at present not very dissimilar from Europeans in feature and complexion,and yet are qualified, as far as the above rule is concerned, for a seat in the house.
The plan was at first laughed at, as whimsical, by many of the Southlanders themselves; but the expediency of it in promoting mutual respect and speedy amalgamation between the two races, who were thusboth alike excludedfrom an important branch of the legislature, was so apparent, and the joke was so good-humouredly joined in by those who were the objects of it, that the laughter was soon divested of all bitterness. The satirists had suggested, as a symbol for the new state, two swans,—an Australian black swan (Cygnus ater) and white European,—lovingly entwining their necks: on which the Upper-Londoners immediately adopted this as the arms of the kingdom; and so it remains to this day, with the motto of “Nimium ne crede colori.” The state, though one of the smaller ones, (its population about two hundred and fifty thousand,) is prosperous, and its citizens respectable, intelligent, and polite.
In most of the states, there are few or noconsiderable taxes, except a land tax; and in many of them even this is not heavy, from the government being in possession of considerable tracts of land, which in some instances have become very valuable from having been covered with buildings, wharfs, &c. [The word “tax” is used as best conveying to English ears the sense intended. They themselves call it “government-rent;” for they consider the state as alone holding what we call the fee-simple of all land, which it assigns to individuals, either for terms of years at a stipulated rent, or in perpetuity, subject to what we should call a land-tax.]
On the whole, Mr. Sibthorpe is of opinion, that, taking into consideration the very small military (and, of course, no naval) establishments, and also the comparative wealth of these and the European states, the government revenues are proportionably greater in the Southland states than in those of Europe,—the revenue that is actuallyexpended in the public serviceeach year; for he does not take into account, as a part of our revenue, the enormous sum annually paid as interest on the national debt.These states having happily been exempt from the prodigal expenditure of wars, have no national debt. Their public expenditure is, however, what we should be apt to call profuse in the payment of public functionaries. All are paid, even the representatives; and to most offices is attached, besides what may be considered an ample salary in reference to the prevailing style of living, a comfortable retiring pension: sinecures however, strictly so called,—i. e.payments fornoservices, either present orpast,—are not known. When the more frugal system, in reference to this point, that prevails among us, was described to them, and also the prevailing clamour for still further reductions on that head, they gave it as their opinion that there could not be money worse saved, and that is must be a great wonder if we were well governed.
“The natural tendency,” they urged, “of a system offrugalgovernment in this sense, is, to obtain a worse commodity. Try the experiment,” they said, “of being frugal to your physicians, and reduce their fees to half-crowns, and you will have a half-crown’s worth of skillinstead of a guinea’s worth. You will still have plenty of physicians, but we should not like to be under their hands. While a man of talents and character, with a liberal education and industry, can realize a handsome and secure income in some of your learned professions, you cannot expect him, especially if he have a family to provide for, and but little private fortune, to give up a lucrative employment, and devote himself to the labours of political life, either gratuitously, or with an uncertain recompense in view. He will either keep aloof from public business, or will bestow on it a hurried, divided, and secondary attention. Thus, political business, and ultimately political power, is thrown into the hands of one or both of two classes of men:—those oflarge estates; andadventurers,—men, who, for want of character, or of steady application, are not succeeding in any reputable and lucrative profession, and therefore see nothing better to do than to take their chance in the profession—an ill-paid and precarious one, as it seems to be among you—of politics.
“Many persons of both these classes, amongyou, may, we doubt not, be possessed of high qualifications; but it seems evident that with so large a total number as you possess of educated and intelligent gentry, you practically limit your choice to a very small proportion of them for persons to conduct public affairs; and these affairs, therefore, we should expect to find conducted, if not ill, yet by no means so well as they might be. We should expect to find the department of government—one of such paramount importance—not so well filled as many subordinate departments; and that there would be among you a larger proportionate number of highly qualified legal, military, and naval men, for instance, of engineers, artisans, &c. than of statesmen.
“You are to observe,” they added, “that we are only throwing out ourconjectures: we are ready and willing to stand corrected. You must know how the matter of fact stands; which may perhaps be at variance with our anticipations, through the operation of some causes we are not aware of. But we lay before you our notions and expectations, as the thought strikes ourselves.”
[There follows here, in the memoranda of the travellers, the explanations they gave, in answer to the foregoing remarks, of our institutions and usages,—the reasons by which they are vindicated,—and the practical working of them. But all this, though of course most interesting to the persons to whom it was addressed, would probably not be so to our readers, who must of course be familiar with discussions relative to our own institutions and customs, and curious rather to learn particulars concerning those of a strange nation, however unreasonable and whimsical their novelty may cause them to appear. For this reason, we have, in several other places as well as here, omitted much that we find recorded of the descriptions and discussions laid before the Southlanders by their guests; inserting only what was necessary to make their descriptions intelligible.]