Chapter 14

We must, so far as this investigation goes, conclude, that, unless the natural tendency of things to decline is powerfully counteracted, every country that rises to wealth must have a fall; and that, therefore, it merits investigation, whether it is or is not possible to counteract the tendency to decline, without interrupting the progress towards greater prosperity, and, to manage matters so, that whether it is not possible, after having attained the summit of wealth, we may remain there instead of immediately descending, as most nations have hitherto done.From individuals, the exertion necessary is not to be expected; but, it may be looked for from the government of a country, which, though composed of individuals, the succession of persons is differently carried on; it is not from age to age, and from an old father to a young son, but from men in the vigour of life, to men in the vigour of life, who, while they are occupied in public affairs, may be considered, with respect to whatever is to be done for the good of the nation, (for its prosperity, defence, or protection,) as animated with the same spirit, without any interruption.With respect to the interior causes of decline, they may be counteracted always with more or less effect, by a proper system of govern----{143} The burthens on the industry of old France, were,Livres.Rent of land                                                                        700,000,000Revenues of clergy                                                              600,000,000Taxes, including the expense of levying                                800,000,000____________2,100,000,000In sterling money                                                                 £87,500,000Half land now occupied by the cultivators,          }and the remainder let at lower rents                    }              350,000,000Revenues of clergy, and the expenses                                    50,000,000Taxes as before                                                                  800,000,000_____________1,200,000,000Or in sterling money                                                            £50,400,000This makes a diminution of £37,100,000; or something more than a third of the whole expense, and more than all the taxes to the state estimated at the highest rate.-=-[end of page #169]ment.  In the latter portion of this work we shall endeavour to shew how that may be attempted with safety, if not accomplished with full success.Before, however, we conclude this subject, and rely on government, it is necessary to mention that, in treating with other nations, a kind of overbearing haughty pride is natural to those who govern a powerful and wealthy people.  In that case, they act as individuals, and are not to be trusted; and the less so, that a nation of proud pampered citizens is but too apt to applaud insolence in those who govern them.This pride has been a very constant forerunner of the fall of wealthy and great nations, and, in Rome excepted, it has never failed.  The emperors of Rome were much less haughty than the ambassadors of the republic; a love of false splendour had supplanted a ferocious affectation of dignity, yet, the former was the less humiliating of the two to other nations. {144}While the rulers of wealthy nations are apt to act haughtily to others, they are liable to fall into another error, in mistaking the strength of their own people, and loading them too heavily, trusting too much both to their internal energy, and external force.As the near observers of the inability of the people are generally afraid to carry unwelcome tidings to their superior; and, if they did, as he is seldom inclined to give credit to unwelcome news, the ruin of a nation has probably made a very considerable progress before he, whose business it is to put a stop to it, is aware of the danger.The continual clamour that is made about every new burthen that is laid on, and the cry of ruin, which perpetually is sounded in the ears of a minister, and of those who execute his orders, are some ex----{144} The appearance of virtue and self-command, which the republican Romans preserved, added to the bravery with which they maintained whatever claims they put in, overawed a great part of their enemies; and those, who were not absolutely overawed thought that defeat and submission were, at least, robbed of their shame, when such was the character of the conqueror; and the claim once allowed was no longer questioned.  Very different was the case, when the emperor was a fidler, or a buffoon, the senators puppets, and the pro-consuls themselves robbers.-=-[end of page #170]cuses for their not attending to them; but the consequence is not the less fatal to the nation on that account.A nation that is feeble has, at least, the advantage of knowing it, and is not insensible if she receives a wound; but the government of a powerful nation is like the pilot of a ship, who navigates in a sea, the depth of which he cannot sound, and who spreads all his sails: if he strikes upon a rock, his ship is dashed to pieces in a moment. The other, sailing amongst shallows and sands, proceeds with caution, avoids them if possible, and, if she touches, it is so gently, that even her feeble frame is scarcely injured.The rulers of nations appear, in general, not to be aware of the evil that arises from the government they have to manage becoming too unwieldly =sic=, or too complicated; in either case, a check, though but of short duration, is irretrievable.  This is a great oversight, and, at least, greatly augments the chances against the durability of a government.  In proportion as the machine is unmanageable and complex, the embarrassment of those who have the conduct of it will be great, and the enemies will be proportionately bold and audacious.  In all such conflicts, much depends on the spirit of the combatants, and more still on that of those who, at first, are lookers on, who act in consequence of the opinion they have of the force or feebleness of either party. {145}The tendency that a nation has to decline is not, then, in general, counteracted, by the government; but, on the contrary, is pushed on by it, and precipitated into the gulf.  No wonder, then, that the career is rapid, and the fall irretrievable.It is, nevertheless, to the government, and to it alone, that we must look for that counteracting force that is to stay the general current.  Individuals can only look to their own conduct, and they neither can---{145} Not only when the French revolution began, but a hundred times afterwards, did the party triumph that appeared the strongest, merely because it appeared so.  All those who stand neutral at first, take a side the moment they have fixed their opinion as to the strength of the contending parties, and this decision is always in favour of the party they think the strongest.-=-[end of page #171]be expected to have time nor inclination to study the public welfare, and, even if they had, they would want the means.Government can never be better employed than in counteracting this tendency to decay.  It has the means, and is but performing its duty in doing so.  The previous step to all this, however, is a knowledge of what is to be done, a full sense of the necessity of doing it, and a disposition to submit to the regimen necessary.For this purpose, both the government and the people must give up something.  The people must allow government to interfere in the education of children, and, in that, give up a little of their liberty; {146} and those who govern must attend to many things which are generally neglected.  To do the routine business of the day is the occupation of most of the governments of Europe, whether in war or at peace; they therefore habitually become agents of necessity, and what can be procrastinated is never done; that is to say, what is good is very seldom done, and what is necessary to prevent immediate evil, is always the chief, and sometimes the only, occupation.There are some men in the world who prosper merely because they look beforehand, and conduct their affairs.  There are others who, with equal industry, and much more trouble and care, are always a little behind, and allow their affairs to conduct them; such men never succeed, and, if they can keep off the extreme of misfortune, it is all that is to be expected.Most governments, in wealthy nations, are like those latter species of individuals,-- they do not conduct their affairs, but are conducted by them, and think they succeed, when the necessary business of the day is done.  This listlessness must be done away, and, though the---{146} From the impossibility of a nation, once immersed in sloth and luxury, returning to the tone and energy of a new people, we may judge of the impossibility of a nation going on progressively towards wealth, not suffering from the manner of educating children.  The leading distinction between a rising and a fallen people is the disposition to industry and exertion, in the one, and to sloth and negligence, in the other.  It is while a nation is increasing in wealth that this alteration gradually takes place; and, as this is the main point on which all depends, the nation is safe when it is well attended to, even if other things are, in some degree, neglected.-=-[end of page #172]governments of countries that are wealthy have no occasion, like Peter the Great, or the founders of new states, to create new institutions, and eternally try to ameliorate, they ought to be very carefully and constantly employed in preventing those good things that they enjoy from escaping their grasp, so far as it depends upon interior arrangement.  Exterior causes are not within their power to regulate, therefore they should be the more attentive to those that are; and, though exterior causes are out of their dominion, yet, sometimes, by wise interior regulations, the evil effects of exterior ones may be prevented.  Nothing of all this can be done, however, until the government rises above the routine business of the day, and until all the necessary and pressing business is got over.  The first thing, then, for a government is to extricate itself from the situation of one who struggles with necessity, after which, but not before, it may study what is beneficial, and of permanent utility.So far it would appear all nations are situated alike, with regard to the general tendency to decay; {147} and so far all of them may be guided by general rules, but as to the particular manner of applying those rules, it must depend on the peculiar circumstances of the nation to which they are meant to be applied.In general, revenue has become the great object with modern nations: and, as their rulers have not ventured to tax the necessaries of the people to any high degree, but have laid their vices, rather than their wants, under contribution, the revenue-system, (as it may be called,) tends to make a government encourage expensive vice, by which it profits, and check innocent enjoyment, by which it has nothing to gain.  This is a terrible, but it is a very prevalent system; it is immoral, inhuman, and impolitic.So far as this goes, a government, instead of checking, accelerates the decline of a people; but, as this is not a natural cause of decline, as it is not universal or necessary, it is to be considered with due---{147} The Chinese, and, in general, the nations of Asia have not been considered as included in this inquiry.  The Chinese, in particular, are a people in a permanent situation: they do not increase in riches, and they seem to have no tendency to decline.  Their laws and mode of education and living remain the same.-=-[end of page #173]regard to particular circumstances.  In general, we may say, that, in place of inviting the lower classes to pass their time in drinking, by the innumerable receptacles that there are for those who are addicted to that vice, every impediment should be put in the way.  Drinking is a vice, the disposition to which grows with its gratification; most other avocations (for drinking in moderation is only such) have no tendency of the sort.  Those enjoyments which have a tendency to degenerate into vice should be kept under some check; those which have no such tendency ought to be encouraged; for, where the main and general mass of the population of a country is corrupted, it is impossible to prevent its decline.  If it remains uncorrupted, the matter is very easy, or, more properly, it may be said that prosperity is the natural consequence.Manners will always be found of more consequence than laws, and they depend, in a great measure, on the wise regulations of government in every country.Not only do most governments profit by laying the vices of the people under contribution; but, as revenue is, by a very false rule, taken as a criterion from which the prosperity of a nation may be estimated, the very evil that brings on decay serves to disguise its approach.  A nation may be irretrievably undone, before it is perceived that it has any tendency to decline; it is, therefore, unwise for governments to wait till they see the effects of decay, and then to hope to counteract them; they must look before-hand, and prevent, otherwise all their exertions will prove ineffectual. [end of page #174]CHAP. X.Of the external Causes of Decline.--  the Envy and Enmity of other Nations.--their Efforts, both in Peace and War, to bring Wealthy Nations down to their level.THE external causes of the decline of nations are much more simple in themselves than the internal ones, besides which, their action is more visible; the way of operation is such as to excite attention, and has made them thought more worthy of being recorded.The origin of envy and enmity are the same.  The possession of what is desirable, in a superior degree, is the cause of envy.  That occasions injurious and unjust proceedings, and enmity is the consequence, though both originated in the same feeling at first, they assume distinct characteristics in the course of time.The desire of possession, in order to enjoy, is the cause of enmity and envy; and all the crimes of nations, and of individuals, have the same common origin.It follows, as a natural consequence, arising from this state of things, that those nations which enjoyed a superior degree of wealth, became the objects of the envy of others.  If that wealth was accompanied by sufficient power for its protection, then the only way to endeavour to share it was by imitation; but if the wealth was found unprotected, then conquest or violence was always considered as the most ready way of obtaining possession.The wandering Arabs, who are the only nations that profess robbery at the present day, (by land,) follow still the same maxim with regard to those whose wealth they mean to enjoy.  If too powerful to be compelled by force to give up what they have got, they traffic and barter with the merchants of a caravan; but if they find themselves able to take, they never give themselves the trouble to adopt the legitimate but less expeditious method of plunder and robbery =sic=. [end of page #175]As it has been found that wealth operates, by degrees, in destroying the bravery of a people, after a certain time, so it happens that, in the common course of things, a moment arrives when it is considered safe, by some one power or other, to attack the wealthy nation, and partake of its riches; thus it was that the cities of Tyre and of Babylon were attacked by Alexander; and thus it was that his successors, in their turn, were attacked and conquered by the Romans; and, again, the Romans themselves, by the barbarous nations of the north.Besides those great revolutions, of which the consequences were permanent, there have been endless and innumerable struggles for the possession of wealth, amongst different nations; but the real and leading causes are so uniform, and so evident, that there is not a shadow of a doubt left on that subject.Mr. Burke had good reason to say that the external causes were much easier traced, and more simple, than the internal ones; for, the Romans excepted, the instances of rich nations attacking and conquering poor ones are very rare indeed.The Romans had erected their republic on a different plan from that of any other; they had neither arts, industry, nor territory of their own, and they conquered nations upon speculation, and for the sake of civilizing the people, and making them contribute revenue; how they were successful has been explained.  But even the Romans would not have attacked poor nations, if they had been, at an earlier period, possessed of the means of attacking those that were wealthy.Necessity obliged them to begin with Italy: their safety made them defend themselves against the Gauls, and, till they had a navy, it was impracticable to carry their conquests into Asia or Africa; but, after they had conquered Carthage, they lost very little time in attacking Egypt, and those countries occupied by the successors of Alexander.The taking of Constantinople was the last decided victory of this sort, and in nothing but time and circumstance did it differ from the others; in all the great outlines it was exactly the same. [end of page #176]The effeminacy and luxury of the rich, those interior causes, of which we have already spoken, always give facility to those efforts which envy and avarice excite.The rivalship, in time of peace, is a contest confined to modern nations; or, at least, but little known to the ancients.  Indeed, it is only amongst commercial nations that it can exist.  There can be no competition in agriculture; and, indeed, it is only in war, or in commerce, that nations can interfere with each other.The Phoenicians were the only commercial people of antiquity.  Carthage was the colony, and received the Indian produce at second hand.  It was in no way a rival.When Solomon mounted on the throne of his father David, he applied himself to commerce; but the wisdom and power he possessed were such as bore down all opposition during his reign.  Having married the daughter of the King of Egypt, who assisted him in several conquests, he founded the city of Palmyra, or Tadmore in the Wilderness, for the greater conveniency of the Eastern trade.  The King of Tyre was his ally, but he was so, most probably, from necessity, for the alliance was very unnatural; and, soon after the death of Solomon, the Tyrians excited the King of Babylon to destroy Jerusalem: so, that if there had been, in ancient times, more people concerned in commerce, there is no doubt there would likewise have been more envy and rivality. =sic=The cities of Italy, the Dutch, the Flemish, the English, and the French, have been incessantly struggling to supplant each other in manufactures and commerce; and the war of custom-house duties and drawbacks has become very active and formidable.This modern species of warfare is not only less bloody, but the object is more legitimate, and the consequences neither so sudden nor so fatal as open force; to which is to be added, that if a nation will but determine to be industrious, it never can be greatly injured.  If it enjoyed any peculiarly great advantages, those may, indeed, be wrested from it, but that is only taking away what it has no right to possess, and what it may always do without. [end of page #177]The intention of this inquiry is not to discover a method by which a nation may engross the trade that ought to belong to others, it is only to enable it, by industry and other means, to guard against the approaches of adversity, which tend to sink it far below its level, thereby making way for the elevation of some other nation, on the ruins of its greatness.As, in the interior causes of decline, we have traced the most part to the manners and habits of the people, so, in the exterior causes, it will be found that much depends upon the conduct of the government. [end of page #178]CHAP. XI.Why the Intercourse between Nations is ultimately in Favour of the poorer one, though not so at first.IN all commercial intercourse with each other, (or competition in selling to a third nation,) the poorer nation has the advantage in its gain; but this advantage is generally prevented by the length of credit which the wealthy nation is enabled to give, by which manufacturers are sometimes ruined in their own country by strangers, who can neither rival them in lowness of price nor goodness in quality.In countries that are poor, those who have the selling, but not the manufacturing of goods, are so much greater gainers by selling goods purchased on credit, of which they can keep a good stock and assortment, than in selling from a shop or store scantily supplied with ready money, that there is not almost any question about either price or quality; there is not scarcely an alternative.  In one line, a man can begin who has scarcely any capital, and do a great deal of business; he can even afford to sell the articles he purchases on credit with very little profit, because they procure him ready money; whereas, if he sells an article upon which he has no credit, he must replace it with another, by paying money immediately.  The consequence is, that while those who sell to the public are poor, the nation or manufacturer that gives the longest credit will have the preference; but this is daily diminishing, for even with the capital of the rich nation itself, the manufactures of the poor one are encouraged; the manner is as follows:A, at New York, purchases goods for one thousand pounds from B, at London, which he sells without any profit, and, perhaps, at a considerable loss; because B gives him twelve months credit.  But A, who has, by this means, got hold of money, as if by a loan, will not lay that out with B, nor let him touch it till the year's end; and, having made no profit by the sale of B's goods, he must turn to advantage the money he obtained for them.  According to the situation of mat- [end of page #179] ters in the country, and the nature of A's concerns, he will make more or less, but what he makes it is not the business to investigate; it is sufficient to know, that he will lay his ready money out with those who will sell cheap, in order to get by it; that is to say, he will lay it out with some person in his own country. {148}  Thus, though the rich nation sells goods on credit at a price which cannot be obtained for them by the purchaser, yet its capital serves to give activity to the manufacturers in the poor country.  It is true, that this operation is slow, but it produces an effect in time, and finishes by robbing the wealthy nation of its superiority, obtained by giving credit.  It is thus that in all their intercourse, the first advantage is to the rich nation, but terminates in favour of the poor; for whenever equality of prices are the question, and both can give sufficient credit, the poorer nation has the advantage in point of price.With regard to rivalling each other, in a third place, the poor nation has the advantage, if the merchants there have the means of paying with ready money, because the price is lower than that of the richer country. {149} If they have not that means, they cannot deal with them, but must wait till they have, by perseverance; and, in course of time, come to have the means when the poor nation is certain to enter into competition with advantage.But this is not the only way in which the capital of a rich nation is employed in fostering a rivalship in a poorer nation.  Were the manufacturers the only persons who sold goods, it would be confined to this; but that is not the case, for merchants, who are the sellers, study only where they can purchase the cheapest; thus English merchants purchase cloths in Silesia, watches in Switzerland, fire-arms at Liege,---{148} The Dutch used to give long credit, and buy with ready money, by which means they had great advantage for a long time; but, at last, the ready money they paid to some, and the credit they gave to others, set their industry at work, and they became rivals.  Dutch capital was, at one period, of great service to the English, as that of England now is to the Americans.{149} This is not meant to apply to any particular sort of manufacture.  In some, a nation may have a permanent advantage over another; in others, only a temporary one, and in the greater portion no other advantage than what arises from superior capital.-=-[end of page #180]in preference to laying out the money in England or Ireland; and they will give credit, as before explained, to the nation that wants it.In this manner it is, that the capital of a rich country supplies the want of it in poorer ones, and that, by degrees, a nation saps the foundation of its own wealth and greatness, and gives encouragement to them in others.It is then that the weight of taxes, the high price of commodities, and the various causes which encumber those who live in wealthy nations, begin to produce a pernicious effect.  The tendency of industry is to remove its abode, and the capital of the merchants, who know no country, but understand arithmetic, and the profits of trade, gives the industry the means of doing it with more ease and promptitude.The Dutch, for the last century, employed their capital in this manner, and, at one time, were the chief carriers, for they secured custom by paying readily and giving credit largely.  They ruined many of their own manufactures in this manner, but it is impossible to separate the calculation of gain from the mercantile system and mercantile practice in individuals; therefore it is no reproach to their patriotism, for patriotism cannot be the rule in purchasing goods from an individual.  A merchant can have no other rule, but his own advantage, or, if he has, he will soon be ruined.There are many manufactures in England that originally rose by means of Dutch capital, not lent capital, but by ready money paid for goods, which were carried to other nations, and sold here upon credit.The English have, for a long time, been able to do this piece of business for themselves; and, of course, the Dutch did not find the same means of supporting their carrying trade; and as they had ruined many of their own manufactures, they sunk both as a commercial and manufacturing people.If the time should ever come that capital should be so abundant in all nations, as that obtaining credit will not be an object, then it will be seen that no nation will have so very great a share of manufactures and commerce more than others, as has hitherto been the case.In countries where the common practice is to sell, chiefly, for [end of page #181] ready money, great fortunes are seldom gained.  Even in wealthy countries, in branches of business where no credit is given, great fortunes are very seldom got, and for a very simple reason.  The business is pretty equally divided.  But in a country that gives long credits, or in a branch of trade on which long credits are given, we always see some individuals gaining immense fortunes, by means of doing a great deal more business than others, who, having less capital, are enabled to do less.There is not any one thing in which a nation resembles an individual so much, as in mercantile transactions; the rule of one is the rule of all, and the rich individual acts like a rich nation, and the poor one like a poor nation.  The consequences are the same in both cases.  The rich carry on an extensive trade, by means of great capital; the poor, a limited one, dependant =sic= chiefly on industry; but wherever the poor persevere in good conduct, they finish by getting the command of the capital of the rich, and then becoming their rivals.There is one thing peculiar to the intercourse of rich and poor nations, in which it differs from the intercourse between rich and poor individuals in the same country.  Money, which is the common measure of value, has a different price in different countries, and, indeed, in different parts of the same country.  If a man, from a poor country, carries a bushel of corn with him into a rich, he can live as long upon it as if he had remained where he was; but if he carry the money, that would have bought a bushel of corn at home, he perhaps may not be able to live upon it half so long. {150}The effect that this produces, in the intercourse between two countries, is, that in proportion as the difference becomes greater, the rich country feels it can command more of the industry of the poor, and the poor feels it can command less of the industry of the rich; so that---{150} In common life, this difference, between carrying money and necessaries, is perfectly well understood, but it is experience that is the teacher; and the rough countryman, or woman, when they have the opportunity of judging from fact, understand the motives as well as the most profound and ingenius =sic= writer on political economy.-=-[end of page #182]when their industry can be both applied, with any degree of equality, to the same object, the poor supplies the rich, and therefore increases its own wealth.It is thus that great numbers of the people in London are fed with butcher-meat from Scotland, and wear shoes from Yorkshire; but there would be a very limited sale in either of those places for meat from Smithfield, or shoes manufactured in London. {151}This diminution of the value of money, that takes place in all rich countries, serves farther to increase the advantage of poorer ones in manufacturing, and accelerates the natural effect of competition, which is facilitated, as has been said, by the capital of the rich country giving activity to the industry of the poorer one.This last neither can be called an exterior nor an interior cause, as it is derived entirely from the relative situations of the two countries, and belongs to both, or originates in both; but, as it raises the poor nation nearer the level of the rich one, its effect gradually becomes less powerful.  Though there is no means of preventing the operation of two nations coming nearly to a level by this means, yet it does not appear to be a necessary consequence that the nation that was the richer should become the poorer.  As this, however, has been a general case, we must conclude it to be a natural one, but there we stop, and make a distinction between what is natural only, and what is a necessary effect.  Their coming to a level was a necessary effect; but, though the other may be natural, it cannot be necessary, and therefore may be counteracted; to find the means of doing this, is all that is proposed by the present inquiry.---{151} If it was not for taxes and rent, that are chiefly spent in large towns, as well as law-expenses, and the prices of luxuries, of dress, and furniture, the cities, like London, would soon be reduced.-=-[end of page #183]CHAP. XII.Conclusion of exteror Causes.-- Are seldom of much Importance, unless favoured by interior ones.-- Rich Nations, with care, capable, in most Cases, of prolonging their Prosperity.-- Digression on the Importance of Public Revenue, illustrated by a statistical Chart.THE exterior causes of the decline of any nation, that has risen above its level, though formidable, are nothing, in comparison to the interior causes, and are of no great effect without their co-operation.As the government of a country has an influence over the interior causes, so its alliances, and the laws of nations, though not very well attended to, (yet seldom altogether forgot,) have a tendency to stop the progress of the exterior causes, before they advance too far; that is to say, before they absolutely depress a nation.

We must, so far as this investigation goes, conclude, that, unless the natural tendency of things to decline is powerfully counteracted, every country that rises to wealth must have a fall; and that, therefore, it merits investigation, whether it is or is not possible to counteract the tendency to decline, without interrupting the progress towards greater prosperity, and, to manage matters so, that whether it is not possible, after having attained the summit of wealth, we may remain there instead of immediately descending, as most nations have hitherto done.

From individuals, the exertion necessary is not to be expected; but, it may be looked for from the government of a country, which, though composed of individuals, the succession of persons is differently carried on; it is not from age to age, and from an old father to a young son, but from men in the vigour of life, to men in the vigour of life, who, while they are occupied in public affairs, may be considered, with respect to whatever is to be done for the good of the nation, (for its prosperity, defence, or protection,) as animated with the same spirit, without any interruption.

With respect to the interior causes of decline, they may be counteracted always with more or less effect, by a proper system of govern-

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{143} The burthens on the industry of old France, were,

Livres.

Rent of land                                                                        700,000,000

Revenues of clergy                                                              600,000,000

Taxes, including the expense of levying                                800,000,000

____________

2,100,000,000

In sterling money                                                                 £87,500,000

Half land now occupied by the cultivators,          }

and the remainder let at lower rents                    }              350,000,000

Revenues of clergy, and the expenses                                    50,000,000

Taxes as before                                                                  800,000,000

_____________

1,200,000,000

Or in sterling money                                                            £50,400,000

This makes a diminution of £37,100,000; or something more than a third of the whole expense, and more than all the taxes to the state estimated at the highest rate.

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[end of page #169]

ment.  In the latter portion of this work we shall endeavour to shew how that may be attempted with safety, if not accomplished with full success.

Before, however, we conclude this subject, and rely on government, it is necessary to mention that, in treating with other nations, a kind of overbearing haughty pride is natural to those who govern a powerful and wealthy people.  In that case, they act as individuals, and are not to be trusted; and the less so, that a nation of proud pampered citizens is but too apt to applaud insolence in those who govern them.

This pride has been a very constant forerunner of the fall of wealthy and great nations, and, in Rome excepted, it has never failed.  The emperors of Rome were much less haughty than the ambassadors of the republic; a love of false splendour had supplanted a ferocious affectation of dignity, yet, the former was the less humiliating of the two to other nations. {144}

While the rulers of wealthy nations are apt to act haughtily to others, they are liable to fall into another error, in mistaking the strength of their own people, and loading them too heavily, trusting too much both to their internal energy, and external force.

As the near observers of the inability of the people are generally afraid to carry unwelcome tidings to their superior; and, if they did, as he is seldom inclined to give credit to unwelcome news, the ruin of a nation has probably made a very considerable progress before he, whose business it is to put a stop to it, is aware of the danger.

The continual clamour that is made about every new burthen that is laid on, and the cry of ruin, which perpetually is sounded in the ears of a minister, and of those who execute his orders, are some ex-

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{144} The appearance of virtue and self-command, which the republican Romans preserved, added to the bravery with which they maintained whatever claims they put in, overawed a great part of their enemies; and those, who were not absolutely overawed thought that defeat and submission were, at least, robbed of their shame, when such was the character of the conqueror; and the claim once allowed was no longer questioned.  Very different was the case, when the emperor was a fidler, or a buffoon, the senators puppets, and the pro-consuls themselves robbers.

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[end of page #170]

cuses for their not attending to them; but the consequence is not the less fatal to the nation on that account.

A nation that is feeble has, at least, the advantage of knowing it, and is not insensible if she receives a wound; but the government of a powerful nation is like the pilot of a ship, who navigates in a sea, the depth of which he cannot sound, and who spreads all his sails: if he strikes upon a rock, his ship is dashed to pieces in a moment. The other, sailing amongst shallows and sands, proceeds with caution, avoids them if possible, and, if she touches, it is so gently, that even her feeble frame is scarcely injured.

The rulers of nations appear, in general, not to be aware of the evil that arises from the government they have to manage becoming too unwieldly =sic=, or too complicated; in either case, a check, though but of short duration, is irretrievable.  This is a great oversight, and, at least, greatly augments the chances against the durability of a government.  In proportion as the machine is unmanageable and complex, the embarrassment of those who have the conduct of it will be great, and the enemies will be proportionately bold and audacious.  In all such conflicts, much depends on the spirit of the combatants, and more still on that of those who, at first, are lookers on, who act in consequence of the opinion they have of the force or feebleness of either party. {145}

The tendency that a nation has to decline is not, then, in general, counteracted, by the government; but, on the contrary, is pushed on by it, and precipitated into the gulf.  No wonder, then, that the career is rapid, and the fall irretrievable.

It is, nevertheless, to the government, and to it alone, that we must look for that counteracting force that is to stay the general current.  Individuals can only look to their own conduct, and they neither can

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{145} Not only when the French revolution began, but a hundred times afterwards, did the party triumph that appeared the strongest, merely because it appeared so.  All those who stand neutral at first, take a side the moment they have fixed their opinion as to the strength of the contending parties, and this decision is always in favour of the party they think the strongest.

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be expected to have time nor inclination to study the public welfare, and, even if they had, they would want the means.

Government can never be better employed than in counteracting this tendency to decay.  It has the means, and is but performing its duty in doing so.  The previous step to all this, however, is a knowledge of what is to be done, a full sense of the necessity of doing it, and a disposition to submit to the regimen necessary.

For this purpose, both the government and the people must give up something.  The people must allow government to interfere in the education of children, and, in that, give up a little of their liberty; {146} and those who govern must attend to many things which are generally neglected.  To do the routine business of the day is the occupation of most of the governments of Europe, whether in war or at peace; they therefore habitually become agents of necessity, and what can be procrastinated is never done; that is to say, what is good is very seldom done, and what is necessary to prevent immediate evil, is always the chief, and sometimes the only, occupation.

There are some men in the world who prosper merely because they look beforehand, and conduct their affairs.  There are others who, with equal industry, and much more trouble and care, are always a little behind, and allow their affairs to conduct them; such men never succeed, and, if they can keep off the extreme of misfortune, it is all that is to be expected.

Most governments, in wealthy nations, are like those latter species of individuals,-- they do not conduct their affairs, but are conducted by them, and think they succeed, when the necessary business of the day is done.  This listlessness must be done away, and, though the

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{146} From the impossibility of a nation, once immersed in sloth and luxury, returning to the tone and energy of a new people, we may judge of the impossibility of a nation going on progressively towards wealth, not suffering from the manner of educating children.  The leading distinction between a rising and a fallen people is the disposition to industry and exertion, in the one, and to sloth and negligence, in the other.  It is while a nation is increasing in wealth that this alteration gradually takes place; and, as this is the main point on which all depends, the nation is safe when it is well attended to, even if other things are, in some degree, neglected.

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governments of countries that are wealthy have no occasion, like Peter the Great, or the founders of new states, to create new institutions, and eternally try to ameliorate, they ought to be very carefully and constantly employed in preventing those good things that they enjoy from escaping their grasp, so far as it depends upon interior arrangement.  Exterior causes are not within their power to regulate, therefore they should be the more attentive to those that are; and, though exterior causes are out of their dominion, yet, sometimes, by wise interior regulations, the evil effects of exterior ones may be prevented.  Nothing of all this can be done, however, until the government rises above the routine business of the day, and until all the necessary and pressing business is got over.  The first thing, then, for a government is to extricate itself from the situation of one who struggles with necessity, after which, but not before, it may study what is beneficial, and of permanent utility.

So far it would appear all nations are situated alike, with regard to the general tendency to decay; {147} and so far all of them may be guided by general rules, but as to the particular manner of applying those rules, it must depend on the peculiar circumstances of the nation to which they are meant to be applied.

In general, revenue has become the great object with modern nations: and, as their rulers have not ventured to tax the necessaries of the people to any high degree, but have laid their vices, rather than their wants, under contribution, the revenue-system, (as it may be called,) tends to make a government encourage expensive vice, by which it profits, and check innocent enjoyment, by which it has nothing to gain.  This is a terrible, but it is a very prevalent system; it is immoral, inhuman, and impolitic.

So far as this goes, a government, instead of checking, accelerates the decline of a people; but, as this is not a natural cause of decline, as it is not universal or necessary, it is to be considered with due

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{147} The Chinese, and, in general, the nations of Asia have not been considered as included in this inquiry.  The Chinese, in particular, are a people in a permanent situation: they do not increase in riches, and they seem to have no tendency to decline.  Their laws and mode of education and living remain the same.

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regard to particular circumstances.  In general, we may say, that, in place of inviting the lower classes to pass their time in drinking, by the innumerable receptacles that there are for those who are addicted to that vice, every impediment should be put in the way.  Drinking is a vice, the disposition to which grows with its gratification; most other avocations (for drinking in moderation is only such) have no tendency of the sort.  Those enjoyments which have a tendency to degenerate into vice should be kept under some check; those which have no such tendency ought to be encouraged; for, where the main and general mass of the population of a country is corrupted, it is impossible to prevent its decline.  If it remains uncorrupted, the matter is very easy, or, more properly, it may be said that prosperity is the natural consequence.

Manners will always be found of more consequence than laws, and they depend, in a great measure, on the wise regulations of government in every country.

Not only do most governments profit by laying the vices of the people under contribution; but, as revenue is, by a very false rule, taken as a criterion from which the prosperity of a nation may be estimated, the very evil that brings on decay serves to disguise its approach.  A nation may be irretrievably undone, before it is perceived that it has any tendency to decline; it is, therefore, unwise for governments to wait till they see the effects of decay, and then to hope to counteract them; they must look before-hand, and prevent, otherwise all their exertions will prove ineffectual. [end of page #174]

CHAP. X.

Of the external Causes of Decline.--  the Envy and Enmity of other Nations.--their Efforts, both in Peace and War, to bring Wealthy Nations down to their level.

THE external causes of the decline of nations are much more simple in themselves than the internal ones, besides which, their action is more visible; the way of operation is such as to excite attention, and has made them thought more worthy of being recorded.

The origin of envy and enmity are the same.  The possession of what is desirable, in a superior degree, is the cause of envy.  That occasions injurious and unjust proceedings, and enmity is the consequence, though both originated in the same feeling at first, they assume distinct characteristics in the course of time.

The desire of possession, in order to enjoy, is the cause of enmity and envy; and all the crimes of nations, and of individuals, have the same common origin.

It follows, as a natural consequence, arising from this state of things, that those nations which enjoyed a superior degree of wealth, became the objects of the envy of others.  If that wealth was accompanied by sufficient power for its protection, then the only way to endeavour to share it was by imitation; but if the wealth was found unprotected, then conquest or violence was always considered as the most ready way of obtaining possession.

The wandering Arabs, who are the only nations that profess robbery at the present day, (by land,) follow still the same maxim with regard to those whose wealth they mean to enjoy.  If too powerful to be compelled by force to give up what they have got, they traffic and barter with the merchants of a caravan; but if they find themselves able to take, they never give themselves the trouble to adopt the legitimate but less expeditious method of plunder and robbery =sic=. [end of page #175]

As it has been found that wealth operates, by degrees, in destroying the bravery of a people, after a certain time, so it happens that, in the common course of things, a moment arrives when it is considered safe, by some one power or other, to attack the wealthy nation, and partake of its riches; thus it was that the cities of Tyre and of Babylon were attacked by Alexander; and thus it was that his successors, in their turn, were attacked and conquered by the Romans; and, again, the Romans themselves, by the barbarous nations of the north.

Besides those great revolutions, of which the consequences were permanent, there have been endless and innumerable struggles for the possession of wealth, amongst different nations; but the real and leading causes are so uniform, and so evident, that there is not a shadow of a doubt left on that subject.

Mr. Burke had good reason to say that the external causes were much easier traced, and more simple, than the internal ones; for, the Romans excepted, the instances of rich nations attacking and conquering poor ones are very rare indeed.

The Romans had erected their republic on a different plan from that of any other; they had neither arts, industry, nor territory of their own, and they conquered nations upon speculation, and for the sake of civilizing the people, and making them contribute revenue; how they were successful has been explained.  But even the Romans would not have attacked poor nations, if they had been, at an earlier period, possessed of the means of attacking those that were wealthy.

Necessity obliged them to begin with Italy: their safety made them defend themselves against the Gauls, and, till they had a navy, it was impracticable to carry their conquests into Asia or Africa; but, after they had conquered Carthage, they lost very little time in attacking Egypt, and those countries occupied by the successors of Alexander.

The taking of Constantinople was the last decided victory of this sort, and in nothing but time and circumstance did it differ from the others; in all the great outlines it was exactly the same. [end of page #176]

The effeminacy and luxury of the rich, those interior causes, of which we have already spoken, always give facility to those efforts which envy and avarice excite.

The rivalship, in time of peace, is a contest confined to modern nations; or, at least, but little known to the ancients.  Indeed, it is only amongst commercial nations that it can exist.  There can be no competition in agriculture; and, indeed, it is only in war, or in commerce, that nations can interfere with each other.

The Phoenicians were the only commercial people of antiquity.  Carthage was the colony, and received the Indian produce at second hand.  It was in no way a rival.

When Solomon mounted on the throne of his father David, he applied himself to commerce; but the wisdom and power he possessed were such as bore down all opposition during his reign.  Having married the daughter of the King of Egypt, who assisted him in several conquests, he founded the city of Palmyra, or Tadmore in the Wilderness, for the greater conveniency of the Eastern trade.  The King of Tyre was his ally, but he was so, most probably, from necessity, for the alliance was very unnatural; and, soon after the death of Solomon, the Tyrians excited the King of Babylon to destroy Jerusalem: so, that if there had been, in ancient times, more people concerned in commerce, there is no doubt there would likewise have been more envy and rivality. =sic=

The cities of Italy, the Dutch, the Flemish, the English, and the French, have been incessantly struggling to supplant each other in manufactures and commerce; and the war of custom-house duties and drawbacks has become very active and formidable.

This modern species of warfare is not only less bloody, but the object is more legitimate, and the consequences neither so sudden nor so fatal as open force; to which is to be added, that if a nation will but determine to be industrious, it never can be greatly injured.  If it enjoyed any peculiarly great advantages, those may, indeed, be wrested from it, but that is only taking away what it has no right to possess, and what it may always do without. [end of page #177]

The intention of this inquiry is not to discover a method by which a nation may engross the trade that ought to belong to others, it is only to enable it, by industry and other means, to guard against the approaches of adversity, which tend to sink it far below its level, thereby making way for the elevation of some other nation, on the ruins of its greatness.

As, in the interior causes of decline, we have traced the most part to the manners and habits of the people, so, in the exterior causes, it will be found that much depends upon the conduct of the government. [end of page #178]

CHAP. XI.

Why the Intercourse between Nations is ultimately in Favour of the poorer one, though not so at first.

IN all commercial intercourse with each other, (or competition in selling to a third nation,) the poorer nation has the advantage in its gain; but this advantage is generally prevented by the length of credit which the wealthy nation is enabled to give, by which manufacturers are sometimes ruined in their own country by strangers, who can neither rival them in lowness of price nor goodness in quality.

In countries that are poor, those who have the selling, but not the manufacturing of goods, are so much greater gainers by selling goods purchased on credit, of which they can keep a good stock and assortment, than in selling from a shop or store scantily supplied with ready money, that there is not almost any question about either price or quality; there is not scarcely an alternative.  In one line, a man can begin who has scarcely any capital, and do a great deal of business; he can even afford to sell the articles he purchases on credit with very little profit, because they procure him ready money; whereas, if he sells an article upon which he has no credit, he must replace it with another, by paying money immediately.  The consequence is, that while those who sell to the public are poor, the nation or manufacturer that gives the longest credit will have the preference; but this is daily diminishing, for even with the capital of the rich nation itself, the manufactures of the poor one are encouraged; the manner is as follows:

A, at New York, purchases goods for one thousand pounds from B, at London, which he sells without any profit, and, perhaps, at a considerable loss; because B gives him twelve months credit.  But A, who has, by this means, got hold of money, as if by a loan, will not lay that out with B, nor let him touch it till the year's end; and, having made no profit by the sale of B's goods, he must turn to advantage the money he obtained for them.  According to the situation of mat- [end of page #179] ters in the country, and the nature of A's concerns, he will make more or less, but what he makes it is not the business to investigate; it is sufficient to know, that he will lay his ready money out with those who will sell cheap, in order to get by it; that is to say, he will lay it out with some person in his own country. {148}  Thus, though the rich nation sells goods on credit at a price which cannot be obtained for them by the purchaser, yet its capital serves to give activity to the manufacturers in the poor country.  It is true, that this operation is slow, but it produces an effect in time, and finishes by robbing the wealthy nation of its superiority, obtained by giving credit.  It is thus that in all their intercourse, the first advantage is to the rich nation, but terminates in favour of the poor; for whenever equality of prices are the question, and both can give sufficient credit, the poorer nation has the advantage in point of price.

With regard to rivalling each other, in a third place, the poor nation has the advantage, if the merchants there have the means of paying with ready money, because the price is lower than that of the richer country. {149} If they have not that means, they cannot deal with them, but must wait till they have, by perseverance; and, in course of time, come to have the means when the poor nation is certain to enter into competition with advantage.

But this is not the only way in which the capital of a rich nation is employed in fostering a rivalship in a poorer nation.  Were the manufacturers the only persons who sold goods, it would be confined to this; but that is not the case, for merchants, who are the sellers, study only where they can purchase the cheapest; thus English merchants purchase cloths in Silesia, watches in Switzerland, fire-arms at Liege,

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{148} The Dutch used to give long credit, and buy with ready money, by which means they had great advantage for a long time; but, at last, the ready money they paid to some, and the credit they gave to others, set their industry at work, and they became rivals.  Dutch capital was, at one period, of great service to the English, as that of England now is to the Americans.

{149} This is not meant to apply to any particular sort of manufacture.  In some, a nation may have a permanent advantage over another; in others, only a temporary one, and in the greater portion no other advantage than what arises from superior capital.

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in preference to laying out the money in England or Ireland; and they will give credit, as before explained, to the nation that wants it.

In this manner it is, that the capital of a rich country supplies the want of it in poorer ones, and that, by degrees, a nation saps the foundation of its own wealth and greatness, and gives encouragement to them in others.

It is then that the weight of taxes, the high price of commodities, and the various causes which encumber those who live in wealthy nations, begin to produce a pernicious effect.  The tendency of industry is to remove its abode, and the capital of the merchants, who know no country, but understand arithmetic, and the profits of trade, gives the industry the means of doing it with more ease and promptitude.

The Dutch, for the last century, employed their capital in this manner, and, at one time, were the chief carriers, for they secured custom by paying readily and giving credit largely.  They ruined many of their own manufactures in this manner, but it is impossible to separate the calculation of gain from the mercantile system and mercantile practice in individuals; therefore it is no reproach to their patriotism, for patriotism cannot be the rule in purchasing goods from an individual.  A merchant can have no other rule, but his own advantage, or, if he has, he will soon be ruined.

There are many manufactures in England that originally rose by means of Dutch capital, not lent capital, but by ready money paid for goods, which were carried to other nations, and sold here upon credit.

The English have, for a long time, been able to do this piece of business for themselves; and, of course, the Dutch did not find the same means of supporting their carrying trade; and as they had ruined many of their own manufactures, they sunk both as a commercial and manufacturing people.

If the time should ever come that capital should be so abundant in all nations, as that obtaining credit will not be an object, then it will be seen that no nation will have so very great a share of manufactures and commerce more than others, as has hitherto been the case.

In countries where the common practice is to sell, chiefly, for [end of page #181] ready money, great fortunes are seldom gained.  Even in wealthy countries, in branches of business where no credit is given, great fortunes are very seldom got, and for a very simple reason.  The business is pretty equally divided.  But in a country that gives long credits, or in a branch of trade on which long credits are given, we always see some individuals gaining immense fortunes, by means of doing a great deal more business than others, who, having less capital, are enabled to do less.

There is not any one thing in which a nation resembles an individual so much, as in mercantile transactions; the rule of one is the rule of all, and the rich individual acts like a rich nation, and the poor one like a poor nation.  The consequences are the same in both cases.  The rich carry on an extensive trade, by means of great capital; the poor, a limited one, dependant =sic= chiefly on industry; but wherever the poor persevere in good conduct, they finish by getting the command of the capital of the rich, and then becoming their rivals.

There is one thing peculiar to the intercourse of rich and poor nations, in which it differs from the intercourse between rich and poor individuals in the same country.  Money, which is the common measure of value, has a different price in different countries, and, indeed, in different parts of the same country.  If a man, from a poor country, carries a bushel of corn with him into a rich, he can live as long upon it as if he had remained where he was; but if he carry the money, that would have bought a bushel of corn at home, he perhaps may not be able to live upon it half so long. {150}

The effect that this produces, in the intercourse between two countries, is, that in proportion as the difference becomes greater, the rich country feels it can command more of the industry of the poor, and the poor feels it can command less of the industry of the rich; so that

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{150} In common life, this difference, between carrying money and necessaries, is perfectly well understood, but it is experience that is the teacher; and the rough countryman, or woman, when they have the opportunity of judging from fact, understand the motives as well as the most profound and ingenius =sic= writer on political economy.

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when their industry can be both applied, with any degree of equality, to the same object, the poor supplies the rich, and therefore increases its own wealth.

It is thus that great numbers of the people in London are fed with butcher-meat from Scotland, and wear shoes from Yorkshire; but there would be a very limited sale in either of those places for meat from Smithfield, or shoes manufactured in London. {151}

This diminution of the value of money, that takes place in all rich countries, serves farther to increase the advantage of poorer ones in manufacturing, and accelerates the natural effect of competition, which is facilitated, as has been said, by the capital of the rich country giving activity to the industry of the poorer one.

This last neither can be called an exterior nor an interior cause, as it is derived entirely from the relative situations of the two countries, and belongs to both, or originates in both; but, as it raises the poor nation nearer the level of the rich one, its effect gradually becomes less powerful.  Though there is no means of preventing the operation of two nations coming nearly to a level by this means, yet it does not appear to be a necessary consequence that the nation that was the richer should become the poorer.  As this, however, has been a general case, we must conclude it to be a natural one, but there we stop, and make a distinction between what is natural only, and what is a necessary effect.  Their coming to a level was a necessary effect; but, though the other may be natural, it cannot be necessary, and therefore may be counteracted; to find the means of doing this, is all that is proposed by the present inquiry.

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{151} If it was not for taxes and rent, that are chiefly spent in large towns, as well as law-expenses, and the prices of luxuries, of dress, and furniture, the cities, like London, would soon be reduced.

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CHAP. XII.

Conclusion of exteror Causes.-- Are seldom of much Importance, unless favoured by interior ones.-- Rich Nations, with care, capable, in most Cases, of prolonging their Prosperity.-- Digression on the Importance of Public Revenue, illustrated by a statistical Chart.

THE exterior causes of the decline of any nation, that has risen above its level, though formidable, are nothing, in comparison to the interior causes, and are of no great effect without their co-operation.

As the government of a country has an influence over the interior causes, so its alliances, and the laws of nations, though not very well attended to, (yet seldom altogether forgot,) have a tendency to stop the progress of the exterior causes, before they advance too far; that is to say, before they absolutely depress a nation.


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