CHAPTER X

We have now gained the standpoint that permits us to view comprehensively the entire body of Anarchistic teachings.

This comprehensive view is possible only as follows: first we have to look and see what the seven recognized Anarchistic teachings here presented have in common, and what specialties are to be found among them; next we must consider how far that which is common to the seven teachings may be equated to that which the entire body of Anarchistic teachings have in common, and, in addition, how far the specialties represented among the seven teachings may be equated to the specialties represented in the entire body of Anarchistic teachings.

To characterize those qualities of the Anarchistic teachings to which attention is to be paid, words already existing are here used as far as has been found practicable. Where such were totally lacking, the need of a concise formula has of necessity overcome repugnance to neologisms.

I. As to their basis the seven teachings here presented have nothing in common.

1. In part they recognize as the supreme law ofhuman procedure merely a natural law, which, as such, does not tell us what ought to take place but what really will take place; these teachings may be calledgenetic. The other part of them regard as the supreme law of human procedure a norm, which, as such, tells us what ought to take place, even if it never really will take place; these teachings may be characterized ascritical. Genetic are the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin: the supreme law of human procedure is for Bakunin the evolutionary law of mankind's progress from a less perfect existence to an existence as perfect as possible, and for Kropotkin that of mankind's progress from a less happy existence to an existence as happy as possible. Critical are the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tucker, and Tolstoi.

2. The critical teachings, again, are partly such as set up a duty as the supreme law of human procedure, the duty being itself the ultimate purpose,—these teachings may be characterized asidealistic,—and partly such as set up happiness as the supreme law of human procedure, all duty being only a means to happiness,—these may take the name ofeudemonistic. Idealistic are the teachings of Proudhon and Tolstoi: Proudhon sets up as the supreme law of human procedure the duty of justice, Tolstoi the duty of love. Eudemonistic are the teachings of Godwin, Stirner, and Tucker.

3. The eudemonistic teachings, finally, regard as the supreme law of human procedure either the happiness of mankind as a whole, which the individual is accordingly to further without regard to his ownhappiness,—these teachings may be characterized asaltruistic,—or the happiness of the individual, which he is accordingly to further without regard to the welfare of mankind as a whole,—these teachings may be calledegoistic. Altruistic is Godwin's teaching, egoistic Stirner's and Tucker's.

II. With regard to what they have in common in their basis, the seven recognized Anarchistic teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings. They have in their basis nothing in common with each other; all the more is it impossible, therefore, that the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings should have in their basis anything in common.

Furthermore, as regards the specialties that they exhibit in respect to their basis the teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of Anarchistic teachings without limitation. For the specialties represented among them can be arranged as a system that has no room left for any more co-ordinate specialties, but only for subordinate. No Anarchistic teaching, therefore, can have any specialty that will not be subordinate to these specialties.

Therefore, what is true of the seven teachings here presented is true of Anarchistic teachings altogether. In their basis they have nothing in common, and are to be divided with respect to its differences as shown in the table onpage 273.

I. In their relation to law—that is, to those norms which are based on men's will to have a certainprocedure generally observed within a circle which includes themselves—the seven teachings here presented have nothing in common.

1. A part of them negate law for our future; these teachings may be calledanomistic. The other part of them affirm it for our future; these teachings may be characterized asnomistic. Anomistic are the teachings of Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi; nomistic those of Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tucker.

There cannot be given a more precise definition of what is common to the anomistic teachings on the one hand and to the nomistic on the other, and what is peculiar to the one group as against the other, than has here been given. For both the negation and the affirmation of law for our future have totally different meanings in the different teachings.

The negation of law for our future means in the cases of Godwin and Stirner that they reject law unconditionally, and so for our future as well as everywhere else: Godwin because it is always and everywhere contrary to the general happiness, Stirner because it is always and everywhere contrary to theindividual's happiness.

In Tolstoi's case the meaning of the negation of law for our future is that he rejects law, though not unconditionally, yet for our future, because it is, though not at all times and in all places, yet under our circumstances, in a higher degree repugnant to love than its non-existence.

The affirmation of law for our future means in the cases of Proudhon and Tucker that they approve law as such (though certainly not every particular form of law) unconditionally, and hence for our future as well as elsewhere: Proudhon because law as such never and nowhere offends against justice, Tucker because law as such never and nowhere impairs the individual's happiness.[1164]

In the cases of Bakunin and Kropotkin, finally, the affirmation of law for our future has the meaning that they foresee that the progress of evolution will in our future leave in existence law as such, even though not the present particular form of law: Bakunin meaning by this the progress of mankind from a less perfect existence to an existence as perfect as possible, and Proudhon its progress from a less happy existence to an existence as happy as possible.

2. The anomistic teachings part company again in regard to what they (in the same different senses in which they negate law for our future) affirm for our future in contrast to the law.

According to Godwin, in future the generalhappiness ought to be men's controlling principle in the place of law.

According to Stirner, in future the happiness of self ought to be men's controlling principle in the place of law.

According to Tolstoi, in future love ought to be men's controlling principle in the place of law.

3. On the other part, the nomistic teachings part company in regard to the particular form of law that they affirm for our future.

According to Tucker, even in future there ought to exist enacted law, in which the will that creates the law is expressly declared,[1165]as well as unenacted law, in which such an express declaration of this will is not present.

According to Bakunin and Kropotkin, in future only unenacted law will exist.

According to Proudhon, there ought to exist in future only the single legal norm that contracts must be lived up to.[1166]

II. With regard to what they have in common in their relation to law, the seven recognized Anarchistic teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings. In their relation to law they have nothing in common. Much less, therefore, can the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings have anything in common intheir relation to law.

Furthermore, as regards the specialties that they exhibit in their relation to law the teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of Anarchistic teachings without limitation. For the specialties represented among them can be arranged as a system in which there is no room left for any more co-ordinate specialties, but only for subordinate. No Anarchistic teaching, therefore, can have any specialty that will not be subordinate to these specialties.

Therefore, what is true of the seven teachings here presented is true of Anarchistic teachings altogether. In their relation to law they have nothing in common, and are to be divided as follows with respect to the differences of this relation:

I. In their relation to the State—that is, to the legal relation by virtue of which a supreme authority exists in a territory—the seven teachings here presented have something in common.

1. They have this in common, that they negate the State for our future.

There cannot be given a more precise definition ofwhat the teachings here presented have in common in their relation to the State than has here been given. For the negation of the State for our future has totally different meanings in them.

In the cases of Godwin, Stirner, Tucker, and Proudhon, the negation of the State for our future means that they reject the State unconditionally, and hence for our future as well as everywhere else: Godwin because the State always and everywhere impairs the general happiness, Stirner and Tucker because it always and everywhere impairs the individual's happiness, Proudhon because at all times and in all places the State offends against justice.

In Tolstoi's case the negation of the State for our future means that he rejects the State, though not unconditionally, yet for our future, because the State is, though not always and everywhere, yet under our circumstances, more repugnant to love than its non-existence.

Finally, in the cases of Bakunin and Kropotkin the negation of the State for our future has the meaning that they foresee that in our future the progress of evolution will abolish the State: Bakunin meaning mankind's progress from a less perfect existence to one as perfect as possible, Kropotkin its progress from a less happy existence to one as happy as possible.

2. As to what they affirm for our future in contrast to the State (in the same different senses in which they negate the State for our future) the seven teachings here presented have nothing in common.

One part of them affirm for our future, in contrast to the State, a social human life in a voluntary legalrelation—to wit, under the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to; these teachings may take the name offederalistic. The other part of them affirm for our future, in contrast to the State, a social human life without any legal relation—to wit, under the same controlling principle that they affirm for our future in contrast to law; these teachings may be characterized asspontanistic. Federalistic are the teachings of Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tucker; spontanistic those of Godwin,[1167]Stirner, and Tolstoi.

3. The spontanistic teachings in turn part company in respect to the non-legal controlling principle which they affirm in contrast to the State as the basis of the social human life for our future.

According to Godwin, the place of the State ought to be taken by a social human life based on the principle that the general happiness should be every one's rule of action.

According to Stirner, the place of the State ought to be taken by a social human life based on the principle that each one's own happiness should be his rule of action.

According to Tolstoi, the place of the State ought to be taken by a social human life based on theprinciple that love should be every one's rule of action.

II. With regard to what they have in common in their relation to the State, the seven recognized Anarchistic teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings. In their relation to the State they have only this one thing in common, that they negate the State for our future—and in very different senses at that. But this is common to all recognized Anarchistic teachings: observation of any recognized Anarchistic teaching shows that in one sense or another it negates the State for our future.

Furthermore, as regards the specialties that they exhibit in their relation to the State the teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of Anarchistic teachings without limitation. For the specialties represented among them can be arranged as a system which affords no room for any more co-ordinate specialties, but only for subordinate. No Anarchistic teaching, therefore, can have any specialty that will not be subordinate to these specialties.

Therefore, what is true of the seven teachings here presented is true of the Anarchistic teachings altogether. In their relation to the State they have in common their negating the State for our future; and with regard to the differences in what they affirm for our future in contrast to the State they are to be divided as shown in the table onpage 280.

I. In their relation to property—that is, to that legal relation by virtue of which some one has within a certain group of men the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing—the seven teachings here presented have nothing in common.

1. One part of them negate property for our future; these teachings may be characterized asindoministic. The other part affirm it for our future; these teachings may be calleddoministic. Indoministic are the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, and Tolstoi; doministic the teachings of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tucker.

There cannot be given a more precise definition of what is common to the indoministic teachings on the one hand and to the doministic on the other, and what is peculiar to the one group as against the other, than has here been given. For both the affirmation and the negation of property for our future have totally different meanings in the different teachings.

In the cases of Godwin, Stirner, and Proudhon, the negation of property for our future means that they reject property unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere: Godwin because it is always andeverywhere contrary to the general happiness, Stirner because it is always and everywhere contrary to the individual's happiness, Proudhon because it always and everywhere offends against justice.

In Tolstoi's case the meaning of the negation of property for our future is that he rejects property, though not absolutely, yet for our future, because it is, though not at all times and in all places, yet under our circumstances, in a higher degree repugnant to love than is its non-existence.

In Tucker's case the affirmation of property for our future means that he approves property as such (though certainly not every particular form of property) unconditionally, and hence for our future as well as elsewhere, because property as such is never and nowhere contrary to the individual's happiness.[1168]

Finally, in the cases of Bakunin and Kropotkin the affirmation of property for our future is as much as to say that they foresee that in our future the progress of evolution will leave in existence property as such, even though not the present particular form of property: Bakunin meaning mankind's progress from a less perfect existence to one as perfect as possible, Kropotkin its progress from a less happy existence to one as happy as possible.

2. The indoministic teachings part company again as to what they affirm for our future (in the same different senses in which they negate property for our future) in contrast to property.

According to Proudhon, a distribution of goods determined by a voluntary legal relation, and basedon the legal norm that contracts ought to be lived up to, ought to take the place of property.

According to Godwin, Stirner, and Tolstoi, the place of property ought to be taken by a distribution without any legal relation, based rather on the same rule of action that is affirmed by them in contrast to law.

According to Godwin, therefore, that distribution of goods which is to take the place of property ought to be based on what is prescribed to each one by the general happiness.

According to Stirner it ought to be based on what is prescribed to each one by his own happiness.

According to Tolstoi it ought to be based on what is prescribed to each one by love.

3. The doministic teachings on their side part company again as to the particular form of property that they affirm for our future.

According to Tucker there ought to exist in future, as at present, both property of the individual and property of the collectivity, in all things indiscriminately.[1169]This teaching may be calledindividualistic.

According to Bakunin, in future there will exist property of the individual and of the entire community only in goods for consumption, indiscriminately, while in the materials and instruments of production there will be solely property of the collectivity. This teaching may be characterized ascollectivistic.

According to Kropotkin, in future there will exist solely property of the collectivity in all things indiscriminately. This teaching may be calledcommunistic.

II. With regard to what they have in common in their relation to property, the seven Anarchistic teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings. They have nothing in common in their relation to property. All the more is it impossible, therefore, that the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings should in their relation to property have anything in common.

Furthermore, in regard to the specialties that they exhibit in their relation to property the teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of Anarchistic teachings without limitation. For the specialties represented among them can be arranged as a system in which there is no room left for any more co-ordinate specialties, but only for subordinate. No Anarchistic teaching, therefore, can have any specialty that will not be subordinate to these specialties.

Therefore, what is true of the seven teachings here presented is true of Anarchistic teachings altogether. They have nothing in common in their relation to property, and are to be divided with respect to the differences of this relation as shown in the table onpage 284.

I. With regard to the manner in which they conceive their realization—that is, the transition from the negated condition to the affirmed condition—as taking place, the seven teachings here presented have nothing in common.

1. The one part of them conceive their realization as taking place without breach of law: they have in mind a transition from the negated to the affirmed condition merely by the application of legal norms of the negated condition; these teachings may be characterized asreformatory. Reformatory are the teachings of Godwin and Proudhon. The other part conceive their realization as a breach of law: they have in mind a transition from the negated to the affirmed condition with violation of legal norms of the negated condition; these teachings may be calledrevolutionary. Revolutionary are the teachings of Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and Tolstoi.

There cannot be given a more precise definition of what is common to the reformatory teachings on the one hand, to the revolutionary on the other, andwhat is peculiar to the one group as against the other, than has here been given. For the conceiving the transition from a negated to an affirmed condition as taking place in any given way has totally different meanings in the different teachings.

If Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tucker, and Tolstoi conceive the transition from a negated to an affirmed condition as taking place in any given way, this is as much as to say that they demand that we should in a given way first prepare for, and then effect, the transition from a disapproved to an approved condition.

If, on the contrary, Bakunin and Kropotkin conceive the transition from a negated to an affirmed condition as taking place in any given way, this means that they foresee that in the progress of evolution the transition from a disappearing to a newly-appearing condition will of itself take place in a given way, and that they only demand that we should make a certain sort of preparation for this transition.

2. The revolutionary teachings part company again as to the fashion in which they conceive of the breach of law that helps in the transition from the negated to the affirmed condition.

Some of them conceive of the breach of law as taking place without the employment of force; these teachings may be characterized asrenitent. Renitent are the teachings of Tucker and Tolstoi: Tucker conceiving the breach of law chiefly as a refusal to pay taxes and rent and an infringement of the banking monopoly, Tolstoi especially as a refusal to do military, police, or jury service, and also to pay taxes.

The other revolutionary teachings conceive of thebreach of law that helps in the transition from the negated to the affirmed condition as taking place with the employment of force; these teachings may take the name ofinsurgent. Insurgent are the teachings of Stirner, Bakunin, and Kropotkin: Stirner and Bakunin conceiving only of the transition itself as attended with the use of violence, but Kropotkin also of preparation for it by such acts (propaganda of deed).

II. With regard to what they have in common in respect of the conceived manner of realization, the seven recognized Anarchistic teachings which have been presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings. In respect of the conceived manner of realization they have nothing in common. Much less, therefore, can the entire body of recognized Anarchistic teachings have anything in common in this respect.

Furthermore, as regards the specialties that they exhibit in respect of the conceived manner of realization the teachings here presented may be taken as equivalent to the entire body of Anarchistic teachings without limitation. For the specialties represented among them can be arranged as a system in which there is no room left for any more co-ordinate specialties, but only for subordinate. No Anarchistic teaching, therefore, can have any specialty that will not be subordinate to these specialties.

Therefore, what is true of the seven teachings here presented is true of the Anarchistic teachings altogether. In respect of the conceived manner of realization they have nothing in common, and are to bearranged as follows with reference to the differences therein:

FOOTNOTES:[1164][I shall not indorse this statement till I understand it, and I doubt if Tucker will. Perhaps Eltzbacher might have been content with saying "is in no case more injurious to the happiness of most individuals than its non-existence."][1165][This, if interpreted by Eltzbacher's quotations from Tucker, must refer to the right of a voluntary association of any sort to make rules for its own members. But in this sense it seems in the highest degree doubtful whether Eltzbacher is justified in denying the same to all the other six, who have omitted to mention this point (perhaps regarding it as self-evident) while they were talking against laws in the sense of laws compulsorily binding everybody in the land.][1166][But see on Proudhon and Stirner my notes onpages 80and97.][1167][It will be seen by consulting the footnotes onpages 46,47, and48that the warrants for this statement about Godwin are drawn exclusively from the first one-fifth of his book, contrary to Eltzbacher's profession at the top ofpage 41; that the passages quotedverbatimare not in Godwin's second edition; and that the quotations which are notverbatimare of doubtful correctness by the second edition. This makes it appear that Godwin's sweeping rejection of the principle of contract was one of those over-hasty propositions about which he changed his mind even before they were published (see his words quoted onpage 40, and the preface to his second edition). Yet I am not prepared to assert that Godwin would at any time have made contract the basis of his civil order.][1168][On Proudhon, Stirner, Tucker, see my notes onpages 80,97,274.][1169][We are getting into an ambiguity of language here. The "collectivity" in which Kropotkin vests property is, as I understand, the entire population; the only "collectivity" which Tucker could recognize as owning property would be a voluntary association, whose membership, whether large or small, would in general be limited by the arbitrary choice of men.]

[1164][I shall not indorse this statement till I understand it, and I doubt if Tucker will. Perhaps Eltzbacher might have been content with saying "is in no case more injurious to the happiness of most individuals than its non-existence."]

[1165][This, if interpreted by Eltzbacher's quotations from Tucker, must refer to the right of a voluntary association of any sort to make rules for its own members. But in this sense it seems in the highest degree doubtful whether Eltzbacher is justified in denying the same to all the other six, who have omitted to mention this point (perhaps regarding it as self-evident) while they were talking against laws in the sense of laws compulsorily binding everybody in the land.]

[1166][But see on Proudhon and Stirner my notes onpages 80and97.]

[1167][It will be seen by consulting the footnotes onpages 46,47, and48that the warrants for this statement about Godwin are drawn exclusively from the first one-fifth of his book, contrary to Eltzbacher's profession at the top ofpage 41; that the passages quotedverbatimare not in Godwin's second edition; and that the quotations which are notverbatimare of doubtful correctness by the second edition. This makes it appear that Godwin's sweeping rejection of the principle of contract was one of those over-hasty propositions about which he changed his mind even before they were published (see his words quoted onpage 40, and the preface to his second edition). Yet I am not prepared to assert that Godwin would at any time have made contract the basis of his civil order.]

[1168][On Proudhon, Stirner, Tucker, see my notes onpages 80,97,274.]

[1169][We are getting into an ambiguity of language here. The "collectivity" in which Kropotkin vests property is, as I understand, the entire population; the only "collectivity" which Tucker could recognize as owning property would be a voluntary association, whose membership, whether large or small, would in general be limited by the arbitrary choice of men.]

It has now become possible to set aside some of the numerous errors about Anarchism and its species.

I. It is said that Anarchism has abolished morality and bases itself upon scientific materialism,[1170]that its ideal of society is determined by its peculiar conception of the way things come to pass in history.[1171]If this were correct, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tucker, Tolstoi, and very many other recognized Anarchistic teachings, would have to be regarded as not Anarchistic.

2. It is asserted that Anarchism sets up the happiness of the individual as final goal,[1172]that it appraises every human action from the abstract view-point of the unlimited right of the individual,[1173]that to it the supreme law is not the general welfare but every individual's free preference.[1174]Were this really the case, we should have to look upon the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tolstoi, and a multitude of other recognized Anarchistic teachings, as not Anarchistic.

3. The moral law of justice is set down as Anarchism's supreme law.[1175]Were this assertion correct,the teachings of Godwin, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, Tolstoi, and numerous other recognized Anarchistic teachings, could not rank as Anarchistic.

4. It is said that Anarchism culminates in the negation of every programme,[1176]that it has only a negative goal.[1177]If this were in accordance with truth, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, Tolstoi, and well-nigh all other recognized Anarchistic teachings, would not admit of being regarded as Anarchistic.

5. It is asserted that Anarchism rejects law,[1178]the compulsion of law.[1179]If this were so, the teachings of Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and very many other recognized Anarchistic teachings, could not rank as Anarchistic.

6. It is declared that Anarchism rejects society,[1180]that its ideal consists in wiping out society to make a fresh start,[1181]that for it fellowship exists only to be combated.[1182]Were this correct, we should have to look upon the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, Tolstoi, and pretty nearly all other recognized Anarchistic teachings, as not Anarchistic.

7. It is said that Anarchism demands the abolition of the State,[1183]wills to destroy the State off the face of the earth,[1184]wills to have the State in no form at all,[1185]wills to have no government.[1186]If this were correct, the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin, andall the other recognized Anarchistic teachings which only foresee the abolition of the State but do not demand it, could not rank as Anarchistic.

8. It is asserted that in Anarchism's future society the individual's consent binds him only so long as he is disposed to keep it up.[1187]Were this really so, then the teachings of Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and very many other recognized Anarchistic teachings, would have to be looked upon as not Anarchistic.

9. It is said that Anarchism wills to put a federation in the place of the State,[1188]that what it is striving for is the ordering of all public affairs by free contracts among federalistically instituted communes and societies.[1189]Were this in accordance with truth, the teachings of Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi, and very many other recognized Anarchistic teachings, would not admit of being regarded as Anarchistic, and no more would the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin and the rest of the recognized Anarchistic teachings that do not demand, but only foresee, a fellowship of contract.

10. It is declared that Anarchism rejects property.[1190]If this were correct, we should have to rate the teachings of Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and all the other recognized Anarchistic teachings that affirm property either unconditionally or at any rate in some particular form, as not Anarchistic.

11. It is asserted that Anarchism rejects private property,[1191]endeavors to establish community ofgoods,[1192]is necessarily communistic.[1193]Were Anarchism necessarily communistic, then, in the first place, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi, and all the other recognized Anarchistic teachings which negate property in every form, even as the property of society, could not rank as Anarchistic; and furthermore, neither could the teachings of Tucker and Bakunin, and such other recognized Anarchistic teachings as affirm private property either in all things or at least in goods for direct consumption. And if in addition to this it were a matter of rejection or endeavor, then not even Kropotkin's teaching, and the rest of the recognized Anarchistic teachings which do not demand, but foresee, a communistic form of property, could be regarded as Anarchistic.

12. A distinction is made between Communist, Collectivist, and Individualist Anarchism,[1194]or simply between Communist and Individualist Anarchism.[1195]Were the first division a complete one, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi, and all the other recognized Anarchistic teachings that do not affirm property in any form, could not rank as Anarchistic; were the second complete, these again could not, nor yet could Bakunin's teaching and such other recognized Anarchistic teachings as affirm a property in the means of production only for society, but in the supplies of consumption for individuals also.

13. It is said that Anarchism preaches crime,[1196]looks to a violent revolution for the initiation of thenew condition,[1197]seeks to attain its goal with the help of all agencies, even theft and murder.[1198]If Anarchism conceived of its realization as taking place by crime, we should have to look upon the teachings of Godwin and Proudhon and very many more recognized Anarchistic teachings as not Anarchistic; and, if it conceived of its realization as taking place by criminal acts of violence, the teachings of Tucker and Tolstoi and numerous other recognized Anarchistic teachings would also have to be regarded as not Anarchistic.

14. It is asserted that Anarchism recognizes the propaganda of deed as a means toward its realization.[1199]If this were correct, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Tucker, Tolstoi, and most of the other recognized Anarchistic teachings, could not rank as Anarchistic.

It is now possible, furthermore, to determine the common and special qualities of the Anarchistic teachings, to assign them a place in the total realm of our experience, and thus to define conceptually Anarchism and its species.

I.The common and special qualities of the Anarchistic teachings.

1. The Anarchistic teachings have in common only this, that they negate the State for our future. In the cases of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, and Tucker,the negation means that they reject the State unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere; in the case of Tolstoi it means that he rejects the State, though not unconditionally, yet for our future; in the cases of Bakunin and Kropotkin it means that they foresee that in future the progress of evolution will do away with the State.

2. As to their basis, the Anarchistic teachings are classifiable asgenetic, recognizing as the supreme law of human procedure merely a law of nature (Bakunin, Kropotkin) andcritical, regarding a norm as the supreme law of human procedure. The critical teachings, again, are classifiable asidealistic, whose supreme law is a duty (Proudhon, Tolstoi), andeudemonistic, whose supreme law is happiness. The eudemonistic teachings, finally, are on their part further classifiable asaltruistic, for which the general happiness is supreme law (Godwin), andegoistic, for which the individual's happiness takes this rank (Stirner, Tucker).

As to what they affirm for our future in contrast to the State, the Anarchistic teachings are eitherfederalistic—that is, they affirm for our future a social human life on the basis of the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker)—orspontanistic—that is, they affirm for our future a social human life on the basis of a non-juridical controlling principle (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi).

As to their relation to law, a part of the Anarchistic teachings areanomistic, negating law for our future (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi); the other part arenomistic, affirming it for our future (Proudhon,Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker).

As to their relation to property, the Anarchistic teachings are partlyindoministic, negating property for our future (Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi), partlydoministic, affirming it for our future. The doministic teachings, again, are partlyindividualistic, affirming property, without limitation, for the individual as well as for the collectivity (Tucker), partlycollectivistic, affirming as to supplies for direct consumption a property that will sometimes be the individual's, but as to the means of production a property that is only for the collectivity (Bakunin), and, finally, partlycommunistic, affirming property solely for the collectivity (Kropotkin).

As to how they conceive their realization, the Anarchistic teachings divide into thereformatory, which conceive the transition from the negated to the affirmed condition as without breach of law (Godwin, Proudhon), andrevolutionary, which conceive this transition as a breach of law. The revolutionary teachings, again, divide intorenitent, which conceive the breach of law as without the use of force (Tucker, Tolstoi) andinsurgent, which conceive it as attended by the use of force (Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin).

II.The place of the Anarchistic teachings in the total realm of our experience.

1. There must be distinguished three lines of thought in the philosophy of law: that is, three fashions of judging law.

The first isjurisprudential dogmatism. It judges whether a legal institution ought to exist or not, and it judges quite unconditionally, solely by what theinstitution consists of, without regard to its effect under this or that particular set of circumstances. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines of aproper law: that is, the schools that seek to determine what law—for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage—is under all circumstances to be approved or to be disapproved. Its best known form is "natural law."

The weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism lies in its not taking account of the fact that our judgment of legal institutions must depend on their effects, and that one and the same legal institution has under different circumstances altogether different effects.

The second line of thought isjurisprudential skepticism. In view of the weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism it foregoes judgment on whether a legal institution ought to exist or not, and pronounces judgment only on whether the tendency of evolution gives ground for expecting that a legal institution will persist or disappear, arise or remain non-existent. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines of theevolution of law: that is, the schools that undertake to inform us what sort of law is to be expected in future—for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage has a prospect of remaining in force among us. Its best-known forms are the historical school in the science of law, and Marxism.

The weakness of jurisprudential skepticism consists in its not meeting our want of a scientific basis that shall enable us to recognize as correct or incorrect the incessantly-appearing judgments on the value of legal institutions, and to approve or disapprove the manifold propositions for changes in law.

The third line of thought isjurisprudential criticism. In view of the weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism it foregoes passing judgment, without regard to the particular circumstances under which a legal institution operates, on whether that institution ought to exist or not; but yet in view of the weakness of jurisprudential skepticism it does not forego answering the question whether a legal institution ought to exist or not. It therefore sets up a supreme governing principle by which legal institutions are to be judged with regard to the particular circumstances under which they operate, the point being whether, under the particular circumstances under which a legal institution operates, it fulfils that supreme governing principle as well as is possible under these circumstances, or at least better than any other legal institution. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines ofthe propriety of law: that is, the schools that set up fundamental principles by which it is to be determined what law—for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage—ought under any particular circumstances to exist or not to exist.

2. With respect to the State these three lines of thought in the philosophy of law may arrive at different judgments, each one from its standpoint.

First, to theaffirmation of the State.

So far as the schools of jurisprudential dogmatism affirm the State, they approve of it unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere, without any regard to its effects under this or that particular set of circumstances.

Among the numerous affirmative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential dogmatism, theteachings of Hobbes, Hegel, and Jhering may perhaps be selected for emphasis as belonging to different sections of history.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential skepticism affirm the State, they foresee, looking to the course evolution is taking, that in our future the State will continue to exist.

The most notable representatives of jurisprudential skepticism, such as Puchta and Merkel, have offered no teaching regarding the State; but affirmative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential skepticism may be found, for instance, in Montaigne and Bernstein.

Finally, so far as the doctrines of jurisprudential criticism affirm the State, they commend it for our future in consideration of the particular circumstances that at present prevail in our case.

Jurisprudential criticism has thus far been most clearly set forth by Stammler, who, however, has offered no teaching with regard to the State; but, for instance, Spencer's teaching may rank as an affirmative doctrine of the State in the sense of jurisprudential criticism.

Second, the three lines of thought in the philosophy of law may arrive at thenegation of the State, each one from its standpoint.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential dogmatism negate the State, they reject it unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere, without any regard to its effects under this or that particular set of circumstances.

Negative doctrines of the State in the sense ofjurisprudential dogmatism are the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, and Tucker.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential skepticism negate the State, they foresee, looking to the course evolution is taking, that in our future the State will disappear.

Negative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential skepticism are the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential criticism negate the State, they reject it for our future in consideration of the particular circumstances that at present prevail in our case.

A negative doctrine of the State in the sense of jurisprudential criticism is Tolstoi's teaching.

3. Therefore, the place of the Anarchistic teachings in the total realm of our experience is defined by the fact that they, as a species of doctrine about the State in the philosophy of law,—to wit, as negative doctrines of the State,—stand in opposition to the other species of doctrine about the State, the affirmative doctrines of the State.

This may be represented as shown in the table on the following page.

III.The concepts of Anarchism and its species.

1. Anarchism is the negation of the State in the philosophy of law: that is, it is that species of jurisprudential doctrine of the State which negates the State.

2. An Anarchistic teaching cannot be complete without stating on what basis it rests, what condition it affirms in contrast to the State, and how it conceivesthe transition to this condition as taking place. A basis, an affirmative side, and a conception of the transition to that which it affirms, are necessary constituents of any Anarchistic teaching. With regard to these constituents the following species of Anarchism may be distinguished.

First, as to basis,genetic Anarchism, which recognizes as supreme law of human procedure only a law of nature (Bakunin, Kropotkin), andcritical Anarchism, which regards a norm as supreme law of human procedure; as subspecies of critical Anarchism,idealistic Anarchism, whose supreme law is a duty (Proudhon, Tolstoi), andeudemonistic Anarchism, whose supreme law is happiness; and, finally, as subspecies of eudemonistic Anarchism,altruistic Anarchism, for which the supreme law is the general happiness (Godwin), andegoistic Anarchism, for which the supreme law is the individual's happiness (Stirner, Tucker).

Second, as to the condition affirmed in contrast to the State, there may be distinguishedfederalistic Anarchism, which affirms for our future a social human life according to the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker), andspontanistic Anarchism, which affirms for our future a social life according to a non-juridical governing principle (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi).

Third, as to the conception of the transition to the affirmed condition, there may be distinguishedreformatory Anarchism, which conceives the transition from the State to the condition affirmed in contrast thereto as taking place without breach of law (Godwin, Proudhon), andrevolutionary Anarchism, which conceives this transition as a breach of law; as subspecies of revolutionary Anarchism,renitent Anarchism, which conceives the breach of law as without the use of violence (Tucker, Tolstoi), andinsurgent Anarchism, which conceives it as attended by the use of violence (Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin).

3. An Anarchistic teaching may be complete without taking up a position toward law or property. Whenever, therefore, an Anarchistic teaching takes up a position toward the one or the other, it contains an accidental adjunct. The Anarchistic teachings that contain this adjunct may be classified according to its character; but, since Anarchism as such can be classified only according to the character of the necessary constituents of every Anarchistic teaching, such a classificationdoes not give us species of Anarchism.

So far as the Anarchistic teachings take up a position toward law, they are eitheranomistic—that is,they negate law for our future (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi)—ornomistic—that is, they affirm it for our future (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker).

So far as they take up a position toward property, they are eitherindoministic, negating property for our future (Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi), ordoministic, affirming it for our future; the doministic teachings, again, are eitherindividualistic, affirming property, without limitation, for the individual as well as for the collectivity (Tucker), orcollectivistic, affirming as to supplies for direct consumption a property which may be the individual's, but as to the means of production a property that is only for the collectivity (Bakunin), or, last of all,communistic, affirming property for the collectivity alone (Kropotkin).

All this is brought before the eye in the table onpage 302.

☞ [The table is given as compiled by Eltzbacher. For correction of errors either certain or probable, see footnotes topages 80,97,278; note also that under "condition affirmed" the distinction is excessively fine between Stirner, who would have men agree on the terms of a union which they are to stick to as long as they find it advisable, and Bakunin and Tucker, who would have them bound together by a contract limited by the inalienable right of secession.]

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