FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[25]Godwin pp. IX-X [1. VI-VII].[26]Ib.pp. 548-9 [2. 132-3].[27]Ib.p. 90 [1, 120].[28]Ib.p. 150 [1, 164].[29]Ib.p. 90 [1, 120-21].[30]Godwin p. 101 [1. 134].[31]Ib.pp. 150, 80 [1. 120, 112].[32]Ib.p. 81 [1. 117-18?].[33]Ib.p. 254 [1. 253].[34]Ib.pp. 360-61 [1.?42].[35]Ib.p. 361. [Not in ed. 2.][36]Ib.p. 361 [1. 342; bracketed words omitted in ed. 2][37]Ib.p. 771 [2. 294].[38]Godwin pp. 766-7 [2. 290-91].[39]Ib.p. 768 [2. 291].[40]Ib.p. 769 [2. 292].[41]Ib.p. 773 [2. 295].[42]Ib.p. 166 [1. 182, except bracketed words].[43]Ib.p. 381 [2. 3][44]Godwin p. 774 [2. 296].[45]Ib.p. 775 [2. 296].[46]Ib.p. 776 [2. 297].[47]Ib.p. 151 [1. 165, except bracketed words].[48]Ib.pp. 121, 81 [1. 145, 118].[49]Ib.p. 773 [2. 295].[50]Godwin pp. 773-4 [2. 295].[51]Ib.p. 778 [2. 298-9].[52]Ib.p. 140-1 [1. 156].[53]Godwin p. 141 [2. 156][54]Ib.p. 148. [Not in ed. 2.][55]Ib.p. 149. [Not in ed. 2.][56]Ib.p. 572 [2. 149-50].[57]Ib.p. 185 [1. 200].[58]Godwin p. 380 [2. 2].[59]Ib.p. 79 [1. 111].[60]Ib.p. 79 [1. 111; credited to Paine's "Common Sense," p. 1].[61]Ib.p. 788 [2. 305].[62]Ib.p. 163 [1. 174-6? 180?].[63]Ib.p. 151 [1. 164-5; but seeper contrap. 170].[64]Ib.p. 156. [Not in ed. 2.][65]Godwin p. 151. [Not in ed. 2.][66]Ib.pp. 161-2 [1. 179].[67]Ib.164-5 [1. 181].[68]Ib.p. 561 [2. 142].[69]Ib.566 [2. 145].[70]Godwin p. 562 [2. 142].[71]Ib.559 [2. 140].[72]Godwin p. 561 [2. 141. Obviously Eltzbacher has misunderstood this passage. His German translation shows that he mistook "interests" for "interest" in the sense of "incentive." Note also that Godwin expressly restricts the application of this paragraph, even in its right sense, on pp. 111, 145].[73]Ib.p. 566 [2. 145].[74]Ib.p. 564 [2. 144].[75]Ib.p. 564-5 [2. 144].[76]Ib.pp. 773, 778, 779-80 [2. 295, 298-300].[77]Godwin p. 565 [2. 144].[78]Ib.p. 566 [2. 145].[79]Ib.p. 566 [2. 145].[80]Ib.pp. 573-4 [2. 150-51].[81]Ib.pp. 573-4 [2. 150-51].[82]Ib.pp. 568-9, 571-2 [2. 146, 149].[83]Godwin pp. 569-70 [2. 148].[84]Ib.pp. 570-71 [2. 148-49].[85]Ib.p. 574 [2. 151][86]Ib.pp. 576-8 [2. 152-3].[87]Godwin pp. 578-9 [2. 154][88]Ib.p. 794 [2. 326].[89]Ib.p. 803. [Not in ed. 2.][90]Ib.p. 794. [Not in ed. 2.][91]Godwin p. 795. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 2. 312].[92]Ib.p. 806 [2. 335].[93]Ib.p. 795. [Not in ed. 2.][94]Ib.pp. 811, 810 [2. 339, 338—but the words "in the poor" seem to be added out of Eltzbacher's head].[95]Godwin p. 802 [2. 332].[96]Ib.p. 809 [2. 338][97]Ib.p. 809 [2. 337][98]Ib.p. 789. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 2. 306-7.][99]Ib.p. 790. [Not in ed. 2.][100]Godwin pp. 790-91. [Not in ed. 2.][101]Ib.p. 821 [2. 351].[102]Ib.p. 821 [2. 352][103]Ib.p. 806 [2. 335].[104]Ib.p. 807 [2. 336].[105]Godwin p. 810 [2. 338].[106]Godwin pp. 779-80 [2. 299-300].[107]Godwin p. 203 [1, 223, only the two sentences beginning at "But"].[108]Ib.pp. 203-4. [Not in ed. 2.][109]Godwin pp. 202-3. [Not in ed. 2.][110]Ib.p. 204. [Not in ed. 2.][111]Ib.p. 223. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 1. 226.][112]Godwin p. 225. [Not in ed. 2.][113]Ib.pp. 222-3 [1. 222, except bracketed words].[114]Ib.pp. 657-8 [2. 210].[115]Godwin pp. 658-9 [2. 211-12; bracketed words a paraphrase].[116]Ib.pp. 659-60 [2. 212].[117]Ib.p. 660 [2. 212].[118]Ib.pp. 660-61 [2. 212-13].[119]Godwin pp. 661-2 [2. 213-14].[120]Ib.p. 662 [2. 214].[121]Godwin p. 888 [cf. 2. 396].[122]Ib.pp. 888-9 [2. 396].[123]Ib.pp. 882-3 [2. 392].[124]Ib.pp. 883-84 [2. 393].

[25]Godwin pp. IX-X [1. VI-VII].

[26]Ib.pp. 548-9 [2. 132-3].

[27]Ib.p. 90 [1, 120].

[28]Ib.p. 150 [1, 164].

[29]Ib.p. 90 [1, 120-21].

[30]Godwin p. 101 [1. 134].

[31]Ib.pp. 150, 80 [1. 120, 112].

[32]Ib.p. 81 [1. 117-18?].

[33]Ib.p. 254 [1. 253].

[34]Ib.pp. 360-61 [1.?42].

[35]Ib.p. 361. [Not in ed. 2.]

[36]Ib.p. 361 [1. 342; bracketed words omitted in ed. 2]

[37]Ib.p. 771 [2. 294].

[38]Godwin pp. 766-7 [2. 290-91].

[39]Ib.p. 768 [2. 291].

[40]Ib.p. 769 [2. 292].

[41]Ib.p. 773 [2. 295].

[42]Ib.p. 166 [1. 182, except bracketed words].

[43]Ib.p. 381 [2. 3]

[44]Godwin p. 774 [2. 296].

[45]Ib.p. 775 [2. 296].

[46]Ib.p. 776 [2. 297].

[47]Ib.p. 151 [1. 165, except bracketed words].

[48]Ib.pp. 121, 81 [1. 145, 118].

[49]Ib.p. 773 [2. 295].

[50]Godwin pp. 773-4 [2. 295].

[51]Ib.p. 778 [2. 298-9].

[52]Ib.p. 140-1 [1. 156].

[53]Godwin p. 141 [2. 156]

[54]Ib.p. 148. [Not in ed. 2.]

[55]Ib.p. 149. [Not in ed. 2.]

[56]Ib.p. 572 [2. 149-50].

[57]Ib.p. 185 [1. 200].

[58]Godwin p. 380 [2. 2].

[59]Ib.p. 79 [1. 111].

[60]Ib.p. 79 [1. 111; credited to Paine's "Common Sense," p. 1].

[61]Ib.p. 788 [2. 305].

[62]Ib.p. 163 [1. 174-6? 180?].

[63]Ib.p. 151 [1. 164-5; but seeper contrap. 170].

[64]Ib.p. 156. [Not in ed. 2.]

[65]Godwin p. 151. [Not in ed. 2.]

[66]Ib.pp. 161-2 [1. 179].

[67]Ib.164-5 [1. 181].

[68]Ib.p. 561 [2. 142].

[69]Ib.566 [2. 145].

[70]Godwin p. 562 [2. 142].

[71]Ib.559 [2. 140].

[72]Godwin p. 561 [2. 141. Obviously Eltzbacher has misunderstood this passage. His German translation shows that he mistook "interests" for "interest" in the sense of "incentive." Note also that Godwin expressly restricts the application of this paragraph, even in its right sense, on pp. 111, 145].

[73]Ib.p. 566 [2. 145].

[74]Ib.p. 564 [2. 144].

[75]Ib.p. 564-5 [2. 144].

[76]Ib.pp. 773, 778, 779-80 [2. 295, 298-300].

[77]Godwin p. 565 [2. 144].

[78]Ib.p. 566 [2. 145].

[79]Ib.p. 566 [2. 145].

[80]Ib.pp. 573-4 [2. 150-51].

[81]Ib.pp. 573-4 [2. 150-51].

[82]Ib.pp. 568-9, 571-2 [2. 146, 149].

[83]Godwin pp. 569-70 [2. 148].

[84]Ib.pp. 570-71 [2. 148-49].

[85]Ib.p. 574 [2. 151]

[86]Ib.pp. 576-8 [2. 152-3].

[87]Godwin pp. 578-9 [2. 154]

[88]Ib.p. 794 [2. 326].

[89]Ib.p. 803. [Not in ed. 2.]

[90]Ib.p. 794. [Not in ed. 2.]

[91]Godwin p. 795. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 2. 312].

[92]Ib.p. 806 [2. 335].

[93]Ib.p. 795. [Not in ed. 2.]

[94]Ib.pp. 811, 810 [2. 339, 338—but the words "in the poor" seem to be added out of Eltzbacher's head].

[95]Godwin p. 802 [2. 332].

[96]Ib.p. 809 [2. 338]

[97]Ib.p. 809 [2. 337]

[98]Ib.p. 789. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 2. 306-7.]

[99]Ib.p. 790. [Not in ed. 2.]

[100]Godwin pp. 790-91. [Not in ed. 2.]

[101]Ib.p. 821 [2. 351].

[102]Ib.p. 821 [2. 352]

[103]Ib.p. 806 [2. 335].

[104]Ib.p. 807 [2. 336].

[105]Godwin p. 810 [2. 338].

[106]Godwin pp. 779-80 [2. 299-300].

[107]Godwin p. 203 [1, 223, only the two sentences beginning at "But"].

[108]Ib.pp. 203-4. [Not in ed. 2.]

[109]Godwin pp. 202-3. [Not in ed. 2.]

[110]Ib.p. 204. [Not in ed. 2.]

[111]Ib.p. 223. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 1. 226.]

[112]Godwin p. 225. [Not in ed. 2.]

[113]Ib.pp. 222-3 [1. 222, except bracketed words].

[114]Ib.pp. 657-8 [2. 210].

[115]Godwin pp. 658-9 [2. 211-12; bracketed words a paraphrase].

[116]Ib.pp. 659-60 [2. 212].

[117]Ib.p. 660 [2. 212].

[118]Ib.pp. 660-61 [2. 212-13].

[119]Godwin pp. 661-2 [2. 213-14].

[120]Ib.p. 662 [2. 214].

[121]Godwin p. 888 [cf. 2. 396].

[122]Ib.pp. 888-9 [2. 396].

[123]Ib.pp. 882-3 [2. 392].

[124]Ib.pp. 883-84 [2. 393].

1. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was born at Besançon in 1809. At first he followed the occupation of a printer there and in other cities. In 1838 a stipend of the Academy of Besançon enabled him to go to Paris for scientific studies. In 1843 he took a mercantile position at Lyons. In 1847 he gave it up and moved to Paris.

Here, in the years from 1848 to 1850, Proudhon published several periodicals, one after the other. In 1848 he became a member of the National Assembly. In 1849 he founded a People's Bank. Soon after this he was condemned to three years' imprisonment for an offence against the press laws, and served his time without having to interrupt his activity as an author.

In 1852 Proudhon was released from prison. He remained in Paris till, in 1858, he was again condemned to three years' imprisonment for an offence against the press laws. He fled and settled in Brussels. In 1860 he was pardoned, and returned to France. Thenceforth he lived at Passy. He died there in 1865.

Proudhon published many books and other writings, especially in the fields of jurisprudence, political economy, and politics.

2. Of special importance for Proudhon's teaching about law, the State, and property are, among thewritings before 1848, the book "Qu'est-ce que la propriété? ou recherches sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement" (1840) and the two-volume work "Système des contradictions économiques, ou philosophie de la misère" (1846); among the writings from 1848 to 1851 the "Confessions d'un révolutionnaire" (1849) and the "Idée générale de la révolution au XIXe siècle" (1851); and lastly, among the writings after 1851, the three-volume work "De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'Eglise, nouveaux principes de philosophie pratique" (1858) and the book "Du principe fédératif et de la nécessité de reconstituer le parti de la révolution" (1863).[125]

Proudhon's teaching regarding law, the State, and property underwent changes in minor points, but remained the same in its essentials; the opinion that it changed also in essentials is caused by Proudhon's arbitrary and varying use of language. Since no history of the evolution of Proudhon's teaching can be given here, I shall present, so far as concerns such minor points, only the teaching of 1848-51, in which years Proudhon developed his views with especial clearness and did especially forcible work for them.

3. Proudhon calls his teaching about law, the State, and property "Anarchism." "'What form of government shall we prefer?' 'Can you ask?' replies one of my younger readers without doubt; 'you are a Republican.' 'Republican, yes; but this word makes nothing definite.Res publicais "the public thing"; now, whoever wants the public thing, under whatever form of government, may call himself a Republican.Even kings are Republicans.' 'Well, you are a Democrat.' 'No.' 'What? can you be a Monarchist?' 'No.' 'A Constitutionalist?' 'I should hope not.' 'You are an Aristocrat then?' 'Not a bit.' 'You want a mixed government, then?' 'Still less.' 'What are you then?' 'I am an Anarchist.'"[126]

According to Proudhon the supreme law for us is justice.

What is justice? "Justice is respect, spontaneously felt and mutually guaranteed, for human dignity, in whatever person and under whatever circumstances we find it compromised, and to whatever risk its defence may expose us."[127]

"I ought to respect my neighbor, and make others respect him, as myself; such is the law of my conscience. In consideration of what do I owe him this respect? In consideration of his strength, his talent, his wealth? No, what chance gives is not what makes the human person worthy of respect. In consideration of the respect which he in turn pays to me? No, justice assumes reciprocity of respect, but does not wait for it. It asserts and wills respect for human dignity even in an enemy, which causes the existence oflaws of war; even in the murderer whom we kill as having fallen from his manhood, which causes theexistence ofpenal laws. It is not the gifts of nature or the advantages of fortune that make me respect my neighbor; it is not his ox, his ass, or his maid-servant, as the decalogue says; it is not even the welfare that he owes to me as I owe mine to him; it is his manhood."[128]

"Justice is at once a reality and an idea."[129]"Justice is a faculty of the soul, the foremost of all, that which constitutes a social being. But it is more than a faculty; it is an idea, it indicates a relation, an equation. As a faculty it may be developed; this development is what constitutes the education of humanity. As an equation it presents nothing antinomic; it is absolute and immutable like every law, and, like every law, very intelligible."[130]

Justice is for us the supreme law. "Justice is the inviolable yardstick of all human actions."[131]"By it the facts of social life, by nature indeterminate and contradictory, become susceptible of definition and arrangement."[132]

"Justice is the central star which governs societies, the pole about which the political world revolves, the principle and rule of all transactions. Nothing is done among men that is not in the name ofright; nothing without invoking justice. Justice is not the work of the law; on the contrary, the law is never anything but a declaration and application of what isjust."[132]"Suppose a society where justice is outranked, however little, by another principle, sayreligion; or in which certain individuals are regarded more highly, by however little, than others; I say that, justice being virtually annulled, it is inevitable that the society will perish sooner or later.[133]

"It is the privilege of justice that the faith which it inspires is unshakable, and that it cannot be dogmatically denied or rejected. All peoples invoke it; reasons of State, even while they violate it, profess to be based on it; religion exists only for it; skepticism dissembles before it; irony has power only in its name; crime and hypocrisy do it homage. [If liberty is not an empty phrase, it acts only in the service of right; even when it rebels against right, at bottom it does not curse it.]"[134]"All the most rational teachings of human wisdom about justice are summed up in this famous adage:Do to others what you would have done to you; Do not to others what you would not have done to you."[135]

I.In the name of justice Proudhon rejects, not law indeed, but almost all individual legal norms, and the State laws in particular.

The State makes laws, and "as many laws as the interests which it meets with; and, since interests are innumerable, the legislation-machine must work uninterruptedly. Laws and ordinances fall like hail on the poor populace. After a while the political soilwill be covered with a layer of paper, and all the geologists will have to do will be to list it, under the name ofpapyraceous formation, among the epochs of the earth's history. The Convention, in three years one month and four days, issued eleven thousand six hundred laws and decrees; the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies had produced hardly less; the empire and the later governments have wrought as industriously. At present the 'Bulletin des Lois' contains, they say, more than fifty thousand; if our representatives did their duty this enormous figure would soon be doubled. Do you believe that the populace, or the government itself, can keep its sanity in this labyrinth?"[136]

"But what am I saying? Laws for him who thinks for himself, and is responsible only for his own acts! laws for him who would be free, and feels himself destined to become free! I am ready to make terms, but I will have no laws; I acknowledge none; I protest against every order which an ostensibly necessary authority shall please to impose on my free will. Laws! we know what they are and what they are worth. Cobwebs for the powerful and the rich, chains which no steel can break for the little and the poor, fishers' nets in the hands of the government."[137]

"You say they shall makefewlaws, make themsimple, make themgood. But it is impossible. Must not government adjust all interests, decide all disputes? Now interests are by the nature of society innumerable, relationships infinitely variable and mobile; how is it possible that only a few laws shouldbe made? how can they be simple? how can the best law escape soon being detestable?"[138]

II.Justice requires that only one legal norm be in force: to wit, the norm that contracts must be lived up to.

"What do we mean by acontract? A contract, says the civil code, art. 1101, is an agreement whereby one or more persons bind themselves to one or more others to do or not to do something."[139]"That I may remain free, that I may be subjected to no law but my own, and that I may govern myself, the edifice of society must be rebuilt upon the idea ofContract."[140]"We must start with the idea of contract as the dominant idea of politics."[141]This norm, that contracts must be lived up to, is to be based not only on its justice, but at the same time on the fact that among men who live together there prevails a will to enforce the keeping of contracts, if necessary, with violence;[142]so it is to be not only a commandment of morality, but also a legal norm.

"Several of your fellow-men have agreed to treat each other with good faith and fair play,—that is, to respect those rules of action which the nature of things points out to them as being alone capable of assuring to them, in the fullest measure, prosperity, safety, and peace. Are you willing to join their league? to form a part of their society? Do you promise to respect the honor, the liberty, the goods, of your brothers? Do you promise never to appropriateto yourself, neither by violence, by fraud, by usury, nor by speculation, another's product or possession? Do you promise never to lie and deceive, neither in court, in trade, nor in any of your dealings? You are free to accept or to refuse.

"If you refuse, you form a part of the society of savages. Having left the fellowship of the human race, you come under suspicion. Nothing protects you. At the least insult anybody you meet may knock you down, without incurring any other charge than that of cruelty to animals.

"If you swear to the league, on the contrary, you form a part of the society of free men. All your brothers enter into an engagement with you, promising you fidelity, friendship, help, service, commerce. In case of infraction on their part or on yours, through negligence, hot blood, or evil intent, you are responsible to one another, for the damage and also for the scandal and insecurity which you have caused; this responsibility may extend, according to the seriousness of the perjury or the repetition of the crime, as far as to excommunication and death."[143]

I. Since Proudhon approves only the single legal norm that contracts must be lived up to, he can sanction only a single legal relation, that of parties to a contract. Hence he must necessarily reject the State; for it is established by particular legal norms, and, as an involuntary legal relation, it binds even those who have not entered into any contract at all.Proudhon does accordingly reject the State absolutely, without any spatial or temporal limitation; he even regards it as a legal relation which offends against justice to an unusual degree.

"The government of man by man is slavery."[144]"Whoever lays his hand on me to govern me is a usurper and a tyrant; I declare him my enemy."[145]"In a given society the authority of man over man is in inverse ratio to the intellectual development which this society has attained, and the probable duration of this authority may be calculated from the more or less general desire for a true—that is, a scientific—government."[146]

"Royalty is never legitimate. Neither heredity, election, universal suffrage, the excellence of the sovereign, nor the consecration of religion and time, makes royalty legitimate. In whatever form it may appear, monarchical, oligarchic, democratic,—royalty, or the government of man by man, is illegal and absurd."[147]Democracy in particular "is nothing but a constitutional arbitrary power succeeding another constitutional arbitrary power; it has no scientific value, and we must see in it only a preparation for theRepublic, one and indivisible."[148]

"Authority was no sooner begun on earth than it became the object of universal competition. Authority, Government, Power, State,—these words all denote the same thing,—each man sees in it the means of oppressing and exploiting his fellows. Absolutists,doctrinaires, demagogues, and socialists, turned their eyes incessantly to authority as their sole cynosure."[149]"All parties without exception, in so far as they seek for power, are varieties of absolutism; and there will be no liberty for citizens, no order for societies, no union among workingmen, till in the political catechism the renunciation of authority shall have replaced faith in authority.No more parties, no more authority, absolute liberty of man and citizen,—there, in three words, is my political and social confession of faith."[150]

II.Justice demands, in place of the State, a social human life on the basis of the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to.Proudhon calls this social life "anarchy"[151]and later "federation"[152]also.

1. After the abrogation of the State, men are still to live together in society. As early as 1841 Proudhon says that the point is "to discover a system of absolute equality, in which all present institutions, minus property or the sum of the abuses of property, might not only find a place, but be themselves means to equality; individual liberty, the division of powers, the cabinet, the jury, the administrative and judiciary organization."[153]

But men are not to be kept together in society by any supreme authority, but only by the legally binding force of contract. "When I bargain for anyobject with one or more of my fellow-citizens, it is clear that then my will alone is my law; it is I myself who, in fulfilling my obligation, am my government. If then I could make that contract with all, which I do make with some; if all could renew it with each other; if every group of citizens, commune, canton, department, corporation, company, etc., formed by such a contract and considered as a moral person, could then, always on the same terms, treat with each of the other groups and with all, it would be exactly as if my will was repeatedad infinitum. I should be sure that the law thus made on all points that concern the republic, on the various motions of millions of persons, would never be anything but my law; and, if this new order of things was called government, that this government would be mine. Therégime of contracts, substituted for therégime of laws, would constitute the true government of man and of the citizen, the true sovereignty of the people, theRepublic."[154]

"The Republic is the organization by which, all opinions and all activities remaining free, the People, by the very divergence of opinions and of wills, thinks and acts as a single man. In the Republic every citizen, in doing what he wishes and nothing but what he wishes, participates directly in legislation and government, just as he participates in the production and circulation of wealth. There every citizen is king; for he has plenary power, he reigns and governs. The Republic is a positive anarchy. It is neither liberty subjectedTOorder, as in the constitutional monarchy, nor liberty imprisonedINorder, as theprovisional government would have it. It is liberty delivered from all its hobbles, superstition, prejudice, sophism, speculation, authority; it is mutual liberty, not self-limiting liberty; liberty, not the daughter but theMOTHERof order."[155]

2. Anarchy may easily seem to us "the acme of disorder and the expression of chaos. They say that when a Parisian burgher of the seventeenth century once heard that in Venice there was no king, the good man could not get over his astonishment, and thought he should die of laughing. Such is our prejudice."[156]As against this, Proudhon draws a picture of how men's life in society under anarchy might perhaps shape itself in detail, to execute the functions now belonging to the State.

He begins with an example. "For many centuries the spiritual power has been separated, within traditional limits, from the temporal power. [But there has never been a complete separation, and therefore, to the great detriment of the church's authority and of believers, centralization has never been sufficient.] There would be a complete separation if the temporal power not only did not concern itself with the celebration of mysteries, the administration of sacraments, the government of parishes, etc., but did not intervene in the nomination of bishops either. There would ensue a greater centralization, and consequently a more regular government, if in each parish the people had the right to choose for themselves their vicars and curates, or to have none at all; if in each diocese the priests elected their bishop; if the assembly ofbishops, or a primate of the Gauls, had sole charge of the regulation of religious affairs, theological instruction, and worship. By this separation the clergy would cease to be, in the hands of political power, an instrument of tyranny over the people; and by this application of universal suffrage the ecclesiastical government, centralized in itself, receiving its inspirations from the people and not from the government or the pope, would be in constant harmony with the needs of society and with the moral and intellectual condition of the citizens. We must, then, in order to return to truth, organic, political, economic, or social (for here all these are one), first, abolish the constitutional cumulation by taking from the State the nomination of the bishops, and definitively separating the spiritual from the temporal; second, centralize the church in itself by a system of graded elections; third, give to the ecclesiastical power, as we do to all the other powers in the State, the vote of the citizens as a basis. By this system what to-day isGOVERNMENTwill no longer be anything butadministration; all France is centralized, so far as concerns ecclesiastical functions; the country, by the mere fact of its electoral initiative, governs itself in matters of eternal life as well as in those of this world. And one may already see that if it were possible to organize the entire country in temporal matters on the same bases, the most perfect order and the most vigorous centralization would exist without there being anything of what we to-day call constituted authority or government."[157]

Proudhon gives a second example in judicialauthority. "The judicial functions, by their different specialties, their hierarchy, [their permanent tenure of office,] their convergence under a single departmental head, show an unequivocal tendency to separation and centralization. But they are in no way dependent on those who are under their jurisdiction; they are all at the disposal of the executive power, which is appointed by the people once in four years with authority that cannot be diminished; they are subordinated not to the country by election, but to the government, president or prince, by appointment. It follows that those who are under the jurisdiction of a court are given over to their 'natural' judges just as are parishioners to their vicars; that the people belong to the magistrate like an inheritance; that the litigant is the judge's, not the judge the litigant's. Apply universal suffrage and graded election to the judicial as well as the ecclesiastical functions; suppress the permanent tenure of office, which is an alienation of the electoral right; take away from the State all action, all influence, on the judicial body; let this body, separately centralized in itself, no longer depend on any but the people,—and, in the first place, you will have deprived power of its mightiest instrument of tyranny; you will have made justice a principle of liberty as well as of order. And, unless you suppose that the people, from whom all powers should spring by universal suffrage, is in contradiction with itself,—that what it wants in religion it does not want in justice,—you are assured that the separation of powers can beget no conflict; you may boldly lay it down as a principle thatseparationandequilibriumarehenceforth synonymous."[158]

Then Proudhon goes on to the army, the customhouses, the public departments of agriculture and commerce, public works, public education, and finance; for each of these administrations he demands independence and centralization on the basis of general suffrage.[159]

"That a nation may manifest itself in its unity, it must be centralized in its religion, centralized in its justice, centralized in its army, centralized in its agriculture, industry, and commerce, centralized in its finances,—in a word, centralized in all its functions and faculties; the centralization must work from the bottom to the top, from the circumference to the centre; all the functions must be independent and severally self-governing.

"Would you then make this invisible unity perceptible by a special organ, preserve the image of the old government? Group these different administrations by their heads; you have your cabinet, yourexecutive, which can then very well do without a Council of State.

"Set up above all this a grand jury, legislature, or national assembly, appointed directly by the whole country, and charged not with appointing the cabinet officers,—they have their investiture from their particular constituents,—but with auditing the accounts, making the laws, settling the budget, deciding controversies between the administrations, all after having heard the reports of the Public Department, orDepartment of the Interior, to which the whole government will thenceforth be reduced; and you will have a centralization the stronger the more you multiply its foci, a responsibility the more real the more clear-cut is the separation between the powers; you have a constitution at once political and social."[160]

I. Since Proudhon sanctions only the one legal norm that contracts must be kept, he can approve only one legal relation, that between contracting parties. Hence he must necessarily reject property as well as the State, since it is established by particular legal norms, and, as an involuntary legal relation, binds even such as have in no way entered into a contract.And he does reject property[161]absolutely, without any spatial or temporal limitation; nay, it even appears to him to be a legal relation which is particularly repugnant to justice.

"According to its definition, property is the right of using and abusing; that is to say, it is the absolute, irresponsible domain of man over his person and his goods. If property ceased to be the right to abuse, it would cease to be property. Has not the proprietor the right to give his goods to whomever hewill, to let his neighbor burn without crying fire, to oppose the public good, to squander his patrimony, to exploit the laborer and hold him to ransom, to produce bad goods and sell them badly? Can he be judicially constrained to use his property well? can he be disturbed in the abuse of it? What am I saying? Is not property, precisely because it is full of abuse, the most sacred thing in the world for the legislator? Can one conceive of a property whose use the police power should determine, whose abuse it should repress? Is it not clear, in fine, that if one undertook to introduce justice into property, one would destroy property, just as the law, by introducing propriety into concubinage, destroyed concubinage?"[162]

"Men steal: first, by violence on the highway; second, alone or in a band; third, by burglary; fourth, by embezzlement; fifth, by fraudulent bankruptcy; sixth, by forgery; seventh, by counterfeiting. Eighth, by pocket-picking; ninth, by swindling; tenth, by breach of trust; eleventh, by gambling and lotteries.—Twelfth, by usury. Thirteenth, by rent-taking.—Fourteenth, by commerce, when the profits are more than fair wages for the trader's work.—Fifteenth, by selling one's own product at a profit, and by accepting a sinecure or a fat salary."[163]"In theft such as the laws forbid, force and fraud are employed alone and openly; in authorized theft they are disguised under a produced utility, which they use as a device for plundering their victim. The direct use of violence and force was early and unanimouslyrejected; no nation has yet reached the point of delivering itself from theft when united with talent, labor, and possession."[164]In this sense property is "theft,"[165]"the exploitation of the weak by the strong,"[166]"contrary to right,"[167]"the suicide of society."[168]

II.Justice demands, in place of property, a distribution of goods based on the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to.

Proudhon calls that portion of goods which is assigned to the individual by contract, "property." In 1840 he had demanded that individual possession be substituted for property; with this one change evil would disappear from the earth.[169]But in 1841 he is already explaining that by property he means only its abuses;[170]nay, he even then describes as necessary the creation of an immediately applicable social system in which the rights of barter and sale, of direct and collateral inheritance, of primogeniture and bequest, should find their place.[171]In 1846 he says, "Some day transformed property will be an idea positive, complete, social, and true; a property which will abolish the old property and will become equally effective and beneficent for all."[172]In 1848 he is declaring that "property, as to its principle or substance, which is human personality, must never perish; it must remain in man's heart as a perpetual stimulus to labor, as the antagonist whose absence would cause labor to fall into idleness and death."[173]

And in 1850 he announces: "What I sought foras far back as 1840, in defining property, what I am wanting now, is not a destruction; I have said it till I am tired. That would have been to fall with Rousseau, Plato, Louis Blanc himself, and all the adversaries of property, intoCommunism, against which I protest with all my might; what I ask for property is aBALANCE,"[174]—that is, "justice."[175]

In all these pronouncements property means nothing else than that portion of goods which falls to the individual on the basis of contracts, on which society is to be built up.[176]The property which Proudhon sanctions cannot be a special legal relation, but only a possible part of the substance of the one legal relation which he approves, the relation of contract. It can afford no protection against a group of men whose extent is determined by legal norms, but only against a group of men who have mutually secured a certain portion of goods to each other by contract. Proudhon, therefore, is here using the word "property" in an inexact sense; in the strict sense it can denote only a portion of goods set apart in an involuntary legal relation by particular legal norms.

Accordingly, when in the name of justice Proudhon demands a certain distribution of property, this means nothing more than that the contracts on which society is to be built should make a certain sort of provision with respect to the distribution of goods. And the way in which they should determine it is this: that every man is to have the product of his labor.

"Let us conceive of wealth as a mass whose elements are held together permanently by a chemical force, and into which new elements incessantly enter and combine in different proportions, but according to a definite law: value is the proportion (the measure) in which each of these elements forms a part of the whole."[177]"I suppose, therefore, a force which combines the elements of wealth in definite proportions and makes of them a homogeneous whole."[178]"This force isLABOR. It is labor, labor alone, that produces all the elements of wealth and combines them, to the last molecule, according to a variable but definite law of proportionality."[179]"Every product is a representative sign of labor."[180]

"Every product can consequently be exchanged for another."[181]"If then the tailor, in return for furnishing the value of one day of his work, consumes ten times the weaver's day, it is as if the weaver gave ten days of his life for one day of the tailor's. This is precisely what occurs when a peasant pays a lawyer twelve francs for a document that it costs one hour to draw up; and this inequality, this iniquity in exchange, is the mightiest cause of poverty. Every error in commutative justice is an immolation of the laborer, a transfusion of a man's blood into another man's body."[182]

"What I demand with respect to property is aBALANCE. It is not for nothing that the genius of nations has equipped Justice with this instrument ofprecision. Justice applied to economy is in fact nothing but a perpetual balance; or, to express myself still more precisely, justice as regards the distribution of goods is nothing but the obligation which rests upon every citizen and every State, in their business relations, to conform to that law of equilibrium which manifests itself everywhere in economy, and whose violation, accidental or voluntary, is the fundamental principle of poverty."[183]

2. That every man should enjoy the product of his labor is possible only through reciprocity, according to Proudhon; therefore he calls his doctrine "the theory ofmutualityor of themutuum."[184]"Reciprocityis expressed in the precept, 'Do to others what you would have done to you,' a precept which political economy has translated into its celebrated formula, 'Products exchange for products.' Now the evil which is devouring us results from the fact that the law of reciprocity is unrecognized, violated. The remedy consists altogether in the promulgation of this law. The organization of our mutual and reciprocal relations is the whole of social science."[185]

And so Proudhon, in the solemn declaration which he prefixed to the constitution of the People's Bank when he first published it, gives the following assurance: "I protest that in criticising property, or rather the whole body of institutions of which property is the pivot, I never meant either to attack the individual rights recognized by previous laws, or todispute the legitimacy of acquired possessions, or to instigate an arbitrary distribution of goods, or to put an obstacle in the way of the free and regular acquisition of properties by bargain and sale; or even to prohibit or suppress by sovereign decree land-rent and interest on capital. I think that all these manifestations of human activity should remain free and optional for all; I would admit no other modifications, restrictions, or suppressions of them than naturally and necessarily result from the universalization of the principle of reciprocity and of the law of synthesis which I propound. This is my last will and testament. I allow only him to suspect its sincerity, who could tell a lie in the moment of death."[186]

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