TROOP OF MARES.
TROOP OF MARES.
As successor to Mendoza the Spanish Government appointed Cabeza de Vaca, an experienced adventurer, who sailed from Spain in 1540 with four hundred men. He landed at Santa Catherina in Brazil, and thence made a most adventurous march to Asuncion. He set out on October 18, 1541, and did not arrive till March 11, 1542, after suffering extraordinary hardships. At Asuncion he found that the Spanish settlers had chosen Domingo Irala as their chief. The two rivals, however, had enough work for both, and Cabeza de Vaca sailed down to the River Plate where the Spaniards had practically abandoned their settlements, and the few survivors were in great danger of destruction by the Indians. He refounded Buenos Aires towards the end of 1542; but the time was not yet ripe for the planting of colonies, and not many months later the city was abandoned for the second time. Nor was Cabeza de Vaca fortunate in his undertakings in Paraguay. His attempts to reform abuses made him unpopular with the settlers, who preferred Irala, and in 1544 Cabeza de Vaca was seized and sent a prisoner to Spain where, after the law's long delays, he was acquitted, but never compensated.
Irala, who was an able and daring leader, contrived to maintain his authority till his death, which occurred in 1557, and credit is due to him for keeping the Spanish flag flying in the isolated post of Asuncion, which was rapidly growing in importance, and in 1547 was made the seat of a Bishop by Pope Paul III. All this time, however, it should be remembered that we are dealing rather with the history of what is now Paraguay than Argentina, for the southern settlements on the River Plate were once more in the hands of the Indians. It was at this time that another important town was established in territory which now belongs to Argentina. Peru had been conquered by Pizarro, parts of Chile by Almagro, and in 1559 Hurtado de Mendoza passed over the Andes from the west and founded the pleasant city which bears his name. This work of building cities on the eastern side of the Andes was carried on by other Spaniards from Peru, and they founded Tucuman in 1565 and Cordoba in 1573.
In the meantime the Guaranies of Paraguay steadily resisted every advance of the Spaniards, but in 1560 they were defeated in a great battle at Acari, and the Spaniards began to push southwards with the determination of again colonising the Parana country—a step, indeed, which was almost essential to their safety, since it would secure their communication with the Atlantic. The necessary exploit was achieved by a man who deserves an honoured place among Spanish-American worthies—Juan de Garay.[23]He advanced slowly towards the south from Asuncion, and in 1573 founded Santa Fé at the junction of the Parana and the Paraguay. In 1580 he took the still more important step of re-establishing Buenos Aires for the third time. With a true statesman's instinct he recognised that a mere military post would not be sufficient for the security of the rapidly growing colonies, and he took with him, besides Creoles and Spaniards, two hundred Indian settlers, and he laid out a town on a considerable scale, while farms and ranches were established in the neighbourhood. There was sharp fighting with the Indians, and Garay was unfortunately killed in a skirmish, but his work remained behind him. "The city," says Southey,[24]"immediately began to prosper, and the ship which sailed for Castile with tidings of its refoundation, took home a cargo of sugar, and the first hides with which Europe was supplied from the wild cattle which now began to over-spread the open country, and soon produced a total change in the manners of all the adjoining tribes."
In 1588 Corrientes had been founded, and the people began to acquire pastoral wealth, although the advantages which they drew from the rapidly increasing herds of horses and cattle were seriously discounted by the exactions and restrictions of officials. It was a piece of great good fortune for both settlers and Indians that neither gold nor silver was to be found in the River Plate country, and thus European marauders, whether Spanish or English, were without one great temptation to harry them. The next generation was one of steady progress, and by the year 1620 the city of Buenos Aires contained three thousand inhabitants. The indefatigable Jesuits established themselves in the country in 1590, and though their history properly belongs to Paraguay, they did much good in Argentina by protecting the Indians and spreading civilisation.
In 1620 a step of extreme importance was taken. The office of Adelantado, or Governor, was abolished, and theRiver Plate country was formed into two separate provinces. Thus we get a rough beginning of Argentina, which now consisted of Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Entre Rios, Corrientes, and the tract now called Uruguay. This last, however, was still uninhabited. Buenos Aires became the seat of a bishop. But the whole of the settlements remained under the Viceroyalty of Peru.
More important than any measure of partition was the personality of Hernan Darias de Saavedra, the ruler at that time. Of pure Spanish blood, he was born in South America in 1561, early distinguished himself in wars with the Indians, and took as his model the able Garay. In 1602 he was appointed to act as Governor of Buenos Aires, and during his term of authority, which did not really end when a new Spanish Governor was placed over his head, he distinguished himself at once by his severity to refractory Indians and his energetic measures to protect those who followed peaceful pursuits. In 1615 he became substantive Governor, and it was by his advice that the division of 1620 was made.
His whole heart was in the peaceful development of the country; he encouraged the Jesuits to teach industries to the natives and to settle virgin tracts, and at the same time he set his face against all forms of slavery. Few Spanish Americans have exercised more beneficent rule, and he was the founder of Argentine prosperity—a tradition which the country never wholly lost in the worst days, and which in recent times it has renewed in a wonderful manner. Not long after the partition this noble-minded statesman died, full, as the historian says, of glory and virtues. Funes[25]remarks: "From tender years he performed military service, earning fame for valour. His valour was rendered the more illustrious by that consummate prudence which in war gives glory towarriors. He distinguished himself by his ability both in the arts of peace and war. He was a staunch protector of the Indians and, in fine, being one of the heroes to whom the New World has given birth, he deserved to have his portrait placed in the Chamber of Commerce in Cadiz. We regret that time has destroyed the records which might have enabled us to draw a more accurate likeness."
With his death it may be said that the history of Argentina as a Spanish colony has fairly begun. It is true that the Governorship of Buenos Aires was both smaller and larger than the present Argentine Republic—larger as comprising Uruguay, and considerably smaller in the absence of Patagonia and much other territory. In fact, there were three Governorships—Buenos Aires, Paraguay, and Tucuman—and these were looked upon as a single colony, although each one was an administrative entity, dependent upon the Crown and independent of its neighbours. Our narrative will necessarily ignore the interesting history of Paraguay and embrace the other two provinces. The above narrative has few of the exciting episodes which marked the history of the conquest of Mexico or Peru, but the history, though less dazzling, is less sullied by crimes, and the two figures of Garay and Hernan Darias afford examples of disinterested toil for the common welfare which in that age was rare indeed except among a small proportion of the clergy. And as the earlier years of Argentina were less turbulent, so have the latter years been more blessed with prosperity than has been the case with other South American States.
The colonisation of South America proceeded upon lines very different from those pursued in the northern continent. The latter was the objective of men who belonged, for the most part, to the Anglo-Saxon race,and who came not for adventure or any kind of gain, but to escape from uncongenial institutions and live their own life. As far as possible they avoided contact with the natives, and neither desired, nor, in fact, maintained, intimate relations with the mother country. But in spite of the circumstances of their exile, they carried with them most of the institutions of their own land, and continued to develop on the lines of their brothers on the other side of the Atlantic. The Spaniards did not, indeed, treat the natives in South America with humanity; on the contrary, in the mining regions their cruelty was notorious, and they were frequently at war with the old inhabitants. But in Argentina and many other places they showed no disinclination to intermarry; they made, as we have seen, systematic settlements of Indians, which assumed that the conquered race was an integral part of their own body politic, and in some respects their policy was statesmanlike and even humane according to the standards of the time. The result was a fusion of races, and the various nations which sprang up were as much Indian as Spanish. How the Argentine nation was evolved it will be the business of the succeeding historical chapters to show, as it will be that of the remainder of this volume to display the country and the people as they actually are after four centuries of growth.
The subsequent history of Argentina during the Spanish dominion does not present much incident, and indeed it is not an uncommon practice for historians of Latin-American countries to make a single leap from the Conquest to the Revolution. But to the real student of history there is much that is of interest in the record of the attempt of Spain to govern a mighty empire and the rapid decay of her power. In the next chapter the Spanish colonial system will be examined; in the present it will be observed in operation. Much will be said about the illiberal restrictions which here receive only incidental notice, but however short-sighted they may have been, at least they could not prevent Argentina from thriving. A considerable trade sprang up between Cordoba and the Andine territories now known as Chile and Bolivia; nor was it only in material well-being that progress was made. At Cordoba, also, a university was founded in 1613, and the town became a seat of learning and a centre of Jesuit influence. For some years peace reigned, but in the second quarter of the seventeenth century it received two serious disturbances. The first was a dangerous Indian war with the powerful nation of the Calchaquies.
This people had lived from time immemorial in the valleys of Rioja and Catamarca, and had been underthe suzerainty of the Incas. As the Spaniards around the River Plate became more powerful they made aggressions upon the Calchaquies, and by the end of the sixteenth century had partly subdued them. Many of these Indians were sold into slavery, and many more were forced to settle about Santa Fé and Rosario, but the spirit of the remainder was still unsubdued, and they awaited an opportunity of recovering their independence. It was about the middle of the century that they made their expiring effort. A leader named Bohorquez came forward and claimed to be the descendant and heir of the Inca kings. He is said to have been a mere impostor of humble Andalusian origin, but it is seldom easy to find out the exact truth about pretenders. Funes doubts whether he was in his right mind. "But the light of reason appeared when he took his first steps in deceit, an art to which he was naturally inclined."[26]He and his wife were greeted with the honours due to the Inca kings, the revolt spread, and he caused the Spaniards endless trouble. The Calchaquies, whom he claimed to represent, were a hardy race, and down to modern times have shown good fighting qualities, and they were inflamed by resentment against the intruding Spaniards, who had undoubtedly oppressed them. Bohorquez first came forward in 1656, and though he appears to have possessed nothing better than the showy qualities of a bold charlatan, he brought about a dangerous war. Don Alonso Mercado, who had been appointed Governor of Tucuman the year before, was obstinate and overbearing, and, strangely enough, began by patronising and encouraging the impostor. The Jesuits, who were always anxious to redress Indian grievances, also supported him, and the revolt assumed such serious proportions that the Governor soon had to abandon hisformer attitude and took up arms against him. The Indians, who, with simple credulity, accepted all the claims of Bohorquez, made a long and heroic resistance, but the Spanish power was too great. The pretender was defeated, and the Spaniards, aware that there could be no safety for the northern provinces as long as Bohorquez was alive, spared no effort to track him down, and were eventually successful. Bohorquez was taken to Lima and put to death, and the Calchaquies were placed under a military Deputy-Governor, who was subordinate to Tucuman. Their martial spirit, however, did not die out, and in the nineteenth century they proved themselves one of the most spirited of the warlike races of South America.
The other trouble of the seventeenth century was more serious and involved more bloodshed. We have seen that there was considerable jealousy between the Spanish and Portuguese in South America. In 1580 Portugal had been united to Spain, but this change did not make the relations any more harmonious, for there was a standing cause of quarrel between the two nations. The Portuguese had founded in the temperate Brazilian uplands the city of São Paulo, and the inhabitants known as Paulistas, were a turbulent people and had an intense hatred of the Jesuits. The Jesuits, supported by the Spanish Government, protected the Indians and devoted themselves to their general welfare, but the chief business of the Paulistas was to capture Indians and sell them into slavery. They looked with covetous eyes upon the Reductions, as the Jesuit settlements were called, for here was the raw material of their industry in the shape of hundreds of thousands of submissive Indians. Accordingly, in 1629 they picked a quarrel with the Jesuits and attacked the Reduction of San Antonio, where they committed great ravages, killingand capturing multitudes of the helpless Indians. The Jesuits, who were not loved by the Governor of Paraguay, were compelled to evacuate Guayra and the scope of their benevolent labours was largely curtailed. This cruel and devastating war continued for many years and caused widespread ruin and loss of life until, in 1638, the Jesuits appealed to the Court of Spain, requesting that their wrongs might be redressed and that they might arm their helpless converts against the oppressor. The appeal was successful. "The King," says Southey,[27]"confirmed all the former laws in favour of the Indians: he declared the conduct of the Paulistas, who had carried away more than thirty thousand slaves from Guayra, and had begun the same work of devastation in the Tapé and on the Uruguay, to be contrary to all laws, human and divine, and cognisable by the Holy Office. The enslaved Indians were ordered to be set at liberty, and directions given to punish those who should commit these crimes in future, as guilty of high treason. A more important edict, because more easily carried into effect, provided that all Indians converted by the Jesuits in the province of Guayra, Tapé, Parana, and Uruguay, should be considered as immediate vassals of the Crown, and not on any pretext consigned to any person for personal service. Their tribute was fixed, but not to commence till the year 1649, by which time, it was presumed, they might be capable of discharging it. And the King not only granted permission to the Jesuits to arm their converts, but sent out positive orders to the Governors of Paraguay and the Plata to exert themselves for the protection of the Reductions." But in 1640 Portugal regained her independence and the marauding Paulistas left a lasting mark on the map of South America. Undoubtedly but for their incursions the whole valleyof the Parana would have been Spanish instead of Portuguese, but, as it was, the Spaniards had to retire behind the river Iguazu.
Emboldened by this success, the Portuguese ever kept in view the design of extending their dominions still further southward. In 1680 the Governor of Rio de Janeiro sent an expedition by sea and built a fort, which he named Nova Colonia, opposite the city of Buenos Aires. Thus the disputed territory of Uruguay was for the first time occupied by Europeans. The establishment of this hostile post caused great annoyance to the Governor of Buenos Aires, and he succeeded in capturing it upon several occasions, but the Home Government, in view of European politics, had no wish to offend Portugal, nor did it consider that the possession of almost uninhabited tracts was worth the risk of complications. It thus happened that Nova Colonia was always restored to the Portuguese eventually. It became a most prosperous port, for it was the seat of the contraband trade, and by its means the Argentines were able to export hides to Brazil. Doubtless it was beneficial to them, however much it may have interfered with the illicit gains of Spanish Governors. It remained in the possession of the Portuguese until 1777.
The contraband trade was indeed the chief feature of the domestic history of Argentina in the sixteenth century, and its tendency was to raise important international questions. The fight against the Spanish monopoly became every year keener as the various countries of Europe became more settled and secure and began to devote their energies to trade. In 1616 the monopoly received a heavy blow by the discovery of a way into the Pacific without passing through the guarded Straits of Magellan. This was made by theDutchman, Schouten,[28]who named Cape Horn after Hoorn, his birthplace. Immediately numerous Dutch and English ships took advantage of the new route and a great trade sprang up. As we have seen, the Governors of Buenos Aires played a prominent part in this trade, and no earthly power was able to prevent the economic law from taking effect. The case of Villacorta, a Governor who was discovered to have sent away three million dollars' worth of prohibited goods to Flanders, illustrates the helplessness of the artificial law. He was dismissed at the moment, but not long after he reappears as Governor of Tucuman. But, however illegally, trade went on and Argentina flourished. A traveller[29]who visited Buenos Aires in 1769 says that its chief trade was with Chile and Peru, and that it sent to them "cotton, mules, some skins, and about 400,000 Spanish pounds' weight of the Paraguay herb, or South Sea tea, every year." In fact Argentina, like the other Spanish colonies, advanced steadily in wealth and population during the eighteenth century, until progress was abruptly checked by the Revolution. But her history from the founding of Nova Colonia to the appearance of the English before Buenos Aires is remarkably barren in incident.
It was, of course, the fate of colonies to be pawns in the wars between powerful European States. Spain was a principal in the great war of the Spanish Succession, which was ended in 1713 by the Peace of Utrecht. Two of the articles were of importance to the Spanish possessions. By theAsiento de NegrosEngland obtained theright to send yearly to the Spanish colonies twelve hundred negro slaves, and Buenos Aires was named as one of the establishments for that traffic, while by theNavio de Permisoshe was permitted to send out yearly to the South Seas a ship with 650 tons of merchandise. These concessions, of course, greatly stimulated the contraband trade, for the colonists were as eager to buy as the English merchants were to sell, nor had the Spanish officials the will or the power to prevent many interlopers following in the wake of the privileged ships. Parish[30]remarks that it was "a trade which supplied the most pressing wants of the colony, and the profits of which were shared by the native capitalists. If they (the officials) did occasionally make a show of exercising their right to visit the ships, it was an empty threat, little heeded by men who were looked upon with almost as much dread as the buccaneers who had so long been the terror of all that part of the world."
Under the Bourbons and under the skilful administration of Alberoni, the fortune of Spain revived, and the colonies benefited in a corresponding degree.
In 1726 the Spaniards seized and fortified Montevideo which had been founded by the Portuguese a few years previously; this was an important step, for it declared that, in spite of Nova Colonia, the territory now known as Uruguay should be Spanish. The new town rapidly became wealthy and second only to Buenos Aires.
There can be little doubt that historians have considerably exaggerated the weakness and decay of Spain during the eighteenth century. Her comparative strength is proved by the fact that she maintained her trade regulations which were only contravened surreptitiously. The attempt of England to overthrow them by force shows how great was the resistive power of this unenterprising but still formidable empire. The War of Jenkins's Ear may be considered as a rehearsal of the struggle for the New World which occupied a great part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which is still unfinished.
Therefore, although the war is in itself trivial and ineffective, its purport is not so; it was the battle of the new spirit against the old, of the trader against the official, of the active against the passive. If here and elsewhere the latter had conquered, we might have had, in place of our modern hives of industry, vast thinly populated regions dotted with little, self-sufficient villages, which possibly were destined to be overrun by a more restless and energetic yellow race.[31]
Undoubtedly the English had not a shadow of right on their side; they were encouraging the breaking of treaties and flagrant political dishonesty. But under the brutal economic codes of the time there was no law but the law of the stronger; England might take if she had the power and Spain might keep if she could. The turbulent English mobs, clamouring for war, were shrewder than Walpole, shrewder than Burke, for they knew that to an island and trading people outlets for their commerce were matters of sheer necessity.
The Spaniards strongly disliked the Asiento Treaty, and,as is well known, English merchants, under cover of the privilege, carried on extensive smuggling operations against which the Spanishguarda costasretaliated vigorously. It was in 1731 that they perpetrated upon Captain Jenkins the outrage which was to make so great a stir some years later. It may be added that Jenkins did really lose his ear on the high seas, and that the insinuations that the whole affair was a fabrication are themselves quite without foundation.[32]However, not for nearly seven years was there any attempt to make political capital out of it, although the smuggling question remained a constant source of irritation between the two countries. It was at the beginning of 1738 that circumstances were favourable for an outbreak, for a powerful opposition was longing to bring about the fall of Walpole, and his position was weakened by the death of Queen Caroline. No weapon could be more effectual than the accusation of being insensible to the claims of national honour and of tamely suffering insults from Spain. On March 30th Carteret, in the House of Commons, carried an address against the right of search, and Walpole, who was anxious on all grounds to settle the matter, expedited the negotiations which had been for some time proceeding with Spain on the subject of compensation. In January, 1739, the terms of the agreement were published to the following effect. The Spaniards were willing that damages against themselves should be assessed to the amount of £200,000, but, on the other hand, the English Government acknowledged a counterclaim of £60,000, on account of the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Byng in 1718. With this and other possible deductions and abatements, the compensation seemed rather meagre, and the whole question of right of search being left to a Commission's decision, there wasnothing in the findings that could be agreeable to Englishmen. A storm at once rose. The Prince of Wales voted against the Government. Young Pitt thundered against Walpole. The Prime Minister had to give way. His colleagues were in favour of war, and, as often happened in such struggles, Admiral Vernon was despatched, long before a declaration of war, "to destroy the Spanish settlements and to distress their shipping." The national feeling continued to rise, and great were the manifestations of popular joy on the occasion of the formal declaration of war on October 23rd. "They now ring the bells," said Walpole, "they will soon ring their hands."
Meanwhile Vernon, though his force was small, lost no time, and having appeared off Porto Bello with six ships on November 20th, he captured it the next day, and the news of this success (which did not reach London till March, 1740), was received with extravagant demonstrations of rejoicing. In the spring Vernon was menacing Cartagena, and on March 24, 1740, captured Chagre. The home authorities appear to have been extremely dilatory, for it took them a whole year to send effectual reinforcements, and then their value was seriously discounted by the fact that General Wentworth had succeeded to the command of the land forces. This officer was thoroughly incompetent, and no exhortations of Vernon could rouse him to energy, and owing to his mismanagement the assault upon Cartagena of April 9th was a complete failure. The armament departed about a week later, having lost at least eight thousand men, and in July an attempt upon Santiago in Cuba failed likewise, owing to Wentworth's incompetence. Little more of note occurred on that side, and it is here proper to mention that Vernon was in nowise to blame for the unfortunate results, and that, with an efficient colleague, there seems no reason to doubt that he would have made a great name for himself in the annals of the British Navy. Nor should Smollett, because he happens to be a famous novelist, be accepted as a judge of the strategy of the expedition. He had, in fact, infinitely less materials for forming a judgment than a private at Waterloo had for criticising Wellington's dispositions.
The haphazard general management is well illustrated by the only brilliant achievement of the war—the Anson circumnavigation. Anson, with six ships manned by Chelsea pensioners and raw recruits, was ordered to the Pacific, and set sail on September 18, 1740. Although his little squadron dwindled to three, he rounded the Horn, and subsequently burnt Paita in Peru, and played havoc with Spanish commerce. He crossed the Pacific, captured a great treasure-ship, and returned by the Cape of Good Hope to England, which he reached June 15, 1744. He brought home treasure amounting to £500,000, and this was paraded through the streets of London in thirty-two wagons.
It would be difficult to say when the War of Jenkins's Ear ended, or what were its results. Carlyle[33]says: "What became subsequently of the Spanish War, we in vain inquire of History-Books. The War did not die for many years to come, but neither did it publicly live; it disappears at this point: a River Niger, seen once flowing broad enough, but issuing—Does it issue nowhere, then? Where does it issue?... Forgotten by official people; left to the dumb English Nation." Doubtless it was not forgotten by the people; they soon showed once more their eagerness to break down the monopoly, and this curious war is noteworthy both as striking the real keynote of a long series of vast struggles, and also as showing the greatvis inertiæof Spain. Southey[34]remarksthat the history of the War of Jenkins's Ear proves the strength of Spain in South America, and points out that an event in the war contributed indirectly to the prosperity of the River Plate settlement. When it was known that Anson was fitting out his celebrated squadron, the Spanish Government for its part also despatched six ships and three thousand five hundred men to protect the settlement. They delayed a long time there and, it is said, eventually not more than one hundred of the crews returned home, the greater part remaining to settle in the country.
Not less important than these hostilities against English and Portuguese (who from their near neighbourhood were almost equally dangerous in the contraband trade) was the loss to South America of that body which had been the conscience of Spanish America, which had protected the Indians, instructed the ignorant, and turned the wilderness into fertile fields. For a long time the civil power in Roman Catholic countries had been jealous of the influence wielded by the Jesuits. As their object was to suppress everything opposed to the Roman Catholic system as they understood it, so every element that felt itself menaced naturally rose in self-defence, and the Jesuits found themselves friendless in Europe. Their downfall was principally due to the able and astute Pombal, the Prime Minister of Portugal, who considered that his country was depressed by a too powerful hierarchy, and his machinations were greatly assisted by circumstances in the River Plate settlements.
Colonia had long been a trouble to the Spaniards, diminishing their trade and insulting them by its propinquity, and in 1750 they made overtures for an exchange. The offending port was to be surrendered and the Portuguese were to receive in exchange a large portion of the Jesuit Missions,i.e., the territory called LaGuayra and about 20,000 square miles to the east of the Uruguay River. This included seven Jesuit Reductions, and the Society and the Indians strenuously resisted the transference. Although the story of the Jesuits belongs rather to Paraguay than Argentina, it is for many reasons necessary to refer to that wonderful and benevolent despotism which they exercised in the Parana settlements, and also to relate the circumstances of their expulsion from South America—a matter of great importance to all the colonies.
The Jesuits did not commence effective work in Paraguay earlier than the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the days of the conquest attempts had been made by them to convert the natives and to further general missionary work, but the circumstances had not been favourable. It was in 1610 that two members of the Order, Cataldino and Mazeta, founded the settlement of Loreto on the Upper Parana. An unfriendly critic[35]remarks: "They began by gathering together about one hundred and fifty wandering families, whom they persuaded to settle, and they united them into a little township. This was the slight foundation upon which they have built a superstructure which has amazed the world, and added so much power at the same time, that it has brought so much envy and jealousy upon their society. For when they had made this beginning, they laboured with such indefatigable pains, and with such masterly policy that, by degrees, they mollified the minds of the most savage nations,[36]fixed the most rambling, and subdued the most averse to government. They prevailed upon thousands of various dispersed tribes of people to embrace their religion, and to submit to their government; and when they had submitted, the Jesuits left nothing undone that could conduce to their remaining in this subjection, or that could tend to increase their number to the degree requisite for a well-ordered and potent society, and their labours were attended with amazing success."
The Jesuit establishments are one of the many meritorious acts of Saavedra who, seeing with concern the depression of the Indians and recognising their value to the Spanish Crown, appealed to the King, whereupon Phillip III., in 1609, issued royal letters patent to the Order of Jesuits for the conversion of the Indians. It is true that the Jesuits drew considerable wealth from their obedient subjects. They exported hides in large quantities and had a monopoly of the production ofmaté. Their method of government also would have been unsuitable to a race of harder fibre,[37]for they jealously excluded their Reductions from the external world, allowing no European to enter, and the Indians were kept constantly at work at the agricultural pursuits which the Jesuits themselves had greatly improved. But in those days it was rare indeed for any settlers to pay any regard to the welfare of the uncivilised races whom they encountered, and it must be remembered that the Jesuits were practically the only Christian missionaries in the period between the Reformation and the middle of the eighteenth century. All honour, then, is due to them for their devotion and philanthropy.
When the peaceful Indians heard of the great disasterthat had overtaken them in their abandonment to their old enemies the Portuguese, there was consternation, but they were remorselessly driven from their homes. However, the Jesuits protested strongly, and in the end the Spanish Government was induced to annul the treaty. Nevertheless, the Indians never recovered their losses and the West of Rio Grande became permanently Portuguese, in spite of the abrogation of the treaty. The result would, no doubt, have been different had their powerful protectors remained in the country.
The officials at Buenos Aires cared much about Colonia and little for the Reductions or the fate of the Indians, and the Jesuits were accused of having brought about the recision of the treaty. Any pretext was now welcome, for their destruction was contemplated. As we have seen, the able Pombal had resolved to expel them from Portugal, and in 1759 he trumped up against them a charge of attempting to assassinate the King, and issued a decree for their deportation from Portugal. France eventually followed this example, and in 1767 even the Spanish King was induced to do the same, while in 1773 Pope Clement XIV. decreed the entire suppression of the Order.
In Argentina the Jesuits were seized and deported. It was expected that the Indians, who were armed, would make a serious resistance, but they were as sheep having no shepherd, and rather than remain in their old abodes to be harried by new masters they migrated to Entre Rios and Uruguay. But the work of the Jesuits has not perished, for they and the conventual orders were the first to give an example of humanity in the treatment of inferior races.
This great change was quickly followed by another. In 1776 the Vice-royalty of Buenos Aires was created, that is, the four countries now known as Argentina,Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, were detached from the Vice-royalty of Peru, under Don Pedro Cevallos, sometime Governor of Buenos Aires. This step was a recognition of the importance of Buenos Aires, to which all observers testify. All the efforts of the Spaniards to force the trade of Europe over the Isthmus of Panama and the Andes had failed, and Buenos Aires was now to fulfil its destiny as the metropolis of Spanish America. The new Governor brought a large force, for there had been serious trouble with Portugal. As the latter was too weak to resist, and as the news of peace between the two countries followed almost immediately, there was no difficulty in coming to terms, and Colonia was finally made over to Spain. The result of this important treaty was that Spain was left in undisputed possession of Uruguay and Portugal of Brazil in its present form, for she recovered Rio Grande and Santa Catharina. Free trade was established between Buenos Aires and Spain, and Argentina made wonderful industrial advances. The rest of the century was uneventfully prosperous, but great events were in the wind, and they were destined to have a powerful influence on Spanish America. The easygoing paternal rule was to come to an end, and a long period of bloodshed and turbulence was to succeed. As was the case in every other part of the world, the motive power was supplied by the French Revolution.
Colonies were one of the many new things which were introduced to Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. Of them mediæval Europe had known nothing since the dissolution of the Roman Empire; the means of communication were too bad, the Asiatic races were too powerful, and the Western world itself was too thinly populated to allow of distant excursions. The planting of settlements was familiar to both Greece and Rome. The Greek system was the simpler of the two, for the city state merely propagated itself by colonies as a plant propagates itself by seeds, and two cities existed instead of one, each independent of the other. But a Roman colony was incorporated as a subordinate and inferior part of the mother state. Greek history and literature were almost unknown in the Middle Ages, and even after the Renaissance they remained much less familiar than Latin. On the other hand, many European States, and especially Spain, inherited their law and their municipal systems from Rome, Latin was the international language, and the Church, by far the most powerful mediæval institution, was Roman. It is, therefore, not surprising that Spain followed the Roman colonial system, but all the circumstances were so different that beyond the mere incorporation and inferiority of the new dominions there was little other resemblance.
The main difference and the main characteristic of the Spanish colonial system was this—the colonies were the private property of the King of Spain. This, then, is the keystone of the edifice—that the dominions were vested in the Crown, not in the nation. The derivation of this theory is doubtless from the fact that in the early exploring days the Spanish and Portuguese kings were, really or apparently, private adventurers, and, in fact, the adventurers always assumed that they were stewards of royal estates rather than officers of a kingdom. Thus the colonies were the property of the King of Spain for the time being. Ferdinand had, in 1511, established a tribunal to manage his new property. This was the Council of the Indies, which made laws for the colonies and distributed all the appointments and acted as a Court of Appeal from the Audiencia in America. The King made all grants of land, and allowed the colonists only local liberties; the Spanish nation had no concern whatever in the matter. A modern parallel is the Congo Free State as it was a year or two ago. It is probable that the New World had little to complain of except in the matter of trade and commerce, but here the system was illiberal and short-sighted. The fifth share of the King in the produce of all the gold and silver mines was a small matter in comparison with the multitude of harassing restrictions,[38]which Spain never had the wisdom to cancel till it was too late. No colony was allowed to trade with any country except Spain; all the exports, whatever their destination, had first to go to the mother country, and thenavigation laws were conceived in a similar spirit. The most glaring instance of stupidity was the prohibition of import trade laid upon Buenos Aires. No Atlantic colonial port might receive goods from Spain except Nombre de Dios. When Argentina purchased goods from Spain they were despatched across the Atlantic to Nombre de Dios, carried by mule across the Isthmus, transhipped to Callao, and then taken over innumerable mountains into the River Plate country. Merely to state such a system is to condemn it, but there was no possibility of altering it, because the whole shipping trade of Spain was in the hands of a syndicate of Cadiz merchants, and they were all-powerful.
As is well known, no foreign State was allowed to trade with Spanish America, nor was any foreigner even allowed to enter it without special permission. Various manufactures were forbidden, and even the cultivation of the vine and olive was placed under restrictions, as it was feared that their produce might compete with the produce of Spain. In fact, the ideal of the home-staying Spaniard was that the colonies should be mere mining-camps. Gold and silver were regarded as the whole of wealth, and it was considered the height of commercial wisdom to drain the whole produce of the mines of America into Spanish ports without allowing a fraction to be diverted elsewhere.
Thus legitimate trade was made extremely difficult, for the Spaniards even discouraged colonial exports from the fear that precious metals might be concealed among them. Accordingly, in 1599, the Governor of Buenos Aires was commanded to forbid exportation and importation alike under penalty of death. But the stringency of the various laws and regulations defeated their own objects, a gigantic contraband trade grew up, and all the officials, from the Governor downward,were implicated in it. Bribes accompanied almost every business transaction.[39]The manufactures of Europe were surreptitiously landed at Buenos Aires, and of course ruined the sale of the goods that had come over oceans, Isthmus, and mountains. This contraband trade was chiefly carried on by the English and the Dutch, and, as Professor Seeley has frequently pointed out, the power to trade with the New World formed for some two hundred years the chief bone of contention in the foreign politics of European countries. The practice of smuggling has had two marked and very pernicious effects upon Spanish-American character; it has fostered contempt of law and the preference of Government service to profitable industry. As the Argentines despised the laws of contraband, so they came to despise all laws, and during their independent history the shackles of the law have been cobwebs light as air to restrain individuals or communities from disturbing the public peace. In a word, out of the contraband trade sprang one of the worst features of South America—lawlessness and turbulence. It is obvious that it also fostered an almost equally injurious spirit—the craving of office. It was easier and more profitable to take bribes from the smugglers than to engage actively in smuggling, and so the tradition has descended to prefer the certain emoluments (direct and indirect) of office to the uncertain gains of trade. In Spanish America it is better to be the nephew of a President than of a successful trader. Of course, itwould be absurd to attribute these two evils solely to the contraband trade, but the first has been undoubtedly encouraged, and the second, to a considerable extent, caused by the practice which was forced upon the Spanish colonies by an absurd fiscal system. The economic condition, therefore, of these countries appears to us very sombre. It must, however, be remembered that such treatment of "plantations" was the accepted policy of the age, and probably the reason why Spain was more unfortunate with her foreign possessions than other nations is rather to be found in the indolent character of her sons and her foreign embarrassments than in any particular set of restrictions.
Till the middle of the eighteenth century the principles of the Spanish colonial system were considered the last words of commercial policy by all nations and practically all individuals.[40]That great statesman, Lord Chatham, was fully convinced of the wisdom of these principles. He remarked: "Let the sovereign authority of this country over the colonies be asserted in as strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever. That we may bind theirtrade, confine theirmanufactures, and exercise everypowerwhatsoever, except that of taking money out of their pocket without their consent."[41]Indeed, the general commercial and colonial policy of Spain was at least as liberal as that of England, and was, during the half century preceding the Revolution, infinitely more liberal, and if we make allowance for the enlargement of the human mind in a hundred and fifty years, it must beadmitted that the present commercial policy of the South American Republics compares unfavourably with the Spanish system. There was at least material prosperity. Adam Smith,[42]while censuring the Spanish system of government and considering it inferior to that obtaining in English colonies, recognised that great progress was being made. He says: "The Spanish colonies are under a government in many respects less favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population, than that of the English colonies. They seem, however, to be advancing in all these much more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile soil and happy climate the great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance common to all new colonies, is, it seems, so great an advantage as to compensate many defects in civil government." It is impossible to put down the failure of Spain to anything but defect of character—the grand defect ofmañana, of putting off every exertion till to-morrow, or rather for ever. But it cannot be denied that a hundred years ago the ill-starred country had to face a series of misfortunes which might well have disheartened a more energetic people. The revolutionary spirit which had spread all over the globe was at first wonderfully impotent in the Spanish settlements owing to the rigid disciplinary system which had been in force for upwards of two hundred years. Yet that of itself would have been enough to have taxed all the energies of an ancient and absolute monarchy. Further, Spain contrived to change sides in such a way during the war as to get all the hardships of defeat and none of the fruits of victory. When she was in alliance with France her fleet was destroyed by the English, and when she was in alliance with England her territory was overrun by the French. At this crisis also she was afflicted bythe feeblest king of a feeble line and probably the worst queen and minister that ever lived. Under these circumstances it can hardly be a matter for wonder that she lost her colonies.
And yet if her general policy towards them be considered, it must be acknowledged that she deserved her fate less than any colonial power then existing. The Spanish merchants did indeed greatly hamper the development of South America, but they acted in obedience to a theory which was considered axiomatic and which was rigorously put into practice by every other nation. The King and the high officials always exerted their influence in favour of humane treatment of the Indians. Irala was conspicuous for his humanity, and the protective regulations which he put forward on their behalf and at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when reports reached Spain that the Indians in Tucuman were being ill-treated, it was ordered that Don Francisco de Alfaro, Auditor of the Supreme Court of Peru, should go to Paraguay and investigate the whole matter. The result was the Ordinances of Alfaro in 1612, which abolished both the forcible subjection of Indians and slavery, and substituted a small capitation tax. As we have seen, the Court of Madrid warmly seconded the early efforts of the Jesuits. The treatment, then, of subject races was as benevolent as circumstances and theories would permit, nor were the colonists in practice subject to any considerable severity. The commercial regulations were easily evaded, and the Argentina steadily advanced in prosperity.
The latter days of Spanish rule were extremely creditable to the sagacity and liberality of the Crown and its advisers. In 1764 a line of vessels was established to run between Corunna and various South American ports, with permission to carry Spanish merchandiseand bring back in return the products of the colonies, and in 1774 the colonies were allowed intercommunication and trade. In 1778 a new commercial code was drawn up for the benefit of the Spanish Indies, and this was surprisingly liberal for those days. Nine ports in Spain and twenty-four in the colonies were declared "ports of entry," and goods, for the most part, were allowed to pass in and out freely. The general duty was nominally 3 per cent. on Spanish goods and 7 per cent. on foreign goods; but as the latter had to be shipped from Spain, the duty upon them was really 40 or 50 per cent. If we compare this scale with that now in force, we shall see how greatly South America has retrograded since the removal of the control of Spain. It is interesting to remember that these beneficent regulations were framed while Smith was publishing the "Wealth of Nations," and that therefore backward Spain anticipated both Pitt and Huskisson.
After this Argentina advanced by leaps and bounds. The average export of hides had been 150,000; they soon rose to 800,000, and in one particular year the figure was 1,400,000. At least seventy ships sailed to Spain every year, and the population of Buenos Aires rose from 37,000 in 1778, to 72,000 in 1800. Buenos Aires became openly what she had long been struggling to be—theentrepôtfor wine and brandy from Cuzo, hides from Tucuman, tobacco,yerba maté, and wood from Paraguay, and gold, silver, copper, rice, sugar, and cocoa from the distant interior. Had the fate of Spain been happier, and the character of her sons stronger, South America would have had a very different destiny, for everything pointed to a period of peaceful development, and the people had a government which was exactly suited to them. The Revolution substituted for the mild rule of Spain a preposterous democracy which was onlyeffective or tolerable when metamorphosed into a dictatorship, and for more than two centuries of comparative peace an indefinitely long period of disorder and bloodshed.
Before closing this brief sketch of a period which has been both neglected and misunderstood (for it is usually passed over with a few reflections upon the perversity and tyranny of Spanish rule) it is desirable to indicate briefly the machinery of government, which underwent substantial alteration only in the last generation of the Spanish dominion. The King had a special body of advisers to help him in the administration of his oversea territory, and this was called the Council of the Indies. There were only two Viceroys—who, of course, were subject to the home authorities—they were the Viceroy of Mexico and the Viceroy of Peru. The latter ruled over the whole of South America. When a new colony was founded it was put under the charge of an Adelantado, or Governor, who was nominally subject to the Viceroy, but in practice he was independent and answerable only to the King. When he vacated office his acts were subject to a review, and he was liable to punishment if found guilty of misconduct, but in the nature of things there was little effective check upon him by the Home Government, and he was really a military ruler with almost despotic powers. However, the Spaniards, following the Roman tradition, always strongly favoured municipal government, and provisions were made which modified the arbitrary character of the system, although, as was inevitable, there were loud complaints that the claims of the Creoles—those born in the country—were neglected, and that the good posts were given to Spaniards from over the seas. Even to the last this grievance remained.[43]
The system of local government, which modified this exclusiveness and gave the children of the soil a considerable share in the management of their own affairs, is a most important feature in the history of Argentina.
To begin with, the Governor made grants of land to each white settler. The recipients of the grants became Encomenderos, who received also in fief several Indian villages and took tribute from the inhabitants in return for protection and Christian teaching. The Encomenderos swore "to defend, enrich, and ennoble the kingdom and care for the Indians," and they appear to have discharged their trust with tolerable fidelity.
But the Spaniards are city-dwelling people, and the history of Argentina chiefly centres in the towns where the governing body was the Cabildo, or town council. The Cabildo consisted of from six to twelve members, and although they had bought their offices of the King and held them for life, they imparted no insignificant popular element into the system of government, and when the Revolution came the Cabildos had sufficient vitality to act as the rallying-point for the revolutionists in every district. In Buenos Aires the Cabildo had great power, and the Governor could not easily override it, while in every city in the provinces the little town councils represented Creole and local interests. This system lent itself to particularism and was unfavourable to representative government, which accordingly has not been a success in Argentina, partly owing to this cause and partly to the natural incapacity of the people. It has been always very difficult to obtain a nationalassembly even for the decision of the most momentous questions and legislation, elections and administrations are controlled by functionaries rather than by electors and deputies. Under Spanish rule the Cabildo system worked extremely well. In the thinly populated districts the great proprietors ruled in patriarchal fashion.
Inefficiency and indolence were the chief grievances which the inhabitants of the Plate district could have reasonably urged against their rulers. The commercial regulations, as we have seen, were so bad that they were perpetually evaded, and the Governor and other officials took bribes and connived at the evasions. Thus grew up the evil tradition that official and political careers are above all others desirable, and that the productive classes are fair game for every kind of official exaction. But, in spite of all defects, the settlements steadily prospered, there were few serious Indian wars, comparatively little fighting even with the Portuguese or other foreign nations, and civil tumults were few and far between. If we make allowance for the natural progress that all nations must make in the face of all adverse circumstances, we cannot deny that even Argentina has lost ground in the nineteenth century, as compared with her position in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Another institution which exerted great influence upon the history of Spanish America was the Consulado, or Chamber of Commerce. In 1543 the first of these bodies was founded at Seville, and its principal object was to regulate trade with the Indies. The Consulado of Cadiz became eventually by far the most influential and gained an unenviable notoriety for its commerce-destroying enactments; but it was following the accepted commercial principles of the age, and there can be no doubt that the Consulados at Mexico and Lima were beneficial. Their business was to adjudge commercialsuits and carry on the entire trade in their respective Viceroyalties, and in general they undertook the commercial development of the settlements. Their policy was cautious and conservative.
Such, then, were the institutions which tempered the rigours of personal or despotic rule, modifying either the unlimited power of the Crown or the absolute military sway of the Governor. But in theory the royal authority was as complete as that of the Roman Emperor. Just as in later days Queen Victoria took the title of Empress of India as the successor of the Mogul Emperor, so the King of Spain was Emperor of the Indies in succession to Montezuma in Mexico and the Incas in Peru. The King's will was the source of law; legislation was carried out by means of Cédulas Reales, or Royal Decrees, which were issued by the Council of the Indies in his name, and, as was natural, the attempt was made at regulation on far too complete a scale, and matters which ought to have been settled by local authorities were the subject of decrees, and thus these enactments increased with alarming rapidity. The principles of these Cédulas soon fell into confusion; it is said that their codification, ordered in 1635, was not carried into effect until 1680, by which time it had become obsolete. It does not appear, however, that the rulers troubled themselves much about the confusion of the law; they would probably have been much more uneasy had all the decrees become effective, for it was obviously impossible to carry on all legislation at such a distance, and travellers and annalists agreed that the Governors and their subordinates usually neglected the law and governed according to equity. The result was not unsatisfactory.
Current ideas about history are very often wrong; they are often the repetition at third or fourth hand of an extremely indifferent authority. An Americantraveller may have come with the preconceived belief that all republics are free and all monarchies grinding tyrannies, and having accordingly stated that the condition of South America under Spanish rule was miserable, his statement has been echoed by all his successors. Or, again, another writer notices that the commercial regulations were absurd and vexatious, and he declares that the colonies were paralysed by the blight of Spanish rule. A third has no difficulty in discovering instances of atrocities committed against the Indians who worked in the Peruvian mines, and he enlarges upon the greed and inhumanity of the Spaniards. Thus the whole history, which possesses few striking incidents to tempt investigators, is distorted by prejudice and the three hundred years of Spanish rule are summarily dismissed as a barren period, fruitful in nothing but misery.
In fact, from first to last the Spanish colonies enjoyed a more liberal trade policy than did those of England. The reason that the abuses of the Spanish colonies were so much more prominent was that the Spanish trade was incomparably more valuable than the North American. Again, apart from the mines, the Spanish treatment of the Indians was considerably in advance of the standards of the time in humanity, nor would it be easy to find any body of men in the three centuries who pursued a wiser and juster policy towards inferior and conquered races. And, further, such cruelty as was perpetrated was the work of private exploiters or, at worst, of disobedient officials. The King of Spain and the ecclesiastics of Spain made every effort to redress the instances of ill-treatment which came to their ears. It was Charles III. who encouraged the Jesuits to proceed upon their mission of mercy, and if he had had the power he would have restrained the cruelty of the Portuguese Paulistas. The condition of the River Plate settlements underSpanish rule compares favourably with that of most civilised nations during the same period.
A recent writer,[44]summing up the general subject, makes some remarks which deserve quotation: "In discussing the often-repeated accusation of Spanish oppression, it is necessary to define what sort of oppression is meant: whether oppression of the Indians by the whites, or oppression of the whites by the Spanish Government. If the former is meant, then the Creoles were as guilty as the Europeans, and both were more guilty than the Spanish Government and its immediate representatives. If the latter, the restraint of the whites was in fact the measure of protection enjoyed by the natives; free immigration and large autonomy granted to European settlers would have meant extermination or enslavement. But the theory of a universal control which should foster both 'commonwealths' and protect the weaker was largely ineffective; and in this failure lay the troubles of the Indians....
"The usual exclusion of Creoles from the highest posts was a grievance; but both its extent and its significance were much exaggerated during the struggle for independence, since a very large number of subordinate posts, some of them commanding large influence and dignity, were usually held by Creoles. In fact, almost all the revolutionary leaders were connected with the royal service through posts held either by themselves or by their fathers....
"Here was an empire which, by the testimony of its own administrators, was honeycombed with continuous decay in all directions; yet this empire survived repeated external shocks, continually extended its influence, and after three centuries evoked the admiration of foreign observers. This vitality is not explained by the theoreticsystem of administration, nor yet by the practical neglect of that system. Perhaps the explanation may partly be found in personal character.... Examples constantly recur of admirable and loyal service, which has something Oriental in its simplicity and self-abandonment; in emergencies the presence of one capable leader counterbalances all vices. Again, the undefinable Spanish quality ofhidalguía, which animated the better part of the community, especially in New Spain, showed itself in a noble charity and hospitality, a liberal and careless use of wealth, indifference to material results, and an old-fashioned, uncalculating loyalty, sometimes almost fantastic."
The Spaniards had not the constructive genius of the Romans, and both in the mechanical contrivances of civilisation and in the moral force which founds laws and institutions they were far inferior. But they played very much the same part in South America which the Romans did in Europe. France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy are not more distinctively Roman than Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Colombia are Spanish. As Spain was in language and institutions the most completely Romanised of all European countries, so she has left her mark upon the West more distinctively than any other colonising Power. For good or evil, Buenos Aires, Lima, and the rest are Spanish cities, and there seems no reason to believe that they will ever be anything else, and the Spanish influence seems likely to be as permanent as the Roman in Southern Europe. Nor will any candid student of the history of the continent be unwilling to acknowledge that it was no small achievement for a nation to build up and administer such an empire, and he will regret that ignorance and prejudice have prevented the world from giving the praise due to a vast political and religious experiment which, in spiteof extraordinary difficulties, was successful as far as its own character was concerned, and which, when it broke down by reason of the weakness of the mother country, left behind it all its institutions, political, religious, and social. Governors became Dictators or Presidents, but everything remains substantially Spanish.