In the early years of the nineteenth century England was engaged in a life and death struggle with Napoleon, and Spain and Holland, two of the chief colonial Powers, were in alliance with the Corsican. At Trafalgar, in 1805, the naval power of France and Spain had been shattered, but Napoleon was master of practically the whole of Europe, and he was devising weapons against his enemies which he hoped would be more potent than fleets or armies. England's trade and industries were advancing rapidly, but the long-continued war tended to spoil her markets, and Napoleon was attempting to prevent his subject allies from engaging in any trade whatever with the enemy. Consequently there was throughout the war frequent distress, especially in the North of England, and the manufacturing interest was urgent upon the Government to find new markets. Possibly in some cases the effective fighting strength of England was dissipated in distant expeditions, but in these years some of the most valuable additions were made to our Empire, and if the expedition which is to be related had been in competent hands, the history of South America would have been changed and England would have had vast dominions in every continent of the world.
One such was acquired in South Africa in January, 1806, when Cape Town was rapidly and easily takenfrom the Dutch. Sir Home Popham commanded the naval forces while Sir David Baird was Commander-in-Chief. Popham was an able and restless man, and hearing a few months later from an American sea-captain that the people of Buenos Aires and Montevideo were oppressed by the Spanish Government and would welcome the English as liberators, he resolved to make an attempt in that quarter and persuaded Baird to lend him a brigade.[45]The flotilla consisted of five ships of war and five transports, and the little army numbered 1,635 men under the command of that fine soldier, General Beresford. Popham was disobeying his orders and leaving Cape Town defenceless, but he knew that the acquisition of a new trade opening would atone for any technical disobedience in the eyes of the Home Government. The expedition left Table Bay on the 13th of April, 1806, and reached the River Plate on June 10th. Very wisely Popham proceeded to Buenos Aires instead of Montevideo, and on June 25th anchored off Quilmes, which is 15 miles south of the capital, and disembarked the same evening. The Spanish Viceroy made a very feeble resistance, and the next day the English force was encamped in the suburb of Barracas. On the 27th of June Beresford hoisted the English flag on the fort and a city of 72,000 inhabitants had been captured by a weak brigade. The Viceroy fled to Cordoba, and undoubtedly the feebleness displayed by the Spanish officials on that occasion helped to prepare the groundfor the subsequent Revolution. The Argentines, indeed, had lost the qualities of self-help and initiative under the paternal rule of Spain, but they were ashamed of the surrender to so small a force, and under their nonchalant attitude there was an eager desire to expel the foreigners if an opportunity should arise. All that was needed was a leader, and a leader was found in Jacques Liniers. He was a Frenchman who had been thirty years in the service of Spain, and at the time of the invasion he was Governor of Misiones. Seeing that the people were ripe for an attempt upon the English he made his way to Montevideo and asked for help from the General in command. This was readily given, and with a small force he marched to Colonia and thence passed over by boats to Conchas, 21 miles north of Buenos Aires. Meanwhile Puirredon, a Creole patriot, had been skirmishing in the neighbourhood, and had succeeded in capturing a gun from the English. This success, which was won by Gauchos, greatly emboldened Liniers and gave him confidence in the abilities of his followers for partisan warfare. His force amounted to 1,124 men with two large guns and four small pieces. On August 10th he suddenly entered the northern suburb of Buenos Aires. The next day he summoned Beresford to surrender, and on his refusal the attack began. On the 12th the enemy forced their way to the Cathedral which overlooks the square where the English had their headquarters, and soon, by annoying street-fighting, compelled them to abandon all the neighbouring streets. From the square itself Beresford was forced by artillery fire to retreat, and the situation was soon seen to be untenable. After 165 had been killed or wounded, the English force, which had attempted an enterprise for which its numbers were altogether inadequate, surrendered to General Liniers. He honourably desired tokeep the terms, which were that the soldiers should be embarked for England and not serve again until exchanged, but the Spanish authorities maintained that they had surrendered at discretion and marched them up-country as prisoners of war. Beresford, it may be added, contrived to escape six months later. The people of Buenos Aires had learned the lesson that if they desired security they must depend upon themselves rather than upon Spain. The first step they took was to depose their faint-hearted Viceroy and set up Liniers in his place.
Popham had sent home a glowing account of the commercial possibilities of the new conquest, and English traders made immense preparations to take advantage of the opportunity which was indeed sufficiently great. Sir David Baird had sent reinforcements of 1,400 men from the Cape, which arrived after the surrender, but of course Popham was too weak to retake the capital. He landed at Maldonado on the left bank and awaited reinforcements which were soon forthcoming, for the Cabinet had been greatly elated by the easy initial victory. On October 11th Admiral Sterling sailed from England in charge of a military force of 4,350 and a month later an expedition of equal strength under General Crauford followed for Chile. When the news of the disaster to Beresford reached England a swift ship was despatched after Crauford, ordering him to sail to the River Plate. Finally there followed General Whitelocke with additional troops and orders to take command of the whole expedition. The total armament amounted to twelve thousand men, eighteen ships of war, and eighty transports—a force amply sufficient to command success if it were well handled, but unfortunately it was placed in incompetent hands. The Ministry of All the Talents failed to justify its title in the planning of expeditions and the allocation of commanders.
John Whitelocke,[46]the new commander, had served with moderate success in the West Indies, but he owed his advancement (chiefly in pacific appointments) to his brother-in-law, Matthew Lewis, the Deputy Secretary at War, and father of the well-known "Monk" Lewis. But his appointment to this important command remains a mystery. It appears from Windham's Diary that he wished to give the command to Sir John Stuart, while Leveson-Gower was in favour of Whitelocke, and the annotator to the Diary declares that the Duke of York decided in favour of Whitelocke. This does not seem very probable, and though Lord Holland, who was a member of the not very competent Cabinet, suggests more plausibly that Whitelocke as Inspector-General of Recruiting was opposed to an important scheme of Windham, who therefore wished to get rid of him, still this view seems untenable in face of Windham's positive statement. The appointment can only be considered as one of the many blunders which sometimes counteract England's usual good luck; and on this occasion the effect was complete.
However, until he arrived matters proceeded in brilliant fashion. The first officer of high rank to appear was Sir Samuel Auchmuty, a loyal American who had served the King, for whose sake his family had suffered ruin, in America, India, and Egypt. Although he had expected merely to assist in the task of completing the conquest of Argentina, he was not dismayed when he found that the work had to be begun over again. He promptly began the bombardment of Montevideo andwithin a few days, February 3, 1807, the breach was found to be practicable. The town, strongly fortified as it was, taken by storm with a loss to the English of six hundred men, and the General acting humanely and prudently, conciliated the inhabitants and established civil rule. Many adventurous English merchantmen, whose owners anticipated a boom, arrived and unloaded, and necessaries and luxuries were sold at prices hitherto unknown in Argentina.
Whitelocke arrived on May 10th and Crauford on June 15th. It was on June 28th that the expedition left Montevideo. It consisted of four brigades, of which three were commanded by Generals Crauford, Auchmuty, and Lumley, the fourth by Colonel Mahon. The transports left amidst the cheers of the fleet, and success might well have been anticipated, for an enterprise was being attempted which a year earlier had been easily accomplished by less than one-sixth of Whitelocke's army, which was ten thousand strong. But these proportions hardly represented the difference between the brother-in-law of Matthew Lewis and the future victor of Albuera, and, moreover, the spirit of the colonists had risen, and they rejected both the feeble restrictions of Spain and the new prosperity offered by England. The first mistake was made in landing at Ensenada, 48 miles south of Buenos Aires, and the troops had to make long marches through deep swamps. But Whitelocke arrived at Quilmes (where he ought to have landed) on July 1st without having seen an enemy, and all promised to go well.
On that day Liniers attempted to oppose the invaders in force, but Crauford, with a vigorous charge, beat down all resistance and pursued the enemy to the suburbs. There is little doubt that Crauford was correct in his belief that if he had been supported by themain body, Buenos Aires would have fallen on that very day. But Leveson-Gower, the second in command, who was as incompetent as Whitelocke and who was the moving spirit in the whole disaster, recalled the troops and gave the discouraged Spaniards a welcome delay. On July 2nd Whitelocke called upon them to surrender, and they refused. He himself was well aware of the difficulties of an assault. As soon as Crauford arrived at Montevideo the Commander-in-Chief had taken him round the works, pointed out the peculiar facilities which the flat-roofed South American houses afforded for street-fighting, and declared that he would never expose his troops to the risk of a general assault. In this resolve Crauford heartily concurred.
The General had two easy and certain means of attaining his object. He might blockade the town and so starve it into surrender, or he might bombard it. But unfortunately he was too unstable to persevere in his previous resolution, and he allowed Leveson-Gower to persuade him to adopt a preposterous scheme of assault. It was decided that on July 5th the troops should be divided into eight columns, and orders were actually issued that they should advance with their muskets unloaded, lest they should be tempted to waste time in returning the enemy's fire. The columns were to march through the town until each had arrived at the square nearest the river. Then they were to halt and, apparently, do nothing, for no further orders were issued.
The attack began at half-past six in the morning. When the English had entered the town a withering fire was poured upon them from innumerable houses. But they pushed gallantly on. Auchmuty, who was on the left, made his way to the Retiro and the Plaza deToros, where he captured thirty-two guns and six hundred prisoners. The troops on the right seized the Residencia. But these successes were of no avail through lack of a competent guiding mind; the column leaders did not even know the whereabouts of the Commander-in-Chief, much less what he wished them to do, and further, the ill-judged scheme had borne its natural fruit in several serious disasters.
Crauford had seized the Convent of San Domingo, but he was surrounded by a very large force of the enemy who kept up a deadly fire of musketry and artillery, and by half-past four in the afternoon he was compelled to surrender. The same fate befell columns under Colonel Cadogan and Colonel Duff. In this day's fighting the English lost 70 officers and 1,130 men, killed and wounded, while prisoners amounted to 120 and 1,500.
Whitelocke and Auchmuty were now besieged in the Retiro. Their army had suffered severely, but they had still a large and efficient force, they had command of the sea, and the knowledge that the English Government would support them with all its available strength. Even if ordinary skill were out of the question, ordinary resolution would quickly have retrieved the initial reverses. But it was not to be.
Flushed by his success, General Liniers the next day sent a flag of truce to Whitelocke proposing to surrender all his prisoners if the English would evacuate Buenos Aires. He probably hardly expected anything but rejection of such terms, but the civilian Alzaga seemed to have had a better appreciation of the character of Whitelocke and insisted thatMontevideoshould be added toBuenos Aires. Nothing could be lost by making extravagant demands. The panic-stricken Whitelocke agreed to everything. At first he seems to have hesitated a little, but Liniers had added the menace that he could not be responsible for the safety of the prisoners if the attack were renewed. In any case such a threat should have been treated with contempt, but it was, as it happened, perfectly empty, for the life and property of every inhabitant of Montevideo were in Whitelocke's power.
Finally, he accepted the terms of surrender without raising the slightest objection to the inclusion of Montevideo, and taking great credit to himself for his humanity in yielding to Linier's threat, he wrote complacently: "Influenced by this consideration, which I knew to be founded in fact, and reflecting of how little advantage would be the possession of a country the inhabitants of which were so absolutely hostile, I resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of the troops had obtained, and acceded to a treaty, which I trust will meet the approbation of his Majesty."
He had signified his willingness to withdraw from Buenos Aires in forty-eight hours and from Montevideo in two months. As the Judge-Advocate remarked at the subsequent trial: "He is his own accuser: he has furnished the strongest testimony against himself." The English army sailed from Buenos Aires on July 12th, from Montevideo on September 9, 1807.
Seldom has there been such a fine army and such splendid officers under such a pusillanimous commander. A young officer[47]on the staff remarks that on many of the street corners in Montevideo was written: "General Whitelocke is either a coward or a traitor! Perhaps both!" He also tells us: "All the English merchants are in an uproar. They say the losses will be immense; that upwards of three millions worth of property is on its way to this country, and that, if it isgiven up, half the merchants in England will be ruined. God knows what will be the result of this unfortunate affair. It appears to me one of the most severe blows that England has ever received." Whittingham adds, with some penetration, that "the period of a revolution" was "not far distant."
It is some small consolation that the court-martials administered even-handed justice. The most important tribunal adjudged "that the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke be cashiered, and declared totally unfit and unworthy to serve his Majesty in any military capacity whatever." On the other hand Popham, who had disobeyed his orders in initiating the whole scheme, was severely reprimanded, but received a sword of honour from the City of London and a few months later was given an important command.
Sir David Baird, who had sanctioned Popham's adventure, was censured and recalled from the Cape, but he also was given the chief command of the very same expedition as Popham—that against Copenhagen. It is certain that public opinion would not have sanctioned any severe measures against officers who had been zealous in the South American attempt.
The most noticeable point throughout the whole affair is the eagerness of the English commercial world, which was dreading the loss of the Continental markets and was rightly convinced that the discovery of new outlets was a matter of life and death.
The remarks of the Judge-Advocate condense the whole case: "By this most unfortunate event all the hopes have been defeated which had been justly and generally entertained, of discovering new markets for our manufactures, of giving a wider scope to the spirit and enterprise of our merchants, of opening new sources of treasure, and new fields for exertion in supplying either the rude wants ofcountries emerging from barbarism, or the artificial and increasing demands of luxury and refinement, in those remote quarters of the globe. Important as these objects must be at all times to this country, the state of Europe, and the attempts that have been daily making to exclude us from our accustomed intercourse with the Continent, have added to the importance of these objects, and to the disappointment of these hopes." It is, perhaps, doubtful whether England could have held any considerable territory in Argentina, for a revolutionary spirit was rapidly being wafted into South America from Europe, and though the population was small the country was vast, and if the population had continued hostile the difficulty of either conciliating or conquering them would have been immense. But, doubtless, the retention of Montevideo and the territory now called Uruguay would have been feasible, and would have been highly beneficial both to England and South America. To have had one country in South America governed upon liberal and conservative principles, with an enlightened system of commerce and complete security for life and property, would have been an incalculable benefit, and would undoubtedly been a salutary check upon the wars and revolutions which have devastated South America since the overthrow of the Spanish dominion.
When the English retired from Buenos Aires and Montevideo there seemed no reason to expect any change in the relations between Argentina and the mother country. The Spanish rule was not rigorous, and, from a financial point of view, its policy was now highly favourable to the colonists. They also warmly sympathised with their European kinsmen in the apparently hopeless struggle against the oppression of Napoleon. When Charles IV. abdicated in 1808, all the Spanish-American dependencies hailed Ferdinand VII. as their King with enthusiasm. Nothing seemed less likely than any kind of disloyalty. And yet a very few years saw the beginning of a struggle which ended in an old and haughty nation being stripped of every one of the dominions she possessed on the American continent, and sinking into a state of lethargy and decay from which, after the lapse of a century, there seems little prospect of a "Roman recovery." The causes of this strange phenomenon certainly do not seem adequate. It is, of course, obvious that the weakness of the Home Government and their own successful repulse of the English showed the Argentines that if they had the will to be independent there was no doubt about the power. Again, their sense of importance could not but be increased by the eagerness with which foreigners soughtfor a share in their trade, and Cisneros, the Viceroy, had strengthened this impression by admitting neutrals unreservedly to the South American trade—a step which he took with great reluctance. But neither of these circumstances could have had any effect if goodwill and loyalty had remained unimpaired. These had probably been undermined by the jealousy between Creole and Spaniard, by the pride of caste shown by the latter towards the former, and by the preference always given to Spaniards in the matter of official appointments. As the people of Argentina increased in consciousness of worth and power, they would be the less willing to brook this assumption of superiority, and doubtless hot-headed young men had frequently discussed the possibility of the step for which the cant term is now "cutting the painter." There is a further circumstance which may have had influence on the course of events. Able and ambitious men could not but see that in the turmoil of revolution, followed by independence, there was a prospect of unbounded riches, and power, which, however speculative, is always more attractive to such minds than to be seated in the mean. Indeed a certain Francisco Miranda from Caracas, ex-volunteer in Washington's army, had, at the close of the war, discussed Spanish emancipation with Washington himself. He then visited Europe, fought in the French revolutionary army, and actually attained to the rank of general. His efforts subsequently to induce Pitt or President Adams to initiate a war of liberation in South America were, however, unsuccessful, but his constant intrigues with Spanish Americans show that the project was undoubtedly in the air.
Yet when we have gone over the meagre list of possible causes, we cannot but attribute the chief place to one which strengthened all the circumstances favourable tochange and neutralised or reversed those which were unfavourable. This was the doctrine of the Rights of Man or, to be plain, the revolutionary spirit itself. Its influence was felt by all classes, and it caused ferment and bloodshed in such widely different places as Ireland and the West Indies. It had already invaded England, and afterwards attacked her ancient rival and overthrew the French monarchy and trampled down the French Church. Thus, this purely moral cause must be taken as the efficient factor of the Spanish-American Revolution; the others could have effected nothing had not the seemingly barren dogma of equality provided an atmosphere and a soil ready to foster any revolutionary seed that might find its way to South America.
Ferdinand VII. was proclaimed King in 1808. The heroic Liniers was then Viceroy at Buenos Aires, but doubtless his French nationality gave rise to suspicions, and as soon as the news came that Joseph, the puppet of Napoleon, had been imposed upon Spain, the Frenchman was deposed, and on July 19, 1809, Cisneros became Viceroy in the name of Ferdinand. As stated above, he threw open the ports with startling results, for the customs revenue was immediately quadrupled. And yet this wise measure revealed to the people their strength and self-sufficiency, and may have predisposed them to revolution.[48]
On the 13th of May, 1810, news came from Spain that the mother country was now under the heel of France and had no longer any power to help or control them. Cisneros was in a very difficult situation. On May 25th he consented to the formation of a Council under thetitle of the Provisional Government of the Provinces of Rio de la Plata, and this date has been generally regarded by historians as the beginning of the Revolution. Prominent among those who desired change were Moreno, Belgrano, Saavedra, and Castelli. Moreno, who was secretary to the new Council, was a man of large views, irresistible enthusiasm, and full of daring. Belgrano was equally fervent in the cause and was devoted to Moreno, content to serve him without reward for the liberation of Spanish America, and he was one of the few men in the Province who, by business aptitude and coolness of character, was qualified to direct the movement. The Council acted with considerable adroitness. Professing to be acting for Ferdinand and thus conciliating all classes, they worked steadily in the direction of depressing and discrediting all Spanish officials, and at last, on June 1st, Moreno ordered Cisneros and other high functionaries to be seized and deported. A merchant brig conveyed them to the Canaries and they vanish from history.
Moreno anticipated trouble from Cordoba; but even there his opponents were losing ground. Liniers had retired thither, but despairing of success he, with several loyal Spaniards, collected a force of about four hundred men and marched in the direction of Peru. They were pursued, overwhelmed, and captured. The liberator of La Plata and five of his colleagues were thereupon shot. This outrage, equally remarkable as an instance of atrocity and ingratitude, was a fitting prelude to Spanish-American history. Before the end of the year the whole of the north was in the hands of the revolutionists, and about the same time they experienced an equally valuable success. The loyalists still held Montevideo and their fleet blockaded Buenos Aires. Moreno took advantage of the English anxiety for open markets,and appealed to the English Minister at Madrid. He received the reply that the British Government could not recognise the blockade, as it desired to maintain a position of perfect neutrality, and thus a potent Spanish weapon was rendered innoxious.
However, it was very early evident that unity and federation would not characterise the Revolution; that each Province would aim at its own particular independence; that Buenos Aires would not be the New York of a single new nation. An expedition sent to Paraguay, with the object of extirpating the Spanish partisans, failed altogether to attach that country to Argentina. Paraguay, like its neighbours, preferred independence.
At the same time jealousies broke out between the leaders. Moreno was worsted in a personal dispute with Saavedra, and at the beginning of the year 1811 was glad to accept an important mission to England. He died on the voyage thither. But the revolutionists were reminded that internal dissensions were out of place by the arrival at Montevideo of the able and energetic Elio, who had been appointed Viceroy by the Home Government. Although he was speedily forced to content himself with holding the town only, he was a source of great trouble to the Council and formed a valuable rallying-point for the loyalists. The Peruvian partisans also harassed them in the north, but Belgrano, by the victory of Tucuman on September 25th, laid the foundations of Argentine independence. The triumphant general wrote to Buenos Aires: "Our country may celebrate with just pride the complete victory obtained on the 25th of September, the anniversary of Our Lady of Mercy, whose protection we had invoked. We have captured seven guns, three flags, one standard, fifty officers, four chaplains, two curés, and six hundred men,besides four hundred wounded prisoners, the stores belonging to the infantry and the artillery, the largest part of the baggage. Such is the day's result. Officers and soldiers have behaved gloriously and bravely. We are pursuing the routed enemy." This victory freed the north from all fear of invasion in the future.
There is no need to give details of the skirmishes with the royal forces or the skirmishes between intriguing leaders which occupied the next eighteen months. It is sufficient to say that during this time the influence of the soldier San Martin was growing rapidly, and towards the close of the year 1813 he replaced Belgrano as commander of the northern army. Hitherto power had been in the hands of two or three men, among whom Alvear was now the most prominent; but in January, 1814, a Congress assembled at Buenos Aires, and on the 31st of that month it chose Posadas, a relation of Alvear, to be Dictator of the so-called United Provinces. In June Alvear captured Montevideo, and the hopes of Spain in the Plate district were for ever quenched; but Uruguay refused to be subordinate to Buenos Aires, and Posadas was in no position to coerce her. Uruguay, therefore, finally severed the connection with Argentina, and passes out of our history.
Meanwhile San Martin, who had become Governor of Mendoza, was carrying on that campaign for the liberation of South America which was to make his name immortal; but in Buenos Aires affairs were going by no means well—in fact, anarchy reigned. The appointment of Puirredon as Dictator brought about some improvement, and on July 9, 1816, the separation from Spain was formally announced.
The next year San Martin, with an efficient army of four thousand men, moved to help the Chilians, andgained a glorious victory over the Spaniards at Chacabuco, not far from Santiago. A year later he won a no less decisive triumph at Maipu (April 5, 1818), which secured the independence of Chile, and by his victories he also strengthened the position of Puirredon and the Government at Buenos Aires.
It was now time for constructive work. A Congress assembled once more at Buenos Aires, and, on May 25, 1819, promulgated a federal Constitution on the pattern of the United States of North America. At the same time Puirredon was glad to resign his difficult position, and, in his stead, General Rondeau became Dictator, or President. He was incapable, and the system of government by Juntas or Dictators, which had distracted the country for ten years, came to an end, and seemed likely to be succeeded by even worse conditions, for all the "United Provinces" flew back to particularism and anarchy. But in 1821 the able and honest Rivadavia intervened, and reduced affairs to some semblance of order. In that year also San Martin entered Lima in triumph, and it was clearly necessary to organise the new and sovereign States of South America. In 1822 Lord Londonderry declared for the part of the English Government that "so large a portion of the world could not long continue without some recognised and established relations, and that the State, which neither by its councils nor by its arms could effectually assert its own rights over its dependencies so as to enforce obedience, and thus make itself responsible for maintaining their relations with other Powers, must sooner or later be prepared to see those relations established by the overruling necessity of the case in some other form." The United States had recognised the independence of Argentina, and in 1823 the complicated state of world politics made decisive action necessary. Spain was once more in the grip of France, and it was the object of England to counteract her influence. Accordingly it was intimated to France that England considered the separation of the colonies from Spain as complete, and in the December of that year the United States put forward the celebrated Munroe Doctrine to serve as a warning to France or any other European Power that might cherish transatlantic designs.
It was on January 23, 1825, that the inevitable result was brought about. With the countenance of Sir Woodbine Parish, the English Minister, whose name is preserved by a meritorious work upon the country where he played so conspicuous a part, the federal States assembled and decreed the fundamental law of the Constitution. Here we may date the true commencement of the Republic of Argentina. The Revolution was at an end. True to the general character of her history Argentina displayed, in this important struggle, fewer striking events than any of the other young nations. The battles in her territory were few, and even the city feuds and inevitable executions were comparatively mild and infrequent. And yet that Argentina had the leading share in the Revolution no one can doubt, for, first of all, she gave to Spanish America that disinterested patriot San Martin, who was the George Washington of South America; and, in the next place, the victory of Belgrano at Tucuman went far towards paralysing loyalist activity in Peru, and finally Buenos Aires was even then regarded as the capital of the continent, on which were fixed the eyes of all South American revolutionists, and towards which all the plans of European statecraft and private intrigue were directed. Argentina was the leader and organiser of victory.
And what good came of it all? It may be regarded as a regrettable necessity due to the weakness of Spain.Spain was too feeble and the other Powers were too alien in every way to control this great Empire. It was necessary to act; but who will say that the consequences of the action were wholly beneficial? Argentina exchanged a benevolent, if unenterprising, Government for a long period of anarchy, alternating with despotism, but she was less unfortunate than most of the sister Republics. The men who fought and laboured for the cause of South American independence had no illusion on the subject. General Bolivar, the Liberator, when his task was over, said: "This country will inevitably fall into the hands of the unbridled rabble, and little by little become a prey to petty tyrants of all colours and races. If it were possible for any part of the world to return to a state of primitive chaos, that would be the fate of South America."
South America was in every respect most unfortunate. The weakness and misfortunes of Spain followed closely upon the growth of the revolutionary spirit which disturbed the whole world, and though the Continent was for a long time comparatively little affected by it, vigorous intrigues in Europe kept it alive, and when the time was ripe the revolutionists set to work. Equally unfortunate was it that the Revolution took place at a time when unchecked democracy was considered a practicable form of government. Experience has shown that it is beset with difficulties in all States; but where a portion of the people have political instincts and capacity, public affairs may go on, even if to some extent hampered by professions of a belief in ochlocracy, without serious disaster. Few people in the world could have been found less suited to direct democratic institutions than the Spanish Creole was at the time of the War of Independence. Little town communities, paternally governed groups of villages, all with complete local self-government andunited only by common loyalty to a King or Viceroy—such was the form of government under which the Indo-Spaniards might have lived and prospered; but the constitutions which they attempted to formulate were altogether incongruous under the circumstances. Political theorising has cost South America very dear.
Canning's oft-quoted sentence about the "New World which was called into existence to redress the balance of the Old" is, in the sense in which it is often quoted, a piece of cheap rhetoric. But, in fact, he was arguing that it was not worth while to go to war with France on account of the marching of French troops into Spain; the present Spain, he said, was not the country of which our ancestors were jealous; the Spain over the waters is independent, and the fact has entirely changed the balance of power.
To suppose, as those who quote the phrase often suppose, that South America was initiating a happy age in contrast to the wrongs and oppressions of the Old World, is too extravagant a belief to require refutation. In the nineteenth century the countries of Europe made steady progress, and even their internal troubles were generally fruitful in improved conditions. In South America most of the countries retrograded, and the whole continent was drenched with blood uselessly shed. Comparative tranquillity now prevails, but this is due to the general progress of the peoples—a progress which it would be rash to say was furthered by their political institutions. The heroics which have been uttered over the Spanish-America War of Independence are discounted by the facts of South American history. For a long time bloodshed and tyranny were its results; the people were as yet unfitted for full emancipation, and so little advantage has been taken of the experiences of three-quarters of a century thatthe promise of the future is by no means serene, and its chief hope is that material prosperity may counterbalance defective political conditions. These are still unsound, and until rulers and subjects advance in civic capacity the good of Argentina will be the effects rather of the industry and enterprise of private individuals than of assemblies and statesmen.
The rule of Rivadavia was of great value to the country. He reformed the laws and administration, introduced wide and somewhat drastic ecclesiastical changes, established the University of Buenos Aires, and, in general, pursued an enlightened and progressive policy.[49]But the country was divided into two hostile parties, and neither being prepared to tolerate the triumph of the opposing system, the position of Rivadavia was rendered very difficult. He belonged to the Unitarian party, and its members have succeeded in maintaining their system, which aimed at a Republic with merely municipal local government. Buenos Aires was to be the administrative centre and to control every province, and thus to hold the position which Paris occupied in France. But the propertied classes in the interior belonged chiefly to the Federalist party. They viewed with suspicion the oligarchy of office at the capital, and advocated a federation on the model of the United States. At first Rivadavia held his ground against his active opponents, led by Manuel Dorrego, who were eagerly looking for an occasion against him; and this was speedily found in a foreign war.
Uruguay has been united to Brazil, but in 1825 itrevolted against the Emperor, and, as might have been expected, Argentina took the part of her neighbour, and Brazil declared war. Assisted by Admiral Brown, an Irishman, the Argentines inflicted great loss upon Brazilian shipping, and Alvear took command of a large army, which invaded Rio Grande do Sul and completely defeated the Brazilians at Ituzaingo on February 20, 1827. This blow was decisive, and a treaty was made by which Rivadavia, distracted by domestic troubles and anxious to secure peace at any price, agreed that Uruguay should still remain a part of Brazil. His enemies had already spared no efforts to rouse prejudice and inflame public resentment against him. Appeals had been made to provincial jealousies, the issue of paper-money was alleged to be draining the country of the precious metals, and even his statesmanlike efforts to encourage immigration and the hospitality he offered to foreigners were matters of accusation against him. The treaty raised a storm of indignation, and had to be annulled. Rivadavia was so completely discredited by this transaction that on July 7, 1827, he was forced to resign, and thus the country lost probably the best constructive statesman she has produced—a loss which she could ill afford.
Dorrego succeeded him, but in reality the Republic was showing a strong tendency to split up, and Lopez in Santa Fé, Ibarra in Santiago, Bustos in Cordoba, and Quiroga in Cuyo, possessed almost as much power as Dorrego at Buenos Aires. However, with the help of several of these men, he succeeded in ending the war by a compromise which left Uruguay an independent state. Argentina was thus free to devote herself to domestic warfare.
Lavalle was now the head of the Unitarians, and he succeeded in expelling Dorrego from Buenos Aires.The latter fled to his estates and raised a body of adherents, but was captured and shot by Lavalle. The death of Dorrego cleared the way for a man who was destined to have a much longer political life than is usual in South America, and also to fill a much larger space in the eyes of the world. That man was Juan Manuel Rosas.
Darwin records that he and the well-wishers of Argentina were looking with satisfaction and hope at the vigorous measures and rapid advances of this remarkable man, and he also adds in a note written years afterwards that these hopes had been miserably disappointed. Rosas was a rich man, and from his earliest days had been engaged in cattle-raising on the southern Pampas. In this hardy open-air life he had greatly distinguished himself by his boldness and skill in riding, and was the idol of hundreds of half-savage Gauchos. He was not endowed with signal abilities, but he was a hard, practical man, full of audacity and little troubled by scruples. He was now the chief of the Federalists, but at first there seemed little prospect that he would be able to make head against Lavalle. The latter led an army to attack his enemies in Santa Fé, while General Paz marched upon Cordoba, and at the same time they sent some veteran troops to operate against Rosas in the south. But these were overthrown by the hardy horsemen of Rosas, and he came to the rescue of the Federalists. General Paz had captured Cordoba, and defeated Quiroga with heavy slaughter, but Rosas' weight turned the scale. He marched to Buenos Aires, and in June, 1829, Lavalle, who had become involved in a dispute with the French Minister, was glad to resign and leave the country. His successor, Viamont, was a puppet of Rosas.
On December 8, 1829, Rosas was elected Captain-General in the interests of the Federalists, but he had no intention of allowing Federalist principles to stand in the way of his supreme rule. Lopez was despatched against Paz, who had the misfortune to be accidentally taken prisoner. Showing unusual magnanimity, Lopez spared his life. The troops of the Unitarians never recovered from the loss of their brave leader, and being attacked by the ferocious Quiroga and driven to Tucuman, they were in a hopeless position. Quiroga butchered five hundred prisoners in cold blood, and few of the remnants of Paz's army escaped to Bolivia.
Rosas then employed himself in consolidating his power at Buenos Aires, and with this object he repealed several of the Liberal laws of Rivadavia. In this task he was assisted by a clever and crafty man named Anchorena, with whose collaboration he passed a rigorous law of "suspects" directed against the Unitarians. Severe as he was against that party, and detested as he was by the late holders of office in the capital, who resented the dominion of a rustic, he was really, by his masterful measures, advancing the principle against which he posed as the nominal antagonist.[50]At the end of 1832 his term of office came to an end, and he was re-elected. But as his extraordinary powers were not renewed he haughtily refused office, and left Buenos Aires to reduce the Indians of the Pampa, who had taken advantage of the civil discords of Argentina. Again a man of straw was put at the helm. His name was Balcarce.
In the Indian war Rosas was successful, penetrating as far as the Rio Negro and destroying, according to his own computation, twenty thousand of the enemy. It is notnecessary to describe the manœuvres and hesitations which preceded his return to nominal as well as real power. In 1835 he accepted the title of Governor and Captain-General, and henceforth ruled as a military Dictator. Never was there a more ruthless tyrant. The two most prominent soldiers and possible rivals left in Buenos Aires were Quiroga and Lopez. Quiroga had seen the elevation of Rosas with ill-concealed disgust, and the new Dictator resolved to make away with him. Rosas, therefore, commissioned him to go to pacify Salta and Tucuman, and on his way thither caused him and his suite to be assassinated. Shortly afterwards Lopez died, and it is only necessary to say that his physician was handsomely rewarded by Rosas. He established a reign of terror, and formed a club of ruffians called the Massorca, whose business it was to murder his enemies. One Maza attempted a Parliamentary resistance to him, and the crafty Dictator, after the plan had failed, first lulled him into security by vague promises of safety and then sent four men to stab him to death. His death was followed by an extensive proscription; in fact, the history at this period is distinctly Tacitean.
The power of Rosas was the greater because he had the help of a skilful general named Urquiza, against whom none of the Dictator's many enemies could make head. For a long time his power was unassailable, for the poignards of the Massorca were ready to repress any opposition, and even the Church was powerless against him. He expelled the Jesuits, paying a tribute at the same time to "their Christian and moral virtues," but declaring that they were opposed to the principles of government. Undoubtedly they were to the principles of his Government.
One of the main features of his policy was jealousy offoreign influence. He decided that all children born in Argentina wereipso factocitizens and liable to military service, and this decision remains in force at the present day. It led, however, to endless trouble with France. It is probable that if he had been able Rosas would have closed the country to all foreign nations, as his brother-tyrant, Francia, did in Paraguay.
But the old Greek saying that the worst disease of tyranny is the impossibility of reposing trust in its friends was to be justified, and Urquiza, his right-hand man, who had crushed the invaders from Uruguay at the battle of India Muerta and who had overawed all opposition, was at last to prove faithless. He had long been established as Governor of Entre Rios, where he had acted with remorseless cruelty in stamping out disaffection. His first attempts to subvert the authority of Rosas were unsuccessful, but in 1851 he made an alliance with Brazil and one of the Uruguayan factions, and in the December of that year he assembled a force of twenty-four thousand men, crossed the Parana, and marched into Santa Fé. On February 3, 1852, Rosas was overwhelmed at the battle of Casseros near the capital and he fled to Europe. Twenty-five years later he died in Hampshire.
Rosas disappeared unregretted. Although it is possible that at the time he came to the front a military dictatorship was the only possible form of government, yet he was one of the worst of the long list of South American tyrants, and it is probably impossible to find any redeeming feature about him except the fact that he encouraged agriculture—a service which was largely neutralised by his hatred of foreigners and foreign commerce. Undoubtedly he stopped the progress of a promising country, not only for the twenty years of his remorseless tyranny but for the long years which were required torecover from the effects of his sanguinary and soulless domination.[51]
Anxious as all were for peace and constitutional government, there was some civil warfare and much dissension before the position of Urquiza could be secured. Finally, on May 1, 1853, the Constituent Congress drew up a Federal constitution, and this is practically still in force.[52]Hardly less important was the treaty of the 10th of July following, made with England, France, and the United States, which declared that the Parana and other rivers should be for ever open to navigation.
Urquiza was elected the first President under the new constitution for a period of six years, and the countrybegan to recuperate. The port of Rosario sprang into being, and the other river cities rapidly doubled in population. But towards the end of Urquiza's term civil troubles were renewed. The Province of Buenos Aires had been left outside the Confederation and was in a position of antagonism to the other Provinces. The party of the capital was called the Porteños—the men of the Port—and they took the place of the old Unitarian party. In 1859 Buenos Aires actually declared war upon the Federal Government, but Urquiza defeated its forces. Before a settlement could be made his term of office expired and he was succeeded by Dr. Durqui. Fortunately, the Governor of Buenos Aires, Bartolemo Mitre, was a true patriot, and though he was obliged to make war upon the President his efforts were directed to settling the Federal question, and they were, for the time, successful. Urquiza evacuated the capital and retired southwards. Mitre followed him with a large army, and in October, 1861, defeated him at Pavon and himself became President.
It would have been well if the energies of Mitre had been left unhampered to settle the thorny question of the respective claims of the Porteños and the provincials, but it was the misfortune of Argentina to be suddenly involved in the most serious foreign war of its history. This was the great Paraguayan war.
The occasion of the hostilities was Uruguay. That country had long been distracted by the savage political strife of the Colorados and Blancos, and in 1864 the Blancos, having got the upper hand, elected Dr. Aguirre to the Presidency, who, by his rigorous measures against all suspected of disaffection, excited the resentment of both Argentina and Brazil. Both of these countries had important stock-raising interests on the Uruguay frontiers, and in the civil turmoil their subjects werefrequently subjected to extortion and plunder. Having incurred the hostility of its too-powerful neighbours, Uruguay looked about for an ally, and found one in General Lopez, the Dictator of Paraguay.
Lopez in his youth had visited Europe, admired the great armies of the Continent, and returned convinced that he might play the part of Napoleon in South America. He had still hardly reached middle age and was able, cruel, and obstinate. He devoted all his efforts to raising and equipping an army by which he hoped to make himself the arbiter of South American politics. Accordingly he welcomed the appeal of Uruguay, and declared that he would regard an invasion of Uruguay by Brazil as an unfriendly act. When Brazil attacked Uruguay he did not, indeed, hasten to fulfil his promise; he cared nothing for the Colorados or Blancos, and the difficulties of invading Brazil were at first insuperable, but he was awaiting a favourable opportunity for his own aggrandisement. As far as Uruguay was concerned the Brazilians soon settled the matter; they beat down all resistance, set up Flores as President in February, 1865, and having established good relations with Montevideo, withdrew their army. But Lopez was a more difficult problem.
Lopez had already declared war; he had attacked Brazilian ships and made preparations to invade Rio Grande do Sul. His main object was to crush the Brazilian troops in the Plate district before they could be reinforced. His plans were bold, but there appeared no reason why they should not be successful. He had forty-five thousand infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and adequate artillery. Another fact in his favour was the friendship of Urquiza, now Governor of Corrientes, who was the enemy of Mitre. Both Brazil and Paraguay requested permission from Mitre to march their armythrough Misiones, but the President wished to remain neutral and refused both requests. Lopez, however, was dismayed by no obstacle, and directed General Robles with twenty-five thousand men to invade Corrientes. They soon overran the province. Argentina was in an awkward position, for her regular army amounted to six thousand men only, but she had the support of Brazil and Uruguay. On June 2, 1865, the defeat of the Paraguayan fleet by Brazil at Riachuelo baulked Lopez's schemes of an offensive war, and the allies prepared to invade Corrientes. Lopez was further hampered by the defection of Urquiza, who finally refused to assist him.
The plan for the invasion of Rio Grande had not been abandoned, but the Paraguayan force was opposed by that of Brazil and Uruguay on August 17th, and suffered defeat. A month later the defeated army under Ertigarribia surrendered. Before the end of the year Lopez was compelled to evacuate the Argentine territory.
But his position was less unfavourable than might be supposed upon a comparison of the resources of the contending countries, for he had an excellent army and the country between the Parana and the Paraguay was admirably adapted to defensive operations. It was densely wooded and liable to floods which often made it impassable. As long as he could hold Humaita, where he had erected batteries to stop the Brazilian fleet, it would be impossible for the allies to make an effective advance. They had an army of forty thousand men concentrated near the town of Corrientes, and by April, 1866, they had forced the passage of the Parana and were in Paraguay. On May 24th they were attacked by twenty-five thousand Paraguayans and a desperate battle ensued, which ended in the victory of the allies. The Paraguayans lost five thousand killed and wounded, and their opponents, who lost about two thousand, were soseverely crippled that they could not advance upon Humaita—a movement which might have ended the war.
The army was devoted to Lopez and the Paraguayan made a fine soldier, while the allies, encamped in unhealthy swamps, lost heavily from disease. Mitre at last began an onward movement, but on September 22nd he was repulsed with great slaughter at Curupaiti, and the war came to a standstill. There was a long pause, for the difficulties of the allies were enormous and cholera broke out in their camp. It was not till November, 1867, that the Brazilian army succeeded in crossing the Paraguay north of Humaita, and this clever movement of the Brazilian Marshal Caxias decided the fate of the war. The allied armies began to close round Humaita and Brazilian warships forced their way beyond Curupaiti. Lopez fought with remarkable determination and skill, but his embarrassments rapidly increased, and on February 18, 1868, the Brazilian fleet ran the batteries at Humaita, and this entirely disorganised the transport system of Lopez, who relied chiefly upon his waterways. All through the year fighting continued, but on December 27, 1868, Lopez received a crushing defeat at Angostura, south of Asuncion, and he was compelled to fly into the interior. A few days later the Brazilians occupied Asuncion. But the irrepressible Lopez proclaimed a new capital at Peribebuy and made desperate efforts to carry on the war. After much fighting the allies succeeded in capturing the town in August, 1869, and pursuing Lopez, defeated him at Campo Grande, the last pitched battle of the war. He fled into the forest with his mistress, Madame Lynch, his children, and numerous faithful followers. Even in this extremity he still kept the field, until at last, on March 1, 1870, while he was encamped far to the north on the riverAquidaban, his men were thrown into a panic by the approach of the enemy. In the confusion Lopez and his staff attempted to escape, but the General's horse stuck in a swamp; he refused to surrender, and was killed by a spear-thrust. Thus died this extraordinary man, who had wantonly led his country into a war in which five-sixths of her population perished.
During this long war the domestic history of Argentina was uneventful. Brazil was far more prominent in the war than Argentina, for General Mitre was several times distracted by rebellions in the north-west which called him from Paraguay. The rebels were easily driven across the Andes. But the constitutional question had never been settled, and hostility to the Porteños became stronger. The influence of Mitre had waned, and in 1868 Sarmiento was quietly elected in his place.
The close of the Paraguayan war is also the close of the anarchical period of Argentina's history. Hereafter, though she was often to be unwisely governed, the worst of the wars and revolutions were at an end, and the people were to devote themselves to developing the natural wealth of the country. Since the Revolution, her history had been almost as bloodstained and turbulent as the worst of her neighbours, but henceforward peace and prosperity, though not uninterrupted, are to distinguish her from the other South American Republics.
The era of modern Argentina is inaugurated by the Presidency of Sarmiento in 1868. Hitherto her business had been to work out her destiny with much waste of human life and wealth, now her task was to create both. Population[53]began to increase and industries flourished. Railways were extended and the administration was improved. It was a season of prosperity in almost every part of the world, and in this Argentina fully shared. Brazil had suffered much during the war, and Argentina profited by supplying its needs and also made up for her own losses by developing the vast pastoral and agricultural resources. The only political event of importance during Sarmiento's term of office was an insurrection in Entre Rios, where the veteran Urquiza was still Governor. One Lopez Jordan was leader of the revolt, and he succeeded in capturing and murdering Urquiza. The old man deserved a more peaceful end, for, though cruel, he had aimed at the public welfare, and he was one of those who did good service in establishing the Republic on a firm basis.After much bloodshed the rebellion was suppressed by young Julio Roca, a rising soldier.
Sarmiento's term of office came to an end in 1874. Mitre, favoured by the Porteños, and Dr. Avellaneda were rivals for the succession, and the latter became President, greatly to the annoyance of the Porteños. He introduced a more economical policy, and the country continued to prosper, but by far the most important event of the time was the reduction of Patagonia—an event the magnitude of which cannot even yet be estimated. It was less than a hundred years ago since the first small attempts at settlement had been made there, and Patagonia was still practically an enormous waste, a no-man's land, unmapped and roamed over by savage Indians. General Roca, now Minister of War, began to peg out claims for posterity. After Rosas had fallen from power the Indians had recovered most of the territory which he had taken from them, but now that Argentina was at peace the Government was more than able to hold its own, and in 1878 Roca employed the whole power of the country to subjugate Patagonia. He succeeded in making the Rio Negro the southern boundary. The Province of Buenos Aires claimed the whole of this new territory, but the other members of the Federation were naturally unwilling to see her thus augmented, and she had to be content with an addition of 63,000 square miles. The rest of the new land was divided into Gobernaciones, or Territories, as they would be called in the United States.
But he was to attain more notoriety in a less useful struggle. The perennial source of discord—the Provinces against Buenos Aires or the Federalists against the Unitarians—which ought to have been settled on the downfall of Rosas, was once more to convulse the Republic. Avellaneda, who was favourable to the Provinces, was determined to choose his successor, and the opposition candidate was Dr. Tejedor, who had the support of Mitre. Roca was the nominee of the outgoing President. The situation rapidly became strained, and in June and July, 1880, the partisans of either side took up arms and there was considerable bloodshed in Buenos Aires. The advantage rested with Roca's party; the Porteños were compelled to ask for terms of peace, and at last the difficult constitutional question was settled. Without delay Buenos Aires was declared the Federal capital, and although the Porteños were nominally defeated, their principles triumphed in reality. The result was the establishment of a strong central Government, and this was of the happiest effect in consolidating the Confederacy and in binding together its hitherto disjointed members.
This was a time of great material prosperity. Other opportunities will be taken of dwelling on this subject; here it is sufficient to say that industry and commerce expanded very rapidly. There was a huge boom; men seemed to be growing rich rapidly; it was a period of inflation and the President's attempt to establish the currency on a gold basis was unpopular and unsuccessful. But under his rule, and with the assistance of the able Pellegrini, the credit of Argentina improved and a loan of £8,000,000 was negotiated. On the whole, Roca's administration did him credit, although undoubtedly he might have taken more advantage of the exceptionally favourable circumstances, and introduced sounder and more honest principles of administration.
His successor, Dr. Juarez Celman, was a person of altogether inferior stamp. The fever for speculation grew rapidly, large additions were made to the national indebtedness, and the premium on gold doubled. TheGovernment, as is usually the case with South American Governments, was below rather than above the public standard of conduct. Government, Provinces, and municipalities, led the way in wasteful expenditure, the inflation reached its height. The time of the inevitable crash drew near.
In 1889 public opinion, wiser than the Government, grew apprehensive, and the Civic Union was formed with the object of overthrowing the President and reforming the finances and administration. Roca and Mitre, sincerely anxious for the good of their country, were the leading spirits in the opposition, and in July, 1890, the Revolution began. Some fighting took place, but the spirit of faction was less ferocious than it had been a generation ago, and most men seemed to consider that the desperate financial condition needed radical measures. The resistance of the Government was half-hearted, and on July 30th Celman resigned.
Pellegrini, the Vice-President, succeeded him, and it was time for the national affairs to be placed in more capable hands. The treasury was empty, and there was a great burden of debt. The whole financial and monetary system was in confusion, and in September Pellegrini was obliged to issue notes for $50,000,000. This step provided money for the immediate necessities of administration, but it helped to precipitate the crash which came in March, 1891. This vast monetary convulsion will be long remembered in England, and it has served as a salutary warning both to European investors and to speculators in the country itself, who now recognise that credit and the reputation for honesty is one of the chief factors in a country's prosperity. The Banco Nacional, in spite of all efforts on the part of the Government to save it, was submerged, and the same fate met every other bank except the London and RiverPlate. As a matter of course, political trouble followed industrial trouble, and in February while Roca was driving in a carriage he was fired at and slightly wounded. It was, however, to him and Mitre that the people looked to extricate them from their troubles, and the Porteños nominated Mitre as candidate for the Presidency amidst great enthusiasm, but the Cordoba section was indignant, and Mitre was induced to withdraw on condition that the new candidate should be non-party and that the election should be impartial. At the beginning of 1892 Saenz Peña, the candidate favoured by Mitre and Roca, was elected, and Alem, the leader of the new Radical party, known as the Civic Union, was banished. Pellegrini's term of office had disappointed his supporters and few regretted his retirement.
The task of Peña was hardly less difficult than that of Pellegrini. The improvement in the finances and administration came very slowly, but the chief troubles were political, for Argentina had not yet adapted herself to the smooth working of federal institutions. Alem, who had returned from exile, was still preaching disaffection and taking advantage of the turbulent disposition of the various Provinces. In 1893 Costa, the Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, who had a strong military force, planned the overthrow of the central Government, and his example was followed by Santa Fé and several other Provinces. In August Costa was forcibly deposed, but the movement in Santa Fé was fostered by Alem, and the Radicals were eager to overthrow Peña and his friends. Matters grew extremely serious, for there was disaffection in the navy, but on September 25th General Roca took command of the army, and on October 1st he rescued Rosario from the hands of the revolutionists. Alem and other leaderswere imprisoned and the power of the Radicals vanished, but public affairs remained in a threatening condition.
Evidence was found of widespread corruption, and that there was no public feeling against it is shown by the following incident. Costa had left the affairs of Buenos Aires in confusion, and the central Government appointed Dr. Lopez to administer them. He found evidence of malpractices against one Colonel Sarmiento and charged him, but failed to secure a conviction. Thereupon Sarmiento provoked Lopez to a duel, in which the latter was mortally wounded, but Sarmiento received a merely nominal punishment. The Government was thoroughly distrusted; it seemed powerless to reform abuses, and there was little likelihood that if the ruling Ministers were removed their successors would do any better. Such progress as the country made was due to the efforts of private citizens and the improvement in the trade conditions of the world.
The detachment of Peña from political parties had been expected to prove advantageous, but in practice this was not the case, for the President, having no party, had no supporters in the Congress, and matters approached a deadlock. At the beginning of 1895 the President found it impossible to induce the Congress to vote the Budget, and there was also a split in the Cabinet about the fate of two naval officers condemned for participation in the Santa Fé outbreak. Peña wished to confirm the death sentence; there was strong opposition, and Peña was probably glad of the excuse to resign and disappear from political life. This took place on January 21, 1895. The sentence upon the two officers was commuted to one of imprisonment.
He was succeeded by the Vice-President Uriburu, who had also been chosen on account of his neutrality; but he was more successful, and he had the powerful supportof Roca and Pellegrini. During his first year of office it seemed probable that a foreign war would be added to all the other troubles of the Republic, for the boundary dispute with Chile was assuming a threatening attitude and continued to disturb public tranquillity for seven years. This subject can be treated more conveniently in the history of the next administration, when it was settled. In this year a boundary dispute with Brazil about the Misiones was settled by the arbitration of President Cleveland in favour of the latter country.[54]
Little progress in settling the nation's difficulties was made under Uriburu, but internal and external peace was maintained. In 1898 General Roca succeeded him as President, and it was generally felt that a man had appeared who was competent to steer the ship of State into smoother waters. He had been of great service during the troubles which had attended the resignation of Celman, and had kept the disorderly elements in check. He had, all through the troubles of ten years, been on the side of law and order, and he was practically the leader of a national party.
In May, 1898, the President in his message to Congress denounced judicial corruption, and the publicity which he gave to these abuses resulted in several improvements; but there is still much matter for adverse criticism in the administration of justice in Argentina. The improvements in Government methods led to gradual general improvement, which, however, was also the result of natural causes, and Argentina became undoubtedly the most prosperous country in South America. The fearof political disintegration has become a thing of the past, owing to the preponderance of the capital in wealth and influence, but neither Roca himself nor any other successor has been able to banish a serious evil from which Argentina suffers, and which, though not causing civil war on a large scale, brings about disquieting strikes and riots. This is due to defective methods of government. The President may be said to have been the "saviour of his country" in the sense that a weaker or dishonest man would probably have plunged the country into both domestic and foreign war, and neutralised all the progress of a generation. But he could not bequeath political capacity to his colleagues, nor could he eradicate many bad traditions of long standing.
His last work was the settlement of the boundary dispute with Chile. It is not necessary to go into the history of the subject previous to the Treaty of 1881. In the old Spanish days there had been uncertainty about the boundary, and during the existence of the two Republics the quarrel had never slept. "During the whole of its progress the Argentine Republic contended that her western boundary from north to south was the Cordillera de los Andes, and that, in consequence, she had dominion over all the territory eastward of the crest of the Cordillera, the greater part of the Straits of Magellan, and the whole of Tierra del Fuego. Chile on her part accepted the natural boundary of the Cordillera, to a great extent, but maintained that this boundary did not rule in the southern part of the continent; that in Patagonia the territory on both sides of the Andes were Chilian, from the Pacific to the Atlantic; that the Straits of Magellan were Chilian; and that Tierra del Fuego was also Chilian."[55]
The two Republics made a Treaty in 1881. Theyagreed that down to 52° S.,i.e., to the Straits of Magellan, the boundary was to be the Cordilleras de los Andes. The line was to pass over the highest points of the watershed. The southern boundary was also determined. The Treaty represents a concession on the part of Chile, who gave up her extravagant claims to the east of Patagonia. But she still claimed that the line should follow the highest points in the watershed, while the Argentine Government insisted that the line should run from highest peak to highest peak.
This Treaty was ratified, but not carried out. In 1883 the Argentine Government informed its Ambassador at Santiago that the time had come to trace the boundary line. But procrastination is a South American characteristic, and the affair drifted on until, in 1888, a Convention was made. In accordance with the Treaty of 1881, this Convention appointed experts to trace the line. The matter, in fact, was one of great difficulty, for unfortunately it turned out that the watersheds and the highest summits did not coincide, and the experts disagreed hopelessly.
The question of the rivers had raised fresh obstacles, and the experts had brought matters to such a tangle that it was necessary in 1893 to draw up a Protocol to explain them further. The main principle which it fixed was that in case the high peaks of the Cordillera should be crossed by any river, that river should be cut by the boundary line. The experts continued their work, which was extremely arduous, for the boundary line ran through unexplored forests and mountains. But in 1895 feelings ran to a dangerous height in both countries, and the people of Argentina declared that the Chilians were assuming an aggressive attitude and were likely to attack them. They were made the more uneasy by the discovery that the army and stores had, like everything else,suffered from long years of misrule, and Congress voted fifty million gold dollars for military preparations. In July, 1898, a further controversy arose. The Puna de Atacama is a great salt waste of rugged tableland, volcanic, grassless, and inhospitable. Working from the north, the experts had found no great difficulty until they reached this savage territory. Here there was a deadlock, and the Chilians claimed the whole district. Possibly the belief that the disputed territory contained considerable borax deposits accentuated the quarrel, but the main source of it was national pride, for the majority of the Andine territory was of small value. The experts south of the Atacama waste proceeded more smoothly till they reached Patagonia. "Here,[56]indeed, the fundamental condition of identity between the "highest crest" and the "water parting" (or "divide," as it is called in North America), existed in full force, and no ground for dispute presented itself, the "main range" of the Andes being exceptionally well adapted by position and structure for an international boundary. It was the divergence of these two essential conditions in Patagonia which imperilled the peace of South America. The Patagonian rivers were found to flow from east to west right athwart, or transverse to, the general trend of the Andine mountain system from north to south. They were found to break across the great mountain masses, and to intersperse wide valleys, across which the boundary must either be carried from one mass of peaks to the next or else be made to skirt the indefinite edge of cordillera and pampas, where the two insensibly combine and where the rivers rise. A very little examination proved the incompatibility of "higher crests" with "water parting" as a fixed principle of demarcation in these parts."[57]