43Ueberweg (Geschichte der Philos. des Alterthums, vol. i. § 46, p. 127, 2nd ed.) gives a just and accurate view of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, as conceived by Aristotle. See also the dissertation of Buhle, prefixed to his unfinished edition of Aristotle, De Aristotelis Libris Exotericis et Acroamaticis, pp. 107-152 — which discusses this subject copiously, and gives a collection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it. It is instructive, though his opinion leans too much towards the supposition of a double doctrine. Bernays, in his dissertation, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, maintains that byexoteric booksare always meant the lost dialogues of Aristotle; and he employs much reasoning to refute the supposition of Madvig (Excurs. VII. ad Cicero, de Fin. p. 861), of Torstrick (ad Aristotel. de Animâ, p. 123), and also of Zeller, that by exoteric discourses are not meant any writings at all, but simply the colloquies and debates of cultivated men, apart from the philosophical schools. On the other hand, Forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion, and has defended it against the objections of Bernays (Forchhammer, Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden, p. 16, seq.). The question is thus fully argued on both sides. To me it seems that each of these two opinions is partially right, and neither of them exclusively right. “Exoteric discourse,â€� as I understand it, might be found both in the Aristotelian dialogues, and in the debates of cultivated men out of the schools, and also in parts of the Aristotelian akroamatic works. The argument of Bernays (p. 36, seq.), that the points which Aristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric discourses, were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by cultivated men out of the schools, or (as he expresses it) in thesalonsor coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) at Athens — this argument seems to me untenable. We know well, from the Topica of Aristotle, that the most abstruse subjects were handled dialectically, in a manner which he called extra-philosophical; and that this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at Athens. To discuss these matters in the way which he calls πρὸς δόξαν, was more frequent than to discuss them πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.Zell remarks (ad Ethica Nikom. i. 13), after referring to the passage in Aristotle’s Physica, iv. 10 (to which I have called attention in aprevious note), “quo loco, à Buhlio neglecto, ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι idem significant quod alibi κοιναὶ δόξαι, εἰωθότες λόγοι, vel τὰ λεγόμενα: quæ semper, priusquam suas rationes in disputando proponat, disquirere solet Aristoteles. Vide supra, ad cap. viii. 1.â€� I find also in Weisse (Translation of and Comment on the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517) a fair explanation of what Aristotle really means byexoteric; an explanation, however, which Ritter sets aside, in my judgment erroneously (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 23).
43Ueberweg (Geschichte der Philos. des Alterthums, vol. i. § 46, p. 127, 2nd ed.) gives a just and accurate view of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, as conceived by Aristotle. See also the dissertation of Buhle, prefixed to his unfinished edition of Aristotle, De Aristotelis Libris Exotericis et Acroamaticis, pp. 107-152 — which discusses this subject copiously, and gives a collection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it. It is instructive, though his opinion leans too much towards the supposition of a double doctrine. Bernays, in his dissertation, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, maintains that byexoteric booksare always meant the lost dialogues of Aristotle; and he employs much reasoning to refute the supposition of Madvig (Excurs. VII. ad Cicero, de Fin. p. 861), of Torstrick (ad Aristotel. de Animâ, p. 123), and also of Zeller, that by exoteric discourses are not meant any writings at all, but simply the colloquies and debates of cultivated men, apart from the philosophical schools. On the other hand, Forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion, and has defended it against the objections of Bernays (Forchhammer, Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden, p. 16, seq.). The question is thus fully argued on both sides. To me it seems that each of these two opinions is partially right, and neither of them exclusively right. “Exoteric discourse,â€� as I understand it, might be found both in the Aristotelian dialogues, and in the debates of cultivated men out of the schools, and also in parts of the Aristotelian akroamatic works. The argument of Bernays (p. 36, seq.), that the points which Aristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric discourses, were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by cultivated men out of the schools, or (as he expresses it) in thesalonsor coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) at Athens — this argument seems to me untenable. We know well, from the Topica of Aristotle, that the most abstruse subjects were handled dialectically, in a manner which he called extra-philosophical; and that this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at Athens. To discuss these matters in the way which he calls πρὸς δόξαν, was more frequent than to discuss them πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.
Zell remarks (ad Ethica Nikom. i. 13), after referring to the passage in Aristotle’s Physica, iv. 10 (to which I have called attention in aprevious note), “quo loco, à Buhlio neglecto, ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι idem significant quod alibi κοιναὶ δόξαι, εἰωθότες λόγοι, vel τὰ λεγόμενα: quæ semper, priusquam suas rationes in disputando proponat, disquirere solet Aristoteles. Vide supra, ad cap. viii. 1.â€� I find also in Weisse (Translation of and Comment on the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517) a fair explanation of what Aristotle really means byexoteric; an explanation, however, which Ritter sets aside, in my judgment erroneously (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 23).
44Thus, for example, the passage in the Ethica Nikom. i. 13, p. 1102, a. 26. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς, is explained in the Paraphrase of the Pseudo-Andronikus as referring to oral colloquy of Aristotle himself with pupils or interlocutors; and thismaypossibly be a correct explanation.
44Thus, for example, the passage in the Ethica Nikom. i. 13, p. 1102, a. 26. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς, is explained in the Paraphrase of the Pseudo-Andronikus as referring to oral colloquy of Aristotle himself with pupils or interlocutors; and thismaypossibly be a correct explanation.
From the time of Cicero downward, a distinction has been drawn between some books of Aristotle which were exoteric, and others that were not so; these last being occasionally designated asakroamatic. Some modern critics have farther tried to point out which, among the preserved works of Aristotle, belonged to each of these heads. Now there existed, doubtless, in the days of Cicero, Strabo, Plutarch, and Gellius, books of Aristotle properly calledexoteric,i.e.consisting almost entirely of exoteric discourse and debate; though whether Aristotle himself would have spoken of an exotericbook, I have some doubt. Of such a character were his Dialogues. But all the works designatedas akroamatic (or non-exoteric) must probably have contained a certain admixture of “exoteric discourseâ€�; as the Physica (Φυσικὴ Ἀκρόασις) and the Metaphysica are seen to contain now. The distinction indicated by Cicero would thus be really between one class of works, wherein “exoteric discourseâ€� was exclusive or paramount, — and another, in which it was partially introduced, subordinate to some specified didactic purpose.45To this last class belong all the works of Aristotle that we possess at present. Cicero would have found none of them corresponding to his notion of an exoteric book.
45To this extent I go along with the opinion expressed by Weisse in his translation of the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517: “Dass dieser Gegensatz kein absoluter von zwei durchaus getrennten Bücherclassen ist, sondern dass ein und dasselbe Werk zugleichexoterischundesoterischsein konnte; und zweitens, dassexoterischüberhaupt dasjenige heisst, was nicht in den positiv-dogmatischen Zusammenhang der Lehre des Philosophen unmittelbar als Glied eintritt.â€� But Weisse goes on afterwards to give a different opinion (about the meaning ofexotericbooks), conformable to what I have cited in a previous note from Sepulveda; and in that I do not concur. However, he remarks that the manner in which Aristotle handled the Abstracta,PlaceandInfinite, is just the same as that which he declares to beexotericin the case ofTime. The distinction drawn by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5) is not accurate: “Ἐξωτερικὰ dicebantur, quæ ad rhetoricas meditationes, facultatem argutiarum, civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant. Ἀκροατικὰ autem vocabantur, in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur; quæque ad naturæ contemplationes, disceptationesque dialecticas pertinebant.â€� It appears to me thatdisceptationes dialecticæought to be transferred to the department ἐξωτερικά, and thatcivilium rerum notitiabelongs as much to ἀκροατικὰ as to ἐξωτερικά. M. Ravaisson has discussed this question very ably and instructively, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote, pp. 224-244. He professes indeed to defend the opinion which I have cited from Sepulveda, and which I think erroneous; but his reasonings go really to the support of the opinion given in my text. He remarks, justly, that the dialogues of Plato (at least all the dialogues of Search) are specimens of exoteric handling; of which attribute Forchhammer speaks as if it were peculiar to the Charmides (Aristot. Exot. Reden. p. 22). Brandis (Aristoteles, p. 105) thinks that when Aristotle says in the Politica, vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 21: νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζώης, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς, he intends to designate the Ethica. It may be so; yet the Politica seems a continuation of the Ethica: moreover, even in the Ethica, we find reference made to previous discussions, ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικῶς λόγοις (Eth. N. I. 13).
45To this extent I go along with the opinion expressed by Weisse in his translation of the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517: “Dass dieser Gegensatz kein absoluter von zwei durchaus getrennten Bücherclassen ist, sondern dass ein und dasselbe Werk zugleichexoterischundesoterischsein konnte; und zweitens, dassexoterischüberhaupt dasjenige heisst, was nicht in den positiv-dogmatischen Zusammenhang der Lehre des Philosophen unmittelbar als Glied eintritt.â€� But Weisse goes on afterwards to give a different opinion (about the meaning ofexotericbooks), conformable to what I have cited in a previous note from Sepulveda; and in that I do not concur. However, he remarks that the manner in which Aristotle handled the Abstracta,PlaceandInfinite, is just the same as that which he declares to beexotericin the case ofTime. The distinction drawn by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5) is not accurate: “Ἐξωτερικὰ dicebantur, quæ ad rhetoricas meditationes, facultatem argutiarum, civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant. Ἀκροατικὰ autem vocabantur, in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur; quæque ad naturæ contemplationes, disceptationesque dialecticas pertinebant.â€� It appears to me thatdisceptationes dialecticæought to be transferred to the department ἐξωτερικά, and thatcivilium rerum notitiabelongs as much to ἀκροατικὰ as to ἐξωτερικά. M. Ravaisson has discussed this question very ably and instructively, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote, pp. 224-244. He professes indeed to defend the opinion which I have cited from Sepulveda, and which I think erroneous; but his reasonings go really to the support of the opinion given in my text. He remarks, justly, that the dialogues of Plato (at least all the dialogues of Search) are specimens of exoteric handling; of which attribute Forchhammer speaks as if it were peculiar to the Charmides (Aristot. Exot. Reden. p. 22). Brandis (Aristoteles, p. 105) thinks that when Aristotle says in the Politica, vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 21: νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζώης, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς, he intends to designate the Ethica. It may be so; yet the Politica seems a continuation of the Ethica: moreover, even in the Ethica, we find reference made to previous discussions, ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικῶς λόγοις (Eth. N. I. 13).
To understand fully the extent comprehended by the wordexoteric, we must recollect that its direct and immediate meaning is negative —extraneous to philosophy, and suitable to an audience not specially taught or prepared for philosophy. Now this negative characteristic belongs not merely to dialectic (as we see it in the example above cited from the Aristotelian Physica), but also to rhetoric or rhetorical argument. We know that, in Aristotle’s mind, the rhetorical handling and the dialectical handling, are placed both of them under the same head, as dealing with opinions rather than with truth.46Both the oneand the other are parted off from the didactic or demonstrative march which leads to philosophical truth; though dialectic has a distant affinity with that march, and is indeed available as an auxiliary skirmisher. The termexotericwill thus comprehend both rhetorical argument and dialectical argument.47Of the latter, we have just seen a specimen extracted from the Physica; of the former, I know no specimen remaining, but there probably were many of them in the Aristotelian dialogues now lost — that which was called ‘Eudemus,’ and others. With these dialogues Cicero was probably more familiar than with any other composition of Aristotle. I think it highly probable that Aristotle alludes to the dialogues in some of the passages where he refers to “exoteric discourses.� To that extent I agree with Bernays; but I see no reason to believe (as he does) that the case is the same with all the passages, or that the epithet is to be understoodalwaysas implying one of these lost Aristotelian dialogues.48
46See the first two chapters of Aristotle’s Rhetorica, especially pp. 1355 a. 24-35, 1358 a. 5, 11, 25, also p. 1404 a. 1.: ὅλως οὔσηςπρὸς δόξαντῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, which is exactly what he says also about Dialectic, in the commencement of the Topica.
46See the first two chapters of Aristotle’s Rhetorica, especially pp. 1355 a. 24-35, 1358 a. 5, 11, 25, also p. 1404 a. 1.: ὅλως οὔσηςπρὸς δόξαντῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, which is exactly what he says also about Dialectic, in the commencement of the Topica.
47Octavianus Ferrarius observes, in his treatise De Sermonibus Exotericis (Venet. 1575), p. 24: “Quod si Dialecticus et Rhetor inter se mutant, ut aiunt, ita ut Dialecticus Rhetorem et Rhetor Dialecticum vicissim induat — de his ipsis veteribus Dialecticis minime nobis dubitandum est, quin iidem dialectice simul et rhetorice loqui in utramque partem potuerint. Nec valde mirum debet hoc videri; libros enim exotericos prope solos habuerunt: qui cum scripti essent (ut posterius planum faciam) dialectico more, illorum lectio cum libris peperit philosophos congruentesâ€� — Ferrari adverts well to the distinction between the philosopher and the dialectician (sensu Aristotelico), handling often the same subjects, but in a different way: between the οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί, upon which didactic method rested, and the δόξαι or diverse opinions, each countenanced by more or less authority, from which dialectic took its departure (pp. 36, 86, 89).
47Octavianus Ferrarius observes, in his treatise De Sermonibus Exotericis (Venet. 1575), p. 24: “Quod si Dialecticus et Rhetor inter se mutant, ut aiunt, ita ut Dialecticus Rhetorem et Rhetor Dialecticum vicissim induat — de his ipsis veteribus Dialecticis minime nobis dubitandum est, quin iidem dialectice simul et rhetorice loqui in utramque partem potuerint. Nec valde mirum debet hoc videri; libros enim exotericos prope solos habuerunt: qui cum scripti essent (ut posterius planum faciam) dialectico more, illorum lectio cum libris peperit philosophos congruentesâ€� — Ferrari adverts well to the distinction between the philosopher and the dialectician (sensu Aristotelico), handling often the same subjects, but in a different way: between the οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί, upon which didactic method rested, and the δόξαι or diverse opinions, each countenanced by more or less authority, from which dialectic took its departure (pp. 36, 86, 89).
48I agree very much with the manner in which Bernays puts his case, pp. 79, 80, 92, 93: though there is a contradiction between p. 80 and p. 92, in respect to the taste and aptitude of the exterior public for dialectic debate; which is affirmed in the former page, denied in the latter. But the doctrine asserted in the pages just indicated amounts only to this — that the dialogues wereincluded inAristotle’s phrase, ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι; which appears to me true.
48I agree very much with the manner in which Bernays puts his case, pp. 79, 80, 92, 93: though there is a contradiction between p. 80 and p. 92, in respect to the taste and aptitude of the exterior public for dialectic debate; which is affirmed in the former page, denied in the latter. But the doctrine asserted in the pages just indicated amounts only to this — that the dialogues wereincluded inAristotle’s phrase, ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι; which appears to me true.
There grew up, in the minds of some commentators, a supposition of “exoteric doctrine� as denoting what Aristotle promulgated to the public, contrasted with another secret or mystic doctrine reserved for a special few, and denoted by the termesoteric; though this term is not found in use before the days of Lucian.49I believe the supposition of a double doctrine to be mistaken in regard to Aristotle; but it is true as to the Pythagoreans, and is not without some colour of truth even as to Plato. That Aristotle employed one manner of explanation and illustration, when discussing with advanced pupils, and another, more or less different, when addressing an unprepared audience, we may hold as certain and even unavoidable; but this does not amount to a double positive doctrine. Properlyspeaking, indeed, the term “exoteric� (as I have just explained it out of Aristotle himself) does not designate, or even imply, any positive doctrine at all. It denotes a many-sided controversial debate, in which numerous points are canvassed and few settled; the express purpose being to bring into full daylight the perplexing aspects of each. There are indeed a few exceptional cases, in which “exoteric discourse� will itself have thrown up a tolerably trustworthy result: these few (as I have above shown) Aristotle occasionally singles out and appeals to. But as a general rule, there is nodoctrinewhich can properly be calledexoteric: the “exoteric discourse� suggests many new puzzles, but terminates without any solution at all. The doctrine, whenever any such is proved, emerges out of the didactic process which follows.
49Luc. Vit. Auct. 26.
49Luc. Vit. Auct. 26.
Of the prodigious total of works composed by Aristotle, I have already mentioned that the larger number have perished. But there still remain about forty treatises, of authenticity not open to any reasonable suspicion, which attest the grandeur of his intelligence, in respect of speculative force, positive as well as negative, systematizing patience, comprehensive curiosity as to matters of fact, and diversified applications of detail. In taking account of these treatises, we perceive some in which the order of sequence is determined by assignable reasons; as regards others, no similar grounds of preference appear. The works called 1. De Cœlo; 2. De Generatione et Corruptione; 3. Meteorologica, — are marked out as intended to be studied in immediate succession, and the various Zoological treatises after them. The cluster entitled Parva Naturalia is complementary to the treatise De Animâ. The Physica Auscultatio is referred to in the Metaphysica, and discusses many questions identical or analogous, standing in the relation of prior to a posterior, as the titles indicate; though the title ‘Metaphysica’ is not affixed or recognized by Aristotle himself, and the treatise so called includes much that goes beyond the reach of the Physica. As to the treatises on Logic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Poetics, Mechanics, &c., we are left to fix for ourselves the most convenient order of study. Of no one among them can we assign the date of composition or publication. There are indeed in the Rhetorica, Politics, and Meteorologica, various allusions which must have been written later than some given events of known date; but these allusions may have been later additions, and cannot be considered as conclusively proving, though they certainly raise a presumption, that the entire work was written subsequently to those events.
The proper order in which the works of Aristotle ought to be studied (like the order proper for studying the Platonic dialogues),1was matter of debate from the time of his earliesteditors and commentators, in the century immediately preceding the Christian era. Boêthus the Sidonian (Strabo’s contemporary and fellow-student) recommended that the works on natural philosophy and physiology should be perused first; contending that these were the easiest, the most interesting, and, on the whole, the most successful among all the Aristotelian productions. Some Platonists advised that the ethical treatises should be put in the front rank, on the ground of their superior importance for correcting bad habits and character; others assigned the first place to the mathematics, as exhibiting superior firmness in the demonstrations. But Andronikus himself, the earliest known editor of Aristotle’s works, arranged them in a different order, placing the logical treatises at the commencement of his edition. He considered these treatises, taken collectively, to be not so much a part of philosophy as anOrganonor instrument, the use of which must be acquired by the reader before he became competent to grasp or comprehend philosophy; as an exposition of method rather than of doctrine.2From thetime of Andronikus downward, the logical treatises have always stood first among the written or printed works of Aristotle. They have been known under the collective title of the ‘Organon,’ and as such it will be convenient still to regard them.3
1Scholia, p. 25, b. 37, seq. Br.; p. 321, b. 30; Diogen. L. iii. 62. The order in which the forty-six Aristotelian treatises stand printed in the Berlin edition, and in other preceding editions, corresponds to the tripartite division, set forth by Aristotle himself, of sciences or cognitions generally: 1. Theoretical; θεωρητικαί 2. Practical; πρακτικαί. 3. Constructive or Technical; ποιητικαί.Patricius, in his Discussiones Peripateticæ, published in 1581 (tom. i. lib. xiii. p. 173), proclaims himself to be the first author who will undertake to give an account of Aristotle’s philosophyfrom Aristotle himself(instead of taking it, as others before him had done, from the Aristotelian expositors, Andronikus, Alexander, Porphyry, or Averroes); likewise, to be the first author who will consultallthe works of Aristotle, instead of confining himself, as his predecessors had done, to a select few of the works. Patricius then proceeds to enumerate those works upon which alone the professors “in Italicis scholisâ€� lectured, and to which the attention of all readers was restricted. 1. The Predicabilia, or Eisagoge of Porphyry. 2. The Categoriæ. 3. The De Interpretatione. 4. The Analytica Priora; but only the four first chapters of the first book. 5. The Analytica Posteriora; but only a few chapters of the first book; nothing of the second. 6. The Physica; books first and second; then parts of the third and fourth; lastly, the eighth book. 7. The De CÅ“lo; books first and second. 8. The De Generatione et Corruptione; books first and second. 9. The De Animâ; all the three books. 10. The Metaphysica; books Alpha major, Alpha minor, third, sixth, and eleventh. “Idque, quadriennio integro, quadruplicis ordinis Philosophi perlegunt auditoribus. De reliquis omnibus tot libris, mirum silentium.â€�Patricius expressly remarks that neither the Topica nor the De Sophisticis Elenchis was touched in this full course of four years. But he does not remark — what to a modern reader will seem more surprising — that neither the Ethica, nor the Politica, nor the Rhetorica, is included in the course.
1Scholia, p. 25, b. 37, seq. Br.; p. 321, b. 30; Diogen. L. iii. 62. The order in which the forty-six Aristotelian treatises stand printed in the Berlin edition, and in other preceding editions, corresponds to the tripartite division, set forth by Aristotle himself, of sciences or cognitions generally: 1. Theoretical; θεωρητικαί 2. Practical; πρακτικαί. 3. Constructive or Technical; ποιητικαί.
Patricius, in his Discussiones Peripateticæ, published in 1581 (tom. i. lib. xiii. p. 173), proclaims himself to be the first author who will undertake to give an account of Aristotle’s philosophyfrom Aristotle himself(instead of taking it, as others before him had done, from the Aristotelian expositors, Andronikus, Alexander, Porphyry, or Averroes); likewise, to be the first author who will consultallthe works of Aristotle, instead of confining himself, as his predecessors had done, to a select few of the works. Patricius then proceeds to enumerate those works upon which alone the professors “in Italicis scholis� lectured, and to which the attention of all readers was restricted. 1. The Predicabilia, or Eisagoge of Porphyry. 2. The Categoriæ. 3. The De Interpretatione. 4. The Analytica Priora; but only the four first chapters of the first book. 5. The Analytica Posteriora; but only a few chapters of the first book; nothing of the second. 6. The Physica; books first and second; then parts of the third and fourth; lastly, the eighth book. 7. The De Cœlo; books first and second. 8. The De Generatione et Corruptione; books first and second. 9. The De Animâ; all the three books. 10. The Metaphysica; books Alpha major, Alpha minor, third, sixth, and eleventh. “Idque, quadriennio integro, quadruplicis ordinis Philosophi perlegunt auditoribus. De reliquis omnibus tot libris, mirum silentium.�
Patricius expressly remarks that neither the Topica nor the De Sophisticis Elenchis was touched in this full course of four years. But he does not remark — what to a modern reader will seem more surprising — that neither the Ethica, nor the Politica, nor the Rhetorica, is included in the course.
2Aristot. Topica, i. p. 104, b. 1, with the Scholia of Alexander, p. 259, a. 48 Br.; Scholia ad Analyt. Prior. p. 140, a. 47, p. 141, a. 25; also Schol. ad Categor. p. 36, a., p. 40, a., 8. This conception of the Organon is not explicitly announced by Aristotle, but seems quite in harmony with his views. The contemptuous terms in which Prantl speaks of it (Gesch. der Logik, i. 136), as a silly innovation of the Stoics, are unwarranted.Aristotle (Metaph. E. i. p. 1025, b. 26) classifies the sciences as θεωρητικαί, πρακτικαί, ποιητικαί; next he subdivides the first of the three into φυσική, μαθηματική, πρώτη φιλοσοφία. Brentano, after remarking that no place in this distribution is expressly provided for Logic, explains the omission as follows: “Diese auffallende Erscheinung erklärt sich daraus, dass diese [the three above-named theoretical sciences] allein das reelle Sein betrachten, und nach den drei Graden der Abstraktion in ihrer Betrachtungsweise verschieden, geschieden werden; während die Logik das bloss rationelle Sein, das ὃν ὡς ἀληθές, behandelt.â€� (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, p. 39.) — Investigations περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι are considered by Aristotle as belonging to τὰ Ἀναλυκτικά; enquiries into method in the first instance, and into doctrine chiefly with a view to method (Metaphys.Γ.p. 1005, b. 2. In Metaphys.Γ.1005, b. 7, he declares that these enquiries into method, or analysis of theprincipiaof syllogistic reasoning, belong to the Philosophia Prima (compare Metaphys.Z.12, p. 1037, b. 8). Schwegler in his Commentary (p. 161) remarks that this is one of the few passages in which Aristotle indicates the relation in which Logic stands to Metaphysics, or First Philosophy. The question has been started among his Ἀπορίαι,Metaph. B. 2, p. 999, b. 30.
2Aristot. Topica, i. p. 104, b. 1, with the Scholia of Alexander, p. 259, a. 48 Br.; Scholia ad Analyt. Prior. p. 140, a. 47, p. 141, a. 25; also Schol. ad Categor. p. 36, a., p. 40, a., 8. This conception of the Organon is not explicitly announced by Aristotle, but seems quite in harmony with his views. The contemptuous terms in which Prantl speaks of it (Gesch. der Logik, i. 136), as a silly innovation of the Stoics, are unwarranted.
Aristotle (Metaph. E. i. p. 1025, b. 26) classifies the sciences as θεωρητικαί, πρακτικαί, ποιητικαί; next he subdivides the first of the three into φυσική, μαθηματική, πρώτη φιλοσοφία. Brentano, after remarking that no place in this distribution is expressly provided for Logic, explains the omission as follows: “Diese auffallende Erscheinung erklärt sich daraus, dass diese [the three above-named theoretical sciences] allein das reelle Sein betrachten, und nach den drei Graden der Abstraktion in ihrer Betrachtungsweise verschieden, geschieden werden; während die Logik das bloss rationelle Sein, das ὃν ὡς ἀληθές, behandelt.â€� (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, p. 39.) — Investigations περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι are considered by Aristotle as belonging to τὰ Ἀναλυκτικά; enquiries into method in the first instance, and into doctrine chiefly with a view to method (Metaphys.Γ.p. 1005, b. 2. In Metaphys.Γ.1005, b. 7, he declares that these enquiries into method, or analysis of theprincipiaof syllogistic reasoning, belong to the Philosophia Prima (compare Metaphys.Z.12, p. 1037, b. 8). Schwegler in his Commentary (p. 161) remarks that this is one of the few passages in which Aristotle indicates the relation in which Logic stands to Metaphysics, or First Philosophy. The question has been started among his Ἀπορίαι,Metaph. B. 2, p. 999, b. 30.
3Respecting the title of Organon which was sometimes applied to the Analytica Posteriora only, see Waitz ad Organ. ii. p. 294.
3Respecting the title of Organon which was sometimes applied to the Analytica Posteriora only, see Waitz ad Organ. ii. p. 294.
These treatises are six in number:— 1. Categoriæ;42. De Interpretatione, or De Enunciatione; 3. Analytica Priora; 4. Analytica Posteriora; 5. Topica; 6. De Sophisticis Elenchis. This last short treatise — De Sophisticis Elenchis — belongs naturally to the Topica which precedes it, and of which it ought to be ranked as the ninth or concluding book. Waitz has printed it as such in his edition of the Organon; but as it has been generally known with a separate place and title, I shall not depart from the received understanding.
4Some eminent critics, Prantl and Bonitz among them, consider the treatise Categoriæ not to be the work of Aristotle. The arguments on which this opinion rests are not convincing to me; and even if they were, the treatise could not be left out of consideration, since thedoctrineof the Ten Categories is indisputably Aristotelian. See Zeller, Die Phil. der Griech. ii. 2, pp. 50, 51, 2nd ed.
4Some eminent critics, Prantl and Bonitz among them, consider the treatise Categoriæ not to be the work of Aristotle. The arguments on which this opinion rests are not convincing to me; and even if they were, the treatise could not be left out of consideration, since thedoctrineof the Ten Categories is indisputably Aristotelian. See Zeller, Die Phil. der Griech. ii. 2, pp. 50, 51, 2nd ed.
Aristotle himself does not announce these six treatises as forming a distinct aggregate, nor as belonging to one and the same department, nor as bearing one comprehensive name. We find indeed in the Topica references to the Analytica, and in the Analytica references to the Topica. In both of them, the ten Categories are assumed and presupposed, though the treatise describing them is not expressly mentioned: to both also, the contents of the treatise De Interpretatione or Enunciatione, though it is not named, are indispensable. The affinity and interdependence of the six is evident, and justifies the practice of the commentators in treating them as belonging to one and the same department. To that department there belonged also several other treatises of Aristotle, not now preserved, but specified in the catalogue of his lost works; and these his disciples Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Phanias, had before them. As all these three disciples composed treatises of their own on the same or similar topics,5amplifying, elucidating, or controverting theviews of their master, the Peripatetics immediately succeeding them must have possessed a copious logical literature, in which the six treatises now constituting the Organon appeared as portions, but not as a special aggregate in themselves.
5Ammonius ap. Schol. p. 28, a. 41; p. 33, b. 27, Br.
5Ammonius ap. Schol. p. 28, a. 41; p. 33, b. 27, Br.
Of the two treatises which stand first in the Aristotelian Organon — the Categoriæ and the De Interpretatione — each forms in a certain sense the complement of the other. The treatise De Interpretatione handles Propositions (combinations of terms in the way of Subject and Predicate), with prominent reference to the specific attribute of a Proposition — the being true or false, the object of belief or disbelief; the treatise Categoriæ deals with these same Terms (to use Aristotle’s own phrase) pronounced without or apart from such combination. In his definition of the simple Term, the Proposition is at the same time assumed to be foreknown as the correlate or antithesis to it.6
6Τὰ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λεγόμενα — τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένωνα(Categ. p. 1, a. 16, b. 25). See Schol. ad Aristot. Physica, p. 323, b. 25, Br.; and Bonitz ad Aristotel. Metaph. (A. p. 987) p. 90.The Categories of Aristotle appear to formed one of the most prominent topics of the teaching of Themistius: rebutting the charge, advanced both against himself, and, in earlier days, against Sokrates and the Sophists, of rendering his pupils presumptuous and conceited, he asks, ἠκούσατε δὲ αὖ τινος τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτηδείων ὑψηλογουμένου καὶ βρενθυομένουἐπὶ τοῖς συνωνύμοις ἢ ὁμωνύμοῖς ἢ παρωνύμοις; (Orat. xxiii. p. 351.)Reference is made (in the Scholia on the Categoriæ, p. 43, b. 19) to a classification of names made by Speusippus, which must have been at least as early as that of Aristotle; perhaps earlier, since Speusippus died in 339B.C.We do not hear enough of this to understand clearly what it was. Boêthus remarked that Aristotle had omitted to notice some distinctions drawn by Speusippus on this matter, Schol. p. 43, a. 29. Compare a remark in Aristot. De CÅ“lo, i. p. 280, b. 2.
6Τὰ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λεγόμενα — τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένωνα(Categ. p. 1, a. 16, b. 25). See Schol. ad Aristot. Physica, p. 323, b. 25, Br.; and Bonitz ad Aristotel. Metaph. (A. p. 987) p. 90.
The Categories of Aristotle appear to formed one of the most prominent topics of the teaching of Themistius: rebutting the charge, advanced both against himself, and, in earlier days, against Sokrates and the Sophists, of rendering his pupils presumptuous and conceited, he asks, ἠκούσατε δὲ αὖ τινος τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτηδείων ὑψηλογουμένου καὶ βρενθυομένουἐπὶ τοῖς συνωνύμοις ἢ ὁμωνύμοῖς ἢ παρωνύμοις; (Orat. xxiii. p. 351.)
Reference is made (in the Scholia on the Categoriæ, p. 43, b. 19) to a classification of names made by Speusippus, which must have been at least as early as that of Aristotle; perhaps earlier, since Speusippus died in 339B.C.We do not hear enough of this to understand clearly what it was. Boêthus remarked that Aristotle had omitted to notice some distinctions drawn by Speusippus on this matter, Schol. p. 43, a. 29. Compare a remark in Aristot. De Cœlo, i. p. 280, b. 2.
The first distinction pointed out by Aristotle among simple, uncombined Terms, or the things denoted thereby, is the Homonymous, the Synonymous, and the Paronymous.Homonymousare those which are called by the same name, used in a different sense or with a different definition or rational explanation.Synonymousare those called by the same name in the same sense.Paronymousare those called by two names, of which the one is derived from the other by varying the inflexion or termination.7
7Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 1-15.
7Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 1-15.
We can hardly doubt that it was Aristotle who first gave this peculiar distinctive meaning to the two words Homonymous and Synonymous, rendered in modern phraseology (through the Latin)EquivocalandUnivocal. Before his time this important distinction between different terms had no technical name to designate it. The service rendered to Logic by introducing such a technical term, and by calling attention to the lax mode of speaking which it indicated, was great. In every branch of hiswritings Aristotle perpetually reverts to it, applying it to new cases, and especially to those familiar universal words uttered most freely and frequently, under the common persuasion that their meaning is not only thoroughly known but constant and uniform. As a general fact, students are now well acquainted with this source of error, though the stream of particular errors flowing from it is still abundant, ever renewed and diversified. But in the time of Aristotle the source itself had never yet been pointed out emphatically to notice, nor signalized by any characteristic term as by a beacon. The natural bias which leads us to suppose that one term always carries one and the same meaning, was not counteracted by any systematic warning or generalized expression. Sokrates and Plato did indeed expose many particular examples of undefined and equivocal phraseology. No part of the Platonic writings is more valuable than the dialogues in which this operation is performed, forcing the respondent to feel how imperfectly he understands the phrases constantly in use. But it is rarely Plato’s practice to furnish generalized positive warnings or systematic distinctions. He has no general term corresponding to homonymous or equivocal; and there are even passages where (under the name of Prodikus) he derides or disparages a careful distinctive analysis of different significations of the same name. To recognize a class of equivocal terms and assign thereto a special class-name, was an important step in logical procedure; and that step, among so many others, was made by Aristotle.8
8In the instructive commentary of Dexippus on the Categoriæ (contained in a supposed dialogue between Dexippus and his pupil Seleukus, of which all that remains has been recently published by Spengel, Munich, 1859), that commentator defends Aristotle against some critics who wondered why he began with these Ante-predicaments (ὁμώνυμα, συνώνυμα, &c.), instead of proceeding at once to the Predicaments or Categories themselves. Dexippus remarks that without understanding this distinction betweenequivocaandunivoca, the Categories themselves could not be properly appreciated; for Ens — τὸ ὂν — is homonymous in reference to all the Categories, and not a Summum Genus, comprehending the Categories as distinct species under it; while each Category is a Genus in reference to its particulars. Moreover, Dexippus observes that this distinction of homonyms and synonyms was altogether unknown and never self-suggested to the ordinary mind (ὅσων γὰρ ἔννοιαν οὐκ ἔχομεν, τούτων πρόληψιν οὐκ ἔχομεν, p. 20), and therefore required to be brought out first of all at the beginning; whereas the Post-predicaments (to which we shall come later on) were postponed to the end, because they were cases of familiar terms loosely employed. (See Spengel, Dexipp. pp. 19, 20, 21.)
8In the instructive commentary of Dexippus on the Categoriæ (contained in a supposed dialogue between Dexippus and his pupil Seleukus, of which all that remains has been recently published by Spengel, Munich, 1859), that commentator defends Aristotle against some critics who wondered why he began with these Ante-predicaments (ὁμώνυμα, συνώνυμα, &c.), instead of proceeding at once to the Predicaments or Categories themselves. Dexippus remarks that without understanding this distinction betweenequivocaandunivoca, the Categories themselves could not be properly appreciated; for Ens — τὸ ὂν — is homonymous in reference to all the Categories, and not a Summum Genus, comprehending the Categories as distinct species under it; while each Category is a Genus in reference to its particulars. Moreover, Dexippus observes that this distinction of homonyms and synonyms was altogether unknown and never self-suggested to the ordinary mind (ὅσων γὰρ ἔννοιαν οὐκ ἔχομεν, τούτων πρόληψιν οὐκ ἔχομεν, p. 20), and therefore required to be brought out first of all at the beginning; whereas the Post-predicaments (to which we shall come later on) were postponed to the end, because they were cases of familiar terms loosely employed. (See Spengel, Dexipp. pp. 19, 20, 21.)
Though Aristotle has professed to distinguish between terms implicated in predication, and terms not so implicated,9yetwhen he comes to explain the functions of the latter class, he considers them in reference to their functions as constituent members of propositions. He immediately begins by distinguishing four sorts of matters (Entia): That which is affirmable of a Subject, but is not in a Subject; That which is in a Subject, but is not affirmable of a Subject; That which is both in a Subject, and affirmable of a Subject; That which is neither in a Subject, nor affirmable of a Subject.10
9Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 16. τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δ’ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δ’ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἶον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.It will be seen that the meaning and function of the single word can only explained relatively to the complete proposition, which must be assumed as foreknown.That which Aristotle discriminates in this treatise, in the phrases — λέγεσθαι κατὰ συμπλοκὴν and λέγεσθαι ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς is equivalent to what we read in the De Interpretatione (p. 16, b. 27, p. 17, a. 17) differently expressed, φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ὡς κατάφασις and φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ὡς φάσις.
9Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 16. τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δ’ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δ’ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἶον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.
It will be seen that the meaning and function of the single word can only explained relatively to the complete proposition, which must be assumed as foreknown.
That which Aristotle discriminates in this treatise, in the phrases — λέγεσθαι κατὰ συμπλοκὴν and λέγεσθαι ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς is equivalent to what we read in the De Interpretatione (p. 16, b. 27, p. 17, a. 17) differently expressed, φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ὡς κατάφασις and φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ὡς φάσις.
10Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 20.
10Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 20.
This fundamental quadruple distinction ofEntia, which serves as an introduction to the ten Categories or Predicaments, belongs to words altogether according to their relative places or functions in the proposition; the meanings of the words being classified accordingly. That the learner may understand it, he ought properly to be master of the first part of the treatise De Interpretatione, wherein the constituent elements of a proposition are explained: so intimate is the connection between that treatise and this.
The classification applies toEntia(Things or Matters) universally, and is thus a first step in Ontology. He here looks at Ontology in one of its several diverse aspects — as it enters into predication, and furnishes the material for Subjects and Predicates, the constituent members of a proposition.
Ontology, or the Science ofEns quatenus Ens, occupies an important place in Aristotle’s scientific programme; bearing usually the title of First Philosophy, sometimes Theology, though never (in his works) the more modern title of Metaphysica. He describes it as the universal and comprehensive Science, to which all other sciences are related as parts or fractions. Ontology deals withEnsin its widest sense, as anUnumnot generic but analogical — distinguishing the derivative varieties into which it may be distributed, and setting out the attributes and accompaniments ofEssentiauniversally; while other sciences, such as Geometry, Astronomy, &c., confine themselves to distinct branches of that whole;11each having its own separate class ofEntiafor special and exclusive study. This is the characteristic distinction of Ontology, as Aristotle conceives it; he does not set it in antithesis to Phenomenology, according tothe distinction that has become current among modern metaphysicians.
11Aristot. Metaphys.Γ. p. 1003, a. 21, 25-33,E.p. 1025, b. 8. ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ’ αὑτό· αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖκαθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὅν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός,&c. Compare p. 1005, a. 2-14.
11Aristot. Metaphys.Γ. p. 1003, a. 21, 25-33,E.p. 1025, b. 8. ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ’ αὑτό· αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖκαθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὅν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός,&c. Compare p. 1005, a. 2-14.
NowEns(orEntia), in the doctrine of Aristotle, is not a synonymous or univocal word, but an homonymous or equivocal word; or, rather, it is something between the two, being equivocal, with a certain qualification. Though not aSummum Genus,i.e.not manifesting throughout all its particulars generic unity, nor divisible into species by the addition of well-marked essentialdifferentiæ, it is an analogical aggregate, or aSummum Analogon, comprehending under it many subordinates which bear the same name from being all related in some way or other to a common root orfundamentum, the relationship being both diverse in kind and nearer or more distant in degree. The wordEnsis thus homonymous, yet in a qualified sense. While it is not univocal, it is at the same time not absolutely equivocal. It ismultivocal(if we may coin such a word), having many meanings held together by a multifarious and graduated relationship to one commonfundamentum.12Ens(orEntia), in this widest sense, is the theme of Ontology or First Philosophy, and is looked at by Aristotle in four different principal aspects.13
12Simplikius speaks of these Analoga as τὸ μέσον τῶν τε συνωνύμων καὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων, τὸ ἀφ’ ἑνός, &c. Schol. ad Categor. p. 69, b. 29, Brand. See also Metaphys.Z. p. 1030, a. 34.Dexippus does not recognize, formally and under a distinct title, this intermediate stage between συνώνυμα and ὁμώνυμα. He states that Aristotle considered Ens as ὁμώνυμον, while other philosophers considered it as συνώνυμον (Dexippus, p. 26, book i. sect. 19, ed. Spengel). But he intimates that the ten general heads called Categories have a certain continuity and interdependence (συνέχειαν καὶ ἀλληλουχίαν) each with the others, branching out from οὐσία in ramifications more or less straggling (p. 48, book ii. sects. 1, 2, Spengel). The list (he says, p. 47) does not depend upon διαίρεσις (generic division), nor yet is it simple enumeration (ἀπαρίθμησις) of incoherent items. In the Physica, vii. 4, p. 249, a. 23, Aristotle observes: εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμωνυμιῶν αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσι αἱ δὲ ἔχουσαί τινα ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δ’ ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμίαι εἶναι οὖσαι.
12Simplikius speaks of these Analoga as τὸ μέσον τῶν τε συνωνύμων καὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων, τὸ ἀφ’ ἑνός, &c. Schol. ad Categor. p. 69, b. 29, Brand. See also Metaphys.Z. p. 1030, a. 34.
Dexippus does not recognize, formally and under a distinct title, this intermediate stage between συνώνυμα and ὁμώνυμα. He states that Aristotle considered Ens as ὁμώνυμον, while other philosophers considered it as συνώνυμον (Dexippus, p. 26, book i. sect. 19, ed. Spengel). But he intimates that the ten general heads called Categories have a certain continuity and interdependence (συνέχειαν καὶ ἀλληλουχίαν) each with the others, branching out from οὐσία in ramifications more or less straggling (p. 48, book ii. sects. 1, 2, Spengel). The list (he says, p. 47) does not depend upon διαίρεσις (generic division), nor yet is it simple enumeration (ἀπαρίθμησις) of incoherent items. In the Physica, vii. 4, p. 249, a. 23, Aristotle observes: εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμωνυμιῶν αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσι αἱ δὲ ἔχουσαί τινα ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δ’ ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμίαι εἶναι οὖσαι.
13Aristot. Metaphys.Δ. p. 1017, a. 7,E. p. 1025, a. 34, p. 1026, a. 33, b. 4; upon which last passage see the note of Bonitz.
13Aristot. Metaphys.Δ. p. 1017, a. 7,E. p. 1025, a. 34, p. 1026, a. 33, b. 4; upon which last passage see the note of Bonitz.
1. Τὸ ὂν κατὰ συμβεβηκός —Ens per Accidens—Ensaccidental, or rather concomitant, either as rare and exceptional attribute to a subject, or along with some other accident in the same common subject.
2. Τὸ ὂν ὡς ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς ψεῦδος —Ens, in the sense /of Truth,Non-Ens, in the sense of Falsehood. This is theEnsof the Proposition; a true affirmation or denial falls underEnsin this mode, when the mental conjunction of terms agrees with reality; a false affirmation or denial, where no such agreement exists, falls underNon-Ens.14
14Aristot. Metaph.E. 4, p. 1027, b. 18, — p. 1028, a. 4. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν — ἀλλ’ ἐν διανοίᾳ — οὐκ ἔξω δηλοῦσιν οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος. AlsoΘ.10, p. 1051, b. 1: τὸ κυριώτατα ὂν ἀληθες καὶ ψεῦδος. In a Scholion, Alexander remarks: τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὂν πάθος ἐστὶ καὶ βούλημα διανοίας, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὸ ἑκάστῳ δοκοῦν οὐ σφόδρα ἀναγκαῖον.
14Aristot. Metaph.E. 4, p. 1027, b. 18, — p. 1028, a. 4. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν — ἀλλ’ ἐν διανοίᾳ — οὐκ ἔξω δηλοῦσιν οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος. AlsoΘ.10, p. 1051, b. 1: τὸ κυριώτατα ὂν ἀληθες καὶ ψεῦδος. In a Scholion, Alexander remarks: τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὂν πάθος ἐστὶ καὶ βούλημα διανοίας, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὸ ἑκάστῳ δοκοῦν οὐ σφόδρα ἀναγκαῖον.
3. Τὸ ὂν δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ —Ens, potential, actual.
4. Τὸ ὂν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν —Ens, according to the ten varieties of the Categories, to be presently explained.
These four are the principal aspects under which Aristotle looks at the aggregate comprised by the equivocal or multivocal wordEntia. In all the four branches, the varieties comprised are not species under a common genus, correlating, either as co-ordinate or subordinate, one to the other; they areanaloga, all having relationship with a common term, but having no other necessary relationship with each other. Aristotle does not mean that these four modes of distributing this vast aggregate, are the only modes possible; for he himself sometimes alludes to other modes of distributions.15Nor would he maintain that the four distributions were completely distinguished from each other, so that the same subordinate fractions are not comprehended in any two; for on the contrary, the branches overlap each other and coincide to a great degree, especially the first and fourth. But he considers the four as discriminating certain distinct aspects ofEntiaorEntitas, more important than any other aspects thereof that could be pointed out, and as affording thus the best basis and commencement for the Science called Ontology.
15Aristot. Metaph.Γ. p. 1003, a. 33, b. 10. Compare the able treatise of Brentano, “Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles,â€� pp. 6, 7.
15Aristot. Metaph.Γ. p. 1003, a. 33, b. 10. Compare the able treatise of Brentano, “Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles,â€� pp. 6, 7.
Of these four heads, however, the first and second are rapidly dismissed by Aristotle in the Metaphysica,16being conceived as having little reference to real essence, and therefore belonging more to Logic than to Ontology;i.e.to the subjective processes of naming, predicating, believing, and inferring rather than to the objective world of Perceivables and Cogitables.17It is thethird and fourth that are treated in the Metaphysica; while it is the fourth only (Ensaccording to the ten figures of the Categories) which is set forth and elucidated in this first treatise of the Organon, where Aristotle appears to blend Logic and Ontology into one.