CHAPTER IX.

58Analyt. Post. II. xvi. p. 98, b. 25.

59Ibid. xvii. p. 99, a. 4: ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὗ αἴτιον καὶ ᾧ σκοπεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκόςÂ· οὐ μὴν δοκεῖ προβλήματα εἶναι.â€œVeluti si probemus grammaticum esse aptum ad ridendum, quia homo est aptus ad ridendum.â€� (Julius Pacius, p. 514.)

59Ibid. xvii. p. 99, a. 4: ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὗ αἴτιον καὶ ᾧ σκοπεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκόςÂ· οὐ μὴν δοκεῖ προβλήματα εἶναι.

â€œVeluti si probemus grammaticum esse aptum ad ridendum, quia homo est aptus ad ridendum.â€� (Julius Pacius, p. 514.)

60Analyt. Post. II. xvii. p. 99, a. 8-16.

The major term of the syllogism will in point of extension be larger than any particular minor, but equal or co-extensive with the sum total of the particulars. Thus the predicate deciduous, affirmable of all plants with broad leaves, is greater in extension than the subject vines, also than the subject fig-trees; but it is equal in extension to the sum total of vines and fig-trees (the other particular broad-leaved plant). The middle also, in an universal demonstration, reciprocates with the major, being its definition. Here the true middle or cause of the effect that vines and fig-trees shed their leaves, is not that they are broad-leaved plants, but rather a coagulation of sap or some such fact.61

61Ibid. a. 16 seq.

The last chapter of the present treatise is announced byAristotle as the appendix and completion of his entire theory of Demonstrative Science, contained in the Analytica Priora, which treats of Syllogism, and the Analytica Posteriora, which treats of Demonstration. After formally winding up the whole enquiry, he proceeds to ask regarding theprincipiaof Demonstrative Science: What are they? How do they become known? What is the mental habit or condition that is cognizant of them?62

62Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 15-19: περὶ μὲν οὖν συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἀποδείξεως, τί τε ἑκάτερόν ἐστι καὶ πῶς γίνεται, φανερόν, ἅμαδὲκαὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀποδεικτικῆςÂ· ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν, πῶς τε γίνονται γνώριμοι, καὶτίς ἡ γνωρίζουσα ἕξις, ἐντεῦθέν ἐστι δῆλον προαπορήσασι πρῶτον.Bekker and Waitz, in their editions, include all these words in ch. xix.: the older editions placed the words preceding περὶ δὲ in ch. xviii. Zabarella observes the transition to a new subject (Comm. ad Analyt. Post. II. ch. xv. p. 640):â€” â€œPostremum hoc caput (beginning at περὶ δὲ) extra primariam tractationem positum esse manifestum est: quum prÃ¦cesserit epilogus respondens proÅ“mio quod legitur in initio primi libri Priorum Analyticorum.â€�

Bekker and Waitz, in their editions, include all these words in ch. xix.: the older editions placed the words preceding περὶ δὲ in ch. xviii. Zabarella observes the transition to a new subject (Comm. ad Analyt. Post. II. ch. xv. p. 640):â€” â€œPostremum hoc caput (beginning at περὶ δὲ) extra primariam tractationem positum esse manifestum est: quum prÃ¦cesserit epilogus respondens proÅ“mio quod legitur in initio primi libri Priorum Analyticorum.â€�

Aristotle has already laid down that there can be no Demonstration without certainprÃ¦cognitato start from; and that theseprÃ¦cognitamust, in the last resort, beprincipiaundemonstrable, immediately known, and known even more accurately than the conclusions deduced from them. Are they then cognitions, or cognizant habits and possessions, born along with us, and complete from the first? This is impossible (Aristotle declares); we cannot have such valuable and accurate cognitions from the first moments of childhood, and yet not be at all aware of them. They must therefore be acquired; yet how is it possible for us to acquire them?63The fact is, that, though we do not from the first possess any such complete and accurate cognitions as these, we have from the first an inborn capacity or potentiality of arriving at them. And something of the same kind belongs to all animals.64All of them possess an apprehending and discriminating power born with them, called Sensible Perception; but, though all possess such power, there is this difference, that with some the act of perception dwells for a longer or shorter time in the mind; with others it does not. In animals with whom it does not dwell, there can be no knowledge beyond perception, at least as to all those matters wherein perception is evanescent; but with those that both perceive and retain perceptionsin their minds, ulterior knowledge grows up.65There are many such retentive animals, and they differ among themselves: with some of them reason or rational notions arise out of the perceptions retained; with others, it is not so. First, out of perception arises memory; next, out of memory of the same often repeated, arises experience, since many remembrances numerically distinct are summed up into one experience. Lastly, out of experience, or out of the universal notion, theunum et idemwhich pervades and characterizes a multitude of particulars, when it has taken rest and root in the mind, there arises theprincipiumof art and science: of science, in respect to objects existent; of art, in respect to things generable.66And thus these mental habits or acquirements neither exist in our minds determined from the beginning, nor do they spring fromother acquirements of greater cognitive efficacy. They spring from sensible perception; and we may illustrate their growth by what happens in the panic of a terrified host, where first one runaway stops in his flight, then a second, then a third, until at last a number docile to command is collected. One characteristic feature of the mind is to be capable of this process.67

63Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 25-30: πότερον οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ ἕξεις ἐγγίνονται, ἢ ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἔχομεν αὐτάς, ἄτοπονÂ· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως λανθάνεινÂ· εἰ δὲ λαμβάνομεν μὴ ἔχοντες πρότερον, πῶς ἂν γνωρίζοιμεν καὶ μανθάνοιμεν ἐκ μὴ προϋπαρχούσης γνώσεως; Compare, supra, Analyt. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30; Metaphys.A. ix. p. 993, a. 1, with the Comment. of Alexander, p. 96, Bonitz.

64Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30: φανερὸν τοίνυν οὔτâ€™ ἔχειν οἷόν τε, οὔτâ€™ ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχουσιν ἕξιν ἐγγίνεσθαιÂ· ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μέν τινα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δâ€™ ἔχειν ἢ ἔσται τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατâ€™ ἀκρίβειαν. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτό γε πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζῴοις.

65Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 37: ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ ἃ μὴ ἐγγίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνῶσις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαιÂ· ἐν οἷς δâ€™ ἔνεστιν αἰσθανομένοις ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἤδη διαφορά τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μή. Compare Analyt. Poster. I. p. 81, a. 38, seq., where the dependence of Induction on the perceptions of sense is also affirmed. See Themistius, pp. 50-51, ed. Spengel. The first chapter of the Metaphysica (p. 981), contains a striking account of this generation of universal notions from memory and comparison of sensible particulars: γίνεται δὲ τέχνη, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις (â€œintellecta similitudoâ€�). Also in the Physica VII. p. 247, b. 20 (in the Paraphrase of Themistius, as printed in the Berlin edition, at bottom of page): ἐκ γὰρ τῆς κατὰ μέρος ἐμπειρίας τὴν καθόλου λαμβάνομεν ἐπιστήμην.

66Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 3-10: ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρίαÂ· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. ἐκ δâ€™ ἐμπειρίας, ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμηςÂ· ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.A theory very analogous to this (respecting the gradual generation of scientific universal notions in the mind out of the particulars of sense) is stated in the PhÃ¦don of Plato, ch. xlv. p. 96, B., where Sokrates reckons up the unsuccessful tentatives which he had made in philosophy: καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ, ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁπᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκτούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκδὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης,λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν,κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην.Boethius says, Comm. in Ciceronis Topica, p. 805:â€” â€œPlato ideas quasdam esse ponebat, id est, species incorporeas, substantiasque constantes et per se ab aliis naturÃ¦ ratione separatas, ut hoc ipsumhomo, quibus participantes cÃ¦terÃ¦ res homines vel animalia fierent. At vero Aristoteles nullas putat extra esse substantias; sedintellectam similitudinem plurimorum inter se differentium substantialem, genus putat esse vel speciem. Nam cum homo et equus differunt rationabilitate et irrationabilitate, horumintellecta similitudoefficit genus. Ergo communitas quÃ¦dam et plurimorum inter se differentium similitudonotioest; cujus notionis aliudgenusest, aliudforma. Sed quoniamsimilium intelligentiaest omnis notio, in rebus vero similibus necessaria est differentiarum discretio, idcirco indiget notio quadam enodatione ac divisione; velut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipsi non sufficit,â€� &c.The phraseintellecta similitudo plurimorumembodies both Induction and Intellection in one. A like doctrine appears in the obscure passages of Aristotle, De AnimÃ¢, III. viii. p. 429, b. 10; also p. 432, a. 3: ὁ νοῦς, εἶδος εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστιν.

A theory very analogous to this (respecting the gradual generation of scientific universal notions in the mind out of the particulars of sense) is stated in the PhÃ¦don of Plato, ch. xlv. p. 96, B., where Sokrates reckons up the unsuccessful tentatives which he had made in philosophy: καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ, ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁπᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκτούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκδὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης,λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν,κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην.

Boethius says, Comm. in Ciceronis Topica, p. 805:â€” â€œPlato ideas quasdam esse ponebat, id est, species incorporeas, substantiasque constantes et per se ab aliis naturÃ¦ ratione separatas, ut hoc ipsumhomo, quibus participantes cÃ¦terÃ¦ res homines vel animalia fierent. At vero Aristoteles nullas putat extra esse substantias; sedintellectam similitudinem plurimorum inter se differentium substantialem, genus putat esse vel speciem. Nam cum homo et equus differunt rationabilitate et irrationabilitate, horumintellecta similitudoefficit genus. Ergo communitas quÃ¦dam et plurimorum inter se differentium similitudonotioest; cujus notionis aliudgenusest, aliudforma. Sed quoniamsimilium intelligentiaest omnis notio, in rebus vero similibus necessaria est differentiarum discretio, idcirco indiget notio quadam enodatione ac divisione; velut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipsi non sufficit,â€� &c.

The phraseintellecta similitudo plurimorumembodies both Induction and Intellection in one. A like doctrine appears in the obscure passages of Aristotle, De AnimÃ¢, III. viii. p. 429, b. 10; also p. 432, a. 3: ὁ νοῦς, εἶδος εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστιν.

67Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 10-14: οὔτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμέναι αἱ ἕξεις, οὔτâ€™ ἀπâ€™ ἄλλων ἕξεων γίνονται γνωριμωτέρων, ἀλλâ€™ ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, â€” ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἵα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο.The varieties of intellectual ἕξεις enumerated by Aristotle in the sixth book of the Nikomachean Ethica, are elucidated by Alexander in his Comment. on the Metaphysica, (A. p. 981) pp. 7, 8, Bonitz. The difference of ἕξις and διάθεσις, the durable condition as contrasted with the transient, is noted in CategoriÃ¦, pp. 8, 9. See also Eth. Nikom. II. i. ii. pp 1103, 4.

The varieties of intellectual ἕξεις enumerated by Aristotle in the sixth book of the Nikomachean Ethica, are elucidated by Alexander in his Comment. on the Metaphysica, (A. p. 981) pp. 7, 8, Bonitz. The difference of ἕξις and διάθεσις, the durable condition as contrasted with the transient, is noted in CategoriÃ¦, pp. 8, 9. See also Eth. Nikom. II. i. ii. pp 1103, 4.

Aristotle proceeds to repeat the illustration in clearer terms â€” at least in terms which he thinks clearer.68We perceive the particular individual; yet sensible perception is of the universal in the particular (as, for example, when Kallias is before us, we perceive man, not the man Kallias). Now, when one of a set of particulars dwells some time in the mind, first an universal notion arises; next, more particulars are perceived and detained, and universal notions arise upon them more and more comprehensive, until at last we reach the highest stage â€” the most universal and simple. From Kallias we rise to man; from such and such an animal, to animalin genere; from animalin genere, still higher, until we reach the highest or indivisible genus.69Hence it is plain that the first and highestprincipiacan become known to us only by Induction; for it is by this process that sensible perception builds up in us the Universal.70Now amongthose intellective habits or acquirements, whereby we come to apprehend truth, there are some (Science and NoÃ»s) that are uniformly and unerringly true, while others (Opinion and Ratiocination) admit an alternative of falsehood.71Comparing Science with NoÃ»s, the latter, and the latter only, is more accurate and unerring than Science. But all Science implies demonstration, and all that we know by Science is conclusions deduced by demonstration. We have already said that theprincipiaof these demonstrations cannot be themselves demonstrated, and therefore cannot be known by Science; we have also said that they must be known more accurately than the conclusions. How then can theseprincipiathemselves be known? They can be known only by NoÃ»s, and from particulars. It is from theprincipiaknown by NoÃ»s, with the maximum of accuracy, that Science demonstrates her conclusions. NoÃ»s is the greatprincipiumof Science.72

68Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 14: ὃ δâ€™ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν.Waitz supposes that Aristotle here refers to a passage in the first book of the Analytica Posteriora, c. xxxi. p. 87, b. 30. M. BarthÃ©lemy St. Hilaire thinks (p. 290) that reference is intended to an earlier sentence of this same chapter. Neither of these suppositions seems to suit (least of all the last) with the meaning of πάλαι. But whichever he meant, Aristotle has not done muchto clear upwhat was obscure in the antecedent statements.

68Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 14: ὃ δâ€™ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν.

Waitz supposes that Aristotle here refers to a passage in the first book of the Analytica Posteriora, c. xxxi. p. 87, b. 30. M. BarthÃ©lemy St. Hilaire thinks (p. 290) that reference is intended to an earlier sentence of this same chapter. Neither of these suppositions seems to suit (least of all the last) with the meaning of πάλαι. But whichever he meant, Aristotle has not done muchto clear upwhat was obscure in the antecedent statements.

69Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 15: στάντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἑνός, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου (καὶ γὰρ αἰσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλâ€™ οὐ Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου) πάλιν δâ€™ ἐν τούτοις ἵσταται,ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀμερῆ στῇ καὶ τὰ καθόλου, οἷον τοιονδὶ ζῷον, ἕως ζῷονÂ· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως.These words are obscure: τὰ ἀμερῆ must mean the highest genera; indivisible,i.e.being aminimumin respect ofcomprehension. Instead of τὰ καθόλου, we might have expected τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου, or, perhaps, that καὶ should be omitted. Trendelenburg comments at length on this passage, Arist. De AnimÃ¢ Comment. pp. 170-174.

These words are obscure: τὰ ἀμερῆ must mean the highest genera; indivisible,i.e.being aminimumin respect ofcomprehension. Instead of τὰ καθόλου, we might have expected τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου, or, perhaps, that καὶ should be omitted. Trendelenburg comments at length on this passage, Arist. De AnimÃ¢ Comment. pp. 170-174.

70Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 3: δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖονÂ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ. Compare, supra, Analyt. Post. I. xviii. p. 81, b. 1. Some commentators contended that Aristotle did not mean to ascribe an inductive origin to the common Axioms properly so called, but only to the specialprincipiabelonging to each science. Zabarella refutes this doctrine, and maintains that the Axioms (Dignitates) are derived from Induction (Comm. in Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 649, ed. Venet., 1617):â€” â€œQuum igitur inductio non sit proprie discursus, nec ratio, jure dicit Aristoteles principiorum notitiam non esse cum ratione, quia non ex aliis innotescunt, sed ex seipsis dum per inductionem innotescunt. Propterea in illa propositione, quÃ¦ in initioprimi librilegitur, sub doctrina discursiva cognitio principiorum non comprehenditur, quia non est dianoÃ«tica. Hoc, quod modo diximus, si nonnulli advertissent, fortasse non negassent principia communia, quÃ¦ dicuntur Dignitates, inductione cognosci. Dixerunt enim Aristotelem hic de principiis loquentem sola principia propria considerasse, quÃ¦ cum non proprio lumine cognoscantur, inductione innotescunt; at Dignitates (inquiunt) proprio lumine ab intellectu nostro cognoscuntur per solam terminorum intelligentiam, ut quod omne totum majus est suÃ¢ parte; hoc enim non magis est evidens sensui in particulari, quam intellectui in universali, proinde inductione non eget. Sed hanc sententiam hic Averroes refutat, dicens hÃ¦c quoque inductione cognosci, sed non animadverti nobis tempus hujus inductionis; id enim omnino confitendum est, omnem intellectualem doctrinam Ã sensu originem ducere, et nihil esse in intellectu quod prius in sensu non fuerit, ut ubique asserit Aristoteles.â€�To the same purpose Zabarella expresses himself in an earlier portion of his Commentary on the Analyt. Post., where he lays it down that the truth of the proposition, Every whole is greater than its part, is known from antecedent knowledge of particulars by way of Induction. Compare the Scholion of Philoponus, ad Analyt. Post. p. 225, a. 32, Brand., where the same is said about the Axiom, Things equal to the same are equal to each other.

To the same purpose Zabarella expresses himself in an earlier portion of his Commentary on the Analyt. Post., where he lays it down that the truth of the proposition, Every whole is greater than its part, is known from antecedent knowledge of particulars by way of Induction. Compare the Scholion of Philoponus, ad Analyt. Post. p. 225, a. 32, Brand., where the same is said about the Axiom, Things equal to the same are equal to each other.

71Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 5: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, &c.

72Ibid. fin. p. 100.

The manner in which Aristotle here describes how theprincipiaof Syllogism become known to the mind deserves particular attention. The march up toprincipiais not only different from, but the reverse of, the march down fromprincipia; like the athlete who runs first to the end of the stadium, and then back.73Generalizing or universalizing is an acquired intellectual habit or permanent endowment; growing out of numerous particular acts or judgments of sense, remembered, compared, and coalescing into one mental group through associating resemblance. As the ethical, moral, practical habits, are acquirements growing out of a repetition of particular acts, so also the intellectual,theorizing habits are mental results generated by a multitude of particular judgments of sense, retained and compared, so as to imprint upon the mind a lasting stamp of some identity common to all. The Universal (notius naturÃ¢) is thus generated in the mind by a process of Induction out of particulars which arenotiora nobis; the potentiality of this process, together with sense and memory, is all that is innate or connatural.

73Aristot. Eth. Nikom. I. iv. p. 1095, b. 1.

Theprincipia, from which the conclusions of Syllogism are deduced, being thus obtained by Induction, are, in Aristotle's view, appreciated by, or correlated with, the infallible and unerring NoÃ»s or Intellect.74He conceives repeated and uncontradicted Induction as carrying with it the maximum of certainty and necessity: the syllogistic deductions constituting Science he regards as also certain; but their certainty is only derivative, and theprincipiafrom which they flow he ranks still higher, as being still more certain.75Both the one and the other he pointedly contrasts with Opinion and Calculation, which he declares to be liable to error.

74The passages respecting ἀρχαὶ orprincipia, in the Nikomachean Ethica (especially Books I. and VI.), are instructive as to Aristotleâ€™s views. Theprincipiaare universal notions and propositions, not starting up ready-made nor as original promptings of the intellect, but gradually built up out of the particulars of sense and Induction, and repeated particular acts. They are judged and sanctioned by Νοῦς or Intellect, but it requires much care to define them well. They belong to the ὅτι, while demonstration belongs to the διότι. Eth. Nik. I. vii. p. 1098, a. 33: οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δâ€™ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλâ€™ ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάςÂ· τὸ δâ€™ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δâ€™ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δâ€™ αἰσθήσει, αἱ δâ€™ ἐθισμῷ τινι, καὶ ἄλλαι δâ€™ ἀλλῶς. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὁρισθῶσι καλῶςÂ· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα.Compare Eth. Nik. VI. iii. p. 1139, b. 25, where the Analytica is cited by name â€” ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλουÂ· εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὔκ ἐστι συλλογισμόςÂ· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. â€” ib. p. 1141, a. 7: λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. â€” p. 1142, a. 25: ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὔκ ἐστι λόγος. â€” p. 1143, b. 1.

Compare Eth. Nik. VI. iii. p. 1139, b. 25, where the Analytica is cited by name â€” ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλουÂ· εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὔκ ἐστι συλλογισμόςÂ· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. â€” ib. p. 1141, a. 7: λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. â€” p. 1142, a. 25: ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὔκ ἐστι λόγος. â€” p. 1143, b. 1.

75Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 37: τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα ἕξειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν διâ€™ ἀποδείξεως οὐ μόνον δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς γνωρίζειν καὶ μᾶλλον αὐταῖς πιστεύειν ἢ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ, ἀλλὰ μηδâ€™ ἄλλο αὐτῷ πιστότερον εἶναι μηδὲ γνωριμώτερον τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἐξ ὧν ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ὁ τῆς ἐναντίας ἀπάτης, εἴπερ δεῖ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἁπλῶς ἀμετάπειστον εἶναι.

Aristotle had inherited from Plato this doctrine of an infallible NoÃ»s or Intellect, enjoying complete immunity from error. But, instead of connecting it (as Plato had done) with reminiscences of an anterior life among the Ideas, he assigned to it a position as terminus and correlate to the process of Induction.76The like postulate and pretension passed afterwards to the Stoics, andvarious other philosophical sects: they could not be satisfied without finding infallibility somewhere. It was against this pretension that the Academics and Sceptics entered their protest; contending, on grounds sometimes sophistical but often very forcible, that it was impossible to escape from the region of fallibility, and that no criterion of truth, at once universal and imperative, could be set up.

76Ibid. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30. καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τινά φαμεν, ᾗ τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίζομεν.Themistius, p. 14: ὧν δὴ ἄρχει πάλιν ὁ νοῦς ᾧ τοὺς ὅρους θηρεύομεν, ἐξ ὧν συγκεὶται τὰ ἀξιώματα.The Paraphrase of Themistius (pp. 100-104) is clear and instructive, where he amplifies the last chapter, and explains Νοῦς as the generalizing or universalizing aptitude of the soul, growing up gradually out of the particulars furnished by Sense and Induction.

76Ibid. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30. καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τινά φαμεν, ᾗ τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίζομεν.

Themistius, p. 14: ὧν δὴ ἄρχει πάλιν ὁ νοῦς ᾧ τοὺς ὅρους θηρεύομεν, ἐξ ὧν συγκεὶται τὰ ἀξιώματα.

The Paraphrase of Themistius (pp. 100-104) is clear and instructive, where he amplifies the last chapter, and explains Νοῦς as the generalizing or universalizing aptitude of the soul, growing up gradually out of the particulars furnished by Sense and Induction.

It is to be regretted that Aristotle should have contented himself with proclaiming this Inductive process as an ideal, culminating in the infallible NoÃ»s; and that he should only have superficially noticed those conditions under which it must be conducted in reality, in order to avoid erroneous or uncertified results. This is a deficiency however which has remained unsupplied until the present century.77

77Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Vol. III. Lect. xix. p. 380, says:â€” â€œIn regard to simple syllogisms, it was an original dogma of the Platonic School, and an early dogma of the Peripatetic, that philosophy (science strictly so-called) was only conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general knowledge is only an induction from an observation of particulars, was too easily forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus obtained almost the force of an acknowledged principle, that everything to be known must be known under some general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated importance attributed to definition and deductions, it not being considered that we only take out of a general notion what we had previously placed therein, and that the amplification of our knowledge is not to be sought for from above but from below, â€” not from speculation about abstract generalities, but from the observation of concrete particulars. But however erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had its day and influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects, the total neglect of one half, and that not the least important half, of the reasoning process. For while men thought only of looking upward to the more extensive notions, as the only objects and the only media of science, they took little heed of the more comprehensive notions, and absolutely contemned individuals, as objects which could neither be scientifically known in themselves nor supply the conditions of scientifically knowing aught besides. The Logic of Comprehension and of Induction was therefore neglected or ignored, â€” the Logic of Extension and Deduction exclusively cultivated, as alone affording the rules by which we might evolve higher notions into their subordinate concepts.â€�(Hamilton, in this passage, considers the Logic ofInductionto be the same as the Logic ofComprehension.)

(Hamilton, in this passage, considers the Logic ofInductionto be the same as the Logic ofComprehension.)

In treating of the Analytica Posteriora I have already adverted, in the way of contrast, to the Topica; and, in now approaching the latter work, I must again bring the same contrast before the mind of the reader.

The treatise called Topica (including that which bears the separate title De Sophisticis Elenchis, but which is properly its Ninth or last Book, winding up with a brief but memorable recapitulation of the Analytica and Topica considered as one scheme) is of considerable length, longer than the Prior and Posterior Analytics taken together. It contains both a theory and precepts of Dialectic; also, an analysis of the process called by Aristotle Sophistical Refutation, with advice how to resist or neutralize it.

All through the works of Aristotle, there is nothing which he so directly and emphatically asserts to be his own original performance, as the design and execution of the Topica:i.e., the deduction of Dialectic and Sophistic from the general theory of Syllogism. He had to begin from the beginning, without any model to copy or any predecessor to build upon: and in every sort of work, he observes justly, the first or initial stages are the hardest.1In regard to Rhetoric much had been done before him; there were not only masters who taught it, but writers who theorized well or ill, and laid down precepts about it; so that, in his treatise on that subject, he had only to enlarge and improve upon pre-existing suggestions. But in regard to Dialectic as he conceives it â€” in its contrast with Demonstration and Science on the one hand, and in its analogy or kinship with Rhetoric on the other â€” nothing whatever had been done. There were, indeed, teachers of contentious dialogue, as well as ofRhetoric;2but these teachers could do nothing better than recommend to their students dialogues or orations ready made, to be learnt by heart. Such a mode of teaching (he says), though speedy, was altogether unsystematic. The student acquired no knowledge of the art, being furnished only with specimens of art-results. It was as if a master, professing to communicate the art of making the feet comfortable, taught nothing about leather-cutting or shoe-making, but furnished his pupils with different varieties of ready-made shoes; thus supplying what they wanted for the protection of the feet, but not imparting to them any power of providing such protection for themselves.3â€œIn regard to the process of syllogizing (says Aristotle, including both Analytic and Dialectic) I found positively nothing said before me: I had to work it out for myself by long and laborious research.â€�4

1Aristot. Sophist. Elench. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 22: μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεταιÂ· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον. ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὂν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι.

2Sophist. Elench. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 34: ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δâ€™ οὐκ ἦν προεξειργασμένον, ἀλλâ€™ οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳÂ· λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητίκους ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν ὠήθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους.

3Ibid. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 2.

4Ibid. a. 7: καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλâ€™ ἢ τριβῇ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν.

This is one of the few passages, throughout the philosopherâ€™s varied and multitudinous works, in which he alludes to his own speciality of method. It is all the more interesting on that account. If we turn back to Sokrates and Plato, we shall understand better what the innovation operated by Aristotle was; what the position of Dialectic had been before his time, and what it became afterwards.

In the minds of Sokrates and Plato, the great antithesis was between Dialectic and Rhetoric â€” interchange of short question and answer before a select audience, as contrasted with long continuous speech addressed to a miscellaneous crowd with known established sentiments and opinions, in the view of persuading them on some given interesting point requiring decision. In such Dialectic Sokrates was a consummate master; passing most of his long life in the market-place and palÃ¦stra, and courting disputation with every one. He made formal profession of ignorance, disclaimed all power of teaching, wrote nothing at all, and applied himself almost exclusively to the cross-examiningElenchusby which he exposed and humiliated the ablest men not less than the vulgar. Plato, along with the other companions of Sokrates, imbibed the Dialectic of his master, and gave perpetuity to it in those inimitable dialogues which are stillpreserved to us from his pen. He composed nothing but dialogues; thus giving expression to his own thoughts only under borrowed names, and introducing that of Sokrates very generally as chief spokesman. But Plato, though in some dialogues he puts into the mouth of his spokesman the genuine Sokratic disclaimer of all power and all purpose of teaching, yet does not do this in all. He sometimes assumes the didactic function; though he still adheres to the form of dialogue, even when it has become inconvenient and unsuitable. In the Platonic Republic Sokrates is made to alternate his own peculiar vein of cross-examination with a vein of dogmatic exposition not his own; but both one and the other in the same style of short question and answer. In the Leges becomes still more manifest the inconvenience of combining the substance of dogmatic exposition with the form of dialogue: the same remark may also be made about the Sophistes and Politicus; in which two dialogues, moreover, the didactic process is exhibited purely and exclusively as a logical partition, systematically conducted, of a genus into its component species. Long-continued speech, always depreciated by Plato in its rhetorical manifestations, is foreign to his genius even for purposes of philosophy: the very lecture on cosmogony which he assigns to TimÃ¦us, and the mythical narrative (unfinished) delivered by Kritias, are brought into something like the form of dialogue by a prefatory colloquy specially adapted for that end.

It thus appears that, while in Sokrates the dialectic process is exhibited in its maximum of perfection, but disconnected altogether from the didactic, which is left unnoticed, â€” in Plato the didactic process is recognized and postulated, but is nevertheless confounded with or absorbed into the dialectic, and admitted only as one particular, ulterior, phase and manifestation of it. At the same time, while both Sokrates and Plato bring out forcibly the side of antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic, they omit entirely to notice the side of analogy or parallelism between them. On both these points Aristotle has corrected the confusion, and improved upon the discrimination, of his two predecessors. He has pointedly distinguished the dialectic process from the didactic; and he has gone a step farther, furnishing a separate theory and precepts both for the one and for the other. Again, he has indicated the important feature of analogy between Dialectic and Rhetoric, in which same feature both of them contrast with Didactic â€” the point not seized either by Sokrates or by Plato.

Plato, in his Sokratic dialogues or dialogues of Search, hasgiven admirable illustrative specimens of that which Sokrates understood and practised orally as Dialectic. Aristotle, in his Topica, has in his usual vein of philosophy theorized on this practice as an art. He had himself composed dialogues, which seem as far as we can judge from indirect and fragmentary evidence, to have been Ciceronian or rhetorical colloquies â€” a long pleadingprofollowed by a long pleadingcon, rather than examples of Sokratic brachylogy and cross-examination. But his theory given in the Topica applies to genuine Sokratic fencing, not to the Ciceronian alternation of set speeches. He disallows the conception of Plato, that Dialectic is a process including not merely dispute but all full and efficacious employment of general terms and ideas for purposes of teaching: he treats this latter as a province by itself, under the head of Analytic: and devotes the Topica to the explanation of argumentative debate, pure and simple. He takes his departure from the Syllogism, as the type of deductive reasoning generally; the conditions under which syllogistic reasoning is valid and legitimate, having been already explained in his treatise called Analytica Priora. So obtained, and regulated by those conditions, the Syllogism may be applied to one or other of two distinct and independent purposes:â€” (1) To Demonstration or Scientific Teaching, which we have had before us in the last two chapters, commenting on the Analytica Posteriora; (2) To Dialectic, or Argumentative Debate, which we are now about to enter on in the Topica.

The Dialectic Syllogism, explained in the Topica, has some points in common with the Demonstrative Syllogism, treated in the Analytica Posteriora. In both, the formal conditions are the same, and the conclusions will certainly be true, if the premisses are true; in both, the axioms of deductive reasoning are assumed, namely, the maxims of Contradiction and Excluded Middle. But, in regard to the subject-matter, the differences between them are important. The Demonstrative Syllogism applies only to a small number of select sciences, each having specialprincipiaof its own, or primary, undemonstrable truths, obtained in the first instance by induction from particulars. The premisses being thus incontrovertibly certain, the conclusions deduced are not less certain; there is no necessary place for conflicting arguments or counter-syllogisms, although in particular cases paralogisms may be committed, and erroneous propositions or majors for syllogism may be assumed. On the contrary, the Dialectic Syllogism applies to all matters without exception; the premisses on which it proceeds are neitherobtained by induction, nor incontrovertibly certain, but are borrowed from some one among the varieties of accredited or authoritative opinion. They may be opinions held by the multitude of any particular country, or by an intelligent majority, or by a particular school of philosophers or wise individuals, or from transmission as a current proverb or dictum of some ancient poet or seer. From any one of these sources the dialectician may borrow premisses for syllogizing. But it often happens that the premisses which they supply are disparate, or in direct contradiction to each other; and none of them is entitled to be considered as final or peremptory against the rest. Accordingly, it is an essential feature of Dialectic as well as of Rhetoric that they furnish means of establishing conclusions contrary or contradictory, by syllogisms equally legitimate.5The dialectic procedure is from its beginning intrinsically contentious, implying a debate between two persons, one of whom sets up a thesis to defend, while the other impugns it by interrogation: the assailant has gained his point, if he can reduce the defendant to the necessity of contradicting himself; while the defendant on his side has to avoid giving any responses which may drive him to the necessity of such contradiction.

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