5Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 29: ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν, (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν), ἀλλ’ ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται· ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων.
5Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 29: ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν, (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν), ἀλλ’ ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται· ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων.
Aristotle takes great pains to enforce the separation both of Dialectic and Rhetoric from Science or Instruction with its purpose of teaching or learning. He disapproves of those (seemingly intending Plato) who seek to confound the two. Dialectic and Rhetoric (he says) have for their province words and discourse, not facts or things: they are not scientific or didactic processes, but powers or accomplishments of discourse; and whoever tries to convert them into means of teaching or learning particular subjects, abolishes their characteristic feature and restricts their universality of application.6Both of them deal not with scientific facts, but with the sum total of accredited opinions, though each for its own purpose: both of them lay hold of any one among the incoherent aggregate of accepted generalities, suitable for the occasion; the Dialectician tryingto force his opponent into an inconsistency, the Rhetor trying to persuade his auditors into a favourable decision. Neither the one nor the other goes deeper than opinion for his premisses, nor concerns himself about establishing by induction primary or specialprincipia, such as may serve for a basis of demonstration.
6Ibid. iv. 2, p. 1359, b. 12: ὅσῳ δ’ ἄν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην (τὴν ῥητορικὴν) μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις, ἀλλ’ ἐπιστήμας, πειρᾶται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας, τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων.
6Ibid. iv. 2, p. 1359, b. 12: ὅσῳ δ’ ἄν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην (τὴν ῥητορικὴν) μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις, ἀλλ’ ἐπιστήμας, πειρᾶται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας, τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων.
In every society there are various floating opinions and beliefs, each carrying with it a certain measure of authority, often inconsistent with each other, not the same in different societies, nor always the same even in the same society. Each youthful citizen, as he grows to manhood, imbibes these opinions and beliefs insensibly and without special or professional teaching.7The stock of opinions thus transmitted would not be identical even at Athens and Sparta: the difference would be still greater, if we compared Athens with Rome, Alexandria, or Jerusalem. Such opinions all carry with them more or less of authority, and it is from them that the reasonings of common life, among unscientific men, are supplied. The practice of dialectical discussion, prevalent in Athens during and before the time of Aristotle, was only a more elaborate, improved, and ingenious exhibition of this common talk; proceeding on the same premisses, but bringing them together from a greater variety of sources, handling them more cleverly, and having for its purpose to convict an opponent of inconsistency. The dialecticians dwelt exclusively in the region of these received opinions; and the purpose of their debates was to prove inconsistency, or to repel the proof of inconsistency, between one opinion and another.
7For an acute and interesting description of this unsystematic transmission of opinions, see, in the Protagoras of Plato, the speech put into the mouth of Protagoras, pp. 323-325. See also ‘Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,’Vol. II. ch. xxi. p. 45, seq.
7For an acute and interesting description of this unsystematic transmission of opinions, see, in the Protagoras of Plato, the speech put into the mouth of Protagoras, pp. 323-325. See also ‘Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,’Vol. II. ch. xxi. p. 45, seq.
This dialectic debate, which Aristotle found current at Athens, he tries in the Topica to define and reduce to system. The dialectician must employ Syllogism; and we are first taught to distinguish the Syllogism that he employs from others. The Dialectic syllogism is discriminated on one side from the Demonstrative, on the other from the Eristic (or litigious); also from the scientific Paralogism or Pseudographeme. This discrimination is founded on the nature of the evidence belonging to the premisses. The Demonstrative syllogism (which we have already gone through in the Analytica Posteriora) has premisses noway dependent upon opinion: it deduces conclusions from true first principles, obtained by Induction in each science, anddifferent in each different science. The Dialectic syllogism does not aspire to any such evidence, but borrows its premisses from Opinion of some sort; accredited either by numbers, or by wise individuals, or by some other authoritative holding. As this evidence is very inferior to that of the demonstrative syllogism, so again it is superior to that of the third variety — the Eristic syllogism. In this third variety,8the premisses do not rest upon any real opinion, but only on a fallacious appearance or simulation of opinion; insomuch that they are at once detected as false, by any person even of moderate understanding; whereas (according to Aristotle) no real opinion ever carries with it such a merely superficial semblance, or is ever so obviously and palpably false. A syllogism is called Eristic also when it is faulty in form, though its premisses may be borrowed from real opinion, or when it is both faulty in form and false in the matter of the premisses. Still a fourth variety of syllogism is the scientific Paralogism: where the premisses are not borrowed from any opinion, real or simulated, but belong properly to the particular science in which they are employed, yet nevertheless are false or erroneous.9
8Topic. I. p. 100, b. 23: ἐριστικὸς δ’ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δέ, καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἢ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων φαινόμενος. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἔνδοξον καὶ ἔστιν ἔνδοξον. οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνδόξων ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, καθάπερ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων ἀρχὰς συμβέβηκεν ἔχειν· παραχρῆμα γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς καὶ μικρὰ συνορᾶν δυναμένοις κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ ψεύδους ἐστὶ φύσις.
8Topic. I. p. 100, b. 23: ἐριστικὸς δ’ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δέ, καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἢ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων φαινόμενος. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἔνδοξον καὶ ἔστιν ἔνδοξον. οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνδόξων ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, καθάπερ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων ἀρχὰς συμβέβηκεν ἔχειν· παραχρῆμα γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς καὶ μικρὰ συνορᾶν δυναμένοις κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ ψεύδους ἐστὶ φύσις.
9Ibid. i. p. 101, a. 5-17.
9Ibid. i. p. 101, a. 5-17.
Upon the classification of syllogisms here set forth by Aristotle, we may remark that the distinction between the Demonstrative and the Dialectic is true and important; but that between the Dialectic and the Eristic is faint and unimportant; the class called Eristic syllogisms being apparently introduced merely to create a difference, real or supposed, between the Dialectician and the Sophist, and thus to serve as a prelude to the last book of this treatise, entitled Sophistici Elenchi. The class-title Eristic (or litigious) is founded upon a supposition of dishonest intentions on the part of the disputant; but it is unphilosophical to make this the foundation of a class, and to rank the same syllogism in the class, or out of it, according as the intentions of the disputant who employs it are honest or dishonest. Besides, a portion of Aristotle’s definition tells us that the Eristic syllogism is one of which the premisses can impose upon no one; being such that a very ordinary man can at once detect their falsity. The dishonest disputant, surely, would argue to little purpose, if he intentionally employed such premisses as these. Lastly, according to another portion ofAristotle’s definition, every syllogism faulty in form, or yielding no legitimate conclusion at all, will fall under the class Eristic, and this he himself in another place explicitly states;10which would imply that the bad syllogism must always emanate from litigious or dishonest intentions. But in defining the Pseudographeme, immediately afterwards, Aristotle does not imply that the false scientific premiss affords presumption of litigious disposition on the part of those who advance it; nor does there seem any greater propriety in throwing all bad dialectic syllogisms under the general head of Eristic.
10Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 4.
10Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 4.
The dialectician, then, will carry on debate only by means of premisses sustained by real opinion; which not only always carry some authority, but are assumed as being never obviously fallacious; though often inconsistent with each other, and admitting of argumentationproandcon. These are what Aristotle callsEndoxa; opposed toAdoxa, or propositions which are discountenanced, or at least not countenanced, by opinion, and toParadoxa(a peculiar variety ofAdoxa),11or propositions which, though having ingenious arguments in their favour, yet are adverse to some proclaimed and wide-spread opinions, and thus have the predominant authority of opinion against them.
11Ibid. I. xi. p. 104, b. 24: περὶ ὧν λόγον ἔχομεν ἐναντίον ταῖς δόξαις.
11Ibid. I. xi. p. 104, b. 24: περὶ ὧν λόγον ἔχομεν ἐναντίον ταῖς δόξαις.
Of these three words,Paradoxis the only one that has obtained a footing in modern languages, thanks to Cicero and the Latin authors. If the wordEndoxhad obtained the like footing, we should be able to keep more closely to the thought and views of Aristotle. As it is, we are obliged to translate the GreekEndoxonas Probable, andAdoxonas Improbable:12which, though not incorrect, is neither suitable nor exactly coincident. Probable corresponds more nearly to what Aristotle (both in this treatise and in the Analytica) announces sometimes as τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ — that which happens in most cases but not in all, as distinguished from the universal and necessary on one side, and from the purely casual on the other;13sometimes, also, as τὸ εἰκός or τὸ σημεῖον. Now this is a different idea from (though it has a point of analogy with) theEndoxon: which is not necessarily true even in part, but may be wholly untrue; which always has some considerations against it, though theremay be more in its favour; and which, lastly, may be different, or even opposite, in different ages and different states of society. When Josephus distinguished himself as a disputant in the schools of Jerusalem on points of law and custom,14his arguments must have been chiefly borrowed from theEndoxaor prevalent opinions of the time and place; but these must have differed widely from theEndoxafound and argued upon by the contemporaries of Aristotle at Athens. TheEndoxonmay indeed be rightly called probable, because, whenever a proposition is fortified by a certain body of opinion, Aristotle admits a certain presumption (greater or less) that it is true. But such probability is not essential to theEndoxon: it is only an accident or accompaniment (to use the Aristotelian phrase), and by no means an universal accompaniment. The essential feature of theEndoxonis, that it has acquired a certain amount of recognition among the mass of opinions and beliefs floating and carrying authority at the actual time and place. The English word whereby it is translated ought to express this idea, and nothing more; just as the correlative word Paradox does express its implication, approached from the other side. Unfortunately, in the absence of Endox, we have no good word for the purpose.
12Aristotle gives a double meaning of ἄδοξον (Topic. VIII. ix. ix. 160, b. 17):— 1. That which involves absurd or strange consequences (ἄτοπα). 2. That which affords presumption of a bad disposition, such as others will disapprove — οἷον ὅτι ἡδονὴ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
12Aristotle gives a double meaning of ἄδοξον (Topic. VIII. ix. ix. 160, b. 17):— 1. That which involves absurd or strange consequences (ἄτοπα). 2. That which affords presumption of a bad disposition, such as others will disapprove — οἷον ὅτι ἡδονὴ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
13Topic. II. vi. p. 112, b. 1: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δ’ ὁπότερ’ ἔτυχεν, &c. Compare also Analyt. Post. I. xxx., et alib.
13Topic. II. vi. p. 112, b. 1: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δ’ ὁπότερ’ ἔτυχεν, &c. Compare also Analyt. Post. I. xxx., et alib.
14See Josephus, De Vitâ Suâ, c. ii.
14See Josephus, De Vitâ Suâ, c. ii.
It is within this wide field of floating opinions that dialectical debate and rhetorical pleading are carried on. Dialectic supposes a questioner or assailant, and a respondent or defendant. The respondent selects and proclaims a problem or thesis, which he undertakes to maintain: the assailant puts to him successive questions, with the view of obtaining concessions which may serve as premisses for a counter-syllogism, of which the conclusion is contradictory or contrary to the thesis itself, or to some other antecedent premiss which the respondent has already conceded. It is the business of the respondent to avoid making any answers which may serve as premisses for such a counter-syllogism. If he succeeds in this, so as not to become implicated in any contradiction with himself, he has baffled his assailant, and gained the victory. There are, however, certain rules and conditions, binding on both parties, under which the debate must be carried on. It is the purpose of the Topica to indicate these rules; and, in accordance therewith, to advise both parties as to the effective conduct of their respective cases—as to the best thrusts and the best mode of parrying. The assailant is supplied with a classified catalogue of materials for questions, and with indications of the weak points which he isto look out for in any new subject which may turn up for debate. He is farther instructed how to shape, marshal, and disguise his questions, in such a way that the respondent may least be able to foresee their ultimate bearing. The respondent, on his side, is told what he ought to look forward to and guard against. Such is the scope of the present treatise; the entire process being considered in the large and comprehensive spirit customary with Aristotle, and distributed according to the Aristotelian terminology and classification.
It is plain that neither the direct purpose of the debaters, nor the usual result of the debate, is to prove truth or to disprove falsehood. Such may indeed be the result occasionally; but the only certain result is, that an inconsistency is exposed in the respondent’s manner of defending his thesis, or that the assailant fails in his purpose of showing up such inconsistency. Whichever way the debate may turn, no certain inference can be drawn as to the thesis itself: not merely as to whether it is true or false, but even as to whether it consists or does not consist with other branches of received opinions. Such being the case, what is the use or value of dialectic debate, or of a methodized procedure for conducting it? Aristotle answers this question, telling us that it is useful for three purposes.15First, the debate is a valuable and stimulating mental exercise; and, if a methodized procedure be laid down, both parties will be able to conduct it more easily as well as more efficaciously. Secondly, it is useful for our intercourse with the multitude;16for the procedure directs us to note and remember the opinions of the multitude, and such knowledge will facilitate our intercourse with them: we shall converse with them out of their own opinions, which we may thus be able beneficially to modify. Thirdly, dialectic debate has an useful though indirect bearing even upon the processes of science and philosophy, and upon the truths thereby acquired.17For it accustoms us to study the difficulties on both sides of every question, and thus assists us in detecting and discriminating truth and falsehood. Moreover, apart from this mode of usefulness, it opens a new road to the scrutiny of the firstprincipiaof each separate science. Theseprincipiacan never be scrutinized through the truths ofthe science itself, which presuppose them and are deduced from them. To investigate and verify them, is the appropriate task of First Philosophy. But Dialectic also, carrying investigation as it does everywhere, and familiarized with the received opinions on both sides of every subject, suggests many points of importance in regard to theseprincipia.
15Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26: ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας.
15Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26: ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας.
16Ibid. a. 30: πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηριθμημένοι δόξας οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς αὐτούς, μεταβιβάζοντες ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν ἡμῖν.
16Ibid. a. 30: πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηριθμημένοι δόξας οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς αὐτούς, μεταβιβάζοντες ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν ἡμῖν.
17Ibid. a. 34: πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, &c.
17Ibid. a. 34: πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, &c.
The three heads just enumerated illustrate the discriminating care of Aristotle. The point of the first head is brought out often in the Platonic Dialogues of Search: the stimulus brought to bear in awakening dormant intellectual power, and in dissipating that false persuasion of knowledge which is the general infirmity of mankind, is frequently declared by Plato to be the most difficult, but the indispensable, operation of the teacher upon his pupil. Under the third head, Aristotle puts this point more justly than Plato, not as a portion of teaching, nor as superseding direct teaching, but as a preliminary thereunto; and it is a habit of his own to prefix this antecedent survey of doubts and difficulties on both sides, as a means of sharpening our insight into the dogmatic exposition which immediately follows.
Under the second head, we find exhibited another characteristic feature of Aristotle’s mind — the value which he sets upon a copious acquaintance with received opinions, whether correct or erroneous. The philosophers of his day no longer talked publicly in the market-place and with every one indiscriminately, as Sokrates had done: scientific study, and the habit of written compositions naturally conducted them into a life apart, among select companions. Aristotle here indicates that such estrangement from the multitude lessened their means of acting beneficially on the multitude, and in the way of counteraction he prescribes dialectical exercise. His own large and many-sided observation, extending to the most vulgar phenomena, is visible throughout his works, and we know that he drew up a collection of current proverbs.18
18Diog. Laert. v. 26. Kephisodorus, the disciple of Isokrates, in defending his master, depreciated this Aristotelian collection; see in Athenæus II. lvi., comparing Schweighäuser’s Animadversiones I. p. 406.
18Diog. Laert. v. 26. Kephisodorus, the disciple of Isokrates, in defending his master, depreciated this Aristotelian collection; see in Athenæus II. lvi., comparing Schweighäuser’s Animadversiones I. p. 406.
Again, what we read under the third head shows that, while Aristotle everywhere declares Demonstration and teaching to be a process apart from Dialectic, he at the same time recognizes the legitimate function of the latter, for testing and verifying theprincipiaof Demonstration:19whichprincipiacannot bereached by Demonstration itself, since every demonstration presupposes them. He does not mean that theseprincipiacan be proved by Dialectic, for Dialectic does not prove any thing; but it is necessary as a test or scrutinizing process to assure us that all the objections capable of being offered against them can be met by sufficient replies. In respect of universal competence and applicability, Dialectic is the counterpart, or rather the tentative companion and adjunct, of what Aristotle calls First Philosophy or Ontology; to which last he assigns the cognizance ofprincipia, as we shall see when we treat of the Metaphysica.20Dialectic (he repeats more than once) is not a definite science or body of doctrine, but, like rhetoric or medicine, a practical art or ability of dealing with the ever varying situations of the dialogue; of imagining and enunciating the question proper for attack, or the answer proper for defence, as the case may be. As in the other arts, its resources are not unlimited. Nor can the dialectician, any more than the rhetor or the physician, always guarantee success. Each of them has an end to be accomplished; and if he employs for its accomplishment the best means that the situation permits, he must be considered a master of his own art and procedure.21To detect truth, and to detect what is like truth, belong (in Aristotle’s judgment) to the same mental capacity. Mankind have a natural tendency towards truth, and the common opinions therefore are, in most cases, coincident with truth. Accordingly, the man who divines well in regard to verisimilitude, will usually divine well in regard to truth.22
19Topic. I. ii. p. 101, b. 3: ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.
19Topic. I. ii. p. 101, b. 3: ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.
20Metaphys.Γ. iii. p. 1005, a. 20-b. 10;Γ. ii. p. 1004, b. 15-30.
20Metaphys.Γ. iii. p. 1005, a. 20-b. 10;Γ. ii. p. 1004, b. 15-30.
21Topic. I. iii. p. 101, b. 5: ἕξομεν δὲ τελέως τὴν μέθοδον, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν ἃ προαιρούμεθα. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει, οὔθ’ ὁ ἰατρικὸς ὑγιάσει· ἀλλ’ ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παραλίπῃ, ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν.The word ἐπιστήμην in the last line is used loosely, since Aristotle, in the Rhetorica (p. 1369, b. 12), explicitly states that Rhetoric and Dialectic are not to be treated as ἐπιστήμας but as mere δυνάμεις.
21Topic. I. iii. p. 101, b. 5: ἕξομεν δὲ τελέως τὴν μέθοδον, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν ἃ προαιρούμεθα. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει, οὔθ’ ὁ ἰατρικὸς ὑγιάσει· ἀλλ’ ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παραλίπῃ, ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν.
The word ἐπιστήμην in the last line is used loosely, since Aristotle, in the Rhetorica (p. 1369, b. 12), explicitly states that Rhetoric and Dialectic are not to be treated as ἐπιστήμας but as mere δυνάμεις.
22Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 17.
22Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 17.
The subject-matter of dialectic debate, speaking generally, consists of Propositions and Problems, to be propounded as questions by the assailant and to be admitted or disallowed by the defendant. They will relate either toExpetendaandFugienda, or they must bear, at least indirectly, upon some point of scientific truth or observed cognition.23They will be either ethical, physical, or logical; class-terms which Aristotle declines to define, contenting himself with giving an example to illustrate each of them, while adding that the student should collect othersimilar examples, and gradually familiarize himself with the full meaning of the general term, through such inductive comparison of particulars.24
23Topic. I, xi. p. 104, b. 2.
23Topic. I, xi. p. 104, b. 2.
24Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 20-29: αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαί. — ποῖαι δ’ ἕκασται τῶν προειρημένων, ὁρισμῷ μὲν οὐκ εὐπετὲς ἀποδοῦναι περὶ αὐτῶν, τῇ δὲδιὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς συνηθείᾳπειρατέον γνωρίζειν ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα παραδείγματα ἐπισκοποῦντα.This illustrates Aristotle’s view of the process of Induction and its results; the acquisition of the import of a general term, through comparison of numerous particulars comprehended under it.The termlogicaldoes not exactly correspond with Aristotle’s λογικαί, but on the present occasion no better term presents itself.
24Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 20-29: αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαί. — ποῖαι δ’ ἕκασται τῶν προειρημένων, ὁρισμῷ μὲν οὐκ εὐπετὲς ἀποδοῦναι περὶ αὐτῶν, τῇ δὲδιὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς συνηθείᾳπειρατέον γνωρίζειν ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα παραδείγματα ἐπισκοποῦντα.
This illustrates Aristotle’s view of the process of Induction and its results; the acquisition of the import of a general term, through comparison of numerous particulars comprehended under it.
The termlogicaldoes not exactly correspond with Aristotle’s λογικαί, but on the present occasion no better term presents itself.
But it is not every problem coming under one of these three heads that is fit for dialectic debate. If a man propounds as subject for debate, Whether we ought to honour the gods or to love our parents, he deserves punishment instead of refutation: if he selects the question, Whether snow is white or not, he must be supposed deficient in perceptive power.25What all persons unanimously believe, is unsuitable:26what no one believes is also unsuitable, since it will not be conceded by any respondent. The problem must have some doubts and difficulties, in order to afford scope for discussion; yet it must not be one of which the premisses are far-fetched or recondite, for that goes beyond the limits of dialectic exercise.27It ought to be one on which opinions are known to be held, both in the affirmative and in the negative; on which either the multitude differ among themselves, the majority being on one side, while yet there is an adverse minority; or some independent authority stands opposed to the multitude, such as a philosopher of eminence, a professional man or artist speaking on his own particular craft, a geometer or a physician on the specialities of his department. Matters such as these are the appropriate subjects for dialectic debate; and new matters akin to them by way of analogy may be imagined and will be perfectly admissible.28Even an ingenious paradox or thesis adverse to prevailing opinions may serve the purpose, as likely to obtain countenance from some authority, though as yet we know of none.29
25Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 67: κολάσεως — αἰσθήσεως, δέονται. Yet he considers the question, Whether we ought rather to obey the laws of the state or the commands of our parents, in case of discrepancy between the two,-—as quite fit for debate (xiv. p. 105, b. 22).
25Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 67: κολάσεως — αἰσθήσεως, δέονται. Yet he considers the question, Whether we ought rather to obey the laws of the state or the commands of our parents, in case of discrepancy between the two,-—as quite fit for debate (xiv. p. 105, b. 22).
26Ibid. x. p. 104, a. 5.
26Ibid. x. p. 104, a. 5.
27Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 7: οὐδὲ δὴ ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὔδ’ ὧν λίαν πόῤῥω· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τὰ δὲπλείονἢ κατὰ γυμναστικήν. The loose use of the word ἀπόδειξις deserves note here: it is the technical term of the Analyt. Post., denoting that application of the syllogism which contrasts with Dialectic altogether.Aristotle here means only that problems falling within these limits are the best for dialectic discussion; but, in his suggestions later on, he includes problems for discussion involving the utmost generalities of philosophy. For example, he often adverts to dialectic debate on the Platonic Ideas or Forms (Topic. II. vii. p. 113, a. 25; V. vii. p. 137, b. 7; VI. vi. p. 143, b. 24. Compare also I. xi. p. 104, b. 14.)
27Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 7: οὐδὲ δὴ ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὔδ’ ὧν λίαν πόῤῥω· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τὰ δὲπλείονἢ κατὰ γυμναστικήν. The loose use of the word ἀπόδειξις deserves note here: it is the technical term of the Analyt. Post., denoting that application of the syllogism which contrasts with Dialectic altogether.
Aristotle here means only that problems falling within these limits are the best for dialectic discussion; but, in his suggestions later on, he includes problems for discussion involving the utmost generalities of philosophy. For example, he often adverts to dialectic debate on the Platonic Ideas or Forms (Topic. II. vii. p. 113, a. 25; V. vii. p. 137, b. 7; VI. vi. p. 143, b. 24. Compare also I. xi. p. 104, b. 14.)
28Topic. I. x. p. 104, a. 11-37.
28Topic. I. x. p. 104, a. 11-37.
29Ibid. xi. p. 104, b. 24-28: ἢ περὶ ὧν λόγον ἔχομεν ἐναντίον ταῖς δόξαις — τοῦτο γάρ, εἰ καί τινι μὴ δοκεῖ, δόξειεν ἂν διὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν.
29Ibid. xi. p. 104, b. 24-28: ἢ περὶ ὧν λόγον ἔχομεν ἐναντίον ταῖς δόξαις — τοῦτο γάρ, εἰ καί τινι μὴ δοκεῖ, δόξειεν ἂν διὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν.
These conditions apply both to problems propounded for debate, and to premisses tendered on either side during the discussion. Both the interrogator and the respondent — the former having to put appropriate questions, and the latter to make appropriate answers — must know and keep in mind these varieties of existing opinion among the multitude as well as among the special dissident authorities above indicated. The dialectician ought to collect and catalogue suchEndoxa, with the opinions analogous to them, out of written treatises and elsewhere;30distributing them under convenient heads, such as those relating to good and evil generally, and to each special class of good, &c. Aristotle, however, admonishes him that he is debating problems not scientifically, but dialectically: having reference not to truth, but to opinion.31If the interrogator were proceeding scientifically and didactically, he would make use of all true and ascertained propositions, whether the respondent conceded them or not, as premisses for his syllogism. But in Dialectic he is dependent on the concession of the respondent, and can construct his syllogisms only from premisses that have been conceded to him.32Hence he must keep as closely as he can to opinions carrying extrinsic authority, as being those which the respondent will hesitate to disallow.33
30Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 1-18. ἐκλέγειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων λόγων.
30Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 1-18. ἐκλέγειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων λόγων.
31Ibid. b. 30: πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν.
31Ibid. b. 30: πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν.
32Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10: πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ζητοῦντι καθ’ ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν μέλει, ἐὰν ἀληθῆ μὲν ᾖ καὶ γνώριμα δι’ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, μὴ θῇ δ’ αὐτὰ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, &c.
32Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10: πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ζητοῦντι καθ’ ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν μέλει, ἐὰν ἀληθῆ μὲν ᾖ καὶ γνώριμα δι’ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, μὴ θῇ δ’ αὐτὰ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, &c.
33Ibid. i. p. 156, b. 20: χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπιλέγειν ὅτι σύνηθες καὶ λεγόμενον τὸ τοιοῦτον·ὀκνοῦσι γὰρ κινεῖν τὸ εἰωθός, ἔνστασιν μὴ ἔχοντες.
33Ibid. i. p. 156, b. 20: χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπιλέγειν ὅτι σύνηθες καὶ λεγόμενον τὸ τοιοῦτον·ὀκνοῦσι γὰρ κινεῖν τὸ εἰωθός, ἔνστασιν μὴ ἔχοντες.
Moreover, the form of the interrogation admissible in dialectic debate is peculiar. The respondent is not bound to furnish any information in his answer: he is bound only to admit, or to deny, a proposition tendered to him. You must not ask him, What is the genus of man? You must yourself declare the genus, and ask whether he admits it, in one or other of the two following forms — (1) Is animal the genus of man? (2) Is animal the genus of man, or not? to which the response is an admission or a denial.34
34Ibid. I. iv. p. 101, b. 30. The first of these two forms Aristotle calls a πρότασις, the second he calls a πρόβλημα. But this distinction between these two words is not steadily adhered to: it is differently declared in Topic. I. x., xi. p. 104, as Alexander has remarked in the Scholia, p. 258, b. 4, Brand. Compare also De Interpretat. p. 20, b. 26; and Topic. VIII. ii. p. 158, a. 14: οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ καθόλου διαλεκτικὴ πρότασις εἶναι, οἷον τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ποσαχῶς λέγεται τἀγαθόν; ἔστι γὰρ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ πρὸς ἣν ἔστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι ναὶ ἢ οὔ· πρὸς δὲ τὰς εἰρημένας οὐκ ἔστιν. διὸ οὐ διαλεκτικά ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς διορίσας ἢ διελόμενος εἴπῃ.
34Ibid. I. iv. p. 101, b. 30. The first of these two forms Aristotle calls a πρότασις, the second he calls a πρόβλημα. But this distinction between these two words is not steadily adhered to: it is differently declared in Topic. I. x., xi. p. 104, as Alexander has remarked in the Scholia, p. 258, b. 4, Brand. Compare also De Interpretat. p. 20, b. 26; and Topic. VIII. ii. p. 158, a. 14: οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ καθόλου διαλεκτικὴ πρότασις εἶναι, οἷον τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ποσαχῶς λέγεται τἀγαθόν; ἔστι γὰρ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ πρὸς ἣν ἔστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι ναὶ ἢ οὔ· πρὸς δὲ τὰς εἰρημένας οὐκ ἔστιν. διὸ οὐ διαλεκτικά ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς διορίσας ἢ διελόμενος εἴπῃ.
Dialectic procedure, both of the assailant and of the defendant,has to do with propositions and problems; accordingly, Aristotle introduces a general distribution of propositions under four heads. The predicate must either be Genus, or Proprium, or Accident, of its subject. But the Proprium divides itself again into two. It always reciprocates with, or is co-extensive with, its subject; but sometimes it declares the essence of the subject, sometimes it does not. When it declares the essence of the subject, Aristotle calls it the Definition; when it does not declare the essence of the subject, although reciprocating therewith, he reserves for it the title of Proprium. Every proposition, and every problem, the entire material of Dialectic, will declare one of these four — Proprium, Definition, Genus, or Accident.35The Differentia, as being attached to the Genus, is ranked along with the Genus.36