106Aristotle sometimes speaks of it as χωριστόν, the other Categories being not χωριστά (Metaphys.Z. p. 1028, a. 34). It is not easy, however, always to distinguish whether he means by the term χωριστὰ “sejuncta reâ€�, or “sejuncta notione solâ.â€� See Bonitz ad Metaphysic. (Δ. p. 1017), p. 244.
106Aristotle sometimes speaks of it as χωριστόν, the other Categories being not χωριστά (Metaphys.Z. p. 1028, a. 34). It is not easy, however, always to distinguish whether he means by the term χωριστὰ “sejuncta reâ€�, or “sejuncta notione solâ.â€� See Bonitz ad Metaphysic. (Δ. p. 1017), p. 244.
107Categor. p. 3, b. 12: ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν. Compare Metaphysic.N. p. 1087, b. 33; p. 1088, a. 10.
107Categor. p. 3, b. 12: ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν. Compare Metaphysic.N. p. 1087, b. 33; p. 1088, a. 10.
108Hobbes says:— “Now that accident (i.e.attribute) for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its Subject, is commonly called the Essence thereof; as rationality is the essence of a man, whiteness of any white thing, and extension the essence of a body� (Hobbes, Philosophy, ch. viii. s. 23). This topic will be found discussed, most completely and philosophically, in Mr. John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic, Book I. ch. vi. ss. 2-3; ch. vii. s. 5.
108Hobbes says:— “Now that accident (i.e.attribute) for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its Subject, is commonly called the Essence thereof; as rationality is the essence of a man, whiteness of any white thing, and extension the essence of a body� (Hobbes, Philosophy, ch. viii. s. 23). This topic will be found discussed, most completely and philosophically, in Mr. John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic, Book I. ch. vi. ss. 2-3; ch. vii. s. 5.
109Categor. p. 3, b. 13: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῶον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλονποιόν τι σημαίνει — ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίανσημαίνει (b. 20).Metaphysic.Z. p. 1038, b. 35: φανερὸν ὅτι οὐθὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐθὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε. Compare Metaphys.M. p. 1087, a. 1; Sophistic. Elench. p. 178, b. 37; 179, a. 9.That which is called πρώτη οὐσία in the Categoriæ is called τρίτη οὐσία in Metaphys.Η. p. 1043, a. 18. In Ethic. Nikom.Z. p. 1143, a. 32, seq., thegeneralissimaare called πρῶτα, and particulars are called ἔσχατα. Zell observes in his commentary (p. 224), “τὰ ἔσχατα sunt res singulæ, quæ et ipsæ sunt extremæ, ratione mentis nostræ, ab universis ad singula delabentis.â€� Patricius remarks upon the different sense of the terms Πρώτη Οὐσία in the Categoriæ and in the De Interpretatione (Discuss. Peripatetic. p. 21).
109Categor. p. 3, b. 13: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῶον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλονποιόν τι σημαίνει — ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίανσημαίνει (b. 20).
Metaphysic.Z. p. 1038, b. 35: φανερὸν ὅτι οὐθὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐθὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε. Compare Metaphys.M. p. 1087, a. 1; Sophistic. Elench. p. 178, b. 37; 179, a. 9.
That which is called πρώτη οὐσία in the Categoriæ is called τρίτη οὐσία in Metaphys.Η. p. 1043, a. 18. In Ethic. Nikom.Z. p. 1143, a. 32, seq., thegeneralissimaare called πρῶτα, and particulars are called ἔσχατα. Zell observes in his commentary (p. 224), “τὰ ἔσχατα sunt res singulæ, quæ et ipsæ sunt extremæ, ratione mentis nostræ, ab universis ad singula delabentis.â€� Patricius remarks upon the different sense of the terms Πρώτη Οὐσία in the Categoriæ and in the De Interpretatione (Discuss. Peripatetic. p. 21).
110Metaphysic.Δ. p. 1020, b. 13: σχεδὸν δὴ κατὰ δύο τρόπους λέγοιτ’ ἂν τὸ ποιόν, καὶ τούτων ἕνα τὸν κυριώτατον· πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ποιοτὴς ἡ τῆς οὐσίας διαφορά. Compare Physic. v. p. 226, a. 27. See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 56, 93.The remarks of the different expositors (contained in Scholia, pp. 52, 53, 54, Brand.), are interesting upon the ambiguous position of Differentia, in regard to Substance and Quality. It comes out to be Neither and Both — οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα (Plato, Euthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something intermediate between οὐσία and ποιότης, or between οὐσία and συμβεβηκός.
110Metaphysic.Δ. p. 1020, b. 13: σχεδὸν δὴ κατὰ δύο τρόπους λέγοιτ’ ἂν τὸ ποιόν, καὶ τούτων ἕνα τὸν κυριώτατον· πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ποιοτὴς ἡ τῆς οὐσίας διαφορά. Compare Physic. v. p. 226, a. 27. See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 56, 93.
The remarks of the different expositors (contained in Scholia, pp. 52, 53, 54, Brand.), are interesting upon the ambiguous position of Differentia, in regard to Substance and Quality. It comes out to be Neither and Both — οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα (Plato, Euthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something intermediate between οὐσία and ποιότης, or between οὐσία and συμβεβηκός.
We see, accordingly, that neither is the line of demarcation between the Category of Substance or Essence and the other Categories so impassable, nor the separability of it from the others so marked as some thinkers contend. Substance is represented by Aristotle as admitting of more and less, and as graduating by successive steps down to the other Categories; moreover, neither in its complete manifestation (as First Substance), nor in its incomplete manifestation (as Second Substance), can it be explained or understood without calling in the other Categories of Quantity, Quality, and Relation. It does not correspond to the definition ofSubstantiagiven by Spinoza — “quod in se est et per se concipitur.� It can no more be conceived or described without some of the other Categories, than they can be conceived or described without it. Aristotle defines it by four characteristics, two negative, and two positive. It cannot be predicated of a Subject: it cannot inhere in a Subject: it is, at bottom, theSubjectof all Predicates: it isUnum numeroand indivisible.111Not one of these four determinations can be conceived or understood, unless we have in our minds the idea of other Categories and its relation to them. Substance is known only as the Subject of predicates, that is, relatively to them; as they also are known relatively to it. Without the Category of Relation, we can no more understand what is meant by a Subject than what is meant by a Predicate. The Category of Substance, as laid out by Aristotle, neither exists by itself, nor can be conceived by itself, without that of Relation and the generic notion of Predicate.112All three lietogether at the bottom of the analytical process, as the last findings and residuum.
111Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.
111Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.
112Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by καθ’ αὑτό — καθ’ αὑτά, in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p. 73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary to include in τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ of the Category Οὐσία, all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation of that Category understood.M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his translation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the Categories generally, and especially of πρώτη οὐσία, as simply naming (i.e.giving a proper name), and doing nothing more. I transcribe the passage, merely noting that the termsanteriorandposteriorcan mean nothing more thanlogicalanteriority and posteriority.“Mais comment classer les mots? — C’est à la réalité seule qu’il faut le demander; à la réalité dont le langage n’est que le réflet, dont les mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous présente la réalité? Des individus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-mêmes, et se groupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, sous des espèces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en étudiant l’individu, l’être individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu’il est possible d’en dire en tant qu’être, on aura les classes les plus générales des mots; les catégories, ou pour prendre le terme français, les attributions, qu’il est possible de lui appliquer. Voilà tout le fondement des Catégories. — Ce n’est pas du reste, une classification des choses à la manière de celles de l’histoire naturelle, qu’il s’agit de faire en logique: c’est une simple énumération de tous les points de vue, d’oùl’esprit peut considérer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport à l’esprit lui-même, mais par rapport à leur réalité et à leurs appellations. — Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix significations principales des mots. — La Catégorie de la Substance est à la tête de toutes les autres, précisément parceque la première, la plus essentielle, marque d’un être, c’est d’être. Cela revientÃdire qu’avant tout, l’être est, l’être existe. Par suite les mots qui expriment la substance sont antérieurs à tous les autres et sont les plus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots là participeront en quelque sorte à cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la nature. Mais de même que, dans la réalité, les individus subsistant par eux seuls forment des espèces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi une existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de même en substance première et substance seconde. — Les espèces et les genres, s’ils expriment la substance, ne l’expriment pas dans toute sa pureté; c’estdéjÃde la substance qualifié, comme le dit Aristote. — Il n’y a bien dans la réalité que des individus et des espèces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n’existent pas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence se produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi, tout comme ils expriment l’existence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes de mots formeront les autres Catégories. — Ces modifications, ces accidents, de l’individu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote n’en reconnaît pas davantage. —Voilà doncles dix Catégories: les dix seules attributions possibles.Par la première, on nomme les individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les qualifie.On dit d’abord ce qu’est l’individu, et ensuite quel il est.â€� Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique d’Aristote, Preface, pp. lxxii.-lxxvii.
112Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by καθ’ αὑτό — καθ’ αὑτά, in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p. 73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary to include in τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ of the Category Οὐσία, all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation of that Category understood.
M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his translation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the Categories generally, and especially of πρώτη οὐσία, as simply naming (i.e.giving a proper name), and doing nothing more. I transcribe the passage, merely noting that the termsanteriorandposteriorcan mean nothing more thanlogicalanteriority and posteriority.
“Mais comment classer les mots? — C’est à la réalité seule qu’il faut le demander; à la réalité dont le langage n’est que le réflet, dont les mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous présente la réalité? Des individus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-mêmes, et se groupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, sous des espèces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en étudiant l’individu, l’être individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu’il est possible d’en dire en tant qu’être, on aura les classes les plus générales des mots; les catégories, ou pour prendre le terme français, les attributions, qu’il est possible de lui appliquer. Voilà tout le fondement des Catégories. — Ce n’est pas du reste, une classification des choses à la manière de celles de l’histoire naturelle, qu’il s’agit de faire en logique: c’est une simple énumération de tous les points de vue, d’oùl’esprit peut considérer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport à l’esprit lui-même, mais par rapport à leur réalité et à leurs appellations. — Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix significations principales des mots. — La Catégorie de la Substance est à la tête de toutes les autres, précisément parceque la première, la plus essentielle, marque d’un être, c’est d’être. Cela revientÃdire qu’avant tout, l’être est, l’être existe. Par suite les mots qui expriment la substance sont antérieurs à tous les autres et sont les plus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots là participeront en quelque sorte à cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la nature. Mais de même que, dans la réalité, les individus subsistant par eux seuls forment des espèces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi une existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de même en substance première et substance seconde. — Les espèces et les genres, s’ils expriment la substance, ne l’expriment pas dans toute sa pureté; c’estdéjÃde la substance qualifié, comme le dit Aristote. — Il n’y a bien dans la réalité que des individus et des espèces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n’existent pas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence se produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi, tout comme ils expriment l’existence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes de mots formeront les autres Catégories. — Ces modifications, ces accidents, de l’individu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote n’en reconnaît pas davantage. —Voilà doncles dix Catégories: les dix seules attributions possibles.Par la première, on nomme les individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les qualifie.On dit d’abord ce qu’est l’individu, et ensuite quel il est.â€� Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique d’Aristote, Preface, pp. lxxii.-lxxvii.
Aristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete sentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the Subject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The noun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when pronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing complementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the conception, raised by the substantive named alone (ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we added to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it would seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to come; a mere point of commencement or departure,113known only by the various lines which may be drawn from it; asubstratumfor various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known only as asubstratum, is known only relatively to a superstructure to come; the one isRelatum, the otherCorrelatum, and the mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There may be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience, belonging to thesubstratum, because it remains numerically one and the same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is nothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an ability of prior independent existence. On the contrary,there is simultaneityby nature(according to Aristotle’s own definition of the phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all imply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is the cause of the others.114
113Plato would not admit the point as as anything more than ἀρχὴν γραμμῆς (Aristot. Metaphys.A. p. 992, a. 21).
113Plato would not admit the point as as anything more than ἀρχὴν γραμμῆς (Aristot. Metaphys.A. p. 992, a. 21).
114Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: φύσει δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος· &c.
114Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: φύσει δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος· &c.
When Aristotle says, very truly, that if the First Substances were non-existent, none of the other Predicaments could exist, we must understand what he means by the termfirst. That term bears, in this treatise, a sense different from what it bears elsewhere: here it means the extreme concrete and individual; elsewhere it means the extreme abstract and universal. The First Substance or First Essence, in the Categories, is aHoc Aliquid(τόδε τι), illustrated by the exampleshic homo,hic equus. Now, as thus explained and illustrated, it includes not merely the Second Substance, but various accidental attributes besides. When we talk of This man, Sokrates, Kallias, &c., the hearer conceives not only the attributes for which he is called a man, but also various accidental attributes, ranking under one or more of the other Predicaments. The First Substance thus (as explained by Aristotle) is not conceived as a meresubstratumwithout Second Substance and without any Accidents, but as already including both of them, though as yet indeterminately; it waits for specializing words, to determine what its Substance or Essence is, and what its accompanying Accidents are. Being an individual (Unum numero), it unites in itself both the essential attributes of its species, and the unessential attributes peculiar to itself.115It is already understood as including attributes of both kinds; but we wait for predicates to declare (δηλοῦν — ἀποδιδόναι116) what these attributes are. The First or CompleteEnsembodies in itself all the Predicaments, though as yet potential and indeterminate, until the predicating adjuncts are specified. There is no priority, in the order of existence, belonging to Substance over Relation or Quality; take away either one of the three, and the FirstEnsdisappears. But in regard to the order of exposition, there is a natural priority, founded on convenience and facility of understanding. TheHoc AliquidorUnum Numero, which intimates in generaloutline a certain concretion or co-existence of attributes, though we do not yet know what they are — being as it were a skeleton — comes naturally as Subject before the predicates, whose function is declaratory and specifying as to those attributes: moreover, the essential attributes, which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a specific name on the subject, come naturally before the unessential attributes, which are predicated of the subject already called by a specific name connoting other attributes.117The essential characters are native and at home; the accidental attributes are domiciliated foreigners.118
115Aristot. Metaphys.Z. p. 1033, b. 24; p. 1034, a. 8. Τὸ δ’ ἄπαν τόδε Καλλίας ἢ Σωκράτης ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἡ σφαῖρα ἡ χαλκῆ ἡδί, ὁ δ’ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὥσπερ σφαῖρα χαλκῆ ὅλως. — τὸ δ’ ἅπαν ἤδη τὸ τοιόνδε εἶδος ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς σαρξὶ καὶ ὀστοῖς Καλλίας καὶ Σωκράτης· καὶ ἕτερον μὲν διὰ τὴν ὕλην, ἕτερα γάρ, ταὐτὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει· ἄτομον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος.
115Aristot. Metaphys.Z. p. 1033, b. 24; p. 1034, a. 8. Τὸ δ’ ἄπαν τόδε Καλλίας ἢ Σωκράτης ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἡ σφαῖρα ἡ χαλκῆ ἡδί, ὁ δ’ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὥσπερ σφαῖρα χαλκῆ ὅλως. — τὸ δ’ ἅπαν ἤδη τὸ τοιόνδε εἶδος ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς σαρξὶ καὶ ὀστοῖς Καλλίας καὶ Σωκράτης· καὶ ἕτερον μὲν διὰ τὴν ὕλην, ἕτερα γάρ, ταὐτὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει· ἄτομον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος.
116Categor. p. 2, b. 29, seq. εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται· μόναγὰρ δηλοῖτὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων. &c.
116Categor. p. 2, b. 29, seq. εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται· μόναγὰρ δηλοῖτὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων. &c.
117Analyt. Poster. i. p. 73, b. 6: οἷον τὸ βαδίζον ἕτερόν τι ὃν βαδίζον ἐστὶ καὶ λευκόν, ἡ δ’ οὐσία, καὶ ὅσα τόδε τι σημαίνει, οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὄντα ὅπερ ἐστίν. Also p. 83, a. 31. καὶ μὴ εἶναί τι λευκόν, ὃ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὃν λευκόν ἐστιν: also p. 83, b. 22.
117Analyt. Poster. i. p. 73, b. 6: οἷον τὸ βαδίζον ἕτερόν τι ὃν βαδίζον ἐστὶ καὶ λευκόν, ἡ δ’ οὐσία, καὶ ὅσα τόδε τι σημαίνει, οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὄντα ὅπερ ἐστίν. Also p. 83, a. 31. καὶ μὴ εἶναί τι λευκόν, ὃ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὃν λευκόν ἐστιν: also p. 83, b. 22.
118Categor. p. 2, b. 31: τὸν γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺςοἰκείωςἀποδώσει — τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ὅ τι ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις,ἀλλοτρίωςἐσται ἀποδεδωκώς, &c.
118Categor. p. 2, b. 31: τὸν γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺςοἰκείωςἀποδώσει — τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ὅ τι ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις,ἀλλοτρίωςἐσται ἀποδεδωκώς, &c.
It is thus that Aristotle has dealt with Ontology, in one of the four distinct aspects thereof, which he distinguishes from each other; that is, in the distribution ofEntiaaccording to their logical order, and the reciprocal interdependence, in predication.Ensis a multivocal word, neither strictly univocal nor altogether equivocal. It denotes (as has been stated above) not a generic aggregate, divisible into species, but an analogical aggregate, starting from one common terminus and ramifying into many derivatives, having no other community except that of relationship to the same terminus.119The different modes ofEnsare distinguished by the degree or variety of such relationship. TheEns Primum,Proprium,Completum, is (in Aristotle’s view) the concrete individual; with a defined essence or essential constituent attributes (τί ἥν εἶναι), and with unessential accessories or accidents also — all embodied and implicated in the OneHoc Aliquid. In the Categoriæ Aristotle analyses thisEns Completum(not metaphysically, into Form and Matter, as we shall find him doing elsewhere, but) logically into Subject and Predicates. In this logical analysis, the Subject which can never be a Predicate stands first; next, come the near kinsmen, Genus and Species (expressed by substantive names, as the First Substance is), which are sometimes Predicates — as applied toSubstantia Prima, sometimes Subjects — in regard to the extrinsic accompaniments or accidents;120in the third rank, come the more remote kinsmen, Predicates pure andsimple. These are the logical factors or constituents into which theEns Completummay be analysed, and which together make it up as a logical sum-total. But no one of these logical constituents has an absolute or independentlocus standi, apart from the others. Each is relative to the others; the Subject to its Predicates, not less than the Predicates to their Subject. It is a mistake to describe the Subject as having a real standing separately and alone, and the Predicates as something afterwards tacked on to it. The Subjectper seis nothing but a general potentiality or receptivity for Predicates to come; a relative general conception, in which the two, Predicate and Subject, are jointly implicated asRelatumandCorrelatum.121
119Aristot. Metaphys.Δ. p. 1017, a. 22. καθ’ αὑτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας· ὀσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει.
119Aristot. Metaphys.Δ. p. 1017, a. 22. καθ’ αὑτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας· ὀσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει.
120Categor. p. 3, a. 1: ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται.
120Categor. p. 3, a. 1: ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται.
121Bonitz has an instructive note upon Form and Matter, themetaphysicalconstituents ofPrima Substantia,Hoc Aliquid, Sokrates, Kallias (see Aristot. Metaphys.Z. p. 1033, b. 24), which illustrates pertinently the relation between Predicate and Subject, thelogicalconstituents of the same σύνολον. He observes (not. p. 327,adAristot. Metaph.Z. p. 1033, b. 19). “Quoniam ex duabus substantiis, quæ quidem actu sint, nunquam una existit substantia, si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus, nunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis, τόδε τι. Ponendum potius, si recte assequor Aristotelis sententiam, utrumque (Form and Matter) ita ut alterum exspectet, materia ut formæ definitionem, forma ut materiam definiendam, exspectet, neutra vero per se et absolute sit.â€� What Bonitz says here about Matter and Form is no less true about Subject and Predicate: each is relative to the other — neither of them is absolute or independent of the other. In fact, the explanation given by Aristotle ofMateria(Metaph.Z. p. 1028, b. 36) coincides very much with thePrima Essentiaof the Categories, if abstracted from theSecunda Essentia.Materiais called there by Aristotle τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καθ’ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται. ἐκεῖνο δ’ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ’ ἄλλο — λέγω δ’ ὕλην ἣ καθ’ αὑτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν (p. 1029, a. 20). ἔστι γάρ τι καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧτὸ εἶναι ἕτερονκαὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται, αὕτη δὲ τῆς ὕλης.Aristotle proceeds to say that this Subject — the Subject for all Predicates, but never itself a Predicate — cannot be the genuine οὐσία, which must essentially be χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι (p. 1029, a. 28), and which must have a τί ἦν εἶναι (1029, b. 2). The Subject is in fact not true οὐσία, but is one of the constituent elements thereof, being relative to the Predicates asCorrelata: it is the potentiality for Predicates generally, asMateriais the potentiality for Forms.
121Bonitz has an instructive note upon Form and Matter, themetaphysicalconstituents ofPrima Substantia,Hoc Aliquid, Sokrates, Kallias (see Aristot. Metaphys.Z. p. 1033, b. 24), which illustrates pertinently the relation between Predicate and Subject, thelogicalconstituents of the same σύνολον. He observes (not. p. 327,adAristot. Metaph.Z. p. 1033, b. 19). “Quoniam ex duabus substantiis, quæ quidem actu sint, nunquam una existit substantia, si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus, nunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis, τόδε τι. Ponendum potius, si recte assequor Aristotelis sententiam, utrumque (Form and Matter) ita ut alterum exspectet, materia ut formæ definitionem, forma ut materiam definiendam, exspectet, neutra vero per se et absolute sit.â€� What Bonitz says here about Matter and Form is no less true about Subject and Predicate: each is relative to the other — neither of them is absolute or independent of the other. In fact, the explanation given by Aristotle ofMateria(Metaph.Z. p. 1028, b. 36) coincides very much with thePrima Essentiaof the Categories, if abstracted from theSecunda Essentia.Materiais called there by Aristotle τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καθ’ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται. ἐκεῖνο δ’ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ’ ἄλλο — λέγω δ’ ὕλην ἣ καθ’ αὑτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν (p. 1029, a. 20). ἔστι γάρ τι καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧτὸ εἶναι ἕτερονκαὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται, αὕτη δὲ τῆς ὕλης.
Aristotle proceeds to say that this Subject — the Subject for all Predicates, but never itself a Predicate — cannot be the genuine οὐσία, which must essentially be χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι (p. 1029, a. 28), and which must have a τί ἦν εἶναι (1029, b. 2). The Subject is in fact not true οὐσία, but is one of the constituent elements thereof, being relative to the Predicates asCorrelata: it is the potentiality for Predicates generally, asMateriais the potentiality for Forms.
The logical aspect of Ontology, analysingEnsinto a common Subject with its various classes of Predicates, appears to begin with Aristotle. He was, as far as we can see, original, in taking as the point of departure for his theory, the individual man, horse, or other perceivable object; in laying down this Concrete Particular with all its outfit of details, as the type ofEnsproper, complete and primary; and in arranging into classes the various secondary modes ofEns, according to their different relations to the primary type and the mode in which they contributed to make up its completeness. He thus stood opposed to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, who took their departure from the Universal, as the type of full and true Entity;122while he alsodissented from Demokritus, who recognized no trueEnsexcept the underlying, imperceptible, eternal atoms and vacuum. Moreover Aristotle seems to have been the first to draw up a logical analysis of Entity in its widest sense, as distinguished from that metaphysical analysis which we read in his other works; the two not being contradictory, but distinct and tending to different purposes. Both in the one and in the other, his principal controversy seems to have been with the Platonists, who disregarded both individual objects and accidental attributes; dwelling upon Universals, Genera and Species, as the only realEntiacapable of being known. With the Sophists, Aristotle contends on a different ground, accusing them of neglecting altogether the essential attributes, and confining themselves to the region of accidents, in which no certainty was to be found;123in Plato, he points out the opposite mistake, of confining himself to the essentials, and ascribing undue importance to the process of generic and specific subdivision.124His own logical analysis takes account both of the essential and accidental, and puts them in what he thinks their proper relation. The Accidental (συμβεβηκός, concomitant,i.e.of the essence) isper senot knowable at all (he contends), nor is ever the object of study pursued in any science; it is little better than a name, designating the lowest degree ofEns, bordering onNon-Ens.125It is a term comprehending all that he includes under his nine last Categories; yet it is not a term connoting either generic communion, or even so much as analogical relation.126In the treatise now before us, he does not recognize either that or any other general term as common to all those nine Categories; each of the nine is here treated as aSummum Genus, having its own mode of relationship, and clinging by its own separate thread to the Subject. He acknowledges the Accidents in his classification, not as a class by themselves, but as subordinated to the Essence, and, as so many threads of distinct, variable, and irregular accompaniments,attaching themselves to this constant root, without uniformity or steadiness.127
122Simplikius ad Categ. p. 2, b. 5; Schol. p. 52, a. 1, Br: Ἀρχύτας ὁ Πυθαγορεῖος οὐ προσίεται τὴν νυνὶ προκειμένην τῶν οὐσίων διαίρεσιν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλην ἀντὶ ταύτης ἐκεῖνος ἐγκρίνει — τῶν μέντοι Πυθαγορείων οὐδεὶς ἂν πρόσοιτο ταύτην τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ὅτι τοῖς καθόλου τὸ πρώτως ὑπάρχειν μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἐν τοῖς μεριστοῖς ἀπολείπουσι, καὶ διότι ἐν τοῖς ἁπλουστάτοις τὴν πρώτην καὶ κυριωτάτην οὐσίαν ἀποτίθενται, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς νῦν λέγεται ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις καὶ αἰσθητοῖς, καὶ διότι τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη ὄντα νομίζουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ συγκεφαλαιούμενα ταῖς χωρισταῖς ἐπινοίαις.
122Simplikius ad Categ. p. 2, b. 5; Schol. p. 52, a. 1, Br: Ἀρχύτας ὁ Πυθαγορεῖος οὐ προσίεται τὴν νυνὶ προκειμένην τῶν οὐσίων διαίρεσιν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλην ἀντὶ ταύτης ἐκεῖνος ἐγκρίνει — τῶν μέντοι Πυθαγορείων οὐδεὶς ἂν πρόσοιτο ταύτην τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ὅτι τοῖς καθόλου τὸ πρώτως ὑπάρχειν μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἐν τοῖς μεριστοῖς ἀπολείπουσι, καὶ διότι ἐν τοῖς ἁπλουστάτοις τὴν πρώτην καὶ κυριωτάτην οὐσίαν ἀποτίθενται, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς νῦν λέγεται ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις καὶ αἰσθητοῖς, καὶ διότι τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη ὄντα νομίζουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ συγκεφαλαιούμενα ταῖς χωρισταῖς ἐπινοίαις.
123Metaphys.E. p. 1026, b. 15: εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, &c.; alsoK. p. 1061, b. 8; Analytic. Poster. i. p. 71, b. 10.
123Metaphys.E. p. 1026, b. 15: εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, &c.; alsoK. p. 1061, b. 8; Analytic. Poster. i. p. 71, b. 10.
124Analytic. Priora, i. p. 46, a. 31.
124Analytic. Priora, i. p. 46, a. 31.
125Aristot. Metaph.E. p. 1026, b. 13-21. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὀνόματι μόνον τὸ συμβεβηκός — φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.
125Aristot. Metaph.E. p. 1026, b. 13-21. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὀνόματι μόνον τὸ συμβεβηκός — φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.
126Physica, iii. 1, p. 200, b. 34. κοινὸν δ’ ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδέν ἐστι λαβεῖν, &c.
126Physica, iii. 1, p. 200, b. 34. κοινὸν δ’ ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδέν ἐστι λαβεῖν, &c.
127See the explanation given of τὸ ὂν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς in Metaphys.E. pp. 1026 b., 1027 a. This is the sense in which Aristotle most frequently and usually talks of συμβεβηκός, though he sometimes uses it to include also a constant and inseparable accompaniment or Accident, if it be not included in the Essence (i. e.not connoted by the specific name); thus, to have the three angles equal to two right angles is a συμβεβηκὸς of the triangle, Metaph.Δ. p. 1025, a. 80. The proper sense in which he understands τὸ συμβεβηκὸς is as opposed to τὸ ἀεὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, as well as τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. See Metaphys.K. p. 1065, a. 2; Analyt. Poster. i. p. 74, b. 12, p. 75, a. 18.It is that which is by its nature irregular and unpredictable. See the valuable chapter (ii) in Brentano, Von der Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (pp. 8-21), in which the meaning of τὸ συμβεβηκὸς in Aristotle is clearly set forth.
127See the explanation given of τὸ ὂν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς in Metaphys.E. pp. 1026 b., 1027 a. This is the sense in which Aristotle most frequently and usually talks of συμβεβηκός, though he sometimes uses it to include also a constant and inseparable accompaniment or Accident, if it be not included in the Essence (i. e.not connoted by the specific name); thus, to have the three angles equal to two right angles is a συμβεβηκὸς of the triangle, Metaph.Δ. p. 1025, a. 80. The proper sense in which he understands τὸ συμβεβηκὸς is as opposed to τὸ ἀεὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, as well as τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. See Metaphys.K. p. 1065, a. 2; Analyt. Poster. i. p. 74, b. 12, p. 75, a. 18.
It is that which is by its nature irregular and unpredictable. See the valuable chapter (ii) in Brentano, Von der Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (pp. 8-21), in which the meaning of τὸ συμβεβηκὸς in Aristotle is clearly set forth.
In discriminating and arranging the Ten Categories, Trendelenburg supposes that Aristotle was guided, consciously or unconsciously, by grammatical considerations, or by a distinction among the parts of speech. It should be remembered that what are now familiarly known as the eight parts of speech, had not yet been distinguished or named in the time of Aristotle, nor did the distinction come into vogue before the time of the Stoic and Alexandrine grammarians, more than a century after him.EssentiaorSubstantia, the first Category, answers (so Trendelenburg thinks128) to the Substantive;QuantumandQualerepresent the Adjective;Ad Aliquid, the comparative Adjective, of whichQuantumandQualeare the positive degree;UbiandQuandothe Adverb;Jacere,Habere,Agere,Patithe Verb. Of the last four,AgereandPaticorrespond to the active and passive voices of the Verb;Jacereto the neuter or intransitive Verb; andHabereto the peculiar meaning of the Greek perfect — the present result of a past action.
128Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 23, 211.
128Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 23, 211.
This general view, which Trendelenburg himself conceives as having been only guiding and not decisive or peremptory in the mind of Aristotle,129appears to me likely and plausible, though Bonitz and others have strongly opposed it. We see from Aristotle’s own language, that the grammatical point of view had great effect upon his mind; that the form (e.g.) of a substantive implied in his view a mode of signification belonging to itself, which was to be taken into account in arranging and explaining the Categories.130I apprehend that Aristotle was induced to distinguish and set out his Categories by analysingvarious complete sentences, which would of course include substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. It is also remarkable that Aristotle should have designated his four last Categories by the indication of verbs, the two immediately preceding by adverbs, the second and third by adjectives, and the first by a substantive. There remains the important CategoryAd Aliquid, which has no part of speech corresponding to it specially. Even this Category, though not represented by any part of speech, is nevertheless conceived and defined by Aristotle in a very narrow way, with close reference to the form of expression, and to the requirement of a noun immediately following, in the genitive or dative case. And thus, where there is no special part of speech, the mind of Aristotle still seems to receive its guidance from grammatical and syntactic forms.
129Ibid. p. 209: “Gesichtspunkte der Sprache leiteten den erfindenden Geist, um sie (die Kategorien) zu bestimmen. Aber die grammatischen Beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht.� P. 216: “der grammatische Leitfaden der Satzzergliederung wird anerkannt.�
129Ibid. p. 209: “Gesichtspunkte der Sprache leiteten den erfindenden Geist, um sie (die Kategorien) zu bestimmen. Aber die grammatischen Beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht.� P. 216: “der grammatische Leitfaden der Satzzergliederung wird anerkannt.�
130Categor. p. 3, b. 13: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷσχήματι τῆς προσηγορίαςτόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει. &c.
130Categor. p. 3, b. 13: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷσχήματι τῆς προσηγορίαςτόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει. &c.
We may illustrate the ten Categories of Aristotle by comparing them with the four Categories of the Stoics. During the century succeeding Aristotle’s death, the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus (principally the latter), having before them what he had done, proposed a new arrangement for the complete distribution of Subject and Predicates. Their distribution was quadruple instead of decuple. Their first Category was τί,AliquidorQuiddam— τὸ ὑποκείμενον, theSubstratumor Subject. Their second was ποιόν,Qualeor Quality. Their third was πὼς ἔχον,certo Modo se habens. Their fourth was, πρός τι πὼς ἔχον,Ad Aliquid certo Modo se habens.131
131Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25; vi. 1, 30: τὰ πὼς ἔχοντα τρίτα τίθεσθαι. Simplikius ad Categor. f. 7, p. 48, a. 13, Brand. Schol.: Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἀξιοῦσι τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν καί τινα ἐν τοῖς ἀλάττοσιν ὑπηλλαγμένα παραλαμβάνουσι. ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα, εἰς ὑποκείμενα, καὶ ποιὰ, καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα, καὶ πρός τι πὼς ἔχοντα.It would seem from the adverse criticisms of Plotinus, that the Stoics recognized one grandγένοςcomprehending all the above four as distinct species: see Plotinus, Ennead., vi. 2, 1; vi. 1, 25. He charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so. He admits, however, that Aristotle did not recognize any one supreme γένος comprehending all the ten Categories (vi. 1, 1), but treated all the ten as πρῶτα γένη, under an analogous aggregate. I cannot but think that theStoicslooked upon their four γένη in the same manner; for I do not see what they could find more comprehensive to rank generically above τί.
131Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25; vi. 1, 30: τὰ πὼς ἔχοντα τρίτα τίθεσθαι. Simplikius ad Categor. f. 7, p. 48, a. 13, Brand. Schol.: Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἀξιοῦσι τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν καί τινα ἐν τοῖς ἀλάττοσιν ὑπηλλαγμένα παραλαμβάνουσι. ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα, εἰς ὑποκείμενα, καὶ ποιὰ, καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα, καὶ πρός τι πὼς ἔχοντα.
It would seem from the adverse criticisms of Plotinus, that the Stoics recognized one grandγένοςcomprehending all the above four as distinct species: see Plotinus, Ennead., vi. 2, 1; vi. 1, 25. He charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so. He admits, however, that Aristotle did not recognize any one supreme γένος comprehending all the ten Categories (vi. 1, 1), but treated all the ten as πρῶτα γένη, under an analogous aggregate. I cannot but think that theStoicslooked upon their four γένη in the same manner; for I do not see what they could find more comprehensive to rank generically above τί.
We do not possess the advantage (which we have in the case of Aristotle) of knowing this quadruple scheme as stated and enforced by its authors. We know it only through the abridgment of Diogenes Laertius, together with incidental remarks and criticisms, chiefly adverse, by Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, and some Aristotelian commentators. As far as we can make out upon this evidence, it appears that the first Stoic Category corresponded with the Πρώτη Οὐσία, First Essence or Substance of Aristotle. It was exclusively Subject, and couldnever become Predicate; but it was indispensable as Subject, to the three other Predicates. Its meaning was concrete and particular; for we are told that all general notions or conceptions were excluded by the Stoics from this Category,132and were designated as Οὔτινα, Non-Individuals, or Non-Particulars.Homowas counted by them, not under the Category τί,Quid, but under the Categoryποιόν,Quale; in its character of predicate determining the Subject τίς or τί. The Stoic CategoryQualethus included the Aristotelian Second Essences or Substances, and also the Aristoteliandifferentia.Qualewas aspecies-making Category (εἰδοποιός).133It declared what was the Essence of the Subject τί â€” the essential qualities or attributes, but also the derivative manifestations thereof, coinciding with what is called thepropriumin Porphyry’s Eisagoge. It therefore came next in order immediately after τί: since the Essence of the Subject must be declared, before you proceed to declare its Accidents.
132Simpl. ad Categ., p. 54, a. 12, Schol. Brand.: συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν, πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ’ αὐτοὺς προφέρονται, καὶ πῶςοὔτινατὰ κοινὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται, καὶ ὅπως παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοῦ μὴ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ τὸπαρὰ τὸν οὔτινασόφισμα γίνεται παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως· οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐν Ἀθήναις, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν Μεγάροις·ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὔτις ἐστίν, οὐ γάρ ἐστί τις ὁ κοινός, ὡς τινὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐλάβομεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος οὔτις κληθείς.Compare Schol. p. 45,a. 7, where Porphyry says that the Stoics, as well as Aristotle, in arranging Categories, took as their point of departure τὸδεύτερονὑποκείμενον, not τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ( = τὴν ἄποιον ὕλην).
132Simpl. ad Categ., p. 54, a. 12, Schol. Brand.: συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν, πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ’ αὐτοὺς προφέρονται, καὶ πῶςοὔτινατὰ κοινὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται, καὶ ὅπως παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοῦ μὴ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ τὸπαρὰ τὸν οὔτινασόφισμα γίνεται παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως· οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐν Ἀθήναις, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν Μεγάροις·ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὔτις ἐστίν, οὐ γάρ ἐστί τις ὁ κοινός, ὡς τινὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐλάβομεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος οὔτις κληθείς.
Compare Schol. p. 45,a. 7, where Porphyry says that the Stoics, as well as Aristotle, in arranging Categories, took as their point of departure τὸδεύτερονὑποκείμενον, not τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ( = τὴν ἄποιον ὕλην).
133Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre p. 222; Plutarch, De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1054 a.; Simpl. ad Categor. Schol. p. 67. Br. Ποιὰ were distributed by the Stoics into three varieties; and the abstract word Ποιότης, in the Stoic sense, corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these three varieties, not to the second or third variety, so that ποιότης had a narrower extension than ποιόν: there were ποιὰ without any ποιοτὴς corresponding to them. To the third Category, Πὼς ἔχοντα, which was larger and more varied than the second, they had no abstract term corresponding; nor to the fourth Category, Πρός τι. Hence, we may see one reason why the Stoics, confining the abstract term ποιότητες to durable attributes, were disposed to maintain that the ποιότητες τῶν σωμάτων were themselves σώματα or σωματικά: which Galen takes much pains to refute (vol. xix. p. 463, seq. ed. Kuhn). The Stoics considered these qualities as ἀέρας τινάς, or πνεύματα, &c., spiritual or gaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance.It is difficult to make out these Stoic theories clearly from the evidence before us. From the statements of Simplikius in Scholia, pp. 67-69, I cannot understand the line of distinction between ποιὰ and πὼς ἔχοντα. The Stoics considered ποιότης to be δύναμις πλείστων ἐποιστικὴ συμπτωμάτων, ὡς ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ τε φρονίμως περιπατεῖν καὶ τοῦ φρονίμως διαλέγεσθαι (p. 69, b. 2); and if all these συμπτώματα were included under ποιόν, so that ὁ φρονίμως περιπατῶν, ὁ πὺξ προτείνων and ὁ τρέχων, were ποιοί τινες (p. 67, b. 34). I hardly see what was left for the third Category πὼς ἔχοντα to comprehend; although, according to the indications of Plotinus, it would be the most comprehensive. The Stoic writers seem both to have differed among themselves and to have written inconsistently.Neither Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, pp. 223-226), nor even Prantl, in his more elaborate account (Gesch. der Logik, pp. 429-437), clears up this obscurity.
133Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre p. 222; Plutarch, De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1054 a.; Simpl. ad Categor. Schol. p. 67. Br. Ποιὰ were distributed by the Stoics into three varieties; and the abstract word Ποιότης, in the Stoic sense, corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these three varieties, not to the second or third variety, so that ποιότης had a narrower extension than ποιόν: there were ποιὰ without any ποιοτὴς corresponding to them. To the third Category, Πὼς ἔχοντα, which was larger and more varied than the second, they had no abstract term corresponding; nor to the fourth Category, Πρός τι. Hence, we may see one reason why the Stoics, confining the abstract term ποιότητες to durable attributes, were disposed to maintain that the ποιότητες τῶν σωμάτων were themselves σώματα or σωματικά: which Galen takes much pains to refute (vol. xix. p. 463, seq. ed. Kuhn). The Stoics considered these qualities as ἀέρας τινάς, or πνεύματα, &c., spiritual or gaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance.
It is difficult to make out these Stoic theories clearly from the evidence before us. From the statements of Simplikius in Scholia, pp. 67-69, I cannot understand the line of distinction between ποιὰ and πὼς ἔχοντα. The Stoics considered ποιότης to be δύναμις πλείστων ἐποιστικὴ συμπτωμάτων, ὡς ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ τε φρονίμως περιπατεῖν καὶ τοῦ φρονίμως διαλέγεσθαι (p. 69, b. 2); and if all these συμπτώματα were included under ποιόν, so that ὁ φρονίμως περιπατῶν, ὁ πὺξ προτείνων and ὁ τρέχων, were ποιοί τινες (p. 67, b. 34). I hardly see what was left for the third Category πὼς ἔχοντα to comprehend; although, according to the indications of Plotinus, it would be the most comprehensive. The Stoic writers seem both to have differed among themselves and to have written inconsistently.
Neither Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, pp. 223-226), nor even Prantl, in his more elaborate account (Gesch. der Logik, pp. 429-437), clears up this obscurity.
The Third Stoic Category (πὼς ἔχον) comprised a portion of what Aristotle ranked underQuale, and all that he ranked underQuantum,Ubi,Quando,Agere,Pati,Jacere,Habere. Thefourth Stoic Category coincided with the AristotelianAd Aliquid. The third was thus intended to cover what were understood as absolute or non-relative Accidents; the fourth included what were understood as Relative Accidents.
The order of arrangement among the four was considered as fixed and peremptory. They were not co-ordinate species under one and the same genus, but superordinate and subordinate,134the second presupposing and attaching to the first; the third, presupposing and attaching to the first,plusthe second; the fourth, presupposing and attaching to the first,plusthe second and third. The first proposition to be made is, in answer to the questionQuale Quid? You answerTale Aliquid, declaring the essential attributes. Upon this, the next question is put,Quali Modo se habens? You answer by a term of the third Category, declaring one or more of the accidental attributes non-relative,Tale Aliquid, tali Modo se habens. Upon this, the fourth and last question follows,Quali Modo se habens ad alia? Answer is made by the predicate of the fourth Category,i.e.a Relative.Hic Aliquis — homo(1),niger(2),servus(3).