Chapter 30

152Ibid. b. 23-29.

153Ibid. p. 120, b. 36-p. 121, a. 9. καθόλου δâ€™ εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν δεῖ τὸ γένος τῷ εἴδει εἶναι.Aristotle here enunciates this as universally true, whereas if we turn to Categor. p. 11, a. 24, seq. we shall find him declaring it not to be universally true. Compare also Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b. 15.

153Ibid. p. 120, b. 36-p. 121, a. 9. καθόλου δâ€™ εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν δεῖ τὸ γένος τῷ εἴδει εἶναι.

Aristotle here enunciates this as universally true, whereas if we turn to Categor. p. 11, a. 24, seq. we shall find him declaring it not to be universally true. Compare also Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b. 15.

You are aware that the species always partakes of the genus, while the genus never partakes of the species; topartakemeaning that the species includes the essence or definition of the genus, but the genus never includes the essence or definition of the species. You will examine, therefore, whether in the thesis propounded to you this condition is realized; if not, the thesis may be refuted. Suppose,e.g., that it enunciates some superior genus as includingEnsorUnum. If this were true, the genus so assigned would still partake ofEnsandUnum; forEnsandUnummaybe predicated of all existences whatever. Therefore what is enunciated in the thesis as a genus, cannot be a real genus.154

154Topic. IV. i. p. 121, a. 10-19.

Perhaps you may find something respecting which the subject (species) may be truly affirmed, while the predicate (genus) cannot be truly affirmed. If so, the predicate is not a real genus. Thus, the thesis may enunciateEnsorScibileas being the genus ofOpinabile. But this last, the species or subjectOpinabile, may be affirmed respectingNon-Ensalso; while the predicatesEnsorScibile(given as the pretended genus ofOpinabile) cannot be affirmed respectingNon-Ens. You can thus show thatEnsorScibileis not the real genus ofOpinabile.155The pretended speciesOpinabile(comprising as it does bothEnsandNon-Ens) stretches farther than the pretended genusEnsorScibile: whereas every real genus ought to stretch farther than any one or any portion of its constituent species.156The thesis may thus be overthrown, if there be any one species which stretches even equally far or is co-extensive with the pretended genus.157

155Ibid. a. 20-26.

156Ibid. b. 1-14. στοιχεῖον δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ γένος ἢ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν λέγεσθαιÂ· ἐπâ€™ ἔλαττον γὰρ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ γένους λέγεται.

157Ibid. b. 4.

It is a general truth that the same species cannot belong to two distinct genera, unless one of the two be subordinate to the other, or unless both of them be comprehended under some common higher genus. You will examine, therefore, whether there is any other genus, besides the predicate of the thesis, to which the subject of the thesis can be referred. If there be some other genus, not under either of the two conditions above indicated, the predicate enunciated by the thesis cannot be the real genus of the subject. Thus, if the thesis declares justice to be science (or to belong to the genus science), you may remark that there is another distinct genus (virtue) to which justice also belongs. In this particular case, however, it would be replied that science and virtue can both be referred to one and the same higher genus, viz., habit and disposition. Thereforethe thesis, Justice is science, will not be truly open to objection on this ground.158

158Topic. IV. ii. p. 121, b. 24, seq.

Again, if the predicate of the thesis be the true genus of the subject, all the higher genera in which the predicate is contained must also be predicatedin Quid(as the predicate itself is)respecting the subject. This you must show by an induction of particular instances, no counter-instance being producible.159If the thesis enunciated does not conform to this condition, you will have a good argument against it. You will also run over the sub-species that are comprehended in the subject of the thesis, considered as a genus; and you will examine whether the predicate of the thesis (together with all its superior genera) is predicable essentially orin Quidof all these sub-species. If you can find any one among these sub-species, of which it is not essentially predicable, the predicate of the thesis is not the true genus of the subject;160the like also, if the definitions of those genera are not predicable of the subject or its sub-species.161

159Ibid. p. 122, a. 5-19. ὅτι δὲ ἑνὸς ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορουμένου πάντα τὰ λοιπά, ἄνπερ κατηγορῆται, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορηθήσεται, διâ€™ ἐπαγωγῆς ληπτέον.

160Ibid. a. 21-b. 6.

161Ibid. b. 7-11. εἰ οὖν διαφωνεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ γένος τὸ ἀποδοθέν.

Perhaps the thesis may enunciate as a genus what is really nothing more than a differentia. It may also enunciate the differentia either as a part of the genus or as a part of the species; or it may enunciate the genus either as a part of the differentia or as a part of the species. All these are attackable. The differentia is not a genus, nor does it respond to the questionQuid est, but to the questionQuale quid est. It is always eithermoreextensive than the species, or co-extensive therewith.162If none of the differentiÃ¦ belonging to a genus can be predicated of a species, neither can the genus itself be predicated thereof. Thus, neither odd nor even can be predicated of the soul; accordingly, neither can the genus(number) be predicated of the soul.163If the species beprius naturÃ¢, so that when it disappears the enunciated genus disappears along with it, this cannot be the real genus; nor, if the enunciated genus or differentia can be supposed to disappear and yet the species does not disappear along with them.164If the species partakes of (includes in its essence) something contrary to the enunciated genus, this last cannot be the real genus; nor, if the species includes something which cannot possibly belong to what is in that genus. Thus, if the soul partakes of (or includes in its essence) life, and if no number can possibly live, the soul cannot be a species of number.165

162Ibid. b. 12-p. 123, a. 10. οὐδὲ δοκεῖ μετέχειν ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ γένουςÂ· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μετέχον τοῦ γένους ἢ εἶδος ἢ ἄτομόν ἐστιν. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐπâ€™ ἴσης ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖον τοῦ εἴδους λέγεται. â€” ἐπὶ πλέον τε γὰρ τὸ γένος τῆς διαφορᾶς δεῖ λέγεσθαι, καὶ μὴ μετέχειν τῆς διαφορᾶς.As an example to illustrate the enclosing of the genus within the species (εἰ τὸ γένος εἰς τὸ εἶδος ἔθηκεν), Aristotle cites a definition given by Plato, who defined τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, as φοράν. Now φορὰ is less extensive in its meaning than ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, which includes βάδισις and other terms of motion apart from or foreign to φορά. â€” Example of enunciating differentia as a genus is, if immortal be given as the genus to which a god belongs. Immortal is the differentia belonging to ζῷον, and constituting therewith the species god. â€” Example of enclosing the differentia in the genus is, if odd be given as the essence of number (ὅπερ ἀριθμόν). â€” Example of enclosing differentia in the species is, if immortal be put forward as the essence of a god (ὅπερ θεόν). â€” Example of enclosing the genus in the differentia is, number given as the essence of the odd. â€” Example of enunciating the genus as a differentia is, when change of place is given as the differentia of φορά.

As an example to illustrate the enclosing of the genus within the species (εἰ τὸ γένος εἰς τὸ εἶδος ἔθηκεν), Aristotle cites a definition given by Plato, who defined τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, as φοράν. Now φορὰ is less extensive in its meaning than ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, which includes βάδισις and other terms of motion apart from or foreign to φορά. â€” Example of enunciating differentia as a genus is, if immortal be given as the genus to which a god belongs. Immortal is the differentia belonging to ζῷον, and constituting therewith the species god. â€” Example of enclosing the differentia in the genus is, if odd be given as the essence of number (ὅπερ ἀριθμόν). â€” Example of enclosing differentia in the species is, if immortal be put forward as the essence of a god (ὅπερ θεόν). â€” Example of enclosing the genus in the differentia is, number given as the essence of the odd. â€” Example of enunciating the genus as a differentia is, when change of place is given as the differentia of φορά.

163Topic. IV. ii. p. 123, a. 11-14.

164Ibid. a. 14-19.

165Ibid. iii. a. 20-26.

Again, the generic term and the specific term ought to be univocal in signification. You must examine (according to the tests indicated in the First Book of the Topica) whether it be taken equivocally in the thesis. If it be so, you have a ground of attack, and also if it be taken metaphorically; for every genus ought to be enunciated in the proper sense of the term, and no metaphor can be allowed to pass as a genus.166Note farther that every true genus has more than one distinct species. You will, therefore, examine whether any other species, besides the subject of the thesis, can be suggested as belonging to the predicate of the thesis. If none, that predicate cannot be the true genus of the subject.167

166Ibid. a. 27-37. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ μεταφορᾷ λεγόμενον ὡς γένος ἀποδέδωκεν, οἷον τὴν σωφροσύνην συμφωνίανÂ· πᾶν γὰρ γένος κυρίως κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, ἡ δὲ συμφωνία κατὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης οὐ κυρίως ἀλλὰ μεταφορᾷÂ· πᾶσα γὰρ συμφωνία ἐν φθόγγοις.

167Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, a. 30.

Severallociare furnished by Contraries, either to the species or the genus. If there be something contrary to the species, but nothing contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species ought to be included under the same genus as the species itself; but, if there be something contrary to the species, and also something contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species ought to be included in that which is contrary to the genus. Each of these doctrines you will have to make good by induction of particular cases.168If that which is contrary to the species be a genus itself (e.g.,bonum) and not included in any superior genus, then the like will be true respecting the species itself: it will not be included in any genus; and the predicate of the thesis will not be a true genus.Bonumandmalumare not included in any common superior genus; each is a genusper se.169Or suppose that the subject (species) ofthe thesis, and the predicate (genus) of the thesis, have both of them contraries; but that in the one there is an intermediate between the two contraries, and in the other, not. This shows that the predicate cannot be the true genus of the species; for, wherever there is an intermediate between the two contraries of the species, there also is an intermediate between the two contraries of the genus; andvice versÃ¢.170If there be an intermediate between the two contraries of the species, and also an intermediate between the two contraries of the genus, you will examine whether both intermediates are of like nature, designated by analogous terms. If it be not so (if,e.g., the one intermediate is designated by a positive term, and the other only by a negative term), you will have ground for contending against the thesis, that the predicate enunciated therein is not the true genus of the subject. At any rate, this is a probable (ἔνδοξον) dialectical argument â€” to insist upon analogy between the two intermediates; though there are some particular cases in which the doctrine does not hold.171

168Ibid. b. 1-8. φανερὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.

169Ibid. b. 8-12.

170Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, b. 12, seq.

171Ibid. b. 17-23: ἔνστασις τούτου ὅτι ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου οὐδὲν μεταξύ, κακοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀγαθοῦÂ· ἢ εἰ ἔστι μέν τι ἀμφοῖν ἀνὰ μέσον, καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γενῶν, μὴ ὁμοίως δέ, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατâ€™ ἀπόφασιν, τῶν δâ€™ ὡς ὑποκείμενον.ἔνδοξον γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν, καθάπερ ἐπâ€™ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίαςÂ· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν τὰ ἀνὰ μέσον.

Again, suppose different conditions: that there is no contrary to the genus, but that there is a contrary to the species. You will examine whether not merely the contrary of the species, but also the intermediate between its two contraries, is included in the same genus; for, if the two contraries are included therein, the intermediate ought also to be included. This is a line of argumentprobable(i.e., conformable to general presumption, and recommendable in a dialectical debate), though there are not wanting examples adverse to it: thus, excess and defect are included in the same genus evil, but the moderate or measured (τὸ μέτριον) is not in the genus evil, but in the genus good.172We must remark, moreover, that though it be a probable dialectical argument, that, wherever the genus has a contrary, the species will also have a contrary, yet there are cases adverse to this principle. Thus, sickness in general has for its contrary health in general; but particular species of sickness (such as fever, ophthalmia, gout, &c.) have no contrary.173

172Ibid. b. 23-30.

173Ibid. b. 30-37.

Such will be your way of procedure, if the thesis propounded be Affirmative, and if you have to make out a negative against it. But if, on the contrary, the thesis be Negative, so that you have to make out an affirmative against it, you have then threelines of procedure open. 1. The genus may have no contrary, while the species has a contrary: in that case, you may perhaps be able to show that the contrary of the species (subject) is included in the predicate of the thesis (genus); if so, then the species also will be included therein. 2. Or, if you can show that the intermediate between the species and its contrary is included in the predicate (genus), then that same genus will also include the species and its contrary; for, wherever the intermediate is, there also are the two extremes between which it is intermediate. 3. Lastly, if the genus has a contrary as well as the species, you may be able to show that the contrary of the species is included in the contrary of the genus; assuming which to be the case, then the species itself will be included in the genus.174These are the three modes of procedure, if your task is to make out the negative.

174Topic. IV. iii. p. 124, a. 1-9.

If the genus enunciated by the thesis be a true one, all the Derivatives and Collaterals of the predicate will be fit and suitable for those of the subject. Thus, if justice be a sort of science, justly will be scientifically, and the just man will be a scientific man. Thislocusis useful to be kept in mind, whether you have to make out an affirmative or a negative.175You may reason in the same way about theAnalogaof the predicate and the subject; about the productive and destructive causes of each; the manifestations present, past, and future, of each, &c.176

175Ibid. a. 10-14.

176Ibid. iv. p. 124, a. 15-34.

When the opposite of the species (subject) is Privative, the thesis will be open to attack in two ways. 1. If the privative opposite be contained in the predicate, the subject itself will not be contained therein; for it is a general truth that a subject and its privative opposite are never both of them contained in the same lowest genus: thus, if vision is sensible perception, blindness is not sensible perception. 2. If both the species and the genus have privative opposites, then if the privative opposite of the species be contained in the privative opposite of the genus, the species itself will also be contained in the genus; if not, not. Thus, if blindness be an inability of sensible perception, vision will be a sensible perception. This lastlocuswill be available, whether you are making out an affirmative or a negative.177

177Ibid. a. 35-b. 6.

If the predicate of the thesis be a true genus, you may convert the thesis simply, having substituted for the predicate the denial of its Contradictory; if not, not.Vice versÃ¢, if the new propositionso formed be true, the predicate of the thesis will be a true genus; if not, not. Thus, if good be the true genus of pleasurable, nothing that is not good will be pleasurable. Thislocusalso will serve both for making out an affirmative and for making out a negative.178

178Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b. 7-14: πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων σκοπεῖν ἀνάπαλιν, &c.

If the subject (species) of the thesis be a Relative, you will examine whether the predicate (genus) be relative also; if not, it will not be the true genus of the subject. The converse of this rule, however, will not hold; and indeed the rule itself is not absolutely universal.179You may also argue that, if the correlate of the genus be not the same as the correlate of the species, the genus cannot be truly predicated of that species: thus, half is the correlate of double, but half is not the proper correlate of multiple; therefore, multiple is not the true genus of double. But your argument may here be met by contradictory instances; thus, cognition has reference to thecognitum, buthabitusanddispositio(the genera to whichcognitiobelongs) do not refer tocognitumbut toanima.180You may also examine whether the correlate, when applied to the genus, is put in the same case (e.g., genitive, dative, &c.) as when it is applied to the species: if it be put into a different case, this affords presumption that the genus is not a true genus; though here again instances may be produced showing that your presumption will not hold universally. Farther, you will observe whether the correlates thus similarly inflected reciprocate like the species and genus; if not, this will furnish you with the same adverse presumption.181

179Ibid. b. 15-22.

180Ibid. b. 23-34.

181Ibid. b. 35, seq.

Again, examine whether the correlate of the genus is genus to the correlate of the species; if it be not so, you may argue that the genus is not truly predicated. Thus, if the thesis affirms thatperceptiois the genus ofcognitio, it will follow thatpercipibileis the genus ofcognoscibile. Now this cannot be maintained; for there are somecognoscibiliawhich are not perceivable,e.g., somecogitabilia(intelligibilia, νοητά). Since thereforepercipibileis not the true genus ofcognoscibile, neither canperceptiobe the true genus ofcognitio.182

182Ibid. p. 125, a. 25-32: ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τὸ ἀντικείμενον γένος, οἷον εἰ τοῦ διπλασίου τὸ πολλαπλάσιον καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος τὸ πολλοστημόριονÂ· δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἀντικειμένου γένος εἶναι.We must take note here of the large sense in which Aristotle uses Ἀντικείμενα â€”Opposita, including as one of the four varietiesRelataandCorrelata=RelativÃ©-Opposita(to use a technical word familiar in logical manuals). I have before (supra,p. 105) remarked the inconvenience of calling the Relativeoppositeto its Correlate; and have observed that it is logically incorrect to treatRelataas a species or mode of the genusOpposita. The reverse would be more correct: we ought to rankOppositaor a species or mode under the genusRelata. Since Aristotle numbersRelataamong the ten Categories, he ought to have seen that it cannot be included as a subordinate under any superior genus.

We must take note here of the large sense in which Aristotle uses Ἀντικείμενα â€”Opposita, including as one of the four varietiesRelataandCorrelata=RelativÃ©-Opposita(to use a technical word familiar in logical manuals). I have before (supra,p. 105) remarked the inconvenience of calling the Relativeoppositeto its Correlate; and have observed that it is logically incorrect to treatRelataas a species or mode of the genusOpposita. The reverse would be more correct: we ought to rankOppositaor a species or mode under the genusRelata. Since Aristotle numbersRelataamong the ten Categories, he ought to have seen that it cannot be included as a subordinate under any superior genus.

Suppose the thesis predicates of memory that it is â€” a continuance of cognition. This will be open to attack, if the predicate be affirmed as the genus (or even as the accident) of the subject. For every continuance must beinthat which continues. But memory is of necessityinthe soul; it cannot therefore beincognition.183There is another ground on which the thesis will be assailable, if it defines memory to be â€” a habit or acquirement retentive of belief. This will not hold, because it confounds habit or disposition with act; which last is the true description of memory. The opposite error will be committed if the respondent defines perceptivity to be a â€” movement through or by means of the body. Here perceptivity, which is a habit or disposition, is ranked under movement, which is the act exercising the same,i.e., perceptivity in actual exercise.184Or, the mistake may be made of ranking some habit or disposition under the power consequent on the possession thereof, as if this power were the superior genus: thus the respondent may define gentleness to be a continence of anger; courage, a continence of fears; justice, a continence of appetite of lucre. But the genus here assigned is not a good one: for a man who feels no anger is called gentle; a man who feels no fear is called courageous; whereas the continent man is he who feels anger or fear, but controls them. Such controlling power is a natural consequence of gentleness and courage, insomuch that, if the gentle man happened to feel anger, or the courageous man to feel fear, each would control these impulses; but it is no part of the essence thereof, and therefore cannot be the genus under which they fall.185A like mistake is made if pain be predicated as the genus of anger, or supposition as the genus of belief. The angry man doubtless feels pain, but his pain precedes his anger in time, and is the antecedent cause thereof; now the genus can never precede its species in time. So also a man may have the same supposition sometimes with belief, sometimes without it; accordingly,supposition cannot be the genus of belief any more than the same animal can be sometimes a man, sometimes a brute.186And indeed the same negative conclusion would follow, even if we granted that every supposition was always attended with belief. For, in that case, supposition and belief would be co-extensive terms; but the generic term must always be more extensive than its specific.187

183Topic. IV. iv. p. 125, b. 6: οἷον εἰ τὴν μνήμηνμονὴν ἐπιστήμηςεἶπεν. πᾶσα γὰρ μονὴ ἐν τῷ μένοντι καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης μονὴ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. ἡ μνήμη ἄρα ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐπειδὴ μονὴ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστίν. τοῦτο δâ€™ οὐκ ἐνδέχεταιÂ· μνήμη γὰρ πᾶσα ἐν ψυχῇ. A definition similar to this is found in the Kratylus of Plato, p. 437, B.: ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ μνήμη παντί που μηνύει ὅτι μονή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλâ€™ οὐ φορά.

184Ibid. v. p. 125, b. 15-19. οἷον τὴν αἴσθησινκίνησιν διὰ σώματοςÂ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἕξις, ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἐνέργεια. This, too, seems to allude to Platoâ€™s explanation of αἴσθησις in the TimÃ¦us, pp. 43, C, 64, B; compare also the Platonic or pseudo-Platonic Definitiones, p. 414, C.

185Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 20-27.

186Waitz, in his notes (p. 478), says that Aristotle is here in the wrong. But I do not agree with Waitz. Aristotle considers πίστις to be an accidental accompaniment of ὑπόληψις, not a species thereof. It may be present or absent without determining any new specific name to ὑπόληψις, which term has reference only to the intellectual or conceptive part of the mental supposition. At least there seems to be nothing contradictory or erroneous in what Aristotle here says, though he does not adhere everywhere to this restricted meaning of ὑπόληψις

187Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 28-p. 126, a. 2.

You will farther examine whether the predicate of the thesis be of a nature to inhere in the same substance as the subject. If it be not, it cannot be truly predicated thereof, either as genus or even as accident. White (species) and colour (genus) are of a nature to inhere or belong to the same substance. But, if the thesis declares that shame is a species of fear, or that anger is a species of pain, you may impugn it on the ground that shame belongs to the reasoning element in man, fear to the courageous or energetic element; and that pain belongs to the appetitive element, anger to the courageous. This proves that fear can neither be the genus nor the accident of shame; that pain can neither be the genus nor the accident of anger.188

188Ibid. p. 126, a. 3-16. Compare V. iv. p. 133, a. 31. Aristotle appears here to recognize the Platonic doctrine as laid down in the Republic and TimÃ¦us, asserting either three distinct parts of the soul, or, rather, three distinct souls. In the treatise De AnimÃ¢ (III. ix. p. 432, a. 25; I. v. p. 411, b. 25), he dissents from and impugns this same doctrine.

Suppose the thesis declares that animal is a species under the genusvisibileorpercepibile. You may oppose it by pointing out that animal is onlyvisibile secundum quid, or partially; that is, only so far as regards body, not as regards mind. But the species always partakes of its genus wholly, not partially orsecundum quid; thus, man is not partially animal, but wholly or essentially animal. If what is predicated as the genus be not thus essentially partaken, it cannot be a true genus; hence neithervisibilenorpercepibileis a true genus of animal.189

189Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 17-25.

Sometimes what is predicated as the genus is, when compared to its species, only as a part to the whole; which is never the case with a true genus. Some refer animal to the genus living body; but body is only part of the whole animal, and therefore cannot be the true genus thereof.190Sometimes a species whichis blameworthy and hateful, or a species which is praiseworthy and eligible, may be referred to the power or capacity from which it springs, as genus; thus, the thief, a blameworthy and hateful character, may be referred to the predicate â€” capable of stealing another manâ€™s property. But this, though true as a predicate, is not the true genus; for the honest man is also capable of so acting, but he is distinguished from the thief by not acting so, nor having the disposition so to act. All power and capacity is eligible; if the above were the true genus of thief, it would be a case in which power and capacity is blameworthy and hateful. Neither, on the other hand, can any thing in its own nature praiseworthy and eligible, be referred to power and capacity as its genus; for all power and capacity is praiseworthy and eligible not in itself or its own nature, but by reason of something else, namely, its realizable consequences.191

190Ibid. a. 26-29.

191Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 30-b. 6: ὑπόληψιςThe general drift of Aristotle is here illustrated better by taking the thief separately, apart from the other two. But we must notice here the proof of his temper or judgment concerning the persons called Sophists, when we find him grouping them in the bunch of ψεκτὰ and φευκτὰ along with thieves. The majority of his uninstructed contemporaries would probably have agreed in this judgment, but they would certainly have enrolled Aristotle himself among the Sophists thus depreciated.

191Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 30-b. 6: ὑπόληψις

The general drift of Aristotle is here illustrated better by taking the thief separately, apart from the other two. But we must notice here the proof of his temper or judgment concerning the persons called Sophists, when we find him grouping them in the bunch of ψεκτὰ and φευκτὰ along with thieves. The majority of his uninstructed contemporaries would probably have agreed in this judgment, but they would certainly have enrolled Aristotle himself among the Sophists thus depreciated.

Again, you may detect in the thesis sometimes the mistake of putting under one genus a species which properly comes under two genera conjointly, not subalternate one to the other; sometimes, the mistake of predicating the genus as a differentia, or the differentia as a genus.192Sometimes, also, the subject in which the attribute or affection resides is predicated as if it were the genus of such affection; or,Ã¨ converso, the attribute or affection is predicated as the genus of the subject wherein it resides;e.g., when breath or wind, which is really a movement of air, is affirmed to be air put in motion, and thus constituted as a species under the genus air; or when snow is declared to be water congelated; or mud, to be earth mixed with moisture.193In none of these cases is the predicate a true genus; for it cannot be always affirmed of the subject.

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