V.

192Ibid. b. 7-33.

193Ibid. b. 34-p. 127, a. 19.

Or perhaps the predicate affirmed as genus may be no genus at all; for nothing can be a genus unless there are species contained under it;e.g., if the thesis declare white to be a genus, this may be impugned, because white objects do not differin speciefrom each other. Or a mere universal predicate (such asEnsorUnum) may be put forward as a genus or differentia;or a simple concomitant attribute, or an equivocal term, may be so put forward.194

194Topic. IV. vi. p. 127, a. 20-b. 7.

Perhaps it may happen that the subject (species) and the predicate (genus) of the thesis may each have a contrary term; and that in each pair of contrary terms one may be better, the other worse. If, in that case, the better species be referred to the worse genus, orvice versÃ¢, this will render the thesis assailable. Or perhaps the species may be fit to be referred equally to both the contrary genera; in which case, if the thesis should refer it to the worse of the two, that will be a ground of objection. Thus, if the soul be referred to the genusmobile, you are at liberty to object that it is equally referable to the genusstabile: and that, as the latter is the better of the two, it ought to be referred to the better in preference to the worse.195

195Ibid. b. 8-17.

There is alocusof More and Less, which may be made available in various ways. Thus, if the genus predicated admits of being graduated as more or less, while the species of which it is predicated does not admit of such graduation, you may question the applicability of the genus to the species.196You may raise the question also, if there be any thing else which looks equally like the true genus, or more like it than the genus predicated by the thesis. This will happen often, when the essence of the species includes several distinct elements;e.g., in the essence of anger, there is included both pain (an emotional element), and the supposition or belief of being undervalued (an intellectual element); hence, if the thesis ranks anger under the genus pain, you may object that it equally belongs to the genus supposition197Thislocusis useful for raising a negative question, but will serve little for establishing an affirmative. Towards the affirmative, you will find advantage in examining the subject (species) respecting which the thesis predicates a given genus; for, if it can be shown that this supposed species is no real species but a genus, the genus predicated thereof will beÃ fortioria genus.198

196Ibid. b. 18-25: ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ἀνασκευάζοντι μέν, εἰ τὸ γένος δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον, τὸ δâ€™ εἶδος μὴ δέχεται μήτâ€™ αὐτὸ μήτε τὸ κατâ€™ ἐκεῖνο λεγόμενον.

197Ibid. b. 26-37: χρήσιμος δâ€™ ὁ τόπος ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων μάλιστα ἐφâ€™ ὧν πλείω φαίνεται τοῦ εἴδους ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενα, καὶ μὴ διώρισται, μήδâ€™ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ποῖον αὐτῶν γένος, &c.

198Ibid. b. 38-p. 128, a. 12.

Some think (says Aristotle)199that Differentia as well as Genus is predicated essentially respecting the Species. Accordingly, Genus must be discriminated from Differentia. For such discriminationthe following characteristics are pointed out:â€” 1. Genus has greater extent in predication than Differentia. 2. In replying to the enquiry,Quid est?it is more suitable and significant to declare the Genus than the Differentia. 3. Differentia declares a quality of Genus, and therefore presupposes Genus as already known; but Genus does not in like manner presuppose Differentia. If you wish to show that belief is the genus to which cognition belongs, you must examine whether thecognoscensbelievesquÃ¢ cognoscens. If he does so, your point is made out.200

199Ibid. a. 20, seq.: ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ τισὶ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι, χωριστέον τὸ γένος ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς, &c.

200Topic. IV. vi. p. 128, a. 35. If you are trying to show τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὅπερ πίστιν, you must examine εἰ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος ᾗ ἐπίσταται πιστεύειÂ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἡ ἐπιστήμη πίστις ἄν τις εἴη.

Wherever a predicate is universally true of its subject, while the proposition is not true if simply converted (i.e., wherever the predicate is of larger extension than the subject), there is difficulty in distinguishing it from a genus. Accordingly, when you are respondent, maintaining the affirmative side, you will use such predicate as if it were a genus; but, when you are assailant, you will not allow the respondent to do so. You may quote against him the instance ofNon-Ens; which is predicable of every thing generated, but which is not a genus, since it has no species under it.201

201Ibid. a. 38-b. 9.

Aristotle passes, in the Fifth book of the Topica, to those debates in which the thesis set up declares the predicate as Proprium of the subject.

A Proprium may belong to its subject eitherper seandsemper, or relatively to something else and occasionally or sometimes. It is a propriumper seof man to be an animal by nature tractable. It is a relative proprium of the soul in regard to the body, to exercise command; of the body in regard to the soul, to obey command. It is a propriumsemperof a god, to be immortal; it is an occasionalproprium(i.e., sometimes) of this or that man, to be walking in the market-place.202When the proprium is set out relatively to something else, the debate must involve two questions, and may involve four. Thus, if the thesis affirms that it is a proprium of man relatively to horse (discriminating man from horse) to be by nature two-footed, youmay (as opponent) either deny that man is two-footed, or affirm that horse is two-footed; or you may go farther and affirm that man is by nature four-footed, or deny that horse is by nature four-footed. If you can succeed in showing any one of these four, you will have refuted the thesis.203

202Ibid. V. i. p. 128, b. 14-21. That which Aristotle calls Propriumper seis a proprium of the subject as muchrelativeas what he calls specially therelativeProprium. The Propriumper sediscriminates the subject from everything else; therelativeProprium discriminates it from some given correlate.

203Topic. V. i. p. 128, b. 22-33.

The Propriumper sediscriminates its subject from everything else, and is universally true thereof; therelativeProprium discriminates its subject only from some other assignable subject. The relative Proprium may be either constant and universally true, or true with exceptions â€” true and applicable in the ordinary course of things: it may be tested through thoseLociwhich have been enumerated as applicable to the Accident. The Propriumper se, and theconstantProprium, have certainLociof their own, which we shall now indicate. These are the most logical (sensu Aristotelico) or suitable for Dialectic; furnishing the most ample matter for debates.204

204Ibid. b. 34-p. 129, a. 35. τῶν δâ€™ ἰδίων ἐστὶλόγικὰμάλισταÂ· &c. He explains presently what he means by λογικά â€” λογικὸν δὲ τοῦτâ€™ ἐστὶ πρόβλημα, πρὸς ὃ λόγοι γένοιτâ€™ ἂν καὶ συχνοὶ καὶ καλοί. The distinctions in this paragraph are not very sharply drawn.

Aristotle distinguishes (1) those cases in which the alleged proprium is a true proprium, but is incorrectly or informally set out in the thesis, from those (2) in which it is untruly predicated, or is no proprium at all.

To set out a proprium well, that which is predicated ought to be clearer and better known than the subject of which it is predicated, since the purpose of predicating the proprium is to communicate knowledge.205If it be more obscure or less known, you may impugn the thesis as bad in form, or badly set out. Thus, if the thesis declare, as a proprium of fire, that fire is of all things the most like to the soul, this is not well set out, because the essence of the soul is not so well known as the essence of fire. Moreover, the fact that the predicate belongs to the subject, ought to be better known even than the subject itself; for whoever is ignorant that A belongs to B at all, cannot possibly know that A is the proprium of B.206Thus, if the thesis declare, as proprium of fire, that it is the first or most universal subject in which it is the nature of soul to be found, the predicate is here doubly unknowable: first, the hearer does not know that the soul is found in fire at all; next, he does notknow that fire is thefirstsubject in which soul is found. On the other hand, the respondent will repel your attack if he can show that his proprium is more knowable in both the two above-mentioned ways. If, for example, he declares as thesis, To have sensible perception is the proprium of an animal, here the proprium is both well known in itself, and well known as belonging to the given subject. Accordingly, it is well set out, as far as this condition is concerned.207

205Ibid. p. 129, b. 7: γνώσεως γὰρ ἕνεκα τὸ ἴδιον ποιούμεθαÂ· διὰ γνωριμωτέρον οὖν ἀποδοτέονÂ· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται κατανοεῖν ἱκανῶς μᾶλλον.He repeats the same dictum, substantially, in the next page, p. 130, a. 4: τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον τοῦ μαθεῖν χάριν ἀποδίδοται; and, again, p. 131, a. 1.

205Ibid. p. 129, b. 7: γνώσεως γὰρ ἕνεκα τὸ ἴδιον ποιούμεθαÂ· διὰ γνωριμωτέρον οὖν ἀποδοτέονÂ· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται κατανοεῖν ἱκανῶς μᾶλλον.

He repeats the same dictum, substantially, in the next page, p. 130, a. 4: τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον τοῦ μαθεῖν χάριν ἀποδίδοται; and, again, p. 131, a. 1.

206Ibid. b. 15: ὁ μὴ γὰρ εἰδὼς εἰ τῷδâ€™ ὑπάρχει, οὐδâ€™ εἰ τῷδâ€™ ὑπάρχει μόνῳ γνωριεῖ.

207Topic. V. ii. p. 129, b. 21-29.

A second condition of its being well set out is, that it shall contain neither equivocal term nor equivocal or amphibolical proposition. Thus, if the thesis declares, To perceive is the proprium of an animal, it is equivocal; for it may mean either to have sensible perception, or to exercise sensible perception actually. You may apply the test to such a thesis, by syllogizing from one or both of these equivocal meanings. The respondent will make good his defence, if he shows that there is no such equivocation: as, for example, if the thesis be, It is a proprium of fire to be the body most easily moved into the upper region; where there is no equivocation, either of term or proposition.208Sometimes the equivocation may be, not in the name of the proprium itself, but in the name of the subject to which it is applied. Where this last is notunum et simplexbut equivocal, the thesis must specify which among the several senses is intended; and, if that be neglected, the manner of setting out is incorrect.209

208Ibid. b. 30-p. 130, a. 13.

209Ibid. p. 130, a. 15-28.

Another form of the like mistake is, where the same term is repeated both in the predicate and in the subject; which is often done, both as to Proprium and as to Definition, though it is a cause of obscurity, as well as a tiresome repetition.210The repetition may be made in two ways: either directly, by the same term occurring twice; or indirectly, when the second term given is such that it cannot be defined without repeating the first. An example of direct repetition is, Fire is abodythe rarest amongbodies(for proprium of fire). An example of indirect repetition is, Earth is asubstancewhich tends most of allbodiesdownwards to the lowest region (as proprium of earth); for, when the respondent is required to definebodies, he must define them â€” such and suchsubstances.211An example free from objection on this ground is, Man is an animal capable of receiving cognition (as proprium of man).

210Ibid. a. 30-34. ταράττει γὰρ τὸν ἀκούοντα πλεονάκις λεχθέν â€” καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀδολεσχεῖν δοκοῦσιν.

211Ibid. a. 34-b. 5. ἕν γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι σῶμα καὶ οὐσία τοιαδίÂ· ἔσταιγὰροὗτος τὸοὐσίαπλεονάκις εἰρηκώς.

Another mode of bad or incorrect setting out is, when the term predicated as proprium belongs not only to the subject, but also to all other subjects. Such a proposition is useless; for it furnishes no means of discriminating the subject from anything; whereas discrimination is one express purpose of the Proprium as well as of the Definition.212Again, another mode is, when the thesis declares several propria belonging to the same subject, without announcing that they are several. As the definer ought not to introduce into his definition any words beyond what are required for declaring the essence of the subject, so neither should the person who sets out a proprium add any words beyond those requisite for constituting the proprium. Thus, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of fire, that it is the thinnest and lightest body, here are two propria instead of one. Contrast with this another proprium, free from the objection just pointed out â€” Moist is that which may assume every variety of figure.213

212Topic. V. ii. p. 130, b. 12: ἀχρεῖονγὰρἔσται τὸ μὴ χωρίζον ἀπότινων, τὸδâ€™ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις λεγόμενον χωρίζειν δεῖ, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὅροις.

213Ibid. b. 23-37.

A farther mistake is, when the predicate declaring the proprium includes either the subject itself or some species comprehended under the subject; for example, when we are told, as a proprium of animal, that animal is a substance of which man is a species. We have already seen that the proprium ought to be better known than its subject; but man is even less known (posterior in respect to cognition) than animal, because it is a species under the genus animal.214

214Ibid. iii. p. 130, b. 38.

Again, our canon â€” That the Proprium should be better known than its subject, or should make the subject better known â€” will be violated in another way, if the proprium enunciated be something opposite to the subject, or in any other waysimul naturÃ¢as compared with the subject; and still more, if it beposterius naturÃ¢as compared with the subject. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of good, that good is that which is most opposite to evil, his proprium will not be well or correctly set out.215

215Ibid. p. 131, a. 12-26. Thislocusis not clear or satisfactory, as Alexander remarks in Scholia (p. 284, b. 12-23, Br.). He says that it may pass as an ἔνδοξον â€” something sufficiently plausible to be employed in Dialectic. In fact, Alexander virtually controverts thislocusin what he says a little farther down (Schol. p. 285, a. 31), that the Proprium is alwayssimul naturÃ¢with its subject.

Perhaps, again, the thesis may enunciate as proprium what is not constantly appurtenant to the subject, but is sometimes absent therefrom; or, intending to enunciate an occasional proprium, it may omit to specify the qualifying epithetoccasional.In either case the proprium is not well set out, and a ground is furnished for censure, which ought always to be avoided.216

216Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 27-b. 18. οὐκ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον â€” οὔκουν δοτέον ἐστὶν ἐπιτιμήσεως σκῆψιν.

Moreover, the proprium will not be well set out, if it be such as does not necessarily belong to the subject, but is only shown by the evidence of sense to belong thereunto. In this case, when the subject is out of the reach of sensible perception, no one knows whether the supposed proprium still continues as its attribute. Thus, suppose the thesis to enunciate as a proprium of the sun, that it is the brightest star borne in movement above the earth: the fact that it is so borne in movement above the earth is one that we know by sensible perception only; accordingly, after the sun sets and we cease to see it, we cannot be sure that it continues to be borne in movement. If a proprium knowable as such by sense be chosen, it ought to be one which is also knowable independently, as belonging to the subject by necessity. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of superficies, that superficies is what first becomes coloured or first receives colour, this is a proprium well set out. For we know clearly that it must always belong to a superficies; though we may also obtain the additional evidence of sense, by looking at some perceivable body.217

217Ibid. b. 19-36. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θέμενος ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον ὃ πρῶτον κέχρωσται, αἰσθητῷ μέν τινιπροσκέχρηταιτῷ κεχρῶσθαι,τοιούτῳ δâ€™ ὃ φανερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχον ἀεί, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον.Aristotle means that we know clearly,by evidence independent of sense, that the superficies must be the first portion of the body that becomes coloured, though we may attain the additional evidence of our senses (προσκέχρηται) to the same fact.

Aristotle means that we know clearly,by evidence independent of sense, that the superficies must be the first portion of the body that becomes coloured, though we may attain the additional evidence of our senses (προσκέχρηται) to the same fact.

Perhaps too the thesis may enunciate the Definition as if it were a Proprium; which is another ground for objecting that the proprium is not well set out. Thus, the thesis may enunciate, as proprium of man, that man is a land animal walking on two feet. Here what is given as proprium is the essence of man, which never ought to be affirmed in the proprium. To set out the proprium well, the predicate ought to reciprocate and to be co-extensive with the subject, but it ought not to affirm the essence thereof. A good specimen of proprium well set out is the following, Man is an animal by nature gentle; for here the predicate is co-extensive with the subject, yet does not declare the essence of the subject.218

218Ibid. b. 37-p. 132, a. 9.

Lastly, the proprium, to be well set out, though it does not declare the essence of the subject, yet ought to begin by presupposing the generic portion of the essence, and to attach itselfthereunto as a constant adjunct or concomitant. Thus, suppose the thesis to enunciate, as proprium, Animal is that which has a soul; this will not be well set out, for the predicate is not superadded or attached to the declared generic essence of animal. But, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of man, Man is an animal capable of acquiring cognition, â€” this will be a proprium well set out, so far as the present objection is concerned. For here the predicate declares first the generic essence of the subject, and then superinduces the peculiar adjunct thereupon.219

219Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 10-21.

Thus far Aristotle has pointed out certain conditions to be attended to in determining whether a Proprium is well set out or described, without determining whether it be really a Propium or not. It may perhaps be truly predicated of the subject, and may even admit of a better description which would show it to be a proprium of the subject; but the description actually set out is defective, and the assailant is entitled to impeach it on that ground. He now proceeds to a larger discussion: What are the conditions for determining whether the supposed Proprium be really a Proprium at all, in respect to the subject of which it is predicated? Assuming that the description of it is not open to impeachment on any of the grounds above enumerated, are there not other real grounds of objection, disproving its title to the character of Proprium?220

220Ibid. p. 132, a. 22-27. πότερον μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἢ οὐ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ ἴδιον, διὰ τῶνδε σκεπτέονÂ· πότερον δâ€™ἴδιόν ἐστινὅλως τὸ εἰρημένον ἢ οὐκ ἴδιον, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον.The distinction here noted by Aristotle (between the two questions:â€” (1) Whether the alleged Proprium is well set out or clearly described? (2) Whether the alleged Proprium is a Proprium at all?) is not carried out, nor indeed capable of being carried out, with strict precision. The two heads of questions run together and become confounded. Alexander remarks (Scholia, p. 284, b. 24-46, Br.) that the three or four last-mentionedlociunder the first head embrace the second head also. He allows only threelocias belonging peculiarly to the first head â€” τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδεδόσθαι τὸ ἴδιον:â€” (1) Equivocal terms; (2) Predicate not reciprocating or co-extensive with subject; (3) Predicate not more knowable than subject. The otherloci(besides these three) enumerated by Aristotle under the first head, Alexander considers as belonging equally to the second head. But he commends Aristotle for making a distinction between the two heads: οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀπηλλοτριωμένον τούτων, καὶ μὴ ἔχον ὁμωνύμους φωνὰς ἤ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ἴδιον ῥητέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. The manner in which M. BarthÃ©lemy St. Hilaire explains this nice distinction is not clear to me (Note to his translation of Topica, p. 177).

220Ibid. p. 132, a. 22-27. πότερον μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἢ οὐ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ ἴδιον, διὰ τῶνδε σκεπτέονÂ· πότερον δâ€™ἴδιόν ἐστινὅλως τὸ εἰρημένον ἢ οὐκ ἴδιον, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον.

The distinction here noted by Aristotle (between the two questions:â€” (1) Whether the alleged Proprium is well set out or clearly described? (2) Whether the alleged Proprium is a Proprium at all?) is not carried out, nor indeed capable of being carried out, with strict precision. The two heads of questions run together and become confounded. Alexander remarks (Scholia, p. 284, b. 24-46, Br.) that the three or four last-mentionedlociunder the first head embrace the second head also. He allows only threelocias belonging peculiarly to the first head â€” τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδεδόσθαι τὸ ἴδιον:â€” (1) Equivocal terms; (2) Predicate not reciprocating or co-extensive with subject; (3) Predicate not more knowable than subject. The otherloci(besides these three) enumerated by Aristotle under the first head, Alexander considers as belonging equally to the second head. But he commends Aristotle for making a distinction between the two heads: οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀπηλλοτριωμένον τούτων, καὶ μὴ ἔχον ὁμωνύμους φωνὰς ἤ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ἴδιον ῥητέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. The manner in which M. BarthÃ©lemy St. Hilaire explains this nice distinction is not clear to me (Note to his translation of Topica, p. 177).

1. Suppose your respondent to set up A as a proprium of B: you will examine first whether A can be truly predicated of B at all; next, if it can so be, whether it is truly predicable of BquÃ¢B, or of every thing that comes under BquÃ¢B. Thus, if he contends that not to be deceived by reason is a proprium of scientific men, you will be able to show that this does not hold in geometry, since geometricians are deceived by pseudographemesor scientific paralogisms. Or, should the respondent deny that A is a proprium of B, you will succeed in refuting him, if you can prove that A is truly predicable of every B andquÃ¢B. Thus, it is a proprium of man to be an animal capable of acquiring knowledge; because that attribute is truly predicable of every manquÃ¢man.221

221Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 27, seq.

2. Again, suppose your respondent affirms a given proprium A of B: you will examine whether A can be truly predicated of every thing called B, and whether B can be truly predicated of every thing called A; if not, the alleged proprium will not hold. Thus the affirmation, A god is an animal participant of knowledge, is a true affirmation; but it would not be true to say, A god is a man: wherefore, to be participant of knowledge is not proprium of man; and, if this be the proprium which the respondent undertakes to maintain, you will be able to refute him. On the other hand, if what he undertakes is the negation of a proprium (A is not a proprium of B), you will establish the affirmative against him by showing that of every thing respecting which A can be truly affirmed B can be affirmed also, andvice versÃ¢. You will thus show that A is a true proprium of B.222

222Ibid. b. 8-18.

3. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm the subject itself as a proprium of something inherent in the subject. You may refute this by showing that, if it were so, the same thing would be a proprium of several things differing from each other in species. On the other hand, the respondent may perhaps deny that something inherent in the subject is a proprium: you may then refute him by showing that it is truly predicable of the subject only, and not truly predicable of any thing else.223

223Ibid. b. 19-34. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 285, a. 14, Br.) has stated thislocusmore clearly than Aristotle â€” τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον ὑπάρχειν δεῖ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐχ ἕτερον ἐν αὐτῷ.

4. The respondent may perhaps affirm as a proprium something contained in the essence of the subject: if so, you will refute him by showing this. On the other hand, if he denies something to be a proprium, you will refute him by showing that, though it is not contained in the essence of the subject, it is nevertheless predicable co-extensively therewith.224

224Topic. V. iv. p. 132, b. 35-p. 133, a. 11.

5. The respondent may affirm as a proprium that which is not a necessary concomitant of the subject, but may either precede or follow it. Or, on the other hand, he may deny something to be a proprium which you can show to be a constant andnecessary concomitant of the subject, without being included either in its definition or differentia. In each case you will have a ground for refuting him.225

225Topic. V. iv. p. 133, a. 12-23.

6. The respondent may affirm as a proprium of the subject what he has already denied of the same subject under some other name; or he may deny of it what he has already affirmed of it under some other name. You will have grounds for refuting him.226

226Ibid. a. 24-32.

7. If there be two subjects (e.g., man and horse) the same with each other in species, the respondent may affirm respecting one of them a proprium which is not the same in species with the proprium of the other. Thus, it is not a constant proprium of horse to stand still spontaneously; accordingly neither is it a constant proprium of man to move spontaneously; these two propria being the same in species, and belonging both to man and to horsequatenusanimal.227If, therefore, the respondent affirms the one while he denies the other, you have an argument in refutation. On the other hand, he may propound as thesis the denial of the one proprium, while he affirms or admits the other. Here too you will be able to make good the counter-affirmation against his denial, on the ground of that which he admits. Thus, if it be proprium of man to be a walking-biped, it must also be proprium of bird to be a flying-biped. The two pairs, man and bird, walking and flying, are the same in species with each other, since both pairs are subordinates under the same genus: man and bird are species, flying and walking are differentiÃ¦, under the same genus animal. Thislocus, however, is not universally applicable; for perhaps one of the two predicates may not be of exclusive application to the subject, but may belong to other subjects also. Thus walking-biped designates only one variety â€” man; but walking-quadruped designates several â€” horse, ass, dog, &c. Walking-quadruped therefore is not a proprium of horse.228

227Ibid. a. 35-b. 5. οἷον ἐπεὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ εἴδει ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἵππου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἑστάναι ὑφâ€™ αὑτοῦ, οὐκ ἀν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑφâ€™ αὑτοῦÂ· ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἴδει τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι ὑφâ€™ αὑτοῦ, ᾗ ζῴῳ ἐστὶν ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν τὸ συμβεβηκέναι. The last words are very obscure: they are explained by Waitz (p. 486) â€” â€œᾗ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι ἑκάτερον (τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι ὑφâ€™ αὑτοῦ intell.) ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ συμβεβηκέναι ᾗ ζῴῳ, quatenus utrumque de utroque, quatenus animal est, prÃ¦dicatur.â€�

228Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 5-14. Alexander declares thislocusto be obscure. He comments, not without reason, on the loose manner in which Aristotle uses the term εἶδος; and he observes that Aristotle himself admits thelocusto be κατά τι ψευδής (Schol. p. 285, a. 40-45, Br.). It is strange to read that man and horse, man and bird, are ταὐτὸν εἴδει, the same inspecies.

8. There is some difficulty in discussing the proprium, whenthe respondent is assailed by a sophistical dialectician who avails himself of the equivocal application ofIdemandDiversum: contending that Subject with an Accident becomes a different subject â€”e.g.,homo albus, a subject different fromhomo(so that, when a proprium has been shown to belong tohomo, it has not been shown that the same proprium belongs tohomo albus); and that the Abstract is a different subject from the Concrete â€”e.g.cognition, from the cognizing man (so that what has been shown as proprium of cognition has not been shown as proprium of the cognizing man). If the respondent shall himself set up these negatives, leaving to you the task of establishing the proprium against him, you will meet him by saying thathomois not a subject absolutely different and distinct fromhomo albus, but that there is only a notional distinction, the same subject having here two names each with a distinct connotation:homohas its own connotation;homo albushas also its own connotation, embodying in one total that which each of the terms connotes. And, when the Sophist remarks that what is a proprium ofscientiacannot be predicated also as a proprium ofhomo sciens, you will reply that it may be so predicated, only with a slight change of inflection. For you need not scruple to employ sophistical refutation against those who debate with you in a sophistical way.229

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