263Ibid. b. 32: ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν μεταφορὰν εἰπόντασυκοφαντεῖνὡς κυρίως εἰρηκότα. Here again we have the word συκοφαντεῖν to designate what seems a legitimate mode of argumentative attack.
263Ibid. b. 32: ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν μεταφορὰν εἰπόντασυκοφαντεῖνὡς κυρίως εἰρηκότα. Here again we have the word συκοφαντεῖν to designate what seems a legitimate mode of argumentative attack.
3. Indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare or far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known.264Definitions given by Plato are cited to illustrate this.
264Ibid. p. 140, a. 3: πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός.
264Ibid. p. 140, a. 3: πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός.
4. Indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image, which is even worse than a professed metaphor: as where law is defined to be — a measure or image of things by nature just.265
265Ibid. a. 6-17. χεῖρον ὁποιουοῦς τῶν κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγομένων.
265Ibid. a. 6-17. χεῖρον ὁποιουοῦς τῶν κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγομένων.
5. The definition is indistinct, if it does not, while making known the definiend, make clear at the same time its contrary.266
266Ibid. a. 18.
266Ibid. a. 18.
6. The definition is also indistinct if it does not, when enunciated, make known what the definiend is, without requiring that the definiend itself shall be expressly enunciated. The definition by itself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend. Otherwise, the definer is no better than those archaic painters, who, when painting a dog or a horse, were compelled to write the name alongside in order that the animal might be recognized.267
267Ibid. a. 20. This last condition is a high measure of perfection to exact from a definition. Assuredly Aristotle’s own definitions often fall lamentably short of it.
267Ibid. a. 20. This last condition is a high measure of perfection to exact from a definition. Assuredly Aristotle’s own definitions often fall lamentably short of it.
Such are theLociregarding Indistinctness in the setting out of the definition. The second defect is Redundancy.
1. Redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include either all things absolutely, or all things contained in the same genus as the definiend; since the definition ought to consist of a generic term to discriminate the definiend from allextra-generic things, and a differential term to discriminate it from other things within the same genus. A definition of the kind mentioned will be useless through redundancy.268It will also be open to the like objection, if it includes what is merely a proprium of the definiend, over and above the essential attributes; or, indeed, if it includes any thing else except what is required for clearly bringing out the definiend.269It will be still worse, if it comprises any attribute not belonging to all individuals of the species; for then it will not even be a proprium or a reciprocating predication.270
268Topic. VI. iii. p. 140, a. 23-32. Alexander, however, remarks very pertinently, that the defects of such a definition are defects of substance rather than of expression. Aristotle has passed unconsciously from the latter to the former: ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν ἐφόδων δόξειεν ἂν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης μετάγειν εἰς τὰς πραγματικὰς ἐξετάσεις (Schol. p. 287, b. 27, Br.).
268Topic. VI. iii. p. 140, a. 23-32. Alexander, however, remarks very pertinently, that the defects of such a definition are defects of substance rather than of expression. Aristotle has passed unconsciously from the latter to the former: ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν ἐφόδων δόξειεν ἂν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης μετάγειν εἰς τὰς πραγματικὰς ἐξετάσεις (Schol. p. 287, b. 27, Br.).
269Ibid. a. 37: ἁπλῶς δ’ εἰπεῖν, ἅπαν περίεργον οὗ ἀφαιρεθέντος τὸ λοιπὸν δῆλον ποιεῖ τὸ ὁριζόμενον.
269Ibid. a. 37: ἁπλῶς δ’ εἰπεῖν, ἅπαν περίεργον οὗ ἀφαιρεθέντος τὸ λοιπὸν δῆλον ποιεῖ τὸ ὁριζόμενον.
270Ibid. b. 16.
270Ibid. b. 16.
2. Repetition is another fault sometimes committed. The same attribute may be predicated twice over. Or a particular and narrow attribute may be subjoined, in addition to a more general and comprehensive attribute in which it has already been included.271
271Ibid. b. 27-p. 141, a. 22.
271Ibid. b. 27-p. 141, a. 22.
So much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the definition tendered. Next, as bearing on the matter and substance of the definition, the followinglociare distinguishable.
1. The first of theselociis, if the matter of the definition is notpriusandnotiusas compared with the definiend. It is one of the canons of Definition, the purpose of which is to impart knowledge of the definiend, to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature and better known than the latter. The essence of each definiend — the being what it is — is one and only one. If a definition be given, other than that by means of what ispriusandnotius, it would follow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences; which is impossible. Accordingly, any proposition tendered as a definition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better known than the definiend sins against this canon, and is to be held as no true definition at all.272
272Ibid. iv. p. 141, a. 24-b. 2.
272Ibid. iv. p. 141, a. 24-b. 2.
Thelocushere indicated by this general feature is one, but it includes a number of varieties.273More known, or less known, it should first be observed, has two distinct meanings: either more or less knownabsolutely(by nature); or more or less knownto us. Absolutely, or by nature, the point is better known thanthe line; the line, than the superficies; the superficies, than the solid; theprius, than theposterius. Butto usthe reverse is true. The solid, as object of sensible perception, is earlier known and more known than the superficies; the superficies, than the line; the line, than the point; theposterius, than theprius.To usmeans to the bulk of mankind:absolutelyorby naturerefers to the instructed, superior, teaching and expository, intellects.274There may be some cases in which thenotius nobiscoincides and is identical with thenotius naturâ;275but, as a rule, the two are distinct, and the one is the inverse of the other. A genuine and perfect definition is one which enunciates the essence of the Species through Genus and Differentiæ, which are both of them absolutely prior and more knowable than the Species, since, if they be supposed non-existent, the Species is nowhere to be found. No man can know the Species without knowing its Genus and Differentiæ; but you may know the Genus and Differentiæ without knowing the Species; hence the Species is more unknowable than they are.276This is the true scientific definition; but there are persons incapable of acquiring knowledge by means of it. To these persons, an imperfect explanation or quasi-definition must be given, by means of matters knowable to them.277Those, however, who regard such imperfect explanations as true definitions, must be reminded that, upon that hypothesis, we should be compelled to admit many distinct definitions of the same definiend. For individuals differ from each other in respect to what is more knowable: what is more so to one man is not more so to another. Indeed the same man differs from himself on this point at different periods: to the early and untrained mind objects of sensible perception are the most knowable; but, when a man has been improved by training and instruction, the case is reversed, and the objects of intellect become the most familiar to his mind.278To define properly, therefore, we must enunciate, not thenotiora nobisbut, thenotiora naturâorsimpliciter; understanding by this last phrase, not what is more knowable to all actual men but, what is more knowable to men of well-trained and well-constituted intellect; just as, when we speak of the wholesome, we mean what is wholesome to the well-constituted body.279These conditions of Definition you must thoroughly master, and apply to each debate as the occasion may require. Your task in refuting an alleged definition will be the easiest in those cases where it conforms to neither of the above conditions; that is, when it enunciates neither what isnotius naturânor what isnotius nobis.280
273Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 20.
273Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 20.
274Topic. VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14.
274Topic. VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14.
275Ibid. b. 22.
275Ibid. b. 22.
276Ibid. b. 25.
276Ibid. b. 25.
277Ibid. b. 16.
277Ibid. b. 16.
278Ibid. b. 34.The general mental fact here noticed by Aristotle may be seen philosophically stated and explained in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and the Will. (Chapter on Consciousness, sect. 19, p. 581, 2nd ed.)“A sensation is, under any view of it, a conscious element of the mind. As pleasure or pain, we are conscious in one way; as discrimination, we are conscious in the other way, namely, in a mode of neutral excitement. — But this is not all. After much contact with the sensible world, a new situation arises, and a new variety of the consciousness, which stands in need of some explanation. When a child experiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet, there is nothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense.… It is very difficult for us to realize or define this original shock, our position in mature life being totally altered. It is the rarest thing for usthento come under a radically new impression; and we can only, by help of imperfect analogies, form an approximate conception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative sensation. The process of engraining these impressions on the mind after repetition, gives to subsequent sensations quite a different character as compared with the first. The second shock of scarlet, if it stood alone, would doubtless resemble the preceding; but such is the nature of the mind, that the new shock will not stand alone, but restores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former. The sensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise, but a coalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous occasions. Hence it may properly be said, when we see, or hear, or touch, or move, that what comes before us is really contributed more by the mind itself than by the object present. The consciousness is complicated by three concurring elements — the new shock, the flash of agreement with the sum total of the past, and the feeling of that past as revived in the present. In truth, the new sensation is apt to be entirely over-ridden by the old; and, in place of discriminating by virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it, our discrimination follows another course. For example, if I have before me two shades of colour, instead of feeling the difference exactly as I am struck at the moment, my judgment resorts to the round-about process of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past impressions; and, having two sum-totals in my mind, the difference that I feel is between those totals. If I made a mistake, it may be attributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination, as to a wrong act of identification. — All sensations, therefore, after the first of each kind, involve a flash of recovery from the past, which is what really determines their character. The present shock is simply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference to all others; the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost insignificant, serving only as the medium of resuscitating the cerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the previous scarlets. — Sensation thus calls into operation the two great intellectual laws, in addition to the primitive sensibility of difference. — When we consider ourselves as performing the most ordinary act of seeing or hearing, we are bringing into play those very functions of the intellect that make its development and its glory in its highest manifestations.�
278Ibid. b. 34.
The general mental fact here noticed by Aristotle may be seen philosophically stated and explained in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and the Will. (Chapter on Consciousness, sect. 19, p. 581, 2nd ed.)
“A sensation is, under any view of it, a conscious element of the mind. As pleasure or pain, we are conscious in one way; as discrimination, we are conscious in the other way, namely, in a mode of neutral excitement. — But this is not all. After much contact with the sensible world, a new situation arises, and a new variety of the consciousness, which stands in need of some explanation. When a child experiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet, there is nothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense.… It is very difficult for us to realize or define this original shock, our position in mature life being totally altered. It is the rarest thing for usthento come under a radically new impression; and we can only, by help of imperfect analogies, form an approximate conception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative sensation. The process of engraining these impressions on the mind after repetition, gives to subsequent sensations quite a different character as compared with the first. The second shock of scarlet, if it stood alone, would doubtless resemble the preceding; but such is the nature of the mind, that the new shock will not stand alone, but restores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former. The sensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise, but a coalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous occasions. Hence it may properly be said, when we see, or hear, or touch, or move, that what comes before us is really contributed more by the mind itself than by the object present. The consciousness is complicated by three concurring elements — the new shock, the flash of agreement with the sum total of the past, and the feeling of that past as revived in the present. In truth, the new sensation is apt to be entirely over-ridden by the old; and, in place of discriminating by virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it, our discrimination follows another course. For example, if I have before me two shades of colour, instead of feeling the difference exactly as I am struck at the moment, my judgment resorts to the round-about process of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past impressions; and, having two sum-totals in my mind, the difference that I feel is between those totals. If I made a mistake, it may be attributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination, as to a wrong act of identification. — All sensations, therefore, after the first of each kind, involve a flash of recovery from the past, which is what really determines their character. The present shock is simply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference to all others; the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost insignificant, serving only as the medium of resuscitating the cerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the previous scarlets. — Sensation thus calls into operation the two great intellectual laws, in addition to the primitive sensibility of difference. — When we consider ourselves as performing the most ordinary act of seeing or hearing, we are bringing into play those very functions of the intellect that make its development and its glory in its highest manifestations.�
279Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 10.
279Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 10.
280Ibid. a. 12; also, a. 32.
280Ibid. a. 12; also, a. 32.
The canon being, That what isposteriusmust be defined by itsprius, — the definer may sin against this in defining thepriusby itsposterius;e.g., if he defines the stationary and the determinate by means of the moveable and the variable.281Also, when his definition is neitherprius, norposterius, but of equal position with the definiend, he is at fault. This may happen (1) when he defines by an Opposite (for, according to some, the science of Opposites is one and the same, and it is impossible that either one of a pair can be absolutely more knowable thanthe other; though it is true that no relative can be understood or explained without the knowledge of its correlative,e.g., double and half); or (2) when he includes the definiend itself in his definition, either under its proper name or any other name;282or (3) when he defines by means of a contra-specific to the definiend — by something of equal specific rank or position, which is thereforesimul naturâtherewith (e.g., Odd is that which is greater than even by unity); or (4) when he defines by something specifically subordinate (e.g., An even number is that which may be bisected, where bisected means divisible by two, itself one among the even numbers283).
281Ibid. a. 20: πρότερον γὰρ τὸ μένον καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ ἐν κινήσει ὄντος.
281Ibid. a. 20: πρότερον γὰρ τὸ μένον καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ ἐν κινήσει ὄντος.
282Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 22-b. 6.
282Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 22-b. 6.
283Ibid. b. 7-19: πάλιν, εἰ τῷ ἀντιδιῃρημένῳ τὸ ἀντιδιῃρημένον ὥρισται — ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ ἐπάνω ὥρισται.
283Ibid. b. 7-19: πάλιν, εἰ τῷ ἀντιδιῃρημένῳ τὸ ἀντιδιῃρημένον ὥρισται — ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ ἐπάνω ὥρισται.
2. The secondlocus(after that bearing on thePrius et Notius) of argument forimpugninga definition is, where it does not enunciate the genus in which the definiend is really included. The mention of the genus, as enunciating the fundamental essence of the definiend, ought to stand first in the definition. If your opponent defines body — that which has three dimensions, or man — that which knows how to count, you attack him by asking, What is it that has three dimensions? What is it that knows how to count? No genus has been assigned.284
284Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 22-29.
284Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 22-29.
3. A thirdlocusis, where the definiend is a complex whole having reference to several distinct facts or phenomena, while the definition indicates only one of them. Thus, if grammar be defined — the knowing how to write from dictation, you will object that it is just as much — the knowing how to read. The definition is incomplete unless it includes both.285
285Ibid. b. 30.
285Ibid. b. 30.
4. A fourthlocusis, where the definiend admits both of a better and a worse construction, and where the definition enunciates only the worse. You may impugn it, on the ground that every cognition and every power must be understood as tending to its best results.286
286Ibid. p. 143, a. 9.
286Ibid. p. 143, a. 9.
6. A fifthlocusis, where the definiend is enunciated as ranking, not in the lowest and nearest species to which it belongs but, in some higher and more distinct genus. Here the real essence will not be declared, and the definition will thus be incomplete; unless indeed it includes, along with the highest genus, the superadded mention of all the differentiæ descending down to the lowest species. It will then be complete, because it will include, in circumlocutory phrase, all that would be declared by enunciating the specific name.287
287Ibid. a. 15-28.
287Ibid. a. 15-28.
6. Assuming the genus to be truly declared in the definition you will examine whether the differentiæ enunciated are differentiæ at all? whether they really belong to the definiend? what is it which they serve to contrast with and exclude, — since, if there be nothing such, they cannot be truly differentiæ? whether the differential term and its counter-differential apply to and cover the whole genus? whether, granting the differentia to be real, it be such, when taken along with the genus, as to constitute a true species, and whether its counter-differentia be such also? This is alocusfurnishing many possibilities of impugning the definition.288
288Topic. VI. vi. p. 143, a. 29-b. 10.
288Topic. VI. vi. p. 143, a. 29-b. 10.
7. Perhaps the definition may enunciate a differentia which is merely negative;e.g., A line is length without breadth. If you are debating with a respondent who holds the (Platonic) doctrine of Ideas, and who considers each Idea or genus to be something numerically one, distinct from all its participants, you will find here alocusfor attacking them.289He asserts the existence of a Self-long or generical long, a Self-animal or generic animal, each numerically one. Now, upon this hypothesis, since of all long you may predicate either in the affirmative or the negative (i.e., either it is broad or it is not broad), so this alternative may be predicated of the Self-long or generical long; and thus the genus will coincide with, or fall under the definition of, one among its own species. Or, if this be denied, it will follow that the generic long must be both broad and not broad; which is a contradiction still more inadmissible. Accordingly, against one who holds the doctrine of Ideas, declaring the genus to beunum numero, the negative differentia will furnish grounds for attack; but not against any other respondent.290For there are various cases in which the negative must be employed as a part of the differentia:e.g., in privative terms, blind is one whose nature it is to see but who does not see. And, even when the differentia enunciated is affirmative, it may have for its condivident member only a negative term,e.g., length having-breadth has for its condivident member only the negative, length not-having-breadth.291
289Ibid. b. 11-30.
289Ibid. b. 11-30.
290Ibid. b. 29: ὥστεπρὸς ἐκείνους μόνουςχρήσιμος ὁ τόπος, ὅσοι τὸ γένος ἓν ἀριθμῷ φασὶν εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὰς ἰδέας τιθέμενοι· αὐτὸ γὰρ μῆκος καὶ αὐτὸ ζῷον γένος φασὶν εἶναι.
290Ibid. b. 29: ὥστεπρὸς ἐκείνους μόνουςχρήσιμος ὁ τόπος, ὅσοι τὸ γένος ἓν ἀριθμῷ φασὶν εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὰς ἰδέας τιθέμενοι· αὐτὸ γὰρ μῆκος καὶ αὐτὸ ζῷον γένος φασὶν εἶναι.
291Ibid. b. 33.
291Ibid. b. 33.
8. Perhaps the definition may enunciate as a differentia what is really a subordinate species; or what is really the genus itself under another name; or what is notQuale, butQuid; or whatbelongs to the definiend as an accident only. Each of these is alocusfor arguments against the definition.292
292Topica, VI. vi. p. 144, a. 5-27.
292Topica, VI. vi. p. 144, a. 5-27.
9. Perhaps also, in the definition given, the differentia or the species may be found predicable of the entire genus; or the genus may be found predicable of the differentia itself, and not of objects under it; or the species (sometimes even one of its sub-species) may be found predicable of the differentia; or perhaps the differentia may not be apriusas regards the species (which it ought to be, while it is aposteriusas regards the genus). Arguments against the definition may be drawn from any one of these loci.293
293Ibid. a. 28-b. 11.
293Ibid. a. 28-b. 11.
10. Recollect that the same differentia cannot belong to two distinct genera neither of which comprehends the other, unless both are comprehended under some higher genus. Examine whether this is observed in the definition tendered to you.294
294Ibid. b. 12.
294Ibid. b. 12.
11. No genuine differentia can be derived either from the CategoryUbior from the CategoryPassio; for neither of them furnishes characteristics essential to the subject. AllPassiowhen intensified to a certain degree destroys the essence of the subject and removes it from its own appropriate species; but the differentia is inseparable from its subject; accordingly, nothing by virtue of which the subject is called ἀλλοῖον can be a true differentia. If the definition sins against this rule, it will be open to question.295
295Ibid. b. 31-p. 145, a. 12: ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ἔν τινι διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκεν οὐσίας· οὐ δοκεῖ γὰρ διαφέρειν οὐσία οὐσίας τῷπουεἶναι. — πάλιν εἰ τὸ πάθος διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκεν. — ἁπλῶς δ’ εἰπεῖν, καθ’ ὅσα ἀλλοιοῦται τὸ ἔχον, οὐδὲν τούτων διαφορὰ ἐκείνου· — ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλοιούμεθα κατὰ τὰς διαφοράς.
295Ibid. b. 31-p. 145, a. 12: ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ἔν τινι διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκεν οὐσίας· οὐ δοκεῖ γὰρ διαφέρειν οὐσία οὐσίας τῷπουεἶναι. — πάλιν εἰ τὸ πάθος διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκεν. — ἁπλῶς δ’ εἰπεῖν, καθ’ ὅσα ἀλλοιοῦται τὸ ἔχον, οὐδὲν τούτων διαφορὰ ἐκείνου· — ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλοιούμεθα κατὰ τὰς διαφοράς.
12. If the subject be relative, its true differentia ought to be relative also; thus, science or cognition is arelatum, and accordingly its three differentiæ — theoretical, practical, constructive — are allrelataalso.296The definition must conform to this; and it must also, in cases where the relative subject has more than one correlate, declare that correlate which is the ordinary and natural one, not any other which is rare and realized only on occasion.297You must watch to see whether this condition is observed; and also whether the correlative enunciated in the definition is the one strictly proximate. Thus, if the definition given of prudence be, It is an excellence of man or an excellence of the soul, this will not be a good definition. It ought to be — an excellence of the rational department of the soul; for it isthrough and by reason of this department that both man and soul are denominated prudent.298
296Ibid. a. 13.
296Ibid. a. 13.
297Ibid. a. 19-26.
297Ibid. a. 19-26.
298Topic. VI. vi. p. 145, a. 28-32. πρώτον γὰρ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἀρετὴ ἡ φρόνησις· κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος φρονεῖν λέγεται.
298Topic. VI. vi. p. 145, a. 28-32. πρώτον γὰρ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἀρετὴ ἡ φρόνησις· κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος φρονεῖν λέγεται.
13. When the definiend is given as an affection or lasting condition of some subject, you must examine whether it really resides or can reside (as by nature it ought to do) in the subject to which it is referred in the definition. If it cannot, thedefinitionis untenable; and this mistake is sometimes made, the producing conditions of a phenomenon being confounded with the phenomenon itself, orvice versâ.299Thus, some persons have defined sleep — incapacity of sensible perception; doubt — equality of contrary reasonings; pain — breach of continuity violently made in parts of the organism which naturally grow together. Now sleep does not reside in perception, nor doubt in reasonings. Sleep is that which produces or occasions incapacity of sensible perception; doubt is a state of mind produced by equality of contrary reasonings.300This will be alocusfor arguing against the definition.
299Ibid. b. 11: τὸ ποιούμενον εἰς τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ ἀνάπαλιν συμβαίνει τιθέναι τοῖς οὕτως ὁριζομένοις.
299Ibid. b. 11: τὸ ποιούμενον εἰς τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ ἀνάπαλιν συμβαίνει τιθέναι τοῖς οὕτως ὁριζομένοις.
300Ibid. a. 33-b. 20.
300Ibid. a. 33-b. 20.
14. Anotherlocusis, when the definiend has direct bearing and reference to something different from what is enunciated in the definition. Thus, if the respondent defines justice — a power tending to make equal distribution, you may remark hereupon, that the just man is he who is deliberately resolved to make equal distribution, not he who has the power to do so. If this definition were allowed, the justest man would be he who has the greatest power of so distributing.301
301Ibid. vii. p. 145, b. 34-p. 146, a. 2.
301Ibid. vii. p. 145, b. 34-p. 146, a. 2.
15. Again, the definition will be assailable, if the definiend admits graduation of More or Less, while that which is enunciated in the definition does not admit it, orvice versâ; also, if both of them admit graduation, but the variations of the two are not corresponding and concomitant. The defining phrase ought to be identical in signification with the term defined.302If both of them agree in reference to some common correlate, but one is to this in the relation of more while the other is in the relation of less, the definition is faulty.303
302Ibid. p. 146, a. 3-12. εἴπερ δὴ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοθὲν τῷ πράγματι.Here we have a principle of Concomitant Variations analogous to that which is so well unfolded, as one of the Four Inductive Methods, in Mr. J. S. Mill’s ‘System of Logic.’ See Book III. ch. viii. sect. 6.
302Ibid. p. 146, a. 3-12. εἴπερ δὴ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοθὲν τῷ πράγματι.
Here we have a principle of Concomitant Variations analogous to that which is so well unfolded, as one of the Four Inductive Methods, in Mr. J. S. Mill’s ‘System of Logic.’ See Book III. ch. viii. sect. 6.
303Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 6-20: ἔδει δ’ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ταὐτὰ ἦν, &c.
303Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 6-20: ἔδει δ’ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ταὐτὰ ἦν, &c.
16. Again, you will be able to object, if the definition enunciate references to two distinct correlates, severally or alternately:e.g.,The beautiful is that which affords pleasure either through the eye or through the ear;Ensis that which is capable either of suffering or acting. You may show that, according to this definition, beautiful and not beautiful, or thatEnsand Non-Ens, will coincide and be predicable of the same subjects.304
304Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 21-32.The definition here given ofEnsappears in the Sophistes of Plato, p. 247, E. The definition of the beautiful (τὸ καλόν) appears in the Hippias Major of Plato (p. 298, E, seq.), where it is criticized by Sokrates.
304Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 21-32.
The definition here given ofEnsappears in the Sophistes of Plato, p. 247, E. The definition of the beautiful (τὸ καλόν) appears in the Hippias Major of Plato (p. 298, E, seq.), where it is criticized by Sokrates.
17. When the definition is tendered, you ought to examine and define its own terms, which, of course, profess to enunciate genus and differentia of the definiend.305You will see whether the definitions of those defining terms are in any way inapplicable to the definiend.
305Ibid. a. 33-35.
305Ibid. a. 33-35.
18. If the definiend be aRelatum, the definition ought to enunciate its true correlate, or the true correlate of the genus to which it belongs. You must examine whether this is done, and whether the correlate enunciated be an ultimate end, as it ought to be (i.e.not merely a means towards something ulterior). If the correlate enunciated is a generation or a process, this will afford you an argument against the definition; for all generation or process is a means towards some ulterior end.306