118Ibid. xxv. p. 180, a. 23-31.
118Ibid. xxv. p. 180, a. 23-31.
In like manner, the FallacyIgnoratio Elenchiwill be solved by analysing the two supposed counter-propositions of theAntiphasis, and by showing that there is no real contradiction or inconsistency between them.119
119Ibid. xxvi. p. 181, a. 1-14.
119Ibid. xxvi. p. 181, a. 1-14.
In regard to the Fallacies underPetitio Principii, the respondent if he perceives that the premiss asked of him involves such a fallacy, must refuse to grant it, however probable it may be in itself. If he does not perceive this until after he has granted it, he must throw back the charge of mal-procedure upon the questioner; declaring that an Elenchus involving assumption of the matter in question is null, and that the concession was made under the supposition that some separate and independent syllogism was in contemplation.120
120Ibid. xxvii. p. 181, a. 15-21.
120Ibid. xxvii. p. 181, a. 15-21.
There are two distinct ways in which theFallacia Consequentismay be employed. The predicate may be an universal, comprehending the subject: because animal always goes along with man, it is falsely inferred that man always goes along with animal; or it is falsely inferred that not-animal always goes along with not-man. The fallacy is solved when this is pointed out. The last inference is only valid when the terms are inverted; if animal always goes along with man, not-man will always go along with not-animal.121
121Ibid. xxviii. p. 181, a. 22-30. ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ ἡ ἀκολούθησις.
121Ibid. xxviii. p. 181, a. 22-30. ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ ἡ ἀκολούθησις.
If the sophistical refutation includes more premisses than are indispensable to the conclusion, the respondent, after having satisfied himself that this is the fact, will point out the mal-procedure of the questioner, and will say that he conceded the superfluous premiss, not because it was in itself probable but, because it seemed relevant to the debate; while nevertheless the questioner has made no real or legitimate application of it towards that object.122This is the mode of solution applicable in the case of the Fallacies coming under the headNon Causa pro Causâ.123
122Soph. El. xxix. p. 181, a. 31-35.
122Soph. El. xxix. p. 181, a. 31-35.
123Schol. p. 318, a. 36, Br.
123Schol. p. 318, a. 36, Br.
Where the sophistical questioner tries to refute by theFallacia Plurium Interrogationum(i.e., by putting two or more questions as one), the respondent should forthwith divide the complex question into its component simple questions, and make answer accordingly. He must not give one answer, either affirmative or negative, to that which is more than one question. Even if he does give one answer, he may sometimes not involve himself in any contradiction; for it may happen that the same predicate is truly affirmable, or truly deniable, of two or more distinct and independent subjects. Often, however, the contrary is the case: no one true answer, either affirmative or negative, can be given to one of these complex questions: the one answer given, whatever it be, must always be partially false or inconsistent.124Suppose two subjects, A and B, one good, the other bad: if the question be, Whether A and B are good or bad, it will be equally true to say — Both are good, or, Both are bad, or, Both are neither good nor bad. There may indeed be other solutions for this fallacy: Both or All may signify two or more items taken individually, or taken collectively; but the only sure precaution is — one answer to one question.125
124Soph. El. xxx. p. 181, a. 38: οὔτε πλείω καθ’ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλ’ ἓν καθ’ ἑνὸς φατέον ἢ ἀποφατέον.
124Soph. El. xxx. p. 181, a. 38: οὔτε πλείω καθ’ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλ’ ἓν καθ’ ἑνὸς φατέον ἢ ἀποφατέον.
125Ibid. b. 6-25.
125Ibid. b. 6-25.
Suppose that, instead of aiming at a seeming refutation, the Sophist tries to convict the respondent of Tautology. The source of this embarrassment is commonly the fact that a relative term is often used and conveys clear meaning without its correlate, though the correlate is always implied and understood. The respondent must avoid this trap by refusing to grant that the relative has any meaning at all without its correlate; and by requiring that the correlate shall be distinctly enunciated along with it. He ought to treat the relative without its correlate as merely a part of the whole significant expression — as merely syncategorematic; just as ten is in the phrase — tenminus one, or as the affirmative word is in a negative proposition.126Thus he will not recognize double as significant by itself without its correlate half, nor half without its correlate double; although in common parlance such correlate is often understood without being formally enunciated.
126Soph. El. Xxxi. p. 181, b. 26: οὐ δοτέον τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων σημαίνειν τι χωριζομένας καθ’ αὑτὰς τὰς κατηγορίας.Mr. Poste observes in his note:— “The sophistic locus of tautology may be considered as a caricature of a dialectic locus. One fault which dialectic criticism finds with a definition is the introduction of superfluous words.â€� He then cites Topic. VI. ii. (p. 141, a. 4, seq.); but in this passage we find that the repetition of the same word is declared not to be an argumentative impropriety, so that the Sophist would gain nothing by driving his opponent into tautology.
126Soph. El. Xxxi. p. 181, b. 26: οὐ δοτέον τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων σημαίνειν τι χωριζομένας καθ’ αὑτὰς τὰς κατηγορίας.
Mr. Poste observes in his note:— “The sophistic locus of tautology may be considered as a caricature of a dialectic locus. One fault which dialectic criticism finds with a definition is the introduction of superfluous words.� He then cites Topic. VI. ii. (p. 141, a. 4, seq.); but in this passage we find that the repetition of the same word is declared not to be an argumentative impropriety, so that the Sophist would gain nothing by driving his opponent into tautology.
Lastly, another purpose which Aristotle ascribes to the Sophist, is that of driving the respondent into a Solecism — into some grammatical or syntactical impropriety, such as, using a noun in the wrong case or gender, using a pronoun with a different gender or number from the noun to which it belongs, &c. He points out that the solution of these verbal puzzles must be different for each particular case; in general, when thrown into a regular syllogistic form, even the questioner himself will be found to speak bad Greek. The examples given by Aristotle do not admit of being translated into a modern language, so as to preserve the solecism that constitutes their peculiarity.127
127Soph. El. xxxii. p. 182, a. 7-b. 5.
127Soph. El. xxxii. p. 182, a. 7-b. 5.
After having thus gone through the different artifices ascribed to the Sophist, and the ways of solving or meeting them, Aristotle remarks that there are material distinctions between the different cases which fall under one and the same general head of Sophistical Paralogism. Some cases there are in which both the fallacy itself, and the particular point upon which it turns, are obvious and discernible at first sight. In other cases, again, an ordinary person does not perceive that there is any fallacy at all; or, if he does perceive it, he often does not detect the seat of the fallacy, so that one man will refer the case to one general head, and another, to a different one.128Thus, for example, Fallacies of Equivocation are perhaps the most frequent and numerous of all fallacies; some of them are childish and jocular, not really imposing upon any one; but there are others again in which the double meaning of a word is at first unnoticed, and is disputed even when pointed out, so that it can only be brought to light by the most careful and subtle analysis. This happens especially with terms that are highly abstract and general: which are treated by many, including evenphilosopherslike Parmenides and Zeno, as if they were not equivocal at all,but univocal.129Again, theFallaciæ Accidentis, and the other classesExtra Dictionem, are also often hard to detect. On the whole, it is often hard to determine, not merely to which of the classes any case of fallacy belongs, but even whether there is any fallacy at all — whether the refutation is, or is not, a valid one.130
128Ibid. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 6-12.
128Ibid. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 6-12.
129Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 13-25: ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος εὐηθέστατος εἶναι τῶν παραλογισμῶν, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσίν ἐστι δῆλα — τὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐμπειροτάτους φαίνεται λανθάνειν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτων ὅτι μάχονται πολλάκις περὶ ὀνομάτων, οἷον πότερον ταὐτὸ σημαίνει κατὰ πάντων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ἢ ἕτερον.
129Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 13-25: ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος εὐηθέστατος εἶναι τῶν παραλογισμῶν, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσίν ἐστι δῆλα — τὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐμπειροτάτους φαίνεται λανθάνειν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτων ὅτι μάχονται πολλάκις περὶ ὀνομάτων, οἷον πότερον ταὐτὸ σημαίνει κατὰ πάντων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ἢ ἕτερον.
130Ibid. b. 27: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, οἱ μὲν ἔσονται ῥᾴους ἰδεῖν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι τῶν λόγων· καὶ λαβεῖν ἔν τινι γένει, καὶ πότερον ἔλεγχος ἢ οὐκ ἔλεγχος, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁμοίως περὶ πάντων.
130Ibid. b. 27: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, οἱ μὲν ἔσονται ῥᾴους ἰδεῖν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι τῶν λόγων· καὶ λαβεῖν ἔν τινι γένει, καὶ πότερον ἔλεγχος ἢ οὐκ ἔλεγχος, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁμοίως περὶ πάντων.
The pungent arguments in debate are those which bite most keenly, and create the greatest amount of embarrassment and puzzle.131In dialectical debate a puzzle arises, when the respondent finds that a correct syllogism has been established against him, and when he does not at once see which among its premisses he ought to controvert, in order to overthrow the conclusion. In the eristic or sophistic debate the puzzle of the respondent is, in what language to enunciate his propositions so as to keep clear of the subtle objections which will be brought against him by the questioner.132It is these pungent arguments that most effectually stimulate the mind to investigation. The most pungent of all is, where the syllogistic premisses are highly probable, yet where they nevertheless negative a conclusion which is also highly probable. Here we have an equal antithesis as to presumptive credibility, between the premisses taken together on one side and the conclusion on the other.133We do not knowwhether it is in the premisses only, or in the conclusion, that we are to look for untruth: the conclusion, though improbable, may yet be true, while we may find that the true conclusion has been obtained from untrue premisses; or the conclusion may be both improbable and untrue, in which case we must look for untruth in one of the premisses also — either the major or the minor. This is the most embarrassing position of all. Another, rather less embarrassing, is, where our thesis will be confuted unless we can show the confuting conclusion to be untrue, but where each of the premisses on which the conclusion depends is equally probable, so that we do not at once see in which of them the cause of its untruth is to be sought. These two are the most pungent and perplexing argumentative conjunctures of dialectical debate.
131Ibid. 32: ἔστι δὲ δριμὺς λόγος ὅστις ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ μάλιστα· δάκνει γὰρ οὗτος μάλιστα.
131Ibid. 32: ἔστι δὲ δριμὺς λόγος ὅστις ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ μάλιστα· δάκνει γὰρ οὗτος μάλιστα.
132Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 33: ἀπορία δ’ ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλελογισμένοις, ὅ τι ἀνέλῃ τις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἡ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, πῶς εἴπῃ τις τὸ προταθέν. The difficulty here pointed out, of finding language not open to some logical objection by an acute Sophist, is illustrated by what he himself states about the caution required for guarding his definitions against attack; see De Interpret. vi. p. 17, a. 34: λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ὁμωνύμως δέ,καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις. What is here meant by σοφιστικαὶ ἐνοχλήσεις is expressed elsewhere by πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας — Metaphys.Γ. iii. p. 1005, b. 21;N.i. p. 1087, b. 20. See the Scholia (pp. 112, 651, Br.) of Ammonius and Alexander upon the above passages of De Interpr. and Metaphys.
132Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 33: ἀπορία δ’ ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλελογισμένοις, ὅ τι ἀνέλῃ τις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἡ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, πῶς εἴπῃ τις τὸ προταθέν. The difficulty here pointed out, of finding language not open to some logical objection by an acute Sophist, is illustrated by what he himself states about the caution required for guarding his definitions against attack; see De Interpret. vi. p. 17, a. 34: λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ὁμωνύμως δέ,καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις. What is here meant by σοφιστικαὶ ἐνοχλήσεις is expressed elsewhere by πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας — Metaphys.Γ. iii. p. 1005, b. 21;N.i. p. 1087, b. 20. See the Scholia (pp. 112, 651, Br.) of Ammonius and Alexander upon the above passages of De Interpr. and Metaphys.
133Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 37-p. 183, a. 4: ἔστι δὲ συλλογιστικὸς μὲν λόγος δριμύτατος, ἂν ἐξ ὅτι μάλιστα δοκούντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔνδοξον ἀναιρῇ· εἷς γὰρ ὢν ὁ λόγος, μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, ἅπαντας ὁμοίους ἕξει τοὺς συλλογισμούς· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ὁμοίως ἔνδοξον ἀναιρήσει [ἢ κατασκευάσει]· διόπερ ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαῖον. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος δριμύς, ὁ ἐξ ἴσου τὸ συμπέρασμα ποιῶν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι. I transcribe this text as it is given by Bekker, Waitz, Bussemaker, and Mr. Poste. The editions anterior to Bekker had the additional words ἢ κατασκευάζῃ after ἀναιρῇ in the fourth line; and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his translation defends and retains them. Bekker and the subsequent editors have omitted them, but have retained the last words ἢ κατασκευάσει in the seventh line. To me this seems inconsistent: the words ought either to be retained in both places or omitted in both. I think they ought to be omitted in both. I have enclosed them in brackets in the fifth line.This difficult passage (not well explained by Alexander, Schol. p. 320, b. 9) requires the explanations of Waitz and Mr. Poste. The note of Mr. Poste is particularly instructive, because he expands in full (p. 164) the three “similar syllogismsâ€� to which Aristotle here briefly alludes. The phrase μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως is determined by a passage in Analyt. Priora, II. viii. p. 59, b. 1: it means “employment of the contradictory of the conclusion, in combination with either one of the premisses, to upset the other.â€� The original syllogism is assumed to have two premisses, each highly probable, while the conclusion is highly improbable, being the negation of a highly probable proposition. The original syllogism will stand thus: All M is P; All S is M;Ergo, All S is P: the two premisses being supposed highly probable, and the conclusion highly improbable. Of course, therefore, the contradictory of the conclusion will be highly probable — Some S is not P. We take this contradictory and employ it to construct two new syllogisms as follows:— “All M is P; Some S is not P;ErgoSome S is not M. And again, Some S is not P: All S is M;Ergo, Some M is not P. All these three syllogisms are similar in this respect: that each has two highly probable premisses, while the conclusion is highly improbable.
133Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 37-p. 183, a. 4: ἔστι δὲ συλλογιστικὸς μὲν λόγος δριμύτατος, ἂν ἐξ ὅτι μάλιστα δοκούντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔνδοξον ἀναιρῇ· εἷς γὰρ ὢν ὁ λόγος, μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, ἅπαντας ὁμοίους ἕξει τοὺς συλλογισμούς· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ὁμοίως ἔνδοξον ἀναιρήσει [ἢ κατασκευάσει]· διόπερ ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαῖον. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος δριμύς, ὁ ἐξ ἴσου τὸ συμπέρασμα ποιῶν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι. I transcribe this text as it is given by Bekker, Waitz, Bussemaker, and Mr. Poste. The editions anterior to Bekker had the additional words ἢ κατασκευάζῃ after ἀναιρῇ in the fourth line; and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his translation defends and retains them. Bekker and the subsequent editors have omitted them, but have retained the last words ἢ κατασκευάσει in the seventh line. To me this seems inconsistent: the words ought either to be retained in both places or omitted in both. I think they ought to be omitted in both. I have enclosed them in brackets in the fifth line.
This difficult passage (not well explained by Alexander, Schol. p. 320, b. 9) requires the explanations of Waitz and Mr. Poste. The note of Mr. Poste is particularly instructive, because he expands in full (p. 164) the three “similar syllogismsâ€� to which Aristotle here briefly alludes. The phrase μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως is determined by a passage in Analyt. Priora, II. viii. p. 59, b. 1: it means “employment of the contradictory of the conclusion, in combination with either one of the premisses, to upset the other.â€� The original syllogism is assumed to have two premisses, each highly probable, while the conclusion is highly improbable, being the negation of a highly probable proposition. The original syllogism will stand thus: All M is P; All S is M;Ergo, All S is P: the two premisses being supposed highly probable, and the conclusion highly improbable. Of course, therefore, the contradictory of the conclusion will be highly probable — Some S is not P. We take this contradictory and employ it to construct two new syllogisms as follows:— “All M is P; Some S is not P;ErgoSome S is not M. And again, Some S is not P: All S is M;Ergo, Some M is not P. All these three syllogisms are similar in this respect: that each has two highly probable premisses, while the conclusion is highly improbable.
But in eristic or sophistic debate our greatest embarrassment as respondents will arise when we do not at once see whether the refutative syllogism brought against us is conclusive or not, and whether it is to be solved by negation or by distinction.134Next in order as to embarrassment stands the case, where we see in which of the two processes (negation or distinction) we are to find our solution, yet without seeing on which of the premisses we are to bring the process to bear; or whether, if distinction be the process required, we are to apply it to the conclusion, or to one of the premisses.135A defective syllogistic argument issilly, when the deficient points are of capital importance — relating to the minor or to the middle term, or when the assumptions are false and strange; but it will sometimes be worthy of attention, if the points deficient are outlying and easily supplied; in which cases it is the carelessness of the questioner that is to blame, rather than the argument itself.136Both the line of argument taken by the questioner, and the mode of solution adopted by the respondent, may be directed towards any one of three distinct purposes: either to the thesis and main subject discussed; or to the adversary personally (i.e., to the particular way in which he has been arguing); or to neither of these, but simply to prolong the discussion (i.e., against time). The solution may thus be sometimes such that it would take more time to argue upon it than the patience of the auditors will allow.137
134Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 7.
134Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 7.
135Ibid. a. 9: δεύτερος δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ δῆλος μὲν ὅτι παρὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσίν ἐστι, μὴ φανερὸς δ’ ὢν διὰ τίνος τῶν ἠρωτημένων ἀναίρεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πότερον αὕτη παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ παρά τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἐστίν.Mr. Poste translates these last words very correctly:— “Whether it is one of the premisses or the conclusion that requires distinction.â€� Here Aristotle again speaks of a mode of solution furnished by applyingdistinction(διαίρεσις) tothe conclusionas well as to the premisses, though he does not say that solution can be furnished by applyingdisproof(ἀναίρεσις) tothe conclusion. See my remarks, a few pages above, on Mr. Poste’s note respecting ch. xviii. (supra, p. 406).
135Ibid. a. 9: δεύτερος δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ δῆλος μὲν ὅτι παρὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσίν ἐστι, μὴ φανερὸς δ’ ὢν διὰ τίνος τῶν ἠρωτημένων ἀναίρεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πότερον αὕτη παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ παρά τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἐστίν.
Mr. Poste translates these last words very correctly:— “Whether it is one of the premisses or the conclusion that requires distinction.â€� Here Aristotle again speaks of a mode of solution furnished by applyingdistinction(διαίρεσις) tothe conclusionas well as to the premisses, though he does not say that solution can be furnished by applyingdisproof(ἀναίρεσις) tothe conclusion. See my remarks, a few pages above, on Mr. Poste’s note respecting ch. xviii. (supra, p. 406).
136Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 14-20.
136Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 14-20.
137Ibid. a. 21.
137Ibid. a. 21.
The last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi is employed by Aristotle in recapitulating the scope and procedure of the nine Books of Topica (reckoning the Sophistici Elenchi as the Ninth, as we ought in propriety to do); and in appreciating the general bearing and value of that treatise, having regard to the practice and theory of the day.
The business of Dialectic and Peirastic is to find and apply the syllogizing process to any given thesis, with premisses the most probable that can be obtained bearing on the thesis. This Aristotle treats as the proper function of Dialecticper seand of Peirastic; considering both — the last, of course — as referring wholly to the questioner. His purpose is to investigate and impart this syllogizing power — the power of questioning and cross-examining a respondent who sets up a given thesis, so as to drive him into inconsistent answers. It appears that Aristotle would not have cared to teach the respondent how he might defend himself against this procedure, if there had not happened to be another art — Sophistic, closely bordering on Dialectic and Peirastic. He considers it indispensable to furnish the respondent with defensive armour against sophistical cross-examination; and this could not be done without teaching him at the same time modes of defence against the cross-examination of Dialectic and Peirastic. For this reason it is (Aristotletellsus138that he has included in the Topica preceptson the best mode of defending the thesis by the most probable arguments, as well as of impugning it. The respondent professes to know (while the questioner does not), and must be taught how to maintain his thesis like a man of knowledge. Sokrates, the prince of dialecticians, did nothing but question and cross-examine: he would never be respondent at all; for he explicitly disclaimed knowledge. And if it were not for the neighbourhood of Sophistic, Aristotle would have thought it sufficient to teach a procedure like that of Sokrates. It was the danger from sophistical cross-examination that led him to enlarge his scheme — to unmask the Sophists by enumerating the paralogisms peculiar to them, and to indicate the proper scheme of the responses and solutions whereby the respondent might defend himself against them. We remember that Aristotle treats all paralogisms and fallacies as if they belonged to a peculiar art or profession called Sophistic, and as if they were employed by Sophists exclusively; as if the Dialecticians and the Peirasts, including among them Sokrates and Plato, put all their questions without ever resorting to or falling into paralogisms.
138Ibid. xxxiv. p. 183, a. 37-b. 8: προειλόμεθα μὲν οὖν εὑρεῖν δύναμίν τινα συλλογιστικὴν περὶ τοῦ προβληθέντος ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς ἐνδοξοτάτων·τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶτῆςδιαλεκτικῆς καθ’ αὑτὴν καὶ τῆς πειραστικῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲπροσκατασκευάζεται πρὸς αὐτὴν διὰ τὴν τῆς σοφιστικῆς γειτνίασιν, ὡς οὐ μόνον πεῖραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς εἰδώς,διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον τὸ λεχθὲνἔργον ὑπεθέμεθα τῆς πραγματείας τὸ λόγον δύνασθαι λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως λόγον ὑπέχοντες φυλάξομεν τὴν θέσιν ὡς δι’ ἐνδοξοτάτων ὁμοτρόπως. τὴν δ’ αἰτίαν εἰρήκαμεν τούτου, ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἠρώτα ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὡμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι.It appears to me that in one line of this remarkable passage a word has dropped out which is necessary to the sense. We now read (about the middle) ὡς οὐ μόνον πεῖραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς εἰδώς. Now the words πεῖραν λαβεῖν as the passage stands, must be construed along with ὡς εἰδώς, and this makes no meaning at all, or an inadmissible meaning. I think it clear that the word ὑπέχειν or δοῦναι has dropped out before εἰδώς. The passage will then stand:— ὡς οὐ μόνον πεῖραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶὑπέχειν(orδοῦναι) ὡς εἰδώς. When this verb is supplied the sense will be quite in harmony with what follows, which at present it is not. Πεῖραν λαβεῖν applies to the questioner, but not to the respondent; ὡς εἰδώς applies to the respondent, but not to the questioner; πεῖραν ὑπέχειν applies to the respondent, and is therefore the fit concomitant of ὡς εἰδώς. The translation given by Mr. Postefirst(p. 93):— “professing not only to test knowledge with the resources of Dialectic, but also to maintain any thesis with the infallibility of scienceâ€� appears to me (excepting the wordinfallibility, which is unsuitable) to render Aristotle’s thought, though not his words as they now stand; but Mr. Poste has given what he thinks an amended translation (p. 175):— “Since it claims the power of catechizing or cross-examining not only dialectically but also scientifically.â€� This second translation may approach more nearly to the present words of Aristotle, but it departs more widely from his sense and doctrine. Aristotle does not claim for either Dialecticians or Sophists the power of cross-examining scientifically. He ascribes to the Sophists nothing but cavil and fallacy — verbal and extra-verbal — the pretence and sham of being wise or knowing (Soph. El. i., ii. p. 165).
138Ibid. xxxiv. p. 183, a. 37-b. 8: προειλόμεθα μὲν οὖν εὑρεῖν δύναμίν τινα συλλογιστικὴν περὶ τοῦ προβληθέντος ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς ἐνδοξοτάτων·τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶτῆςδιαλεκτικῆς καθ’ αὑτὴν καὶ τῆς πειραστικῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲπροσκατασκευάζεται πρὸς αὐτὴν διὰ τὴν τῆς σοφιστικῆς γειτνίασιν, ὡς οὐ μόνον πεῖραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς εἰδώς,διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον τὸ λεχθὲνἔργον ὑπεθέμεθα τῆς πραγματείας τὸ λόγον δύνασθαι λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως λόγον ὑπέχοντες φυλάξομεν τὴν θέσιν ὡς δι’ ἐνδοξοτάτων ὁμοτρόπως. τὴν δ’ αἰτίαν εἰρήκαμεν τούτου, ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἠρώτα ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὡμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι.
It appears to me that in one line of this remarkable passage a word has dropped out which is necessary to the sense. We now read (about the middle) ὡς οὐ μόνον πεῖραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς εἰδώς. Now the words πεῖραν λαβεῖν as the passage stands, must be construed along with ὡς εἰδώς, and this makes no meaning at all, or an inadmissible meaning. I think it clear that the word ὑπέχειν or δοῦναι has dropped out before εἰδώς. The passage will then stand:— ὡς οὐ μόνον πεῖραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶὑπέχειν(orδοῦναι) ὡς εἰδώς. When this verb is supplied the sense will be quite in harmony with what follows, which at present it is not. Πεῖραν λαβεῖν applies to the questioner, but not to the respondent; ὡς εἰδώς applies to the respondent, but not to the questioner; πεῖραν ὑπέχειν applies to the respondent, and is therefore the fit concomitant of ὡς εἰδώς. The translation given by Mr. Postefirst(p. 93):— “professing not only to test knowledge with the resources of Dialectic, but also to maintain any thesis with the infallibility of scienceâ€� appears to me (excepting the wordinfallibility, which is unsuitable) to render Aristotle’s thought, though not his words as they now stand; but Mr. Poste has given what he thinks an amended translation (p. 175):— “Since it claims the power of catechizing or cross-examining not only dialectically but also scientifically.â€� This second translation may approach more nearly to the present words of Aristotle, but it departs more widely from his sense and doctrine. Aristotle does not claim for either Dialecticians or Sophists the power of cross-examining scientifically. He ascribes to the Sophists nothing but cavil and fallacy — verbal and extra-verbal — the pretence and sham of being wise or knowing (Soph. El. i., ii. p. 165).
Aristotle, we have already more than once seen, asserts emphatically his claim to originality as having been the first to treat these subjects theoretically, and to suggest precepts founded on the theory. On all important subjects (he remarks) the elaboration of any good theory is a gradual process, the work ofseveral successive authors. The first beginnings are very imperfect and rudimentary; upon these, however, subsequent authors build, both correcting and enlarging, until, after some considerable time, a tolerably complete scheme or system comes to be constructed. Such has been the case with Rhetoric and other arts. Tisias was the first writer and preceptor on Rhetoric, yet with poor and insufficient effect. To him succeeded Thrasymachus, next Theodorus, and various others; from each of whom partial improvements and additions were derived, until at length we have now (it is Aristotle that speaks) a copious body of rhetorical theory and precept, inherited from predecessors and accumulated by successive traditions. Compared with this, the earliest attempt at theory was indeed narrow and imperfect; but it was nevertheless the first step in a great work, and, as such, it was the most difficult and the most important. The task of building on a foundation already laid, is far easier.139
139Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 17-26: τῶν γὰρ εὑρισκομένων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον· τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὑρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως· μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὃν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι· ταύτης δ’ εὑρημένης ῥᾷον προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν.
139Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 17-26: τῶν γὰρ εὑρισκομένων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον· τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὑρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως· μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὃν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι· ταύτης δ’ εὑρημένης ῥᾷον προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν.
While rhetorical theory has thus been gradually worked up to maturity, the case has been altogether different with Dialectic. In this I (Aristotle) found no basis prepared; no predecessor to follow; no models to copy. I had to begin from the beginning, and to make good the first step myself. The process of syllogizing had never yet been analysed or explained by any one; much less had anything been set forth about the different applications of it in detail. I worked it out for myself, without any assistance, by long and laborious application.140There existed indeed paid teachers, both in Dialectic and in Eristic (or Sophistic); but their teaching has been entirely without analysis, or theory, or system. Just as rhetoricians gave to their pupils orations to learn by heart, so these dialectical teachers gave out dialogues to learn by heart upon those subjects which they thought most likely to become the topics of discourse. They thus imparted to their pupils a certain readiness and fluency; but they communicated no art, no rational conception of what was to be sought or avoided, no skill or power of dealing with new circumstances.141They proceeded like men, who, professingto show how comfortable covering might be provided for the feet, should not teach the pupil how he could make shoes for himself, but should merely furnish him with a good stock of ready-made shoes — a present valuable indeed for use, but quite unconnected with any skill as an artificer. The syllogism as a system and theory, with precepts founded on that theory for Demonstration and Dialectic, has originated first with me (Aristotle). Mine is the first step, and therefore a small one, though worked out with much thought and hard labour: it must be looked at as a first step, and judged with indulgence. You, my readers, or hearers of my lectures, if you think that I have done as much as can fairly be required for an initiatory start, compared with other more advanced departments of theory, will acknowledge what I have achieved, and pardon what I have left for others to accomplish.142
140Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 8: καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπῆρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶδὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἢ τριβῇ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν.
140Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 8: καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπῆρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶδὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἢ τριβῇ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν.
141Ibid. a. 1: διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος δ’ ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ’ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον.Cicero, in describing his own treatise De Oratore, insists upon the marked difference between his mode of treatment and the common rhetorical precepts; he claims to have followed the manner of the Aristotelian Dialogues:— “Scripsi Aristoteleo more, quemadmodum quidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de Oratore, quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutiles. Abhorrent enim a communibus præceptis, atque omnem antiquorum et Aristoteleam et Isocrateam rationem oratoriam complectunturâ€� (Cicero, Epist. ad Famill. i. 9).
141Ibid. a. 1: διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος δ’ ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ’ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον.
Cicero, in describing his own treatise De Oratore, insists upon the marked difference between his mode of treatment and the common rhetorical precepts; he claims to have followed the manner of the Aristotelian Dialogues:— “Scripsi Aristoteleo more, quemadmodum quidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de Oratore, quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutiles. Abhorrent enim a communibus præceptis, atque omnem antiquorum et Aristoteleam et Isocrateam rationem oratoriam complectuntur� (Cicero, Epist. ad Famill. i. 9).
142Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 3: εἰ δὲ φαίνεται θεασαμένοις ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκ τοιούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἡ μεθόδος ἱκανῶς παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πραγματείας τὰς ἐκ παραδόσεως ἠυξημένας, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ἠκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ’ εὑρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν.It would seem that by τοῖς θεασαμένοις Aristotle means to address the readers of the present treatise, while by τῶν ἠκροαμένων he designates those who had heard his oral expositions on the same subject.
142Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 3: εἰ δὲ φαίνεται θεασαμένοις ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκ τοιούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἡ μεθόδος ἱκανῶς παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πραγματείας τὰς ἐκ παραδόσεως ἠυξημένας, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ἠκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ’ εὑρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν.
It would seem that by τοῖς θεασαμένοις Aristotle means to address the readers of the present treatise, while by τῶν ἠκροαμένων he designates those who had heard his oral expositions on the same subject.
Such is the impressive closing chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi. It is remarkable in two ways: first, that Aristotle expressly addresses himself to hearers and readers in the second person; next, that he asserts emphatically his own claim to originality as a theorist on Logic, and declares himself to have worked out even the first beginnings of such theory by laborious application. I understand his claim to originality as intended to bear, not simply on the treatise called Sophistici Elenchi and on the enumeration of Fallacies therein contained, but, in a larger sense, on the theory of the Syllogism; as first unfolded in the Analytica Priora, applied to Demonstration in the Analytica Posteriora, applied afterwards to Dialectic in the Topica, applied lastly to Sophistic (or Eristic) in the Sophistici Elenchi. The phrase, “Respecting theprocess of syllogizing,143I found absolutely nothing prepared, but worked it out by laborious application for myself� — seems plainly to denote this largecomprehension. And, indeed, in respect to Sophistic separately, the remark of Aristotle that nothing whatever had been done before him, would not be well founded: we find in his own treatise of the Sophistici Elenchi allusion to various prior doctrines, from which he dissents.144In these prior doctrines, however, his predecessors had treated the sophistical modes of refutation without reference to the Syllogism and its general theory.145It is against such separation that Aristotle distinctly protests. He insists upon the necessity of first expounding the Syllogism, and of discussing the laws of good or bad Refutation as a corollary or dependant of the syllogistic theory. Accordingly he begins this treatise by intimating that he intends to deduce these laws from the first and highest generalities of the subject;146and he concludes it by claiming this method of philosophizing as original with himself.
143Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 1: περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, &c. (cited in a precedingnote).
143Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 1: περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, &c. (cited in a precedingnote).
144See notep. 402.
144See notep. 402.
145Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 1: ὅλως τε ἄτοπον, τὸ περὶ ἐλέγχου διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλα’ μὴ πρότερον περὶ συλλογισμοῦ·ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός ἐστιν,ὥστε χρὴ καὶ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ πρότερον ἢ περὶ ψευδοῦς ἐλέγχου.
145Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 1: ὅλως τε ἄτοπον, τὸ περὶ ἐλέγχου διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλα’ μὴ πρότερον περὶ συλλογισμοῦ·ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός ἐστιν,ὥστε χρὴ καὶ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ πρότερον ἢ περὶ ψευδοῦς ἐλέγχου.