III.

113Ibid. p. 114, a. 7-12.

In regard toRelata, the inference holds from the correlate of the subject to the correlate of the predicate. If knowledge is belief, that which is known is believed; if vision is sensible perception, that which is visible is sensibly perceivable. Some say that there are cases in which the above does not hold;e.g., That which is sensibly perceivable is knowable; yet sensible perception is not knowledge. But this objection is not valid; for many persons dispute the first of the two propositions. Thislocuswill be equally available for the purpose of refutation â€” thus, you may argue â€” That which is sensibly perceivable is not knowable, because sensible perception is not knowledge.114

114Ibid. a. 13-25.

18. You will look at the terms of the proposition, also, in regard to their Derivatives, Inflections, &c., and to matters associated with them in the way of production, preservation, &c. Thislocusserves both for proof and for refutation. What is affirmable of the subject, is affirmable also of its derivatives: what is not affirmable of the derivatives, is not affirmable of the subject itself.115

115Ibid. ix. p. 114, a. 26-b. 5. δύστοιχα, πτώσεις, τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά â€” δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἑνὸς ὁποιουοῦν δειχθέντος τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συστοιχίαν ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἐπαινετοῦ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα δεδειγμένα γίνεται. â€” b. 23: ὧν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ποιητικὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ αὐτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὧν δὲ τὰ φθαρτικὰ ἀγαθά, αὐτὰ τῶν κακῶν.

19. Arguments may often be drawn, both for proof and for refutation, from matters Similar or Analogous to the subject or predicate of the thesis. Thus, if one and the same cognition comprehends many things, one and the same opinion will also comprehend many things. If to possess vision is to see, then also to possess audition is to hear. If to possess audition isnotto hear, then neither is to possess vision to see. The argument may be urged whether the resemblance is real or only generally supposed. Sometimes, however, the inference will not hold from one to many. Thus, if to know is to cogitate, then to know many things should be to cogitate many things. But this last is impossible. A man may know many things, but he cannot cogitate many things; therefore, to know isnotto cogitate.116

116Topic. II. x. p. 114, b. 25-36: πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, εἰ ὁμοίως ἔχει, â€” καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν δοκούντωνÂ· χρήσιμος δâ€™ ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἄμφωÂ· â€” σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐφâ€™ ἑνὸς καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ πολλῶν ὁμοίως ἔχειÂ· ἐνιαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ.

20. There are variouslocifor argument, arising from degrees of Comparison â€” more, less, equally. One is the argument from concomitant variations, which is available both for proof and for disproof. If to do injustice is evil, to do more injustice is more evil. If an increase in degree of the subject implies an increase in degree of the predicate, then the predicate is truly affirmed; if not, not. This may be shown by Induction, or repetition of particular instances.117Again, suppose the same predicate to be affirmable of two distinct subjects A and B, but to be more probably affirmable of A than of B. Then, if you can show that it doesnotbelong to A, you may argue (Ã fortiori) that it doesnotbelong to B; or, if you can show that it belongs to B, you may argue (Ã fortiori) that it belongs also to A. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting the same subject but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if you can disprove the more probable of the two, you may argue from thence in disproof of the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you may argue from thence in proof of the more probable. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting two distinct subjects but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if you can disprove the more probable you may argue from thence against the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you are furnished with an argumentin proof of the more probable.118If the degrees of probability, instead of being unequal, are equal or alike, you may still, in the cases mentioned, argue in like manner from proof or disproof of the one to proof or disproof of the other.119

117Ibid. b. 37-p. 115, a. 5: εἰσὶ δὲ τοῦ μᾶλλον τόποι τέσσαρες, εἷς μὲν εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον τῷ μᾶλλον, â€” χρήσιμος δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ὁ τόποςÂ· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐπιδόσει ἡ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐπίδοσις, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δῆλον ὅτι συμβέβηκεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐ συμβέβηκεν. τοῦτο δâ€™ ἐπαγωγῇ ληπτέον.

118Topic. II. x. p. 115, a. 5-14.

119Ibid. a. 15-24: ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἢ δοκεῖν ὑπάρχειν, &c.

21. Anotherlocusfor argument is, thatex adjuncto. If the subject, prior to adjunction of the attribute, be not white or good, and if adjunction of the attribute makes it white or good, then, you may argue that the adjunct must itself be white or good. And you might argue in like manner, if the subject prior to adjunction were to a certain extent white or good, but became more white or more good after such adjunction.120But thislocuswill not be found available for the negative inference or refutation. You cannot argue, because the adjunction does not make the subject white or good, that therefore the adjunct itself is not white or not good.121

120Ibid. xi. p. 115, a. 26-33.

121Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.

22. If the predicate be affirmable of the subject in greater or less degree, it must be affirmable of the subject simply and absolutely. Unless the subject be one that can be called white or good, you can never call it more white or more good. Thislocusagain, however, cannot be employed in the negative, for the purpose of refutation. Because the predicate cannot be affirmed of the subject in greater or less degree, you are not warranted in inferring that it cannot be affirmed of the subject at all. Sokrates cannot be called in greater or less degree a man; but you cannot thence infer that he is not called a man simply.122If the predicate can be denied of the subject simply and absolutely, it can be denied thereof with every sort of qualification: if it can be affirmed of the subject with qualification, it can also be affirmed thereof simply and absolutely, as a possible predicate.123This, however, when it comes to be explained, means only that it can be affirmed of some among the particulars called by the name of the subject. Aristotle recognizes that the same predicate may often be affirmed of the subjectsecundum quid, and denied of the subject simply and absolutely. In some places (as among the Triballi), it is honourable to sacrifice your father; simply and absolutely, it is not honourable. To one who is sick, it is advantageous to undergo medical treatment; speaking simply and absolutely (i.e., to persons generally in the ordinary state of health), it is not advantageous. It is only when you can truly affirm the proposition,without adding any qualifying words, that the proposition is true simply and absolutely.124

122Ibid. b. 3-10.

123Ibid. b. 11-35. εἰ γὰρ κατά τι ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐνδέχεται.

124Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 33: ὥστε ὃ ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἁπλῶς ῥηθήσεται.

Such are the chief among the thirty-sevenLociwhich Aristotle indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the predication is only of Accident â€” not of Genus, or Proprium, or Definition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal separately with one special branch of such theses, respectingExpetendaandFugienda: where the question put is, Of two or more distinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The cases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the two subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable, but where there is a tolerably near approximation of value between them, so as to warrant doubt and debate.125

125Ibid. III. i. p. 116, a. 1-12: Πότερον δâ€™ αἱρετώτερον ἢ βέλτιον δυεῖν ἢ πλειόνων, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. &c.

We must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently among the dialectical debates of Aristotleâ€™s contemporaries; so that he thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in the best manner.

1. Of two good subjects compared, that is better and more desirable which is the more lasting; or which is preferred by the wise and good man; or by the professional artist in his own craft; or by right law; or by the multitude, all or most of them. That is absolutely or simply better and more desirable, which is declared to be such by the better cognition; that is better to any given individual, which is declared to be better by his own cognition.126

126Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 13-22.

2. That is more desirable which is included in the genus good, than what is not so included; that which is desirable on its own account andper se, is better than what is desirable only on account of something else andper accidens; the cause of what is good in itself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by accident.127

127Ibid. a. 23-b. 7.

3. What is good absolutely and simply (i.e., to all and at all times) is better than what is good only for a special occasion or individual; thus, to be in good health is better than being cut for the stone. What is good by nature is better than what is good not by nature;e.g., justice (good by nature), than thejust individual, whose character must have been acquired.128What is good, or what is peculiarly appurtenant, to the more elevated of two subjects is better than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated. Good, having its place in the better, prior, and more exalted elements of any subject, is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative, secondary, and less exalted; thus, health, which has its seat in proper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of the body (wet, dry, hot, cold), is better than strength or beauty â€” strength residing in the bones and muscles, beauty in proper symmetry of the limbs.129Next, an end is superior to that which is means thereunto; and, in comparing two distinct means, that which is nearer to the end is the better. That which tends to secure the great end of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end; means to happiness is better than means to intelligence; also the possible end, to the impossible. Comparing one subject as means with another subject as end, we must examine whether the second end is more superior to the end produced by the first subject, than the end produced by the first subject is superior to the means or first subject itself. For example, in the two ends, happiness and health, if happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater proportion than health surpasses the means of health, then the means producing happiness is better than the end health.130

128Topic. III. i. p. 116, b. 7-12.

129Ibid. b. 12-22: καὶ τὸ ἐν βελτίοσιν ἢ προτέροις ἢ τιμιωτέροις βέλτιον, οἷον ὑγίεια ἰσχύος καὶ κάλλους. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὑγροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς, ἁπλῶς δâ€™ εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὧν πρώτων συνέστηκε τὸ ζῷον, τὰ δâ€™ ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροιςÂ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχὺς ἐν τοῖς νεύροις καὶ ὀστοῖς, τὸ δὲ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν τις συμμετρία δοκεῖ εἶναι.The reason given in thislocusfor superior estimation is a very curious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the definition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of the face.

The reason given in thislocusfor superior estimation is a very curious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the definition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of the face.

130Ibid. b. 22-36.

Again, that which is more beautiful, honourable, and praiseworthyper se, is better than what possesses these same attributes in equal degree but only on account of some other consequence. Thus, friendship is superior to wealth, justice to strength; for no one values wealth except for its consequences, whereas we esteem friendshipper se, even though no consequences ensue from it.131

131Ibid. b. 33-p. 117, a. 4.

Where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to the antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the consequents; and, according as these exhibit most ofgood or least of evil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which they respectively belong.132The larger lot of good things is preferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if cast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to another thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is notper segood, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice and courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with the absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or along with pain.133Everything is better, at the season when it tells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than in youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required, and therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is useful only now and then;e.g., justice and moderation, as compared with courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other would not be required;e.g., justice is better than courage, for, if every one were just, courage would not be required.134

132Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.

133Ibid. a. 16-25.

134Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.

Among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation or acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or the loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to theSummum Bonumor to that which is better than itself (unless indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of a caricature, as the ape is to man135); that which is the more conspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and peculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that which we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our friends, rather than to ordinary strangers (e.g., doing justice or conferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we prefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer seeming to do so136); that which we cannot obtain from others, as compared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally desirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have something else along with it; that of which the absenceis a ground of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;137that which does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the proprietor (to his mind rather than his body);138that which is eligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that which is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.139Acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are sometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life simply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes necessaries are more eligible, as,e.g., to a starving man. Speaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are better.140

135Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα εἴη ὅμοιον, καθάπερ ὁ πίθηκος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῦ ἵππου μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίουÂ· οὐ γὰρ κάλλιον ὁ πίθηκος, ὁμοιότερον δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

136Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. ἃ πρὸς τὸν φίλον πρᾶξαι μᾶλλον βουλόμεθα ἢ ἃ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα, ταῦτα αἱρετώτερα, οἷον τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ δοκεῖνÂ· τοὺς γὰρ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν βουλόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν,τοὺς δὲ τυχόντας ἀνάπαλιν.

137Topic. III. ii. p. 118, a. 16-26.

138Ibid. iii. p. 118, a. 29.

139Ibid. b. 20. The definition of this last condition is â€” that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that we possessed it: ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, τὸ μηδενὸς συνειδότος μὴ ἂν σπουδάσαι ὑπάρχειν.

140Ibid. p. 118, a. 6-14. οὐ γὰρ εἰ βελτίω, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ αἱρετώτεραÂ· τὸ γοῦν φιλοσοφεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλâ€™ οὐχ αἱρετώτερον τῷ ἐνδεεῖ τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τὸ δâ€™ ἐκ περιουσίας ἐστίν, ὅταν ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα τινὰ προσκατασκευάζηταί τις τῶν καλῶν. σχεδὸν δâ€™ ἴσως αἱρετώτερον τὸ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἐκ περιουσίας.

Among many otherloci, applicable to this same question of comparative excellence between two different subjects, one more will suffice here. You must distinguish the various ends in relation to which any given subject is declared to be eligible: the advantageous, the beautiful, the agreeable. That which conduces to all the three is more eligible than that which conduces to one or two of them only. If there be two subjects, both of them conducive to the same end among the three, you must examine which of them conduces to it most. Again, that which conduces to the better end (e.g., to virtue rather than to pleasure) is the more eligible. The like comparison may be applied to theFugiendaas well as to theExpetenda. That is most to be avoided which shuts us out most from the desirable acquisitions:e.g., sickness is more to be avoided than ungraceful form; for sickness shuts us out more completely both from virtue and from pleasure.141

141Ibid. iii. p. 118, b. 27-36.

The samelociwhich are available for the question of comparison will also be available in the question of positive eligibility or positive ineligibility.142Further, it holds for all cases of the kind that you should enunciate the argument in the most general terms that each case admits: in this way it will cover a greater number of particulars. Slight mutations of language will often here strengthen your case: that which is (good) by nature is more (good) than that which is (good) not by nature; that whichmakes the subject to which it is better than that which does not make the subject good.143

142Ibid. iv. p. 119, a. 1.

143Topic. III. v. p. 119, a. 12: ληπτέον δâ€™ ὅτι μάλιστα καθόλου τοὺς τόπους περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ μείζονοςÂ· ληφθέντες γὰρ οὕτως πρὸς πλείω χρήσιμοι ἂν εἴησαν.

Thelocijust enumerated are Universal, and applicable to the debate of theses propounded in universal terms; but they will also be applicable, if the thesis propounded be a Particular proposition.

If you prove the universal affirmative, you will at the same time prove the particular; if you prove the universal negative, you prove the particular negative also. The universallocifrom Opposites, from Conjugates, from Inflections, will be alike applicable to particular propositions. Thus, if we look at the universallocusfrom Contraries, If all pleasure is good, then all pain is evil, â€” this will apply also to the particular, If some pleasure is good, then some pain is evil: in the particular as in the universal form the proposition is alike anEndoxor conformable to common received opinion. The like may be said about thelocifromHabitusandPrivatio; also about those from Generation and Destruction;144again, from More, Less, and Equally â€” this last, however, with some restriction, for thelocusfrom Less will serve only for proving an affirmative. Thus, if some capacity is a less good than science, while yet some capacity is a good, then,Ã fortiori, some science is a good. But, if you take the samelocusin the negative and say that the capacity is a good, you will not be warranted in saying, for that reason, that no science is a good.145You may apply this samelocusfrom Less to compare, not merely two subjects in different genera, but also two subjects of different degrees under the same genus. Thus, let the thesis be, Some science or cognition is a good. You will disprove this thesis, if you can show that prudence (φρόνησις) is not a good; for, if prudence, which in common opinion is most confidently held to be a good, be really not so, you may argue that,Ã fortiorino other science can be so. Again, let the thesis be propounded with the assumption that, if it can be proved true or false in any one case, it shall be accepted as true or false in all universally (for example, that, if the human soul is immortal, all other souls are immortal also; or if not that, then none of the others): evidently, the propounder of such a thesis extends the particular into an universal.If he propounds his thesis affirmatively, you must try to prove the negative in some particular case; for this, under the conditions supposed, will be equivalent to proving an universal negative. If, on the other hand, he puts his thesis negatively, you will try to prove some particular affirmative; which (always under the given conditions) will carry the universal affirmative also.146

144Ibid. vi. p. 119, a. 32-b. 16. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνδοξον τὸ ἀξιῶσαι, εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ λύπην πᾶσαν εἶναι κακόν, τῷ εἴ τις ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ λύπην εἶναί τινα κακόν â€” ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὁμοίως τὸ ἔνδοξον.

145Ibid. b. 17-30. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατασκευάζειν μόνον ἐκ τοῦ ἧττον ἔστιν.

146Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 31-p. 120, a. 5.

Suppose the respondent to propound his thesis indefinitely, not carrying the indication either of universal or particular;e.g., Pleasure is good. This can be proved by showing either that all pleasure is good, or that some pleasure is good; while it can be refuted only through the universal negative â€” by showing that no pleasure is good.147But, if the thesis be divested of its indefinite character and propounded either as universal or as particular, there will then be two distinct ways of refuting it. If it be farther specialized â€”e.g., One pleasure only is good â€” there will be three ways of refuting: you may show either that all pleasures are good; or that no pleasure is good; or that more pleasures than one are good. If the proposition be specialized farther still â€”e.g., Prudence alone among all the virtues is science, â€” there are four lines of argument open for refuting it: you may prove either that all virtue is science; or that no virtue is science; or that some other virtue (such as justice) is science; or that prudence is not science.148

147Ibid. p. 120, a. 6-20: ἀδιορίστου μὲν οὖν ὄντος τοῦ προβλήματος μοναχῶς ἀνασκευάζειν ἐνδέχεται â€” ἀναιρεῖν μὲν μοναχῶς ἐνδέχεται, κατασκευάζειν δὲ διχῶς. &c.

148Ibid. a. 15-31.

In dealing with a particular proposition as thesis, still otherlocialready indicated for dealing with universal propositions will be available. You will run through the particulars comprised in the subject, distributed into genera and species. When you have produced a number of particulars successively to establish the universal, affirmative or negative, you are warranted in calling on the respondent either to admit the universal, or to produce on his side some adverse particular.149You will also (as was before recommended) distribute the predicate of the thesis into the various species which it comprehends. If no one of these species be truly affirmable of the subject, then neither can the genus be truly affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to be affirmative. If, on the contrary, any one of the species be truly affirmable of the subject, then the genus will also be truly affirmable; so that you will have refutedthe thesis, supposing it to be negative. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The soul is a number: you divide number into its two species, odd and even, and prove that the soul is neither odd nor even; wherefore, it is not a number.150

149Ibid. a. 32-38: ἄν τε γὰρ παντὶ φαίνηται ὑπάρχον ἄν τε μηδενί, πολλὰ προενέγκαντι ἀξιωτέον καθόλου ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ φέρειν ἔνστασιν ἐπὶ τίνος οὐχ οὕτως.

150Topic. III. vi. p. 120, a. 37-b. 6. It would appear from the examples here given by Aristotle â€” ὁ χρόνος οὐ κινεῖται, ὁ χρόνος οὔκ ἐστι κίνησις, ἡ ψυχὴ οὔκ ἐστιν ἀριθμός, that he considers these propositions as either indefinite or particular.

After this long catalogue ofLocibelonging to debate on propositions of Accident, Aristotle proceeds to enumerate those applicable to propositions of Genus and of Proprium. Neither Genus nor Proprium is often made subject of debate as such; but both of them are constituent elements of the debate respecting Definition, which is of frequent occurrence.151For that reason, both deserve to be studied.

151Ibid. IV. i. p. 120, b. 12: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐπισκεπτέονÂ· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα στοιχεῖα τῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὅρουςÂ· περὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ὀλιγάκις αἱ σκέψεις γίνονται τοῖς διαλεγομένοις.

When the thesis propounded affirms that A is genus of B, you will run over all the cognates of B, and see whether there is any one among them respecting which A cannot be affirmed as genus. If there be, this is a good argument against the thesis; for the genus ought to be predicable of all. Next, whether what is really no more than an accident is affirmed as genus, which ought to belong to the essence of the subject. Perhaps (e.g.) white is affirmed in the thesis as being genus of snow; but white cannot be truly so affirmed; for it is not of the essence of snow, but is only a quality or accident.152Examine whether the predicate A comes under the definition already given of an Accident, â€” that which may or may not be predicated of the subject; also, whether A and B both fall under the same one out of the ten Categories or Predicaments. If B the subject comes underEssentia, orQuale, orAd Aliquid, the predicate ought also to belong toEssentia, orQuale, orAd Aliquid: the species and the genus ought to come under the same Category.153If this be not the case in a thesis of Genus, the thesis cannot be maintained.

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