229Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 15-p. 134, a. 4. πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πάντως ἐνιστάμενον, πάντως ἀντιτακτέον ἐστίν. It appears to me that Aristotle is not entitled to treat this objection as sophistical (i.e.as unfair Dialectic). He is here considering predication as Proprium, contrasted with predication as Accident. What is true as an accident respectinghomo albus, will also be true as an accident respectinghomo: but what is true as a proprium respectinghomo albus, will not be true as a proprium respectinghomo— norvice versâ. This is a goodlocusfor objections in predication of Proprium. There is a real distinction betweenhomoandhomo albus; between Koriskus and Koriskusalbus: and one of the ways of elucidating that distinction is by pointing out that the proprium of one is not the same as the proprium of the other. Aristotle treats those who dwelt upon this distinction as Sophists: what their manner of noticing it may have been he does not clearly tell us; but if we are to have that logical accuracy of speech whichhisclassification and theory demand, this distinction must undoubtedly be brought to view among the rest.
229Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 15-p. 134, a. 4. πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πάντως ἐνιστάμενον, πάντως ἀντιτακτέον ἐστίν. It appears to me that Aristotle is not entitled to treat this objection as sophistical (i.e.as unfair Dialectic). He is here considering predication as Proprium, contrasted with predication as Accident. What is true as an accident respectinghomo albus, will also be true as an accident respectinghomo: but what is true as a proprium respectinghomo albus, will not be true as a proprium respectinghomo— norvice versâ. This is a goodlocusfor objections in predication of Proprium. There is a real distinction betweenhomoandhomo albus; between Koriskus and Koriskusalbus: and one of the ways of elucidating that distinction is by pointing out that the proprium of one is not the same as the proprium of the other. Aristotle treats those who dwelt upon this distinction as Sophists: what their manner of noticing it may have been he does not clearly tell us; but if we are to have that logical accuracy of speech whichhisclassification and theory demand, this distinction must undoubtedly be brought to view among the rest.
9. The respondent may perhaps intend to affirm as proprium something which by nature belongs to the subject; but he may err in his mode of stating it, and may predicate it as always belonging to the subject. Thus, he may predicate biped as a proprium always belonging to man. Under this mode of expression, you will be able to show that he is wrong; for there are some men who have not two feet. On the other hand, if the respondent denies biped to be a proprium of man, relying upon the statement that it is not actually true of every individual,you will be able to show against him that it is so in the correct phraseology of belonging to man by nature.230
230Topic. V. v. p. 131, a. 5-17. Thislocusis a question rather of phraseology than of real fact, and seems therefore rather to belong to the former class ofLocirespecting the Proprium — πότερον καλῶς ἢ οὐ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ ἴδιον — than to the present class, which Aristotle declares (V. iv. p. 132, a. 25) to relate to the question πότερον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ὅλως τὸεἰρημένονἢ οὐκ ἴδιον.
230Topic. V. v. p. 131, a. 5-17. Thislocusis a question rather of phraseology than of real fact, and seems therefore rather to belong to the former class ofLocirespecting the Proprium — πότερον καλῶς ἢ οὐ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ ἴδιον — than to the present class, which Aristotle declares (V. iv. p. 132, a. 25) to relate to the question πότερον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ὅλως τὸεἰρημένονἢ οὐκ ἴδιον.
10. That which is affirmed as a proprium may belong to its subject either primarily and immediately, or in a secondary way — relatively to some prior denomination of the same subject. In such cases it is difficult to set out the proprium in terms thoroughly unobjectionable. Thus, the superficies of a body is what isfirstcoloured: when we speak ofcorpus album, this is by reason of its white superficies.Albumis a proprium true both of body and of superficies; but the explanation usually given of Proprium will not hold here — that, wherever the predicate can be affirmed, the subject can be affirmed also.Albumis proprium of superficies; andalbumcan be truly affirmed as also proprium of body; but superficies cannot be truly affirmed of body.231
231Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 18-25. This is a very obscure and difficultlocus. I am not sure that I understand it.
231Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 18-25. This is a very obscure and difficultlocus. I am not sure that I understand it.
11. The respondent who is affirming a Proprium may sometimes err by not clearly distinguishing in what mode, and in respect to what precise subject, he intends to affirm it. There are ten different modes, in one or other of which he always proposes to affirm it:—232
a.As belonging to the subject by nature.E.g., Biped is by nature a proprium of man.
b.As belonging to the subject simply — in some way or other.E.g., To have four fingers, belongs to Koriskus or some other individual man.
c.As belonging to thespecies.E.g., It belongs to fire to be the most subtle of all bodies.
d.As belonging absolutely (ἁπλῶς, καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν) — in virtue of the essence of the subject —per se.233
e.As belonging to the subject by reason of some primary intervening aspect or attribute thereof.E.g., Prudence is a proprium of the soul, looked atquatenusreasonable or intellectual.
f.As belonging to that primary attribute or special aspect, logically distinguished and named separately from the subject.E.g., Prudence is a proprium of thelogistikonorrationale.
g.As belonging to the subject viewed as possessing or holding in possession.E.g., The scientific man possesses that acquired mental habit which renders him incapable of having his convictions farther altered by discussion.
h.As belonging to some possession held by a possessing person.E.g., Science is unalterable by discussion; where science, a possession of the scientific man, is assigned as subject of the proprium, unalterable by discussion.
i.As belonging to a subject which is partaken or held in participation by another subject lying behind.E.g., Sensible perception is a proprium of the genus animal which genus is partaken or held in participation by this individual man, that individual horse, &c.; whence it may be predicated not only of animal but also of man, as thus participant.
k.As belonging to the ultimate subject partaking.E.g., To live is a proprium of this particular man or horse, participant in the genus animal, in the way just indicated.
232Ibid. a. 26-b. 4: συμβαίνει δ’ ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ἰδίων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαί τινα ἁμαρτίαν παρὰ τὸ μὴ διορίζεσθαι πῶς καὶ τίνων τίθησι τὸ ἴδιον. ἅπαντες γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον, &c.He then proceeds to enumerate the ten diversities of Proprium which I have given in the text: this paragraph also is very obscure.I cannot but repeat the remark here (which I madesuprap. 318), that the contents of this paragraph also belong to the former investigation (viz., How ought the Proprium to be set out and described?) rather than to the present investigation (viz., Whether the alleged Proprium is really a Proprium of the assigned subject or not?).
232Ibid. a. 26-b. 4: συμβαίνει δ’ ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ἰδίων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαί τινα ἁμαρτίαν παρὰ τὸ μὴ διορίζεσθαι πῶς καὶ τίνων τίθησι τὸ ἴδιον. ἅπαντες γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον, &c.
He then proceeds to enumerate the ten diversities of Proprium which I have given in the text: this paragraph also is very obscure.
I cannot but repeat the remark here (which I madesuprap. 318), that the contents of this paragraph also belong to the former investigation (viz., How ought the Proprium to be set out and described?) rather than to the present investigation (viz., Whether the alleged Proprium is really a Proprium of the assigned subject or not?).
233Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 32: ἢ ἁπλῶς, καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν. Is not τὸ ζῆν included in theessentia(τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι) of ζῷον? If so, how can it be admitted as apropriumthereof?
233Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 32: ἢ ἁπλῶς, καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν. Is not τὸ ζῆν included in theessentia(τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι) of ζῷον? If so, how can it be admitted as apropriumthereof?
Now each of these varieties of the Proprium is liable to its own mode of erroneous setting out or description. Thus the corresponding errors will be:—234
a.Not to add the qualifying wordsby nature.
b.Not to state the proprium as simply belonging, when it does only belong to the subject now, and may presently cease to belong.
c.Not to state the proprium as belongingto the species. If he omits these words, he may be told that it belongs to one variety alone among the species (e.g., should it be a superlative) and not to others: perhaps it maybelong to some conspicuously, and to others faintly. Or perhaps, if he does add the express words —to the species, he may err, inasmuch as there exists no real species properly so called.
e.f.Not to distinguish whether he means to affirm it of B by reason of A, or of A directly: he will lay himself open to the objection that his proprium, and the subject term of which he declares it to be a proprium, are not co-extensive in predication.
g.h.Not to distinguish whether he intends as subject the person possessing, or the possession. If he leaves this undetermined, the objector may attack him on one ground or the other.
i.k.Not to distinguish whether he means as subject the partaker, or the genus which is partaken. Here too the objector will have ground for attack either from one side or from the other.
234Topic. V. v. p. 134, b. 5-p. 135, a. 5. For the fourth head (d.), no corresponding error is assigned. It should be noted that the illustration given of it, and remarked upon at the foot of the last page, is repeated for the concluding head of the list.
234Topic. V. v. p. 134, b. 5-p. 135, a. 5. For the fourth head (d.), no corresponding error is assigned. It should be noted that the illustration given of it, and remarked upon at the foot of the last page, is repeated for the concluding head of the list.
In case the respondent should enunciate his proprium in any one of the above defective ways, you will thus know where to find objections against him. But, if you undertake yourself to enunciate a proprium, you will avoid laying yourself open to the objections, by discriminating under which of these heads you intend to affirm it.235
235Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 5: ἄλλου μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἀποδιδόντος τὸ ἴδιον ἐπιχειρητέον, αὐτῷ δ’ οὐ δοτέον ἐστὶ ταύτην τὴν ἔνστασιν, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς τιθέμενον τὸ ἴδιον διοριστέον ὃν τρόπον τίθησι τὸ ἴδιον.
235Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 5: ἄλλου μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἀποδιδόντος τὸ ἴδιον ἐπιχειρητέον, αὐτῷ δ’ οὐ δοτέον ἐστὶ ταύτην τὴν ἔνστασιν, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς τιθέμενον τὸ ἴδιον διοριστέον ὃν τρόπον τίθησι τὸ ἴδιον.
12. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm as proprium a predicate really identical with the subject, though under a different name. Thus, he may declare to τὸ πρέπον to be a proprium τοῦ καλοῦ: you may then refute him by showing that πρέπον is identical with καλόν. If he is on the negative side, denying A to be a proprium of B on the ground that A is identical with B, you will make out the affirmative against him by showing that A is not identical with B, but only co-extensive and reciprocating therewith. Thus, you may show that animated substance is not identical with animal, but a proprium of animal.236
236Ibid. a. 11-19.
236Ibid. a. 11-19.
13. Where the subject ishomœomeric, the respondent may declare as proprium of the whole what cannot be truly affirmed as proprium of a part separately; or he may declare as proprium of a part separately what cannot be truly declared as proprium of the whole. In either case, you have a plausible argument for refuting him; but your refutation will not be always conclusive,because there are various cases in which what is true of each homœomeric part is not true of the whole; andvice versâ. If your position in the debate is affirmative, you will select as illustration some case in which what is by nature true of the whole is also true of each separate part:e.g., The earth as a whole, and each of its parts, tend by nature downwards. This is a proprium of the earth.237
237Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 20-b. 6.
237Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 20-b. 6.
14. RespectingOpposita, there are differentlocifor different varieties.
a.Contraria. — Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of B: you will examine whether the contrary of A is proprium of the contrary of B. If it be not, then neither is A proprium of B. Thus, if best is not a proprium of justice, neither can worst be a proprium of injustice. If the respondent is on the negative side, you may prove the affirmative against him by showing that the contrary of the alleged proprium is a proprium of the contrary of the alleged subject.238
238Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 7-16.
238Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 7-16.
b.Relata. — Suppose the respondent to affirm arelatumA as proprium of arelatumB, you may refute him by showing that the correlate of A is not proprium of the correlate of B. Suppose him to deny the same, you will refute him by proving the affirmative between correlate and correlate.239
239Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 17-26.
239Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 17-26.
c.Habitus et Privatio. — Suppose the respondent to affirm an attribute of thehabitusB, as proprium thereof: you may refute him by showing that the corresponding attribute of theprivatiocorrelating withhabitusB, is not proprium of thatprivatio. Suppose him to take the negative side, you will refute him by proving the affirmative of this latter proposition.240
240Ibid. b. 27-p. 136, a. 4.
240Ibid. b. 27-p. 136, a. 4.
15. Respecting Contradictory Propositions (affirmation and negation of the same), more than one mode of dealing may be stated. Wherever the affirmation is a proprium of the subject, the negation cannot also be a proprium thereof; andvice versâ. If the affirmative predicate be not a proprium of the affirmative subject, neither can the negative predicate be proprium of the negative subject; andvice versâ. If the affirmative predicate be proprium of the affirmative subject, the negative predicate will also be proprium of the negative subject. The same predicate cannot be proprium both of the affirmative subject and of the negative subject.241
241Ibid. p. 136, a. 5-b. 2. Thislocusis declared by Aristotle to furnish arguments for refutation only, and not for proof.
241Ibid. p. 136, a. 5-b. 2. Thislocusis declared by Aristotle to furnish arguments for refutation only, and not for proof.
16. Respecting two or more Contra-Specific Terms under thesame genus and exhausting the whole genus:— Suppose A and B contra-specific terms used as subjects; C and D contra-specific terms used as predicates. If C be not a proprium of A, neither will D be a proprium of B; thus, if perceivable (αἰσθητόν) is not a proprium of any other species (except gods) included under the genus animal, neither will intelligible (νοητόν) be proprium of a god. Again, if C be a proprium of A, D also will be a proprium of B. Thus, if it be a proprium of prudence to be by its own nature the excellence of the rational or calculating soul (λογιστικοῦ), we must also affirm as proprium of temperance that it is the excellence of the appetitive soul (ἐπιθυμητικοῦ).242
242Topic. V. vi. p. 136, b. 3-13. “Il faut supposer ici quatre termes, qui sont deux à deux les membres d’une division: si le premier n’est pas le propre du troisième, le second ne le sera pas du quatrième; et réciproquement pour la négation d’abord. Les quatre termes sont ici: sensible, intelligible, membres d’une même division: mortel, divinité, membres d’une autre division.� (Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p. 197.)
242Topic. V. vi. p. 136, b. 3-13. “Il faut supposer ici quatre termes, qui sont deux à deux les membres d’une division: si le premier n’est pas le propre du troisième, le second ne le sera pas du quatrième; et réciproquement pour la négation d’abord. Les quatre termes sont ici: sensible, intelligible, membres d’une même division: mortel, divinité, membres d’une autre division.� (Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p. 197.)
17. Respecting Cases or Inflections, either of the subject B, or the predicate A:— If the case or inflection of the predicate be not a proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject, neither will the predicate be proprium of the subject. If the case or inflection of the predicate be a proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject, then the predicate itself will also be proprium of the subject.Pulchréis not proprium ofjusté; therefore,pulchrumis not proprium ofjustum.
Thislocuswill be found available in combination with the precedinglocusbearing onOpposita. Not onlyoppositathemselves, but also the cases and inflections ofopposita, may be adduced as arguments, following the rules above laid down.243
243Topica, V. vii. p. 136, b. 15-32.
243Topica, V. vii. p. 136, b. 15-32.
18. Analogous cases or propositions:— If the respondent affirms A as proprium of B, you have an argument against him by showing that something analogous to A is not proprium of a subject analogous to B. Thus, the builder, in relation to house-making, is analogous to the physician, in relation to health-making; now health-making is not the proprium of the physician, and therefore neither is house-making the proprium of the builder. If the respondent has advanced a negative, you will apply this samelocusin the affirmative against him:e.g., as it is the proprium of the gymnast to impart a good habit of body, so it is the proprium of the physician to impart health.244
244Ibid. b. 33-p. 137, a. 7.
244Ibid. b. 33-p. 137, a. 7.
19.Esse, andGenerariorFieri:— If A considered asEnsis not the proprium of B considered asEns, then neither will A considered asFiensbe the proprium of B considered asFiens.Viceversâ, on the affirmative side: if the former of these two be the fact, you may argue that the latter is the fact also.245
245Topic. V. vii. p. 137, a. 21-b. 2.
245Topic. V. vii. p. 137, a. 21-b. 2.
20. Comparison with the Idea:— If the respondent sets up A as proprium of B, you will turn your mind to the Idea of B, and note whether A is proprium of this Idea, in the same sense and under the same aspect as it is affirmed to be proprium of B. If it be not so, you will have an argument in refutation of the respondent. Thus, if he maintains that it is a proprium of man to be at rest, you will argue that this cannot be so, because to be at rest is not the proprium of the Self-man (αὐτοάνθρωπος)quatenusman, butquatenusIdea.Vice versâ, you will have an affirmative argument, if you can show that it is the proprium of the Idea. Thus, since it is a proprium of the self-animalquatenusanimal to be composed of soul and body, you may infer that to be composed of soul and body is really a proprium of animal.246
246Ibid. b. 3-13.
246Ibid. b. 3-13.
21.Locusfrom More and Less:— Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of B: you will have an argument against him, if you can show that what is more A is not proprium of that which is more B. Thus, if to be more coloured is not proprium of that which is more body, neither is to be less coloured proprium of that which is less body; nor is to be coloured proprium of body simply.Vice versâ, if you can show that what is more A is proprium of what is more B, you will have an affirmative argument to establish that A is proprium of B. Thus, to perceive more is proprium of that which is more living. Hence, to perceive simply is proprium of that which is living simply; also, to perceive most, least, or less, is proprium of that which is most, least, or less living, respectively.247
247Ibid. viii. p. 137, b. 14-27.
247Ibid. viii. p. 137, b. 14-27.
If you can show that A simply is not proprium of B simply, you have an argument to establish that what is more or less A is not proprium of that which is more or less B. If, on the other land, you show the affirmative of the first, this will be an argument sustaining the affirmative of the last.248Perhaps you can show that what is more A is not proprium of what is more B: this will be an argument to show that A is not proprium of B. Thus, to perceive is more proprium of animal than to know is proprium of man; but to perceive is not proprium of animal; therefore, to know is not proprium of man. Or again, if you can show that what is less A is proprium of what is less B, this will form an argument to show that A is proprium of B. Thus, natural mansuetude is less proprium of man than life is propriumof animal; but natural mansuetudeisproprium of man: therefore life is proprium of animal.249Farther, if you can show that A is more a proprium of C than it is a proprium of B, yet nevertheless that it is not a proprium of C you may thence argue that A is not a proprium of B. Thus, to be coloured is more a proprium of superficies than it is a proprium of body; yet it is not a proprium of superficies; therefore, it isnota proprium of body. This last variety of thelocusof More and Less (Aristotle remarks) affords no corresponding affirmative plea;250for the same predicate cannot be a proprium of many subjects. If A be really a proprium of superficies, it cannot be also proprium of body. Lastly, you may perhaps be able to show that C is more a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B; yet, if C isnota proprium of B, you will infer negatively that neither is A proprium of B. Thus, to be perceivable is more proprium of animal, than to be divisible is proprium of animal; yet to be perceivable isnotproprium of animal, and, therefore, neither is to be divisible proprium of animal. You may invert this argument for the affirmative, if you can show that C is less a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B, yet still that Cisa proprium of B; hence you will infer,Ã fortiori, that A is a proprium thereof.E.g., If to perceive is less a proprium of animal than to live is a proprium thereof, yet to perceiveisa proprium of animal; then, to live is so likewise.251
248Ibid. b. 28-p. 138, a. 3.
248Ibid. b. 28-p. 138, a. 3.
249Topica, V. viii. p. 138, a. 4-12.
249Topica, V. viii. p. 138, a. 4-12.
250Ibid. p. 138, a. 13-20: κατασκευάζοντι δὲ ὁ τόπος οὗτος οὔκ ἐστι χρήσιμος· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸ πλειόνων ἴδιον εἶναι.
250Ibid. p. 138, a. 13-20: κατασκευάζοντι δὲ ὁ τόπος οὗτος οὔκ ἐστι χρήσιμος· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸ πλειόνων ἴδιον εἶναι.
251Ibid. a. 21-30.
251Ibid. a. 21-30.
22.Locusfrom Equal Relation:— Arguments both negative and affirmative may in like manner be obtained by comparing different things which are (not more or less propria, but) alike or equally propria of some other subject. If A is as much a proprium of B as C is proprium of D, while yet A isnota proprium of B, you may hence infer that C is not a proprium of D. If, under this hypothesis, Aisa proprium of B, you may infer affirmatively that C is a proprium of D.252Or, if A and C be, alike and equally, propria of the same subject B, then, if you show that A is not proprium thereof, you will infer negatively that C is not so; if you show that Aisproprium of B, you will infer affirmatively that C is so likewise. Or, thirdly, if A be, alike and equally, a proprium of B and of E, then, if you can show that A isnota proprium of E, you may infer negatively that it isnota proprium of B. Here, however, the counter-inference affirmatively is not allowable; for the same proprium cannot belong as proprium to two distinct subjects, as was stated before.253
252Ibid. a. 30-b. 15.
252Ibid. a. 30-b. 15.
253Ibid. b. 16-22.
253Ibid. b. 16-22.
23.Locusfrom Potentiality:— No potentiality whatever can belong toNon-Ens. Accordingly, if A, the proprium affirmed of a subject B, is a potentiality, this must imply some realEnsin which it inheres, and which is correlate to the subject. But, if in the specification of the proprium no allusion is made to such correlate, you will attack it as a bad proprium — as a potentiality inhering inNon-Ensor nothing.E.g., if the case be, It is a proprium of air to be respirable, you will refute this by pointing out that this is true only when there exist animals in whom the potentiality of breathing resides; that no mention is made by the respondent of this correlate or of any other correlate; in other words, that, so far as the specification is concerned, the correlate is passed over asNon-Ensor a non-entity. Therefore the proprium is not a good proprium.254Again, suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium ofEnsto be capable of doing or suffering something; this will be defensible because it is only when the subjectis Ens, that it is declared to have such proprium.255
254Topica, V. ix. p. 138, b. 27-37. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν τῇ δυνάμει μὲν ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἴδιονοἷον ἀναπνεῖσθαιἀναπνευστόν ἐστιν), ἀποδέδωκε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὃν τὸ ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος ζῴου, οἷον ἀναπνεῖν πέφυκε τὸν ἀέρα, ἐνδέχεται ἀέρα εἶναι· οὐ μέντοι μὴ ὄντος ζῴου δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀναπνεῖν· ὥστ’ οὐδ’ ἀέρος ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀναπνεῖσθαι,τότε ὅτεζῴον οὐκ ἔσται τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀναπνεῖν. οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν.Respirability(the proprium here discussed) being a relative term, Aristotle demands that the correlate thereof shall be named and included in setting out the proprium. If this be not done, a refutative argument may be drawn from such omission — that the respondent was not aware of the relativity. We may remark here that this objection is founded on a bad or incomplete specification of the proprium in question: it is not an objection against the reality of that proprium itself, if carefully described. The objection belongs to that class which Aristotle had discussed before, at the commencement of Book V.
254Topica, V. ix. p. 138, b. 27-37. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν τῇ δυνάμει μὲν ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἴδιονοἷον ἀναπνεῖσθαιἀναπνευστόν ἐστιν), ἀποδέδωκε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὃν τὸ ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος ζῴου, οἷον ἀναπνεῖν πέφυκε τὸν ἀέρα, ἐνδέχεται ἀέρα εἶναι· οὐ μέντοι μὴ ὄντος ζῴου δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀναπνεῖν· ὥστ’ οὐδ’ ἀέρος ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀναπνεῖσθαι,τότε ὅτεζῴον οὐκ ἔσται τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀναπνεῖν. οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν.
Respirability(the proprium here discussed) being a relative term, Aristotle demands that the correlate thereof shall be named and included in setting out the proprium. If this be not done, a refutative argument may be drawn from such omission — that the respondent was not aware of the relativity. We may remark here that this objection is founded on a bad or incomplete specification of the proprium in question: it is not an objection against the reality of that proprium itself, if carefully described. The objection belongs to that class which Aristotle had discussed before, at the commencement of Book V.
255Ibid. p. 139, a. 1-8.
255Ibid. p. 139, a. 1-8.
24.Locusfrom the Superlative:— Suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium of fire to be the lightest of all bodies: this you may refute by showing that, if fire ceased to exist, there would still be some other body the lightest of all bodies. Therefore the proprium may still be predicated of something else, when its alleged subject has ceased to exist. The proprium and its subject are not reciprocating and co-extensive; therefore it is not a true proprium.256
256Ibid. a. 9-20.
256Ibid. a. 9-20.
We now enter on the Sixth Book, containing theLocibearing on Definition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points on any of which the attack and defence may turn:—257
1. That which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true at all, even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be defined; or at least not true of everything that bears the name of the subject.
2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that genus to which it rightly and specially belongs.
3. The definition given may not be specially appropriate to the definiend (i.e., it may include, not only that but, other matters besides).
4. The definition, though unobjectionable on any of the above three grounds, may nevertheless not declare the Essence of the definiend.
5. Lastly, the definition may be good in substance, but badly expressed or set out.
257Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 24-35: τῆς δὲ περὶ τοὺς ὅρους πραγματείας μέρη πέντε ἐστίν.
257Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 24-35: τῆς δὲ περὶ τοὺς ὅρους πραγματείας μέρη πέντε ἐστίν.
As to the first of these five heads, theLocibearing thereupon have already been enumerated in the Third Book, on Accident: in accidental predications the question raised is always about the truth or falsehood of the predication.258As to the second and third of the five heads, these have been dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth Books, enumerating theLocion Genus and Proprium.259
258Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 36.
258Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 36.
259Ibid. b. 3.
259Ibid. b. 3.
There remain the fourth and fifth heads, on which we are about to enter: (1) Whether the definition is well expressed or set out (the fifth head); (2) Whether it has any right to be called a definition at all,i.e., whether it declares the Essence of the subject (the fourth).260The fifth is taken first, because to do a thing well is always more difficult than to do it simply, and is therefore likely to afford greater opening for argumentative attack.
260Ibid. b. 6.
260Ibid. b. 6.
The definition, while unobjectionable in substance, may be badly set out in two ways. First, it may be indistinct in terms — not plain nor clear. Next, it may be redundant: the terms may include more than is required for the definition. Under each of these defects of expression severallocimay be indicated.261
261Ibid. b. 12-18.
261Ibid. b. 12-18.
1. Indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in the definition. Or it may arise from the term to be defined being itself equivocal; while the definer, taking no notice of such equivocation, has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and the same definition. You may attack him either by denying that the definition as given covers all the different meanings of the definiend; or you may yourself distinguish (which the definer has omitted to do) these different meanings,and show that none of them or few of them are covered by the definition.262
262Topic. VI. ii. p. 139, b. 19. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ὁριζομένου πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου μὴ διελὼν εἶπεν· ἄδηλον γὰρ ὁποτέρου τὸν ὅρον ἀποδέδωκεν, ἐνδέχεταί τεσυκοφαντεῖνὡς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττοντος τοῦ λόγου ἐπὶ πάντα ὧν τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδέδωκεν.The term συκοφαντεῖν surprises us here, because the point under consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real mistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure whereby such mistake is exposed asmere cavil— συκοφαντία. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says that Aristotle intends to apply the term συκοφαντεῖν to the respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant who impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with this interpretation.
262Topic. VI. ii. p. 139, b. 19. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ὁριζομένου πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου μὴ διελὼν εἶπεν· ἄδηλον γὰρ ὁποτέρου τὸν ὅρον ἀποδέδωκεν, ἐνδέχεταί τεσυκοφαντεῖνὡς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττοντος τοῦ λόγου ἐπὶ πάντα ὧν τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδέδωκεν.
The term συκοφαντεῖν surprises us here, because the point under consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real mistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure whereby such mistake is exposed asmere cavil— συκοφαντία. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says that Aristotle intends to apply the term συκοφαντεῖν to the respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant who impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with this interpretation.
2. Indistinctness may arise from defining by means of a metaphor; but Aristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as though it wereproprio sensu.263He declares it to be wrong, but he seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a metaphor, without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate.