CHAPTER IV.1824.Bundoola—Retreat of Captain Noton—Defeat at Ramoo—Repulse of the Burmans—Burmese account of the War—Rangoon expedition—Description of Rangoon.
Bundoola—Retreat of Captain Noton—Defeat at Ramoo—Repulse of the Burmans—Burmese account of the War—Rangoon expedition—Description of Rangoon.
Maha Men-gyee Bundoola, the Burman general, was one of the best of the subjects of the monarch of Ava. He owed his proud position, not to the empty promoting system of a European court, but, like an adventurer in a brave and warlike country, he rose from the ranks, and, pioneer-like, cut away the overhanging branches between himself and his honourable goal. Such a change of fortune is not uncommon in Oriental countries; but it is uncommon to find little court favour at work in his elevation. He had fought and received honour and solid pudding, yet he had an end to expect, and the culminating point of his fame had now arrived, and cab-like, he would have to take care of the post at the corner. That post was the Anglo-Indian army, and he hazarded himself upon the chance of overthrowing it, with what success will afterwards be seen.
“It has been already noticed,” says Wilson,[269]“that a large Burman force had been assembled in Arakan, under the command of the chief military officer of the state of Ava, Maha Men-gyee Bundoola, an officer who enjoyed a high reputation, and the entire confidence of the court, and who had been one of the most strenuous advisers of the war; in the full confidence that it would add a vast accession of power to his country, and glory to himself. His head-quarters were established at Arakan, where, probably, from ten to twelve thousand Burmans were assembled. Early in May, a division of this force crossed the Naf, and advanced to Rutnapullung, about fourteen miles south from Ramoo, where they took uptheir position, and gradually concentrated their force to the extent of about eight thousand men, under the command of the four rajas of Arakan, Ramree, Sandaway, and Cheduba, assisted by four of the inferior members of the royal council, or atwenwoons, and acting under the orders of Bundoola, who remained at Arakan.
“Upon information being received of the Burmans having appeared, advancing upon Rutnapullung, Captain Noton moved from Ramoo with the whole of his disposable force, to ascertain the strength and objects of the enemy. On arriving near their position, upon some hills on the left of the road, in which the Burmans had stockaded themselves, they opened a smart fire upon the detachment, which, however, cleared the hills, and formed upon a plain beyond them. In consequence, however, of the mismanagement of the elephant-drivers, and the want of artillery details, the guns accompanying the division could not be brought into action; and as without them it was not possible to make any impression on the enemy, Captain Noton judged it prudent to return to his station at Ramoo, where he was joined by three companies of the 40th native infantry, making his whole force about one thousand strong, of whom less than half were regulars. With these, Captain Noton determined to await at Ramoo the approach of the Burmans, until the arrival of reinforcements from Chittagong.”
In this the captain was most decidedly wrong. It was not only injudicious to retreat before the barbarian Burmans, but it was reprehensible on his part to give them so much encouragement and breathing-time. The Burmans always looked upon the English as “wild foreigners,” and despised them on account of their creeping, sneaking policy. The first impression made on their minds by the unresented massacre of Negrais was not forgotten; and the mission of Alves, Symes, Cox, and Canning, with their undecided, un-English measures, had added to form the contempt with which they had learnt to regard the Anglo-Indian government into a tangible shape. These considerations, joined with the natural arrogance of a semi-civilised race, with the advantage of a victorious general, with the indecision of a British officer, all tended to prepare the Burmese for the victory which was soon to grace their arms. But, in recounting the events at Ramoo, it must ever be remembered, that the day was lost ratherby British indecision, than gained by Burman valour. Indeed, up to this time, it is remarkable to what extent snail policy had obtained among the Indian authorities; and how, partly from want of accurate information, partly from this mean and truckling spirit, the Anglo-Indian government had lost consequence in the eyes of the king of Ava. Undoubtedly, the overcharged work of Colonel Symes had led to an incorrect estimate of the resources of the country; it is well, however, that I shall hardly have occasion to return to this, for soon I shall have to record—welcome task!—the daring scheme of Lord Amherst’s administration, and its successful, though less fortunate, accomplishment, by Sir Archibald Campbell. To continue the narrative in the words of the Professor:[270]—
“On the morning of the 13th of May, the enemy advanced from the south, and occupied, as they arrived, the hills east of Ramoo, being separated from the British force by the Ramoo river. On the evening of the 14th, they made a demonstration of crossing the river, but were prevented by the fire from the two six-pounders with the detachment. On the morning of the 15th, however, they effected their purpose, and crossed the river upon the left of the detachment, when they advanced, and took possession of a tank; surrounded, as usual, with tanks in this situation, by a high embankment, which protected them from the fire of their opponents.” However, the captain, who saw the necessity of action, soon took up a favourable position, and “a sharp fire was kept up on the Burmans as they crossed the plain to the tank; but they availed themselves with such dexterity of every kind of cover, and so expeditiously entrenched themselves, that it was much less effective than was to have been expected.” Honour is certainly due to the officers and men so perilously situated; and it gives us satisfactory proof that Captain Noton’s previous retreat was not caused by want of courage, but by an indecision, as unaccountable as it was finally disastrous.
The Professor proceeds:—“On the morning of the 17th, the enemy’s trenches were advanced within twelve paces of the picquets, and a heavy and destructive fire was kept up by them. At about nineA.M., the provincials and Muglevy abandoned the tank entrusted to theirdefence, and it was immediately occupied by the enemy. The position being now untenable, a retreat was ordered, and effected with some regularity for a short distance. The increasing numbers and audacity of the pursuers, and the activity of a small body of horse attached to their force, by whom the men that fell off from the main body were instantly cut to pieces, filled the troops with an ungovernable panic, which rendered the exertions of their officers to preserve order unavailing. These efforts, however, were persisted in until the arrival of the party at a rivulet, when the detachment dispersed; and the siphahis, throwing away their arms and accoutrements, plunged promiscuously into the water. In the retreat, Captains Noton, Trueman, and Pringle, Lieutenant Grigg, Ensign Bennet, and Assistant-surgeon Maysmore, were killed. The other officers engaged, Lieutenants Scott, Campbell, and Codrington, made their escape; but the two former were wounded: the loss in men was not ascertained, as many of them found their way, after some interval and in small numbers, to Chittagong: according to official returns, between six hundred and eight hundred had reached Chittagong by the 23rd of May; so that the whole loss, in killed and taken, did not exceed, probably, two hundred and fifty.”[271]This was, however, enough to arouse the slumbering ire in British hearts. Colonels Shapland and James speedily revenged the death of the captain, whose imprudence had cost him so much, and whose courage and endurance had availed him so little; soon the Burmese lost their temporary advantage, and never were they to regain it. At the end of July the enemy fled from all their positions on the Naf.
The campaign was also speedily terminated in the provinces of Cachar, and the Burmese were much weakened in all their attempts upon the Anglo-Indian army.
“We have thus terminated the first period of the system of defensive operations,” observes the Professor, “and shall now proceed to the more important enterprises of an offensive war, to which those we have noticed were wholly subordinate. The results of the operations described were of a mixed description, but such as to leave no question of the issue of the contest. In Asam a considerable advance had been made. In Kachar, also, a forward positionhad been maintained; although the nature of the country, the state of the weather, and the insufficiency of the force, prevented the campaign from closing with the success with which it had begun. The disaster at Ramoo, although it might have been avoided, perhaps, by a more decided conduct on the part of the officer commanding, and would certainly have been prevented by greater promptitude than was shown on the despatch of the expected reinforcements, reflected no imputation upon the courage of the regular troops, and, except in the serious loss of life, was wholly destitute of any important consequences. In all these situations the Burmas had displayed neither personal intrepidity nor military skill. Their whole system of warfare resolved itself into a series of intrenchments, which they threw up with great readiness and ingenuity. Behind these defences, they sometimes displayed considerable steadiness and courage; but as they studiously avoided individual exposure, they were but little formidable in the field as soldiers. Neither was much to be apprehended from the generalship that suffered the victory of Ramoo to pass away, without making the slightest demonstration of a purpose to improve a crisis of such splendid promises, and which restricted the fruits of a battle gained to the construction of a stockade.”[272]
There is certainly nothing which better shows the little real self-reliance possessed by the Burmese than the idle manner in which they neglected to pursue an advantage. One thing must, however, be always borne in mind, that up to this time they had always been engaged with energies whose fate might be decided by a single skirmish, or one complete rout. They had yet to learn how persevering the efforts of a civilised state are in war. They had now indeed met their masters, and were about to feel their inferiority; for the Indian government at Calcutta were already carrying out an excellent and well-conceived idea, the history of the progress of which it is now my office to relate. But first, it were not inapposite to listen to the following account of the Burmese war by the Burmese themselves; it will afford some amusement, though its strict truth cannot fail to be somewhat doubted. “In the years 1186 and 1187,” according tothe Royal Historiographer, “the Kula-pyee, or white strangers of the West, fastened a quarrel upon the Lord of the Golden Palace. They landed at Rangoon, took that place at Prome, and were permitted to advance as far as Yandabo; for the king, from motives of piety and regard to life, made no effort whatever to oppose them. The strangers had spent vast sums of money in their enterprise; and by the time they reached Yandabo, their resources were exhausted, and they were in great distress. They petitioned the king, who, in his clemency and generosity, sent them large sums of money to pay their expenses back, and ordered them out of the country.”[273]
Ere I proceed to give the English account, I think it right to let the Burmans speak for themselves; and therefore I have placed this before the serious history, just as, at Richardson’s, a comic song, by way of abonne bouche, is placed before the deep tragedy, “Just a-goin’ to begin.”
Some little time before the operations in Cachar were brought to a temporary close, Lord Amherst conceived the idea of diverting the attention of the Burmese from our possessions to their own, and of turning what had hitherto been a defensive war, on the part of the English, into an offensive one. Accordingly, after a formal declaration of war, and the promulgation of an address containing the details of the origin of the quarrel, the court commenced active preparations for an expedition into the enemy’s territory. The idea was a good one, and it was nobly pursued; yet, though it was successful in its ultimate object, it unfortunately cost the government more than its proceeds in land can possibly repay for many years. The military resources of the Burmese were infinitely over-estimated, while the facilities for obtaining food and proper housing for the troops were also totally unknown, except from the work of Symes, who evidently caused the whole mischief, as far as the inadequate outfit was concerned. The consequences of his hasty views ought to be a warning to all travellers in countries so little known as Burmah was then, and, indeed, in many points is now. Symes sacrificed truth for the sake of making an agreeable and amusing book, which it is to be hoped no one else will do.
“The British government was driven into that war by the insolence and aggressions of the court of Ava, intoxicated with the uninterrupted success which had attended all its schemes of aggrandisement from the days of Alompra. The most ambitious of our governors-general had entertained no views of conquest in that quarter. Lord Hastings had anxiously staved off the contest, at the close of his administration, by a political artifice. But Lord Amherst, the most moderate and pacific, was compelled to add vast provinces, covered for the most part with trackless forests, miserably under-peopled, unhealthy, and far beyond our natural boundaries, to our already enormous empire. In this case there was everything to dissuade from appropriation. It was known that the climate of one of the provinces was equally deadly to our European and our native troops; it was known that many years must elapse before any of them could support their own indispensable establishments; but there was no escape. It was absolutely necessary to interpose sufficient barriers between our peaceable subjects, on a frontier where it was impossible to maintain large military establishments, and their barbarous neighbours; to provide places of refuge for the reluctant tributaries, or half-conquered subjects of the Burmese, from whom we had received cordial assistance during the war; and, not less, to inflict upon Ava a chastisement, the smart of which might protect us from future encroachment and annoyance.”[274]
The plan to be pursued in this campaign was to be as follows:—Rangoon, the great trading city, was to be the point assailed in the first instance. This place had its advantages as being the principal maritime (if it may so be called) place in the Burmese dominions; it was also remote from the scene of war, that is, not remote enough to admit of the army remaining where it was in Arakhan, and a fresh levy being made for the defence of the coast: the harbour was likewise good; and there the advantages ceased. These manifest good qualities, in the eyes of the attacking army, were counterbalanced by the extreme unhealthiness of the place, the difficulty of obtaining food there; a disadvantage, however, with which the Indian authorities were not acquainted; and the additionalnuisance of the Irawadi not being navigable at the time of the year selected for the expedition. Upon the acquirement of Rangoon, the movements of the army were to depend very much upon circumstances, but an advance was to be attempted in any case. The soldiers for the enterprise were to be levied both in the presidency of Bengal and in that of Madras; and the forces were to unite in the harbour of Port Cornwallis, at the Great Andaman Island, whence the whole squadron was to proceed to Rangoon, under the general command of Sir Archibald Campbell.
The observations of an able historian will prove of no little interest:—“The difficulty of collecting a sufficient force for a maritime expedition from Bengal, owing to the repugnance which the saphahis entertain to embarking on board vessels, where their prejudices expose them to many real privations, had early led to a communication with the presidency of Fort Saint George, where there existed no domestic call for a large force, and where the native troops were ready to undertake the voyage without reluctance. The views of the Supreme Government were promptly met by Sir Thomas Munro, the governor of Madras, and a considerable force was speedily equipped. The like activity pervaded the measures of the Bengal authorities, and by the beginning of April the whole was ready for sea.
“The period of the year at which this expedition was fitted out was recommended by various considerations of local or political weight. Agreeably to the information of all nautical men, a more favourable season for navigating the coast to the eastward could not be selected; and from the account given by those who had visited Ava, it appeared that the expedition, upon arriving at Rangoon, would be able to proceed into the interior without delay; the rising of the river, and the prevalence of a southeasterly wind, rendering June or July the most eligible months for an enterprise, which could only be effected by water conveyance, by which it was asserted that a sufficient force might be conveyed to Amarapura, the capital, in the course of a month or five weeks. That no time should be lost in compelling the Burmas to act upon the defensive was also apparent; as, by the extent of their preparations in Arakan, Asam, and Kachar, they were evidently manifesting a design, to invade the frontier witha force that would require the concentration of a large body of troops for the protection of the British provinces, in situations where mountains, streams, and forests, could not fail to exercise a destructive influence upon the physical energies of the officers and men, and would necessarily prevent the full development of the military resources of the state. To have remained throughout the rains, therefore, wholly on the defensive, would have been attended, it was thought, with a greater expense, and, under ordinary circumstances, with a greater sacrifice of lives than an aggressive movement, as well as with some compromise of national reputation. The armament, therefore, was equipped at once, and was not slow in realizing some of the chief advantages expected from its operations.”[275]
The Bengal contingent amounted in all to 2,175 men, consisting of two regiments, the second battalion of the 20th (now 40th) native infantry, and two companies of artillery; that of Madras was much greater, and amounted to 9,300 men, making together the somewhat formidable number of 11,475 men, of whom nearly 5,000 were Europeans. In addition to the transports, there was a Bengal flotilla of twenty gun-brigs and rowing-boats, each carrying an eighteen-pounder. The ships in attendance were H.M.’s sloopsLarne, Captain Marryatt, andSophia, Captain Reeves; some Company’s cruisers, and theDianasteam-boat. In the Madras division were comprised H.M.’s shipLiffey, Commodore Grant; theSlaneysloop of war, and a number of transports and other vessels. Most of these arrived at Port Cornwallis about the 4th of May, and the next day the whole fleet set sail for Rangoon, and arrived off the mouth of that river on the 9th, and anchored within the bar on the following morning; the vessels then proceeded with the flood to the town of Rangoon, situated at about twenty-eight miles from the sea, and thus ably described by a visitor.
“Built on the left bank of the river, by the great Alompra, in commemoration of his victories, Yangoon, or Rangoon, offers but a very poor sample of Burman opulence. Its shape is oval, and round the town is a wooden stockade, formed of teak piles, driven a fewfeet into the ground, and in some places twenty feet high. The tops of these are joined by beams transversely placed, and at every four feet is an embrasure on the summit of the walls, which gives it a good deal the appearance of an ancient fortification. A wet ditch protects the town on three sides, the other is on the bank of the river.
“The interior consists of four principal streets, intersecting each at right angles, on the sides of which are ranged, with a tolerable degree of regularity, the huts of the inhabitants. These are solely built with mats and bamboos, not a nail being employed in their formation: they are raised invariably two or three feet from the ground, or rather swamp, in which Rangoon is situated, thereby allowing a free passage for the water with which the town is inundated after a shower, and at the same time affording shelter to fowls, ducks, pigs, and pariah dogs, an assemblage which, added to the inmates of the house, place it on a par with an Irish hovel. The few brick houses to be seen are the property of foreigners, who are not restricted in the choice of materials for building, whereas the Burmans are, on the supposition that were they to build brick houses, they might become points of resistance against the government. But even these buildings are erected so very badly, that they have more the appearance of prisons than habitations. Strong iron bars usurp the place of windows, and the only communication between the upper and lower stories is by means of wooden steps placed outside. Only two wooden houses existed much superior to the rest, and these were the palace of the Maywoon, and the Rondaye, or Hall of Justice. The former of these, an old dilapidated building, would have been discreditable as a barn in England, and the latter was as bad.... Two miles north of Rangoon, on the highest point of a low range of hills, stands the stupendous pagoda, called the Shoe Dagon Prah, or Golden Dagon.... It is encircled by two brick terraces, one above the other; and on the summit rises the splendid pagoda, covered with gilding, and dazzling the eyes by the reflection of the rays of the sun. The ascent to the upper terrace is by a flight of stone steps, protected from the weather by an ornamented roof. The sides are defended by a balustrade, representing a huge crocodile, the jaws of which are supported by two colossal figures of amale and female Pulloo, or evil genius, who, with clubs in their hands, are emblematically supposed to be guarding the entrance of the temple. On the steps the Burmans had placed two guns, to enfilade the road; and, when I first saw this spot, two British soldiers were mounting guard over them, and gave an indescribable interest to the scene: it seemed so extraordinary to view our arms thus domineering amidst all the emblems and idols of idolatry, that, by a stretch of fancy, I could almost suppose I saw the green monsters viewing with anger and humiliation the profanation of their sanctuaries.
“After ascending the steps, which are very dark, you suddenly pass through a small gate, and emerge into the upper terrace, where the great pagoda, at about fifty yards’ distance, rears its lofty head in perfect splendour. This immense octagonal gilt-based monument is surrounded by a vast number of smaller pagodas, griffins, sphinxes, and images of the Burman deities. The height of the tee,[276]three hundred and thirty-six feet from the terrace, and the elegance with which this enormous mass is built, combine to render it one of the grandest and most curious sights a stranger can notice. From the base it assumes the form of a ball or dome, and then gracefully tapers to a point of considerable height, the summit of which is surmounted by a tee, or umbrella, of open iron-work, from whence are suspended a number of small bells, which are set in motion by the slightest breeze, and produce a confused though not unpleasant sound. The pagoda is quite solid, and has been increased to its present bulk by repeated coverings of brick, the work of different kings, who, in pursuance of the national superstitions, imagined that, by so doing, they were performing meritorious acts of devotion.... Facing each of the cardinal points, and united with the pagoda, are small temples of carved wood, filled with colossal images of Gaudma. The eastern temple—or, as we call it, the golden—is a very pretty edifice. The style of building a good deal resembles the Chinese; it is three stories high, and is surmounted by a small spire, bearing a tee; the cornices are covered in the most beautiful manner, and with a variety and neatness of conception scarcely to be surpassed; and the whole is supported by a number of giltpillars.... Round the foot of the pagoda are ranged innumerable small stone pillars, intended to support lamps on days of rejoicing; and in their vicinity are large stone and wooden vases, meant for the purpose of receiving the rice and other offerings made by the pious.”[277]
Such is Rangoon and its great temple, and the reader will feel, as Major Snodgrass says, that after “we had been so much accustomed to hear Rangoon spoken of as a place of great trade and commercial importance, that we could not fail to feel disappointed at its mean and poor appearance. We had talked,” continues the gallant author, “of its custom-house, its dock-yards, and its harbour, until our imaginations led us to anticipate, if not splendour, at least some visible signs of a flourishing commercial city; but however humble our expectations might have been, they must still have fallen short of the miserable and desolate picture which the place presented when first occupied by the British troops.”[278]
An unpardonable piece of Vandalism was attempted by the English, during their stay at this place. In the temple there was and is a great bell, famous for its inscription, and this bell the English endeavoured to ship for Calcutta; however, they were frustrated by the heeling over of the boat in which it was being conveyed to the ship; the bell sunk to the bottom, but was subsequently raised and replaced. There is no extenuation for such a wanton violation of any place of worship; and though it may be excusable, and indeed proper, to preserve works of ancient art in museums, yet it was grossly wrong to take advantage of a victory, to shock the religious feelings of a people, however far from the truth they may be according to Christian ideas. The action was as reprehensible as the stealing system of that most miserable of all mean pretenders, Napoleon; indeed, it was more so, for the bell was not even an ornament.