CHAPTER VIII.1825-1826.Arrival at Prome—Prome under English rule—Re-assembly of the Burmese armies—Negotiations for peace—Battle of Meaday—Melloon—Yandabo—Treaty of peace.
Arrival at Prome—Prome under English rule—Re-assembly of the Burmese armies—Negotiations for peace—Battle of Meaday—Melloon—Yandabo—Treaty of peace.
The general did not tarry long at Donabew, but pushed forward toward Prome, where the rainy season was to be passed. On his way to that place, he was joined at Tharawa by McCreagh’s reserve column from Rangoon, and the united forces pushed forward for Prome. The charm was now broken, and as the British lines advanced, the prince of Tharawadi, at the head of the opposing army, fell back, and, though strong in numbers, offered no resistance to the progress of the Anglo-Indian army. Prome was reached by the 25th of April, and taken without one round of firing. The indecisive conduct of the prince seems to have arisen partly from a wish to negotiate a peace, which was attempted at Turriss Miu, a few miles below Prome. A native soldier came to the camp with a letter from two of the Atwenwoons, proposing an accommodation; but Sir A. Campbell replied, that at all events he should advance to Prome: and though another letter was received from the Atwenwoons, he continued in his resolve. Luckily for him, he arrived in time to save the place from being stripped of all the necessaries of life, in the same manner as the towns he had before passed had been served. On hearing of the arrival of Campbell, Prince Tharawadi left for Ava, to insist upon a peace being concluded.
The British had only just arrived in time to stand the change of the seasons in this place,—a more favourable spot than the lower country for that purpose. Previous to the setting in of the rainy season, the thermometer had risen in the shade to 110°, but the nights were still cool, and the climate was not unhealthy. The monsoon brought its ordinary effects upon the condition of theEuropean troops, who, though suffering much less severely than at Rangoon, lost almost one-seventh of their number between June and October; the native troops were much more exempt, although not wholly free, from disease. Although the level of the country was higher than in the coast districts, yet the site of the town was so low as to be under water at the rise of the river, and to the east extended for many miles a plain laid out principally in rice-cultivation; south of the town was a range of low hills, crowned by the principal pagodas, and thither some of the troops were removed, when the suburbs in which they had been quartered were found liable to sudden inundations; supplies were in some abundance, and there was comparatively little demand for the active services of the force; it seems probable, therefore, that much of the disease that still prevailed was the consequence of previous exposure and exhaustion, although ascribable in some measure to the effects of climate and of ill-selected quarters for the troops.[311]
It were almost beyond the limits of this volume to enlarge upon the prosperous state of Prome under British rule, and Mr. Mac Farlane’s able sketch will compensate in every way for my own shortcomings. In speaking of an excursion made by Colonel Graham, partly for forage, and partly to calm the fears of the natives themselves, the historian of India continues:[312]—“Almost immediately after their return, the persecuted and dislodged inhabitants of the town poured in from every quarter, some from the woods, bringing their families, their cattle, their waggons, and other property; and some escaped from the military escorts and disjointed corps of the king’s fugitive army. Food and covering were given to the starving and naked; and those who had houses and property were secured in the possession of them. Our British soldiers assisted them in rebuilding their wooden houses and their bamboo huts, and in a very short time Prome had risen from its ashes, a greater town than it had been before the war. As the people were punctually paid for whatever they brought, plentiful bazaars were soon established, and our soldiers lived in comfort and abundance, and unmolested ease; while the ill-conducted armies of the king of Ava, unpaid, unsupplied, and driven up the country, were left to thealternative of starvation or dispersion. The towns and districts in our rear followed the example of the provincial capital, and the banks of the Irawadi below Prome were soon enlivened by the presence of a contented people. An excellent depôt was soon formed at Prome, with supplies sufficient not only for the rainy season, but for the long campaign which possibly might follow. The plains which our soldiers had traversed on their advance up the country without seeing a single bullock were again covered with numerous herds; from every pathway of the deep and extensive forests, which cover far more than half of the country, droves of the finest oxen—the oxen of Pegu —now issued daily. The menthagoes, or hereditary headmen of the districts and chief towns, tendered their allegiance, and were restored to their municipal functions by the British generals. A state of desolation and anarchy once more gave way to order and plenty; and from Rangoon to Prome, from Bassein to Martaban, all classes of natives not only contributed their aid in collecting such supplies as the country afforded, but readily lent their services in facilitating the equipment and movement of military detachments.[313]The only anxiety which the people seemed to find was, that the English would leave them, and give them back to their old masters.”
It was now the rainy season, and the operations of both parties were, to a certain extent, suspended. Little was done by the British, and the Burmese made no preparations against any hostile aggression on our part. The only event that at all did away with the tedium of the period was the discomfiture of the Thekia Wungyee at Old Pegu, where the Taliens, who trusted (a sad reliance, as it afterwards was found) in the British assistance towards the hoped-for object of the recovery of their independence, rose, and seized as many of the officers of his detachment as they could secure; one chief of importance was amongst them,—the Thekia Wungyee himself escaping. Their prize they brought to Rangoon, and delivered to Brigadier Smith.
The successes of the British naturally created the utmost dismay at the metropolis; but the native arroganceof the people, so common in a semi-civilised race, soon caused the usual lofty tone to be assumed, and generals stepped forward, willing to risk a combat with the British army, or pay the hard penalty that awaited an unsuccessful commander. This man was the Pagahm Wungyee, a chief of no little consequence and considerable vanity. A leader found, it was necessary to get an army,—a far more difficult task. It may easily be conceived, that the forces levied in a hasty manner, and without any attention as to their courage, could not be very formidable; and so, indeed, it proved onreconnoissance.
But war costs money, as Sir A. Campbell found, and he was now fully sensible of the fact, that little was to be regained from the enemy. Therefore, he gave the Burmese government another opportunity of coming to a peaceful conclusion, by means of a letter addressed to the prince of Tharawadi, and borne by a servant of that person, who had come under English protection to Prome. However, it was totally unavailing; no answer was received, and therefore the hostile preparations of the king of Ava were continued; and to facilitate these, the commander-in-chief went down to Rangoon in theDiana, and did not return till the 2nd of August. It was satisfactory to find that, in the lower provinces, “a state of desolation and anarchy once more gave way to order and plenty; and from Bassein to Martaban, and Rangoon to Prome, every class of natives not only contributed their aid to collect such supplies as the country could afford, but readily lent their services to the equipment and march of military detachments.”[314]
Soon after, intelligence was received of the approach of the mighty armament of Burmah, amounting to 40,000 men (so it was said), under the command of Memia-Bo, a brother of the king himself. There were also 12,000 at Tongho, under the prince of Tongho. General Cotton was sent to reconnoitre their force, which he discovered at Meaday, on the 15th, on the west bank of the river. Our forces, it may be observed, amounted to but 3,000 men, though 2,000 more were daily expected. The preparations at Meaday were very energetic, and the force amounted to 16,000 men, at the lowest estimate.
At this juncture, a letter of Sir A. Campbell took effecton the Burmese, and on the 6th September, a boat arrived at Prome, with a flag of truce, and two commissioners presented a reply from the general of the Burmese army. Accounts differ as to the terms of the letter, but Wilson is decidedly the best authority; and according to him, the letter was proud and unconciliating, yet a wish was expressed in it for a lasting peace. “Sir Archibald Campbell lost no time in sending two British officers to Meaday, to offer an armistice, and to propose a meeting of commissioners from the two armies. The Burmese prime minister tried hard to delay the meeting. It was found necessary to allow a delay of nearly two weeks, the Wongees protesting that they must wait until full powers arrived from their court. The Keewongee, or prime minister, agreed to be one of the commissioners, and it was finally settled that the meeting should take place at a spot midway between the two armies, and that each party should be accompanied by 600 men, the rank of the Keewongee not permitting him to move with a smaller escort.”[315]
It seemed, however, impossible to come to any determination with this uncivilised, changeable race. On discussing matters, on our demanding compensation, there was much hesitation, and, at last, when the armistice was on the point of expiring, the Wungyee sent these words to Sir A. Campbell:—
“If you wish for peace, you may go away; but if you ask either for money or territory, no friendship can exist between us. This is Burmese custom.”
It is, indeed, Burmese custom! Nothing is to be obtained from them without force; not that they do not feel the demand just, but because they will hold doggedly to what they can get, though it benefit them not, nay, even if it be hurtful.
“The court of Ava,” observes Wilson, “indignant at the idea of conceding an inch of territory, or submitting to what, in oriental politics, is held a mark of excessive humiliation, payment of any pecuniary indemnification, breathed nothing but defiance, and determined instantly to prosecute the war.”[316]It was then that, on the numerous incursions of the Burmese, the definite reply was returned to the British commander-in-chief, provingthat, after all, the advances made by the Burmese were only made to gain time.
The gallant general now determined to advance boldly on the enemy. His forces now amounted to 5,000 men, of whom 3,000 were British. Up to the 1st of December, operations were rather unfavourable than otherwise; on that day, however, fickle fortune again turned over to the English side. I shall give the events of the day in the words of Wilson:[317]
“Leaving four regiments of native infantry for the defence of Prome, General Campbell marched, early on the morning of the 1st of December, against the enemy’s left, while the flotilla, under Sir James Brisbane, and the 26th Madras native infantry, acting in co-operation, by a cannonade of the works upon the river, diverted the attention of the centre from the real attack.
“Upon reaching the Nawine river, at the village of Zeonke, the force was divided into two columns. The right, under Brigadier-General Cotton, formed of his Majesty’s 41st and 89th regiments, and the 18th and 28th native infantry, proceeding along the left bank of the river, came in front of the enemy’s intrenchments, consisting of a series of stockades, covered on either flank by thick jungle, and by the river in the rear, and defended by a considerable force, of whom 8,000 were Shans, or people of Laos, under their native chiefs. The post was immediately stormed. The attack was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, with the advanced guard of the right column, and the stockades were carried in less than ten minutes. The enemy left three hundred dead, including their general, Maha Nemyo, and all their stores and ammunition, and a considerable quantify of arms were taken. The left column, under the commander-in-chief, composed of his Majesty’s 13th, 38th, 47th, and 87th regiments, and 38th Madras infantry, which had crossed the Nawine river lower down, came up as the fugitives were crossing, and completed the dispersion of the Burman army.
“Following up the advantage thus gained, General Campbell determined to attack the Kyee Woongyee in his position, without delay. His force accordingly marched back to Zeonke, where they bivouacked for the night, and resumed their march on the following morning at daybreak. The nature of the country admitted of noapproach to the enemy’s defences upon the hills, except in front, and that by a narrow pathway, accessible to but a limited number of men in line. Their posts at the foot of the hills were more readily assailable, and from these they were speedily driven; but the attack of the heights was a more formidable task, as the narrow road by which they were approached was commanded by the enemy’s artillery and breastworks, numerously manned. After some impression had been apparently made by the artillery and rockets, the first Bengal brigade, consisting of H.M.’s 13th and 38th regiments, advanced to the storm, supported on the right by six companies of H.M.’s 87th. They made good their ascent, in spite of the heavy fire they encountered, and to which scarcely a shot was returned; and when they had gained the summit, they drove the enemy from hill to hill, until they had cleared the whole of the formidable and extensive intrenchments. These brilliant advantages were not gained without loss; and in the affair of the 1st, Lieutenants Sutherland and Gossip, of H.M.’s 41st, and Ensign Campbell, of the royal regiment, were killed; and Lieutenant Proctor, of H.M.’s 38th; Lieutenant Baylee, of the 87th; and Captain Dawson, of H.M.’s shipArachne, in that of the second. The division under General Cotton, which had made a circuitous march to take the enemy in flank, was unable to make its way through the jungle to bear part in the engagement. On the 5th a detachment from it proceeded across the river, and drove the right wing of the enemy, not only from their post upon the river, but from a strong stockade about half a mile in the interior, completely manned and mounting guns. The enemy were dispersed with severe loss in killed and prisoners, and their defences were set on fire.”
No time was now lost in advancing upon the retreating army. On the 9th of December the march of the British columns began, and their path lay along “dismal swamps,” and jungles, which, overrun with every kind of reeds and elephant-grass, presented a dreary and dispiriting aspect to the troops. Indeed, the effect of the marshy country was soon felt on the army, for on the 12th the cholera broke out among the troops, and, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch,[318]nearly two regiments were placed in an unfit condition for action. At Meaday the sight was sad enough. “Within and among thestockades,” says Mac Farlane,[319]“the ground was strewed with dead and dying Burmese lying promiscuously together, the victims of wounds, of disease, or of want. Several large gibbets stood about the stockade, each bearing the mouldering remains of three or four crucified Burmese, who had been thus barbarously put to death for having wandered from their posts in search of food, or for having followed the example of their chiefs in flying from the enemy.”[320]
I must pass briefly over subsequent events. Conferences for the purpose of settling a peace were sought and obtained by the Burmese; but the negotiations came to nothing. It seemed that all feelings of any kind had left them. They neither sought to conclude a peace, nor, on the other hand, did they prepare for contesting the advance of the army on the capital. At last, after much deliberation and little determination, a treaty of peace was concluded by commissioners appointed for that purpose, through the intervention of a priest. However, after all, it never reached the king for his ratification. “During the conferences,” however, “the Burman commissioners repeatedly declared their being furnished with full powers, and their firm persuasion, that whatever they agreed to, the king would ratify; they expressed their entire satisfaction with the spirit in which the negotiations had been conducted by the British commissioners, and their gratification at the prospect of a speedy renewal of friendly relations; they made no secret of their motives, and frankly and unreservedly admitted that the king had been ruined by the war, that the resources of the country were exhausted, and that the road to Ava was open to the British army. There appears every reason to credit their assertions, and all who had an opportunity of exercising personal observation were impressed with this conviction, that the negotiators were honest.”[321]I cannot, however, but point out to the reader that there appears to be a singular dash of cunning in their confessions. The king was ruined, at least so they said; thus it was useless ever to require money for expenses. Otherwise, there seems to be simplicity enough.
Still the war was not at an end. The treaty was notratified; nor destined to be. Time was asked, and repeatedly granted; but treachery was found to be at work again in the Burman hearts. They felt no peace with the wild foreigners. At last they were told, that on their withdrawing from Melloon by the morning of the 20th, and their passage to Ava, hostilities would not be recommenced. But they refused; therefore they received intimation of an attack on the 18th. “Batteries were accordingly erected with such expedition,” says Wilson, “that by ten the next morning, eight and twenty pieces of ordnance were in position on points presenting more than a mile on the eastern bank of the Irawadi, which corresponded with the enemy’s line of defence on the opposite shore; nor had the Burmas been idle, having, in the course of the night, thrown up additional defences of considerable strength and extent, and well adapted to the purposes for which they were constructed.”[322]
The heavy cannonade which ensued, soon drove away the fickle Burmese, and crowned the British armies with success. It is to be observed, that the rapidity and precision of the English movements insured our success. Here was it discovered that the treaty had not been sent to Ava at all, and when a note was sent by the British to the chief commissioner, informing him that the treaty had been left behind and would be restored, that official replied, that a large sum of money had also been left behind, which he likewise hoped would be refunded. The whole show of negotiation was a blind for hostile preparations of no avail, as it was afterwards found.
“By this time,” says Mr. Mac Farlane,[323]“the Golden Face was completely clouded with despair. Every hope and every promise had failed; every day fixed upon by his star-gazers as a lucky day had turned out an unlucky day; and all his astrologers and soothsayers had proved themselves to be but cheats and liars. Sir Archibald assured the two envoys that he was desirous of peace, and that his terms would vary very little from those which had been offered and accepted by the Wongees at Melloon. He furnished them with a statement of his terms, and promised not to pass Pagahm-mew for twelve days. On the following morning, the 1st of February, 1826, the two delegates quitted the English camp to return to Ava, the American missionary being sanguinein his expectations of returning in a few days with cash, and a treaty of peace, duly signed by the king. Yet, in truth, his Burmese majesty was still undecided, and, in the course of two or three days, it became known in the British camp that he was displaying a determination to try the fortune of war once more ere he submitted. He was probably encouraged herein by a knowledge of the smallness of the force with which Sir Archibald Campbell was advancing upon his capital, and by the intelligence received of the defeat of a weak British detachment, before the strong stockade of Zitoung, in Pegu, where the commanding officer, Colonel Conroy, and another officer, were killed, and several wounded, and where the loss in men was very heavy for so small a force.
“Sir Archibald Campbell continued his advance. On approaching Pagahm-mew, a town about a hundred miles above Melloon, he obtained positive information that a levy of 40,000 men had been ordered; that the Golden Foot had bestowed upon his new army the flattering appellation of ‘Retrievers of the King’s Glory,’ and that this army had been placed under the command of a savage warrior, styled Nee Woon-Breen, which has been, variously translated as ‘Prince of Darkness,’ ‘King of Hell,’ and ‘Prince of the setting Sun.’
“Upon the 8th of February, when within a few days’ march of Pagahm-mew, Sir Archibald ascertained that the Retrievers of the King’s Glory and the Prince of Darkness were prepared to meet him under the walls of that city.
“On the 9th, the British column moved forward in order of attack, being much reduced by the absence of two brigades, and considerably under 2,000 fighting men. The advanced guard was met in the jungle by strong bodies of skirmishers; and, after maintaining a running fight for several miles, the column debouched in the open country, and there discovered the Burmese army, from 16,000 to 20,000 strong, drawn up in an inverted crescent, the wings of which threatened the little body of assailants on both their flanks. But Sir Archibald pushed boldly forward upon the point for their centre, threw the whole weight of his column, broke and shattered it in the twinkling of an eye, and left the unconnected wings severed from each other. The Retrievers of the King’s Glory did not fight so well as those who had been accused of forfeiting his majesty’sglory: they all fled, as fast as their legs could carry them, to a second line of redoubts and stockades, close under the walls of Pagahm-mew; but the British column followed them so closely, that they had little time for rallying in those works; and as soon as a few English bayonets got within the stockades, all the Burmese went off screaming like a scared flock of wild geese. Hundreds jumped into the river to escape their assailants, and perished in the water; and, with the exception of 2,000 or 3,000 men, the whole army dispersed upon the spot:” and from this time no opposition was offered to the British. The Burmese were now wearied out; their resources, as it has been observed, were exhausted, their spirit broken, and while the court felt that resistance was impossible, the nobles individually saw that the Company was a better ally than the sovereign of Ava; yet it was still attempted to gain some advantage, and inactive despair, succeeded by active flight, showed the English what the general sentiment of the Burmese nation was. As a means, however, of gaining some little advantage, the European prisoners were retained in custody by the nation; but at Yandabo it chanced that our troops caught sight of several of the captives, and their misery caused the troops to be more anxious than ever for vengeance upon the Burmese government. The two or three prisoners held out as a bait by the Burmese monarch, were not of much avail. The same sum of twenty-five lacs of rupees was demanded, and the Burmans had to pay; shuffling was of no use.
“After halting two or three days at Pagahm,” says Wilson,[324]“General Campbell resumed his march, which now seemed likely to conduct him to the capital of Ava. There, one feeling alone prevailed, and although various reports were thrown out, at one time of the intention of the king to defend the city to the last extremity, and at another to protract the war by flying to the mountains, these purposes, if ever conceived, originated in the anxiety of the moment, and were never seriously entertained. The king and his ministers felt that they were in the power of the British; and their only anxiety was that the personal dignity and security of the sovereign should not be violated. It was with as much satisfaction as astonishment, therefore, that they learned from Mr. Price, on hisreturn from Ava, that the British commissioners sought to impose no severer terms than those which had been stipulated in the treaty of Melloon. To these there was now no hesitation to accede, although a lurking suspicion was still entertained that the invaders would not rest satisfied with the conditions they professed to impose. With a mixture of fear and trust, Mr. Price was again despatched to the British camp to signify the consent of the Burman court to the terms of peace; and Mr. Sandford was now set wholly at liberty, and allowed to accompany the negotiator to rejoin his countrymen. These gentlemen returned to camp on the 13th of February; but as the envoy had brought no official ratification of the treaty, Sir A. Campbell declined suspending his march until it should be received.”
Thus, at Yandabo the British were met by the returning envoy bearing the money, and the rest of the required despatches. On the 26th of February, the memorable treaty of Yandabo was drawn out, and by it British ascendancy in the farther peninsula of India fully established.
In order that the reader may be fully acquainted with the bearings of our negotiations at Yandabo, I shall here give the treatyin extenso, from a late official document.[325]
“Treaty of Peacebetween the Honourable East-India Company on the one part, and his Majesty the king of Ava on the other, settled by Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K.C.B. and K.C.T.S., commanding the expedition, and senior commissioner in Pegu and Ava; Thomas Campbell Robertson, Esquire, civil commissioner in Pegu and Ava; and Henry Ducie Chads, Esquire (captain), commanding his Britannic Majesty’s and the Honourable Company’s naval force on the Irrawaddy river, on the part of the Honourable Company; and by Mengyee-Maha-Men-Klah-Kyan-Ten Woongyee, Lord of Lay-Kaeng, on the part of the king of Ava; who have each communicated to the other their full powers; agreed to and executed at Yandaboo, in the kingdom of Ava, on the 24th day of February, in the year of our Lord 1826, corresponding with the fourth day of the decrease of the moon Taboung, in the year 1187, Mandina era:—
“Article I.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava on the other.
“Article II.—His Majesty the King of Ava renounces all claims upon, and will abstain from all future interference with, the Principality of Assam and its dependencies, and also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar and Jyntia. With regard to Munipore, it is stipulated, that should Ghumbheer Singh desire to return to that country, he shall be recognised by the King of Ava as rajah thereof.
“Article III.—To prevent all future disputes respecting the boundary-line between the two great nations, the British Government will retain the conquered provinces of Arracan, including the four divisions of Arracan, Ramree, Cheduba, and Sandowey, and His Majesty the King of Ava cedes all rights thereto. The Annonpeeteetonmien, or Arracan Mountains (known in Arracan by the name of Yeornabourg or Pokhengloung range), will henceforth form the boundary between the two great nations on that side. Any doubts regarding the said line of demarcation will be settled by Commissioners appointed by the respective Governments for that purpose, such Commissioners from both powers to be of suitable and corresponding rank.
“Article IV.—His Majesty the King of Ava cedes to the British Government the conquered Provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies thereunto appertaining, taking the Saluen River as the line of demarcation on the frontier. Any doubts regarding their boundaries will be settled as specified in the concluding part of Article III.
“Article V.—In proof of the sincere disposition of the Burmese Government to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the nations, and as part indemnification to the British Government for the expenses of the war, His Majesty the King of Ava agrees to pay the sum of one crore of rupees.
“Article VI.—No person whatever, whether native or foreign, is hereafter to be molested by either party, on account of the part which he may have taken, or have been compelled to take, in the present war.
“Article VII.—In order to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established betweenthe two Governments, it is agreed that accredited Ministers, retaining an escort or safeguard of fifty men, from each, shall reside at the Durbar of the other, who shall be permitted to purchase, or to build a suitable place of residence, of permanent materials, and a Commercial Treaty, upon principles of reciprocal advantage, will be entered into by the two High Contracting powers.
“Article VIII.—All public and private debts contracted by either Government, or by the subjects of either Government, with the other previous to the war, to be recognised and liquidated upon the same principles of honour and good faith as if hostilities had not taken place between the two nations; and no advantage shall be taken by either party of the period that may have elapsed since the debts were incurred, or in consequence of the war; and, according to the universal Law of Nations, it is further stipulated, that the property of all British subjects who may die in the dominions of his Majesty the King of Ava shall, in the absence of legal heirs, be placed in the hands of the British Resident or Consul in the said dominions, who will dispose of the same according to the tenour of the British law. In like manner, the property of Burmese subjects, dying under the same circumstances in any part of the British dominions, shall be made over to the Minister or other authority delegated by his Burmese Majesty to the Supreme Government of India.
“Article IX.—The King of Ava will abolish all exactions upon British ships or vessels in Burman ports, that are not required from Burman ships or vessels in British ports: nor shall ships or vessels, the property of British subjects, whether European or Indian, entering the Rangoon river, or other Burman ports, be required to land their guns or unship their rudders, or do any other act not required of Burmese ships or vessels in British ports.
“Article X.—The good and faithful ally of the British Government, his Majesty the King of Siam, having taken a part in the present war, will, to the fullest extent, as far as regards his Majesty and his subjects, be included in the above treaty.
“Article XI.—This treaty to be ratified by the Burmese authorities competent in the like cases, and the ratification to be accompanied by all British, whether European or native (American), and other prisoners, whowill be delivered over to the British Commissioners; the British Commissioners, on their part, engaging that the said treaty shall be ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, and the ratification shall be delivered to his Majesty the King of Ava in four months, or sooner if possible; and all the Burmese prisoners shall, in like manner, be delivered over to their own Government as soon as they arrive from Bengal.”
Subsequently, the following article was added:—
“The British Commissioners being most anxiously desirous to manifest the sincerity of their wish for peace, and to make the immediate execution of the fifth article of this treaty as little irksome or inconvenient as possible to His Majesty the King of Ava, consent to the following arrangements, with respect to the division of the sum total, as specified in the article before referred to, into instalments; viz., upon the payment of twenty-five lacs of rupees, or one-fourth of the sum total (the other articles of the treaty being executed), the army will retire to Rangoon; upon the further payment of a similar sum at that place, within one hundred days from this date, with the proviso as above, the army will evacuate the dominions of His Majesty the King of Ava, with the least possible delay; leaving the remaining moiety of the sum total to be paid by equal annual instalments in two years, from this 24th day of February, 1826,A.D., through the Consul, or Resident in Ava, or Pegu, on the part of the Honourable the East-India Company.”
Since the conclusion of this treaty, little has occurred in the kingdom of general interest, as far as we are concerned, until the recent war. From the year 1826 to our own day, revolution has overthrown revolution, and the same spirit is at work at present as in the days of the creator of Burmese importance, Alompra, with this difference, that while at that period the turbulent elements disturbing the peace of the peninsula could in some measure be controlled, as there was a man of consummate talent and great power capable of so doing, there is now no one; and further, that if we do not annex the country, there is not a doubt, but that we shall find a disadvantage in not having done so. In the first place, the trade with the country will be destroyed by the hardness of the officials; and, secondly, it has not been forgotten by the Peguese, thatwe foully betrayed them in 1827. They are now giving us another trial: let us show that we are worthy of confidence.
I shall now close this sketch of the fortunes of the Burmese nation with a few remarks made during a former crisis by an Edinburgh reviewer, as they will, no doubt, be found somewhat applicable to the present time:[326]—
“The difficulty of dealing with inflated barbarians, and of resisting the constant provocation to chastise them, not merely into civility, but into the due observance of their federal obligations, and the necessary restraint of the plundering propensities of their subjects upon our borders, is extreme.
“Yet the dire necessity of entering upon another war with such enemies must be contemplated with unmixed dislike. There is nothing, either of honour or profit, to be gained; and the process, from the nature of the country, and the remoteness of its vital parts from the stations of our troops, must always be tedious and expensive. The seat and strength of the government is fixed almost at the upper extremity of the long valley of the Irrawaddy. The capital is six or seven hundred miles from the sea. The lower part of the valley is a pestilential swamp during a considerable portion of the year. Though the shorter route to the capital, over the Arracan mountains, would unquestionably be taken by our main army, the expense of transporting a considerable body of troops, with an adequate supply, not only of military appurtenances, but of provisions (for the Burmese proved, to our cost, in the last war, that they could effectually sweep the country of all resources), through such wildernesses, and by such mere footpaths, would necessarily be great. These were the circumstances which, joined with much ignorance and carelessness, rendered the last war so tedious and costly.”