CHAPTER XII.

The Militia—American Intentions—Instability of the Volunteer Principle—The Drilling of Militia—The Commission of 1862—The Duke of Newcastle’s Views—Militia Schemes—Volunteer Force—Apathy of the French Canadians—The First Summons.

In a country situated as Canada is, without well-defined obligations as regards the sovereign power, there can be but two kinds of military force available for defence—a militia and an organisation of volunteers. The first is essentially the proper constitutional force on which Canada must mainly rely in case of invasion. The second, notwithstanding its enormous importance and value, is but accidental. Unless Canada assumed towards us the relations of a protected state, like India, and raised an army officered by the British such as was that of Oude, or as that, to a certain extent, of some states at the present day, her volunteers could have no fixed and adequate value in a general scheme of defence. The Canadian militia must constitute the chief strength of Canada in operations on her territory. It would be impossible for Great Britain to do more than provide officers, money, arms, artillery, and ammunition—perhaps the head and backbone of the forcewhich would be needed for a large system of campaigns. The only enemy Canada has to fear is the Northern Republic. I am quite willing to do every justice to the moderation of Mr. Seward, and to the pacific policy of Mr. Lincoln, but it cannot be disputed that the strength of the central Government will be much diminished on the cessation of the present conflict, and that whatever way it ends the Cabinet of Washington will be little able to oppose the passions of the people in the crisis which peace, whether it be one of humiliation or of triumph, will bring with it. Passion, the passion wrought of pride, love of dominion, national feeling, and the like, is far stronger than the silken bond of commerce. There is danger of war with Great Britain as soon as this war in America is over; and the question is, how far Canada will be able to aid herself? Because if she does not contribute largely to her own defence, it seems certain that British statesmen will not strive very strenuously to avert her doom. At the moment I write there is not, in a state of organised efficiency, one regiment of militia in the length, which is great, and the breadth, which is small, of Canada. Party violence has set at nought all warnings and all solicitations. The Canadians appear to rely on the traditions of the past, and on the result of the small campaigns in the war with America, without any appreciation of the vast changes which have taken place since. Northern Americans, reaching their boundaries with pain and many a toilsome march, filtered small corps upon their soil—far inferior in numbers and equipment to those which now represent the quota of the smallest state in the Union. In my letters from America I called attention to the significant fact that the northernmostpoint of the territory claimed by the Southern Confederacy was within 120 miles of the lake which forms the southern boundary of Canada. It may not be likely that the Confederacy will ever make good its claim to Western Virginia, and fix its standard in undisturbed supremacy at Wheeling, but it is nevertheless true that a strong passionate instinct urges the people of the North to consolidate the states of the West and those of the East by the absorption of Canada, which, with its lakes and its St. Lawrence, would be ample recompense for the loss of the South; and, with the South in the Union, would be the consummation of the dream of empire in which Americans wide-awake pass their busy restless lives. The Americans are well aware of the vast advantage of striking a sudden blow. The whole subject of Canadian invasion lies developed in well-considered papers in the bureau drawers of Washington. At the time of the Trent affair I was assured by an officer high in rank in the government that General Winfield Scott had come back from France solely to give the State the benefit of his counsels and experience in conducting an invasion of Canada; and I cannot think it doubtful that the Federal Government would, in four or five weeks after a declaration of war with England, be prepared to pour 120,000 or 150,000 men across the British frontier. What has Canada done to meet the danger? In May, 1862, the Honourable John Macdonald proposed that a minimum of 30,000 men or a maximum of 50,000 men should be enrolled and drilled for one month every year for three or for five years, but it was considered that Canada could not spare so large a number of men from the pursuits of trade, and above all of agriculture, duringthe open season when drill would be practicable. The measure was rejected. Mr. Sandfield Macdonald, after the failure of this proposal, introduced and carried a measure which gave the Government a permissive power to call out the unmarried militiamen for six days’ drill in every year, and which provided that militia officers might be attached to the regular regiments serving in Canada for two months every year in order to learn their duties. By the fundamental law of Canada the Government has the power of calling out in time of war, first, all eligible unmarried men between 18 and 45 years of age; secondly, married men between 18 and 45; and finally, those males fit to carry arms between 45 and 60 years of age. Under these laws Canada should have a force of 470,000 men available for service, and of these there are actually on the muster rolls of the militia 197,000 unmarried men between 18 and 31 years of age, whose service would be compulsory in case of need. The Canadian Parliament voted half a million of dollars in each of the years 1863 and 1864 for military purposes, but the greater proportion of these sums was expended on the volunteers and on the staff of the militia. There has been no adequate return for the heavy drain such a sum causes on the Provincial exchequer. The best commentary on the voluntary system in militia drills is to be found in the fact that less than 10,000 men have been in attendance on them.

With the experience we have had of the unstable character of volunteer forces in the field, it is not prudent for Canada to rely on her volunteers so much as she does. They have within their very body theseeds of dissolution. Some corps can decree their disbandment at two months’, others at six months’ notice—in other words, they may melt away at the very crisis of the war. Does American volunteering teach us nothing? In all human probability the South would have been struck to the earth at the first Battle of Bull Bun, if the Pennsylvania volunteers had not presented to the world the extraordinary and disgraceful spectacle of whole battalions under arms marching off from the field, as their unfortunate General McDowell expressed it, “to the sound of the enemy’s guns.” That was no isolated case. The desertion, at the same time, of other volunteer battalions under the equally unfortunate General Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley, left him unable to prevent the Confederate General Johnston marching with all his men to the aid of Beauregard. Over and over again the Federal leaders have been paralysed by similar defections, and it was not till they became strong enough to hold the volunteers by force, as Meade did before he made his attempt against Richmond, that the evil was cured. Had the Federals gained Bull Bun, they were ready to have marched on Richmond at once—they would have found the city defenceless, and the South disorganised. Such a proof of Federal power as a decisive victory would, I believe, from what I saw in the South, have crushed the Secession party, and have strengthened the adherents of the Union, who were then numerous in many of the States. It might not have stopped the civil war, but it would have certainly given the most enormous preponderance to the North. The defeat mainly caused by McDowell’s weakness in men, and the reinforcements received by the enemy in consequenceof Patterson’s inability to hinder their arrival, which was caused by the wholesale disbandment of volunteers, gave such an impetus to the Confederates, that their principle was carried triumphantly over the States, and crushed all opposition. We have seen what that defeat has cost the Federals since. In Canada the volunteers belong almost exclusively to the urban population—only a fifth come from rural districts; and as the towns in Canada are very small, it is plain that the volunteer system would operate very injuriously on the trade of the cities, and would in all likelihood break down, without any imputation on the courage and patriotism of the townsmen. It is, of course, beyond the power of Canada to cope with the people of the United States single-handed, but the agencies which England could bring to bear against the enemy on the American seaboard, and on all the seas furrowed by her ships, would damp the ardour which the Northerners would exhibit at the first onslaught. It would be, no doubt, a very deplorable and a very disgraceful contest, but Great Britain would not be responsible for the beginning of hostilities.

Just in proportion to the celerity and magnitude of their first successes would be the efforts of the Americans to secure their conquest. It is far easier to repel than to expel. A handful of militia, ill-drilled, supported by a similar force of volunteers of similar inefficiency, could offer no resistance to the swarms of invaders, and would but increase the stress to which the little army of Queen’s troops in garrison here and there would be subjected at the outbreak of war. To all argument and entreaty, to insinuations and menace, Canada opposes the grand simplicity of hernon possumus.She is burthened with debt, and even without any expenditure for the militia her outlay is considerably more than her income. A party in Canada called for a regular agreement with the Government at home to regulate the amount to be paid by Canada, and the troops to be furnished by her, as a part of the British Empire. These troops were to consist of militia of the first class, to be drilled by detachments in each succeeding year, till the whole number, whether it were 50,000 or 100,000, should be properly disciplined. It was proposed by some advocates of this scheme that each body of militia should be called out for six months; and that when that period expired the men should be entitled to immunity from further drills till war broke out, when they would become liable for ten years’ service, after which they would go into a reserve only to be used in great emergencies.

Many modes of raising, maintaining, and drilling this force have been suggested; but as the principle was not adopted they are scarcely worth discussing. Drills for short periods are certainly of little or no avail; and if money cannot be borrowed to put 100,000 men in a state of readiness, the organisation of 50,000 men to be drilled for three months in each year in bodies of 12,000 or 15,000 does not seem at all unreasonable. The rate of wages in Canada is very high, and the lowest estimate for the support, pay, and clothing of a militiaman for six months comes to about £20 per man. It is, therefore, a simple sum in multiplication to arrive at the ultimate figure of Canadianpossumusin regard to the paying power of the Provinces. It is not true that if one man can be kept for £20 for six months two men can be kept for the same sum for threemonths. The levy of 50,000 militiamen for six months would cost Canada, if she were alone, one million sterling. Mr. Cartwright has pointed out that Canada could discipline 100,000 militia, with half a year’s instruction each, for as much as would support a standing army of 2,000 men for the same period. We may be very angry with the Canadians for their happy security. It is not so very long ago since the Duke’s letters to Sir John Burgoyne startled us out of a similarinsouciance. We may feel that the sudden development of the United States has placed us in a very doubtful military position. It is not so easy to shake off the obligations incurred by conquest and by emigration under the flag of Great Britain. In the face of very frigid warnings from the press, and very lukewarm enunciations of policy from her best friends, Canada had some reason to fear that there is a secret desire “to let her slide,” and that nothing would please England so much as a happy chance which placed the Provinces beyond our care without humiliation or war.

The duty of Canadians to their own country is very plain indeed if the people of England refuse to give them distinct guarantees that under certain conditions they will give them the whole aid of money, men, and ships that is required; but these guarantees are implied in the very fact of suzerainty of the Crown. It must, however, be made known—if it be not plain to every Englishman—that the abandonment of Canada implies a surrender of British Columbia, of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward’s, Newfoundland, if not also the West India Islands. Many bitter words written and spoken here rankle in the breasts of the Canadians, and I have quoted the words in which a Canadianstatesman has placed before Englishmen the terrible consequences which Canada may suffer from war, because she is a part of the British empire, engaged in a quarrel on imperial grounds with the Government of the United States. We do undoubtedly owe something to Canada, from the bare fact that for many years she resisted temptation, and remained under our flag unmoved by the blandishments and threats of the United States. In my poor judgment the abandonment of Canada would be the most signal triumph of the principle of democracy, and the most pregnant sign of the decadence of the British empire which could be desired by our enemies. No matter by what sophistry or by what expediency justified, the truth would crop out through the fact itself that we were retiring as the Romans did from Britain, Gaul, and Dacia, but that the retreat would be made in the face of united and civilised enemies, and that the sound of our recall would animate every nation in the world to come forth and despoil us.

As yet there is no reason for such a pusillanimous policy.

The Commission of 1862 laid it down as their opinion that an active force of 50,000, with a reserve of the same number, would be required for Canada; but as the bill founded on their report did not become law, the Canadian Government had no power to borrow arms from the home Government for the whole number, as would have been the case had they passed the bill. Lord Monck, however, procured from the home Government a considerable augmentation of the supplies in store of artillery, small arms, ammunition and accoutrements. But the rejection of the Militia Billof 1862 filled the home Government with apprehension. The Duke of Newcastle, on the 20th of August of that year, wrote as follows:—

“If I urge upon you the importance of speedily resuming measures for some better military organisation of the inhabitants of Canada than that which now exists, it must not be supposed that Her Majesty’s Government is influenced by any particular apprehension of an attack on the Colony at the present moment, but undoubtedly the necessity for preparation which has from time to time been urged by successive Secretaries of State is greatly increased by the presence, for the first time on the American Continent, of a large standing army, and the unsettled condition of the neighbouring States. Moreover, the growing importance of the Colony, and its attachment to free institutions, make it every day more essential that it should possess in itself that without which no free institutions can be secure—adequate means of self-defence. The adequacy of those means is materially influenced by the peculiar position of the country. Its extent of frontier is such that it can be safe only when its population capable of bearing arms is ready and competent to fight. That the population is ready, no one will venture to doubt; that it cannot be competent, is no less certain, until it has received that organisation, and acquired that habit of discipline which constitute the difference between a trained force and an armed mob. The drill required in the regular army, or even in the best volunteer battalion, is not necessary, nor would it be possible, in a country like Canada, for so large a body of men as ought to be prepared for any emergency; but the Government should be able to availitself of the services of the strong and healthy portion of the male adult population at short notice, if the dangers of invasion by an already organised army are to be provided against.“We have the opinions of the best military authorities, that no body of troops which England could send would be able to make Canada safe without the efficient aid of the Canadian people. Not only is it impossible to send sufficient troops, but if there were four times the numbers which we are now maintaining in British North America, they could not secure the whole of the frontier. The main dependence of such a country must be upon its own people. The irregular forces which can be formed from the population, know the passes of the woods, are well acquainted with the country, its roads, its rivers, its defiles: and for defensive warfare (for aggression they will never be wanted), would be far more available than regular soldiers.“It is not therefore the unwillingness, or the inability of Her Majesty’s Government to furnish sufficient troops, but the uselessness of such troops without an adequate militia force, that I wish to impress upon you.“In your despatch of the 17th May last, you informed me that there were then 14,760 volunteers enrolled, besides others who had been more or less drilled. It is far, indeed, from my intention to discredit either the zeal or the efficiency of these volunteers, who have, I hope, greatly increased in number since the date of your despatch; but they constitute a force which cannot suffice for Canada in the event of war. They might form an admirable small contingent; but what would be required, would be a large army.They might form a force stronger than is necessary in time of peace to secure internal tranquillity, but would be inadequate to repel external attack in time of war. Past experience shows that no reasonable amount of encouragement can raise the number of volunteers to the required extent.“It appears to me that the smallest number of men partially drilled which it would be essential to provide within a given time, is 50,000. The remainder of the militia would of course be liable to be called upon in an emergency. Perhaps the best course would be, to drill every year one or more companies of each battalion of the sedentary militia. In this manner the training of a large number of men might be effected, and all companies so drilled should, once at least in two years, if not in each year, be exercised in battalion drill, so as to keep up their training.“I put forward these suggestions for the consideration of the Canadian Government and Parliament, but Her Majesty’s Government have no desire to dictate as to details, or to interfere with the internal government of the Colony. Their only object is so to assist and guide its action in the matter of the militia as to make that force efficient at the least possible cost to the Province and to the mother country.“The Canadian Government will doubtless be fully alive to the important fact that a well-organised system of militia will contribute much towards sustaining the high position with reference to pecuniary credit, which, in spite of its large debt, and its deficient revenue for the past few years, the Colony has hitherto held in the money markets of Europe. A country which, however unjustly, is suspected of inability or indisposition toprovide for its own defence, does not, in the present circumstances of America, offer a tempting field for investment in public funds or the outlay of private capital. Men question the stable condition of affairs in a land which is not competent to protect itself.“It may, no doubt, be argued on the other hand, that the increased charge of a militia would diminish rather than enlarge the credit of the Colony. I am convinced that such would not be the case, if steps were taken for securing a basis of taxation sounder in itself than the almost exclusive reliance on Customs duties. It is my belief that a step in this direction would not only supply funds for the militia, but would remove all apprehension which exists as to the resources of the Colony.“Whatever other steps may be taken for the improved organisation of the militia, it appears to Her Majesty’s Government to be of essential importance that its administration, and the supply of funds for its support, should be exempt from the disturbing action of ordinary politics. Unless this be done there can be no confidence that, in the appointment of officers, and in other matters of a purely military character, no other object than the efficiency of the force is kept in view. Were it not that it might fairly be considered too great an interference with the privileges of the representatives of the people, I should be inclined to suggest that the charge for the militia, or a certain fixed portion of it, should be defrayed from the consolidated fund of Canada, or voted for a period of three or five years.“It has further occurred to me, that the whole of the British Provinces on the continent of North Americahave, in this matter of defence, common interests and common duties. Is it impossible that, with the free consent of each of these Colonies, one uniform system of militia training and organisation should be introduced into all of them? The numbers of men to be raised and trained in each would have to be fixed, and the expenses of the whole would be defrayed from a common fund, contributed in fair proportion by each of the Colonies. If the Governor-General of Canada were Commander-in-Chief of the whole, the Lieutenant-Governors of the other Colonies would act as Generals of Division under him; but it would be essential that an Adjutant-General of the whole force, approved by Her Majesty’s Government, should move to and fro, as occasion might require, so as to give uniformity to the training of the whole, and cohesion to the force itself.“As such a scheme would affect more than one Colony, it must, of course, emanate from the Secretary of State, but Her Majesty’s Government would not entertain it unless they were convinced that it would be acceptable both to the people of Canada and to the other Colonies; and they desire to know, in the first instance, in what light any such plan would be viewed by the members of your Executive Council. I understand that the Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, availing themselves of the leave of absence lately accorded to them, intend to meet you in Quebec in the course of the ensuing month. This visit will afford you a good opportunity for consulting them upon this important question.“The political union of the North American Colonies has often been discussed. The merits of that measure,and the difficulties in the way of its accomplishment, have been well-considered; but none of the objections which oppose it seem to impede a union for defence. This matter is one in which all the Colonies have interests common with each other, and identical with the policy of England.”

“We have the opinions of the best military authorities, that no body of troops which England could send would be able to make Canada safe without the efficient aid of the Canadian people. Not only is it impossible to send sufficient troops, but if there were four times the numbers which we are now maintaining in British North America, they could not secure the whole of the frontier. The main dependence of such a country must be upon its own people. The irregular forces which can be formed from the population, know the passes of the woods, are well acquainted with the country, its roads, its rivers, its defiles: and for defensive warfare (for aggression they will never be wanted), would be far more available than regular soldiers.

“It is not therefore the unwillingness, or the inability of Her Majesty’s Government to furnish sufficient troops, but the uselessness of such troops without an adequate militia force, that I wish to impress upon you.

“In your despatch of the 17th May last, you informed me that there were then 14,760 volunteers enrolled, besides others who had been more or less drilled. It is far, indeed, from my intention to discredit either the zeal or the efficiency of these volunteers, who have, I hope, greatly increased in number since the date of your despatch; but they constitute a force which cannot suffice for Canada in the event of war. They might form an admirable small contingent; but what would be required, would be a large army.They might form a force stronger than is necessary in time of peace to secure internal tranquillity, but would be inadequate to repel external attack in time of war. Past experience shows that no reasonable amount of encouragement can raise the number of volunteers to the required extent.

“It appears to me that the smallest number of men partially drilled which it would be essential to provide within a given time, is 50,000. The remainder of the militia would of course be liable to be called upon in an emergency. Perhaps the best course would be, to drill every year one or more companies of each battalion of the sedentary militia. In this manner the training of a large number of men might be effected, and all companies so drilled should, once at least in two years, if not in each year, be exercised in battalion drill, so as to keep up their training.

“I put forward these suggestions for the consideration of the Canadian Government and Parliament, but Her Majesty’s Government have no desire to dictate as to details, or to interfere with the internal government of the Colony. Their only object is so to assist and guide its action in the matter of the militia as to make that force efficient at the least possible cost to the Province and to the mother country.

“The Canadian Government will doubtless be fully alive to the important fact that a well-organised system of militia will contribute much towards sustaining the high position with reference to pecuniary credit, which, in spite of its large debt, and its deficient revenue for the past few years, the Colony has hitherto held in the money markets of Europe. A country which, however unjustly, is suspected of inability or indisposition toprovide for its own defence, does not, in the present circumstances of America, offer a tempting field for investment in public funds or the outlay of private capital. Men question the stable condition of affairs in a land which is not competent to protect itself.

“It may, no doubt, be argued on the other hand, that the increased charge of a militia would diminish rather than enlarge the credit of the Colony. I am convinced that such would not be the case, if steps were taken for securing a basis of taxation sounder in itself than the almost exclusive reliance on Customs duties. It is my belief that a step in this direction would not only supply funds for the militia, but would remove all apprehension which exists as to the resources of the Colony.

“Whatever other steps may be taken for the improved organisation of the militia, it appears to Her Majesty’s Government to be of essential importance that its administration, and the supply of funds for its support, should be exempt from the disturbing action of ordinary politics. Unless this be done there can be no confidence that, in the appointment of officers, and in other matters of a purely military character, no other object than the efficiency of the force is kept in view. Were it not that it might fairly be considered too great an interference with the privileges of the representatives of the people, I should be inclined to suggest that the charge for the militia, or a certain fixed portion of it, should be defrayed from the consolidated fund of Canada, or voted for a period of three or five years.

“It has further occurred to me, that the whole of the British Provinces on the continent of North Americahave, in this matter of defence, common interests and common duties. Is it impossible that, with the free consent of each of these Colonies, one uniform system of militia training and organisation should be introduced into all of them? The numbers of men to be raised and trained in each would have to be fixed, and the expenses of the whole would be defrayed from a common fund, contributed in fair proportion by each of the Colonies. If the Governor-General of Canada were Commander-in-Chief of the whole, the Lieutenant-Governors of the other Colonies would act as Generals of Division under him; but it would be essential that an Adjutant-General of the whole force, approved by Her Majesty’s Government, should move to and fro, as occasion might require, so as to give uniformity to the training of the whole, and cohesion to the force itself.

“As such a scheme would affect more than one Colony, it must, of course, emanate from the Secretary of State, but Her Majesty’s Government would not entertain it unless they were convinced that it would be acceptable both to the people of Canada and to the other Colonies; and they desire to know, in the first instance, in what light any such plan would be viewed by the members of your Executive Council. I understand that the Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, availing themselves of the leave of absence lately accorded to them, intend to meet you in Quebec in the course of the ensuing month. This visit will afford you a good opportunity for consulting them upon this important question.

“The political union of the North American Colonies has often been discussed. The merits of that measure,and the difficulties in the way of its accomplishment, have been well-considered; but none of the objections which oppose it seem to impede a union for defence. This matter is one in which all the Colonies have interests common with each other, and identical with the policy of England.”

The Government of the day presented a scheme which was rightly characterised by Lord Monck as containing no principle calculated to produce effective results, and to be entirely illusory and nugatory as far as the enrolment of the militia was concerned. Lord Monck enclosed the heads of a plan for the reorganisation and increase of the active militia, based mainly on the voluntary principle, with rules for the erection of armouries, drill-sheds and rifle-ranges, and the appointment of brigade-majors and sergeants, &c., and other means of a perfect organisation. The scheme was to raise an active battalion for each territorial division of the country corresponding with the regimental district of the sedentary militia, to be increased in number as needed, each active battalion to be taken from the sub-division of the district. Mr. Macdonald thought no Government could exist which would venture to recommend the raising of 50,000 partially trained militia, although the cost, spread over five years, would scarcely exceed the annual appropriations. In fact, at the root of all these various schemes and plans lay the evil of uncertainty. Canada did not know how far England would go in her defence, and seemed fearful of granting anything, lest it might be an obligation which the mother country would have otherwise incurred, whilst England, by withholding any definite promise, or indulging only in vague remonstrances, sought tomake the Canadians show their hands. Each was anxious for an answer to the question, “How much will you give us?” The Military Commissioners reported that Canada ought to provide 150,000 men, including the reserves, which force, large as it is, would be less than that furnished by states of smaller population in the Northern Union; but Canada is very poor, and not unnaturally makes the most of the argument that she can have no war of her own, and that her defence should be our affair. No one, I apprehend, will allow himself to be beaten to death because there is no policeman by.

In February, 1863, a report of the state of the militia of the Province was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel de Salaberry and Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, of the Adjutant-Generals of Militia Department in Lower and Upper Canada, respectively, from which it appears that there were then 25,000 volunteers organised, of whom 10,230 belonged to Lower, and 14,780 belonged to Upper Canada. Of these there were proportionately 33 for every 1000 in the cities, and 7⅓ for every 1000 in the counties; those in the upper section contributing less than those in the lower section, and Upper Canada contributing a larger number on the 1000 than Lower Canada. In the enumeration of the various companies—field batteries, troops of horse, companies of artillery, engineers, rifles, infantry, naval and marine companies—it is to be observed that only one naval company appears as having performed twelve days’ drill. Some steps should be taken to develop naval and marine companies in the passes along the shores of the lakes. The importance of having trained sailors and gunners stationed just where they are wanted cannot be exaggerated,but it is not very likely that Brigade-Majors will look after such a force. It must be remembered that the national force of Canada consists of two different organisations—the volunteer militia and the regular militia. Canada is divided into twenty-one military districts, eleven in Lower and ten in Upper Canada. In each district there is a Brigade-Major to superintend the drill and instruction of all volunteer companies, furnish monthly reports thereon, and by inspections and active organisation to promote the efficiency of the volunteer service as far as possible. The appointment of these officers has been attended with very good results in this branch of the Militia Staff. In August, 1862, forty-six non-commissioned officers were sent out by Government, and paid by the Canadian Parliament, to drill volunteers; and sixty-eight sergeants were subsequently applied for to meet the increasing demand for instruction. The report of the Deputy Adjutant-Generals of Militia, presented to Lord Monck in 1863, stated——

“Taking population as a basis, these Volunteer Corps are distributed as follows:—“Population all Canada (census 1861), 2,506,752,—present Volunteer force, 25,010, or say 10 Volunteers for each 1,000 inhabitants.“Population—Lower Canada.1,110,664Volunteers,10,230,—or say 9¼ for each 1,000.Upper Canada.1,396,088Volunteers,14,780,—or say 10⅔ for each 1,000.———————2,506,75225,010“Population all Canada, showing proportion of Volunteers in cities and counties.Cities,257,273Volunteers8,525,—or say 33 for each 1,000.Rural,2,249,479”16,485,—or say 7⅓ for each 1,000.———————2,506,75225,010“Population of Cities.Lower Canada,153,389Volunteers,5,500,or say 36 for each 1,000.Upper Canada,103,884”3,025,or say 29 for each 1,000.—————–257,2738,525“Population of Rural Parts.Lower Canada,957,275Volunteers,4,730,or say 5 for each 1,000.Upper Canada,1,292,204”11,755,or say 9 for each 1,000.———————2,249,47916,485“It will thus be seen that in the cities of Canada, those in the Upper Section of the Province contribute less, in proportion to their population, than do those in the Lower Section; while in the rural parts, Upper Canada contributes a larger number for each 1,000 inhabitants than does Lower Canada.“The volunteering, thus far, has been the free-will offering of the people, and it is gratifying to observe that in the counties of Upper Canada, with the exception of three, nearly every one has furnished its quota of the 25,000 now organised, while in many instances they are considerably beyond the proportionate number.“In Lower Canada, until of late, volunteer corps have been chiefly organised in the cities, but within the last six months a considerable number of volunteers have been organised in the rural parts, and now evidences are not wanting that ere long applications will be received at this department for permission to increase this number considerably.“The present volunteer force comprises field batteries, troops of cavalry, foot companies of artillery, engineer companies, rifle companies, companies ofinfantry, and naval and marine companies, and is divided properly into three classes, viz.: Class A, and two divisions of Class B.“Corps in Class A are those who have furnished their own uniforms, and who have been paid $6.00, for each man uniformed, for 12 days’ drill performed in 1862.“First corps in Class B who have furnished their own uniforms, and who have been paid $6.00 in lieu of clothing, after 12 days’ drill performed in 1862.“Second corps in Class B who have been organised upon the understanding that they receive no pay for the 12 days’ drill, but that the Government will provide them with uniforms and drill instruction.“Of the corps in Class A, 6 field batteries, 11 troops of cavalry, 2 companies of foot artillery, and 33 rifle companies have certified to the performance of 12 days’ drill in accordance with the General Order of the 4th November last, and have received from the Government $22,672 therefor.“Of the corps in Class B, 3 troops of cavalry, 8 foot companies of artillery, 2 engineer corps, 49 rifle companies, 15 companies of infantry and one naval company have certified to the performance of 12 days’ drill in accordance with the General Order of the 4th November last, and have received from the Government $20,952 therefor.”

“Taking population as a basis, these Volunteer Corps are distributed as follows:—

“Population all Canada (census 1861), 2,506,752,—present Volunteer force, 25,010, or say 10 Volunteers for each 1,000 inhabitants.

“Population—Lower Canada.

Upper Canada.

“Population all Canada, showing proportion of Volunteers in cities and counties.

“Population of Cities.

“Population of Rural Parts.

“It will thus be seen that in the cities of Canada, those in the Upper Section of the Province contribute less, in proportion to their population, than do those in the Lower Section; while in the rural parts, Upper Canada contributes a larger number for each 1,000 inhabitants than does Lower Canada.

“The volunteering, thus far, has been the free-will offering of the people, and it is gratifying to observe that in the counties of Upper Canada, with the exception of three, nearly every one has furnished its quota of the 25,000 now organised, while in many instances they are considerably beyond the proportionate number.

“In Lower Canada, until of late, volunteer corps have been chiefly organised in the cities, but within the last six months a considerable number of volunteers have been organised in the rural parts, and now evidences are not wanting that ere long applications will be received at this department for permission to increase this number considerably.

“The present volunteer force comprises field batteries, troops of cavalry, foot companies of artillery, engineer companies, rifle companies, companies ofinfantry, and naval and marine companies, and is divided properly into three classes, viz.: Class A, and two divisions of Class B.

“Corps in Class A are those who have furnished their own uniforms, and who have been paid $6.00, for each man uniformed, for 12 days’ drill performed in 1862.

“First corps in Class B who have furnished their own uniforms, and who have been paid $6.00 in lieu of clothing, after 12 days’ drill performed in 1862.

“Second corps in Class B who have been organised upon the understanding that they receive no pay for the 12 days’ drill, but that the Government will provide them with uniforms and drill instruction.

“Of the corps in Class A, 6 field batteries, 11 troops of cavalry, 2 companies of foot artillery, and 33 rifle companies have certified to the performance of 12 days’ drill in accordance with the General Order of the 4th November last, and have received from the Government $22,672 therefor.

“Of the corps in Class B, 3 troops of cavalry, 8 foot companies of artillery, 2 engineer corps, 49 rifle companies, 15 companies of infantry and one naval company have certified to the performance of 12 days’ drill in accordance with the General Order of the 4th November last, and have received from the Government $20,952 therefor.”

In the twenty-one districts there were recorded 468 battalions of sedentary militia. Seventy-six drill associations, composed of the officers and non-commissioned officers, had been formed, and were to be supplied with arms and instructors, to which number considerable additions have since been made. Thetotal number of militiamen in Lower Canada was estimated at 190,000; in Upper Canada, at 280,000. In the former, 63,000 first-class service men; in the latter, only 33,000 first-class service men. Second-class, 58,000 and 83,000 respectively. Reserve, 20,000 and 25,000 respectively. The cities of Upper Canada gave 29 volunteers for every 1000—the rural districts only 9 volunteers for every 1000. In three counties containing 50,000 people there was no volunteer or volunteer corps. In thirteen counties the average number of volunteers was 250, and in sixteen counties it was only 125.

In Lower Canada, however, the zeal of the people for militia volunteering was by no means remarkable. Thirty counties, with a population of 450,000, had not a single volunteer corps, nor one volunteer. The towns gave 36 volunteers per 1000, the rural districts only 5 per 1000. In fact, the people of French descent appeared to consider militia volunteering a sort of playing at soldiers, which had no particular attractions for them. England had taken them in charge, and might do as she liked with them.

By degrees, a great change occurred in the sentiments if not in the actions of the people. A little more address in dealing with their prejudices; a little more of a conciliatory tone; somewhat greater tact in legislative business, produced beneficial results. The foundation, at all events, was laid of a sound militia bill. The Commissioners who reported in 1862, including Mr. Cartier, Mr. John A. Macdonald, Mr. Galt, and Colonel Lysons, proposed a scheme which was very comprehensive and ably conceived; but it was not considered suitable to the means of the country by thepoliticians, and the debates which arose on the Militia Bill prepared in accordance with its recommendations, were characterised by an acrimony and party spirit which flavoured the subsequent discussions on the same subject. They recommended complete battalions as the base of the system, for reasons which are in the abstract irrefutable. They then recommended that the Province should be divided into military districts, as the Commander-in-Chief might direct, and that each military district should be divided into regimental divisions. They further recommended as follows:—

“That in order to facilitate the enrolment, relief and reinforcement of an active force, each regimental division be divided into ‘sedentary battalion divisions,’ and be sub-divided into ‘sedentary company divisions.’“That each regimental division shall furnish one active and one reserve battalion, to be taken as nearly as practicable in equal proportions from the male population of such division, between the ages of 18 and 45.“That each company of an active battalion, together with its corresponding reserve company, be taken from within the limits of a defined territorial division, the boundary of which shall be identical with that of a sedentary battalion division, or of a distinct portion of such division.“That in order to accommodate the sedentary battalion divisions to the organisation of the active battalions, the limits of the former be, where necessary, re-arranged.“We recommend that each of the principal cities of the Province, namely—Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, and London, with such portions of the surrounding country as may, from timeto time, be added to them by the Commander-in-Chief, shall constitute a military district, to be divided into regimental and sedentary battalion divisions, as hereinbefore detailed; that they be allowed to furnish volunteer militia of the three arms in the proportions hereinafter detailed in lieu of active battalions of regular militia. In the event of these cities failing to furnish their full complement of volunteers, they shall in part, or altogether, fall under the general regulations of the regular militia, in such manner as the Commander-in-Chief shall direct.”

“That each regimental division shall furnish one active and one reserve battalion, to be taken as nearly as practicable in equal proportions from the male population of such division, between the ages of 18 and 45.

“That each company of an active battalion, together with its corresponding reserve company, be taken from within the limits of a defined territorial division, the boundary of which shall be identical with that of a sedentary battalion division, or of a distinct portion of such division.

“That in order to accommodate the sedentary battalion divisions to the organisation of the active battalions, the limits of the former be, where necessary, re-arranged.

“We recommend that each of the principal cities of the Province, namely—Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, and London, with such portions of the surrounding country as may, from timeto time, be added to them by the Commander-in-Chief, shall constitute a military district, to be divided into regimental and sedentary battalion divisions, as hereinbefore detailed; that they be allowed to furnish volunteer militia of the three arms in the proportions hereinafter detailed in lieu of active battalions of regular militia. In the event of these cities failing to furnish their full complement of volunteers, they shall in part, or altogether, fall under the general regulations of the regular militia, in such manner as the Commander-in-Chief shall direct.”

The recommendations of the Commissioners were to some extent acted upon; and since the foregoing pages were written the first-fruits of the volunteer organisation have been witnessed, in the actual appearance on service of a number of companies, which have been dispatched to guard the frontiers of Canada from being made the base of offensive operations against the Northern States by Confederate partisans sheltered for the time under the British banner. These are but the advance guard of the 80,000 men who have been ordered to hold themselves in readiness for active service.

The summons of the Governor-General has been heard and obeyed in the best spirit. The people of Canada have answered to the call with an honourable alacrity, and have displayed a temper which gives the fairest guarantee of their services; but they have not indulged in threats or offensive language, and the most irritable of Federal Republicans must admit that the cause which has called them from their homes is entitled to consideration and respect.

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